Ruy Horta
8th January 2005, 13:11
Although I have a nice section of Battle of Britain books I never obtained, arguably, the most famous and influential one of all: The Narrow Margin.
In the midst of The Right of the Line, The Most Dangerous Enemy, Battle over Britain, The Battle of Britain-Then and Now or other later publications, does it still have a place?
Also, but that's more of a discussion topic, how much of a narrow margin does the Battle of Britain really present and how few were the few? Were they really a few, I mean compared to the attacking force and its disposition?
Weren't the Luftwaffe and RAF actually pretty well matched in terms of both quality and numbers, didn't the actual number of defending fighters present quite good odds?
Isn't one of the problems that in the whole few and narrow margin concept the dive- and level bombers are always counted into the picture and thus distorting the view between the hunter and the hunted?
Maybe I am distorted in my fighter orientated view, but again, the fighters in the Battle of Britain had the iniative, the only real opponents being other fighters. Again these fighter numbers and their quality were pretty much evenly matched, with RAF Fighter Command having the advantage of home turf and psychology.
Did the RAF even need to commit all its reserves? Although there might have been some tough times, it was often just ahead of a positive trend.
Generally a/c were never a problem, trained pilots at some stage were, only to be offset by a major training program that would take Britain and later allies to unprecented highs of personnel.
Could the Luftwaffe have won the Battle of Britain at all?
Could any AF of 1940 have won a strategic campaign and defeated a country on the basis of air war alone? Of course I am not talking about some two bit Banana Republic or some Afghan tribe, but modern countries, defeat them with only minor assistence of the other arms?
Would Britain have accepted defeat in 1940 if it had lost 50% of Fighter Command and air superiority over southern England?
If the British government was quite confident in WW1 that a German invasion was quite improbable, even when the german fleet at that time was a real player, how could they ever have taken a German invasion serious in 1940?
So how narrow was that margin?
As wide as the channel perhaps?
So one book question and perhaps a bigger debate.
In the midst of The Right of the Line, The Most Dangerous Enemy, Battle over Britain, The Battle of Britain-Then and Now or other later publications, does it still have a place?
Also, but that's more of a discussion topic, how much of a narrow margin does the Battle of Britain really present and how few were the few? Were they really a few, I mean compared to the attacking force and its disposition?
Weren't the Luftwaffe and RAF actually pretty well matched in terms of both quality and numbers, didn't the actual number of defending fighters present quite good odds?
Isn't one of the problems that in the whole few and narrow margin concept the dive- and level bombers are always counted into the picture and thus distorting the view between the hunter and the hunted?
Maybe I am distorted in my fighter orientated view, but again, the fighters in the Battle of Britain had the iniative, the only real opponents being other fighters. Again these fighter numbers and their quality were pretty much evenly matched, with RAF Fighter Command having the advantage of home turf and psychology.
Did the RAF even need to commit all its reserves? Although there might have been some tough times, it was often just ahead of a positive trend.
Generally a/c were never a problem, trained pilots at some stage were, only to be offset by a major training program that would take Britain and later allies to unprecented highs of personnel.
Could the Luftwaffe have won the Battle of Britain at all?
Could any AF of 1940 have won a strategic campaign and defeated a country on the basis of air war alone? Of course I am not talking about some two bit Banana Republic or some Afghan tribe, but modern countries, defeat them with only minor assistence of the other arms?
Would Britain have accepted defeat in 1940 if it had lost 50% of Fighter Command and air superiority over southern England?
If the British government was quite confident in WW1 that a German invasion was quite improbable, even when the german fleet at that time was a real player, how could they ever have taken a German invasion serious in 1940?
So how narrow was that margin?
As wide as the channel perhaps?
So one book question and perhaps a bigger debate.