Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kurfürst (Post 129192)

They always had control of the air, just like the Allies in 1944. It simply follows that the Allies could use a dedicated GA plane.

What doesn't track here is your overemphasis on fighter interception, as if the lethality of return fire from Russian troops was meaningless. Ground fire was clearly the greater threat to Stukas on the Eastern Front.

In his September 1943 address to his fellow Stuka pilots, Oberstleutnant Ernst Kupfer insisted that Junkers 87 flying units were "on the verge of extermination" at which time he also noted that ground fire accounted for 80% of Stukas lost to enemy action. It follows that Kupfer would endorse the air-cooled Focke-Wulf 190, for its higher speed and manueverability was now essential in the face of intense antiaircraft fire.

Kupfer added that Ju-87 pilots no longer favored vertical dives due to excessive losses from enemy fire during the pull outs. He reasoned that even though vertical bombing was technically more accurate if done properly, better reflex sights could offset the difference. Ground fire or not, the Ju-87 was a sitting duck for the Yaks and Lavochkins. Kupfer dismissed the Stuka and the heavily armored Russian Il-2 as obsolete in concept; only able to operate with substantial fighter escort.

Among his other thoughts, Kupfer advocated that because the individual tank was an elusive target, the pilots should increase attacks on the more vulnerable supply convoys that supported the enemy tanks, because destroying their fuel and spares was just as likely to halt the armored breakthroughs.

Finally, Kupfer used tanks as an analogy, when he stated that "We created the Tiger, the Panther, the Ferdinand with enormous strength, thick plates of armor. But we saw from the air time and again in the slaughters at Kursk, Belgorod, and Orel that even these tanks could be stopped by Flak and by Pak" … expensive high-tech machines knocked out by cheap and easy to replace towed guns.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kurfürst (Post 129192)

1, Uhm, no to the first part. We know that the basic Typhoon carried very little "armor" (though the airfame was tough). From the GA POV, it was unarmored. As Juha pointed out however, we know there were two mods designed, one with a small armor augmentation, and another which was quite serious. Now we have to know how service planes looked like, and how many were modded etc.

First of all the weapons available for the Typhoon were quite unsatisfactory for many tasks. Rockets were far too inaccurate, the bombs it could carry were way too small for bigger targets, and only simple HE bombs were developed, lacking much more effective bomb types like German or Soviet AP and AT cluster bomb containers. There were no large caliber autocannons for tank destroyer operations. They could fight soft targets like trucks, which was very damaging overall indeed, but there was a serious lack of capability in CAS.

Typhoons had no staying power over the Battlefield like Il-2s did. After all, it was not built for this, but pressed into a role as it wasnt very good in its original role of as fighter, and it was available, and could carry more ordonance to a decent, than the Spitfire. Its basic limitations are still appearant.

Every aircraft can be shot down of course. The point is that Ju 87s or Sturmos could carry on with their task even they were intercepted, keeping in formation, and provide themselves with defensive fire. They could also stay above the battle and provide continous support or suppression (Il-2s for example often did this). They can also attack more effectively, part a, because they can operate slower b, had less concern to ground fire c, at least in the case of Stuka, there were proper aiming sights, not just guesswork with the reflector sight.

Propaganda stories about flying tanks with heavy cannons is not proof they were better. The armor plating of RAF Hurricanes was increased more than once, and this resulted in higher losses and lowered effectiveness. Each increase in weight made it more difficult for the pilot to aim the underwing guns and correct fire. The Ju-87 was not immune to those effects.

The British air weapons evaluation staff was reasonably patient with testing heavy cannons on all fronts. The Hurricane Mk IID and Mk IV were used over France before the D-Day invasion, with No. 184 Squadron the first in December 1942. Followed by No. 164 Squadron in February 1943, and 137 Squadron in June. But after Exercise SPARTAN in March 1943, the pilots were not satisfied with the effectiveness of S-guns against tanks, or the limited angles of approach required to consistently achieve penetrations. The best results were got when flying low at a very shallow dive angle, but over France the pilot could look forward to seeing treetops and power cables in his line of sight. The 40-mm Hurricanes nevertheless flew across the Channel, with fighter escorts in tow, and attacked German vehicles with mixed results. Next they looked for larger targets out in the open, like railroad cars and enemy shipping. But here again the 3-inch rocket with its assorted warheads was more useful and versatile. By September 1943, rockets had replaced heavy cannons on the English Channel front just as it would be in Italy about six months later.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kurfürst (Post 129155)

Thanks for the heads up. The key sentence seems to be (continued): "...Nor do I know to what extent this armour was employed on operations. However many photos of Typhoons from D-day onwards show stencilling on the radiator fairings - "This fairing is armoured" - as a warning to groundcrew who might be removing the fairing.'"

If it was present, common etc. it would certainly make them as armored as say 190F Schlacht planes (400 kg or about 850 lbs iirc), protecting engine, pilot from below, sides from small caliber fire.

A 7.62-mm bullet from a hand-held ground weapon was not much of a threat to RAF Typhoons. The additional armor put on some Focke-Wulfs greatly overloaded the aircraft, yet it was not sufficient to withstand hits from 20-mm, let alone 37-mm flak bursts. So there was little to gain from adding the same level of armor protection to RAF fighters.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kurfürst (Post 129205)

After 30.06.40, what western front battlefields are you aware of until four years later..?

Dismissing the whole Sturmovik and Stuka operational records and characterizing it as human wave attacks and 'being hacked from the sky' is ridiculus, really. The whole point of the thread is that the Western Allies could use a dedicated ground attack aircraft, which they lacked. And if you continously miss the point arguing that 'these aircraft need air superiority', because the Allies had this in 1944/45.. BTW which aircraft operates well when the enemy controls the skies? Hmm? Even B-17s could not..

The Stuka lived well past its expiration date due to fascist propaganda rather than common sense. Kupfer wanted the official terms Stuka and Schlacht dropped, declaring all ground attack operations should fall under a more appropriate heading of Nahkampffliegerei (close support operations). His proposal was rejected by Erhard Milch who said that "Nahkampf doesn't sound good". Later it was announced that Hermann Goering did not want the word Stuka to disappear.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kurfürst (Post 129192)

The USMC operates the Harrier within a special scope, for them its a hybrid between an attack chopper and a fighter. The main advantage of is that it can operate from small carriers and from frehsly seized land bases, something the A-10 can't do. But compared to the A-10, its tactical qualities are in every aspect inferior. Its a useful specialist tool for a specialist force.

Now as for the Su 25, unlike the A-10 it is freely available to anyone with the $$ in the pockets (long live the Perestroika!), is very popular abroad and is in service in about a dozen countries. Its quite clear that there is need for such plane - this is especially true in light of current COIN operations.

Testimony of British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq did verify that A-10s and AC-130s were more effective at CAS than Harriers. But the Taliban and Al Qaeda "air defense network" can hardly amass the radars, flak guns, and missile sites that blanketed Festung Europa and Vietnam. If you wanted aircraft for no other purpose than hunting down lightly-armed hillbillies, you could buy a nice fleet of unmanned drones for less than the cost of one Sukhoi 25.

For obvious reasons of safety, the preferred method for USAF A-10 pilots is firing stand-off guided weapons for tank-busting rather than guns. That has been the drill since the 1980s. I would not want to be on the receiving end of its cannon fire, but the combat tally of the nose gun versus tanks is, like Hans-Ulrich Rudel himself, mostly stuff of legend.