Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Hi.

Could you please point out the inconsistencies for me?

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Dear Rene, Andreas and Brian,

Thank you very much for the input! As I see the issue with von Bibra is not clear for the moment.
Let me explain, researching the Stalingrad battle in the air deeply, I came across some cases that puzzled me a lot and made me think that some of the GQ loss returns are not complete and mistaken for this period. August 23, is one of the cases. According to Soviet documents, fighters made around 50 claims against different German planes through that day. Officialy only two planes one from 9/KG55 and another from stab I/St.G77 were reported as jagerbeschuss. However, I saw the interrogation protocole of Fw. Fritz Gammel that bailed out in the vicinity of Srednaya Achtuba and was taken POW. Although he states that the reason was "motorschaden", there are vitnesses that his Bf-109 was shot down by Soviet fighter.

The origin of the second case also comes from the interrogation protocole. This time of Uffz. Rupert Holzer from 3(H)/12 that came down on August 14. He describes the attack on the airfield Bereska on August 12 by a group of Sturmovicks that copletely obliterated 3(H)/12, more than 15 planes were destroyed or severely damaged, thus making 3(H)/12 to withdraw all the safe planes from this forward airfield and put the proup out of combat for several days. As far as I know (maybe wrong? still not have the full info) this case is not reflected in GQ lists.

Many other cases can be found while matching with Soviet side. My general question is if it is possible that groups, suffered lots of redeployments, ecpecially from one Lftflt to another thoughout august-september 1942 could report losses incorrectly or simply drop some without reporting. It concerns e.g. II/JG3, II/JG52, III/KG4...

TIA

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Hi, Nikita

I think you might be on to something, even if I do not believe the reason is that it was not reported by the units 'on purpose'.

I have found several documents lately regarding the regime used for reporting losses in the Luftwaffe, and will put together an article on this issue during this winter.

The thing is that there were to channels for reporting, and one was it seems better with regards to consistency (or maybe I should say stricter), namely the losses were personnel losses occured.

I will come back to it later.

With regards to the specific case on 3.(H)/12, is is of interest to note that the loss record for said pilot WAS registered, and in fact as the last loss record for this unit. I do however also believe this interrogation report to be incorrect with regards to the fact, maybe a translation problem? as the strength report of said unit would leave it with no more than 9 aircraft in total at any time during August 1942, of which 4 seems to have been lost/damaged during this month. The natural conclusion to me is that there must have been more units at the airfield mentioned, and that Holzer reported that a TOTAL of more than 15 aircraft were lost/damaged during this attack, and probably some of the 3 aircraft lost aside his own during this month where one of them. Another possibility is that some of these aircraft mentioned were (at least som of them) MENT for his unit, but still officially not taken over from for example the depot organisation which were transferring them. Another distinct possibility is that the losses were reported under some dubious makeshift unit designation and that we yet have not 'found' them. (The unit did exist for some time after this, but invariantly known for example as Aufklärungsgruppe Fleischmann)

Interesting topics, we will have to discuss them more.

Please do not hesitate to send more specific data my way if you want me to look at it from the German side.

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Hello Nikita
on Holzer interrogation. One simple explanation is that Holzer simply lied to his interrogators as he should do. Or he simply played the old trick, when on is in very ackward position, one tells to his tormentors what he thinks they want to hear and so keep them happy in hope that he will get more lenient treatment.

Juha

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Andreas,

Sent you a PM.

Juha,

This is not that kind of case, I believe. Holzer's info was double checked in those days.

BR,
Nikita

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Hi Andreas

Here (http://www.ahs.no/ref_db/lw_loss_pub...?lossid=132030) stands Pl.Qu.3135 and Ju88 WNr.5502 15% .
In the NVM stand Pl.Qu.3069 and no hind of damage. Neither 100% or 15%.
On http://www.lwag.org/forums/archive/index.php/t-2201.html I found this:
Ju 88A-4 5502 BIBRA, Major Ernst Frhr. von Stab III. KG 51 blau A 9K+AA 23-Aug-42 Kommandeur. Notlandung due to Flak. 2 crew WIA. Oblt. Poppenburg landed 9K+AD and picked up Bibra and crew. RK Ostfront Gen.Qu.6.Abt. (mfm #7)-Vol.11; KG 51, p. 187 Pl. Qu. 3135 15% F

Rene

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Very strange indeed. Landing and picking up crew make sense if it is done on enemy held territory. Why it is reported only 15%, as should be 100%?

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Third attempt trying to put a reply through, has been stopped twice.

A German Army veteran told me the stitation on the Eastern Front was ofton quite fluid with no defined front line, and some times a mile or so between the main opposing forces. If Bibra came down in this sort of location it was probaly thought prudent to pick him up, I believe the KG 51 book indicates Poppenburgs aircraft came under Russian fire during the rescue. As this was at the start of a German Army offensive it seems likely that Bibras aircraft was recovered by the Germans hence the assessment at 15%.

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

Some comments:

1) Picking up a crew makes also sense in "Niemannsland" nobodies-land, or even in german-hold-area, if the place is far away from anything else, to make the crew return earlier then by car/Storch/etc. And the area around Stalingrad was pretty empty afaik. Where exactly did the emergency ladnig take place?
In any case, it is well possible that the (still advancing) german troops made (re-)possession of the emergency-landed "9K+AA".

2) Every statistic contains errors, even with our modern computer systems. Reason: These animals on two legs ;). On the other hand, I also heard about germans deliberately falsifying their loss figures (but without proof so far). Also it seems illogical: If a nit looses more then it reports, it would have no A/C left after some time of doing so.

Re: KG51 losses on 23 August 1942.
 

If you want the proof, you need to go to Berlin aviation museum, it is standing there. A Me 110 of the museum was deliberately claimed as a technical loss, although downed by AA fire. A Me 109 recovered in Poland had clear traces of inflight fire, but was declared as a loss due to pilot's error.
In regard of GQ6 losses, I would say that they are simply incomplete. Nobody would ask RLM for replacements, it is the duty of local service unit.