Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Sources for B-24 crews bailing.. yah, ask all the members who got banned at wwiaircraft.net. Your agenda is too one sided.

My appolgies to OP for off topic.

Kindest regards.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

I don't think I stated or posed an 'agenda' - just asked for substantiation for your comments and noted that your comments regarding LW pilot concerns regarding opening chute too soon had an analogue with Allied pilots...

not to mention the dangers of surviving long enough to become a POW when confronted by local citizenry or Wermacht/SS that didn't wish to waste time with prisoners.

As to wwiiaircraft.net my experience with those who were 'banned', like you, were unable to contain themselves when warned by moderators to cease and desist with flame wars.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Oberst, don't you think it would have been more effective simply to provide some sources when asked? I think TOCH embers generally understand that if you're going to post here, you don't import conflicts from elsewhere. Just stay polite and if you have relevant information then share it with us all.

Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Hi guys

In The Luftwaffe Over Germany by Caldwell and Muller there is a section focused on motivation and morale. Factors that influenced the generally high level of morale in the Jagdwaffe even late in the war included: innate German discipline, youthful spirit, love of flying, patriotism, ignorance of the direction of the war, comfortable living conditions and the effects of propaganda. Regarding the removal of the outer cannon it is true that many aces flew these without such as Bär, Priller and Weiss to mention a few but on the other hand Unteroffizier Ernst Schröder (7 victories) of 5./JG 300 is quoted that he was refused permission to remove the outer cannon of his famous Fw 190 A-8 "Red 19" (W.Nr. 172 733) in Focke Wulf Jagdflugzeug by Rodeike.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

So, Leo, by implication, Don and Rich are suggesting that loyality to unit and devotion to comrades had little to do with morale in the late-war Jagdwaffe? Wow! That would largely contradict Jochen Prien and about a thousand other impeccable sources. It would also contradict my own 11 years of experience in the military.

Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Hello Larry

Of course loyalty to their comrades was a factor as well a sense of duty and a desire to defend their homeland and its people in addition to those that I listed in my previous post. However, there were other factors involved. Caldwell and Muller note that studies on the morale of the German military demonstrate that such remain high even though normal primary group cohesion was destroyed by the high casualty rates suffered in the last years of the war. They also mention that interrogation reports from captured German pilots indicated not only good morale even after D-Day and the willingness to obey orders and join combat even though they were fully aware of the odds against them but also a certain distrust among them regarding their comrades. The more experienced pilots felt that newcomers were not as capable as their predecessors and for their part the more recent pilots felt a certain lack of confidence in their leaders due to the shortage of section, flight and squadron commanders. Therefore, there was a certain lack in mutual confidence among the members of a unit caused mainly by the high losses suffered. One unit that comes to mind that exhibited a marked case of the above was III./JG 26 where there was considerable distrust among the enlisted men and their officers to the point that the former did not invite any of the latter to their post-war reunions if I am remembering correctly.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

I agree at the 80% - 85% level with your comments, Leo, but I would add that unit cohesion and trust is developed through leadership at the officer and NCO level. That this quality was beginning to fragment in some units during the last 6 months or so of the war is quite understandable, but there is a big difference between a gradual depletion of confidence and the onset of distrust, and the much more severe case of unit dissolution with large number of men stealing off into the night and going AWOL or refusing to obey their officers. As Caldwell and Muller seemingly admit, the Wehrmacht units largely maintained their morale and stuck it out to the bitter end, fighting whenever they had to. The late war ADI(K) and CSDIC reports and the postwar special "hidden microphone" reports do tend to confirm this.

Larry