Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

For a moment I have thought that GCD I/55 was based at Villacoublay on 3 June 1940, but it was not, being at Etampes. Nonetheless accounts of Polish pilots, five of them being attached, of whom three achieved ace status later in the war, just confirm Park's comments. In the effect Poles refused to fly with French, and wanted to fly with Czechs. According to Zumbach, on 3 June only one French pilot actually engaged enemy. Poles had little success due to faulty aircraft, and in general both Czechs and Poles complained they had worsest aeroplanes.
One thing is worth to note, though. Frenchmen were one of the most communised societies in Europe, and post-war it was even feared that communists may won free-elections! In 1940 communists supported Germany, organised strikes or sabotage (hey, this happened in Britain too, eg. in Castle Bromwhich AF), and perhaps this was one of factors behind the French collapse.

French Campaign
 

Yves aka Grozibou wrote:

"It should not be forgotten that the key to the 1940 German success was the big breakthrough at Sedan, across a rather big and wide river (the Meuse) mainly with 7 of the 10 German armoured divisions! This operation was incredibly risky : it was simply madness. No reasonable C-i-C would have accepted these terrible hazards but Adolf Hitler was not reasonable, he was a fanatic and a lunatic. Nonetheless he had foreseen that the French would be too slow and not react properly in time. So to speak, the French moved on foot when the Germans attacked with fast vehicles at 30 mph or so. Too bad Hitler was so right. If the French generals, mainly Huntziger and Georges, had reacted simply in a normal way (without needing to be military geniuses) the German forces would have been stopped in their tracks BEFORE crossing the Meuse and they would have suffered appalling losses, their offensive would have been dead by 14 May... This same Huntziger became the French C-i-C after the defeat!
To sum up, this unique German victory was the result of a madman's gambling. It worked fine this time, afterwards it didn't... All discussions about the respective air forces etc. are very interesting but the German victory was won on the ground, mainly with ten armourded divisions deploying about 1,000 real tanks plus 2,000 small, vulnerable tankettes (the French alone had got 3,300 real tanks, all with a good armour and most of them with a good gun). The German air force supported the army and made their victory quicker and easier but it didn't win the French Campaign : the German army did, mainly thanks to a crazy attack plan which worked."

The German victory in May-June 1940 was not the result of some madman's gamble but it was the result of careful and thorough planning which was carried out by a superb military force which had a modern military doctrine and the modern combined arms tactics to carry out the mission. The "madman" was not Hitler but it was the outstanding military mind of General Erich von Manstein, the author of Operation Sichelschnitt, who saw that the standard strategy of attacking through Belgium and Holland would not result in a decisive military victory (the old Schlieffen plan), but that it would result in prolonged campaign which might not achieve a German victory. Every military operation involves a degree of risk especially more so when the German Army had no superiority of numbers or quality of weapons. What the German Army had which the French, British, Dutch and Belgians did not have was the doctrine of subordinates deciding on how to carry out a mission which is called Auftragstaktik. When I was in the USMC, the one organization which was admired by Marines was the German Army and the Waffen SS, not the British Army or the French Army or even the U.S. Army (Marines have nothing complimentary to say about the Army).

The war games and map exercises, with the input of the creator of the Blitzkrieg, Heinz Guderian, confirmed that armor could travel through the Ardennes forest. Guderian had fought there during WW I, was thoroughly familiar with the terrain and the road network, and he stated that it would be no problem of moving a panzer division through there. When his corps, the XIX, was given the mission, he stated that he wanted all three of his divisions, the 1st, the 2nd, and the 10th PD, to move in mass. Klotzen, nicht kleckern (Mass, not dispersion). He was also given the Grossdeutschland Infantry Regiment. Guderian was the right officer in the right place at the right time. His armor,infantry, engineers, artillery, anti-tank, flak, etc. had perfected the combined arms doctrines as a result of the Polish campaign and the additional training prior to May 1940. The French and British had not learned the lessons of the Polish campaign, prefering to believe for various reasons that the Poles were simply too weak and not capable of stopping the German Army. The Allies believed they would have no problem stopping the Germans since they had a superiority in numbers.

The German Army had another tremendous advantage in that the leaders of combat units fought at the front and could immediately size up the situation and take immediate action. The U.S. Army finally learned this after the Vietnam war and prior to Desert Storm. Books on this war credit the Isaraelis with this concept but they themselves had studied the armored warfare of the Wehrmacht. In Desert Storm, the battalion commander was with his leading company; the brigade commander with the leading battalion; the division commander with his leading brigade; and so on. This was nothing new to the Germans.

The armored divisions of the XIX Corps moved faster through the Ardennes and reached the Meuse at Sedan and when the first units arrived, they immediately crossed the Meuse without waiting orders from higher HQs. Immediately, the Stukas and bombers were called for fire support and all available weapons used--machine guns, mortars, a few artillery pieces, a few tanks, assault guns, flak(especially the 88mm)--to pin down the French on the opposite shore. The first to cross were the infantry and assault engineers who destroyed the French bunkers. This made it possible to build pontoon bridges to get the tanks across. But it was the infantry of the 1st Rifle Regiment, 1st Panzer Division, commanded by Col. Hermann Balck and the Grossdeutschland Regiment which made this possible. He faced the French 55th Infantry Division and the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. Men such as Feldwebel Rubarth and eleven men of the 10th PD performed heroic tasks in eliminating many French bunkers and firing positions. He was awarded the Knight's Cross. His performance was typical of the German soldiers at Sedan. Once across Guderian's forces had achieved the prerequisite to the successes which were to follow.

The armed forces of France, Britain, Belgium and Holland were actually superior in numbers to that of the Wehrmacht. The Allies had four million men versus three million of the German Army. Other comparisons are as follows:
151 Allied divisions v. 135 German (inc. 42 reserve)
14,000 artillery guns v. 7378 German guns
4204 Allied battle tanks v. 2439 German tanks
Aircraft have been covered elsewhere.

The French have not been able to win a war on their own since Napoleon. They have required the assistance of the British Empire, Russia, and finally the U.S. which came to their rescue in two world wars. The Germans fought more effectively in WW I when they knocked out Russia but the U.S. was required to turn the tide for the French and British Empires which outnumbered the German Empire. During the 40-day campaign in 1940, the German fought more effectively as demonstrated by the casualties of both sides:
Germany lost 43,110 KIA and MIA
France: 124,000 KIA and MIA
Great Britain: 11,010
Belgium: 7500
Holland: 2890
Allied total dead and missing: c.145,400
The ratio of German to Allied dead and missing is 1:3.37.
This demonstrates a German superiority in skill and doctrine since they did not have the superior firepower that might have caused such a disparity.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Brilliant!
Nothing to add...

Chris

Re: French Campaign
 

But we can all be grateful that shortly afterward Germany went on to make a complete pig's ear of the Battle of Britain.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Well, Nick, BoB is not a "military" war but, at the beginning at least, a political war.
Up to Sept. 40, Hitler had no intention to crush the British as he could have done at Dunkirk.

Chris

Re: French Campaign
 

Hmm!!!

Another not discussed issue was communications and use of Enigma that allowed to react quickly in changing situation.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

I'll only answer the comments on the date and reason for Douglas' visit.

The high ranking french officer's didn't come to the field, the British delegation visits them (at their respective headquarters?). I simply haven't quoted the continued text.

Douglas is just expressing surprise that there is no welcome, which is then explained by the impending air attack. Something that could serve as a confirmation of the date.

The talks themselves don't seem out of place either, the British looking for some reassurance in case Italy entered the war. The extended text wasn't quoted by me, so don't be to quick to dismiss events.

He experienced an air raid on his aerodrome in WW1, with casualties, that would have been dwarfed by the attack on Villacoublay by virtue of technology and numbers of planes involved. His personal courage should not be questioned, he was just being realistic in his assessment.

It would be nice if anyone could confirm the airfield and date.

I'm disappointed to see a lot of assumptions and at best educated guesses.

If the dates and places are correct, I am not convinced that Douglas did not see numerous fighters, and that he did see air force personnel in the officers' mess. Whatever misinterpretations he may have made, it left a bad impression on him.

Sholto Douglas isn't gospel, just a high ranking british air officer who wrote his experiences of two world wars and his life before, in between and after. In short an autobiography as many...

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

[quote=Franek Grabowski;70535]Poles refused to fly with French, and wanted to fly with Czechs. According to Zumbach, on 3 June only one French pilot actually engaged enemy. Poles had little success due to faulty aircraft, and in general both Czechs and Poles complained they had worsest aeroplanes.[quote]

Grozibou in post # 40 already :

<< As I already remarked these insults are ludicrous anyway, not credible in the least in view of the missions actually accomplished and of the losses in combat, and such insults eventually make only their authors dirty. They ARE dirty. >>

PS : please learn English at last. They say "worst" not "worsest".

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

What then was the intention, Chris? To starve Britain out; to demoralise the government or population; to damage war production; to degrade the air defences; or ... ? They seem to have tried all of these at some point, expending a couple of thousand aircraft and their crews for a gain of what - medals and promotions for a few hotshots? They undoubtedly did a lot of damage but at the end of it all, Britain was still an active belligerent and the RAF and the British Army were stronger than they had been at the start.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Alex
The French Air Force had numerous problems; fragmented command, poor pre-war training which emphasised daylight/fair-weather operations (but then so did the RAF) and a failure to achieve maximum effort, especially the fighter units which rarely seemed to average more than one or two sorties per pilot per day.
The French certainly used a great deal of comint and appear to have had their own Ultra system for they (and the British) had lots of notice of Unternehmen 'P' (Paula). They were helped by poor Luftwaffe signals security in which an Enigma signal clearly stating that Object P was Paris was sent to one Kampfgeschwader. The French also had a form of airborne early warning with Potez 631s tracking enemy bomber formations targeting Paris and providing a running commentry. The British had extended their RDF system into northern France and had begun handing over stations and sets to the French during the spring.
If you really want to know about the French Air Force go to the Chateau de Vincennes and the air force archives. Even if you speak poor French you can get by and the staff are very helpful.
I agree about Invisibles Vainquers and there is a useful background book 'The Forgotten Air Force: French air doctrine in the 1930s' by Anthony Christopher Cain. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington/London, 2002 ISBN 1-58834-010-4 which you might be able to order through your local library. There is a book shop specialising in aviation in Paris with loads of French language books but I have forgotten the name and address. I am sure other members will be able to help you.
Tango Echo Dog

Enigma coding machine, ULTRA decrypts
 

The whole "ULTRA" deciphering activity in Britain, which provided the Allies with incredibly important and useful intelligence, started in Poland thanks to the Polish secret service (I presume) and in particular a young Polish mathematician who was a genius and a member of the team. They had performed all the fundamental and the most important work already when Poland was invaded. They passed the whole thing to the French, who continued the work already 1939 with the help of some Polish experts and kept the British entirely informed, with some British officers taking part in the ongoing work. Numerous German messages were decrypted already albeit they were only a small fraction of the whole coded radio traffic. They probably decrypted some decisive messages on operation "Paula" but I understand at least the French had a well-placed German agent in Luftwaffe headquarters, too (Schmidt; I think he was a relative of LW general Schmidt). Britain certainly had some good agents in Germany too.

When France was invaded too obviously the whole Enigma-business was passed on to the British, who further refined and developed it, hence Bletcheley Park etc.

There is no doubt that all this remarkable activity was started by Polish experts.

You see, it is fully possible to discuss Poland and France at the same time without wholesale insulting a whole country or a whole air force. That's a relief!

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Nick,
We could start a long discussion about it that would be OT.
Let me just say that AH did not want to make war on Great-Britain and tried everything to end hostilities against a foe that he respected a lot (more than France).
Had not WC moved into 10 Downing Street on the very day of "Fall Gelb", no doubt that Lord Halifax would have opened peace talks with Germany.

Air attack?
 

Ruy, I tried to send you a PM but your box is full. Please do something, thanks.

-Yes this is fully possible but not credible - 0 % credibility - on the day of a massive German air attack aimed at airfields the Allies were aware of! You may be crazy but there are some limits somewhere. Please remember that general Vuillemin was the C-i-C of the French Air Force and on this battle day he had other concerns than drinking a nice cup of tea with a few Rosbifs.

- My foot! They probably made a navigation error and landed at a wrong airfield, possibly Orly, Marseille or Bordeaux! Then Douglas didn't want to admit such an error... Coming PRECISELY on June 3 is out of the question. They had about 95 % chances of being shot down by German fighters, or by FRENCH fighters, or by French AAA. This is RI-DI-CU-LOUS, please try to understand at last. Why not on June 1st or 4th, hmmm? Why precilesy June 3? To be able to libel every single Frenchman afterwards? No high-ranking HQ general from any country ever went on sight-seeing PRECISELY at the place and on the day of a big battle.

- This is all very fine but why the hell precisely on June 3?

- Come on! I was just joking about rushing into some shelter. I would have run faster myself and taken shelter first!

- Is this aimed at sweet little me? I only can repeat that the whole Sholto Douglas-story is totally incredible from the first to the last word. It is not true. It was entirely invented, possibly to show (after the war!) what a hero SD was. Remember that his behavior during the Battle of Britain was extremely objectionable in the "big wing" discussion. Later his "nonstop offensive" which achieved nothing but heavy British losses really was no basis for glory (see "The JG 26 War Diary", volume 1, by D. Caldwell, page 212). He needed to show what a great man he was, for he was not.

Now please let us travel from France to England, namely to many RAF fighter airfields during the Battle of Britain. It certainly happened often that RAF fighters did not take off when German formations were flying overhead and even bombing nearby places. How come? They were waiting, and rightly so, for the order to take off and accomplish their mission within a whole, complex strategical and tactical system. A foreign observer as dumb as Sholto Douglas, possibly a Franek Grabowski, would have been outraged at all the RAF fighter pilots not jumping at the enemy's throat immediately.

See?

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

It certainly happened often that RAF fighters did not take off when German formations were flying overhead and even bombing nearby places.

Any evidence?

RAF tactics in the BoB
 

Very simple : read a few books (in English!) on the BoB. I read about 20.

To sum up, Dowding and Park were obviously right when they didn't want to engage all their fighter squadrons at the same time, which would have meant that they would have been back on the ground, refuelling and rearming, all at the same time too and the Huns would have had an excellent opportunity to catch and hit them on the ground in spite of AAA. Besides, it was similar within the Armée de l'Air in May-June : the last serviceable 2, 3 , 4 or 5 fighters of a Groupe de chasse, if the rest were not, were kept for protecting their own airfield (above all the precious aircraft, even undergoing repairs). Don't infer from this that French fighters were wiped out for it would be a serious error, but this situation did exist sometimes. The neighbouring Groupes de chasse were generally all right.

I think it happened only once during the BoB that there were no reserves left - within 11 Group but 10 and 12 Groups nearby also totalled hundreds of fighters, part of which could have been used in an emergency : on one occasion all 11 Group-squadrons were airborne, as can be seen in the film on the BoB*. Nevertheless they had not taken off all at the same minute but with differences of up to 30 minutes in certain cases I guess, so that some sqns were able to land, refuel and rearm before the others did, and take off again if necessary.

* This was on August 18 or September 15 I think.

Re: Air attack?
 

Nope, Krasnodębski and Zumbach were pilots with some experience, and knew their trade. Quite contrary to you, they were at Etampes, and took part in those combats. They managed to UK and they wrote their statements for Polish officials. They marked quite clearly, that the French pilots from Etampes did not want to engage the enemy. They either flew in the other direction or engaged solitary aircraft, instead going for the main force. Poles and Czechs commented, that French pilots took best aircraft in order to escape faster from the enemy, leaving crap for their allies.
This is in perfect agreement with the situation at Villacoublay.
I suggest you to look further for French airmen at both Etampes and Villacoublay, instead of suggesting that Zumbach had no knowledge about fighter tactics. The latter makes you just ridiculous.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Actually Zumbach didn`t take part in air combats in September 1939 so I doubt in his combat experience at this stage.

Robert

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Lesson one, reading of text and understanding it.
Where is combat experience mentioned?

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

So I must say that you are just ridiculous because every pilot in French Campaign has had some experience unless you mean cooking experience.

Robert

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Well, turn back to lesson one.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

As far as Douglas is being ridiculous, I'd like to counter that we have an autobiography of a high ranking RAF officer versus the "logic" and guesses of a post war enthusiast. Now unless the enthusiast has hard data to clearly show that the visit didn't take place, or at a different date, or with different participants, I will continue to take Douglas' word over the educated guesses of the enthusiast, no matter what "logic" these guesses are wrapped in.

Within the chaos of that period, the purpose of visit has both urgency and reason behind it. It isn't as ridiculous as you assume with hindsight.

Douglas is not a hero of mine, nor do I place the RAF on a pedestal.

That the french were valiant, I have no doubt, but there is also no doubt that they also had problems of moral. Plenty of examples on the ground, there are no reasons to assume that the air component was entirely free of said phenomena. It takes a while to recover from a shock.

So unless there is hard evidence I find credible that:

1. visit took place
2. fighters were present
3. a limited number took off
4. field was bombed
5. left bad impression on Douglas

The rest is (also) interpretation and (also) subjective, unless proven by documents or at least similar sources. Actually I'd give up fighting this "infamous quote" unless supported by strong evidence instead of guessing. Without this, you'd better concentrate on events which proof your general point, but which are backed up with hard data.

Now before you grow a fit, I do see the French air force as an important and undervalued participant in the fighting in the West. However, and I've written this before in similar threads, proving the point is all about method.

Ridiculous?
 

- Did I suggest such a thing? When? Where? Please be exact.

Who is ridiculous?

Stand by!
 

My dear Ruy, my dear, dear, adored sweet Franek, you're wonderful and so clever but alas real life is catching up with me and I have a few other duties so I can't explain extremely obvious things for you for the 100th time (it seems you can't read English properly or that you don't want to...).

Once more we can see that the 1940 French air force is the only air force in the world which can be insulted at will by all possible incompetent, dirty people. This is a little strange indeed. There must be some explanation...

Don't worry : I'm not forgetting you. I'll be back.

Air battles on June 3, 1940, and during the FC
 

Air battles on June 3, 1940

I know about your great impatience while I'm not able to post anything new so in an effort to help you to survive in your despair (this doesn't mean Mr. Grabowski) I'll answer one particularly disgusting post which is forever a shame for its author :

Quote:

Originally Posted by Franek Grabowski (Post 70535) In the effect Poles refused to fly with French, and wanted to fly with Czechs.

- There was a war on, remember? Nobody had the right to "refuse" this and that. When you are a soldier (even a pilot, ESPECIALLY a pilot!) you don’t choose what you fancy do. It was not a club of naughty little girls like the Polish air force and army. It was serious military units at war. Every pilot had to obey orders and do as he was told by his CO, "even" the Polish supermen - er, sorry, superlittle girls. Disobeying orders in combat can bring you in front of a firing squad quicker than you naively think, or to hard military prison for 20-30 years if you're lucky. I was an Air Force officer and a combat aircrew myself so I can tell you that this outrageous behaviour can be tolerated in no circumstances and that it would mean some immediate and harsh punishment including shooting the offender.

Quote:

According to Zumbach, on 3 June only one French pilot actually engaged enemy.

- One more particularly vile statement : I'm about to throw up. The official documents in archive canNOT be disputed, in particular on soldiers KIA. On 3 June 1940 French fighter units (Groupes de chasse) had the following losses :

10 French fighter pilots killed - 2 other French aircrew killed (Potez 631) - 3 Czech fighter pilots killed - 0 Polish pilot killed.

10 other French pilots were badly injured.

So obviously not "only one French pilot actually engaged the enemy" but at the very least about 20. In fact - luckily - all pilots who made contact were not killed or wounded; many even shot down German aircraft (a total of about 23).

According to Paul Martin in his book "Ils étaient là...", published by CJE, page 152, French fighters flew 243 sorties (not "one") on this day so they won about one victory per 10 sorties, which is fair enough. Add the local "chimney flights". Most of these sorties resulted in "contact" (with the enemy). So I'd say AT LEAST 200 French pilots (not one) engaged the enemy on this day, or were engaged by him, for dozens of them were caught taking off among exploding bombs or climbing, because the early warning system had not worked; most killed pilots were among these. P. Martin got his figures from official archives which can't be disputed and also from the numerous veterans he met.

If anybody doesn't believe the number of pilots KIA on this day it's very easy to check on their graves and count them. One of them was Czech pilot Stanislav Popelka (GC I/6, equipped with MS 406s, based at Lognes about 30 km East of Paris, not far from Meaux and Coulommiers, today a very active flying club which can be seen from the road). Most probably he was shot down and killed by captain Adolf Galland (JG 27). Popelka's body was found on June 5 at Ozoir-la-Ferrière and buried on the same day in the local cemetery (not far from Lognes), where my brother was buried, too, 20 years later. Two other - French - pilots from the same unit (GC I/6) were shot down during the same mission, one of them also probably by Galland. (Nowadays some authors claim these victories for Werner Mölders. Odd.).

[qutote]Poles had little success due to faulty aircraft, and in general both Czechs and Poles complained they had worsest aeroplanes.[/quote]

- The WORST, please! English please!

Everybody in the world agrees that the best fighter aircraft the French Air Force engaged 1940 were the Curtiss H-75 in spite of too low performances (max. speed approx. 500 km/h vs 570 for the Me 109 E) and above all the Dewoitine 520 or D.520, slightly slower than the 109 but which was simply a supreme, superlative aircraft even though its followers D.523 and D.524 were even better (up to 630 km/h etc.) and were following tightly behind the 520 in the factories. Deliveries would have started in August, giving the French fighter arm an aircraft in the Me 109 F-class but at least 6 months earlier and much better armed than both the 109 E and F (French not German cannon).

The Czech pilots were much better integrated in French fighter units simply because their country had been invaded by Hitler about 6 months to one year before he invaded Poland so the Czech pilots had had plenty of time to learn the particular French procedures and get used to the particular aircraft types. Also, perhaps they didn't think that every single Czech was a god much better than any bloody French frog. Besides, Poland, too, took advantage of the 1938 situation to claim some Czech territories...

This chronology resulted in far less Poles being permanent members of established French units. Remember that no Polish fighter was a "modern" aircraft with a retractable landing gear, flaps, variable-pitch propeller etc. and that all French fighters were equipped with all these modern refinements, plus one or two very powerful cannon (not the Curtisses). Polish pilots had to get many new habits and reflexes like for example lowering the landing gear before landing… Not so obvious, in particular for experienced pilots.

In spite of this the following two out of 177 Polish pilots flew Curtiss fighters :

Stefan Laszkiewicz (GC III/2) - Stefan Zantara (GC III/2). This unit was re-equipped by French AF HQ from MS 406 to Curtiss around June 1. All these 30 fighters were brand-new and of the latest mark : no “worst aeroplanes” here either.

Jan Bury-Burzynski and Leopold Flanek (killed on May 14) had been members of GC III/2. B.-Burzynski probably had been withdrawn from combat (?) (perhaps posted to some staff of the Polish Air Force in France) before he could fly a Curtiss, for he is not listed as killed nor wounded during the French Campaign.

In contrast to this 27 out of 111 Czech pilots served with Curtiss-equipped units, and this with great distinction. Several of them became great aces, the best of all being Frantisek Perina (GC I/5, 1re escadrille led by Cne Accart), who won 11 "certain" and 2 "probable" victories, alone or shared ones. Vasatko (GC I/5) won 12 + 2 victories and was one of the top aces of the Armée de l’Air. Nobody tried to steal their victories from them (!) nor to have them fly on the "worst" aircraft. As I said, many Czech pilots served side by side with many of the greatest French aces like Plubeau, Accart, Dorance, Marin-la-Meslée etc. simply because they arrived in France early enough to be properly re-trained and become part of a team (this is very important in the fighter business).

Many other Polish pilots flew Curtisses in DAT units (Défense aérienne du territoire (in-depth defence), or "chimney flights"), in particular seven of them (7) at Bourges, where these AC were assembled, armed (French light machine-guns - too bad they refused to keep the one .50 gun on each AC) etc. after delivery from the USA. Flying Curtisses at Bourges was a pretty convincing sign of confidence from the French! 8 more served at DAT Toulouse (Dewoitine factory), where they could fly Curtiss or D.520 fighters. Not bad! No less than 10 were based at Châteauroux in the centre of France, where the Marcel Bloch-factory was mass-producing MB 152 and 155 fighters. It is quite possible that many Polish pilots (at least 32) never had the opportunity to fly anything better than a CR.714 (considered NON-combat-worthy by French HQ) or (before that) MS 406s because Polish HQ insisted on creating an all-Polish fighter unit immediately, even with this poor aircraft which had hardly been test-flown and still had all its teething trouble. This was a Polish decision. This unit (GC I/145) won some 8 victories at the cost of 3 pilots killed and many more CR.714s shot down.

12 Polish pilots served with units which re-equipped from MS 406s to D.520s at the beginning of June (GC II/7) and from June 10 on (GC III/6, facing Italy, its most famous member being Le Gloan). The D.520s they received were brand-new, fresh from the Toulouse-factory. No "worst aircraft".

19 Czech pilots were posted to former MS 406-units which were reequipped with the superlative D.520 from April 1940 (GC I/3 with 34 D.520s) to the first days of June (GC III/3). GC II/3 was engaged with their 34 D.520s on 15 June. No “worst AC” here either. As I said, many Czech pilots flew the best French fighters simply because they arrived in France earlier. This is no anti-Polish discrimination or apartheid.

As you see no less than 46 Czech pilots flew both best French fighters types with great distinction and very successfully.

Numerous Polish and Czech pilots flew Bloch 152s. As a whole they simply flew whatever fighters were available, just like the French pilots, depending on aircraft production, losses and replacements. On May 10 several hundred FRENCH pilots were “still” flying the “obsolete” MS 406 and hundreds more flew the MB 152 – a new AC but with rather poor performance, with which they gave a good account of themselves. It seems that German fighter pilots were on strict orders not to insist if they had not succeeded in surprising even a MB 152 flying alone (at least if they were alone too).

It never occurred to me that Zumbach was an historian. He undoubtedly was a brave man like many others, an ace and also a phoney and a big mouth. I don't know why he complained : he was lucky enough to fly quite a few hours, and even at least one combat sortie, on the latest and best French fighter in June 1940, the Arsenal VG-33! Only very few FRENCH pilots were as lucky as he was. Only about 10 Arsenal VG-33s had been made AND were able to fly.

French fighter pilots including officers had a good opinion of their Polish comrades, whom they obviously were glad to receive in their units as a welcome reinforcement (but don’t forget that France had declared war on Germany only because of her aggression on Poland, and that France paid a very high price for this, including 563 000 people killed, much more than the USA in the Pacific AND in Europe together, who make such a fuss about their old Private Ryan and “dying for the French” (!)). In AT LEAST one instance I read the story of a Polish pilot who broke off his attack because he found the return-fire from the German bombers too dangerous. Up till now I never deemed him a coward but if you insist I could change my opinion. I just found this reasonable : don’t get killed for nothing today and you’ll be able to fight many more days and inflict a lot of damage on the enemy.

Here is the judgement of the French Air Force on Polish fighter pilots :

They were good pilots and eager to fight but unfortunately most of them didn’t really like or even understand discipline and they often left formation to attack some odd German AC they happened to see. The RAF made exactly the same experience including with those Poles who never had been in France but came directly to the UK. We all know that this behaviour is extremely objectionable and dangerous (for the whole formation and all comrades) in the combat area.

Polish pilots had another flaw : they were so fanatically enraged at the Germans (which I fully understand) that they often didn’t care about their petrol consumption and their own return to base. To them the important thing was shooting at the hated Huns, no matter what might happen. The result was higher losses to German fighters or else, and numerous belly-landings somewhere in the countryside. In the BoB this was not all too bad for the AC could be salvaged quickly but during the French Campaign (France is much larger than South-East England) this was a serious hazard and numerous good fighters were lost in this stupid way, probably also because Polish pilots were not so good at navigation : French fighter production was very high all right but not unlimited. Even the Armée de l’Air could not afford to lose one fighter per sortie! The fighter arm would have been wiped out in 4 days! This, indeed, could explain some problems between French officers and Polish pilots who behaved as if France had owned unlimited numbers of fighters. It would be interested to see how many fighters were belly-landed by Polish and by French pilots. This is not in every case evidence of a great skill – it depends.

Finally I find it very sad that precisely Polish people keep insulting and libelling the French all the time. There is no real, rational reason for this. I never noticed any French equivalent nor retaliation in kind (it is not too late to start and find a lot of not-so-glorious stuff about Poland and the Poles but this really would be a pity). It would be very easy indeed. During the FC they flew exactly the same, various fighter types as their French and Czech comrades in all possible Groupes de chasse and “chimney flights”, mainly DAT units (local defence flights deep inside the French territory, as far as even Toulouse or Salon near Marseille.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

I thought that it was clear. Zumbach wrote that only one French fighter pilot from Etampes actually engaged enemy. The remaining chose the safer option. By crappy aircraft I mean that the Poles received faulty, badly serviced ones.
I agree about disobeying orders. Unfortunately, Polish commander had no position to shot French.
BTW
Prove that the Polish losses were extremely high.

Correcting a small error
 

I wrote the following myself in my preceding post :

27 out of 111 Czech pilots served with Curtiss-equipped units, and this with great distinction. Several of them became great aces, the best of all being Frantisek Perina (GC I/5, 1re escadrille led by Cne Accart), who won 11 "certain" and 2 "probable" victories, alone or shared ones. Vasatko (GC I/5) won 12 + 2 victories and was one of the top aces of the Armée de l’Air.

Arguably the best of all was Vasatko not Perina for Vasatko won one more "certain" victory. Sorry!

WHAT? I am not unfallible (Vasatko)? This is an incredible historical discovery!

But the quality of a fighter pilot is not to be found in the number of his victories only. There are other important factors, like protecting their comrades and conversely, choosing good tactics etc. (I am not claiming that Vasatko didn't have these qualities but I think he did have them). Besides, Vasatko, too, was a member of 1st escadrille of GC I/5, together with many other top-ranking aces : CO Cne Acart, Lt Marin-la-Meslée, Sgt Morel, Perina, Vasatko, Rouquette, Muselli, Vuillemain, Penzini, Rey. Most of these pilots were GREAT aces (9-20 victories each). Simply flabbergasting. It seems that wizard Accart was able to make an ace out of any pilot under his command. Think that he had trained several others who then went to other units, including Ace N° 2 : Adjt. Camille Plubeau.

Re: Book on French AF 1939-40?
 

Looks like one of my co-moderators unlocked the thread.

Hopefully we can keep it going in a constructive manner, or I will lock it permanently.

Etampes, Villacoublay
 

- OK, I looked at this.

Etampes : on June 3, 1940 the following victories were won by the local flight based at Etampes; it was equipped mainly with MS 406s and also with 3 MB 151-152s :

Victories :

Benausse (French) 1 certain victory (plus one probable on June 5)

Balmer (FRench) 1 certain and 1 probable victories

Karubin (Polish) 1 certain vict.

Three to one for the "non-eager-to-fight" Frenchmen although there were very numerous Poles in the local flights (for lack of time to re-train them in time and post them to regular fighter squadrons).

Villacoublay : never mentioned.

Losses (Etampes only) :

French adjdt. Doucet ( senior "sous-officier", NCO) wounded in combat

Ptacek and Vopalecy (both Czech) wounded in combat too.

SOURCE : "AVIONS" hors série N° 7 : La Chasse française inconnue mai-juin 1940 (special issue on French local air defence flights).

Villacoublay is OT. Some regular, permanent Groupes de chasse were based there from time to time : GC I/4 (Curtiss) May 21-June 1; GC II/8 (Bloch 152) May 20-27; GC I/145 (purely Polish, CR 714 fighters) May 17-June 2.

Source : Paul Martin.

That's all. A few units visited Villa 1939 but this is completely off topic.

To sum up : Polish losses or victories (Etampes) on June 3 : none, zero, 0, nada, nitshevo, ingenting, niente, que dalle mon pote. I suspect the POLISH pilots were hiding in concrete shelters whereas French and Czech comrades were fighting and dying for them (13 pilots KIA on the same day). Where was big mouth Zumbach all the time? How come this great ace didn't score and wasn't wounded either? He was so keen and so eager to fight : why was he not KIA in this very big air battle, "Operation Paula" against the whole Paris area?

All French pilots at Etampes were NCOs with 3 adjts. or adjt-chefs, most of them junior ones (sergent). The Czech section comprised two (senior)lieutenants - superior in rank to any French pilot.

The Poles based at Etampes comprised Zumbach, who was an officer -sous-lt. - senior to all French pilots, and commandant (major/Sqn Ldr) Krasnodebski, an "officier supérieur" (from Commandant upward) who certainly would not have tolerated nor accepted any discrimination of Polish pilots by French NCOs! Discrimination was out of the question anyway for, as I already mentioned, Czech and Polish pilots were a VERY WELCOME and VERY USEFUL reinforcement of their French comrades who, at the end of the French Campaign, had suffered approx. 40 % losses in men killed (30 %), wounded or prisoners (a small minority) shot down behind the German lines.

As you can see all this vicious anti-French propaganda, libelling and insulting is devoid of any justification. Admittedly all French pilots (who were well-trained) possibly were not geniuses at the same time as angels and aces - they did their best and fought to the death. Obviously Polish pilots wrere MUCH, MUCH better - and so honest and objective including in their hundreds of victory claims won flying aircraft which were able to fly only thanks to repairs performed with tape and strings and with stones as ammunition. Engine fuel for the Poles was water (big improvement as compared to the hundreds of gallons of alcohol they used to drink) and they even had to ride French cows because the naughty French would not give them any aircraft, not even some made of paper and glue. At least cow-milk could be used as aviation fuel in French engines.

Re: Etampes, Villacoublay
 

After reading this I'm surprised that you come up with the following text, which is at the least just as offensive.

I must say that I am disappointed, this cannot lead to anything constructive and therefor I will close the tread.