Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Indeed, I think we're aware that the Luftwaffe was a 'tactical' force led by incompetent leaders into a total 'strategic' war. I think most commentators agree that the Soviet shifting of their production centres out of range of the Luftwaffe medium bomber force contributed in a fundamental fashion to Soviet victory..or did it not? ...or that the German air defence organisation had everything - a Flak arm and civil defence organisation of millions- except a 'roof'.. By the way have you looked at the (mediocre) Luftwaffe attempts to carry out strategic bombing on Moscow... ?

Soviet victory because of Normandy Landing without it the war on Ost not finished before the fifties, strategic vs tactic if your scope is to beat France polen nd even Russia you can go tactic, necessary to put some strategic against England, but for sure England was very not the goal at the beginning just "collateral" adversary..
Strategic-bombing is interesting to starve fighter opposition, with in mind the landing, nd attack benzin facilities, all other is quite just to occupy the force

rémi

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Even a medicore economist would be able say to Hitler that he is not able to win the parallel war against the Soviet Union and the USA (+GB). It is not a question. The mental problems of the leaders of the Third Reich is one thing, while the performance of the Luftwaffe's bomber arm is another. Without proper aircraft they were not able to make a strategic air war. But it is not their failure. Even if they would have a proper heavy bomber, the result of the war would be the same. The industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was heavily underestimated both by the Third Reich and by the Western Allies. The Luftwaffe would not be able to ruin it with several hundred heavy bombers.
The series of raids against Moscow were not any kind of real strategic bombing campaign, so wrong example. It was again Hitler's brainchild, political decision not against industrial targets and such pointless attacks were just waste of resources (like the baby blitz).

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Even the failed campaigns had some effect on the other side, no one questioned that, but comparing it with the huge efforts of the British side, it is very poor exposition.
As for who was "blinded by propaganda" (maybe 100000th time about the same topic). BC attacked Berlin and few other German cities in the same time, 1940/41 (with smaller forces, but only because they had not enough aircraft to conduct larger raids, not because their leaders were so humane). Even Poles would attack Berlin with considerable bomber forces, if they would have enough force to conduct such raids. I have never questioned, that the Luftwaffe conducted attacks, which are describable only as terror attacks to kill civilians. The German leaders, who ordered such attacks, were called as war guilties. Incidentally, what about the Allied politicians, who ordered the same? Are they the 'heroes' for the same?
I hope, that you don't suggest, that the 100 000's of German civilians, killed by air raids "well deserved" their fate, because "they had started it".
But is is pretty off topic here (and a never ending story...)

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Perhaps the "strategic" initiative in was held by the RAF, but tactically it was the Jagdwaffe.

Initiative to be a nuisance.

In the ETO, certainly in 1941 and arguably even 1942, however from 1943 onward you have a point.

But I am not starting an argument for the sake of a "challenge". Certainly not willing to start another endless tit for tat debate...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Let's not talk about moral side of the war, but please remember, that the law knows such words like repercussions or reprisals. Thus said, Poland DID NOT conduct any reprisal attacks, despite having the force allowing to do so. There were clear orders for that. Otherwise I do not understand, why do you extract bits and pieces to prove that a five year long campaign was a failure. It is obvious that at times it did not went according to the plan nor achieved estimated goals, but it was constantly improved. Tell me, was Peenemuende a failure or a success?
I am not sure what do you mean, but even on a single raid level, Jagdwaffe was unable to prevent Allied actions. Yes, they were shooting down multiple aircraft, but still they were bombed, and efficiency of the latter constantly improved, with catastrophic results in 1943. I would say it was a general shortseeing by Lw command, which resulted with pilots arriving to combat units in mid-1944 completely unprepared for anything, despite two years of training.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

There you go, perhaps catastrophic in 1943, but merely a nuisance in 1941 and 1942, albeit it night or day.

Stopping raids is a bit theatrical isn't it, we're talking attrition not dramatics.

But Franek, we've been here before and the thread can go on and on and we won't agree. OTOH our new member will have a lot of fun.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Falke, I understand what you are saying, however, when one considers the incredible odds later in the war against Jagdwaffe pilots, it's amazing that they held out as long as they did. Sure, the RAF could mount large-scale raids against the continent, but one has to take into account the vast resources available to England at that time, both in terms of raw materials and manpower, such as the Commonwealth training plan. Germany had a few poor quality allies, most of whom dropped out of the conflict early on. When I think of my uncle, who was blind in one eye and well into his 40's, flying combat until April, 1945, I can only surmise that he must have been extremely well trained, and perhaps a little lucky. I agree that the leadership of the Luftwaffe was poor at the highest echelon, but they had many outstanding commanders, especially in the field. To simply imply that the German pilots were a bunch of overrated overclaimers is a gross simplification of the truth and a besmirching of the memory of thousands who fought and died bravely.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

..the original post referred to the Luftwaffe's 'mediocre' performance... My point about Bomber Command was specifically about production, not the validity of 'terror' bombing. Few Allies ?.. by 1941 Germany controlled the entire Continental European coal and steel industry, not to mention the huge French aviation industry, which had just introduced the brilliant D.520 & Amiot 351/354 - and still failed miserably to produce the aircraft that the Luftwaffe required to wage the war on which it's mediocre leaders had embarked, churning out instead thousands of He 177, Me 210/410s etc etc etc..The British on their own were indeed 'out-producing' them for long periods..(Lancaster, Mosquito etc etc) ..but does this really need to be said...

and to answer Remi's point ...

by late 1944 90 Allied divisions were facing 60 German divsions in Western Europe..in the East it was 560 Soviet divisions vs. 240 German...some have argued that the Soviets had won the war by 1944, whether the Anglo-Americans invaded or not...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

There is some truth in the original post, but the author should have explained himself clearly to avoid hostile replies.

Yes, German political and military officials often made poor decisions in their use of resources and promotion of leaders (at all levels). So did their opponents. It's a matter of degree. Mediocrity is not hard to find if you look for it, but what I have read so far does not prove that the British, American or Russian air forces made better overall use of their own war-making potential.

When making these comparisons, the outside political interference must be carefully separated from bad choices made by military leaders. That there were plenty of both only adds to the complexity.

For that reason, discussions about this subject tend to degenerate into arguments over amounts of material. It is easier to count the beans than to agree on the best recipe to cook them.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Franek: An interesting comment; can I inquire as to which Slacht units were fighting in Poland at the time and, IF you know...their statistics: Vics, losses, etc?

TiA

nickm

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

by late 1944 90 Allied divisions were facing 60 German divsions in Western Europe..in the East it was 560 Soviet divisions vs. 240 German...some have argued that the Soviets had won the war by 1944, whether the Anglo-Americans invaded or not...


I wonder why they don't made it ??? Germany against Russia no match even at 1 against 2, but with the landing all the best divisions were driven to the west, so at that time they are fighting 1 against 4 or 5, in the air 1 against 15, same situation in Italia where they opposed nearly no air opposition

rémi

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

RT, that is not entirely fair since the German Wehrmacht had operated on the fireman principle for quite some time out of poverty. Sending the best units to hotspots to stop the fire and relocate. Troops were moved to the area of direct crisis, in this case from the Eastern Front to the Western. Lets not forget that together with those crack divisions were also a lot of mediocre ones.

The original thread wasn't clear and it was more of a challenge to the community than an effort to start a constructive discussion.

When we discuss the Luftwaffe we tend to compare it with the RAF and USAAC/F and while forcing it in that mold conclude that it failed miserably. At that point we fail miserably because although the Luftwaffe may have failed to win the war it did so while faced with a very different set of circumstances. Yes, some of these are socio-political, others are industrial and technological and last but not least there is the geo-strategical side.

The Brits were out-producing the Germans in bombers, because they were getting a lot of (war) material from the US, and could thus afford to allocate massive resources to their strategic bomber arm.

Besides, a large strategic bomber force is a luxury that you can only enjoy under special circumstances. Britain enjoyed that luxury because of its geographic location. In the past this enabled it do concentrate on the Navy and now the RAF instead of having a big standing army like its continental adversaries. The long range "strategic" bomber was a weapon of stalemate and attrition, not a war of movement. Germany did not have the resources (nor the luxury) to produce and equip for both.

The Soviet miracle may have been the successful movement of their production facilities beyond the range of German bombers, but it is arguable if the Luftwaffe had the strength to concentrate on these targets even if they had not moved. More significant was their removal from the advancing German armies. At that point the tank was more important than the bomber.

Side notes:
Actually in 1939-40 bombers like the Hampden, Wellington and Whitley were the RAF's equivalent of "strategic" bombers, to these you must compare the Do 17, Do 215, He 111 and Ju 88. They don't compare badly.

Besides in the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe bomber force was both strategic in thinking and equipment, yet flexible to fully support the army if the situation required it to do so.

It is in the sustained effort in its over extended position that it "failed". That its higher (and political) leadership was mediocre is beyond dispute. Ironically Goering for all his failings did proof to be instrumental in its massive growth program during latter half of the thirties, an other thing we easily overlook with 20-20 hindsight. That first battle was won by the Luftwaffe before any shot was fired and it did influence early allied decision making and action.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

but the Allies were always going to 'out-produce' the Germans since the latter had no means of hitting major Allied production centres -whether that be America or the Urals- surely a major failing of Luftwaffe planning, procurement and strategy..? of course ultimately the Luftwaffe finished the war with the same pre-war types in service (109, He111, Ju 87 etc etc), whereas the Hampdens and Whitleys had long gone..

Ruy, you seem to be saying in effect that the Luftwaffe performed ‘well’ given that it was waging a war under changed circumstances, a war for which it not been conceived....presumably you see these changing circumstances as starting to impact from, say, about December 1941 ?...

That line of argument unfortunately brings us back to the Battle of Britain and the importance of Britain’s geographical situation for the continued prosecution of the war in the West. The Luftwaffe -supporting the army- couldn't impede the BEF at Dunkirk & more crucially failed to bring to the British to their knees or the negotiating table during the summer of 1940.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

A bit off the topic, but
FalkeEins
Soviet divisions had appr. ½ of the manpower of German divisions, so comparing the number of divisions doesn’t necessary give right picture, even if many German divisions were badly understrenght.

RT
What You think was wrong with 1., 3. – 7., 12. – 14., 16., 17. and 24.PzDs and PzGrD GD with usually are counted as among the best divisions of WM. All were in the East iduring summer 44

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Britain could only out produce because they were let off the hook in the winter of 1940 and were receiving massive support from the US.

The British have history on its side, at least that part which they choose to high light, thus it would take more than a continental defeat (at most a major setback) or a single summer of bombing to crack their will.

But no, I don't regard 11 dec as crucial, although I regard it as a fundamental mistake by Hitler. It was Barbarossa which turned the table in the war against Britain. With the Eastern Front it was impossible for the Germans to make the strategic shift in allocated resources needed to defeat Britain. That shift in resources was actually part of pre war military planning, but Hitler choose to shorten the war by quickly defeating the Soviets first (he might be forgiven if one looks at the history of the eastern front in WW1 and the quick unexpected victory against Anglo-French in 1940)..

Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain are important only in as far as it didn't give Germany the quick settlement they were after in their gamble. But I think it is an illusion to think that Britain would have lasted long if she had to sustain the full pressure of the German war machine for an extended period. Tough as it may have been for war time Brits, and the British people can certainly be proud of their country and themselves during this period, it certainly wasn't the full German war machine nor its full potential that was aimed at them.

As for the Luftwaffe not being able to impede the BEF in its evacuation, that's true, but is it that by which we measure its performance? If so, what does that make of the Allied AF during the Sicilian evacuation? Perhaps we should judge it by the fact that the BEF was so quick in leaving the continent in the first place, something that the RAF could not change either.

But I am entering a tit for tat discussion, something that I did not want to do. A lot of pointless writing that has no other purpose than amusing some anonymous OP.

Falke, like I seem to write often these days, we won't agree, so it is better to agree to disagree.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Juha,

Good point.

We tend to focus on the veteran units that were moved to the west, forgetting about the experienced and crack units that stayed in the East. Besides many of the veteran units pulled out of the East were under strength and in need of replacements.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

RT
What You think was wrong with 1., 3. – 7., 12. – 14., 16., 17. and 24.PzDs and PzGrD GD with usually are counted as among the best divisions of WM. All were in the East iduring summer 44

....Nd the vast majority of SS-units move to west, idea was just to hold the front, nd wait for a miracle or the Wunderwaffen..



but the Allies were always going to 'out-produce' the Germans since the latter had no means of hitting major Allied production centres -whether that be America or the Urals- surely a major failing of Luftwaffe planning, procurement and strategy..? of course ultimately the Luftwaffe finished the war with the same pre-war types in service (109, He111, Ju 87 etc etc), whereas the Hampdens and Whitleys had long gone..

The brits finish the war with 1946 models like the spifire, nd the beaufighters, Germany with 1918 models like the Ar234 nd Me262

No necessity to go on that way, the strategic-war is merely the ressource-war, without gas, rubber, "special metals" ...the better is to expect that war will not last,
when you hv the good allied-steel you could produce good bombers those with turbo-compressors not using coupled-fighterengines

Remi

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello RT
not all SSDivs were transferred to West, of the mechanized SSDivs 3. and 5. SSPzDs stayed in East as well as 11.SSPzGrD. And LW’s Fallschirm PzD Hermann Göring was transferred from Italy to East and not to West in July 44
And IMHO SS mechanized divs were not better than Heer’s best mechanized divs, for ex. somehow it was the 2.PzD (not SS) that got farthest during both Mortain and Ardennes counterattacks, not any of SS PzDs .

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Ruy I don't necessarily disagree with you - your posts are interesting & perfectly valid. I guess I'm playing devil's advocate in any case. I'm interested in the notion that the BoB was not 'the full pressure of the German war machine'. I think this was a view also expressed most notably by Prien in the Foreword to Teil 4 of his Jagdfliegerverband series. Of the 90+ days that the BoB lasted, the Luftwaffe only appeared in British skies on 45 of them..or similar. I suppose Hitler could have used the winter of 1940-41 to build up his invasion fleet and mass-produce aircraft as well as re-equipping the Bf-109 with drop tanks for another attempt in 1941 - rather than go East. Even so 200 fighter pilots lost for nothing during the summer of 1940 seems a pretty high price to pay for a 'draw'.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
I don’t entirely agree with You. Britain and Commonwealth stood alone against Germany almost a year from late June 40 onwards. With surface power of Kriegsmarine crippled during Norway campaign there wasn’t much else to try against GB than air-attacks and U-boat campaign. And LW losses during the BoB were a bit under 2000 a/c permanently lost and apr. 3400 flying personnel KIA/POW, to me that doesn’t sound as half-hearted attempt. And those almost straight after substantial losses during the May-June 40 campaign.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I really don't have much to add other than this is a very interesting thread and I've been really reading it thoroughly. It's very thought provoking.

And thanks, kild, for not forgetting that there are some ladies on here *wink*

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Ok Juha not the bestest, although they hv the best material available, but the Ost-front could wait for better days, just a bit more attention was paid than to Italy, or Jugoslawia where half of the country was pretty insecure, keep in mind than germans with forces equal to France+Gr.Britain finished the mai 40 campaign in 5 weeks, nd arrived in front of Moskau in 5 months, by september 44 at that rythm the allies would hv to see the leaves falling down unter den Linden...

Rémi

New thread "Soviet army Myths"

The only way to beat Gr.Britain was at sea..

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I agree that it wasn't a half-hearted attempt, but just like it took a couple of years for Britain to gear up for the strategic bomber campaign, so it would have taken at least a year if not more to switch the German war economy from a continental strategy based on the army to a strategic force able to deal effectively with Britain. It is that gap in force balance and full potential on one side and what Britain really had to face that I am aiming at.

Let this not detract from British (and Commonwealth) achievement in WW2, but if it really was a narrow margin and if Churchill didn't exaggerate the U-boot menace, it is surprising that the Germans did as well as they did waging strategic warfare in the first couple of years of the war.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Gents,

IMHO, the main reason of the failure of the LW was a lack of a long-term strategy. The Allies had a strategy and built their air forces around it. The LW was a victim of its belief in "der große Schlag" that was supposed to give them air superiority long enough to win the campaign. German easy victories in Poland and France led them to think they were right. But they were not, as "Barbarossa" will prove it.
Even so, the LW had no plans beyond the "großer Schlag" and did not know what to do after air superiority was gained in a campaign that lasted more than they thought at the start. They were kind of a chess played who wouldn't know what would his next move be once he claimed "check".

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello RT
IMHO even claim that SS had best equipment was myth, it depended the date, which units were just got rest and refitment. Just before D-Day the two best equipped PzDs in West were Heer’s, then came three SSPzDs but the problem is how to value 21.PzD, it had 98 PzIVs plus 23 French Somuas and 88 SP guns on French chassises, maybe it should be placed after all on 4th or 5th place. But two weakest were Heer’s 9th and 116th PzDs. I cannot remember the equipment level of Heer’s 11th PzD at the time but IIRC it had more or less same number of tanks as the weakest SSPzD (2nd). OK, so much on ground forces.

But on the subject, LW was the only AF which had real armoured division plus some 20 infantry divisions in its strength. RAF Regiment had rather small ground combat capacity when compared with that. And the fact is a good indication to the byzantine structure of 3rd Reich.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I don't know if this is 100% correct, at least it isn't if you look at Vom Luftkriege, which forms the theoretical back ground. The extend to which this was put into official planning is something else.

There certainly was a gap between theory, planners and administrators though. Barbarossa doomed the over-stretched Luftwaffe to the support role, having caught a bear by the tail and not being able to let it go.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

There was an earlier post which sought to counter my doubts as to the true validity of some of the amazing Luftwaffe "kill" claims. This individual brought up the point that by staying in the war more or less continuously, this allowed Luftwaffe "experten" to gain so much experience that their kill scores were perfectly believable. This view, although certainly having some validity, is in my opinion, at its core, partially flawed. Allow me to explain.

"Experience", in the normal arena of human pursuits is much to be admired. The more a certain craftsman practices his trade, the better he is likely to become. In this sense then the experienced plumber, carpenter, surgeon or computer programmer is likely to get better the more he practices his art. But in the case of the Luftwaffe, we are talking about a very different kind of experience; namely mortal combat. With increased exposure to this ambience, a warrior would indeed enhance his prowess and even his deadliness, but only up to a certain point. There comes a time when the law of diminishing returns must be invoked since with experience there comes too, a constant exposure to violent death. Do you believe that any human being could long remain immune from the sheer psychological stress imposed by such a daily occurrance? There was bound to be a mistake, a slight oversight, an error in judgment which could (and repeatedly did) send even the most experienced fighter and bomber pilots to their deaths. Again, if I may invoke the experience of Japanese ace Saburo Sakai, he told me personally of the heated arguments he had with his girl friend over his refusal to marry her as long as the war persisted. He tried to explain to her that all of his victories in essence counted for naught. On his very next flight, death could come from anywhere at any time. He was bound to make a mistake; it was inevitable.

This is powerful stuff. The psychology of watching good friends perish in grisly fiery deaths would weigh heavily. The constant need for alertness, coupled with the rigourous demands of flying, would also result in physical fatigue. No man could possibly withstand this. As the physical world of Nazi Germany shrunk further and further, matters would have steadily deteriorated. There were no safe havens. Even a fledgling student, from his very first flights in a 'Jungmann' would be exposed to attack, and his experienced instructors had to be aware of this.

Let me give you a real world example. If I may for a moment digress to the other side of the world and to the United States Navy, you may get a better grasp of what I am espousing. Commander Sam Dealy of the USN Submarine USS Harder was an extraordinary submarine skipper. He has gone down in history as being one of the most resourceful and aggressive commanders in the history of the US Navy (in this regard, successful submarine captains shared a great deal in common with their aerial counterpart; the fighter pilot). Commander Dealy actually managed to destroy five Japanese destroyers in rapid succession; an absolutely unheard of, and never repeated, fete. This was akin to a bomber pilot attacking and destroying fighter aircraft. And yet on his next to last war patrol, Commander Dealy found himself utterly exhausted up to the point where he actually had to be temporarily removed from command. The man was simply worn out. He was killed on his last war cruise and awarded, posthumously, a much deserved Medal of Honor.

In this same vein then, Luftwaffe fighter pilots fighting a constant battle would have been fighting not only the odds, but also the sheer physical denouement which was part and parcel to a never ending exposure to death. No one was immune to it. During the Battle of Britain, when some Luftwaffe crews were flying three or even more missions per day, the exhaustion and fear reached unmanageable proportions. One fighter pilot wrote of this somewhat whimsically, and asked the question at large, "Why not just wander off somewhere and wait out the day's battle, and then return to base? Who would know?" Indeed, who would know? How widespread were these same sentiments, and how often were they acted upon is a question almost certainly lost to history.

In the end, fate and circumstance affected all. A green bomber crew or novice fighter pilot could get the chop as easily on his first mission as he could on his last. There is an old axiom in aviation circles which says, "I'd rather be lucky, than good". It is quite humorous, but also conveys a certain element of truth, and even of the dread implicit of never having total control over one's fate. I think any individual long involved in combat would certainly acknowledge that on top of all the experience one accrued, a healthy dose of luck was often needed to see him through.

The race does not always go to the swift, nor the battle to the brave.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
more or less agree. One must anyway to remember that as a continental power Germany had excellent army and thanks to Prussian heritage excellent general staff from which also LW benefit.

On the other hand as a maritime power UK had excellent navy and one cannot built a good navy in couple of years and without it it would have been risky to invade UK. Airpower wasn’t able single-handedly to subdue a major power before the arrival of nuclear weapons. Of course it might have been possible to force UK to compromise peace but IMHO Churchill’s strategy was based on hope that in a long run USA or USSR or both would side UK and so UK’s side would win. Hitler saw this and this was one reason behind Barbarossa, besides the ideological and economic reasons.

One more thing, LW seemed to lack the singlemindness of RAF. BC boundered Germany years even if in times losses were prohibiting. During the BoB LW changed it's targeting often while trying to find the Achille's heel of UK. I'm not sure was the area bombing a right solution but at least BC understood that there was no easy way to subdue a major power.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

My pleasure to do so Madam Baroness.
And how do you know that I am not Baroness myself?!

One can never be certain about these things...
;)

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I'm inclined to agree. The main advantage held by certain Waffen SS units was not in tanks or other equipment. It was sheer manpower. This was more obvious in the last year of the war. The SS divisions usually had more infantry and other ground troops, which allowed them to sustain higher losses and therefore stay in the front line for longer periods than a smaller army division.

Most of the SS divisions had fewer draftees than the traditional army divisions, and that was probably the most important distinction.

I do not believe that SS officers tended to be better leaders than "the regulars". But any organization filled with volunteers is always more motivated to pursue its goals, and typically performs more effectively than conscripted workers.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Luftwaffe, Luftwaffe, Luftwaffe...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I suggest suspending this thread until everyone has read "The Wages of Destruction" by Adam Tooze.

His argument is that the German of 1933-45 simply lacked the economic base to support its leaders' ambitions. Germany the world industrial power that we know is, he argues, a post-war phenomenon. In many respects it was a poor, largely agricultural country, with small pockets of engineering excellence and heavily dependent on imports it couldn't afford.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

John Vasco has a point I side with......this thread is drifting all over the field. A tit for tat about who scored most points in the war. Wrong forum for Wehrmacht and Waffen SS matters perhaps?
Go back to the first posting and compare with where the discussion is now.

Time to lock it?

Cheers
Goran

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

What was the alternative? Everyone has a breaking point, but if everyone stopped working or competing because of stress, there would be no progress and civilization as we know it.

Fighter pilots were not immune to trauma but they had numerous comforts that other front-line soldiers could only dream of. Such as a chance to retire from the front line and sleep in the rear until called for another mission. As well, shooting at long range does not produce the same psychological effects of close combat.

The biggest killers on the battlefield were artillery crews. And owing to the distance of their targets, they could kill with a sense of detachment that was not possible for infantry assault troops. Fighter pilots and artillerymen very seldom had to see the faces of their victims. I'm sure this helped them cope with the reality of their actions.

Unlike a large crew inside of a heavy bomber, the fighter pilot was typically alone in the cockpit and therefore he was usually spared from the horror of seeing spilled blood or bodies torn apart and burned, except when it was his own body.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

If you were to go through the list of top aces, you will find that roughly two-thirds eventually did succumb to flight accidents or combat. Not to mention the many times that each was previously shot down and wounded but able to return to fight. There are instances of pilots breaking down from the stress (Sachsenberg), stories of overwhelming fatigue (Oesau), lost limbs and eyes.The point is that even if the number of kills is not completely accurate, most of the Experten were there putting up a fight, harassing and disabling targets, over extended periods of the war.

Don

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

... which existed almost exclusively for the purpose of supporting Nazi-Germany's ground forces.

Is that more off-topic than your music? Not all of us want to know about your hobbies unless they are related to flying, but I've never felt compelled to complain about it.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

c'mon guys ..I was enjoying this thread...

Nick's right..although Tooze is not exactly easy fare for your average Luftwaffe enthusiast, it helps to see the bigger picture (and get out of your comfort zone now and again)

..As Don indicates, I guess there is a tie-in here with 'performance' as per the original post. A certain number of Experten survived almost constant front-line combat while attrition took the rest. Most, not to mention the Nachwuchs, became cannon fodder....

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Frankly I think Mr. Tooze is out of his mind. I mean - the industrial output figures, ie. steel, aluminium etc. production, production rate of aircraft and armaments are there for all to see... its quite simply a fact that Germany was the World's second largest industrial power after the US. Steel production, the usual scale of industrialization at the time for example exceeded that of the UK's and USSR's combined.

Wheter this was enough for the ambitions of its leaders between 1933-45 is another question, answered by history already.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Good point Six Nifty.

It’s impossible to understand the structure of LW without knowing the organisation of the armed forces of 3rd Reich, especially the SS, and after all a flieger of LW field division with his rifle in his foxhole was as much a member of LW than an unterofficier in the cockpit of his Bf 109. And there were many more former than latter
The personnel strength of PzD Hermann Göring (over 23 000 at its peak and IIRC it was later enlarged to PzKorps, which consisted 2 divs) alone was much larger than that of Jagdwaffe’s pilot strength. Add ¼ million in Field Divs. We much consider also these as well as LW’s naval units when we value the overall effectiveness of LW. And the generally rather ineffective ground combat units of LW caused considerable drain to Germany’s resources.

And I agree with Kurfürst
Germany was one of the leading industrial power of the world even if it lacked many of the raw materials but it had put vast resources to produce substitutes to some of those, for ex. aviation fuel production which used coal as its raw material.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Figures put forward elsewhere suggest that Germany's "war-making potential" amounted to only about 14.4% of the total WORLD war-making potential. And no oil. Germany quickly over-ran a few militarily weak neighbours but didn't have the industrial strength to take on Britain and the USSR, let alone the USA - combined. Output is all very well, it has to be utilised. Hitler built aircraft carriers which weren't even ever deployed. And couldn't produce enough aluminium to build a long-range four-engine bomber fleet. And by 1941 as (Murray points out) he'd already lost the equivalent of two air forces....