|
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Dear Peter
One thing is for sure, the loss reports for July 1940 are confusing to say the least. My information is mainly from the following contemporary documents: KTB for General der Luftwaffe beim Oberkommando der Marine KTB for Oberquartiemeiser/General der Luftwaffe beim Oberkommando der Marine KTB for Seenotzentrale (Luft) Nord Loss list from Gen.Qu. 6. Abt. I have had no access to the NVM reports. In addition I have noted info from previous postings on this forum. Since I made my last posting, I have found that one of the aircraft reported lost on 28.07.40 actually was shot down on 27.07.40. This from a radio intecept at 00.05 on 28.07. with info that a white seaplane had ceashed into the sea and exploded on impact. I believe that only one aircraft was lost on 20.07., one on 27.07. and one on 28.07.40. I do have information about the He 59 that was sent off to assist D-ASUC on 28.07. My info says that the plane was damaged, no percentage given, by a british fighter and that two crewmembers were injured. I have not seen a loss report that can identify this aircraft. What is the source for your information ? It would be great to get these things correct once and for all. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Seaplanes,
Thanks for the clarification. As you say, the records are a somewhat confusing but I feel that we are very close to nailing these losses once and for all. Agreed there was only one loss on July 20, 1940. The original entry in the QMG Returns (#4 of 22.7.40) was duplicated (#18 of 3.8.40) and later rescinded 25.10.40. But my question remains, is there any document that confirms this was indeed an SNFKdo.1 loss rather than SNFKdo.4 and what time it occurred ? There are two RAF claims on the day that could relate. Yes, I was confident that the loss of Oberlt Chudziak and crew was on July 27 and subject of later reporting in the QMG Returns. Finally, the casualties to SNFKdo.1 on July 28, 1940, are recorded in the QMG Returns (#21 of 3.8.40) with additional details provided via Winfried Bock. Hopefully, somebody will still come up with the KTB entries or the NVMs to resolve these questions beyond dispute. Thanks for your input and also that I received in a PM from Brian Bines. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Infantrymen running from an enemy advance even if they have discarded their weapons are still fired on as are tank crews jumping from destroyed tanks. It is quite logical to seek to kill enemy aircrew who otherwise will return to attack ones country although not a choice everyone would make.
with the slight difference that when the SND plane appears , battle is over , it seems that this case hv to be compare with action of sanitary services in the field , noone take excuse of the fact that the salvaged wounded will probably be in action later to shot at these men, seems to be the original cause of the red-cross building, WW2 move day after day to an "unlimited" war, shooting at ambulance planes seems to be a typical down-step from civilized war, giving rationnal reasons to explain that means that some other down-step are very near remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
remi,
Read Bruce's post, #36, on page 4, and that will explain all. It shows the SND aircraft did not always arrive after the battle was over, and that definite confirmation was gained that they were also doing intelligence gathering. It's not a step down from civilized war, it's a case of attacking an enemy's participating aircraft. Participating, in the sense that they are taking an active military role in the service of their country in a combat area. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
I read the post, but I have already answered , there is always an explanation, it also makes sense to kill the workers in the factories , to add that the war in the air with limited combattants made the fight appearing less as mass-killing, for sure that was the feeling that had the airmen at that time.
remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
I Hv to add that post of Bruce , gave lot of brut informations, after they could be interpreted differently,
Do18/ nd majority of He59 don't wear the red cross, The post of Brian give full of goodsense reasons to minor the role of these planes if they hv any in gathering data missions The losses occured in july at that time attacking convoys , is just a little bit more than kill time nd give some experience to crews in these matters, seems the strategy of the germans was nt well established... The channel is a straight in july for the 2/3 of the day trying to hide convoys is quite a waste of energy Did they really broke codes in july 40 ?? Ops began beg. of july the first losses beg. of july, so in quite a few days man hv to believe that they amassed informations, analysed them nd take a decision ???? coastal convoys that could only have come from aerial observation, and the only German aircraft in the area had been rescue craft ?????? Some kids could believe that.... were not in an area where a rescue was needed ??????? Remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
"Some kids could believe that.... "
Ah, how nice to be mistaken for someone young. Coastal convoys were predictable, but their composition was not. The Kreigsmarine were unable to spare craft for any meaningful recon, and there were no agents on shore radioing convoy details. Radio traffic was practically nonexistent among the ships and escorts, and the coastal routes covered hundreds of miles (not just the bit in front of Dover), German radar was not a factor, and that leaves the Mark 1 eyeball as the only solid source available to Luftwaffe Intelligence. It was only from human observation that the composition of the number, size and escort of a convoy, together with their position and formation could be reported, and this is what was happening. The orders posted by Junkers show that the rules were respected and followed by the Luftwaffe in the middle of June, but the events in question happened the following month after the decision to utilise the Seenot aircraft as spotters was initiated by orders from the highest command. The British considered the coastal trade convoys too valuable to sacrifice, and the RAF were obligated to defend them. There was no viable alternative means of transport in Britain at this time of the war, so the convoys sailed with whatever escorts could be scraped together. The Luftwaffe used them in attempts to draw out the defending fighters. Both sides read basic R/T codes instantly in most cases from the Battle of France onwards, as these of necessity had to be simple and based on plain language. British Intelligence began reading higher level German traffic, including Enigma encoded messages, before the Munich Crisis. And, of course, as explained earlier the WAAF listeners heard radio traffic from Seenot aircraft where there were no aircrew to be rescued. Whether these were marked with the Red Cross or not was beyond them to establish conclusively, but by June they were very good at knowing what units they were listening to. The reconciliation of the Y Service, radar and combat reports was usually completed by the night watch of Air Intelligence and hence available for the following day. Bruce |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
remi,
After Bruce's latest post (#47), quit while you're behind, and not totally out of sight... |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
If the reason for shooting down Seenot. aircraft was that they were spying on Convoys then attacks on them should surely have reduced with the drastic cutting of Channel convoys after July. Many of the later attacks on Seenot. aircraft were carried out when they were operating near the French coast with no convoy in sight. There was a view expressed by, as I remember, a former British merchant seaman in a book in the 1950's which claims the channel convoys were run as a politcal gesture to show the English Channel was still British. He claimed the convoys could have gone up the west coast, and goods been distributed by Britains then extensive Rail network without the need to get seamen killed ( I have no idea if this was a valid or practical arguement). He also praised the Luftwaffe for looking after its aircrew by setting up an extensive ASR network with launches, aircraft, rescue bouys , marker dye one man dinghies etc.
Which ever view on the discussion a person has I suspect it will be hard to convince them to change, and there is probaly supporting evidence for both views at different stages of the Air Battle of 1940. It has been said that in war the first causality is the truth. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Many thks , Bruce these explanations hv worth, at least for me , ...nd for John, I am still not fully convinced, nd maybe the truth is in-between, Brian gives also strong arguments, maybe a look at Söhnke Neitzel book could give some fuel to this debate...
remi for the moment I stay behind but at sight.. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Hello Brian, Remi, John et al
Truth was indeed a casualty. I can’t comment with any facts on the later Seenot losses, but I should imagine it unlikely as the Battle of Britain grew in intensity and invasion fears mounted that anyone would consider issuing an order to not engage any German aircraft. The genie was out of the bottle. The air and naval campaigns over the channel in the summer of 1940 are completely intertwined. Many people believed the coastal convoys could be re-routed, but this was not a practical alternative mainly because (A) the lack of available naval escort craft for the significantly longer route proposed and (B) the burden already placed on the railway system. This is more plainly visible when it is seen that the bulk of the cargo carried in the southern routes was destined for the Thames area, much of it being coal in dedicated colliers, and the railways to and from the west were already under emergency war scheduling to accommodate the needs of the armed services. The southern part of England was very much dominated by anti-invasion measures. Much of the railway capacity was taken up carrying (and being available for) personnel and equipment. As I understand it, between September 1939 and the summer of 1940 the use of rolling stock had increased in efficiency by around 30% and there still wasn’t enough to make a difference to the supply of coal in the industrial Thames area (can’t carry coal in passenger coaches, no time to make new coal hopper cars). There was an element of arrogance in the ‘English Channel shall remain English’ approach, but it didn’t matter: there was no alternative. The RN was ill equipped for Channel operations and every destroyer assigned to the channel wasn’t protecting an Atlantic convoy, where the larger threat lay. Whalers, tugs, trawlers and everything but the grandchild’s waterwings were given guns and scratch guncrews and pressed into service as channel escorts, and the convoys continued. By June a crisis was averted through more efficient management of the composition and routines of the coastal convoys, and the bare beginnings of an effective overall control system, but the Luftwaffe still had plenty of targets and the RAF and FAA had to respond. Regards, Bruce |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Hello Bruce,
This is probaly one that will never be completly resolved, but the denying of aircrew to the Luftwaffe still seems the main aim of the Shoot-down order. Probaly hastened by the attempt of some Seenot. aircraft to make rescues close to the English coast. At the time much of the Luftwaffe Radio transmissions from bomber, recon and fighter units would have some mention of convoys because that is where the action was. An aircraft ditching may well have used the position of a convoy as a reference point for where it was coming down. Equally a Seenot aircraft is likely to have made for the convoy position and back-tracked in its search for the crew, transmitting its location as it progessed. A captured Observers log was also suppoed to be part of the evidence against the Seenot. but did not all Air Forces navigators/observers keep a Flight Log on their flight noting all events as the aircraft flew its mission. Another point as aircrew could survive in a dinghy for some time after ditching would this explain why Seenot, aircraft operated on days when there was no or few air operations. It would be interesting to know whether the WAAF's listening in were picked solely for their langauge skills and what sort of knowledge they had of Luftwaffe operations. Did they merely translate into to English with more senior officers putting what was heard into reports. If so it would not be too difficult to produce a spying report from trawling the various transmissions if producing the evidence was ordered. As regards the convoys after July they were reduced so was the coal getting through on individual sailings, or was alternative routings found. I believe the Escorts were diverted to Atlantic duties with this convoy reduction. As with all servicemen Luftwaffe aircrew would be subject to a wide range of orders issued from Staffel level up to the RLM, has any specific ' Spy on the convoys' order ever turned up. Anway the reason for a discussion forum is to hear both sides and it tends to give a wider view on the subject to all those interested, Regards Brian Bines |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
It is so easy to be wise after the event. Please remember that Gt Britain was engaged in a fight to the death with the most unprincipled enemy, so tree hugging rules did not apply.
|
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
As allready said in my earlier post the Seenotdienst-Aircraft were strictly forbidden to transmit anything that could be laid out as if they were engaged in warlike activeties. Also that Luftwaffe were in no doubt that these Red-Cross aircraft did not fall in under the Geneva Convention. And yes at least 1 He 59 did on once break these rules, and the Luftwaffe did assume that it was shot down because of this. See the attached copy from KTB Seenot Nord, in my earlier post.
Junker |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Quote:
|
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
John, I would agree with Peter completely, in my posts I am not trying to deny the right of the RAF to stop enemy airmen from returning to operations. What I am hoping is that someone can come up with some evidence as to whether the reason given for shooting down these aircraft was valid on not. It is likely the spying story was for public/world consumption including the USA who may have viewed the British action as firing on ambluances thus losing us the moral high ground. At this time we desperately needed US support when a lot of US politicians had written us off. Personally I think the Luftwaffe were very optimistic in hoping to operate these aircraft without any RAF reaction, and ultimatly as the war progessed all sides had no qualms about shooting at rescue aircraft/launches or in some cases airmen in the water,
Regards Brian Bines |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
To add that if relations between Luftwaffe nd RAF , were pretty bad at that time, between Luftwaffe nd Kriegsmarine, it was hardly better....
remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Well I don't agree!
"tree hugging" pleeese! When a country signs the Hague and Geneva conventions they agree to ALL the protocols and don't pick and choose which they will follow. Shooting unarmed civilians in war is a warcrime. SO is shooting ANY medics who are unarmed and wearing the Redcross symbol (or the vehicle they are in). Yes, murders still happen in war. Yes the victors write the history and often don't prosecute their own side for such events but on occassion they do as decisions have consequences that may put you in court. You might not like it or agree but the idea of 'rules of war' is to maintain some form of civility in an otherwise barbaric event. It maintains some hope that there can be life or help and prevents the slide down the slippery slope to being barbaric which is why they were written in the first place. Certainly all soldiers in the Australian Army (and all Western armies too) have a number of lessons on the conventions and the 'rules of war' and how it affects them. Needless to say there are a LOT of "what happens if...." questions. And a lot of disbelief but it at least makes them think. And I hope for your and my sake that they do think if put in that situation. regards Peter |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Good thread.
The rules to which Peter refers work both ways: if you want the status and protection of a non-combatant then you cannot carry out military tasks. The orders produced by Junker show that the Luftwaffe was following proper procedures in May, but orders are orders and they were changed in July. The existence of the earlier orders adds to my belief that the July orders were in response to the lack of progress. It isn’t that big a leap to believe that the German forces used this ruse in July, on orders from Berlin. There are several first hand accounts of the ground forces advancing into France during May and June using red-cross marked vehicles ‘inappropriately’. Brian has quite rightly questioned whether or not the mention of a convoy constitutes ‘spotting’. The allegation is that the red-cross marked aircraft were sent to look for convoys. There were no transcripts of the German R/T conversations that originally raised suspicion among the WAAF Y Service listeners, but their professionalism by this stage was well established. It would be difficult to state that they had misunderstood or over-reacted without casting doubt on every other report they turned in during the same period. This simply was not a factor. Their training and experience ensured that the Y Service reports were taken at face value by the entire Intelligence and Operational structure even at the height of a crisis. The fact that other independent intelligence sources corroborated, and amplified, the suspicions of the listeners should underline the solid nature of the information they passed on. It seems clear that the RAF shot down these aircraft, and it may be in dispute as to how many were actually marked with red-crosses, but surely we are not discussing who had the moral high ground? The war had claimed all of Britain’s allies and the German thrust was pointless unless Britain surrendered: the stakes were high on both sides and the odd punch ‘below the belt’ should not surprise anyone. I am not justifying either the misuse of rescue aircraft or shooting them down, but in this case I am satisfied that German red-cross marked aircraft were used for convoy spotting and were therefore ‘fair game’. Regards to all, Bruce |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Hi guys
What a fascinating response and discussion, with so many of our 'experts' chipping in. Thanks a million! I have trawled the responses and have extracted much of the relevant information for the relevant chapter of my draft. I have acknowledged accordingly. I did not have personal knowledge and certainly didn't wish to plagiarise, therefore I have decided to use this vital information and conclusions verbatim, with accredited footnotes. I do hope that none of you has any objection. In Chris Goss' excellent 'The Luftwaffe Bombers' Battle of Britain' mention is made of the loss of a white-painted, Red Cross-marked Do24 (D-APDA) on 17 August. Were other such-marked Do18s and Do24s lost? Does anyone know approximately how many aircrew - German/British - were rescued by the Luftwaffe seaplanes during the Battle of Britain? Cheers and thanks again Brian |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Quote:
Junker |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Brian,
A quick count up of Luftwaffe aircrew rescued by Seenot. aircraft or launch and Kriegsmarine vessels from what I have noted comes to 176 men in the July-Oct. period. I'd use this for guidance only as someone who has gone into Seenotdienst history may have a more accurate figure. Just out of interest on the subject did any other Air Force attempt Air Sea Rescue under Red Cross markings, Regards Brian Bines |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Quote:
The 1908 Hague Rules of Land Warfare, the 1940 British Army field manual for the administration of occupied territory and the U.S. Army Field Manual with amendments through 1943 that covers the same subject all allowed for the taking of civilian hostages as well as the executing of civilian hostages under certain circumstances. Read the main trial transcript (12,000 pages) for Nürnberg Case VII (the Southeast or Hostage Case) and you will find endless discussion and citations on this matter. Further, both the prosecution and defense exhibits are full of documentation on the subject, too. If those interested will go to Freiburg and spend a week or two researching the OKW war crimes files, they will find numerous files on Allied war crimes committed in North Africa, at sea in the Mediterranean, on Sicily and in Italy. The intentional shooting up of clearly marked Sanitäts- Ju 52s and German ambulances marked with a huge red cross on the roof by RAF and USAAF aircraft was one of my favorites. There are also files there on the shooting down of the Seenot aircraft, too. Documented reference to all this in published format can be found in the several books by Alfred M. deZayas (run his name through ABA Books, Amazon and Google). Larry |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Thanks once again, guys.
Some discussion! Excellent! Thanks Brian for the figures - they provide a guide. I have a note that some 200 airmen (RAF and Luftwaffe?) were lost over the Channel in 1940, and that some could have been saved had the RAF/FAA adequate seaplanes etc. Any comment on this? Were Walruses armed when they were used on ASR missions? One point I don't believe that has been mentioned was that Dowding and Churchill were very angry when the French released all their thousands of prisoners from the fighting in France etc, which included some 400 airmen who had been shot down "They would be used to bomb this country, and thus force our airmen to shoot them down for the second time over ..." I'm sure this would have been fresh in their memories when the decision to shoot down the Red Cross aircraft was made. Cheers Brian |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Brian,
The lack of a one man dinghy was probaly one of the biggest problems facing downed RAF fighter pilots. I believe survival times for a man down in the North Sea varied from 20 minutes to a few hours depending on the time of year. So without a dinghy even with a properly equipped ASR service the airman would have to be found pretty quick. I have also seen a claim that the RAF shirt with its detachable collar was a problem, if worn on operartions it could constrict around a downed airmans throat in the sea. Going back to P/O Clarke in ' Strike from the Sky' following his Roc mission on 8th. Aug. he said on ASR 'it showed up our inefficiency compared with the Germans'. Suprising as Britain is a Maritine nation, still as already said hindsight is always very accurate. Considering the short time between the Chamberlain agreement and the war the RAF had a hell of a lot to do bringing the Spitfires and Hurricanes operational, I guess there was not time for everything. |
| All times are GMT +2. The time now is 02:01. |
Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.7.2
Copyright ©2000 - 2025, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Copyright ©2004 - 2018, 12oclockhigh.net