Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

My first thought is that the cost of Bomber Command cannot be viewed in isolation from the impact of Bomber Command on Germany in damage and expenditure.

My second thought is that, if there was no Bomber Command, one has to find a viable alternative that would have caused the Germans equivalent damage, expenditure, lost production and redirected military assets.

43,000 Churchill tanks is a nonsensical alternative. Firstly, they could have addressed not a single one of the targets Bomber Command did; secondly, Churchill tanks did not use either the same materials or industrial plant and so were not a direct production equivalent; and thirdly, unlike the Lancaster, they were poor at what they did.

The article seems to assume that the number of duds and misses by Bomber Command bombs were a unique problem. However, only the smallest proportion of bullets or shells hit a significant target either. Less bombs does not automatically mean more of more accurate missiles.

Despite its unrealistically narrow focus, the article was an interesting read.
Nor does Bomber Command seem prohibitively costly, given that it absorbed at most 15% of defence expenditure.

Certainly winning the war cost Britain a fortune. However, the alternative of losing it doesn't seem particularly financially attractive either!

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I initially found this discussion of interest but that soon began to wear off. I think that Tony is just interested in a confrontation to voice his own opinion and using statistics to his own advantage to justify a point.

Is this discussion about, 1) the financial cost, 2) targeting, 3) strategy, 4) accuracy, or a mix of all.

As far as I am concerned the courage, determination and sacrifice of all those who served in the ranks of Bomber Command is unquestionable.

Like wise as far as accuracy is concerned No.3 Group who pioneered the use of GH and where the only main force group within the command to be thus equipped carried out a number of very accurate raids on Benzol / oil plants / coking plants as well as transportation targets from October 1944 onwards. Bombing accuracy was measured at times to within 500 yards, or better. The Group operated in all weathers and importantly did not require to see the target. We seem to be missing the contribution of this group.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

The role of Air Power is to gain, maintain and exploit air superiority in pursuance of strategic and operational objectives, everything else is rubbish.
bregds
SES
Been there, done that for more than 40 years.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Looks mighty devastated to me.

Before and after aerial photos of the bombing of Wilhelmshaven: The German port city of Wilhelmshaven was bombed twice in 1943 -- once by the USAAF on January 27, and again by the RAF Bomber Command on February 11-12. These aerial reconnaissance images show Wilhelmshaven before and after the two bombings. The second bombing, carried out at night, was especially challenging because of dense cloud cover. Planes equipped with the RAF's newly developed H2S ground-mapping radar located strategic targets, then illuminated them with parachute flares. A successful strike on a naval ammunition dump south of Wilhelmshaven caused widespread destruction of dockyards and the city.

http://static.howstuffworks.com/gif/...o-allies-8.jpg

http://static.howstuffworks.com/gif/...o-allies-7.jpg

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

At what cost to the Soviets Tony? You moan about the number of lives lost by BC yet that was minuscule compared to the Soviet military lives lost in the tactical war they fought.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.
b) The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership compared with Russian. So I do not know what point you are trying to make.

Steve, You are obviously as tired as I am of argument. Why don't you just state your conclusions after studying BC for 30 years. Perhaps some of us will learn something. I promise to say nothing.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony, you're moving this into an arena which few of us can contend with. If you are now claiming that (despite Churchill tanks, which you were anxious to have more of) the D-Day Invasion forces had inferior equipment, then your opinions should be voiced in a more broader forum such as WW2Talk, than in an Aviation based one.

I feel that you are determined that your view be correct and will brook no contradiction. That isn't a reasoned basis for debate, you may find a more stimulating environment for your views elsewhere now you have broadened your arguments into an OVERALL strategic overview.

Like BC, the Army did the best with what it had, not just equipment, but use of tactics to outflank the Germans doggedly resisting the Anglo Canadians. Again, by totally absorbing all the German effort against them, they drew away defenders to allow the Americans to break through, culminating with the Falaise Gap and the abandonment of France by the Germans. And how, if everything they used was poor, did they achieve such a resounding defeat on the Germans?

BC by its continued Operations succeeded in holding back a vast amount of German manpower and resources, slowing development of what could have been war winning weapons such as the V1, V2 and jets. That allowed the Russians to achieve battlefield superiority sooner. However, I am sure you will have yet another answer to support your view.

Just don't hint that the lives of those who died were "thrown away" wilfully.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

11/12 February 1943

Wilhelmshaven. This was an interesting and important raid by 177 aircraft - 129 Lancasters, 40 Halifaxes and 8 Stirlings. The Pathfinders found that the Wilhelmshaven area was completely covered by cloud and they had to employ their least reliable marking method, skymarking by parachute flares using H2S. The marking was carried out with great accuracy and the Main Force bombing was very effective. Crews saw through the clouds a huge explosion on the ground, the glow of which lingered for nearly 10 minutes. This was caused by bombs blowing up the naval ammunition depot at Mariensiel to the south of Wilhelmshaven. The resulting explosion devastated an area of nearly 120 acres and caused widespread damage in the naval dockyard and in the town. Much damage was also caused by other bombs.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

If I may join in the debate.
There can be little doubt that this was a lucky hit, however there is equally no doubt that by looking at the two photos the damage to the docks were extensive. Harsly a building left standing and more importantly no vessels in the docks, they had been removed. The raid achieved what it set out to do.
I would expect the loss ratio of any front line Infantry Unit of any army to be at a similar level to BC. I would however not expect it to rival the Russian Units as their tactics were hard on the troops and they put less resources to the removal and treatment of the wounded.
As for the equipment, lets take them one at a time.
Crap Infantry Weapons
The Lee Enfield was and is one of the all time greats and cannot be described as Crap.
Bren Gun, again a first class weapon as good an LMG as any produced anywhere.
Sten Gun totally agree, absolute rubbish

Crap Tanks
Sherman 75 was roughly as good as the T34/76 and the Sherman 76 a good match against the T34/85. You can argue which was the best but there was little in it.
Sherman Firefly was vulnerable but it did at least have the firepower so that it could destroy anything that could destroy it which evens things up.
The UK/Canadians did lack a heavy tank of that there is no doubt but they had the edge in specialised tanks. But then again the Russians lacked equipment such as the M10/M36/Achilles so take your pick as to which approach you want.

Crap Artillery.
Sorry but on this you are very wrong. The 25pd and the 4.5in guns which formed that backbone of the Anglo Canadians were second to none. Plus they were supported by a far more sophisticated and flexible fire control structure.
6pd and 17pd AT guns were at least as good as anything else on the battlefield.

Crap Tactical Support
Again you are very wrong. There was a difference in approach, the Russian aircraft being designed to take heavy damage but were easier to hit being slower and larger, whereas the Typhoon was less robust but harder to hit. The advantage the Anglo Canadians had was that at a push every allied fighter could be a very effective GA machine. In the 2TA even Spitfires were being armed with 1,500lb of bombs. Russian fighters were unable to carry the payload.

Crap Leadership.
Both sides had a selection of good and bad.

What Russia totally lacked was a strategic air arm. The RAF/USAAF bombers would have had a field day attacking targets such as transport choke points and the losses would have been significantly smaller that those caused by the German defences. The Daylight would have belonged to the USAAF high level bombers as Russia lacked a decent high altitude fighter able to take on the B17/B24 and their escort. The night would belong to the RAF as Russian lacked radar in any was apart from warning. i.e. an almost total lack of radar fire control or radar in nightfighters.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

That's all well and good, but I fail to see the "so what" in it. 617 did just fine without Oboe, and I can see no reason why one would even need both H2S and Oboe in the same aircraft. Oboe told you exactly where you were, but (without repeater equipment) had limited range. H2S had unlimited range, but could only give a rough location.

Again, 617 did just fine without either.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony,

My 30 years of research tells me not to get into a argument with someone who obviously is conformational and argumentative. What I have learnt is that the death of 55,573 young men was not in vain.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Much of this caption is nonsense.
The attached Google Earth photo shows the aiming point in the naval dockyard in the town was 4kms away from the exploding Mariensiel arsenal. The bit of dock shown in your aerial photos is the Westwerft, which was mistaken by the photo interpreters for the naval dockyard.
I told you the raid happened in a NE gale which blew the skymarkers over Mariensiel before the Main Force arrived.
No doubt Butcher Harris put your pictures in his Blue Book together with the misleading caption.
By the way, where are these Blue Books today? Rumour has it there were three copies - one on Harris's desk, one on Churchill's desk, and one in the British Embassy in Moscow for showing to Stalin.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Glider1, we're getting completely off-topic, but I will briefly comment on your points.

1. The Mariensiel arsenal explosion has been covered in my reply to Kutscha. The raid did not set out what it aimed to do, which was to destroy submarines on the stocks in the Bauhafen, 4 kms away from Mariensiel.

2.
- Crap infantry weapons; the British had nothing to equal the PPSh-41 or MG-42 in rate of fire, which is the important thing for infantry.
- Crap tanks; the only half-decent allied tank was the Churchill. The literature on this is extensive eg 'Death By Design' by Peter Beale.
- Crap artillery; the 25-pdr was 88-mm in calibre and could not match the weight of fire delivered by Russian 122-mm, or even German and US 105-mm artillery. No Katyusha or Nebelwerfer. No infantry divisional SP artillery after D-Day.
- Crap tactical support; no accurate dive-bomber, and no armoured IL-2, only vulnerable and inaccurate Spitfire and Typhoon fighter-bombers and mediums.
-Crap leadership; from Stalin down to battalion level, the Russians led everybody, including the Germans, in professionalism.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

So the bombs were dropped where they were suppose to be dropped, on the sky markers. Not the bombers fault the sky markers weren't where they were suppose to be.

Pure bull. You are saying that after years worth of photos taken of Wilhelmshaven, the photo interceptors didn't know what was what.

Soviet Union 1941–45, All branches of service - 10,725,345 KIA/MIA

British Commonwealth, All branches of service - 580,351 KIA/MIA

Hyde Park has a soapbox reserved with your name on it Tony.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Kutscha, you keep changing the subject.

1) BC went to Wilhelmshaven following instructions to destroy Type VIIC U-boats that were building in the Bauhafen. AFAIK the markers were dropped over the U-Boats on the stocks.
The bombs, however, dropped 4kms away on an arsenal full of sea mines and ammunition for ships like Graf Spee that were at the bottom of the ocean or like Hipper that were decommissioned.
It is but another example of BC's being unable to hit the target, which is one of the main reasons why its costs were momentous.

Your confidence in the photo interpreters is touching, but you have a problem; either they misunderstood what they were looking at, or they were lying. You say they knew what was what, which means you think they were lying - perhaps to make Butcher Harris's Blue Book look good?

2) The total for Soviet KIA/MIAs was not the answer to the question we were discussing, which was infantry losses. Your point, I thought, was that the Soviet method of waging war was more costly in terms of human life than it was for the Western Allies. The point I am making is that the Anglo-Canadian method of waging war after D-Day was equally and probably more costly because the Anglo-Canadians were less well-equipped than the Soviets. I asked you for figures for losses in Soviet infantry divisions as this interests me.
The astronomical total Soviet and German losses was the inevitable result of Hitler's attempt to seize Lebensraum from the Russian 'Untermenschen', and is tragically uninteresting. It is the basis of the valid Russian claim that they and not the West were instrumental in destroying the Wehrmacht.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Taking your points one at a time

This is covered, I did say it was a lucky hit and there is hardly a building left standing. Also all the vessels had been moved (as far as I can say) so it was a damn good try.
You are being a little selective here. The PPsh-41 is a sub machine gun and I did say that the Sten was total rubbish, so we agree on that. I also agree that the UK didn't have anything like the Mg42, but neither did Russia.

As is the literature for the performance of the tanks as outlined in my previous posting.

The 25pd was at least as good as the Germand and US 105. It had a longer range than the former, it was reliable, flexible and in service from the start in good numbers. To compare it against the 122mm is a little off as the 122mm should be compared with the 4.5in which is a good match.
I certainly agree that the British had no Katyusha but I notice that you don't deny that the British fire control system was far more flexible which is a significant advantage in this kind of combat.
I also agree that the British Infantry divisions didn't have SP Artillery, but then again, neither did the Russian Infantry units. However the British Armoured divisions did, how many Russian Tank Divisions had SP Artillery?.


No more vulnerable or inaccurate than the Il-2 as I said before there was a different approach. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter bomber. One thing is for certain, the Typhoon was more able to defend itself against fighters. As for the mediums Russia didn't have anything close to a Beaufighter or Mosquito, let alone the mediums.

That I would question, both countries had their good and bad moments.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony

Just where are we going with this continuing discussion, are you trying to batter us all in to submission to accept your points?

Whilst you have stated “I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.....”

I find that I have to totally agree with the comment by Steve Smith “My 30 years of research tells me not to get into an argument with someone who obviously is conformational and argumentative. What I have learnt is that the death of 55,573 young men was not in vain.”

Are you writing your piece simply from your understanding of "Britain 1939-1945; The Economic Cost of Strategic Bombing", by John Fahey, and seeing matters with the benefit of 65 years of hindsight, and “reading online” at that – presumably in the comfort of your house - or did you actually take part in raids as a member of BC, or serve in an armoured unit in your much vaunted Churchill tank, where your comments might have more validity?

Personally, in my own family I had one serving in a fighter wing HQ in 2TAF from Normandy to Denmark, one flew a complete tour with Bomber Command between August ’44 – April ’45, one served in the 22nd Armoured Brigade of 7 Armoured Division from Normandy to the Baltic, and, finally, one served in the desert and Italy with the 8th Army. And all did their best with the equipment that they were issued with, and the orders that they were given at the time, which must have worked as we are deemed to be the victors!

Something which is confirmed by Icare9 in his comment “Like BC, the Army did the best with what it had, not just equipment, but use of tactics to outflank the Germans doggedly resisting the Anglo Canadians. Again, by totally absorbing all the German effort against them, they drew away defenders to allow the Americans to break through, culminating with the Falaise Gap and the abandonment of France by the Germans. And how, if everything they used was poor, did they achieve such a resounding defeat on the Germans?”

Whatever conclusions you come up with, as you do not appear to accept other peoples points of view, it won’t make a scrap of difference now as VE-Day was in 1945, not 2010.

Allan125

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Just for the record
in summer 44 the artillery component of Soviet Rifle/Infantry Div consisted 24 76mm (3in) light field cannon and 12 122mm light field howitzer, the artillery component British Inf Div consisted 72 25pdr (3.45in) gun-howitzer. Soviet div also had 21 120mm heavy mortars and also some 76mm infantry guns, which were short range light guns for direct fire support. Both Soviet and British Armies also had plentiful medium and heavy artillery under GHQ/Stavka control which were allocated to Corps (next level up from division) according to need. While both Soviet and British field artillery guns were good, British divisions had more of them.

Soviet Tank and Mechanized Corps, these were in size nearer to German and British divisions than Corps, had 21 76mm SP guns, but British armoured divisions had 24 25pdr SP gun-howitzer plus 24 towed ones. All also had SP AT guns, Soviet 85mm SU-85s, British M10s (76mm)or Achilleses, M10 regunned with British 17pdr, also 76mm but much more powerful than US gun, in fact it had more penetration power than Soviet 85mm AT gun.

So in divisional level British seems to have more artillery support than Soviets, how much GHQ/Stavka allowed extra artillery support and ammo varied and so no absolute truth here if one doesn't want to go to individual cases.

Finnish experience was that also Il-2s were usually inaccurate.

Juha

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Allan, I'm inclined to make this my last post on this thread as yours is evidence of mounting bafflement about motives, and shows there is no environment here for a cool exchange of views. I accept the blame for that.

Recall the thread was triggered by Fahey's publication of the first ever analysis of the momentous cost of BC. This raised the question whether and how our opinions about BC should now be revised.

For me Fahey confirmed one element of a complex answer to a simple question that first arose in 1947, and which I finally answered to my own satisfaction only in 1995.

In 1947 as an 8-year-old living in Germany, I was taken by my father to a battlefield where his unit, 2 Lincolns in 3rd British Infantry Division had succeeded at great loss in breaking through the German defences on March 2, 1945. We placed flowers on the graves of 24 soldiers who had died that day and whose remains were soon moved to the Reichswald War Cemetery - the CWGC's largest.

The question that arose then was later verbalised into this: why did the Allies, with control of the air and unlimited resources, lose so many men, and find it so difficult, to advance against the remnants of a beaten German Army within six weeks of the end of the war?

In the 1980s I spoke to Allied infantrymen, gunners, tank crews and Typhoon pilots, and to German paratroops, who had been on or over the battlefield to establish what had happened during the three battles fought over four days that led to the breakthrough by 2 Lincolns.

The answer to the question took a long time to produce, and is still subject to revision as more and more information gets published, such as Fahey's analysis of BC's costs.

That's all there is to it.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Juha
Thanks for the information, I didn't realise that the Russian Infantry Units had so little gun support. 24 x 76mm + 12 x 122mm vs 72 x 25pd is no contest let alone with the more flexible fire control.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Thanks, Juha.

The Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions that landed on D-Day were supplied with the M7, which they called the Priest 105-mm SP Gun. These were highly regarded, and the decision to replace them with towed 25-pdrs was resented because of poorer mobility and reduced weight of shell.
The gunners called the 25-pdrs 'crap' in comparison with the M7.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I would say with a ~20:1 difference in KIA/MIA it should be obvious to everyone that the Soviets method of waging war was very much more costly.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

You can support this statement? I say this as I can understand them being resentful of swapping the SP Gun for a towed gun where life is harder. But they would have been more ticked off if they had to use the M101 which weighed quite a lot more.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Do you have a reference for this?

Enemy assessments of the performance of the 25 pdr was that it was anything but "crap".

The Germans in and around Normandy were amazed by the rate of fire that the 25 pdr could sustain, to the point where it was believed the gun was mechanically rather than manually loaded. German PoWs spoke of the "automatic" 25 pdr. Ref. G Blackburn's, The Guns of Normandy.

While the Anglo Canadian ground and air forces had shortcomings in some areas, but so did the forces of the Germans/Soviets.

To label their equipment, and especially Anglo Canadian leadership, as simply "crap" is overly simplistic and needlessly derogatory.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

OK, we're getting way off topic here. The topic is the cost of RAF Bomber Command's activities in WW2. Stay on topic or start a new thread.

Frankly, I'm inclined to shut this thread down as it seems exhausted to me. Agreement will never be reached on the ideas in this thread, so why don't you all give it a rest?

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

John,

Thank you. !!

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

John
hopefully You accept one more off topic message from me just for the background info.

Hello Glider1
while the divisional artillery of Soviet Rifle divisions was rather weak, Soviet Army, like the British Army but contrary to German Army, had vast High Command artillery resources, so from mid-43 onwards, when Soviets wanted a breakthrough, they allocated plenty of artillery assets for the attack and as a rule, achieved breakthrough.

Hello Tony
the cold fact is, that it is always costly and difficult to crush an enemy which had a army with good fighting spirit and sound tactical doctrine, was it well equipped as German Army was during WWI and WWII or even rather poorly equipped poor Army as the Finnish Army was during WWII. On British artillery, Germans had high regard on it, IIRC they thought it was the best arm of the British Army.

On 25pdr vs US 105mm, there wasn’t so big difference in the weight of the HE shells (25pdr vs 15kg) but it is true that in the US shell had almost 3 times more explosive (2.2 kg vs 0.82 kg) so fragmentation was different. But IIRC there wasn’t enough 105mm ammo even for the US Army in 1944, thanks for the Congress which had curtained the 105mm ammo production to prevent “overstocking”, so IIRC the British gave some 25pdrs and ammo for them to US Army in ETO during the autumn 44.

Now on BC, heavy bombers could deliver very heavy concentration of HE in a short timeframe either to a tactical or a strategic target, that means flexibility. When they used right kind of ordnance it was very effective as during the opening of Oper Goodwood. It wasn’t BC’s guilt that the British Army had not understood how deep the German defensive system was, as a good army should, Germans had understood the need of depth in a good defensive planning and were good in camouflaging, even if not nearly as good as the Soviets who were masters in that and in deception. So the British attack was stopped south of the BC’s target area.

I agree that the use of BC wasn’t always most effective and that Harris’ obstinacy took off much of the potential flexibility of the BC. In fact I also agreed that BC got a too big portion of British defence spending, with cleverer use of it it could have achieved better results with lesser losses, so there would have been need for smaller production of heavy bombers and for fewer crews. The first part isn’t hindsight, some in the uppermost hierarchy of RAF saw that but thanks for Harris and Portal that was not achieved, the latter is because many who wanted more intelligent use of BC were also heavy bomber men who wanted more powerful BC.

Juha

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Just discovered an intersting set of quotes on this subject, from some people who were there.

http://www.ww2talk.com/forum/general...re-beaten.html

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hi Bill,
Thank you very much, MOST interesting quotes, but some parties may still not be convinced or claim that they were extracted under moderate physical duress ;-).
bregds
SES

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I suspect that for many of them the greatest duress came from their own egos. "It wasn't my fault...."

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony

Thank you for giving us the background information to your question - perhaps things might have turned out differently with some replies if you had put your current reply in with your question.

"Recall the thread was triggered by Fahey's publication of the first ever analysis of the momentous cost of BC. This raised the question whether and how our opinions about BC should now be revised".

From the benefit of hindsight everybody can see how things could be done differently - my opinion is they did a necessary job with the tools and orders they were given. As, no doubt, did your father and others in 2 Lincolns, none of whom knew the war would end in 6 weeks and war is a messy business. And would those attacks costing 24 lives still have gone ahead even if they knew when VE-Day was - yes it would!

"The question that arose then was later verbalised into this: why did the Allies, with control of the air and unlimited resources, lose so many men, and find it so difficult, to advance against the remnants of a beaten German Army within six weeks of the end of the war?"

Simply put - they were fighting an invader of their country, with draconian measures being taken if they tried to fall back without orders, which must have concentrated the mind somewhat!!

Bill Walker appears to have found some quotes from leading German military figures with different views to yours.

Allan

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Allan,
I thought this thread was finished, but it has sprung back to life.

Bill Walker's quotes from leading Germans do not support BC, and are not different from mine.

An analysis divides their reasons into four main (non-exclusive) areas;

1. Transportation got 13 votes (Galland, Jahn, Guderian, v Seidel, Veith, Wolff, v Vietinghoff, GM of Junkers Italy, Sperrle, Bodenschatz, Krupp, Dollmann, Goering)
2. Oil got 7 votes (Galland, Jahn, v Massow, Veith, v Vietinghoff, Goering, Wille)
3. Production got 6 votes, but production must include oil (Schacht, Thyssen, Wolff, Henschell, Siemens-Schukert, Steel director)
4. Unspecified strategic bombing got 7 votes. I don't know if 'strategic' includes transportation, although it must include oil (Lindemann, Kolb, v Rohden, Thomas, Kesselring, Ibel, Goering).

It is clear that the biggest number of votes for why Germany lost go to Transportation and Oil.


Both of these targets were, however, strongly rejected by BC as 'panaceas'. BC and Churchill/Lindemann were adamant that area bombing of city centres was about to end the war. BC must not be diverted to tactical bombing which had its own TAFs under Leigh Mallory.
Spaatz commanding 8 and 15 USAAFs, and not BC, chose Oil.
The AEAF and SHAEF, and not BC, chose Transportation.

Zuckerman produced an entirely convincing analysis of the effect of bombing on the Southern Italian and Sicilian railroads. Zuckerman argued that “the destruction of the railway network of W Europe should become a prime strategic target sui generis, and not just a series of targets related to Overlord” (Apes to Warlords, page 222).
Leigh-Mallory, Portal, Tedder and Eisenhower agreed with Zuckerman. But BC strongly disagreed and used one argument after another against it.

1. Harris sent a letter to Portal on January 13, 1944 listing 22 reasons why BC was not designed for, and was unsuited to doing, anything except area bombing of city centres.
2. This got everyone behind Harris' objection - the Air Ministry's Director of Bomber Operations (Bufton); the Intelligence Wing of the Ministry; the Enemy Objectives Unit of the US Economic Warfare Dept (Kindleberger, Rostow and Kayson); the Objectives Dept of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (Lawrence); and Slessor in the Med.
3. Harris argued that BC at night was inaccurate and had an average error of 1,000 yards. It could not therefore do the job of bombing marshalling yards and bridges, and would kill 40,000 French civilians and wound 120,000 in making the attempt. Zuckerman showed that the calculation was fallacious and the right estimate was that 12,000 civilians might be killed and 6,000 seriously wounded. (Actual casualties were 10,000 killed and wounded).
4. The next argument was that military traffic on the railway was so small a proportion that it could not be significantly effected in any relevant period of time. The attack on railway centres would have to be continued for 12 months before the German war effort could be adversely affected. Kindleberger argued that the Germans had so many locomotives that they would be able always to get military traffic through to the front. Zuckerman pointed to the fact that in southern Italy the railroad system was paralysed even though there were plenty of locomotives.
5. Zuckerman pushed for the Transportation Plan to be generalised across the Reich. Bufton stated Harris' contrary view; 'Attacks on railway centres in the Reich will represent effort dissipated in some measure against one of the most invulnerable targets of the German economic system. The fact that the railway system is the one common denominator of the whole enemy war effort is a clear indication of its unsuitability as a vital target system in strategic attack” (Apes to Warlords page 244).
6. BC argued they could and would smash Germany through night raids on German cities, while the American Strategic Forces would do so by precise attacks on the arsenals of German air power – aircraft and aircraft component factories, and on Germany's synthetic oil plants. Not one member of the intelligence etc. staffs, nor even Tooey Spaatz, suggested prior to D-Day that the oil offensive would yield immediate results in the military field. That came later.
7. So Portal and Eisenhower decided on the Transportation Plan because they thought it the only target that could affect the Germans in the field in the first month of the invasion. On March 27, the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave control of the strategic air forces to Eisenhower. But Harris and Spaatz still went on arguing, and it was not until April 17, 1944 that Eisenhower directed implementation of the Transportation Plan and Pointblank. But still nothing but Pointblank was implemented. BC raised the spectre of massive French civilian casualties which Churchill sent to FDR on May 7, 1944. FDR replied on May 11 that it was Eisenhower's decision.
8. Harris finally got the message, complied, and implemented well starting in earnest on the eve of D-Day.
9. But Harris was not convinced, and soon topped bombing railroads to concentrate on area bombing. This came to light in an analysis by Zuckerman of how the Germans managed the build-up for the Ardennes counteroffensive, which could never have happened had the Transportation Plan continued to be implemented. Harris did not speak the truth in his memoirs when he said he had always supported the Transportation Plan.
10. Zuckerman saw the light when he studied the Southern Italian and Sicilian railroad results. From then on he argued that Transportation should be the sole target for all of the Allied strategic heavy bombers. German industry would then grind to a halt without the need for bombing cities or factories, because inputs and outputs could not be moved. It seems the Germans in Bill Walker's list of quotes agreed with Zuckerman. I certainly do, but my point has always been that destroying the Achilles' heel of transportation or electrical generation and supply was a job for TAF Mosquitos, which made BC redundant. Fahey shows how much money that would have saved. Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony - those are well reasoned arguments but lend themselves to post mortems. The clear message is that Harris, like Spaatz had enormous influence for their points of views and the political clout to advance their theories despite heavy losses.

There is no doubt that Transportation was a critical strategic resource, as well as Power, as well as the Petro/Chem industry.

The challenge is that each thesis had to have enough analytics behind them that the argument could a.) be easily grasped and b.) easily presented to Churchill and FDR.. otherwise they depend on the senior officers in charge to make the decisions and be accountable for the results.

To the last point, it was only possible AFTER the war to parse through the German production and logistics and perspectives to gain true insight to the relevance and resources which "could" have been wiser and better choices. Facts were hard to come by during the day to day parsing of bombing results.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hello Tony
IMHO Mossie was not nearly as good as a heavy bomber against marshalling yards, one key target type of transport plan, which needed to be saturated with bombs to make them inoperative. Also some sturdy bridges/viaducts were easier to knock down with superheavy bombs, of which only Lancs were able to carry in ETO.

Didn’t notice that earlier
Quote:” that first arose in 1947, and which I finally answered to my own satisfaction only in 1995.

In 1947 as an 8-year-old living in Germany, I was taken by my father to a battlefield where his unit, 2 Lincolns in 3rd British Infantry Division had succeeded at great loss in breaking through the German defences on March 2, 1945. We placed flowers on the graves of 24 soldiers who had died that day and whose remains were soon moved to the Reichswald War Cemetery - the CWGC's largest.

The question that arose then was later verbalised into this: why did the Allies, with control of the air and unlimited resources, lose so many men, and find it so difficult, to advance against the remnants of a beaten German Army within six weeks of the end of the war?”

At least the Soviet system didn’t produce a sure answer, look http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ilomantsi, that battle ended 3 weeks before armistice between SU and Finland. Now Soviet losses might well have been only ½ of that mentioned in the article but still fairly high.

Juha

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

A comparison of the key issues raised in Hansen's account (Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942-45) with those of Goebbels (diary) on the same subject follows:

Hansen: "It cannot be proved that bombing prevented the increase in arms production from being considerably greater than it was."

Goebbels: "The damage to our armaments potential is quite beyond repair"; "we are bombed day and night and damage to our ... armaments potential is very severe"; and "our armaments potential ... (is) being battered to such an extent that we shall be standing in a void."

Hansen: Destruction of cities "may have helped the war effort by releasing workers from non-essential occupations to work in the armaments industry."

Goebbels: "... bombed cities undergo pretty bad dislocation of public life as a result of which workers often stay away from their workbenches for weeks ... This explains the large production deficits we record"; "Destruction in the munitions industry can be more easily repaired than is the case with the disorganization in cities"; "the population ... is sunk in lethargy and looks upon events of the war with the greatest apathy. This is primarily due to months of uninterrupted enemy air bombing"; "Once again a major attack descended upon the Reich capital. One of the main targets was large munitions plants. The situation has become even more alarming in that one industrial plant after another has been set on fire."

Hansen: "The effects of these (British) raids on production (in the Ruhr) were minimal."

Goebbels: "... another exceedingly heavy (British) raid on Essen. This time Krupp has been hard hit"; "the night raid of the English on Dortmund has been extraordinarily heavy ... with industrial and munitions plants (having) been hit."

Hansen: "After two years, the effects of the (British) bomber dream was obvious to everyone but Harris himself."

Goebbels: "The Berlin munitions industry is still in bad shape. Alkett [which produced almost half of Germany's field pieces and was hit during a British raid] is almost completely destroyed"; "it is necessary that we overcome England's nerve-wracking air superiority"; "I cannot understand how the English can do so much damage."

Hansen: "They (the Americans) wanted to avoid hitting towns if they could"; "... the U.S. will not at any time direct (its) efforts towards area bombing."

Goebbels: "... frightful damage wrought daily by the American Air Force on unfortified and undefended German towns"; "The Americans over fly German territory almost unrestricted and are destroying one town after another"; "The Americans carried out heavy area bombing of (Berlin) causing fearful devastation. In extent, this raid was at least as heavy as the last terror raid."

Hansen: "Despite the failure of area bombing to deliver results ... it was clear, and increasingly so, that area bombing was not delivering results"; "... area bombing was a moral and strategic failure."

Goebbels: "... for in the last analysis all our setbacks are due to failure of the Luftwaffe to stop allied air attacks"; "Our entire military predicament is due to enemy air superiority"; "The reason for our military decay is to be found in the air terror."

more: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=content;col1

Esprit de Corps Sept, 2010 by Michael Jarvis

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Thanks for these Kutscha. I'm not sure Goebbels was a great expert on production and military matters in general, but it clearly shows the bombing campaign was worrying high German officials. That alone counts for something.

If I may offer a general comment:

Global war is a complicated affair, with a need to deploy multiple weapons and methods in multiple locations. It is easy with what we know today to calculate what worked and what didn't, but at the time this information was not always available to the leaders on both sides. They had to try everything they could at every chance they got, or risk falling behind. I think that in the end it wasn't any one weapon or tactic that won or lost the war. Instead, it was the greater willingness of the Allies to try a bit of everything, and their greater ability to try a bit of everything (because of production capability, manpower resources, training strategies, etc.) that won the war.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Two points.
1). In his December 1943 report on the Sicilian and Southern Italian railways that persuaded Tedder and Eisenhower to insist on the Transportation Plan over BC's objections, Zuckerman wrote; "The two factors which contributed most to the outcome of the offensive ... were the destruction and damaging of rolling-stock and repair facilities. Largely because of this, the Sicilian and Southern Italian rail systems had become practically paralysed by the end of July 1943 - as a result of attacks on only six railway centres, Naples, Foggia, San Giovanni, Reggio, Messina, Palermo. ..... so too was the finding (unexpected) that the most economic way to disrupt communications was not to cut lines, but to attack large railway centres which contain important repair facilities and large concentrations of locomotives and rolling stock.... The efficiency of a railway system ... appears to fall very rapidly when bombing simultaneously leads to an increase in the calls upon, and a decrease in the capacity of the repair facilities."

2) Zuckerman does not specify the weight of bomb used in paralysing the Sicilian and Southern Italian railway system, but I would be surprised if any bomb larger than the 4,000 lb (1,182kg) bomb was used on that task in mid-1943.
And please remember that this large bomb could be carried by the 54 Mosquito B Mk IVs that were modified by BC with a bulged bomb bay. So I believe the Mosquito was up to fulfilling the Transportation Plan had that aircraft been available in numbers - which it would have been in the absence of BC.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony
geography of Italy and France is very different and so were their rail networks and as Zuckermann writes, the most effective way to knock out a railway system was to attack big marshalling yards, repair works were usually at marshalling yards and usually there were plenty of rolling stocks there. And most effective way to do that was a massive attack with heavy bombers, so USAAF and RAF had the right tools for that.

Juha