Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

And what was the net result of destroying this bridge? Germany was defeated maybe a day or two later?

This story reminds me very much of some recent reading on the German night fighter force. It glorified and catered to a small number of highly skilled and successful pilots, giving them individual aircraft modifications, first choice of interception areas, etc. The end result was some very impressive statistics for the individual pilots, but not for the night fighter force as a whole. This kind of approach had some benefit in the very short campaigns the Germans fought early in the war, but was self-defeating in the protracted struggle that the war became. In the end this handful of highly capable individuals was overwhelmed by masses of average aircrew (no disrespect meant) flying masses of average aircraft. I think this is part of of what Six Nifty 50s was referring to in his mention of a "cost/benefit analysis". Given the choice of developing highly skilled individuals (and aircraft to suit them) or producing masses of average aircrew in average aircraft, the Allies made one choice, and the Germans made another. History tells us who was correct.

It is obvious that the Allies quickly realized that this was to be a long war, and adopted training and equipment philosophies to suit this. The Germans realized this too late, if at all. In my opinion, looking at this underlying difference in philosophies does far more to explain differences in equipment fielded and tactics used by the two air forces than talking about "Tribalism" amongst senior officers.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

"On Oct 5 1943 dive bombing was officially abandoned with the Stukageschwaders being redesignated to Schlachtgeschwaders and commited almost exclusively to the low level ground attack role."

The now useless dive brakes were often removed.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

From this interesting article on dive bombers:

http://www.australianflying.com.au/n...e-bomber-myths


"By the time the Trumpets of Jericho (Jericho-Trompeten - dive sirens) were being discussed in the Allied press, they had had their heyday and were being phased out due to their lack of surprise effect and because of drag."

The Ju-87 probably lost its air brakes for the same reason, to reduce drag. The faster you dive, the faster you come out of the dive, making you less of a target.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Basic physics shows things are not this simple. At a constant maximum g load (set by the design of the aircraft and the physical limits of the pilot) the radius of the pull up maneuver goes up as the square of any speed increase. In other words, a 20% increase in speed through the pull up requires a 44% bigger radius. The actual length along the arc (from start of pull up to when the aircraft resumes straight line flight) goes up linearly with the radius. So, the aircraft has a 44% longer curved flight path, flown at only 20% greater speed. Time during the pull out (when the aircraft is lowest, flight path is most predicable, and therefore the AA gunner's job is easiest) is thus increased. Also, if the aircraft releases the bomb before the pull up starts, for greatest accuracy, the minimum release altitude has to increase (to keep the low point in the pull up arc above the ground).

Dive brakes were intended to limit the aircraft to some maximum speed in the dive. This gives some "hang time", allowing the pilot to adjust the aim point and release at some optimum altitude without worrying about airspeed during the dive and pull up. If the dive brakes are removed, dive bombing tactics become very different. No dive brakes means no more "traditional" (i.e. very steep) dive bombing.

Added in edit: The drag of the sirens was present at all phases of flight, limiting both maximum speed and range with a given payload (or payload over a given range).

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Spitfire pilots operating in close support were trained to bomb in a dive, as were Typhoon and Hurricane pilots as far as I recall, whilst not dedicated dive bombers diving at the angles of a Stuka would this explain the RAF not operating purpose built aircraft in this role?
Interstingly Adrian Warburton "Warby" used a Maryland to dive bomb an Italian ship off Malta!

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Tony
Yefim Gordon's and Sergey Komissarov’s Il-2 and Il-10 book has lot of pictures but also a fair amount of text. But be careful on its combat narrative sections, info is based on old Soviet info and attack results given are many times optimistic sometimes wildly so. I liked Oleg Rastrenin’s Il-2 book in Osprey’s Combat A/C series. He has written also proper books on the subject.

On German sources, unfortunately my most serious interest on German units are/were 1st-7th, 11th and 12th PzDs, of which only 2nd and 11th fought also in West during the later part of the war.
There is a unit history on 2nd PzD, but I haven’t see it. There is also a unit history on the A/T battalion of the div, Friedens- und Kriegslebnisse einer Generation. Schweinfurt (1961?). I read the book a couple decades ago but IIRC it was a better unit history. On 11th PzD I have only see a pictorial history and a couple articles on its retreat along Rhone Valley during Aug 44.

One more which comes to my mind is Wolfgang Vopersal’s Soldaten, Kämpfer Kameraden. It is a unit history of 3rd SS Div Totenkopf. I was very positively surprised when I read the Band III (1987) on the battles fought during summer 43 and Band IVa on the battles fought during Autumn 43. The div fought only in the Eastern front after 1941 but the books seemed to give a realistic picture on the war in the East.

The German books mentioned off course concentrated on ground war but they mentioned also effects of air attacks.

Now I must stop.

HTH
Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Another small point, but I didn't question accuracy of dive bombers, they were very accurate.

However regards this posting we are not questioning the accuracy of a dive bomber vs a Blenhiem, what would be interesting is a comparison of a dive bomber vs a Typhoon or a P47. Vengeances were replaced by the P47 in RAF service presumably for good reasons and one of those would be that the Fighter Bomber had a good enough accuracy, maybe not as good as a Dive Bomber but good enough.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I also notice that he was shot down six times, lucky man and that was against the Russian Forces.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Kryten, the term "dive bombing" has had several meanings through the years. In these threads Tcolvin appears to stick to the original narrow sense of the term: releasing the bomb from a vertical or very nearly vertical dive. This tactic was developed in the 1920s and 1930s, and theoretically gave great accuracy. On the other hand, aircraft designed for this specific task were at a disadvantage in terms of payload and maneuverability, and the maneuver, once understood by the enemy, gave lots of opportunities for opposing AA gunners and fighters.

You will find the term used loosely from WW2 up to today to describe any tactic where the bomb is released in a dive, even from fairly shallow angles. Don't get hung up on the words, you need to understand what the aircraft was actually doing in order to follow this discussion. I think most 2 TAF "dive bombing" was at angles of 30 to 45 degrees below the horizon. This gave less accuracy, but afforded the aircraft a wider range of approach options, and was a maneuver possible for fighter aircraft, as opposed to pure dive bombers like a Stuka. This meant the 2 TAF could use true multi-role fighters, that could also do strafing and rocket attacks, and hold their own in air-to-air combat. As the Luftwaffe learned in the Battle of Britain, a true dive bomber is a "one trick pony".

It is interesting to note that allmost all the 2 TAF "dive bombing" was done in aircraft originally designed as interceptors: the Spitfire and the Typhoon. Some here suggest this resulted from ignorance or deliberate hostility to other branches by senior RAF staff. I personally believe that it is more a reflection of the tough decisions made at all levels in the Allied government and military on the allocation of finite resources amongst a large number of competing demands. Like any compromise, somebody always looses, at least relatively. A similar trade off had to be made with large aircraft and their trained crews going to Bomber Command or Coastal Command, generating alot of unresolved questions over the years. Rather than lengthy discussions of "what could have been" (which can never be truly resolved) we should be looking at the overall outcome of the trade offs made on both sides. In most wars it is not "the best side" that wins, but the "least bad side".

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I agree. And the comparison should not just be on accuracy, but on the overall contribution to victory, and cost to the Allies, of each aircraft type. The purpose of the RAF was never just to destroy bridges, but to win the war with the available resources. Destroying bridges or any point target is only one part of a bigger task.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Please do not shout at me for going off at a tangent, but we are debating the merits of the Spitfire and Typhoon and their ability or inability to hit precise targets when compared with the dive bombers of either the VVS or the Luftwaffe.

There is one very large airforce operating in Europe alongside the RAF that also lacked dedicated dive bombers, i.e. the 9th USAAF. In 1944-5 they had lots of P-47s and some P-38s and P-51s. No Vengences or Dauntlesses. I wonder why?

12th USAAF was also largely dive bomberless (except for a few A-36s, which were replaced by more conventional fighter bombers in 1944- for production reasons)

Please do not tell me they were brainwashed by the RAF and could not think for themselves. I would argue that the USAAF (interestingly an Army Air Force) looked at the Western European environment which was likely to develop following an invasion. An environment that was likely to densly fill up with ground units and their associated flak defenses (high densities of Army Divisions/mile, in comparison with the wide open spaces of the Eastern Front where there were more men but much more space too) and an environment where fighter defences were likely to be well trained and capable. Given that scenario the USAAF chose fighter bomber types for their ground support, which were more flexible and capable in a range of roles than a dedicated dive bomber.

Could they have equipped a number of Dive Bomber Groups? Certainly they could have. Did they? No

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

The single-seat Typhoon and P47 would bomb with far less accuracy than a slower Blenheim IV bomber which was equipped with bomb sights manned by a trained bomb aimer who would direct the pilot.

There was no good reason for replacing the Vengeance in RAF service. It was done to avoid continuing RAF embarrassment at its success, news of which was filtering back to the UK (see Peter C Smith).

I suppose you know the quantified inaccuracy of Typhoon RPs provided by the Operational Research Sections of 21AG and RAF.
The percentage of shots hitting a; a) small gun position was 0.2%; b) Panther tank 0.5%; c) large gun position 0.8%; d) army hut 2.8%; and e) large building 10.0%. The number of sorties needed for a 50% chance of a hit on; a) was 44; for b) 18; c) 11; d) 3; and e) 1.

Remember what Gill said; 2 sorties would guarantee a hit on a bridge.
On the basis of cost-benefit, the Vengeance always won hands down.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Giles, that's no tangent. It shows you're catching on. There is no mystery why the A36 was dropped. The USAAF did not want it and decided to kill production on March 22, 1943, even before the A-36 had flown its first mission. The decision was made on the recommendation of a Board of Officers convened to study the USAAF's needs and requirements, and to "evaluate current dive-bombers now in production". Their opinion was that, "dive bombers in general, and converted Navy dive-bombers in particular, were not so useful for the tactical conditions encountered by Army Air Forces combat units as were low level attack bombers".
On July 12, 1943, just as the A-36A was proving itself to be an invaluable weapon, the Truman Committee of the Senate issued a press release; "The Army has concluded that it will have little need for additional dive-bombers, for the reason that dive-bombers cannot be operated unless there is a clear air superiority, and then only when the ground forces are not adequately equipped with anti-aircraft equipment".
This press release accurately reflected RAF thinking, so I am afraid your worst fears are true and the USAAF was "brainwashed by the RAF and could not think for themselves" (your words).

A footnote; Col George R Halliwell flew the A-36 from July 1943 to March 1944. He said this; "I've dive-bombed in the P-40 and the A-36 in WWII, in the F-80 and F-86 during the Korean War and in the F-4 Phantom against North Vietnam. Against all these the accuracy of the A-36 stood out head and shoulders above all the others and this was primarily because you could utilise the truly vertical dive with the A-36". (quoted in "Straight Down" by Peter C Smith, which is a must-read if you are interested in dive-bombing).

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Let's see the numbers. Be sure to include the 6,000 foot runway needed by a Vengeance, the high maintenance man-hours per flight hour, and the cost of building, manning and maintaining the escorting Typhoons and Spitfires.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I suspect not, the slow level bomber which is an easy target for AA fire, carring a bomb with a max size of 250lb flying at altitude would probably be no more accurate than a dive bombing Typhoon with his 2 x 1000lb bombs.

Can you give a quote for this statement that it was done to avoid embarrassment?

Well known and interesting figures but I cannot see the connection with the debate as I can not recall any dive bombers firing rockets. Its interesting that the RAF seemed to have started switching from rockets to bombs towards the end of the war. Tempests for instance were never equipped with rockets and some Typhoon squadrons were changing from rockets to bombs as well.

However while we are on the topic of accuracy, you didn't make any comments about the Finns observations that IL 2 attacks were ineffective against small targets due to their lack of accuracy.

A fair point however, why then did they replace them with P47's and I don't buy the 'to save embarassment story' without some evidence. If they were worried about embarassment they wouldn't have used Wellingtons and Hurricanes right until the end.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Well that is one spin one could put on the statement. Or, it was a conclusion reached independently.

Those A-36s operated in areas (27FBG, 86FBG in the MTO, 311FBG in the CBI) that did not have large enemy fighter forces.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Glider.
I'm afraid you're revealing a sketchy knowledge of this subject.

In terms of accuracy, the Blenheim bomber was always more accurate at the same altitude as a glide-bombing Typhoon. (They rarely dive-bombed; in fact the only case I know was Lallement who fired his RPs vertically into tanks because it was the only way of ensuring a kill). The Blenheim was less vulnerable to FLAK because of its air-cooled engines, and it could fly on one engine if the other was shot up. However being slower over the target it was vulnerable for longer than the Typhoon. But we were discussing accuracy and not vulnerability.

Read 'Vengeance' by Peter C Smith for a full expose of the RAF's despicable behaviour with regard to dive-bombing. Page 104 has the following; "The 8th July 1943 was notable as the first-ever time that a reference to Vengeance aircraft operating in Burma was given by the BBC in London. Hitherto Air Ministry policy had been to pour scorn and ridicule on dive-bombers and dive-bombing at every opportunity and the media had faithfully reflected this policy. The successful use of dive-bombers, with no losses and maximum efficiency, was in such stark contrast to the previous three years' proclamations as to leave the RAF hoist with its own petard. There was considerable embarrassment and it was only with reluctance that they finally admitted a few of the facts". But it also increased their determination to stop operating any dive-bomber and to speed up the transfer of the crews to P-47s and Liberators, in order to eliminate the possibility of further embarrassment.

It is untrue to say the RAF switched from rockets to bombs; they operated Bombphoons and Typhoon RPs together at all times.

It is also untrue to say the Tempest FBII was not equipped with rockets - it was, and although the aircraft never saw action in NW Europe, it was to have used RPs in Japan.
BTW, the Tempest FBII with the Centaurus air-cooled engine would have had higher survivability than the Typhoon with its fitter's-nightmare and glycol-cooled Sabre. So why didn't the Tempest FBII replace the Typhoon 1B? Did the RAF top brass actually care a damn about its pilots? If they did, they had a funny way of showing it.

There is no reason to think the Il-2 was any more accurate than the Typhoon. Where the Il-2 scored was in survivability, because it was immune to all German infantry weapons. These were what killed you when you flew low over infantry.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

[quote=Bill Walker;127710]Kryten, the term "dive bombing" has had several meanings through the years. In these threads Tcolvin appears to stick to the original narrow sense of the term: releasing the bomb from a vertical or very nearly vertical dive. This tactic was developed in the 1920s and 1930s, and theoretically gave great accuracy. On the other hand, aircraft designed for this specific task were at a disadvantage in terms of payload and maneuverability, and the maneuver, once understood by the enemy, gave lots of opportunities for opposing AA gunners and fighters.

You will find the term used loosely from WW2 up to today to describe any tactic where the bomb is released in a dive, even from fairly shallow angles. Don't get hung up on the words, you need to understand what the aircraft was actually doing in order to follow this discussion. I think most 2 TAF "dive bombing" was at angles of 30 to 45 degrees below the horizon. This gave less accuracy, but afforded the aircraft a wider range of approach options, and was a maneuver possible for fighter aircraft, as opposed to pure dive bombers like a Stuka. This meant the 2 TAF could use true multi-role fighters, that could also do strafing and rocket attacks, and hold their own in air-to-air combat. As the Luftwaffe learned in the Battle of Britain, a true dive bomber is a "one trick pony".

It is interesting to note that allmost all the 2 TAF "dive bombing" was done in aircraft originally designed as interceptors: the Spitfire and the Typhoon. Some here suggest this resulted from ignorance or deliberate hostility to other branches by senior RAF staff. I personally believe that it is more a reflection of the tough decisions made at all levels in the Allied government and military on the allocation of finite resources amongst a large number of competing demands. Like any compromise, somebody always looses, at least relatively. A similar trade off had to be made with large aircraft and their trained crews going to Bomber Command or Coastal Command, generating alot of unresolved questions over the years. Rather than lengthy discussions of "what could have been" (which can never be truly resolved) we should be looking at the overall outcome of the trade offs made on both sides. In most wars it is not "the best side" that wins, but the "least bad side".[/quote

Hi Bill,
Whilst not getting hung up on the "dive bomber" term , my point is simply I doubt the RAF could see any real benefits to developing a dive bomber in the stuka sense when they allready had fighter bombers early on in the shape of the Hurricane and P40 that could deliver bombs with sufficient accuracy relative to the numbers available.

Bearing in mind stukas failed to hit thier targets on a number of occasions (just reading through Fortress Malta) whilst suffering heavy losses to enemy fighters and ground fire, I would suggest the concept became more of a liability as the war progressed and higher performance fighter aircraft and AAA became available to thier opponents!

consider what would have happened if the UK had deployed Luftwaffe 1944 levels of light flak during the BOB when the stukas were attacking chain home installations for instance!

Losses of Typhoon and Spitfires to AAA in Normandy I would argue has a direct relationship to the increase in AAA the Germans had to deploy to counter the weakness of the Luftwaffe at that time, saturate a target with flak and someones going to hit!

so would the performance advantages of a fighter bomber and its time exposed to AAA and enemy interception make a fighter bomber more effective at that time?

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I will let the other members of this forum decide who has a balanced and informed understanding of the topic.

Dive bombing was the preferred choice for Typhoons when using bombs unless there was no alternative, with the dive starting at 8,000ft for Typhoons and pull out at 4,000ft (6,000 and 3,000 for Spitfires) dive angle was between 60 and 45 degrees with the leader using 60 degrees and the following pilots between 60 and 45 as they would dive together. Attacks normally by section but sometimes individually. Low level bombing was used on large single buildings as the face of the building was used to expload the bombs.
60 degrees isn't 90 degrees but it is steep and a high level of accuracy can be obtained.
I don't pretend to know what height Blenhiems normally bombed at but am confident that apart from special low level raids it wasn't 4,000ft. Besides vulnerability and accuracy do have a link, anyone can do well on a bombing range and no one is shooting at you, its how well you perform in action that counts.I hope to read the book next week if the British Museum have a copy. However I do note that the first Vengence Missions were in March with the second squadron starting in June, so it wasn't too tardy in reporting them. Secondly the AA fire and fighter oposition in Burma was almost negligable compared to the opposition in Europe, to compare the two is chalk and cheese.

Sorry but it is true to say that the emphasis in 2 TAF was switching. We know that the Tempest wasn't equipped with rockets, we know that the 2TAF FB Mosquito's didn't use rockets on the wings and we do know that some Typhoon squadrons were retraining to use bombs instead of rockets. This was mentioned in an earlier posting of mine. Rockets were always the weapon of choice against shipping which in view of the accuracy figures you gave is understandable. Its also true to say that some Typhoon squadrons kept rockets until the end of the war.
Sorry but you are also wrong to say that bombphoons and Typhoon RP were used together at all times. It was a rare occaision when this happened. Squadrons were trained in either bombing or rocket firing and if the Rockets were to be used, then the bomber squadrons often acted as fighter escort and in reverse.

I don't know why you raised this. I thought we were talking about the war and the Tempest FBII wasn't operational during the war.

As I said earlier the Tempest II wasn't operational during the war with the first production aircraft being built in Oct 1944.

This we have covered a number of times the IL 2 could take more damage, but was a hell of a lot easier to hit. It was invulnerable to mg fire whereas the Typhoon had the radiator issue but was otherwise well protected against mg fire. My position is and always has been that these factors probably balanced out. I do agree with you over the accuracy.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

The first squadron to receive Tempest IIs was No. 183 Sqd. It replaced the Spitfire IX in squadron service. 183 Sqd operated Tempest IIs initially from Chilbolton Hampshire from Aug 17 1945 to Nov 1945, when it was disbanded.

The second squadron to receive the Tempest II was No.247 Sqd. It replaced the Typhoon in squadron service. 247 Sqd operated Tempest IIs from Aug 20 1945 to May 1946 from Chilbolton Hampshire when Vampire Is replaced the Tempest IIs.

These were the only two squadrons to receive Tempest IIs during the war.

No. 33 Sqd received Tempest IIs in Nov 1945. In 1949, while stationed in Malaya, it used RPs.

I don't know how the Tempest IIs could to be used in Japan as it didn't have the range to reach Japan from any Allied base.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Glider and Kutscha,

"Tempest IIs produced during the war were intended for combat against Japan, and would have formed part of a proposed British Commonwealth long range bomber force based on Okinawa, Tiger Force. The Pacific War ended before they could be deployed." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawker_Tempest

Basta. Let's call it a day.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Not on this planet. On 7th May 1944, five P-47 Thunderbolts of the 365 Fighter Group attacked the steel railway bridge at Vernon, France. The weapon of choice was 1000-lb. General Purpose bombs. A sixth pilot started his run, then broke off when one of the three spans of the bridge fell into the River Seine. All this was verified by photographs, and marked the first time that this unit had ever dive-bombed a target.

Oh yeah, and there was intense ground fire. All of the major crossings over the Seine were flak traps. There is no reason to expect that a slow-flying Stuka or Vengeance would have survived this trip.




I have a copy of Straight Down!, but you are disingenuous about the contents. Most of the highlights about "accuracy" or dive-bombed targets are based on pilot claims, not post-strike photos or ground investigations. The only piece of back-up material I saw in this book was one picture of a bridge cut, which the author attributed to A-36 attacks.

There are quite a few more pictures of bridges taken out by 9th Air Force Medium Bombers, published by John Moench in his Marauder Men. The P-47 Thunderbolts of the 368th Fighter Group were credited with 33 bridges destroyed.




Except that the A-36 was, in reality, just another fighter-bomber. It was only masquerading as a specialized dive-bomber. Ironically, that fact is exactly why the A-36 was a lot more versatile than the Ju-87 which you so admire. A Mustang refitted with dive brakes and a low-altitude supercharger might have been helpful at certain times, but the value of those refinements were exaggerated by the author.





Nearly all pilots who weighed in on this matter believed that the Mustang was not well suited to fighter-bomber operations. The 370th Fighter Group history reinforces that oft-repeated opinion. The group flew P-38s until replaced by the P-51 in 1945, and the change was not entirely well received. Every pilot who was asked said that, for various reasons, the Lightning was better than the Mustang in the ground attack role.




Unless the Blenheim squadron had radio navigation aids, the aircrews had no hope of outperforming a P-47 fighter-bomber squadron against the typical targets. It doesn't matter whether it was level bombing, dive-bombing, skip-bombing, or any other kind.

On 17th July 1944, one squadron of P-47 Thunderbolts from the 362nd Fighter Group attacked the heavy bridge over the Seine at Rouen, France. 1,000-lb. GP bombs were used and five direct hits were scored, making two of four lanes impassable. The weapons were released in level flight, and more importantly, the pilots did this while flying blind over the target. The flight was controlled by a ground radar station built by IX TAC. The primary tools included a MEW radar, a SCR-584 radar borrowed from a U.S. Army artillery unit, and a salvaged Norden bombsight which acted as a computer and was moved over a custom map table to guide the air strike by radio.

On the same day, the IX TAC introduced two other weapons that proved to be more effective than GP bombs on certain types of targets. Fourteen P-38s of the 370th Fighter Group dropped napalms on a German headquarters at Countances, and fourteen rocket-armed P-47s of the 406th Fighter Group attacked the Nevers railyards with HVAR.





I don't think that any RAF Thunderbolt pilot would accept that opinion. Also they were quite smitten by the destructive power and psychological benefits of napalm fire bombs. A thick jungle hideout might slow down bullets and fragments, but the bush offered considerably less protection against burning jellied gasoline.





For some reason, you still ignore Luftwaffe officers who reached the same consensus. Ernst Kupfer, Hubertus Hitschhold, and Paul Deichmann to name a few. In his manuscript German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, General Deichmann wrote that: "one important disadvantage of the dive-bomber was that it could not be employed when the cloud ceiling was lower than 2,600 feet, since the bombs could only be released in a relatively vertical dive. The manufacture of these aircraft ceased in October 1943" …

He continues: "When it became evident during the war that the Ju-87 was too slow to protect itself, the decision was taken after numerous tests to equip the ground attack units with FW-190 planes, a fighter model, after various adaptations in the plane's equipment. Operational testing of this model commenced early in 1942"...

Deichmann added that 1,100-lb bombs "came into use as an emergency measure" because direct hits on a small target like a tank was wishful thinking, and it was hoped that a larger blast from a near miss might immobilize the tank if close enough. However, "the explosive pressure of this bomb could not incapacitate a tank unless it exploded within roughly 12 feet of the target, and immediately above the ground" … "In practice, near hits capable of putting a tank out of action proved a rare exception."




Here is another statistic: In 1944, live fire tests against a captured tank by RAF Typhoons scored three direct hits out of 64 rockets fired. But I don't think it's unreasonable to conclude that the best Ju-87 pilot in the Luftwaffe might drop 500 bombs before he scored three direct hits on enemy tanks.

Testimony from German prisoners told the RAF that being attacked by aircraft rockets had a demoralizing effect that was similar to flame weapons like napalm. The nature of the attack was even more terrifying to the victims than the damage it caused.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Wow. The RAF high command had even brain washed the Luftwaffe!

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

More research on the JU87 removal of dive brakes:
The dive brakes were removed for the ground attack versions of the JU87, not the dive bomber. Specifically, versions JU87 D-5 and the Ju87 G (anti tank) circa March 1943.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Glider,
I note you also have found no quantification of the accuracy of dive-bombing compared with glide-bombing, nor indeed of RPs and bombs compared with airborne PAKs. So we're left with anecdotes and opinion.

The army required a TAF that could;

1. destroy machine guns and PAKs
2. destroy hardened defences
3. destroy artillery
4. destroy tanks and StuGs
5. suppress or neutralise fire so the army could move on the battlefield
6. destroy bridges

Based on anecdotes and experience, 2TAF should have had no difficulty destroying the Wesel bridges (6), having brought down all of the Seine bridges from the Paris banlieues to the sea. Postwar they plumped for mediums, and not fighter-bombers. The Vengeance could certainly have done the job when combined with FLAK suppression by strafing fighters.


Machine guns and PAKs (1) were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing. 2TAF claimed and believed they could do it, but in effect were providing a bit of 5) – fire suppression. In some circumstances this was better than nothing, but because of the vulnerability of Spitfire and Typhoon to infantry weapons, support was necessarily tentative. On a cost-benefit basis there was no sense in sacrificing a Typhoon plus pilot for an MG42. It was here the Il-2 gained, not because it was more accurate, but because its immunity to infantry weapons permitted intensive use. For higher value opposition, such as the 88-mm Pakfront, the Vengeance would have gained because of accuracy.


Hardened defences (2) were beyond 2TAF's capabilities. Something perhaps could have been done with the Vengeance and hollow charge bombs, even if it only achieved suppression (5) for long enough to enable movement by tanks and infantry.


Artillery (3) was protected by FLAK. 2TAF's answer was to fly mediums above the FLAK, but accuracy was poor because of height and visibility. This was the target of choice for the Vengeance when combined with simultaneous strafing by fighters to suppress the FLAK.


Tanks and StuGs (4) were targeted by RP Typhoons which were hopelessly inaccurate. 2TAF also used Bombphoons; I know of a half-squadron of Bombphoons attacking in vain a StuG in Kervenheim. 2TAF hadn't the equipment for destroying AFVs. They needed an airborne PAK mounted in an armoured aircraft, like the Ju-87G or Hs129B. The RAF used an unarmoured Hurricane IID in this role in the desert with success, but losses from FLAK required it be armoured, and armour was ordered from Britain. This ran up against Air Ministry policy so the Hurricane IID was scrapped.


That covers the range of equipment inadequacy. The flawed structural relationship between 2TAF and 21AG was a more serious matter that fed back to cause the equipment problem.


You again raise a red herring with the question of the Ju-87 being too slow to defend itself. This became a serious matter for Deichmann only when the GAF lost air superiority. As the problem appeared for the GAF it disappeared for the RAF who began flying their Heavies in daylight for the first time. Thus no problem either for the Vengeance.


Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Tony
according to my sources, those Hurri IIDs used operationally by 6 Sqn in the desert had extra armour, only 92 first out of 300 IIDs had only the same armour protection than IICs because it was first thought that with 2 40mm guns a/c was already overburdened, but those lightly armoured planes were mostly used for training. and the later planes had extra 368lb (167kg) extra armour which produced considerable performance penalty. And IID was followed by a definite armoured ground attack version. Mk IV, which were used to the end of the war in Med and in Far East. IMHO GA Hurris were as well armoured as was rationally possible to given power.

And if the FLAK was too dangerous to fighter bombers it would have took heavy toll also from srafing fighters trying to support Vengeances.

Effectiveness of air support depended on many factors, so one can took individual cases to prove any opinion one wants. During Karelian Isthmus operations in Summer 44 hundreds of Soviet Il-2s or Pe-2s didn't manage to destroy a single AFV of the Finnish Armoured Div. IIRC the most effective air attack on it was made by Il-4 medium bombers, they damaged a AA tank. Also the most effective air attack on Finnish infantry I can recall was made by Il-4s, not Il-2s. They managed to disperse badly a reserve infantry battalion and caused very heavy losses to it. Was the Il-4 better CAS plane than Il-2, IMHO no. I have no info on their relative effectiveness against Finnish artillery and terrain here made life must more difficult to GA planes than the plains in Ukraina. But if intelligence could pinpoint a unit not dug in a forest a medium bomber unit could deliver clearly more HE on it than an Il-2 unit

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hurricane Mk IVs operated from UK bases, No 137, 164 and 184 Squadrons.

It should be noted Juha that in the desert there wasn't the cover for AFVs to hide in, unlike in NW Europe.

I guess Tony is thinking these Vengeance dive bombers were sitting around doing nothing on UK bases for 2 years till June 1944.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Kutscha
1) yes, but they were replaced in early 44 by Typhoons in ETO, but continued serve till end of the war elsewhere

2) that was what I was saying, in Ukraina (or in the desert) there was much less cover than in Finland

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I happen to think that any airforce would have difficulty knocking down the Wesel bridges for the reasons stated earlier mainly their construction.

Sorry but I believe you to be wrong on this. B25/B26/Boston/Baltimore were all withdrawn very quickly after the war. Mosquitos were kept for a while but mainly in the PR/NF versions with some bombers. However, post war the Hornet, Tempest II and Vampire jets were brought into service as fighter bombers, can you tell me how you came to the statement that the RAF plumped for Medium Bombers?

You overate the effectiveness of Flak suppression, the Vengence would have had serious/very serious losses. Plus I understand that they could only carry 500lb bombs in a config of 2 x 500lb and 2 x 250lb. A good combination but the weapon of choice for bridges is 1000lb boombs.



Rubbish, 4 x 20mm is more than enough for a gun why use a 1000lb bomb.

Tentative support?. I take it you can support this statement with example of calls for support being declined.

It was a very unlucky Typhoon pilot who was lost to an LMG, he was a difficult target and well proctected, the Vengence was vulnerable, big, low and slow.


A big statement with nothing to support it. Do you have examples of 2TAF failing to destroy a target that they attacked? Remember here that the IL had a smaller bomb load and smaller bombs so how much better would the VVS be?


You keep saying this so lets get specific
a) Have you any example of mediums being used against artillery?
b) Have you any examples of FB's not being used against artillery?
c) If as you believe the RAF were scared about using FB against flak so FB's would attack, why would they use FB's against flak so the Vengence could attack?
d) If as you believe the RAF were scared about using FB against flak, why were FB's being used against shipping and airfields up to and including the last day of the war. Targets which any decent book on attack missions will tell you are amongst the most heavily defended targets of all?
e) If as we know the RAF FB didn't hesitate to attack heavily defended targets stuffed with 20 and 37mm guns, why do you believe they were afraid of an LMG, against which they were well protected?


And I know of an attack where 8 Typhoons attacked and left two german tanks destroyed and four smoking. Both our examples are exceptions that do not make them the rule. The average was somewhere in the middle.

I always thought that the Hurricane IID was replaced with the Hurricane IVD, not a cancellation but an improvement.


This is a new one on me, can you expand of the flawed relationship as it could be a difficult issue whatever the equipment


The problem for both the Ju87 and the Vengeance is that slow speed makes you a very easy target. We have discussed in some detail the difference between the well armoured but easier to hit IL 2 and the less well armoured but harder to hit Typhoon and as you know my opinion is that they would balance out.
The Venegnce would have the worst of both worlds being easier to hit than the Typhoon whilst lacking the protection of the IL2.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

BoB and Malta pilots are quoted in many publications stating JU87 was a sitting duck coming out of it's dive!
even to worn out and patched up Hurricanes in Malta.
sorry to interrupt.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

In essence, you imply that the RAF should have ordered a large and expensive fleet of Vengeance bombers in 1940, just in case they might be able to use them safely in 1945.

Surely you must have read about the limited manpower in the British armed forces. I can't wait for you to explain to us what the Vengeance air and ground crews were supposed to do until Allied troops crossed the Rhine.




Speaking of red herrings, that point might be valid if you proved that a significant number of RAF Typhoons were felled by bullets from light infantry weapons. Given enough time to research the cause of loss data, I could probably identify a few cases, but most of the writers who suggest the possibility of this happening have also failed to provide the names of any actual victims.

I would be willing to wager that bad weather killed more Typhoons than the MG 42.




This is a contradiction. If the Spitfire and Typhoon were so vulnerable as you claim, it hardly seems correct to throw them into a flak suppression role.




The Luftwaffe had the same problem because the Stuka was useless against the heavy fortresses on the Maginot Line and Sevastopol. Even if the Junkers 87 was redesigned to carry a 5,000-lb bomb, a direct hit would not be sufficient to knock out most of the enclosed positions.

A hollow charge bomb with enough power to destroy heavy concrete and steel bunkers or U-boat pens was still limited by the ability of the pilot to place it accurately. The best bet for reducing German forts was using flame weapons just prior to infantry attacks.




Repeating a delusion does not make it more believable.

There is no empirical evidence that a 75mm gun was consistently effective against the thick armor plating of the StuG III or Panzers IV, V, and VI. So why would the RAF want to bother with a wider deployment of its heavy and clumsy 40mm guns?

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Nifty.

Your points.

1. The RAF did order a "large and expensive fleet (300 aircraft) of Vengeance bombers in 1940". The British taxpayer paid for them and took delivery in 1942/43. They would therefore have been available, manned by trained crews, bombed and fuelled up, and ready to blitz Hillman on D-Day and support 21 Army Group through to Bremen in April 1945 if the RAF had believed in them. I have no idea, therefore, what you are talking about or what point you are trying to make with your sarcasm about resources being limited.
2. Of course aircraft vulnerable to FLAK were used in the FLAK suppression role. How else could FLAK be suppressed in WWII, or in Vietnam come to that?
3. I told you I was considering further the use of aircraft against fixed defences. The Wiki article I quoted claimed the German hollow-charge bomb could penetrate 11.5 feet of reinforced concrete. Hollow-charge bombs would have been developed by 1943 in order to rectify the Stuka's problem with the fixed defences in France/Belgium and at Sevastopol.
4. Airborne PAKs could easily penetrate the StuG III's 12-mm top plate and the 10-mm top plate of the Jagdpanzer IV. Rudel in his Ju-87G2 aimed his twin 37-mm guns at the engine covers when destroying 519 tanks and 150 StuGs. BTW, you know Rudel's withering opinion of RPs as "Quatsch". He told some Typhoon aces of 2TAF that he had tested RPs and rejected them as too inaccurate compared with guns. He did his homework while 2TAF did not.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Why would Rudel be attacking and destroying German armor, ie STuGs?

So Vengeance crews would be sitting around for up to two years with a war going on waiting for June 1944. Then they would go into combat with no operational experience.

How could hollow charge bombs, developed in 1943, be of help in Belgium/France in 1940 or Sevastopol in 1942-42?

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

This nicely summarizes the difference between the German attitude and the Allied attitude to pilots and weapons in general, as I alluded to earlier in my mention of the Luftwaffe's night fighter pilots. The Germans gave Rudel the equipment he wanted and allowed him to develop his own tactics. His personal accomplishment was, as a result, quite spectacular. If the Luftwaffe could have generated a thousand Rudels the war might have gone differently. They couldn't do this because there aren't a thousand Rudels, and because they spent so much time and money catering to a handful of super stars that they couldn't sustain large fleets. The Allies took the approach of fielding large numbers of "average" quality pilots and weapons. That meant concentrating production on a relatively small number of aircraft and weapon systems. With the luxury of hind sight we can second guess their choices in these fields, but the results were obviously good enough - unlike the results of the German approach. The Allied attitude to "special purpose" weapons like dive bombers can be seen in the remarks of Major General Davenport Johnson, Director of Military Requirements for the USAAF about the Vengeance: "a shining example of the waste of material, man-power, and time in the production of an airplane which this office has tried to eliminate for several months".

But of course he was brain washed by the evil RAF high command.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Yes, he was. You've quoted me before with sarcasm, and I let it pass because you were venting, and how boring it would be to correct every misapprehension. Now you've repeated your attempt at ridicule, perhaps it's time to respond lest others are influenced to think you're on to something.

I will quote from Tami Davis Biddle;
"Throughout the interwar years a debate raged inside the US military ......... about the degree to which an air force could and should act independently in war. A desire for greater autonomy naturally inclined the airmen to focus their attention on strategic bombing - a role that promised them greater independence, responsibility, and prestige. Their subordinate status caused them to behave differently from the British, but the differences were, ultimately, more in the realm of official action than in the realm of ideas. RAF leaders defended themselves and Air Corps leaders sought to assert themselves by using similar claims about the possibilities for independent air operations. In both cases, the circumstances caused them to become heavily invested in those claims.
....American airmen ..... were not immune from problematical assumptions, faulty analyses, oversights, and a tendency to make bold, unsubstantiated claims. The latter in particular stemmed from a desire to win greater freedom from the institutional confines of the army."

Thus, as you say, "The Allied attitude to "special purpose" weapons like dive bombers can be seen in the remarks of Major General Davenport Johnson, Director of Military Requirements for the USAAF about the Vengeance: "a shining example of the waste of material, man-power, and time in the production of an airplane which this office has tried to eliminate for several months"".

Bottom line; an Air Corps desperate for independence believed sincerely in the RAF's judgment that a B-29 trumps an A-31. 'Brain washing' was an apt description of the process whereby the Air Corps adopted the Air Ministry's Trenchardist nonsense. By contrast, the VVS and Luftwaffe developed their part in the war-winning all-arms equation by concentrating on specialised CAS equipment.

As for Rudel and the Kanonenvogel, the lesson lies in his success. The RAF had a surplus of fully trained pilots who could have got the best out of the Ju-87G2, whereas the GAF suffered from deteriorating training standards caused by the fuel shortage. So your point is irrelevant to the Allies.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

We are just playing with words here Tony, but you used the term "brain washing" in referring to decisions made by US senior military. Arriving at the same faulty conclusion through the same faulty thought process (if that is what actually happened) is hardly brain washing. If you called what appears to have happened simultaneously in the US and the UK the result of people of similar backgrounds reaching similar conclusions when presented with similar data, I would appreciate that as an interesting view point. When you allege active malfeasance in this process you lose all credibility in my eyes.

And are you serious when you talk about the "the VVS and Luftwaffe developed their part in the war-winning all-arms equation"? VVS maybe, but hardly the Luftwaffe.

The VVS suffered much higher casualties than the RAF in part due to their subservient role to the Army in the military and economical decision processes within the USSR. Given the massive casualties also suffered by the Russian Army and the Russian people, I don't see how the Russian process offers any advantage over what was done in the US and the UK. Destroying a bridge here or a pillbox there doesn't win wars. Sustained effort wins wars. The Allies (including the Russians) could do it, the Germans could not. The reasons for that are far more complex than anything we are discussing here.

Wars kill people. Arguing about whether it is better to kill these people or those people dishonours the deaths on all sides. Making those arguements with incorrect facts annoys me, that is why I post here from time to time.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

If the USAAF were so esily brainwashed by the RAF,
a) why did they do daylight bombing?
b) why did they develop a long range single engined fighter
c) why did their training techniques differ so much
d) why did they stick with the 0.50 HMG

No doubt with some thought I could come up with some other differences, but you get the point.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Tony
firstly some general notes
Germany lost the war, so it didn’t develop a war-winning system
We still don’t know what was Rudel’s achievement, we only know what he claimed.
VVS wasn’t very happy with Il-2s with 37mm guns and concluded that large number of small hollow-charge bomblets was more effective antitank weapon than large calibre cannon, so the use of 37mm armed Il-2 was limited.

Personally I think that RAF should have kept some sqns which could have used 40mm Vickers S gun, it was capable to penetrate side and rear armour of all German AFVs but that of Tigers if terrain allowed shallow dive attacks from side and/or from rear. And the gun was very accurate.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Nice little discussion on the so called effectiveness of the Hs129 and Ju87G in stopping tanks attacks: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Fo...ML/000016.html

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Very interesting information from Kutscha. Particularly interesting is the observation that perhaps only 1% to 5% of the Soviet tank losses relsulted from air power, the rest resulting from Army activity.