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Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Marius
You need to read Holmes' book, but a partial answer to your question is the route taken by the formation, it crossed the North Sea roughly on latitude 55 deg N and at 55N 08E it turned roughly south ending up W of Nordholz before turning west towards Wilhelmshaven. Off Wilhelmshaven it turned North (effectively doing a large U turn) and once clear of Wangerooge 37 Sqn went WSW along the chain of islands, 149 and 9 carried on roughly NW until the reached a point N of Heligoland where they too turned roughly SW for home. Therefore a fair amount of time spent loitering off the NW coast of Germany. Still does not account for the bad time reporting but partially explains the situation Still only one RAF attack Regards Martin |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
The route to Wilhelmshaven is well described in C.Shores book. Off Wilhelmshaven it seems to be authors interpretation which has a very weak basis. It is clear some aircraft of 37 Sqd felt near Borkum at appr. 14.40-14.45 hours. But that`s all.
It does not explain the second formation of bombers and German claims after 14.40-15.06 between Wangerooge and NW Borkum. J.Prien wrote in his books something about the 148 Sqd & 38 Sqd`s participating in the attack on Wilhelmshaven. I hope he will comment it. Regards, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Marius- i am afraid it is clear. Some authors are mistaken. Contemporary RAF records confirm just one attack
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Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Chris, no problem. I am looking for an explanation of some things. As I understand the following German (confirmed) victories are pure science fiction:
I./ZG 76 Fw. Groening 14.40 Langeoog I./ZG 76 Olt. Gollob 14.45 Langeoog I./ZG 76 Ofw. Fleischmann 14.45 Spiekeroog JGr.101 Olt. Kaldrack 14.50 Helgoland JGr.101 Olt. Robitzsch 14.50 Helgoland II./JG 77 Staffelabschuß 14.52 Wangerooge II./JG 77 Olt. Henz 14.55 Wangerooge I./ZG 76 Uffz. Kalinowski 15.00 Borkum I./ZG 76 Lt. Graeff 15.00 Borkum I./ZG 76 Olt. Gresens 15.00 Borkum I./ZG 76 Olt. Uellenbeck 15.00 Ameland I./ZG 76 Olt. Uellenbeck 15.05 Ameland II./JG 77 Lt. Brockmann 15.06 Borkum A lot of stuff... The propaganda machine worked hard on the big victory... Or maybe not? Regards, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
There is nothing inconsistent in these later losses, they are following the 37 Sqn formation down the length of the Frisians and heading for home, though only one of them made it. Another group of fighters followed 9 and 149 uo towards Heligoland, though these lost contact sooner than the ones after the 37 Sqn formation
The problems in air combat, especially involving single seaters, is recording times and knowing exactly where you are when you made your claim. It all gets a bit frenetic and when you land thirty minutes later mistakes are made, plus I am sure there are typos in the write ups and a certain amount of discussion between pilots as to get a claim verified you need corroboration, especially over the sea. One says we were about 20km N of Langeooge when the e/a went down at 07:02, where as the other says they were 30km NW of Spiekeroog at 07:04 when it happened The problem seems to be that some of the claim times as per the Tony Woods listing are inconsistent with the position of the aircraft at that time, this is not unusual. I have seen other times quoted in other places. It all adds to the fun I probably cannot help you more Regards Martin |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Hi all
What is certain, is that there were indeed two formations approaching the area. Do not discount those three Wellingtons of 38 Sqn on a sweep. It seems that both formations were detected (38 Sqn approaching from the west), but, for sure, only one of them was intercepted. Fighters were scrambled to intercept this second formation, while it turned for home without ever reaching vicinity of Borkum from the west. Those newly scrambled fighters run into the first formation of Wellingtons and engaged it, apparently under impression that this was the second formation they were after on its way back to base. So they reported the strength of this 'second' formation roughly as equal to that of the first. Regarding claims. Quote:
While the claim of Lt Lent at 14.42 hrs listed five km north of Borkum, the claims of Lt Uellenbeck at 15.00 hrs and 15.05 hrs listed 50km north [sic!] of Ameland, ie well out to sea, and its obvious that German pilots were pursuing retreating Wellingtons of 9, 37, 149 Sqns all the way from Heligoland Bight as far as a range of their aircraft permited. Most probable cause of overclaiming is that there were several German fighter units involved. Let's look at Tony Wood claim lists. Both major units participating - II./JG 77 and I./ZG 76, each claimed fifteen Wellingtons ( two claims of I./ZG 76 and four claims of II./JG 77 were rejected), while other German units involved claimed ten further victories (two rejected). It's clear in the light of the knowledge we have today, that both II./JG 77 and I./ZG 76 have claimed credit for all actual RAF losses suffered. We also could sort these claims along the following lines - 13 confirmed for Bf 110's and 19 confirmed for Bf 109's. I think, the picture is clear. Why all of these claims were confirmed? I presume, that this was because the Germans were under the firm impression they engaged two separate formations. |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Hi Marius,
I think it is important to you understand that, unlike Luftwaffe records, the records of Bomber Command, being a "home-based" formation, survived the war relatively intact. While there is a lot of minutiae that has not been preserved, all of the essential records have been available to the public since they were released in 1972. These include the individual squadron "war diaries", the Bomber Group "war diaries", and the Bomber Command "War Diary". These records, combined with casualty data and aircraft production and history data, make it clear that there was no "ghost" formation as you have proposed. I can give a reverse analogy from the other end of the war: between November 1944 and May 1945, Bomber Command crews claimed a total of 77 jet-/rocket-propelled aircraft destroyed in air combat at night, along with a further 9 probably destroyed and 9 damaged. On the face of it so many crews over such a long period couldn't all be mistaken so surely there must have been a significant number of Me262s and Me163s shot down at night, right? Wrong, surviving records do not support even one jet-/rocket-propelled aircraft being shot down at night by a heavy bomber crew, and Bomber Command Headquarters understood this at the time. Not one of the 95 claims was confirmed... On another note that will interest you, I will post an index list of Luftgaukommando XI crash reports for 18 December 1939, as found in the US-produced index of crash reports at NARA in the US. I should state that there appears to be duplication in the list, so caveat emptor... Cheers Rod |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
following is a list of Luftgaukommando XI crash reports for 18 December 1939,as indexed at NARA.
The list shows the time of the crash, the aircraft type that crashed, the location of the crash, and the microfilm frame number of the report: 1440 Vickers Wellington Between Langeroog and Spiekeroog 101566 1440 Vickers Wellington 10 km west-north-west of Borkum 101566 1440 Vickers Wellington Near Borkum 101582 1440 Vickers Wellington Near Borkum 101568 1445 Vickers Wellington North-west of Spiekeroog 101564 1445 Vickers Wellington North-west of Spiekeroog 101565 1445 Vickers Wellington North-west of Borkum 101560 1445 Vickers Wellington 25 km west-north-west of Borkum 101557 1445 Vickers Wellington Near Borkum 101587 1450 Vickers Wellington 30 km south-west of Helgoland 101559 1450 Vickers Wellington 20 km south-west of Helgoland 101558 1450 Vickers Wellington Map grid 6535 101579 1450 Vickers Wellington Near Borkum 101584 1455 Vickers Wellington Near Borkum 101583 1500 Vickers Wellington 25 km west-north-west of Borkum 101554 1500 50 km north of Ameland 101563 1500 Vickers Wellington 50 km north of Ameland 101562 1500 Vickers Wellington 25 km west-north-west of Borkum 101561 1500 Vickers Wellington 25 km west-north-west of Borkum 101555 1506 Vickers Wellington Map grid 6445 101569 1542 Vickers Wellington Map grid 7475 101571 1939 Vickers Wellington Map grid 7579 101573 As previously mentioned, this is the data as it was transcribed by the Americans. To make sense of it and to weed out errors and duplicated entries, one would have to order copies of each page (as indicated by the microfilm frame number) from NARA. Cheers Rod |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Hello,
I agree with the two victories of Ullenbeck. It is theoretically possible he attacked aircraft from the "Heligoland formation" 9/149 Sqd. But I think it was the second "ghost" formation which he traced so long over the sea. The Luftgaukommando crash report is very interesting. But it starts with the victory of Fw. Groening I./ZG 76. The rest corresponds with Tony Woods list. The first part of the victories (JG 77 & JG 26) is not mentioned or - what I do believe - just getting lost.(?) There is no problem with the German victories` times & places or pilots making mistakes. But there would be too many mistakes and false interpretations. Above this we have a formation of 22 hostile aircraft observed from the mainland (not reported by pilots!) flying from Borkum to Wangerooge and back again along the Frisian islands. Even if the observers made an error with the direction (instead of East-West West-East), they could have not count the aircraft of the Heligoland formation flying back. They consisted in the area of Borkum of appr. 10 aircraft still (not 22). At that time many Wellingtons were shot down already. On the other side the whole victory list of Luftgaukommando XI agrees with the ghost formation, which - as our British friends say - was not existent. My feeling is telling me our British friends have concealed something. By the way I would understand it - in the time of war and propaganda. Regards, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Quote:
The second formation was real (three aircraft of 38 Sqn), its interception was imaginary. Could we presume, that when 38 Sqn was detected approaching from the west, some Bf 110's of I./ZG 76, which were already not scrambled against 9,37, 149, took off to intercept. Let's look at the most probable route of these Bf 110's - from Jever to the Borkum flying almost straight on westward course. On reaching Borkum they did not find any hostile aircraft (38 Sqn by this time turned back while still off Dutch coast). What would be then the most probable course of action for these pilots? Right! Most promising to intercept British aircraft would be flying eastward along the coast from Borkum to Wangerooge in the hope to catch that second formation (which they presumed was flying on to Heligoland Bight) While doing so these Bf 110's were spotted by observers on the coast and were mistaken for Wellingtons. Finally, these Bf 110's intercepted 9, 37, 149 as the latter was already under attack by other fighters, and also engaged them, chasing them back and under impression that this was the formation which they were after (which was, of course, not) Yes, these thoughts are speculative to some degree, but this version explains all the 'misteries' |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Marius,
I, like many others, have done some work on this air battle. I have all the Bomber Command ORBs for 1939-1940 and there is not a shred of evidence that any other squadrons took part in this operation. All 12 Wellingtons lost came down in the North Sea or just offshore on the German coastline. Five more were damaged but all reached England and all five were later repaired. That is all. The British were not concealing any other casualties, at that time or post-war. Have you evidence of any other case by any other air force during WW2 where many extra losses were revealed long after the war ended ? Regards, Martin Gleeson. |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Hi Marius,
with the LGK XI list, I don't believe that you can take it at face value. To put it in to context I believe that you would have to view the original reports as these should describe the unit reporting the crash. Then it should be possible to plot the positions of the reported crashes and to gauge from where and from what distance the observations were made. Are these records infallible? No, I have a LGK XI example of an aircraft observed to crash in to the sea but where the aircraft concerned landed heavily damaged in the UK a couple of hours later. It seems that you still do not comprehend the scale and scope of archival material available from the British side, and if you did you would appreciate that to erase a "ghost" formation and losses from history would be next to impossible: 1. Bomber Command records would have to somehow be changed not only for the day concerned, but to retrospectively erase all trace of the machines and men in the "ghost" formation that where lost. The posting in of new aircraft and crews to replace losses would have to be hidden. 2. Aircraft production records and/or aircraft record cards would have to be altered. 3. Any survivors of the "ghost" formation and the multitude of personnel from their squadrons in the UK would have to maintain a vow of silence to their graves. 4. The casualty records would have to be altered and/or destroyed and the families of the missing men would also have to maintain a wall of silence. Quite frankly, I think the British had more pressing issues in which to expend resources on at that time :) Anyway, I would suggest that you start looking at the original source documents and trustworthy written material: The National Archives, Kew, London: AIR 27 Series - Squadron Operation Records Books and Appendices - these can be ordered as a digital download AIR 24/200-201 - Bomber Command Operations Record Book (i.e. war diary) 1936-1940 AIR 24/210-214 - Bomber Command Operations Record Book Appendices 1939-1940 AIR 25/1 - No 1 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book 1936-1943 AIR 25/22 - No 2 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book 1936-1940 AIR 25/26 & 27 - No 2 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book Appendices 1939 AIR 25/51 - No 3 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book 1926-1940 AIR 25/56 - No 3 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book Appendices 1939 AIR 25/93 - No 4 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book 1937-1943 AIR 25/96 - No 4 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book Appendices 1939-1940 AIR 25/109A - No 5 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book 1937-1943 AIR 25/111 - No 5 (Bomber) Group Operations Record Book Appendices 1939-1940 AIR 81/62-73 - these are the newly released RAF casualty files relating to the losses on 18 December 1939. Misc files that may contain information on the 18 December 1939 actions: AIR 2/4289 - OPERATIONS: Sea Areas (Code B, 55/2/11): Reconnaissance and attacks on German battleships in Heligoland Bight 1939-40 AIR 2/8541 - OPERATIONS: Sea Areas (Code B, 55/2/11): Attacks on German Fleet in Heligoland Bight: points from Bomber Command 1939-40 AIR 14/157 - W.A.7(a)(Attack on Wilhelmshaven): reports on various aspects of operations 1939-1940 AIR 2/3018 - PLANNING: Germany (Code B, 85/2/4): Plan W.A.7(a) (Plan K): Attack on Wilhelmshaven 1938-1942 AIR 14/156 - Operation Wilhelmshaven Area 3 Group 18-12-39 Nos. 149, 9 and 37 Squadrons. 1939-1940 AIR 20/292 - Part I to Plan `K' (W.A.7(a)): Attack on Wilhelmshaven: appreciation by Air Staff 1939 This list is by no means exhaustive. For printed books, besides what has already been mentioned, there are the Air Britain books published on aircraft serials, the Bomber Command Losses series by Bill Chorley, Vol 1 of which has recently been published as an updated and revised edition. "My feeling is telling me our British friends have concealed something." Marius, the fundamental question is who is hiding what from whom and why. Since we are dealing with the once classified operational and administrative records of the Royal Air Force, the only answer to that question would be that the RAF could only have to be hiding from themselves, and there would be no logical reason why... Regards Rod |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Guys, I think we have pretty well beat this to death.
Marius it seems to me you have posted a lot of speculation without any real proof of a "conspiracy". If you have some official, original documents that you can quote, along with the sources, please do so. Otherwise, lets not waste time with pointless speculation. The documentation from the RAF/UK side is pretty overwhelming. |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Yes, no 'conspiracy' and no 'hidden' losses from British side. Only twelve. But I think Marius' doubts in 'traditional' version are justifable. We can't ignore picture from 'the other side of the hill' and just say 'no ghost formation, the German pilots reported victories in wrong place and their timing was wrong' etc. In this case why we should belive any records from any side?
One could just see posts #46 and #50 in this topic - the description from both sides fits perfectly, in those circumstances double claiming by Luftwaffe was inevitable. |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Well gentlemen,
The idea of I./ZG 76 forming the ghost formation, yes, very interesting. But not serious. Several Messerschmitts were patrolling in the air and the unit had 23 Bf 110 at all on this day, as I remember. I believe you all that there is nothing in the documents you can look inside. Regular bomber units attacked the target flying via Heligoland to Wilhelmshaven. This is correct and was described in several Operation Records Books. Maybe it is the wrong trail. Let me say the following: I don`t think on a regular RAF-unit. For the second ("ghost") formation it could have been a "training flight" or whatever else. At this stage of war I can imagine the arrogance of militaries starting such noncence and riskful missions, for just showing its own power. Maybe the whole formation consisted of completely unexpierenced crews and all Wellingtons were shot down between 14.40-15.06. In such a case it would be much easier to conceal true losses from the public. Especially if it was a shortly and fast created "command" of school crews. Here is the most important part of the Lagebericht West 119 from 19 December 1939 r., I mean the second part is very, very interesting, when you compare it with the German victories documented by Luftgaukommando XI (as well with Toni Woods claims list). Im Bereich der Luftflotte 2: Abschliessende Meldung vom 18.12.1939, 2130 Uhr: Um 1343 Uhr wurden etwa 12 feindl. Flugzeuge 55 km nordwestl. Helgoland, 1356 Uhr etwa 10 feindl. Flugzeuge nördl. Helgoland im Anflug nach Südost gemeldet. Beide Staffeln flogen die Weser- und Jademündung an und wurden, nachdem sie bei Wilhelmshaven von Flak beschossen waren, bei Wangerooge und westl. davon in einen Luftkampf verwickelt. Abflug nach Westen. 1445 Uhr flogen etwa 22 weitere feindl. Flugzeuge nordwestl. Borkum die ostfries. Westküste an. Der größte Teil dieser Flugzeuge flog längs der ostfriesischen Inseln nach Osten, 6 Flugzeuge über das Festland bei Norden auf Wangerooge. Auch diese Flugzeuge wurden in einen Luftkampf bei Wangerooge verwickelt. Regards, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Quote:
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Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Andrei, I appreciate your comments, but in your last sentence, you ask, "In this case why we should believe any records from any side?" The difference is that all nations engaged in propaganda for daily consumption by the public and the press. It is another thing to fake official records that were not open to the public--this is not a Freedom of Information time frame like today. No one could see the records and no commander would fake records of losses, etc. because he would not get replacements that would enable his unit to get back to full strength. This is a classic case of overclaiming and the propaganda people took over and ran with it.
Marius, many posters have overwhelmingly refuted your arguments about "ghost" formations and RAF special units, arrogance, etc. The records of what you are saying are just not there. If you want to believe there are still "secret" documents out there that would prove your point, fine, I cannot argue. But that means they are still secret and we cannot know. Further speculation is pointless. If you want to continue down this path, then I will shut this thread down and you can go to another forum. |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
John et.al.,
One last note here. I've sent to Marius the translation of the Heinrich Weiss manuscript account of the Heligoland Bight action on 18.12.39. Heinrich compiled from every source available to him AND FROM THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE, a detailed summary of this action. While noting discrepancies with some of the German reports, his account is entirely consistent with what has been put forward here as the events of that day. He concluded that the discrepancies were due to over-claiming and erroneous reporting. He found no reason to create an alternative story of what happened. Keep in mind that this is a very experienced researcher who compiled a 6000+-page manuscript on LW operations in the west from the beginning of the war to mid-1941. You don't get much more experience working with the source documents and information than that. If Marius doubts the conventional story of what happened I think that it is up to him to produce the evidence. When and if he has this, I think that we will all take his objections to the conventional story very seriously. Otherwise, there isn't anywhere else we can take this other than pure speculation, which gets us nowhere. Regards, Larry Hickey EoE Project Coordinator |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
John, my post was not about faking official records or propaganda. 'In this case why we should believe any records from any side?' - I've mean we can't believe RAF records and at the same time disregard similar Luftwaffe records or vice versa, as you could see in this topic. My point is to obtain true picture we should correlate reports from both sides.
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Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Many historians have doubts on the British story. Here is a short example:
"...nach Gefangenenaussagen sollte es sich nur um einen Navigations- und Übungsflug mit propagandistischem Nebenauftrag gehandelt haben. Fest steht, dass im Gebiet um Wilhelmshaven bei diesem Angriff keine Bomben fielen..." J.Prien/P.Rodeike - Einsatz in der Reichsverteidigung von 1939 bis 1945 Jagdgeschwader 1 und 11 Teil 1 1939-1943, Eutiin 1993, p. 11. I can confirm this, as it is indeed mentioned so in German documents; for example British demonstrative mission was supposed. Larry & John, Heinrich Weiss tried to combine both sides or the information he could get at that time - German and British. He made an interpretation but could not explain the differences for example what I cited a few hours ago from Luftlagebericht West Nr.119. This is an original document and you have to bring the evidence (not me!) that it is falsified or whatever. I like more the assumption about 22 German aircraft (where is the evidence?) than "pure speculation which gets us nowhere". The differences are hard to explain today but I do not believe we will find the truth with "you can go to another forum". I am really shocked about that. Best wishes for all, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Hello,
I have some substantive info to add to this discussion. An earlier post by Petrusja asked about information that he'd heard that perhaps 20 downed British crewmen were reportedly picked up by He59 rescue planes that day. For the past couple of years we've been translating all the maritime KTBs for 1939-40 for the EoE Project. According to the KTB of Seenotzentrale Nord, the air sea rescue seaplanes could be not operate that day due to icing conditions. Only one took off to try and locate a German fighter pilot who bailed out of a Bf109. No British airmen were rescued. If any other air-sea rescue unit picked up any British airmen down in the sea that day, it would have been noted in this unit diary. So, whatever the source of this information, it is not correct. Regards, Larry Hickey EoE Project Coordinator |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Quote:
I reiterate that being a "home" command, the records of Bomber Command survived the war intact. If the "ghost" formation was actually real then there would be a multitude of archived records that would point to its' existence. There are no missing or hidden documents that would magically explain the "ghost" formation. Many, many researchers before us have worked extensively through the Bomber Command archives since 1972, and if there was a hint of documentation that supported your claims then such documents would have been brought to light well before now. Ditto with the records of other RAF Commands, as well as the CWGC documents and individual aircraft records. Cheers Rod |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Quote:
1)There were aircraft flying along the coast from west to east at the time of the battle (Lagebericht West 119, posted by yourself) 2) There were no British aircraft flying in that direction at the time (ORB's of RAF squadrons, all already mentioned in this topic) ORB 38 Sqn gives some coded references as the area of their sweep, but stating that the route was clear of the Dutch coast. Time of mission between 12.37 and 15.50. But as the 38 Sqn did not sighted anything means they not pressed on to Heligoland Bight turning for home earlier. It's clear that the aircraft flying eastwards from Borkum to Wangerooge could be only German. Germans expected the British aircraft would be flying from the west along the coast (38 Sqn) and know nothing about actual streight of formation detected approaching from the west, so when they observed aircraft flying they cast no doubt about nationality of these. |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Quote:
After several hours last night researching material I do have, for me it is clear now here arose two big problems which are affecting the official story of the attack. The first one is the Britsh point of view including the mission details which are given not correctly by no one historian. The Heinrich Weiss manuscript is containing exactly the same story – an interpretation – as published in “Fledgling Eagles” in 1991. No revelations then. J. Prien wrote several years ago something about possible participation of 148 Sqd and about 30 serial numbers of bombers he apparently knows. This seems to be false. On the other hand the mistakes and speculations done in the last 20-30 years allow to look forward for example in the direction of RAF OTU units and more – as well as Obstlt. Carl Schumacher supposed just after the battle. So I didn`t want to exclude such possibilities first. But now I do. The second one is the formation consisting of 22 hostile bombers which appears in German documented material: well, it seems “22” was just doubled somewhere because two formations were seen at all – no matter if right or wrong. But this is the reason for several upcoming interpretations and mistakes ending with the effect of too less refused claims by German officials. The massive attack with "22 x 2" or even 52 bombers – as the POWs related – made the mass of victories just more believable and the confirmation was going its own way. It was an overclaiming but not caused by the phantasies of German pilots. The victory tall was doubled because the whole formation was doubled – and this happened obviously accidentally. Just a false interpretation following one another false interpretation. My conclusion is simple. The participation of 9, 37 & 149 Sqd only is fully correct (38 & 148 Sqd as some authors wrote have nothing to do with). But the whole description of the mission`s carrying-out is almost completely wrong. I would say: too much speculations instead of attentive reading of documents. Regards, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Marius,
It seems that we now agree with the results and participants of this air battle, and that there were no other participants on the British side. However, I'm a little puzzled with your statement: "But the whole description of the mission`s carrying-out is almost completely wrong. I would say: too much speculations instead of attentive reading of documents." Do you mean the German description of the mission is wrong, or do you think that the British account is also wrong? What exactly do you mean by this statement? Since John Beaman prefers that we not continue discussion in this thread, please send me your reconstruction of the events that day where it differs from the Heinrich Weiss account. I'm highly interested in where you differ with his interpretation of the story. Also, you refer to claims by British PoWs of many more British a/c involved. As near as I can tell there was only part of one crew that was captured by the Germans--the one from the Wellington that I posted the photo of earlier. Do you know of more PoWs that the three members of the crew of 37 SQ LFoJ: Sergeant Herbert Ruse (Pilot), Sergeant T. May, and Leading Aircraftsman H. A. Jones? Considering the number of Wellington's lost, this is only a very small number of PoWs, and none of them were officers or leaders who might more likely be in a position to have a lot of knowledge about the big picture of the mission. Regards, Larry Hickey EoE Project Coordinator |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Following were POWs
Sgt H Ruse (pilot), Sgt TK May (second pilot) and LAC HA Jones (gunner) all from N2936 F/O P A Wimberley (pilot) N2888 AC1 GW Geddes (gunner) N2889 (died following day from injuries) I thought you had Chorley's book? Regards Martin |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Larry,
I am waiting for more material. I will check it step by step first instead of bringing in further wild speculations. Heinrich Weiss manuscript is no help, because his interpretations were published in "Fledgling Eagles" already. I have R. Holmes` book now. But as I see so far it is not well done. I don`t see what is authors interpretation and what is coming from documents. Apparently some things are still concealed from the public because Holmes is not giving us the complete information about the mission. For example the route back of the leading formation seems to be completely wrong. I will check it in detail again. But if it really is some authors interpretations were gone the wrong way for sure. Regards, |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Martin,
The EoE British loss lists are overwhelmingly the efforts of Peter Cornwell, with assistance from many others. Of course he has Chorley. His British loss lists for the downed Wellington's did make note of the PoWs from the other two a/c, Wimberley and Geddes; I simply missed those when I did that post. Not Peter's omission at all, but mine. Does anyone know of any account of the rescue of either Wimberley or Geddes, and how they made it to shore? It appears that the Ruse crew came down on the shoreline of this island off Borkum, so it's no mystery about their capture. However, are there any accounts in the German press or other sources of the capture of any of these airmen? I suspect that there may well be information about this in the contemporary accounts of this mission in the German press, or the statements of the released prisoners after the war that could give us more of the story about this. Can anyone help. Regards, Larry Hickey EoE Project Coordinator |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Hi Larry,
Are the EoE lists viewable/obtainable anywhere? Nick |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Nick,
No they are not. Peter and I frequently post individual incidents in response to questions on the TOCH or LEMB boards, but these will not be fully available until the EoE project is published in the various volumes, which include detailed information on all the losses, damages and casualty events for all of the participating air forces involved in the first 16 months of the airwar in Europe, from 01.09.39 through 31.12.40. For the British alone, there are thousands of entries involved, and they are now in the process of a massive revision. We are attempting to add the full names of all British airmen listed during the first 16-months of the war. Sounds like an easy thing to do, but it is actually a very complicated and challenging endeavor, since British records do not normally record pilots and aircrew with their full names. Trying to ID an airman aboard a British bomber with the name J. Smith, gives you some idea of what we're up against. Eventually we will complete this , but it's going to take a while. In the meantime, Peter Cornwell's volumes on "The Battle of Britain: Then and Now", and "The Battle of France: Then and Now," are the most complete versions of his work on this subject in print. There are now thousands of additions, changes and corrections that have been added to these previous volumes in the EoE Project loss listings, which for the British now includes the Scandinavian Campaign, Coastal Command, Royal Navy and the campaign against the German homeland, primarily by RAF Bomber Command, that Peter hasn't covered in his previously published works. However, the EoE project doesn't cover training unit losses, except in the rare occasions when a training unit became directly involved in a combat role. This was the case in some measure with the Polish Air Force during the 1939 PC, and with some units during the WC/FC of 1940. Regards, Larry Hickey EoE Project Coordinator http://airwar-worldwar2.com |
Re: Losses German Bight 18.12.1939
Guys, I am closing this thread. I think the facts have been established about this battle from numerous sources and expert members of this board. I regret that some people just will not accept that 2+2 does not equal 5.
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