Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Thanks for the 332nd operational statistics Paul. The July statistics do reflect the single group (A) policies that existed at that time (with exceptions for occasional A and B with perhaps 28-30 apiece). In the fall of 1944 in both 8th and 15th AF the two force Group had enough pilots and aircraft in the TO&E to fly them frequently. You might look at the 332nd mission numbers for comparison.

It does strike me as 'odd' that with approximately 100-120 (and approx. 120 pilots) Mustangs in the July timeframe (estimated based on standard squadron TO&E at that time), that only a typical strength mission based on three squadrons would be flown.

The only documents that might provide insight would be the squadron Engineering daily status logs recasting availability based on inventory, battle damage, engine changes, etc. One other thought is that the 332nd may have flown a non-typical 12 Mustang squadron in three flights rather than four flights of four. Perhaps the policy of maintaining 100% Black American pilots placed a 'supply' problem for replacement pilots.. more likely, and less likely is a maintenance issue in which a lot of a/c were grounded for lack of crews.

Yes the task of copying USAF 85 line by line was arduous - and done before USAF populated database at USAFHRC at Maxwell AFB. Equally challenging was pinpointing change of equipment (i.e from P-47 to P-51) to perform the distribution analysis of victory credits.

As to the P-38 being able to perform adequate escort for 8th AF? I agree, given a priority of stripping PTO to replace P-47s in ETO that the escort population would have enabled the 8th AF to continue deep raids after March 1944 when the supply of P-38J-15s arrived with 110 gallons in LE of wing and improved intercooler. The J-25s arrived after D-Day so the dive flaps and boosted ailerons would not be present to extend the P-38 performance envelope.

IMO, since the P-38 was a marginal performer air to air (~2:1 over LW with barely parity through D-Day) the P-38/P-47 combination would have resulted in 500+ more LW pilots and many more fighters available for Invasion Front on June 7.. The AAF/RAF would still have major numerical superiority but a lot more LW bomber and fighter bomber sorties would have been successful against shipping.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

You are welcome, Bill. Do I understand that the A and B Groups would have about 36 aircraft each, for a total of 72, and a possible C Group with 12 more? Following a more detailed look at Mahoney, I can report that the 46 Mustangs on 17 July was at the very bottom of the range of sorties for the 332nd. The highest number of aircraft put up by the 332nd FG in 1944 appears to have been 64 Mustangs on 23 October. This number must be slightly higher than the average for a 15th Air Force Fighter Group during that year. On 12 October, the 52nd, 325th, and 332nd sortied 163 aircraft between them. The highest number for the 306th Fighter Wing that I can find is 185 P-51s on 20 November. Note that Mahoney sometimes lists the number of aircraft flown by each Fighter Group separately, in other places he quotes just the total for a mission or a Wing.

The sortie numbers listed by Mahoney for the 332nd FG in 1944 range from 39 to 64, with the average at about 52 aircraft. In short, its strength was very similar to that of the other Mustang groups, notwithstanding the presence of the fourth squadron.

Both Mahoney and the 332nd Osprey profile mention the problem of a lack of replacement pilots, so that was most likely the primary problem. I haven’t read either book fully, as yet, so I will be able to say more once I have done so. The losses suffered by the group were fairly low and there is little mention of maintenance problems, so technical issues were less important.

How helpful of the USAF to do the database so many years after the war. I wonder if part of the reason for that is that were no concerns about unit effectiveness, as there were during and after the Vietnam war. On the subject of equipment changes, did any of the Fighter Groups ever fly two different aircraft types in combat at the same time? My impression is that this would have been very rare, but various combinations of sub-types of the same aircraft were flown regularly, depending on supplies of new aircraft.

I certainly agree that the increased range and performance of the J-15 was important, but I was making a broader point, returning to the idea that deep raids were not essential. Even with a hundreds more pilots and aircraft, the Luftwaffe could not seriously challenge Operation Overlord, because the overall standard of German equipment and training was very low compared to the Allies. They would have needed, at a minimum, hundreds of new aircraft with the two-stage supercharged Jumo 213E/F and turbocharged BMW 801J. They barely achieved this in the case of fighters in 1945 and never came close in the case of strike aircraft. Given that this was the case, any D-Day strike would have confronted large numbers of Allied fighters with superior altitude performance, which could engage the Luftwaffe at will. It is possible to imagine higher Allied casualties in the air and on the ground, but I would say no serious disruption to the landings was possible, even in 1943.

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

We would disagree on the last point Paul. The standard of the German pilot skill top to bottom by June 6 was relatively low to February 1944 because of the attrition caused by escort fighters over central and deep Reich, primarily caused by the Mustang. During Q1 and Q2 four P-38 FG's in the ETO destroyed only 178 LW fighters by the end of June, approximately 130, by D-Day as contrast to 1361 by Mustangs in the same period with fewer sorties

If one surmises that Double the actual P-38 Victory credits in the medium range to long range missions (as contrast to P-47 short to medium range Penetration/Withdrawal escort), one could speculate that at least twice the experienced LW pilots that weren't killed by Mustangs would have been available.. and the tempo of attrition should have given LW training command some relief to develop better replacement pilots.

Second point to tactical advantages, somewhat nullified by Beachy Head and Type 16 Control for direction, is the weather and cloud cover favored the LW with respect to putting scattered but strong penetrations of fighter bombers and fighters at low altitude where the P-38, P-51 and P-47 were less effective in performance advantage over FW 190 and BF 109. The Spit and Tempest and Typhoon would have been just as effective.

I am not offering a victory to Germany but I am suggesting that it was dicey at Omaha, dicey in consolidation of beach head, fronts dicey 'enough' in ability to stop Panzer reinforcements from Calais area via strong airpower - if 2x experienced LW fighter pilots had been available to disrupt logistics at the Beach or destroy Mulberry or give the Panzer more time to travel at night.

I am saying "I just don't know " how to calculate the impact of what the Joint Chiefs and Allied Command feared most - namely a LW that was not reduced successfully as a result of POINTBLANK.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

I’ve extracted some information from the 332nd history below. In summary, you appear to be right as far as the initial period of operations is concerned, but then the pilot shortage set in. The number of sorties did recover as 1945 progressed, but it appears the group’s maximum effort for 1945 was somewhat less than 60 aircraft.
To briefly digress, flying 16 aircraft squadrons in combat was another USAAF advantage over the Luftwaffe. I don’t think any German Staffel had 16 aircraft for more than a few days.

Extracted information
26 July 1944 – “61 Mustangs took off, but 26 returned to base. This high abort rate was due in part to the group’s newness to the P-51, but some of it could be explained by the skill level of the groundcrews… availability rates would gradually rise to equal those of other groups”
31 August – 100th and 301st FS flew 32 P-51s, the 99th and 302nd – 31 more, for a total of 63.
12 September – the whole group flew 71 Mustangs, including 4 spares.
4 October – 37 Mustangs flown by 99th, 101st, 301st FS and 14 more by 302nd.
Quote from Colonel Davis – “the Army Air Force screwed up pilot training production so very much that by the winter of 1944-45, there weren’t any replacements, and our pilots were doing 70 missions while other fighter groups’ pilots were going home after 50 missions”
26 December – 100th and 301st flew 23 P-51s, the 99th and 302nd – 21 more, for a total of 44.
January 1945 – “The group managed to temporarily ease its pilot shortage when 34 new aviators arrived from the USA”.
17 February 1945 – 54 Mustangs flown by all four squadrons

The Osprey book does not go into any such detail, as you expected. The book has 108 pages of text and a 2 page appendix, so it is a brief introduction to the subject. The Aviation Elite series was 28 pages longer than the Osprey 100 page standard. It is probably because the book is so short that there is no mention of damage categories or the Service Group.

Thank you for providing the background for the USAFHRC project. I should have checked the date online, the publication date listed on the USAF website is 1978. It seems that my assumption was the opposite of reality and this venture is connected to analysis of the problems over Vietnam. I have never heard of the larger study, has it been approved for public release?

This shows how much I have yet to find about the Eighth! Did the formations operate together, or in sub-groups of different types of aircraft?

Your points have significant weight, but I think that you overstate the magnitude of the Luftwaffe threat in February 1944. The force may have been significantly more powerful than it would become in June 1944, but it was a pale shadow of its former strength, in terms of experience and effectiveness. Many more fighters and even improved pilots would not necessarily have led to any greater success in an offensive role, as opposed to a defensive one. The last time the Luftwaffe had any operationally significant success against shipping was during Operation Agreement off Tobruk in September 1942. In that case, the Royal Navy had very little air cover and a small number of ships. The huge invasion fleet of June 1944 was a very difficult target on its own, with plenty of AA guns and radar to direct them.

Accepting your point that the USAAF fighters may have been less effective, I think the RAF on its own would have had sufficient resources to contain and defeat the German threat. Even when the Fw 190 fighter-bombers got through fairly often, as they did in Tunisia and Sicily, the results never came close to changing the course of the fighting.

I entirely agree that any specific calculation is impossible. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the Joint Chiefs were not willing to fight the kind of war that the Germans had conducted until the autumn of 1941, taking risks to win large-scale operational victories. For example, the Wehrmacht could have demanded an air superiority campaign before the invasion of France or that of the USSR, but instead the air and ground campaigns happened simultaneously. Much is made in American and British literature of the deception plan for D-Day, but if Pointblank is considered as a part of the D-Day campaign, it becomes clear that tactical surprise was bought at the price of a long delay at the strategic level.

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Paul - I agree your points, reserve judgment regarding true potential of LW had POINTBLANK not been successful - but I am laboring under the weight of Opinion in this matter.

As to 'Transition' during P-47/P-38 to P-51. It varied only for one Fighter Group, namely the 4th. Its first Mustang mission was all P-51 on 28 February, 1944. They had the advantage of borrowing all of the 355th FG inventory (scheduled originally to be in front of the 4th FG) to achieve an inventory of 50 ships on the eve of the 27th. They put up 35 and had several aborts. The 339th was completely set up for P-51s and never flew either P-47s or P-38s after arrival in England in February 1944. They flew an all P-51 mission on their first - April 30, 1944.

All other transitions were 'partial' first time deployments with mixed task forces of same type, i.e - one P-51 FS while the other two, then one FS were composed of P-47s. The 355th flew one squadron P-51 on March 8, one on March 9 - with the other two flying P-47s.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Some previous dogfights on the topic.
Can't say I like to read what I wrote back then <cough ... Fill in> but for the sake of some cheap amusement

:piliot:

http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...ight=P-47+p-51
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...ight=P-47+p-51

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

A help in figuring Luftwaffe fighter unit losses may be Dr. Prien's new volume in his JV series. This is 13/1 covering time from Jan 1/44 to Jun 5/44 in the RVT. Available now.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

john - is it available in English?

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Bill, that's absolutely fine, my taks when I write up will be to demonstrate that Opinion on the subject of Pointblank has some flaws :)

Thank you for the the very specific answer about fighter group transitions, clearly it was a fairly complicated process, with large-scale combat operations ocurring at the same time as the transitions.

I have sent you a message about Prien's Jagdfliegerverbände books.

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Hello Ruy,

I am glad that the discussion caught your interest! Thank you for the links to the past threads, they aren't that bad :) This makes me think how much important work is still being published on the subject, whether it is Bill's 'Our Might Always', Don Caldwell's book cited or the magnum opus by Prien et al. It's a good field of research, even 70 years after VE-Day!

I've sent you a PM.

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Unfortunately, no. If you have some rudimentary German knowledge, you can follow along.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

OK...so as I understand things Herr Prien is writing the history of each & every fighter staffel in the Jagdwaffe?! If that's the case then, I salute the sheer awesomeness of this task.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

It is true that P-51 was better fighter than P-47 in many respects - I guess that from today´s point of view we could add even the advantage of less Co2 emissions (slim Mustang consumed less fossile fuel per flying hour than heavy Jug).

But as Ruy Horta suspects in this thread: http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...ight=P-47+p-51 - I have also the feeling that everyone loved P-51 because it was prettier, cheaper, faster etc. than the poor Razorback. The one became the swan and the other remained as ugly duckling.

I still think that P-47 was what was needed and was available when there were teething problems with P-38 and improved P-51 not ready to take in combat in great numbers. The tide had turned against LW dayfighter force before the elegant bubbletop P-51 D stole the show (more credit should be given also to earlier P-51 models).

I have not complete data but I believe that it will show the downward spiral of LW dayfighter force and growing losses at accelerating speed as soon as Thunderbolts entered in the picture. Of course Spitfire IX´s played also a part in balancing the scales vs. FW 190 and Bf 109 but less than Thunderbolts I guess.

For comparison lets take the Pacific War: there is no doubt that Hellcat and Corsair were better performing fighters than Wildcat, but during the critical period of 1942 the Wildcat was which bore the brunt of combat (together with P-40) and it was good enough to stop Japanese triumph.

By the time when Hellcat, Corsair and P-38 made their combat debut at the Pacific, the Japanese fighter force was already decisively weakened. The downward spiral of Japanese air forces had already started and Hellcat & Co. just accelerated it.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

GC, NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II

http://www.history.navy.mil/content/...raphs/nasc.pdf

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Ruy - I enjoyed re-reading the discussions and noted that for several of the posters there were misconceptions regarding the build up and relative strength of 8th FC as it related to operations and tactics.

Repositioning of LW S/E and T/E Fighter Force from East to Central Germany
The second not so well discussed facet of Operation POINTBLANK (or difference of opinion regarding the same facts) is the reaction by German command regarding the alarm created by 8th AF attacks in the summer of 1944, particularly culminating in the joint strikes by AAF and RAF on Hamburg and the re-organization of the Luftwaffe after Jeschonnek's suicide. That raid marked the end of the notion that Defense of the Reich could be adequately managed by LuftFlotte 3. The migration of experienced JG 3, JG 11, 27 and 53 started stripping the East and moving to defense of Reich. The result on expanding air operations from UK into the Reich had a two fold impact, namely reducing the LW activity in both East and South to one of defensive operations with far too few aircraft to play an important role in supporting the Wermacht, and developing a layered defense approach to Defense of the Reich.

By January 1944, 75% of German fighter strength opposing POINTBLANK was concentrated in Germany, the remainder between the Loire estuary and Norway (quoted from the Rise and Fall of the German Air Force - written by RAF General Staff).

LW night fighter units were also increasingly deployed in the late Summer and Fall 1943 with excellent results but had the effect of diminishing the threat to Bomber Command.

US Escort Fighter build up - from Q1 through Q4, 1943 - very significant but the P-47 augmentation not as impactful as the P-51
The US build up of Fighter strength was rapid. On the date of the Hamburg raids the 8th AF had three P-47 FG's (4th, 56th and 78th) which by that time had received VC's for 134 LW fighters. By the end of Feb 1944 the total VC's for the 4, 56 and 78FG's was 395... 96 of which during February 1944. By contrast the rest of the 10 operational 8th and 9th AF P-47 FG's from August 1943 through the end of February destroyed 243 more, P-38 's two operational FG's 52 and Mustang FG's (2) 144.

In January, 1944 the lone Mustang Group 354FG destroyed 145% of the combined 4th, 56th and 78th FG (46.5 to 32).

What is relevant about the statistics is that nearly all of the Mustang scores were from the Frankfurt to Hannover line - all the way to Berlin and Schweinfurt whereas the P-47 VCs' were dominantly achieved to and just past the German/Holland/Belgium/France borders

"There were Hundreds of Them"
Well, no. The 8th AF doctrine at full P-47D FG strength, augmented by 9th AF until June 1944, was to perform Penetration and Withdrawal escort to 8th BC due to lack of range capability past Stuttgart/Dummer Lake combat radius. The P-38's performed middle and long Target escort from Hannover to Berlin, from Kassel to Mulhausen, from Stuttgart to Freidrichshafen. The Mustang provided Target Escort from Hannover to Posnan/Stettin, from Kassel to Brux, from Frankfurt past Munich.

The Order of Battle for P-38s performing escort missions were 3 FG from March through April, five (including 9th AF) in June, one after July until late September.

The Order of Battle for 8th/9th AF Mustang's performing escort missions were 3 (4, 354, 357) during Big Week, five by March 9 (4, 354, 355, 357, 363), six by end of April (add 352), nine by mid May (4, 339, 352, 354, 355, 357, 359, 361, 363). June saw the diversion of two back to CAS duty in 9th AF (354, 363).

The 8th AF BC was comprised of 31 Bomb Groups in three Bomb Divisions, roughly 10 BG's each .

During a typical deep penetration raid pointed at one target, say Berlin, the 30+ Bomb groups were in trail, and with excellent formation and precise R/V, five 8th and 9th AF FG's plus several RAF squadrons of Spits would be escorting a string of bomber 60 miles long. If formations were strung out - 90-100 miles. Frequently there would be gaps between the P-47s running low and turning back while the P-51s were en route to pick their assigned bombers up and take them to the target and back until in range of Withdrawal support.

If you go back up and look at the total number of Mustang and P-38 FG's available for Big Week you will quickly note that a Maximum of one Long Range escort per 10 BG Bomb Division and One medium to long range P-38 FG per 10 BG's.

Simply stated the sky is a big place, the fighter squadrons are arranged in a dispersed fashion front, top and rear of say 50 B-17s over a 5 mile stretch, with the FG responsibility to cover two to three boxes of 40 to 50 bombers (or more). The LW was successful at detecting un-escorted bomber boxes and often attacked where the fighter coverage was nil, then dove away when the escorts arrived. But, LW could concentrate in mass and attack with significant Local superiority in a 20 mile span.

Additionally, the 8th AF FG commanders did not keep their jobs when they sent 40+ fighters after a few. The flight leaders were most often the attacking/defending force and more arrived when the battle escalated... but a squadron 5-10 miles in the rear would take several minutes to join the fight. Simply speaking there Never was much of a numerical advantage of the defending Mustang/Lightning fighter group, if any, over the attacking LW force in 1944.

Willy Reshke is often quoted, as are many other LW vets as saying "we fought against 10:1 odds".. If you could place every US 8th AF fighter Group in one section of the sky, it could achieve 10:1 over a fully equipped Gruppe - but that was impossible - more often it was One US fighter Group opposing one or more Gruppen in a local 10 cubic mile airspace.

I apologize for the length.

Bill

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

GuerraCivil, you are not quite acknowledging that the Mustang was a fundamentally superior to its contemporaries, much like the Bf 109 when it appeared in the late 1930s. For purposes of illustration, see the comparative data on zero-lift drag coefficient (CD,o) and maximum lift-drag ratio (L/D)max , for several US aircraft.
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/Hi...468/app-a2.htm
.

The P-47 was needed above all because the P-38 groups had been sent to the Mediterranean. The 1st, 14th and 82nd Fighter Groups made a very important contribution to Allied victory in Tunisia as well as Sicily. The first Lightning group of the Eighth, the 55th FG, did not become operational until mid-October 1943. In the Pacific, the 475th FG, and the equivalent of another Lightning group in separate squadrons, was operational at this time.

The key period when the Luftwaffe was defeated was the summer and early autumn of 1942, before the USAAF operations had any significant effect. In the West, the introduction of the Spitfire IX was important, but so was the improvement in Fighter Command tactics. Over the Western Desert and Malta, the situation was even clearer. The Spitfire V and the Merlin-engined Kittyhawk II (P-40F) were both inferior to the Bf 109, but the Luftwaffe technical advantage was relatively narrow and so Allied numerical superiority proved decisive. This is the reason why I think the Thunderbolt versus Mustang debate on its own is less important, it is the general course of the air war that is most interesting.

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Bill, the crisis in summer 1943 was caused by several operations, of which the Hamburg raids were just a part. The most prominent action on the fighting fronts at the time was the collapse of the Axis forces in Sicily in July. This forced the halt of all operations on the Eastern front and precipitated the Italian armistice. With regard to strategic bombing, the Peenemunde and Ploesti raids in August 1943 were just as important as the attack on Hamburg.

I’ve summarised the movements of 18 selected Gruppen below. Notice that several of these units moved to from the East to the Mediterranean and only then to the Western front. Several units were formed for air defence tasks in spring, so the crisis was being felt even before the summer:

1943 Gruppen:
I./JG27 Mediterranean (11.42) to West (1.43)
I./JG3 East to West 2.43
I./JG11 formed West 4.43
II./JG11 formed West 4.43
III./JG11 formed West 5.43
IV./JG3 formed West 6.43
II./JG3 East to West 8.43
III./JG3 East to West 8.43
II./JG27 East (7.41) to Mediterranean (9.41); Mediterranean to West 8.43
II./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 10.43
III./JG77 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 11.43

1944 Gruppen:
III./JG27 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 3.44
IV./JG27 formed Mediterranean 5.43; Mediterranean to West 4.44
I./JG53 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 5.44
III./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (11.41); Mediterranean to West 6.44
I./JG77 East to Mediterranean 7.42; Mediterranean to West 8.44
II./JG77 East (11.42) to Mediterranean (12.42); Mediterranean to West 8.44
IV./JG53 formed West 10.44

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

I agree all the detailed Gruppen movements as you have presented them.

Would note that several ZG and JG's moved into Defense of the Reich in fall 1943 and early winter 1944 that are not mentioned above. My previous notation was to reference movements as early as end of Battle of Kursk and near the Hamburg (and Ploesti/Peenemunde) times. II./JG 51 shows up in defense of Stuttgart in early September, for example and I don't see combat ops against 8th AF for JG 1 and JG 11 until July, 1943 (into Bfh Mitte). By August 17 all JG 1, JG2, JG3, JG11, JG 26 plus the ZG and NJG units committed plus I. and II./JG 27.

The KIA/WIA as a % of the sorties stayed at or below 10% for combined LF Reich and LF 3 through the end of 1943 but nearly doubled in January and February - finally jumping to 16%-25% between March and the end of May, 1944. To me, that is the most important statistic because a.) it coincides with the Mustang operations from January forward and b.) it is the most important of the 'required replacement' numbers that had to be met by LW Training and 'foraging' (from bomber and transport ranks).

Another point to ponder regarding loss of experienced pilots is that the WIA/KIA statistics very much reflect the increasing vulnerability of Me 110 and Do 217/Ju 88 crews from the NJG units as 'two for one' to aircraft lost - in which the gunner, while equally dead, did not contribute to the shortage of pilots. The number started ramping up in October 1943 as the P-38s entered service and started catching the T/e crews by surprise past the escort range of the P-47, then the P-51 in December further compounded the problem.

I have some stuff I owe you via email

Regards,

Bill

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Bill, we are in broad agreement. I think the tactical operations should be given equal weight with strategic operations in this period, this again is something I have to write about.

I agree with all of the above. I have put an updated list at the end of this message, with units that I have added to the list underlined. You will see that a total of 4 Gruppen were withdrawn from the East and Mediterranean even before the battles of Kursk and Sicily. JG 1 and 11 were intercepting allied tactical raids before they joined the strategic defences. Many Luftwaffe units would get caught in between Allied tactical and strategic operations, a famous example being Kurt Brändle and II./JG 3 on 3 November 1943.

The casualties are the most important statistic, of course. I am not sure the jump from 10% to higher levels is that important in the sense that the critical level was below 10%. Allied air forces would probably have curtailed operations if they had suffered such losses.

Did Don Caldwell include aircrew fatalities in his totals? I don't know, so can't comment, but your point is a valuable one.

Here is the JG list:

1943 Gruppen:
I./JG27 Mediterranean (11.42) to West (1.43)
I./JG3 East to West 2.43
III./JG54 East to West 2.43
I./JG11 formed West 4.43
II./JG11 formed West 4.43
III./JG11 formed West 5.43
IV./JG3 formed West 6.43
I./JG26 West to East 2.43; East to West 6.43
II./JG3 East to West 8.43
III./JG3 East to West 8.43
II./JG27 East (7.41) to Mediterranean (9.41); Mediterranean to West 8.43
II./JG51 East (10.42) to Mediterranean (11.42); Mediterranean (7.43) to West (8.43)
II./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 10.43
III./JG77 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 11.43

1944 Gruppen:
I./JG5 Norway to Romania (11.43); Romania to West 2.44, redesignated III./JG6 (10.44)
III./JG27 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (12.41); Mediterranean to West 3.44
IV./JG27 formed Mediterranean 5.43; Mediterranean to West 4.44
II./JG5 East to West (5.44), redesignated IV./JG4 (10.44)
I./JG53 East to Mediterranean 10.42; Mediterranean to Romania 5.44
III./JG53 East (10.41) to Mediterranean (11.41); Mediterranean to West 6.44
II./JG4 formed West 7.44
III./JG4 formed West 7.44
II./JG6 formed East Prussia 7.44, to West 8.44
I./JG77 East to Mediterranean 7.42; Mediterranean to West 8.44
II./JG77 East (11.42) to Mediterranean (12.42); Mediterranean to West 8.44
I./JG4 Romania (11.43) to Mediterranean (12.43); Mediterranean to West (8.44)
I./JG6 formed East Prussia 7.44, to West 9.44
IV./JG54 East to Romania 4.44; Romania to East 6.44; East to West 9.44
IV./JG53 formed West 10.44

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Paul - Don C does include casualties in Table B "Reich defense force missions against the 8th AF" and Table D for the 15th AF.

Some more food for thought. The Defense of Reich sorties against US escort for March, April and May, 1944 was 40,422.

From September 1942 through December 1943 the total sorties against US escort fighters was 12, 538.

January/February 1944 showed 14,277 - more than all of 1942 and 1943 - but one third of the next three months preceding D-Day.

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Bill, got that, thank you for reminding me. I am not quite sure that crewmembers of twin-engined aircraft are counted in the overall casualty totals. They are definitely reported for individual days, as you will be aware.

The Luftwaffe sortie numbers did increase very sharply, as you have recounted. The context was that Allied sortie rates were increasing even faster, with some 115,000 in March-May 1944, of which 34,000 were by USAAF fighters (data from Ted Hooton's 2010 book Luftwaffe: A Study in Air Power). I'll send you an email with more detailed information and some thoughts on the subject.

Regards,

Paul

Re: Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?
 

Agree your points Paul - Not sure how Don Caldwell extracted KIA/MIA statistics but his table does itemize the t/e and single engine fighter losses by type within unit in detail throughout the book - in what looks like excel formatted tables (like my own). I suspect that unless he was maintaining two sets of 'books' to differentiate the t/e and s/e crew fatalities that it would be very difficult to separate them.

The only point I am making about Caldwell's sortie statistics is the incredibly steep gradient in the Feb-May timeframe for LW Sorties vs US Fighters is that the gradient for losses due to Mustangs was equally steep despite proportionately fewer Mustang sorties when compared to P-47.