So I checked two other ones I have handy.

One of the pilots underwent full 30 hrs course at OTU - he was trained in 1941, through 1940 flying Ferry etc. Another one finished his OTU course in the Autumn 1940 and indeed he logged about 10 hrs. He was not posted to a frontline unit, however, but to a 'sheepherding' squadrons, where he logged further 30-40 hrs of various training sorties. He had some flighttime in PZL P-23 and Fairey Battle bombers, so I cannot exclude he was on simplified course.

I have already noted to Ruy, this thread should be splitted.

The point to make a split was not clear enough, hence I did not honor your request the first time you asked and I won't do so in this thread as things stand now.

My advice, start a new topic, with a clear subject and keep the discussion limited to performance figures and issues. The more one keeps on track, with hard data and suppporting sources, the less one is likely to finish discussing the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914.

Ruy
The thread has a clear subject related to a certain aircraft called La-7. Since post of Christer Berstroem it is discussion concerning Soviet vs Allied airmen. For me those are two distinctive subjects. And I see no reason to start another thread on La-7 if there was one already started.

Interpreting Groehler
 

Ruy --

Although Groehler's article contains a lot of data in 23 tables, these are in wildly inconsistent formats, and only the data from Sep 43-Oct 44 can be split out both by aircraft type and by Luftflotte, so that's what I used for my own table. I'm disappointed that I couldn't include that period in my table, but we live with what we've got. However, it should be obvious to anyone that losses on the eastern front from mid 1941-mid 1943 far exceeded those on the western front, because that's where most of the fighting was happening.

WRT your other points:

1. In 1944-45 few JG 26 pilots survived their first five missions. After that, survival was a matter of "luck", which of course eventually ran out for most of them. I don't know if these data are available for other units, but I see no reason for the overall trend to be any different, except that the loss/sortie ratio on the western front (in 1944) was almost 8 times as great as that for the eastern front, so the overall odds of survival in the west were much lower.

2. I see no point in trying to compare the Western Allies to the VVS. They were fighting altogether different wars, which both won. The Western Allies unquestionably were superior overall both qualitatively and (especially) quantitatively to the Luftwaffe in 1944-45, despite the Luftwaffe's having a handful of superior aircraft (Me 262s) and a few "super" pilots such as Grislawski who never got tired. The quantitative superiority of the VVS to the Ostfront Luftwaffe is also not questioned; qualitatively, I think the question is still open, which was the original point of this over-long thread.

Don

Thanks Donald for explaining.

The point I'd like to make is the relative importance of sorties which result in enemy engagements versus number of sorties.

If the chance of encountering enemy opposition in the West was also higher by an X factor, that should change the way one looks at that bare figure of 8 times... - if an engagement was twice as likely in West, the figure is effectively reduced by one half, und so weiter.

The war in the West might have been much more concentrated, not more difficult in terms of combat per se.

Christer may have a point, if I understood it correctly, that we should look for periods when combat in the East and West were most similar, instead of concentrating on the differences, to get significant answers.

US claim accuracy I think was more a function of period of the war than theater. Late war Pacifict claims were fairly accurate too. Rather than time as a magic variable, the US air arms tended to have the upper hand against their opponents late in the war (for quantitative and qualitative reasons we could debate, but anyway they had the upper hand) and the having the upper hand tends to lead to more accurate claims, among variables affecting claim accuracy. But there was also more organization and development of the intel function to cull claims, this is specifically written about in the USN's postwar analysis of its results v. Japanese records.

Back to the main (hijacked from La-7 :D ) point, if we wish to compare the effectiveness of mid 20th century USAF (as a proxy for "Western") and VVS, it seems to me much more direct to look at the Korean War than to try evaluate each's performance against the LW correcting for variations in intra-LW quality, relative numbers and such. This is not to say studying WWII air combat is not a far larger and richer topic in general overall, of course it is, but for that particular comparison, late war effectiveness (assuming it didn't change alot a few years postwar) Korean War performance seems just much simpler and more direct, head to head.

And while the claim/loss results of that war may be controversial still to some, on the level of primary source research I think it's actually pretty clear. There is no situation comparable to loss numbers to "unknown" several times as high as those actually attributed to fighters or AAA (as you provided for VVS losses 1944), nor a major question of loss record accuracy that hasn't been researched yet (as you said for the German overall losses in air combat v. those of just one JG).

Joe

Ruy
I have understood that You have Murray's LW, there is also a table on LW monthly losses during at least most of the 1942, Eastern Front vs. other fronts. I typed the monthly fighter losses of LW in 1943 because IMHO the year is very important because during it LW really began lost its grip and was forced to mostly defencive posture and the losses became crippling and really began weaken its quality. Also Murray in that table divided the losses against Western Allies between West and Med., which opens IMHO a way to interesting observations. I gave also the LW's losses for all combat a/c for Apr and May 43 because these were the months of Kuban air battles, the figures of Jan. - Nov 43 can be foud on the given page from Murray's book. Please, help Yourself.

Eastern and Western air wars were different from number of reasons. But after the 6.6.44 on the both fronts there were active ground war going and that usually focused the use of tactical air power.

One more point. The activity of the front also depends of the activity of the participians, Western Allies activitely hunted LW and especially the longer ranged US a/c were effective in this and as a plus began to hinder LW training activities which benefited both Western Allies and SU.

Second point, the offensive against oil targets really hurts LW and again helped both Western Allies and SU. Of course at that time war was already lost for Germans and one must give a credit to SU for its success to keep Germans out of its main oil fields during 42 and the destruction of the Maikop oirfields before Germans got them.

But Franek is right this has no connection to La-7.

Juha

Hello Ruy,
I checked the Murray's LW myself, the Table XXV on page 107 gives German monthly losses June - Dec. 42 and shows that losses were bigger on Eastern Front from June to Sept and then in Dec.42 but losses on other fronts were so much bigger in Oct. and Nov. 42 that the cumulative losses on other fronts were bigger than those on the Eastern Front for the whole period of Jun - Dec. 42. So once again the importance of the Med. is surprising.

Juha

Imagine the Western Allies fighting the Luftwaffe without a numerical superiority. Imagine that there were 4,900 Luftwaffe aircraft (including 2,100 fighters) versus 4,900 Western Allied aircraft (including 2,100 fighters) in the Mediterranean in mid-1943. Is there anyone here who thinks that would not have completely altered the situation - compared to the real relation of a Western Allied numerical superiority of 7:1?

Imagine that the Luftwaffe had just as many aircraft in France as the Allied had when the Allies invaded France on 6 June 1944? Is there anyone here who doesn't think that that would have created a completely different situation?

Now assume also that it was the Luftwaffe which enjoyed a 7:1 numerical situation in the air in the Mediterranean area in mid-1943, and a 10:1 numerical superiority in the air over France in June 1944. Would that have created a completely different situation?

I ask only because I get the impression that some people here seem to dismiss the huge Western Allied numerical superiority in the air as THE decisive factor to the severe German difficulties in the air in the Med from 1943 onward and in the West in 1944 - 1945.

And please don't takl about individual air combats which might have constituted exceptions from the general rule. The vast Western Allied numerical superiority in the air in the Med from 1943 onward and in the West in 1944 - 1945 is a fact which can't be dismissed by pointing at a few accounts from one of the warring sides.

Remember - this is just a hobby, so stayr calm and remain friends! :D

All best,

Christer Bergström

Hello, it's late, so only a few comments and only on Med.
Firstly, one reason why LW was losing the production race was the earlier decisions made by OKL that it could manage the situation with lower than maximum production. OKL awaked too late to the needs of total war.
Secondly, as I have wrote earlier, the rather poor shape of LW in Med. was atleast partly a product of bad decisions at the top of OKW, I mean the decision to stay in Tunisia too long. And with effective actions of Allied forces LW had lost during the first 5 months of 1943 appr. 1.700a/c in Med. theatre. That according to Murray's LW p. 138.

And Christer, You have forgotten the Italians, they were still a part of the Axis in mid 43. According to C.J.C. Molony et al. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Volume V (London 1973) p. 45 - 46 to support oper. Husky Allies had 3.462a/c (excl. coastal a/c and air transports) of which about 2.510 were serviceable. and At the beginning of July Axis had in Sardinia, Sicily and all Italy about 1750 a/c (excl. coastal a/c and air transports) of which 960 were German. Of these 775 operational LW a/c were within effective range of Sicily (and 63 more bombers were on the point of arriving). On where exactly the Italian a/c were the book only gives the info that of them 145 (63 serviceable) were in Sicily. IMHO is that the superiority of Allies in Central Med at the eve of Oper. Husky was somewhere between 2:1 to 3:1 in serviceable combat a/c, which for a Finn doesn't sound overwhelming. But of course they had also clear intelligence superiority. Our Italian specialists surely know more exact figure to the RA, but really Christer, this had nothing to do with La-7 vs. ???.

All the best
Juha

Imagine Pamela Anderson crossing Mareth line in the 1943. Imagine that she is tan and naked. Is there anyone here who thinks that would not have completely altered the situation - compared to the real relationship of a fighting men?

Of course we can imagine plenty of situations but what for?
The fact is that Axis were beaten in Tunisia and Normandy not due to numerical advantage (though it was a contributing factor) but due to better training, tactics and organisation of Western Allies.

Christer, please show us those dogfights, where the Germans were so outnumbered! Please give a single sample of a Staffel (6-9 aircraft) fighting with two or three Wings or Fighter Groups (60-90 aircraft)!

That indeed is a strong assertion! Everyone knows that a numerical superiority always is of great advantage. Since Franek denies that the Allied advantage in the air was a key factor to their numerical superiority, he has the burden of proof. We need some evidence which shows that the huge Allied numerical advantage played a secondary role! What makes Franek believe that so strongly?

Because only when man thinks creatively - i.e. creates alternative scenarios in his mind - is he able to evaluate and draw deep comparative conclusions.

I say that the huge numerical superiority which the RAF and USAAF enjoyed was a key factor to their dominance in the air in 1944 - 1945. This can be tested in our minds if we theoretically imagine completely reversed roles - everything else unchanged, it is the Luftwaffe which holds such a vast numerical superiority: On 6 June 1944, there are 10,500 Luftwaffe aircraft (including 5,400 fighters) against only 1,300 RAF and USAAF aircraft (including 475 fighters). If your conclusion is that regardless of that, the Allies would have dominated the skies completely, you think that my theory is wrong.

Franek says that the RAF’s and USAAF’s dominance in the air in 1944 - 1945 was "not due to numerical advantage (though it was a contributing factor) but due to better training, tactics and organisation of Western Allies". This can be tested in our minds if we theoretically imagine completely reversed roles - everything else unchanged: The Luftwaffe still has only 1,300 aircraft (including 475 fighters), but it has the training, tactics and organisation which the Allies had. And the Allies still have all their 10,500 aircraft (including 5,400 fighters), but they have the training, tactics and organisation which the Luftwaffe had. If your conclusion is that regardless of that, the Allies would have dominated the skies completely, you think that Franek’s theory is wrong.

Before anyone jumps in to be a smart guy and says that there are several contributing factors, allow me to say that both Franek and I have said so all the time. What we are discussing is whether the Allied numerical superiority of 8:1 or even 10:1 was a key factor or not. Now what seems most plausible in this concrete situation - that the numerical superiority of 8:1 was of decisive importance or not?

Oh, that is very easy. I will give you more than a single example, and I will refrain from using German sources, since it is a well-known phenomenon that the pilots of one side often exaggerate the number of enemy aircraft which they engaged (and often "forget" to mention that other friendly units participated in the same combat). So I will give you a few US reports:

Some interesting examples of the vast Allied numerical superiority over France during the invasion of France are given by the combat reports which are published in 20th FG’s chronicle, “King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”:

On 25 June 1944 in the evening, a formation of 49 Lightnings from US 20 FG attacked 15 Bf 109s near Chartres. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 161.)

The US report from the mission against targets north of Paris on 28 June 1944, shows a total of 25 German fighters intercepting 684 heavy bombers escorted by fourteen Fighter groups with a total of 569 fighters. US 20th FG, with 46 Lightnings, was attacked by eight Fw 190s and Bf 109s. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 162.)

The report for 14 July 1944 reads: “This morning 524 P-51s and P-47s were dispatched to support a special heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area. Enemy opposition was characteristically meagre and 4 of 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s encountered were shot down by our fighters.”

Okay, now to the question of “better training, tactics and organisation” which Franek claims was present in the RAF and the USAAF to such a decisive degree.

Regarding training, I fully agree. Like David Clark (to pick just one out of dozens of researchers) writes in his 380-page study on the air war over Normandy 1944 (“Angels Eight: Normandy Air War”, 2003): “We noted how many German super-aces appeared in the air battle. The skill level of the pool of German pilots was not homonogenous but rather, presented a dramatic contrast. The killing of so many good pilots in the first six months of 1944 left most gruppen with a smattering of super-aces, a small number of experienced but not yet expert pilots, and the vast majority with but a few hours flying experience. These latter had been desperately pressed into service without sufficient training.” (p. 59.)

Indeed, the victories attained by the Allied fighter pilots in 1944 - particularly in the latter half of that year - were relatively “easy”, in that regard quite comparable to the victories attained by the German fighter pilots on the Eastern Front in 1941.

While I agree with Franek on that issue, I see the declining quality among the German fighter pilots as a direct result of the Allied numerical superiority. Forced to wage a battle against terrible odds, the Luftwaffe sustained increasing losses. Thus, the Luftwaffe lost pilots at a much higher pace than it was possible to train pilots. Thus, pilot training quality inevitably suffered. It started with the calling of many instructors to first-line service. This first step lowered the quality of the trainers themselves. Next, the pilot training schemes were shortened. Already in early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. Finally, in the spring of 1944, the B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours!


“Tactics and organisation” is a bit more problematic. I would like to see a concrete description and evaluation of exactly which RAF and USAAF tactics were so superior to the Luftwaffe’s tactics? I would like to see a concrete description and evaluation of exactly in which way the RAF and USAAF organisation was so superior to the Luftwaffe’s organisation? And above all - exactly how can this be of even greater importance than a numerical superiority of eight to one?


All best,

Christer Bergström

Christer
we can always theorizice but in that we must be careful. And You are not. Your figures for Med are a moot point. You forget one major player (RA) and by doing so You almost double the superiority of Allies, and that at the time when the Allies had just achieved a major victory. Usually after a crushing defeat the victors had superiority at that theatre of war. From the situation after the battle is rather difficult to draw right conclusions on the reasons of the victory/defeat. Or what You think on the following example. On 30.6.40 British had in Europe let say 100 combat ready tanks, Germans had let say 2.500. (the number were imaginary but not far from the reality) From this one draws the conclusion that it was the 25:1 superiority in tanks which decided the 1940 Campaign in West and this historian proofs his claim on the assertion that if the British had had 2500 tanks and the Germans only 100 tanks in 10.5.40 the results would have been different. To me this sort of argument isn't creative thinking but zero-research, if not worse.

6.6.44 situation in the West is better example, because it is the time of the beginning of one campaign, but it was also a result of a long and bitter campaign for the air supremacy over Western France, which the Allies had won by greater industrial capacity, by much better production planing, by focusing right things, by better high command, by perseverance and by aggressiveness. And of course by the effects of Eastern front. But as I have wrote earlier, the LW losses against Western Allies had been greater than those against SU since late 1942. The importance of the many mistakes made by the OKL (which clearly is a part of LW and must be taken in account when we estimete the quality of the LW as an air force) and OKW must not be forgotten. For example the LW had wasted much of its bomber force in West in early 44 in those largely useless attacks against UK.

I don't deny the effects of numerical superiority in air war, but when the waring parties are big industrial powers it would be not easy to get and maintain a great numerical superiority if one's AF is greatly worse in tactical skills than the opponent.

Juha

Juha
Perhaps we should consider to include Task Force 58 in those stats? There is a saying: there are small lies, there are big lies and there is statistics.
Luftwaffe was unable to manage their resources properly, partially due to decisions of government and this led to cutting the training of new airmen. Could you imagine such situation during the war? I do not mention the German training was simply inadequate in terms of modern warfare.
List of such grave errors committed by Germans is very long and it is really no surprise they have lost - fortunatelly. Unfortunatelly Soviet Union was among the winners but that is another story. Part of the story is quality of the latter's aircraft, including La-7. ;)

In mid-1943, the majority of the Italians were not particularly interested in dying for Il Duce. If you read Prien, “JG 77”, p. 1621, you will find a long text about how it seems plausible that elements in the Italian Air Force cooperated with the Allies and in July 1943 gave them information on the whereabout of German aircraft on airfields in Sicily.

Moreover, even the parts of the Italian Air Force which were interested in fighting for Il Duce, were badly hampered by a lack of fuel, spare parts, aircraft - you name it. (See what Steinhoff writes in his book on Sicily.) Which in turn was an effect, among other things, of the lacking motivation to fight for Mussolini.

I don’t ask you to compare the number of Allied aircraft shot down by Italian airmen with the number of Allied aircraft shot down by German airmen in the Mediterranean; such figures are very hard to obtain. (However, some hints are found in Shores's two books on the air war in North Africa.) But here’s something easier: If you study the history of the Italian AF in action against the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean between 1940 and 1943 and compare that with the accomplishment of much smaller Luftwaffe detachments against the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean between 1940 and 1943, I think it is obvious that you can’t just compare the numbers when the Italian armed forces are involved.




The Western Allies were able to sustain much higher losses than the Luftwaffe, because they (the Allies) had many, many more aircraft, and each day large numbers of new aircraft and new aircrew arrived to increase the size of the combined Allied air force, while the Luftwaffe barely was able to replace its losses. If the huge Allied numerical superiority in the air in the Med was not the dominant reason to their victory in the air, then you have to come up with some really convincing arguments regarding other factors which should have been even more important.

Please consider these figures for Tunisia, April 1943:

I./JG 53 lost 47 Bf 109s (including 15 to enemy action) and received only 21 Bf 109s as replacement, and had only 13 Bf 109s on 1 May 1943. (During the same period, it achieved 32 victories.)

II./JG 53 lost 51 Bf 109s (including 18 to enemy action, 14 of which were destroyed in bombing attacks against II./JG 53’s air base) and received only 38 Bf 109s as replacements. (During the same period, it achieved 24 victories.)

II./JG 77 lost 28 Bf 109s (including 9 to enemy action) and received 26 Bf 109s as replacements. (During the same period, it achieved 34 victories.)

In total, the combined strength of these three Jagdgruppen went down from 103 Bf 109s on 1 April 1943 to 66 on 1 May 1943, a drop of 35 % in just one month.

(Talking about the Italian Air Force, Italy produced only 2,818 aircraft through 1942.)

The Allied ability to not only replace their losses, but even increase their number of aircraft, was the single most important factor to the fact that the Allies finally managed to achieve air supremacy in Tunisia. If the crushing Allied numerical superiority was not a key factor - then what? You can’t say that the Allies had better trained pilots than the Germans in Tunisia, and you can’t say that they had better tactics or generally better aircraft. If numerical superiority did not decide the outcome - then what? :?:

In fact, one of the key factors to the German victory in the West in 1940 was German numerical superiority in tanks and aircraft on the battlefield. Out of the Luftwaffe’s plus 5,000 aircraft, almost 4,000 were directly involved to support the Western offensive in May 1940. On 10 May 1940, Armée de l’Air had 1,400 aircraft deployed in France’s western and northern parts, and the RAF had 416 aircraft stationed in France. On 10 May 194o, the Allies possessed a total of 2,689 tanks against the German total of 2,439 tanks. However, on the battlefield, the Germans enjoyed a crushing numerical superiority. For instance, most of the 530 French FT17, FT18 tanks were deployed behind the Maginot line in May 1940. Meanwhile, the Germans created power concentrations where they concentrated the bulk of their armoured forces - thus reaching a crushing numerical superiority in tanks.

But your example is ill-sought, at least if you are looking for a parallel to the reason to the Allied dominance in the air in Tunisia in 1943. All historians agree that the Germans were able to achieve such a decisive numerical superiority on the battlefield in the West in 1940 due to a superior German tactic.

Alas: I have seen no one who claims that the Allies had such a superior tactic in Tunisia in 1942/1943. To the contrary, it seems to be that if any side had a better tactic and better trained pilots in Tunisia in 1942/1943, it was rather the Germans. :!:

So we are back where we started: It seems quite plausible that the Allied dominance in the air in Tunisia in 1943 - which was finally achieved against an enemy which enjoyed a qualitative superiority - would have been completely unthinkable without the Western Allied crushing numerical superiority which ultimately overwhelmed German qualitative advantages.


Yes, there were two major industrial powers, with unlimited access to raw material and work forces, against less than half the industry in a Germany which was poor on key minerals. Of course the combined industries of the USA and the UK were larger than less than half of Germany’s industry. (More than half of Germany’s war production was sent to the Eastern Front.) That was a key factor to the huge numerical superiority which the Western Allies built up.


Maybe. In any case, the USA and the UK sent something like ten times more aircraft into action than the Germans were able to employ.


:o Please elaborate on that. In which way did the Western Allies have more competent air force commanders than the Luftwaffe? It’s easy to feel strong when you outnumber your enemy by ten to one. However, the American AF commanders entered the war without having learned much about the need for a fighter escort doctrine, and the British AF commanders wasted thousands of aircraft sorties and airmen on virtually useless operations over France in daylight in 1941 and against German population centres. The Western Allies could sure have made use of a more competent air force high command!


:o Aircraft production figures:

1943:
UK: 26,263
USA: 85,898

1944:
UK: 26,461
USA: 96,318

When the Western Allies produced almost a quarter of a million aircraft in those two years - while Germany produced “only” 25,527 aircraft in 1943 and 39,807 in 1944 - I don’t think there was a great demand for particular skills in perseverance abilities. . . What do you think?

(Okay, Japan: 8,861 aircraft produced in 1942 and 16,693 in 1943. . . The meagre Italian figures were showed above.)

Remember also that a large part (around 50 % in mid-1943) of the Luftwaffe served on the Eastern Front.

Are you seriously implying that the RAF and USAAF pilots showed a greater aggressiveness than the Luftwaffe pilots in 1943, 1944, 1945? If not - what is the point of bringing this up when we are discussing which other factors than sheer numbers that might have decided the air war in the West and Med to the advantage of the Western Allies? (If you really think that the RAF and USAAF pilots showed a greater aggressiveness than the Luftwaffe pilots in 1943, 1944, 1945, then please show us the sources to your theory.)

I agree completely. Without the efforts of the Red Army, not even the vast numbers of the RAF and the USAAF would have sufficed to bring down the Luftwaffe in 1944. In the end, they probably would have brought down the Luftwaffe - but it would have taken much longer. (And of course conversely, without the "second front" which the Western Allies opened in June 1944, the Red Army would not have sufficed to bring down the Wehrmacht in 1945. In the end, the Soviets probably would have brought down the Wehrmacht - but it would have taken much longer.)

Just one small correction. The Luftwaffe losses in the West plus the Med temporarily surpassed the losses in the East in October - November 1942, as a combined result of the thaw period in the East which brought down air action to a minimum while at the same time the German air offensive against Malta in October 1942 and the Allied major offensive in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco in November resulted in a peak in air fighting in the Mediterranean area. The tendency of the West plus the Med and being responsible for the bulk of the Luftwaffe losses started in February 1943, when the Allies achieved a manifold and steadily increasing numerical superiority in Tunisia.

Prior to that, the bulk of the Luftwaffe’s losses were sustained on the Eastern Front. The reason is simple - although the British enjoyed a significant numerical superiority against the Luftwaffe in both the Wets and the Mediterranean from mid-1941 and throughout 1942, it was not until the Americans arrived to add their huge numbers to those of the British that the Western Allies achieved such a numerical superiority that they could start wearing down the Luftwaffe. So you see, it really had very little to do with pilot quality, aircraft quality, tactics or organisation. The superiority in pilot quality which the Allies later achieved was an effect of the numerical superiority which eventually wore down even the Luftwaffe’s quality.

I don't deny that the OKL and the OKW committed many serious mistakes. But before we start discussing “many mistakes”, we must take the general picture into consideration. The OKL and the OKW also accomplished much which testifies to great military competence. Mistakes were made by both sides. The decisive effect of mistakes committed by one side can be measured only if we compare them with the effect of mistakes committed by the other side. Otherwise, we fall in the trap of making too strong simplifications and nurturing myths.

There is a trend in popular history to selectively focus on mistakes committed by “Hitler and Göring”, while mistakes of similar amplitude committed by the Allies are neglected. One such huge mistake made by the Allied was that the Americans entered the war with a totally wrong air doctrine, assuming that there was no need for fighter escort. There simply was no real US air doctrine for fighter escort, which had a negative impact on fighter designation. This led to total failure for the first phase of the bomber offensive, and tremendous losses for the bombers. As Williamson Murray writes: “They allowed preconceived judgements to filter out reality until ‘Black Thursday’ over Schweinfurt faced them with defeat”. (“Luftwaffe”, p. 443.)

Also, both the RAF and the USAAF wasted much of their bomber forces to bomb objects which dealt Germany no decisive harm, while Germany’s real Achilles heel (synthetic oil plants) was saved from methodical Allied bombings until May 1944.

Why? In 1943 - 1944, the USA and the UK produced almost a quarter of a million combat aircraft. With such a huge industrial power, it was evident from the onset that the crushing numerical superiority would ultimately wear down also the Luftwaffe’s superior quality. And that also is exactly what happened. There is no other factor which might explain why the Western Allies were able to turn the difficult situation in the air war in the period 1940 to mid-1942 into one of a crushing victory in late 1944.

All best,

Christer Bergström

Franek,

That goes without saying. I have to say that no single decision made by the Nazi government had a more disastrous impact on Germany’s war resources than the decision to invade the Soviet Union. That decision alone deprived Hitler of his possibility to bring the war to a successful conclusion, and wasted the bulk of Germany’s war effort, plus - of course! - millions of Russian and German lives. (Please - no discussions on the reason to the German invasion of the USSR! Please save that to a political forum, we all know that the clique who believes that Hitler acted in defence when he invaded the USSR has some followers among the members on the TOCH board, but please spread that gospel somewhere else!)

Franek, yesterday you asked me to show you only one example of an air battle in the summer of 1944, where the Germans were so outnumbered. I gave you a whole row of examples - and I refrained from using German sources, since it is a well-known phenomenon that the pilots of one side often exaggerate the number of enemy aircraft which they engaged (and often "forget" to mention that other friendly units participated in the same combat). Since you didn’t comment on that in your last post, I assume that you are satisfied with those random examples - two of which showed air battles where there were between 50 and 60 Allied aircraft against each Luftwaffe aircraft involved.

If you allow me to quote one of the German fighter pilots who experienced this while flying over Normandy in 1944, Hans-Ekkehard Bob told me:

“I often found myself alone pursued by eight or ten Mustangs, and was able to survive only by mobilising all my flight skills, twisting and turning around small woods and church towers in low-level flight. I was aided by the lacking skills on behalf of the American pilots, since each one of them wanted to shoot me down, and thus they blocked each other.” Bob has included that in his memoirs too.

Prien quotes III./JG 3’s War Diary on 13 June 1944:

“Die zahlenmässige Überlegenheit des Gegners, abgesehen von der technischen, ist derart gross, dass Starts in Schwarm- oder Staffelstärke zu untragbaren Verlusten führen. . . . Eigene Verbände werden in kürzester Zeit in Luftkämpfe mit überlegenen Feindkräfte, die laufend Verstärkung erhalten.“ (Prien, ”III./JG 3“, German edition, p. 364.)


I know that you asked for only one example, and I gave you several, but although I can’t write the whole history of the air war over Normandy here, I’ll provide you with just one more example of a single air combat which you wanted:

Let’s first listen to our friend Don Caldwell, who in his excellent “JG 26 War Diary” writes on page 292 (dealing with 27 June 1944): “134 Fw 190 and 196 Bf 109 sorties during the day, in thirty-five ordered missions. It is probable that a ‘mission’ in this context represented an effort by one Gruppe; a Gruppe mission thus contained an average of fewer than ten aircraft”.

In other words, an average of no more than nine German fighters participated in each mission on 27 June 1944.

The largest single mission performed by the Luftwaffe over France on 27 June 1944 probably was that which involved I. and II./JG 27 in the evening, with approximately 20 Bf 109s. These were attacked by the Thunderbolts of 353 FG, and then Thunderbolts of 56 FG joined in, followed by the Mustangs of 352 FG and 355 FG. It is possible that the Mustangs of 339 FG also participated in the onslaught on I. and II./JG 27’s little formation, since this fighter group claimed a victory against a German fighter in the same area and at the same time, while there are no records of other German fighter units in the vicinity by the same time. However, it doesn’t matter whether I. and II./JG 27’s little formation was battered by four or five different US fighter groups; what matters is that the Bf 109 pilots stood no chance and lost nine Bf 109s (the Americans claimed 14 victories) while they only managed to shoot down two US fighters. (See Clark, book, p. 94, and CD for 27 June 1944.)


All best,

Christer Bergström

Well, you forget to note it is CIA sponsored clique of mad imperialistic supporters tending to a unjustified war with the peace-loving Soviet Union.
If you give preemptive attack theory as a reason, why do you refrain from discussing it? Certainly it does not fit into La-7 thread but it is too serious not to be discussed at all.

I did comment in Lw aces thread.

So I have to believe in that without any further research?

So?

One further point. It was apparently enough three weeks to decimate Luftwaffe in Normandy. I suppose that by the end of the year Allied numerical superiority in France was tremendous. But it is not a proof in your case. At the start of the invasion Germans had more-less full strenghth units.

Why the assupmtion 339, 352 and 339 FGs participated? Dave's data do not allow such conclusion.
Nonetheless I agree, Luftwaffe stood no chance against highest quality Allied war machine that annihilated the enemy within few weeks.

Luftflotte 3 fighter strength (source: Prien, “JG 1/11”, p. 1004):

10 June 1944: 475 (290 serviceable)
26 June 1944: 529 (251)
20 July 1944: 509 (302)
20 August 1944: 581 (344)


Actually, in December 1944, in sheer numbers the Allied numerical superiority was less strong that it had been in June 1944. That had two major reasons:

a) The Western Allied failure to bring the German aircraft production to a halt through their bombing raids.

b) The German scrapping of the B flight schools and the radically shortened flight training schemes, which allowed the Germans to bring a very large number of inadequately trained pilots into first-line service.

It also is a fact that in the main battle days in December 1944 the Western Allied air forces sustained a loss rate in the West which was worse than ever encountered at Normandy the previous summer. These are the figures for the 9th AF on 23 December 1944: 58 medium bombers and fighter-bombers were shot down while 624 sorties were flown - a 9.3 % loss rate! On 24 December 1944, the Allies performed 5,000 sorties in the West and lost 94 aircraft - almost a 2 % loss rate.

The Allied loss rate on D Day was 1.1 %, and the average loss rate was 0.6 % during the whole air war over France June - August 1944.

However, In January 1945, the Allied numerical superiority in the West suddenly exploded into astronomical proportions - when the vast majority of the Luftwaffe was shifted to the Eastern Front, leaving only a fuel-starved tiny number tasked to operate against the RAF and the USAAF.

All best,

Christer Bergström

I hope no one asked him to prove it. As time passes and memory fades, one Mustang becomes four, and later becomes eight. If no one questions it, maybe he will change it to twenty.

How many aerial victories did he claim?

You have a point - some of those 'heroic' rammings lauded by the press 60 years later perhaps were a result of simple collisions and ended up with the pilots' shooting a line, no doubt helped along by the press of the day.

A Famous Gulf War Tornado pilot berated his pilots for being alowed to be used by the media to portray an air war that didn't exist.

Human beings, that's all. Heroes, no question. Keep a perspective.

Six Nifties,

To give credit to Christer, such a scenario doesn't seem too far fetched during the Normandy invasion, the Jagdwaffe was rushed to the front, the Allies were ready in numbers.

Why the irony when its a german pilot and the ready acceptance when its an allied one?

1 vs 4 would be fairly regular, 1 vs 8 as well - wasn't 8 the basic fighting formation late in the war?

It will be very busy week for me , so only a couple short comments
Don't underestimate Italians. Their torpedo-aircraft hit for example battleship Nelson, their fighter-bombers hit fleet carrier Victorious etc... so don't ignore them so lightly. They accomplished something after all, and in mid-1943 they began to get their 5-series fighters (M.205, G.55 and R. 2005 plus some 110 Bf 109Gs) which gave more effectiveness to their fighter arm, which at last had equal equipment to their opponents. In 1943 in Med Heer accused LW and the Italians, LW probably accused the Italians (who else?). Defeat is always orphan and the fingers are pointing to others. So I'd not put too much weight on German oppinion on this.

On the losses, according to Molony et al book, during a few periods which loss figures I came across when I was looking for the strenght figures the Allied losses were not very much higher, You might have different figures or are you comparing LW claims to LW losses. The LW losses 1.1. - 31.5.43 in Med were appr. 1700 a/c according to Murray's Luftwaffe and above that came the Italian losses. Do You have the Allied losses, which were "much higher" according to You? I know that because of the bad accounting habits of the USAAF in North Africa it is probably impossible to discover the exact USAAF loss figures.

On JGruppen, where You got the achieved victories, or are they claimed victories?

Maybe the Allies had better escort tactics, clearier operational plan etc at least for. example in the Mareth battle their fighter bombers and bombers worked with good effect even if in fighters the Allies didn't have overwhelming superiority. I don't claim that the LW wasn't very good in Tunisia but the Allies were also good and handled their operations well. And I'm not sure that the Germans enjoyed qualitative advantage for exp. in bomber force in Tunisia.

The point of my rather extreme example was that the Germans didn't have more tanks but better operational doctrine for them and better tank generals, and of course better operational plan, that of French played to hands of Germans. So, even if there is many reasons to French defeat the main reason was that the Allies were outgeneraled. BTW the 530 French FT17, FT18 tanks were rather unimportant, being WWI wintage.

At least Allied high command understood that in the total war one needs lot of planes, argued against their political leaders' decisions, which they saw wrong, which is more than could say on the CoS of LW.

Quote: Tähe British AF commanders wasted thousands of aircraft sorties and airmen on virtually useless operations over France in daylight in 1941 and against German population centres. The Western Allies could sure have made use of a more competent air force high command!

One of the reasons of daylight operations in later part of 41 was to attempt to help SU with those meager ways they had. British knew that the achilles heel of Germany was the oil but when they found out that the night bombers didn't find the specific targets they switched to area bombing. I think it was understandable that they tried to hit at least something but freely admit that after the BC got better navigational aids and got the ability to hit specific target, IMHO is that they should have switch away from area bombing. But if You look LW bomber leaders, they got the idea to hit SU's powerplants so late that when they got they aircrews trained to long range navigation the frontline was retreated so far to west that most of the targets were outside the range of their main bomber, He 111. So the plan was scrapped. And here one see the other main problem of LW High Command, that of production planning. Bomber B program was a fiasco to which LW didn't have afford. And in general LW lost one generation of warplanes because of bad procurement system. And if the USAAF lacked escort doctrine the LW doctrine based on Bf 110 wasn't flawless either, even if I had a gut feeling that Bf 110 wasn't so bad than usually claimed.

Perseverance, I meant that even if they had great difficulties in 1941 and 42 against LW and they knew it because of Ultra, they continued to "lean towards France". The problem with qualative edge is that it erose easily under constant stress. Much the same with aggressiveness, this was shown on lower level. I may even say that there were too many over-agressive USAAF pilots, meaning too many attacks on own side a/c. Were they more agressive than Germans, difficult to say but at least CinC of LW seemed to think so. And he should knew that, shouldn't he.

Quote: äPrior to that [Feb. 43], the bulk of the Luftwaffe’s losses were sustained on the Eastern Front

As I have shown earlier, the LW losses in Med in Oct and Nov. 42 were so big that cumulatively it losses in later half of 42 were more severe against Western Allies than against SU. And before 22.6.41 the bulk of LW losses were suffered on other fronts than Eastern. The last sentence is a bad joke, I admit.

Quote: äThe reason is simple - although the British enjoyed a significant numerical superiority against the Luftwaffe in both the Wets and the Mediterranean from mid-1941 and throughout 1942, it was not until the Americans arrived to add their huge numbers to those of the British that the Western Allies achieved such a numerical superiority that they could start wearing down the Luftwaffe.

I really don't agree, IMHO You miss the qualitative progress of British AFs.

After all more than a couple comments.
Tyvärr I'm very busy in this week, maybe we can continue this argument later.

Juha

Ruy
Well, you should read comments of Polish pilots when they heard of multiple claims of US B-17 gunners in the late 1942! The same one that caused a lot of laugh at Abbeville!
6's comment is quite valid though I do not think it exagerated in time. Please look at memoirs of Rudel when he describes a massacre done by Mustangs over SE (then S) Poland in 1944.

Andy
Doubtless, but there were some deeds of heroism or... stupidity! It just needs proper research and recognition and to filter out propaganda. I perfectly remember a talk with the late Skalski, who on the first day of war landed near a downed Henschel and personally took the crew POW. He said: people always ask me why I did it. I do not know, I was stupid! Friends were telling me that I will regret that. I do! I have to talk about that all the time!

Christer
Just check how many aircraft went through the units during the June.

In France?

Close to the battlefront that may have been the case, but in general that was not true. It would seem that Christer does not appreciate the basic principle of attack used by the Germans -- one that was equally popular with their air, ground, and naval services.

In reality, the Allied fighter escorts were dispersed over great distances whereas the Germans tended to schwerpunkt, or concentrate their fighters at certain locations. For that reason, the majority of escort pilots did not see German planes. The Germans looked for gaps in the fighter coverage and failing that, they simply tried to overwhelm the fighter escorts at the point of attack (with numbers, not aerobatics). As a result the Allied fighter pilots were sometimes outnumbered locally.

In a perfect world, the Allies could magically predict exactly where the Germans would attack the heavy bombers and then all of the escorts would appear to meet them there. If that were possible, the Jagdwaffe would have been destroyed much sooner.

Yes, there's always laughs to be had at someone else's expense Franek. You like to return to that subject, which is good because it ties in with your previous remarks about the Seafire.

After Operation Avalanche, it is safe to say that USAAF A-36 pilots had no respect at all for the flying skills of British Navy pilots. Major Joseph Kelly of the 27th Fighter-Bomber Group described typical encounters with the FAA, which indicates that their training left much to be desired:

" Some British aircraft carriers were providing Seafire aircraft for the patrol line between Salerno and Capri. They lasted about a week! Word was that they damaged all of their aircraft trying to land on the carriers. They spent most of their time when they were aloft, attacking the other Allied aircraft which were also on patrol. At first, we took evasive action. Later, because of their vague idea of what constituted a 'curve of pursuit', we did not pay much attention to them. We figured that they needed the practice but they never seemed to get themselves into a position where they could do damage to another aircraft! "

The Brits deployed 106 Seafires on their carriers and flew 713 'combat' sorties. 83 Seafires were wrecked or seriously damaged in landing accidents (32 were total write-offs). The Seafire pilots claimed two German planes shot down, although that is unlikely. If they shot down any planes, they were probably friendlies.

There's an amusing sidebar to this story. Some weeks earlier, the USAAF loaned six A-36As to the RAF for No. 1437 Flight, because the Spitfire was measured and found wanting. This unit did special recon work for the ground forces. On August 17, 1943, Flight Lieutenant J. L. Griffith and his wingman were scouting some roads near the Italian coast when they were misidentified as Me 109s and jumped in error by two Spitfires of No. 43 Squadron. The Mustang pilots then assumed that they were under attack by Me 109s. In self-defense, they out-manuevered the Spitfires and Griffith latched onto the tail of Spitfire BR290, which was shot down in flames. Flight Lieutenant N.W. Lee baled out safely and splashed down into the sea. Before Griffith returned to base, he was hit by flak and baled out, also landing in the water. A Walrus was dispatched and it soon arrived. Guess who was aboard but Flight Lieutenant Lee.

It must have been an interesting conversation.

I'm not surprised by the comments of Hans-Ekkehard Bob and Joseph Kelly. Fighter pilots are competitive and it's natural for them to belittle pilots from other air forces. But there is an important difference here; the Mustang had a good combat record, and the Seafire did not.

I wouldn't know what Rudel bandied about, but he had zero credibility with some of his fellow ground attack pilots. Members of SG 2 referred to Rudel as selfish, childish, a poor leader, and a political extremist. They also thought Rudel was a flake because he refused to fly an Fw 190 like his subordinates. Instead he clung to his beloved Stuka which belonged in a museum by 1945.

Well, yes but perhaps at another thread?

Well, I will leave any comments to our British friends.

No Seafire stats on my part, so cannot comment but I recall US P-40 pilots in CBI/SWP were also quite good in destruction of own aircraft.

Well, your supposition is not a proof. Quite a lot of RAF pilots believe a bulk of USAAF claims were RAF Spitfires. I am still looking who shot up Poles over Antwerp on 4.05.1943.

I am wondering what Horby told to Lee when he was back. Hmm, I had an email addy for J Norby King somewhere.

Not necessarily. A friendly fighter pilot was of high regard of Canadian pilots whom he instructed in OTU. Americans of 94 FS were of highest regard of Polish pilots of 303 Sqn.
I never wrote Mustang was a bad aircraft but it was never used as a carrier borne fighter.

Well, he saw much more Mustangs than there were around. A rather limited field of error in Poland in 1944.
As to Rudel, I have heard he was a NS hardcore but at least he had balls not to become a democrat like so many did. I am wondering what was influence of his political views on post war comments on him.

Thanks Franek good point :D