Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Further to Graham's information on the tail fins, it seems to get curiouser:

If JP137 was a MK II series 1, then we should expect Merlin XX engines, if my understanding is correct?

If JP 137 was a MK II series 1A, then I think we should expect Merlin XXII engines - and modified tail fins, as he suggests.

From the record cards, the reference to the tail fins not being modified suggests a MK II series 1.
The fact that the other record card clearly describes Merlin XXII engines, suggest a MK II series 1A ?

Unless of course these designations were not 'absolute', and there were examples of aircraft with a mixture of various modifications and engine types?

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Just to advise that the Moordown Halifax Memorial is now in place, and was dedicated on July 10th.

Video of the dedication ceremony here

Some notes on the events surrounding the crash here

and some very interesting Civil Defence photos of the crash site, that came to light recently here


My thanks to the guidance received from the members here. We continue to receive information from a variety of sources --- it's been fascinating to hear some of the eye witness accounts.
I must add that I have been honoured to meet some of the relatives of the victims, both aircrew and civilians, during the course of this fascinating project.
Thanks again to those who contributed to this thread.

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

fascinating thread... thanks.

GC

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Apologies for incorrect third link to the photographs in this post. It should link to here

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

On the Accident Card shown it is a Mk II and does not have the modified rudders. I also see the reference to a wing dropping and a "spin".

Generally, there was rudder overbalance and it is recorded that the first Halifax Rudder Modifications did not solve the problem according to the A & AEE in 1943:-

"When rudder locking takes place, the rudder overpowers the ailerons completely and the aircraft rolls over to the side in which the rudder is applied. At the same time, the nose drops, and the aircraft enters a spiral dive."

"If the Pilot pulls the control column back as the aircraft rolls over and drops its nose as he would instinctively do then the controls are set for a spin and, unless action is taken quickly ... a spin may result."

"In any case there is a large height loss of anything up to 4,000 feet during recovery."

If he had recently taken off, he would likely not have enough height to recover the aircraft. That is why the Inquiry is saying the modification is really required.

Generally with an engine problem more rudder is also applied to maintain track, so if an engine was on fire and the Pilot needs more rudder any problem with rudder overbalance / locking is likely to be compounded.

During 1943 tests, they tried limiting the rudder travel and also thicker cord on the rudder trailing edges, to make them feel heavier to the Pilot and hopefully prevent the rudder reaching the overbalance stage, but the thicker cord did not improve the rudder locking characteristic. The rudders were considered too heavy for general flying and the thicker cord made the rudders unpleasantly heavy according to the A & AEE.

They next tried some factory modified rudders which were tested and these also suffered from overbalance troubles.
Rudder limit stops were recommended and more training of Pilots in recovery techniques in No.4 Group.

However, the problem was only really settled with a new larger redesigned 'D' fin area (40% larger fin area) and rudder combination and when tested there was no tendency to overbalance in various flight conditions.

This aircraft did not have the modified rudders and I feel you can clear the Pilot of blame. Also sufficient height to attempt a recovery was likely insufficient and if an engine was also on fire, his problems were made worse.

Mark

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Many thanks for those observations. It does seem from eyewitness accounts that there was an engine fire, although there appears to be no mention of that in the 'official' accounts.
The AHB has confirmed that the original Court of Inquiry notes no longer exist, but we are hoping there may be some mention of the observed engine fire in the Civilian Inquest records. We are currently awaiting those.
There has been a renewed interest in trying to clear the pilot of any blame, following the publication of the story of the Memorial in the Daily Mail and Telegraph recently. Hopefully we shall be able to obtain enough evidence to get the RAF (or should that be MoD?) to amend the records.

The recent reversal of the Mull of Kyntire Chinook decision seems to have acted as a stimulus.......

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

It is a shame that the Accident Files with the Court of Inquiry or Court of Enquiry, along with the accident paperwork etc., plans, maps and damage photographs, newspaper cuttings, Observer Corps, Police and Witnesses etc., etc., from all the relevant sources are claimed not to exist.

Basically, once the findings of an RAF Court of Inquiry had been issued by the Unit CO or Group (or whoever was holding the Inquiry) on Form 2 or Form 412, it went to higher authority at Group or/and Command level and they could add their Statements, mount any defence against the earlier findings that they wished and include the findings of any further Inquiries that the Air or other Officer Commanding knew about or wished to make about the aircraft and these were recorded on the Form (sometimes annexed to the Form), before the Court of Inquiry Forms went to the Air Ministry. Some accidents were even referred by the Command to their own Engineering Branch or A.O.A. and then back to the aircraft Manufacturers, when the cause pointed to a structural airframe problem etc. They could also seek the technical assistance and an opinion from the Air Ministry A.I.B.

Paragraph 1318 of "The Kings Regulations of the Royal Air Force and Air Council Instructions" (known as "King's Regs" or "K.R.") refers, to when the Character or the professional reputation of an Airman or Pilot is called into question, or affected.

A Pilot or Airman has the right to defend himself and in the event of his death he cannot defend himself, so the accident cause must really be without any doubt.

In this case according to the summary on the Flying Accident Card a defect with regard to the aircraft rudders was mentioned, as they are unmodified. Therefore, this fact that there is in effect a defect with the aircraft involved which could likely cause this crash, throws into doubt any earlier reference to the Pilot causing the crash.

Therefore, the Pilot cannot be blamed, when there may be doubt or is any doubt as to the cause, or the earlier provisional cause is called into question.

The Inquest would likely have occurred before the RAF Inquiry was finalised and may not have been privy to any technical advice and information the RAF was receiving during any Investigation.

According to the K.R. this accident would also have to have been reported to the AIB (Accidents Investigation Branch) now the AAIB, under the reasons given in K.R. 743 Investigation of Accidents.

The A & AEE Report into the rudder problem on this type of aircraft said that it could take up to 4,000 feet for an experienced Test Pilot to recover this type of aircraft with the rudder problems.

The Pilot cannot be blamed, when an unmodified airframe defect could have caused this crash.

Mark

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Oh hang on a minute, you requested a Court of Inquiry? The Form 412 [Court of Inquiry] box has a cross in it.

However, the Flying Accident Card indicates that you should be specifically requesting the Forms 765(C) and the Form 1669 along with any "copy of any relevant letter or memorandum" ... "attached to Form 1669." or pieces annexed thereto.

These were completed at the time according to the Flying Accident Card and must be on the Airmans "Personal File" / "Casualty File". They have to be retained for 75 Years (from creation / i.e. 1944 in this case) and therefore paperwork ought to be complete. They cannot refuse it under FOI.

Form 765(c) = Forced Landing Not Due to Enemy Action
Form 1669
According to the AMO covering Investigation of Accidents as at 30 Dec 1943, "The purpose of Form 1669 is to ensure that suggestions made by Groups and Commands regarding accident prevention are available for consideration at the Air Ministry at the earliest possible moment."

Regards Mark

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Mark -
Many thanks for that valuable information.
I should explain that I am not an expert historian, and that my role in this project has essentially been as the member of the organising committee, tasked with correlating information acquired. There have been a number of sources of information, which the committee has been very grateful to receive.
The recent 'Court of Inquiry' document request to the AHB was made by the BBC, as part of their research into an upcoming documentary piece on the crash.
I shall ask them if they followed the line of enquiry you have indicated, or whether they simply made a request for the Court of Inquiry papers, which I had suggested.
As I say, as a non expert air historian, that was the line of inquiry I had been recommended to follow.
I'll report back on any further developments.
Thanks again.

Re: RAF Non-operational loss 21 March 1944
 

Hello Arjay

I have the AMO (rules as it were) governing the accident paperwork, but to ensure you get the right part do you know if this aircraft was based with an Overseas Unit / Group or Command?

In the meantime you may like to see this attachment researched by Brian Johnson around 1982, Brian was a BBC Television Producer and he gained access to A & AEE Reports with a T. Heffernan who worked at Boscombe Down during the war years.

All the general Reports and Handling Trials ought to be in the AVIA series in The National Archives, Kew, by now. The general Reports into the "disappearing Halifaxes" over the sea on Ops & the Rudder problems should be A & AEE Report No.760; No.760a. These Reports have numerous (55) parts. See also Report 760c according to Brian Johnson's research and others.

You might also look at AIR 29/897 A&AEE ORB 1939-1944 in Appendix A which is recorded and published to have an Accident Report on a Halifax II, Accident Report No.W7917.

If you go to TNA, Kew, take some photographic ID such as Passport / Photo Driving Licence and at least two RECENT printed forms with both proof of your name and current address together on them (such as Council Tax Bill & Inland Revenue letter (although they probably ask for them within last 3 months), to get a Readers Ticket issued. Ring TNA before going.

Also Try
AVIA 13/560
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/c...accessmethod=0
and

AVIA 18/708 Halifax aircraft: performance and handling trials A.& A.E.E/760 13 pts 760a-e 55 pts 1940 to 1946
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/c...accessmethod=0
and check
AVIA 46/112
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/c...accessmethod=0
[although some of this info is pretty general, but you never know]

Brian Johnson wrote a book with the help of Heffernan which covers this Halifax type of aircraft with Rudder problems called "A Most Secret Place"
covering some of the work at "Boscombe Down 1939-45" you ought to be able to get this via Abe Books or a search of the other secondhand book search online companies.

Mark