Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

The early P-47s had only a few extra miles of range over the Spitfire of the time period. Btw, the Spitfire was over Berlin years ahead of any American fighter.

The Mustang was built at the request of the British and the two that the American got from the British order languished at W-P for around a year until the USN needed some weapon testing done. It still wasn't an a/c that would be of much use in long range escorting at 20,000ft plus. No British order,then no American P-51.

When the Vengeance would have been operational in the ETO, the German fighter force was still a force to be recond with (1942-43). They were sent to theaters where they could survive better.

So the Germans destroyed 2 of the 19 temporary bridges that the American had constructed to get across the Roer.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Before I start I must thank you for the time and effort you clearly put into the replies, its much appreciated.

As I understand it then, it wasn't the failure of the 2 TAF that the bridges were not destroyed, but the responsibility of the 8th Air Force with B17/B24 to destroy the bridges. I admit to not being suprised about the difficulty. B17/B24's didn't carry big enough bombs to damage the foundations of such bridges and had to rely on a direct hit. You then have the problem of the low payload of the US bombers limiting the number of bombs carried and the normal carpet bombing approach of the USAAF depending on the lead bomber which would spread the bombs over an area the sixe of the formation. I didn't doubt the ability of the FB to hit the bridge, I doubted the ability of a FB to carry a big enough bomb to damage the foundations. I didn't say it but agree with you when you say that a FB lacked the precision of a dive bomber. Unless you hit the span square on then most bombs would have a limited effect.
From what I have heard the medium bomber would have been the right weapon and in particular the 4000lb cookie in a mosquito, but these were not used. Its also truer that from what you say, the 2TAF never tried to destroy the bridges so its a bit off to say that they failed. If they had given the job to 2TAF the result might have been different as they did have the right tools.

My statement was intended to point out that an IL2 was just as vulnerable as a Typhoon to AA fire, the Typhoon being smaller, faster and more manoeverable and more difficult to hit but more vulnerable when hit. Whereas the IL 2 could take more damage but was much easier to hit. Its only a guess but the pluses and minus' would even out. However when faced up against fighters the Typhoon had all the advantages.

As for the vulnerability of the dive bomber. You are correct when you say that the danger from fighters was low there is still the danger from AA fire. After droping their bombs dive bombers were low, slow and very vulnerable. The losses to AA fire sufferred by all the allied airforces would be magnified for dive bombers due to their low performance. A couple of points on this.
1) There is no doubt that Hillman wasn't badly damaged by the landing bombardment from sea and air. But others were and some surrendered as soon as the ground forces attacked..
2) Why would an IL2 do better than a Typhoon against a heavily protected bunker system?
3) As far as I can tell Hillman wasn't attacked directly by the 2TAF once the landing was underway. With that in mind I don't see how it can be used as an example of the failure of the 2TAF.
4) Typhoons were used in support of the attack on Hillman with some success in just the role that some people believe they had little impact. You will notice the phrase 'Typhoons dive bombed Tanks as they moved up'.

Soon after four o'clock a troop of the Staffordshire Yeomanry scouting ahead reported enemy tanks advancing from Caen. The squadron with the Suffolk at Hillman strong-point was hastily moved to Biéville and had just taken up position to the west when about forty enemy tanks, moving very fast, attacked. Two were knocked out by the Yeomanry and two by the Shropshire anti-tank guns and the enemy turned away into the woods. They were pursued by the Yeomanry and by field-gun fire, and when they showed again some more were destroyed. They swung off again and were joined by others, and making a wide détour they came in towards the Périers ridge. There they met the squadron of the Staffordshire posted at Point 61 for just such an occasion. Three more were knocked out and again they drew off. Thirteen had then been knocked out to our knowledge (our only loss was one self-propelled gun), but they had already been persistently harassed by aircraft while they were south of Caen. On the western outskirts of the town eight Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air Force had dive-bombed tanks moving up to join the fight and had left two in flames and four others smoking. Feuchtinger has since said that his division started the day with 124 tanks and by nightfall had only 70 left. In view of his figures British records were over-modest

http://warchronicle.com/british_3rd_...ctorysword.htm

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

I cannot understand the points you are making, Kutscha.

1. Long-range air-superiority fighters.
The Spitfires over Berlin were stripped PR machines with extra internal fuel tanks - designed by a civilian to show the disbelieving RAF what was possible. What's your point?
The Americans adapted two Spitfires to fly the Atlantic in a vain attempt to prove to Portal that it was possible to design long-range fighters. He wouldn't listen.
All the action on long-range air superiority fighters came from the Americans. Are you disputing this?

2. The Mustang was built to a British order, and re-engined with a Merlin. And your point?

3. Most of the Vengeance dive-bombers were sent to Devon in South-west England as target tugs, while the Normandy campaign was being fought with Allied air superiority and without dive bombers. Devon was not a theatre of war. So both your point and your meaning are unclear.

4. Yes, the American bridges destroyed by the GAF were temporary. Again, what's your point?

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Glider, I now see the difficulty.

It was always 2TAF's responsibility to destroy the Wesel bridges. It was their decision to ask for Heavies rather than use their own glide-bombing Typhoons and Spitfires or Mediums. The failure of the Heavies was not the responsibility of VIIIUSAAF - they did what they could with an inaccurate weapon system, and they did it frequently and whole-heartedly. The failure to destroy the bridges remains at the door of 2TAF. The postwar audit confirmed this when 2TAF decided they should have used their own Mediums.

You think Mediums were the right tools? I beg to differ. The Medium was only a small version of a Heavy with the same inaccuracy. 2TAF's Mediums were notoriously inaccurate, destroying vast areas of housing around all of the bridges they did take down - the Dutch were particularly scathing, and Dutchmen I've spoken to said whenever they saw an Allied medium they'd dive for cover. I guess you know that Horrocks, OC XXX Corps, banned the Mediums after they had twice bombed his troops in Operation Veritable.

The problem of the Typhoon was its vulnerable engine. The great Eric Roberts, CO 609 Squadron, was brought down by a solitary MG42 on the barge he was attacking on March 9, 1945. He had been given the OK to attack the barge by Johnny Baldwin, who was present, ironically because there was no FLAK; defended targets had been placed out of bounds in order to cut down the pilot loss rate. The only possible conclusion is that the Typhoon was not fit for purpose. It can be said with a certainty that no Il-2 could not be brought down by an MG42.

There was no FLAK at Hillman. But even if there had been, a non-frivolous 2TAF under Army control, would have devised a drill for neutralising FLAK before sending in the Vengeance dive-bombers. These were, in any case, less vulnerable than Typhoons to FLAK.

The question to be answered is why 2TAF chose the Typhoon and Spitfire for CAS. I suggest the reasons were both psychological and philosophical. The psychological problem resulted from the trauma of 1939/40 when the cream of the strategic bomber crews were killed in daylight when flying Wellingtons in the Heligoland Bight and Battles against the Meuse bridges. They said never again, and took to the night. When they had to destroy the Wesel bridges, they passed the parcel to the Heavies. The RAF's philosophical problem was due to the teaching of Trenchard that air power was unique in that it could succeed without needing to engage the enemy's main force. Instead it would attack the enemy's means of production. When ordered to accompany the Army or be broken up, the RAF, like the tanks, grasped at the panacea of mobility; a 400mph Typhoon would survive where a 250mph Battle could not (a 30mph cruiser tank would survive where a 12mph Infantry tank could not). When the Typhoon loss rate from FLAK reached an unacceptable level, 2TAF simply withdrew the Typhoon and Spitfire from defended targets.

Concerning the Typhoon's claims against 21 Panzer Division on D-Day, I would question that Typhoons dive-bombed (sic) tanks and left two in flames and four others smoking. Such claims (eg around Mortain in July), when investigated by Operational Research teams, were almost always reduced and the destruction ascribed to anti-tank guns.

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony
I still don't see how you can blame the 2 TAF for not attacking the bridges when they were not asked to attack them in the first place. According to the records I have seen (which are not conclusive I admit) the 2 TAF were never asked, tasked or ever planned to attack the bridges. It wasn't a case of the 2ATF passing the buck, they never had the buck to pass over in the first place.

Its a similar situation re the Hillmen strongpoint. How can you blame the 2TAF for not knocking it out when no one asked for it to be attacked? Had they been asked to so, then they would have attacked, flack or no flack.

I didn't know about Gen Horricks decision to ban mediums but I do know that 38 Brigade prepared a detailed report on the fighting and no problems with the air support were mentioned.
http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_R...d%20Report.htm

No one would deny that the achilles heal of the Typhoon was its radiator, the same wen for the Tempest and P40, all of which performed well in the GA role. However I would still argue that its smaller size, higher speed and better maneouverability would balance the additional vulnerability. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter and if he hadn't hit the radiator, the german would not have done much apart from knock a couple of holes in the plane.
As has been pointed out a large number of IL2's were shot down but the Finns who were on the receiving end of the IL2 noted that against pin point targets they were pretty ineffective due to a lack of accuracy.

As for why the Spitfire and Typhoon were chosen for GA I believe there are two different reasons.
Typhoon because it was fast, robust, well protected, exceptionally well armed and capable of carrying a heavy payload plus, by RAF standards it had a good range.
Spitfire, because we had planty of them, and as time went on the Mk IX could carry a respectable payload but not as much as the Typhoon or P47, whilst the XIV became the fighter to give top cover.

Finally can I ask where you get the information that the Typhoon and Spitfires were withdrawn from attacking defended targets?
I say this as on the last day of the war Spits and Typhoons were attacking ships and airfields both of which were amongst the most heavily defended targets you could find.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

see above

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony
On Il-2 vs Typhoon. Typhoon was vulnerable to rifle calibre fire but much less vulnerable to Bf 109s and Fw 190s. Both were vulnerable to 20mm AAA.

Il-2 was interesting solution to CAS problem but if you look the Soviet losses in men and material in 44-45 and compared those to losses of Western Allies in ETO in 44-45 you can see that it wasn’t a magic weapon. One could not fight a cheap war against an army like WM.

On Hillman. I cannot follow your logic. If British had known how difficult object it was they could have softened it by heavy naval fire, for ex from HMS Rodney. 1 Suffolks had had easy job to reduce Morris shortly before (white flag went up before 1 Suffolk even had begun their attack on it). and it dawned to them that Hillman would be a totally different game only after their point platoon and parts of the second were inside Hillman. A bit late if one was not totally callous to the life of his own troops to deploy heavy support fire, dive bombers, BB main armament fire etc at that point.

Juha

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Guys, this thread has really strayed from its original subject. I'm closing it down. If you want to start a new thread on the subject being discussed in the last posts, please do so, but keep on subject.