Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

Surrendering would have saved a lot of lives but that wasn't something the people running Germany were much concerned about.



Was Galland's vision of a Großer Schlag against Ameican bombers really any more realistic than Bodenplatte or just another example of the Luftwaffe's late-war dreams of some big spectacular to damage their enemies' morale? See also Drachenhöhle, the planned Mistel strike on Scapa Flow.

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

I'm somewhat puzzled by the last line in #20. Allied dump in Amsterdam on 1 Jan 1945? City was in German hands till early May 1945...
Leendert

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

Nick
In fact, they could not surrender, and FDR's stance in Tehran effectivelly cut down any possible peace talks.
As for Galland, this is a person that deserves a honest biography, which would debunk a few myths around him. Hard to say without a proper research into structure of command, but doubtless he was one of the key figures responsible for the collapse of the Luftwaffe.
Franek

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

LOL! Sorry. ...the port of Antwerp.

Bronc

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

Interesting point. It deserves its own thread, but would you please briefly touch on this?

If portrayed honestly/accurately in a screenplay/film what would the most accurate presentation of Galland look like? (Everyone knows the carefully curated persona and reputation, but what was the real story? Is it even possible to tell it? Like Hartmann, Galland has an eternal fan club.)

Once again, Leendert, please forgive me. The port of Antwerp, not Amsterdam.

Bronc

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

Well, there are tidbits here and there, suggesting he was actually a bit different person, see eg. account of Galland in Sicily in 1943 in Prien's JG 53 history.
Symptoms of collapse of Luftwaffe appeared in 1943, and in fact the poor performance cannot be explained by outnumbering of the Luftwaffe. In fact, researching a number of 1944 combats, I have noticed that Jagdwaffe had a numerical local advantage but still performed bad. Thus obviously, they were either poorly trained or had bad tactics or both, and this was area of responsibility of Galland. My impression is that Luftwaffe never learned how to fight in large formations against large formations.

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

Agreed. THIS deserves a gigantic thread and discussion, because Helmut Lipfert, (in his book about the Eastern Front,) talks about the complete lack of combat and operational mentoring (at any level) by the Experts and experienced pilots that he experienced as a new pilot. It was survival of the fittest and luckiest. (His flight of novice pilots didn't even get navigational help on their very first ferry flight to their operational (airfield) duty station. It was a long flight and, if I recall correctly, he was the only pilot to actually find the field. The rest of the flight got lost and some were never seen again!)

The Experts were always off on free hunts, thereby providing no leadership whatsoever, and the experienced combat pilots didn't find it necessary to share their wisdom or experience.

Simply said, the distinct impression one gets from reading Lipfert's book is the Jagdwaffe (in the East) didn't fight and never fought as a cohesive team.

Bronc

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

I disagree with your blanket statement. I have correspondence with numerous pilots who trained with my uncle during the period 1940-41 with Erg. JG3 and Erg. Jagdgruppe 51, such as Rudi Sinner, Walter Schuck and Helmut Rueffler, amongst others. They maintained that their later successes were primarily due to the high quality training they received. I suppose things could have deteriorated later in the conflict, but to dismiss categorically the experienced pilots as a group of self-interested parties only interested in padding their scores is a gross generalisation.

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

You are missing the point. The mentioned airmen were trained before Galland became responsible. Otherwise, individual successes meant nothing in aerial warfare. While Allies worked hard to make a force, to develop strategy and tactics, to manage air war, Luftwaffe got stuck, and was unable to gain local supremacy by managing large formations and to organise proper training system. If you go through individual air combats, you can find, that Luftwaffe could not go upper hand even with local numerical advantage, because of lack of proper training and tactics. Even looking at Bodenplatte, you can see that a fair number of losses was caused by lack of escort, ie. sections left above, to cover strafing aircraft.

Re: Operation Bodenplatte (the real story?)
 

For those who don't have it, I highly recommend, "The War Diary of Hauptmann Helmut Lipfert ~ JG 52 on the Russian Front 1943-1945."

The book is amazing, an honest and accurate account, from an honest claimer with 203 aerial victories.

One thing has always stayed with me after reading the book: the "dead pool" his squadron maintained. Lipfert describes a betting pool and funeral party fund that all the pilots contributed to. The pool was sanctioned and well known to the squadron's leadership and they participated in it. The pilots in the squadron were betting on each other's death in combat. AND the ground crews would line up every morning and take bets as to who would crash and burn and die on takeoff. (This was in Crimea.)

This behavior, I think, was absolutely unheard of in Allied units, betting on each other's death in a dead pool, and it paints a stark contrast between the cohesive, team effort of Allied fighter units and the survival of the fittest attitude of the Jagdwaffe. (At least in the East.)

If Galland knew of this caustic practice, and if it was wide-spread, then Galland bears responsibility for this culture. It had to have had enormous, though difficult to quantify, ramifications

Bronc