Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

What I put up in post #18 was a humourous riposte to a comment made by the thread starter in one of their previous posts. Ostensibly, it was nothing more than that, which I'm sure most (if not all except you) saw it as such. What you posted were serious comments about ground forces, which merited the comment I made. Too bad if you didn't like being called out for them.

What you do not know is the content of the PM that passed between myself and the forum owner regarding the initial thrust/purpose of the thread. If you did, then my post #18 would make more sense.

Complain all you like, I don't give a shit. But do try to follow the humour also...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

That's why Barbarossa is the most crucial turning point. With a clear back, the dream of German military planners since modern times, and access resources in the occupied territories, neutral or sympathetic countries, and even the Soviet Union, Germany could have waged war on Britain with completely different playing cards.

Nick, on your suggestion I bought Tooze, but if his thesis excludes ANY realistic scenario for German victory I am not going to agree with his work.

Besides there are more books of the genre (even have one or two still unread).

As for freezing the thread?

Why, perhaps splitting and/or moving parts of it. I hope there is room for more varied discussion on this board...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

To the OP and his latest theory.

Until now the accepted line of thinking revolves around a couple of variables:

In the Jagdwaffe there wasn't a tour system like the Anglo-American AF. German pilots generally flew until exhausted, with some short home leave in between. Only higher command, recovery from wounds or exhaustion were their route out of combat. Recovering pilots might wind up with training duties. The other way out was death or captivity.

Combine this with opportunity. Just compare the target rich environment of the German Jagdwaffe with that of their Allied counterparts. In many cases Allied pilots flew entire tours with practically no enemy encounters. The mediocre might have enough time to build the experience needed when they finally did encounter the enemy. The Jagdwaffe was a hard school, as the war progressed their pilots received less and less operational training before being exposed to combat. Those who survived long enough were both lucky and good. They didn't call them Alte Hasen (or old Hares) for nothing.

That old hare having flown hundreds of missions knew his a/c and his own abilities through and through, now compare that with an pilot on his first tour and first mission with enemy contact (or at best after a couple of earlier encounters). Even with a lot of operational training on the side of the Allied fighter pilot there is bound to be a gap. If the tactical situation was anywhere equal and their aircraft of relatively similar performance, I'd know where I'd put my money.

Like I wrote earlier the Luftwaffe isn't about the Jagdwaffe, and the Jagdwaffe isn't about Hartmann. Even if you ignore the top third of high scoring Jagdwaffe Experten, you are still left with a lot of high scores.

Franek made a point that multiple kills don't necessarily mean a successful mission. OTOH in terms of the battle of attrition it is all about kills. If the main target is heavies, but you manage to take steady heavy toll of the escorting fighters, you will influence the effectivity and efficiency of the escorts. One major mistake by the Luftwaffe leadership was its insistence on getting at the heavy bombers and neglecting the escorts. This removed one element of initiative from the defenders. Even in defence the fighter must always attack.

PS. I don't believe in Uebermenschen nor that the Jagdwaffe Top Experten were a breed apart, just that they experienced a unique set of circumstances that enabled them to achieve such high scores. Putting a guy like Chuck Yeager or even our own Art Fiedler in that place might have resulted Experten-like numbers, or their demise.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

My only point was that a discussion of the evidence in the book — which, as someone said is outside the Luftwaffe researcher's usual territory — might be more interesting.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
I generally agree with your messages #82 and 83, very good thinking IMHO. Only point I’d like to make is that IMHO you underestimate a bit the importance of good training, good teamwork and aggressiveness plus good communications. Because of these USAAF escort FGs did remarkably well. One must remember that escort fighters flew in relays and had at least hundred mile long bomber stream to protect against an enemy who could concentrate it’s fighters against single section of bomber stream.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I agree with you Juha, completely. Just one minor side comment.

In general those German fighters were concentrating their effort on fighting the heavy bombers, often leaving the initiative to the American escort fighters. Call it orders, lack of training or Jägerschreck*.

This fact itself was a force multiplier in favor of the American escort fighter, especially from early '44 and onward.

Of course as in any generalization, there will be many examples of the opposite, but I still think the general point stands firm.

But, please let me stress that I don't think that this lessens the overal achievement of the American fighter escorts. No lack of fighting spirit and aggressiveness. Perhaps sometimes modesty, but that may be forgiven :)


*As explained by Mike Spick in his Ace Factor, the first encounters are crucial for the development of the fighter pilot.
Again this favored the American escort fighter.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
I agree completely. Agressiveness and taking initiative are very important ingrediences for success in air combat.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Nick
Not much details, this is a general observation based on identified crashsites or accounts. Actually, the whole front in Poland was covered by just only two Geschwadern, JG 51 and JG 52, and occasionally a group from another Geschwader. Only in about April 1945 more fighters appeared, but as the front was on Oder, I presume they could fly on both fronts at once. General feelings of pilots were that there was no Luftwaffe, and that the one must have been very careful to avoid unexpected hit and run attack. In regard of SG units, I think M Holm's site is most informative.
You are missing the entire point. Germany simply wasted a lot of its resources, and failed any long term plans, which (fortunately) ended in a catastrophe.
All of the German allies who dropped out, did that when the war was already lost, but Yugoslavia, which fell under German attack after coup d'etait. It is interesting to note, that Germany did nothing to improve equipment and technology of its allies, this being a short seeing policy.
[/quote]I agree that the leadership of the Luftwaffe was poor at the highest echelon, but they had many outstanding commanders, especially in the field. To simply imply that the German pilots were a bunch of overrated overclaimers is a gross simplification of the truth and a besmirching of the memory of thousands who fought and died bravely.[/quote]
The discussion is about the real view of Luftwaffe, and not a sweet propaganda that continues since creation of Bundesluftwaffe. The real Luftwaffe was incompetent at all levels, and ultimately led to a collapse during 1943. Otherwise it is always worth to remember what for they were fighting.
In 1939-1940 production of heavy bombers like Halifax, Manchester/Lancaster or Stirling was being prepared. Obviously, designs were of 1930s rather 1940s, so it clearly contradicts your thesis. RAF won the battle and ultimately the war because proper decisions were taken already before the war, and in the early part of war it was a matter of surviving the time needed to make the thing work. Germany tended to war much earlier, hence it was better prepared, initially.
I may understand that you do not like preemptive attack theory, but why are you ignoring it at all? Do you think that Hitler contradicted himself without the reason? Do you believe Hitler would remain at power if getting crazy to attack SU without any reason?
Actually, it is a model case. Germany put lots of effort into introducing aircraft not fit for operational service, and more, without any prospect for development. No 1946 German aircraft would fly, because there were no 1946 engines for them. To the contrary, there were several matured designs on the Allied way, like Fury/Sabre family. They were put into production just when they were ready.
Not exactly.

The training system was just hopeless. That is one of the reasons Luftwaffe collapsed.
Have you ever tried to compare flightime of Allied and German aces and number of take offs in a day? You would be surprised. The point is that by 1944 RAF fighters were led by seasoned veterans of several campaigns, who were able to take care of their fresh and well trained pilots, and get them through the war unscathed. In the meantime, German aces lost the technical edge, and were sitting ducks, while rookies were just hopeless.
Yes, but kill what? The war was won by bombers, not fighters. Destruction of one factory and associated labour meant more than loss of a few fighters that could have been easily replaced.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I remember reading some time ago that the reason that Goering insisted on the fighters attacking the bombers over Europe was because in North Africa the fighters would attack the escort fighters and would be letting the bombers get through to their targets too easily.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Except when surprise was on their side, escort fighter pilots (of any air force) rarely held the initiative if flying top cover.

The bombers were the attackers, while the fighter escort mission was largely defensive in nature. When and if the numbers of fighter escorts increased dramatically, some might venture further afield to hunt for targets of opportunity. Otherwise the escorts could only react to enemy counterattacks, which tended to occur at a time and place of the enemy's own choosing.

To radar interpreters, all this looked much like a naval battle, with destroyers and other small ships trying to form a screen of protection against intruders. The principles did not change so much as the machinery.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

The bombers are "attackers" but in the air they are defensive. Escort fighters if not too tied to the bombers are offensive in all almost every sense of the word.

Franek, I keep wondering how many of these heavy bomber types were actually in operation and in significant numbers during the essential period I describe - 1939-41.

Let off the hook and having the freedom to allocate resources to these heavies was crucial in their development, production and deployment. That events happened as they did doesn't mean that they were the only possible outcome. That's 20-20 "blindsight".

It is not being disputed that the Luftwaffe was poorly led at the highest level. Williamson Murray's example of bad planning is a good case, although again it is not the only possible outcome.

The RAF had a very good training program, proof of good or even essential foresight.

Yet again that part of having been let off the hook is essential to the development of FC. Those experienced fighter pilots evolved during the 1941-43 period, so by 1944 FC had a large cadre of highly experienced men.

Certainly, flying over the channel in uncontested skies does allow the accumulation of many flight hours, steady confidence building of the pilot, his ability to handle his aircraft and a gradual exposure to (the stresses of) combat.

Apart from the bad political leadership and bungling of a number of high ranking Luftwaffe officials. Gambling on a short war everything was geared towards that end, including freezing long term development of aircraft, engines and weaponry. But also production and training suffered, again see Murray.

However a blanket statement like worthless is exactly that. The Jagdwaffe and essentially a good operational training program, granted not geared for massive wartime expansion, but capable of producing good fighter pilots as long as there were time and resources to do so. The early wartime trainees are perhaps the best operationally trained Jagdwaffe pilots of the war. Getting the best practical and operational training.

And if we shouldn't call all Germans Nazis, we can safely say that the majority of them believed in Hitler.

There were plenty of doubts about any military operation from 1938 onward, but every success made Hitler's position stronger. After the defeat of the Anglo-French - the evacuation of the BEF from the continent, and French armistice - he was at his zenith as so-called military leader. Those who thought it that it was madness (or stupidity) to attack the Soviet Union not voice this sentiment in public, certainly not act upon it.

That at its core Nazism stood opposed to Communism is just the irony of this most unlikely of partnerships, especially considering that they were in practically open warfare with each other only a few months earlier as the Spanish civil war was being wound down.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Again, its difficult to see how was that any different than the bomber programmes in Germany. The He 177 programme started in 1935, by the end of 1939 the prototype made its first flight, and soon the order for serial production came again. Given the defeat of France and Britain in the Western campain, the orders were much reduced in June 1940, but re-instated in October 1940, after it become clear that the war would drag on. In other words, the German heavy bomber programme run parellel to the British, but because of its much more technically ambitious nature, it took a year longer to be fit for operations.

OTOH, I tend believe that the Luftwaffe wasn't in such a need for a heavy bomber as the Western Allies. The operational requirements could be just as well satisfied by the existing medium bombers with significantly less strain on logistics and production, and the introduction of a viable heavy bomber design would not solve the inherent strategical dilemmas: the US and the USSR's industrial areas beyond the Ural would be still out of reach; and given that bases were readily close to Britain, the Luftwaffe was not facing the same operational problem as the RAF BC (and 8th USAAF), ie. that medium bombers did not have the range/payload to hit target deep in Germany while taking off from British airfields - Luftwaffe bombers could take off from airfields in France.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Once again, you all forget the political aspect of WW2, particularly so on the German side.

In October 1941, Hitler forbad all night intruder activities of NJG 2 over the British bases, because he wanted RAF bombers being shot down over German territory to show his people that the Luftwaffe was doing its work. For over three years, RAF bombers were able to take off and assemble without any interference (apart from the short-lived "Gisela Unternehmen").
What a major mistake! But it was a political decision.

Hitler had no clear idea of what to do with the LW, except a close support of Panzers. He was an infantry man and did not know anything about a 3D war - hence his reluctance to launch more submarines into the Atlantic war.
The He 177 and Me 264 were only avatars of a long gone strategy Hitler never had.

Read Richard J. Overy and Williamson Murray.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Six Nifty .50s is spot on with this comment. And this was perfectly illustrated in one of the many conversations I had with Otto Hintze, who led the Jabo 109 Staffel of Erprobungsgruppe 210 during the Battle of Britain (for those who may not know who he is). Hintze said that en route to a target, inconcert with the Stab and Bf 110 Staffeln of the unit, his 3. Staffel were solely charged to get to the target and bomb it as their first responsibility (attackers). Once that was achieved, they could then move to protect the slower Bf 110s of the unit, as required (defenders). Going into the target last, things did not always work out as planned, as with the Croydon raid of 15/8/40, but the defensive work was amply illustrated on that raid by Lt. Marx trying to escort his Commanding Officer safely back to France but in the process getting shot down himself. The 109s of 3./210 illustrate perfectly Six Nifty .50s point about attackers and defenders, in this case in a single Staffel.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

That was typical of Germany, forgetting the KISS principal.

The He177 was still a relatively bug ridden a/c, even into 1944.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

In October 1941, Hitler forbad all night intruder activities of NJG 2 over the British bases, because he wanted RAF bombers being shot down over German territory to show his people that the Luftwaffe was doing its work. For over three years, RAF bombers were able to take off and assemble without any interference (apart from the short-lived "Gisela Unternehmen").

In 1944 the Me410 of KG2 flew intrusion, they had some success against the Bomber
He177 hs been a failure because germans came late in dev. powerful motors nd no material to build Turbo, in any other case when we compare german cars nd american or brits, no speaking of the russian ones, they would built better
CJE great idea to hv change mat picture

Remi

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

This was a myth itself, in that time, the night fighter tactics was still in its infancy, and Luftwaffe only had very limited resource committing in its Nachtjager force, so in order to defend against the attack of RAF bomber commander, Luftwaffe HAD TO concentrate its limit night fighter units in the Europe coninent, see Peter Hinchliffe's "The Other Battle: Luftwaffe Night Aces Versus Bomber Command"

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

God forgive, this way any offensive weapon when attacked turns defensive!
The war with Germany was in the years 1939-1945, so I do not know, why to limit the period up to 1941. Anyway, if you do not know, Halifax, Manchester and Stirling, apart of Wellington of course.
Those fighter pilots evolved in the period 1939-1944! Quite to the contrary to the Luftwaffe, which lost or otherwise misused vast combat experience gathered since SCW. Management of resources is key issue here.
This is an utter nonsense. Every word of it. Sorry.
This is no achievement. The problem is to build large and quality air force during wartime, and both Americans and British achieved this.
Have you read Mein Kampf?

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

"What you do not know is the content of the PM that passed between myself and the forum owner regarding the initial thrust/purpose of the thread. If you did, then my post #18 would make more sense".


Well since in fact I was the initial poster to this thread, I would be very interested in knowing what was passed back and forth. As you may recall, I received a surprising and extraordinarily hostile number of responses to my original posting (quite a welcome!). Now I am not some kind of panty waist who runs in terror anytime somone disagrees with me, but I have gone back and read, and re-read and re-re-read my initial posting, and I'm damned if I can find what upset some people so. If the Luftwaffe in its totality cannot be discussed here, then why are we all here in the first place? Very odd.

This is the Luftwaffe Discussion forum, right?

p.s. Even my screen name was attacked...!!?

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

When the escorting fighters were totally cut loose from the bombers, the fighters were not performing the escort function. They were instead freelancing, not unlike a basketball player who competes mainly to increase his personal score, and who seems to believe that he can defeat the other team by himself.

Some of the best-known fighter pilots appeared to place more emphasis on personal achievement than team goals. They may have said otherwise, but actions speak louder than words.

Some pilots in the USAAF and Luftwaffe felt that "releasing the hounds" was not the best solution to a long term problem. The main effect was that a small majority of fighter pilots greatly increased their tally of enemy aircraft shot down, or strafed on the ground. Unfortunately, it also caused more own losses than necessary.

Better to keep the dogs on a leash, they said, because the whole point of escort fighters was: prevent enemy fighters from interfering with the air strikes. It did not matter how many enemy fighters were shot down. But it did matter when the enemy broke through the escorts, or found a hole in the coverage because some of the escorts were off on a hunting trip.

The escorts could not fly too close to the bombers either. They required some flexibility as Adolf Galland and Hubert Zemke rightly noted, but just how far away they should be allowed to stray was a major point of contention.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

You win, I surrender to your superior intellect and knowledge...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

You don't upset people, it takes but a click to end any unwanted participation in this community.

If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it must be a duck.
Unfortunately your entry, nickname and reaction seem to fit the profile of a troll.

Of course this believe may be unjustified, and that's why you get the chance to proof it wrong.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Great. And in the saved time I suggest you to read Mein Kampf and then answer a simple question: why Hitler, who considered war on two fronts as a worst error of the old Empire, and considered it a criminal stupidity, did exactly the same in 1941.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

good point Chris...I recall a quote from Beevor's 'Berlin'

" ..if we hadn't have persecuted the Jews maybe Einstein would have developed the bomb for us.."...or similar

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Well, the answer is simply to that, it become clear by November 1940 that Soviet ambitious in Eastern Europe are unsatifisfiable, and strategically unacceptable. War was unavoidable. There were pretty good clues about that the USA will enter the war in the near future, and very little doubt on which side.

In the given strategic situation, in 1941 Hitler made the only viable strategic decision, and tried to knock out the only immediate threat. Soviet-Russia was major risk and threat to the German position on the continent; Britain wasn't and could simply never become one. With Soviet-Russia neutralized as a threat, the German strategic position in Europe would be set in concreate, even if the USA would eventually enter the war. At the same time, strategic resources, a safe Hinterland for continuing war against the forming Anglo-Saxon coalition would be secured, as well as Hitler's main strategic deperature from the old Reich colonization politics - securing resources for German industrial hunger in Eastern Europe, rather in Africa and Asia - would be realized sooner than original planned.

Thus Hitler entered a race with time with fairly reasonable gamble - and eventually lost when Russia could not be neutralized by 1943.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

One would guess that Hitlers attack on the USSR probaly did not constitute a war on two Fronts in his mind. In 1941 he had secured his position in Western Europe Britain was isolated and had no hope of mounting an invasion on its own. The RAF has not built up its Bomber force to the threat it later posed and the battle of the Atlantic was a very serious threat. I have not read Mein Kampf but according to a British historian it indicated Hitler's ambitions lay in the east, although he felt Britain and France might well attack him once he was committed to an eastward expansion. To protect his west border he had the West Wall built as a line of defence, but following his takeovers in the east prior to Sept 39 and his pact with the USSR decided to secure his position in the West once Britain and France made a stand over Poland. I believe he was credited as saying of an attack on the USSR something to the effect ' kick in the front door and the whole rotten system will collapse '. There is still a debate about whether his support for Italy over its invasion of Greece meant he did not get to Moscow before the winter of 1941 set in, which then committed Germany to a long war.
The Lufwaffe and indeed the whole of the German Armed Forces and economy simply did not have the ability to win a war that could not be won quickly as planned.
Thats my bit on a very complicated issue .

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Brian
By any means read Mein Kampf. You will understand then, that Hitler rejected war against both Britain and Russia, and wanted an alliance with one of the powers against the other one. Russia/Soviet Union supported him in the war and provided raw materials, so why he attacked them, instead of dropping Britons on their knees?
Sorry, gents, I may understand that you do not agree, but do not ignore the theory just because you do not like it.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

The simple answer to that is that in November 1940 Molotov came to Berlin. Hitler suggested that Germany and USSR would divide up the British Empire - Molotov was not interested, and told Hitler in fairly straightforward terms that Soviet-Russia wants Finnland, Rumania, Turkey and Bulgaria. Hitler probably heard that as nickel, oil and chromium... the rest is history.

I highly recommomend Paul Schmidt's book, 'I was Hitler's Interpreter' on the matter, as he was present at the meeting and gives a very detailed account of it.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

There seems to be an assumption underlying many of the above posts that (a) Hitler and (b) Nazi policy were either rational or at least followed a consistent internal logic.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Franek,

It is not that I agree or disagree with what you say, I have an interest in this subject and can only learn/modify my views by discussion which I hope offends no one.
As you say Hitler wanted to ally himself with one power against the other, from his point of view did the isolation of Britain 1940/41 constitute to him a compromise to an alliance, leaving him free to attack the USSR. Would his view of the USSR as an ally have been modified by that countries invasion of Poland and war with Finland. You also make the point that Germany traded with the USSR for vital raw materials would this also have made it a better economic target. I believe that the German trade was carried out through bi-lateral trade agreements ( now banned by the IMF) because of the weak mark, something that in the long term who have threatened the international banking system.
I believe there was a lot of opposition to the communist system in Germany following attempted revolution in Germany 1918/19, and also fear that the Red Army almost came through Western Europe under Voroshilov following World War One.
Would the Hitler the dictator in 1941 hold and stick to the same views as Hitler the author of Mein Kampf in the 1920's,



Regards

Brian Bines

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

There were two, however: the Drang nach Osten which pushed Hitler to invade Russia and the will to kill Jews at any cost.
WW2 was an ideological war, but many people disregard this fact.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Gents, please. I just wanted to note that the theory of preemptive attack is ignored and to learn why. Certainly, discussion of all the related issue are far of the scope of the thread. Let's return eg. to strategic planning, that was made already before the war.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I do not know Tooze´s Wages of Destruction but I have read his Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge and it is brilliant (although a little bit boring and unpenetrable for non-economists I am afraid) so if this guy states something I think he should be taken seriously because he obviously knows what he´s talking about..

Jan

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

After reading through this highly entertaining thread I have come to one conclusion. If all of you had been in charge of policy making for the Luftwaffe the result would have been exactly the same. None of you can agree on anything. :D

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Gentlemen,


In the book IG Farben by Richard Sasuly, chief of financial intelligence and liaison of the Finance Division of [the] United States Military Government (dated 1947), he shows that those who put Hitler into power were the ones pulling the strings so to speak. These were the financial people and industrialists, among which IG Farben was the 4th largest company in the world. And there was also the Hermann Goering Werke.

England may have missed an invasion by Germany, but the V-1s and V-2s flew without pilots that could not be replaced.

I sometimes think some people believe Hitler financed the war out of his pocket. But in 1944, with the reverses in Russia and the Anglo-American landings in Normandy, a decision was made. From the book, "They waited as long as they did because up till July, 1944, they had been satisfied with Hitler." But the assassination attempt failed.

Also from the book: "And the Strategic Bombing Survey demonstrated conclusively that the bulk of German capacity to produce was intact. In spite of all the damage, German industrial capacity was greater at the end of the war than at the beginning. The greatest single bar to production was the breakdown of all transportation; and this had largely been brought about by the Germans when they blew up their own bridges."



Ed

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

As Tooze argues this was because the Germans were starting from a low point for waging war, in GDP terms only 60% of British/French combined output in the mid-to-late 30s

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Quite an irony is that IG Farben was formed by a well known financial family of Warburgs, which was quite active on political scenes, supporting various movements.
It is also worth to note, that the German power was largely supported by robbing of occupied countries of virtually anything, gold, raw materials, workforce, etc. Germany never compensated for this due to the Cold War, this being one of the reasons it is one of the leading economies in the world.
The assassination never ceases to amaze me, it was so amateurish. Nonetheless it is true that political goals of assassins targeted against Hitler but not his achievements. They just wanted separate truce on the West and to continue old policy on the East.
Had Allied bombing campaign no effect on the German industry, they would not invest considerable amount of money and workforce into building underground factories, would not they? This recalls me very well a Soviet propaganda of the past. Everything that was not available in the Soviet Union was described as useless, be it strategic bomber force or aircraft carriers.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Franek,



My own parents became eligible for post-War compensation from Germany as they were forced laborers. My mother told me about seeing entire factories dismantled for shipment out of Germany by the Allies. Looted art treasures were returned. Even Allied Intelligence was involved in tracking some of it down. Billions of dollars in German patents were simply taken as spoils of war by the Americans, directly harming Germany's immediate post-war competitiveness. Your claims are without foundation.



Regards,
Ed

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I quite agree with you RE: this point; the transportation 'paralysis' caused by blowing up their own bridges?...Eh & I thought it was because EVERYTHING that moved by road, rail or river would get the bombed or strafed by allied Tac Air or given 'the treatment' by the Heavies, along with the power generating industry...

nm

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

No, Ed, not all art treasures were returned, and for example, the German government still refuses to cooperate with Poland on this matter. Only spectacular treasures were returned.
In regard of factories, perhaps some high technology works were moved, but the West did not need tools, they have had enough of their own. The situation was different in the East, where Soviet moved whole factories (with workers), but this stopped within few years, and the situation vastly improved, on both sides, as both Soviets and Americans feared, that 'their Germans' will twist sides. Germany indeed lost patent rights, but not inventions themselves, and were quite competitive if not only because lower workmanship costs or due to reduced military expenditures. Last but not least, they got plenty of help due to Marshall Plan. Remaining countries were forced to pay for their own costs of war (Britain only recently paid for Lend-Lease), and never got any proper compensation, this is especially true for the Eastern Europe.
All in all, certainly Germany suffered some losses, but in general their balance was quite in favour. Mind you, losses of Warsaw alone were estimated at at least $40,000,000,000, this without human losses or private property, and never got a dime of refund.