Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Other Luftwaffe flyers testified that Hans-Ulrich Rudel filed bogus claims for tanks destroyed when other Stuka pilots flew over the same battlefield and reported no vehicles were burning. I don't take stock in what Rudel imagined about himself or the world around him. His Nazi handlers were not keen on applying science to investigate, substantiate, or question the claims of national heroes.




You did not consider the physics of this problem very carefully.

The Stuka pilots usually made heavy cannon attacks in a shallow dive, so a 37mm round could bounce off horizontal armor plate that was 10-15mm thick. The pilots could try a much steeper dive angle, but a heavy and poorly maneuvering machine like the Ju-87G would need a lot more room to pull out at the bottom -- which means that the pilot must open fire from a much greater height and distance -- throwing off his aim and lessening the chance of getting good strikes on the target.

Geometry is another reason why we can find endless accounts of tank-fired 75mm and 76mm shots that failed to penetrate the thinner side armor of Panther and Tiger tanks. It doesn't matter how big your gun is, you need a good angle of attack when shooting at a hard surface. I don't know why some of you think that a 37mm peashooter will do better.




Advancing the timeline to Vietnam will not help your case. No other air war provided us with more verification that sending aircraft straight into the teeth of flak was hideously expensive. No air force could afford to suppress so many flak guns, so the Americans reduced their ambitions to pinpointing radar sites that controlled some of the guns, missiles, and interceptors.

Better and less expensive solutions were studied and tested like the all-weather F-111 and its terrain-following radar. With or without smart bombs, it was the most cost-effective bomber in Southeast Asia. Despite the dangers of flying at supersonic speeds just 200 feet off the ground, F-111 airstrikes suffered few losses and did not require the support of escort fighters, AWACS, ECM aircraft, air-refueling tankers, or Wild Weasels. During its 1972 deployment, the 474th Tactical Fighter Wing flew over 4,000 combat sorties and lost six airplanes, for a loss rate of 0.15%, which is better than some outfits achieved in peacetime.




No taxpayer that I've ever met wants to spend money on obsolete weapons that can be deployed only on the speculation that battle conditions might become safer in the future.

British and American operational research teams studied, compared, and mapped the effectiveness of ALL air weapons kept in stock, not just rockets. If you showed us the results of real performance trials which tested these relevant airplanes, and which scored the mathematical difference in probability of hitting various targets with free-falling bombs, it would make this thread more interesting.

We both know that you do not have that kind of information, but you tried to form a hypothesis without it. I cannot think of a more blatant advertisement that you are not objective. Until you provide scientific proof that a lamentably outdated airplane could do the job better, you are spin-doctoring.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Juha.
1. I beg to differ. The all-arms systems developed by Russia and Germany were both war-winning in that they both won wars.
Germany's system won the war against France and Britain in 1940 at a time when Russia was allied with Germany and the USA was neutral.
And Russia of course won its Great Patriotic War with Germany in 1945.
It would be misleading to term the Anglo-Canadian or US systems as war-winning just because they were allied with Russia in 1945.
2. Rudel's achievement in terms of numbers, whatever they were, should not be allowed to affect the fact that shooting a tank with a gun from an aircraft was more accurate than with an RP, and Rudel tried and tested both.
3. Your point about the Il-2 is well taken and I thank you for that. Note the Il-2 did not rely on RPs to destroy tanks, but rather hollow-charge bomblets dropped from low-overflying aircraft that were armoured against infantry weapons.
4. We agree about the British 40mm. The RAF knew about the gun's accuracy compared with RPs, so the decision to scrap it was final proof that effectiveness did not feature among 2TAF's success criteria.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Nifty.
We'll just have to agree to disagree.
That is if we do disagree, as I have no idea.
Shalom.
Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

1. The Russian StuGs were Su-76 and Su-85, just as the British Stuka was the Vengeance. And I know that Samokhodnaya Ustanovka does not translate exactly as Sturmgeschütz, so please resist the temptation to correct me.
2. When the Vengeance was ordered in 1940, the British expected to win the war by 1942. In that event, the Vengeance would have been too late. You obviously don't know that.
3. German hollow-charge bombs were developed because of the shortcomings in ordnance experienced in 1940/42. Surely that was clear.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

1. A StuG is a German AFV and a SU is a Russian AFV. They might have the same name when translated to English but using the name for another country's vehicle is not correct. The Wespe and the Hummel were the German SU's. When Rudel showed up with his Ju-87G most StuGs were used in the anti-tank role.

2. Well that is a new one.

3. OK, misread.

..........................................
At some cost I might add. Over 8.6 million dead and missing and 15 million wounded and survived for the USSR. Some 5.5 million for Germany, though not all were on the EF.

Neither had a strategic bombing force which tied up German resources that could have been put to good use on the Eastern Front.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Tony
Germany knocked France out of war in 1940 partly because its all-arms system but not GB, in fact GB survived alone one year partly because LW wasn’t a strategic AF, not a big deal in itself because there was no effective strategic AF around in 1940.

4. RAF didn’t scrap 40mm gun Hurricanes, they moved them to Theaters in which losses were bearable. In NA 6 Sqn claimed to have hit 144 tanks of which 47 were claimed destroyed but lost 39 Hurrica IIDs to AA. In Burma 40mm armed Hurricanes first destroyed or knocked out 12 Japanese tanks while losing one Hurri and on 19 Feb. 45 20 Sqn destroyed 11 Japanese tanks without loss. Hurris in Burma were mainly used against river crafts because scarcity of Japanese AFVs there. But clearly AA was much weaker in Burma than in NA not to say in NW Europe . So what worked in Burma not necessary suited in ETO.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello.

Just my two pences

I would say, from V. Perov and O. Rastrenin book

For 1944: 3344 losses, 822 lost to fighters, 1859 to AAA, 569 failed to return, 34 on the ground.



I would say according to statistical Krivosheiev’s book, based on GHQ accounts. An account is to be complete and balance is about zero. So it’s done. Reasons of losses are of secondary importance.

So on 1.1.44 VVS had 8 800 stormoviks on line , and 10 200 on the 1.1.45
With 10 300 planes recieved for the year, it makes 8 900 account losses.

Exactly as for yout tank loss numbers, from the same source:
On 1.1.44 RKKA had 24 400 tanks and SU, 35 400 on the 1.1.45
Since 34 700 were recieved, 23 700 were lost.

Can you give us partition between those written-off for wear, for combat damages, for technical reasons?

So what conclusion?
Losses were high of course, but not dispropotionnaly higher than in the others armies. Despite them, the Red Army was constantly growing in force, quality and size...
For instance the Il-2 had a loss rate of 1 plane for 85 combat (in fact more than 85...) missions in 1944, instead of 1 for 13 in 1941. Not bad for a plane that had no more than 100 TBO engine hours anyway!
1.1%; compare to USAF bombers loss rate.


And others rough numbers from Alexeenko (using TsAMO op. 64-65 archives) docs:

2999 failed to return, 107 from fighers, 583 AAA, 38 on airfields, 1141 by accident, 2594 from wear ; 7452 total Il-2/10 losses.

It means some early, uncomplete and uncompilated stats probably at the end of 1944; the way your’e managing your stats even without being biaised, can change the whole picture and meaning.

So how was made the research work from later more complete and compilated archives used by Rastrenin or Krivosheiev? I don’t know...

But what is 100% sure from Efremov, Romanov, Zinoviev (yes, yes the famous anti-soviet dissident) and other Il-2 crews testimony, it is that was far better to write off planes for "combat reasons" rather for "flying accident". USSR was the kind of contry where pilots were easily prosecuted and sometimes executed for "unjustified plane crashes". It also should be remembered...when just looking at crude statistics.

Regards

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

[quote]
Rather pleasent post, i didn't knew about that.
If we have a statistical approach, from published soviet numbers, only 2,4% of soviet tank losses were due to the Luftwaffe. The lion's part is going to Anti Tank canons (mainly 75-88 mm) at about 75-80% losses. German tanks are for 6 to 10%, but there are mines, panzerfausts, infantery...

So even if all of the 93 500 lost soviet AFV's are tanks were all due to combat reasons (and this is untrue), it means that Rudel alone destroyed about 1/4 of them, due to the Luftwaffe.

If he was not a liar, what the hell were doing others Luftwaffe pilots?


Regards

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Let me re-phrase that, and see if it meets your exacting definitions.

2TAF was based on 1TAF's organisation, methods and commanders (Mary Coningham and then Harry Broadhurst), but decided to replace the 40-mm Hurricane IID with the RP Typhoon 1B, and the Hurricane IIC with the Bombphoon and Spitfire. 3TAF also opted for the Spitfire but maintained the Hurricane IIC and IID, and also operated the Vengeance dive-bomber. Thus the RAF TAFs ceased to have consistency in aircraft equipment and methods.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

You ignore, or skate over, the RAF culture which was in many/most/all (take your pick) respects a cult created by Trenchard. He selected the RAF's leaders and indoctrinated/conditioned/brainwashed them (you choose) in his beliefs at Cranwell. These leaders could never emotionally go against Trenchard's beliefs which were formulated by Slessor.
The USAAF in its driving ambition to replicate the RAF's independence from the Army, copied or imitated these RAF beliefs.
The use of the word 'brainwashed' was extended to the US Air Corps as an explanation why Trenchard's beliefs should have been transferred across national boundaries.
The rational approach to the use of air power was that which was taught in the VVS and Luftwaffe. In those organisations it was part of all-arms. Russians and Germans were never tempted by the Trenchardist belief that air power could win wars on its own and uniquely did not need to engage with the enemy's main force.
If Trenchard had never existed, the USAAF would never have adopted Trenchardist beliefs, because only a nut could have come up with them. And only a Churchill would have given Trenchard's beliefs the time of day.

Tony

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello VG
As much I’d like to have exact info, I don’t have, maybe nobody have because the high number of those which simply went missing, but losses in operations was 10759 – 109 destroyed by enemy on the ground + probably most of 807 lost by Naval units.

IMHO it is rather useless to compare Il-2 losses to US heavy bomber losses, their attack profiles were so different and heavy bombers spent so much more time in hostile airspace per sortie. More fruitful comparison would be Il-2losses vs fighter-bomber losses

Quote:” But what is 100% sure from Efremov, Romanov, Zinoviev (yes, yes the famous anti-soviet dissident) and other Il-2 crews testimony, it is that was far better to write off planes for "combat reasons" rather for "flying accident". USSR was the kind of contry where pilots were easily prosecuted and sometimes executed for "unjustified plane crashes". It also should be remembered...when just looking at crude statistics. “

I don’t have info on Shturmovik units but in fighter units also too high combat losses might mean hard times to the CO. One might try to alleviate the impact of high losses by inflating victories but if caught doing that, one would have been in deep trouble indeed. Life wasn’t easy under Stalinist system.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I think you give way too much credit to Trenchard, and too little to Churchill. Here is what Dr. Chris Harmon, a CC academic adviser and professor at the Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia recently said about Churchill and the RAF: (from http://www.winstonchurchill.org/lear...k-for-coventry)

"Churchill did not think well of area bombing but began to believe it could be a grim necessity after (1) he watched devastating German air attacks on Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other places full of noncombatants; and (2) he could see precious few ideas for hitting back. In the ever lengthening build-up to Normandy, the bomber offensive was about the best he had to hurt the Germans and their industrial war effort. Later, when he saw France liberated, Germany's defensive lines being pierced, and the war being won, he quickly lost taste for it.

"Churchill's head of Bomber Command, Air Marshal Harris, seemed to think German morale might still be broken by bombing, but Churchill rebuked him after Dresden, and again, just as strongly for bombing Potsdam shortly thereafter."

If you read Churchill's memoirs, he talks regularly about requests from Bomber Command, Fighter Command, Coastal Command, RN, Army, etc. for more men and equipment. Each voice claimed they would win the war with more resources, or the war would be lost without extra resources. Churchill often complained about the balancing act he had to maintain between all these requests. He didn't write blank cheques for anyone.

And I don't think the US needed Trenchard to lead them down the "strategic bomber" garden path. Read Seversky, Billy Mitchell, or Douhet's "The Command of the Air" - published in 1921. I think it is really not appropriate to call any of them "nuts" when history shows some parts of their theories wrong at some times. The invention of the nuclear bomb proved them all frighteningly correct.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Interesting quotes from USAF Historical Studies no 175 "The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders" (p333-4) DW Schwabedissen 1960, summarising the work of the Ground Attack arm of the VVS

"As long as the German fighters could mount fighter missions in adequate strength against Soviet ground attack forces, the latter suffered considerable losses. These losses were increased by German medium and heavy anitaircraft guns, As a consequence the results achieved by the Soviets remained small. The ratio of German defensive fighters to attacking Soviet ground-attack aircraft, however, became less and less favourable to the Germans. Thus approximately from the end of 1944 on, the Russian ground-attack units were able to secure more effective results.

In spite of all German measures, the Soviet ground attack air arm steadily improved in the last two years of warfare, although it lagged behind its Anglo-American counterparts in the scope and effectiveness of its attacks. One reason for this was probably the inadequate training given to newly assigned personnel.

A massed commitment of ground attack air units in action coordinated with the army was always observed at those points where the Soviet Command was seeking to force a decision, while only small forces were committed in areas of secondary importance. Nevertheless, in most cases the effects achieved were of a psychological rather thana material nature.

In all justice to the Soviet ground-attack air arm, and in spite of the indisputable results it achieved, it at no time during the war played a decisive role."

Martin

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hi,

I noticed that the discussion has turned to Churchill, Arnold, Trenchard, and the role of strategic bombing in the Second World War. Please find attached an extract from my Ph.D. thesis about this subject.


Cheers,
Andrew A.

Air War Publications - www.airwarpublications.com

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Contrary to what we have been told the RAF didn't give up on the idea of an airbourne 40mm. I believe that a Typhoon and know that a Tempest (SN354) was trialed with the twin 40mm S guns but this wasn't taken up for a number of reasons. One of which, was the Tempest would be a one trick pony effective only against tanks which were a tiny fraction of the calls for support.
It is worth noting that the 40mm were trialed with the littlejohn adapter which gave it a penetration of 80mm at 500 meters more than enough for all but the heaviest tanks when attacked from the rear or side.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Glider
as I wrote in my message #78 40mm Vickers S gun was capable to pierce side and rear armour of all German AFVs but that of Tigers , even with the normal late war 3lb AP shot it could penetrate 58mm armour plate at 20deg from 400y if a/c speed was 350fps. So enough even against Panther if attacked from rear (turret) or from side (both turret and superstructure sides).

And thanks for the Tempest info, I was aware only the trial installation of the post-war 47mm P-gun pods under Tempest wings

Juha

Addum: 40mm S gun had also HE ammo, which made it effective also against "soft" targets and dugouts.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

In December 1942 No. 6 Squadron was withdrawn from the front after losing 14 aircraft in about 300 sorties. They flew defensive patrols over Egypt until March 1943, when they were back in action with the latest Hurricane IID (uprated power and armor protection for the engine and radiator). These "enhancements" imposed a very unfortunate side effect: the aircraft was too heavy to begin with but now it was overweight towards the front, and this caused control problems in all flying maneuvers.

After 6 Squadron moved to Italy in 1944, the Hurricane pilots preferred to carry 3-inch rockets. The 40mm underwing guns were removed due to the considerable nose-down pitch when firing. Even with heavy cannons discarded, the nose armor moved the center of gravity very close to the forward limit.


The decision to rid themselves of the 40mm S gun was requested by front-line RAF pilots, not old men back in England who were supposedly hidebound by the Trenchard doctrines.


The British 40mm gun (and pretty much all other underwing cannons) did not fire accurately compared to internal guns. The best place to hang the outboard gun was on the centerline, to avoid overloading the wings and convergence of fire problems. Obviously that was not possible with single-engine types.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

And the P-47. John Hamlin in Flat Out: The Story of 30 Squadron RAF wrote a general outline of dive-bombing missions in the Far East during 1945. The squadron was based in Burma and equipped with the Thunderbolt Mk II:

" … Dive-bombing techniques used in close support were well rehearsed, and accurate results were usually obtained. Twelve aircraft carrying 500lb bombs took off, joined up in fours, line astern, and as soon as the leader set course re-formed in three sections of four, Red, White and Blue, in finger formation. An easy climb at 170mph (indicated) took them to 10,000 feet. Bombing was carried out from a deep echelon, with Blue and White leaders line astern to Red leader, aircraft being spaced at about 150 yards, each one at the same altitude as the one in front and just outside its slipstream, with the exception of Blue and White leaders. Targets were identified on one-inch or 1:25,000 scale maps, sometimes with the help of photographs, and pilots were also briefed by the squadron's army liaison officer. Forward air controllers equipped with VHF radios had been set up in forward areas, and at times the army was able to provide smoke indicators. An interval of one second between the time each aircraft 'peeled off' to bomb was normal; a 120 degree turn was found to be most satisfactory, eliminating the need to make an aileron turn back onto the target during the dive. The angle of dive was between 60 and 80 degrees, bombs were released at 4000 feet, and at the bottom of the dive indicated air speeds often reached 500 mph! Engine rpm was set at 2500 before the dive began …"

When the Hurricane was replaced by the Thunderbolt, the bomb payload doubled and sometimes the sorties lasted about four hours. From February through March 1945, the squadron dropped 393,000 tons of General Purpose Bombs and 20,895 gallons of napalm. The primitive jungle bases surely lacked the amenities of English airfields, but aircraft serviceability was rated at 93.1%.


Pilot interviews from William Hess Thunderbolt at War:

Pilot Officer A. L. Coombs, No. 146 Squadron:
" … We had our misgivings when we were told that the Thunderbolt would be our replacement aircraft as we all wanted Spitfires. We lost about eight pilots converting on the type as we had no idea how fast it could dive. An American pilot put us at ease by looping it off the deck, and then we put it to work.
We experimented with long-range tanks as well as 500 pound bombs. In fact we used it for low level strafing more than its original intent as a fighter. It was the most stable platform we had ever used, especially in a dive from 23,000 feet.
We had little contact with enemy aircraft, but at first we were escorted by RAF Mosquitos which at the time were rated as the world's fastest fighters. However, when they escorted us, they had trouble keeping up.
I saw one of our aircraft come home with nine cylinder heads shot off by flak and another hit a palm tree on a low level run which only resulted in a dented wing … "


Squadron Leader Neil Cameron, No. 258 Squadron:
" ... In December 1944 we started to receive our first supplies of napalm. It was a simple weapon system of long range tanks being filled with the new mixture and with a detonator applied to the tail. The tactics were to run in low over the targets, such as Japanese foxholes, jettison the tanks, which as a rule blew up in contact with the ground, and the usual napalm throw-forward and fire developed. We used napalm a lot and in hilly jungle country we were quite often asked to burn down a whole side of a hill so that the army could see the foxhole targets which otherwise had been covered by trees ... "



Another summary from Brian Philpott RAF Combat Units / SEAC 1941-45: " … The all-round versatility of the Thunderbolt is summed up by Squadron Leader Hawkins, a former pilot of No. 17 Sqn., who also operated Hurricanes with No. 135 when it was the most forward unit in first Arakan offensive and flew its aircraft off the beaches. Hawkins recounts how the Thunderbolt responded in the air with the most delicate touch, belying its rather cumbersome appearance on the ground -- its fantastic acceleration in the dive; its steadiness as a gun platform; and, perhaps in many ways of most importance to its pilots, the amount of punishment it could absorb and still stay in the air …"

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Juha
The penetration figures you mention are for the normal 40mm firing the 3lb shot but without the Littlejohn adapter. With the adapter the performance increased to 80mm of penetration. The HE shell would have had some results against soft targets but then again the 4 x 20mm would be a lot better.
The point is that the claim was that the RAF were dead set against this but as we can see, it wasn't.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

[quote]
To resume we can agree that 11 500 - 12 000 Il-2 were lost or written off after combat damage due to ennemy action?

I just want to point out the fact that if everybody here shouted loud about horrendous shtormovik losses, no one was able to provide reliable data about them.

For instance


or


or

or
etc. So since no one answered to tvcolin

I 'm giving the soviet (Perov & Rastrenin) stats.
one lost for combat 85 missions in 1944
one for 90 in 1945



So you have now, it was 1:127 in 44, 1:194 in 1945 for fighters. Quite moderate even low, loss rate.



I agree with the opposite. Strategic missions were far less dangerous, the light AAA was devastating on small Il-2 formations flying low and slow. So were the german fighters. Amercan escort had the advantage of hight, speed and number...

I will add from myself, that real combat losses due to some arrengements between friends and other good old fellows ( to write of accidents as combat losses) were even lower. How many? I dont know but with air superiority and skilled krews it should not exceed 0,8%!

It's less than Mustang's loss rate and perfectly acceptable to RAF and USAF standards.




I wouldn't say that. Reading about Mustang attack missions over France and soviet Il-2 ones over russia it's quite different.
One was practicing "fire and escape" surprise attack carefully avoiding any flack position, the others were smashing it, to provide free ride to others shtormoviks. At high coast.
From Normandie pilots point of vue, a stormovik attack was looking like a "furious madness". Once target founded, Il-2 were attacking and attacking it again and ...again without any care to own losses and damaged it order to destroy it definitly until victorious issue or death...

Anyway a stormovik attackit was at least 3 passes, one for bombs, one for rockets, one other at least and often more for guns.

The result was simple, even on calm fronts was damaged by Flack all 4 missions. And knocked-off less than 10 ones. K'O' means sometimes written off in fact in 10% of the cases, but pilot was changing of plane.

3th army official statistic was even worse, one Il-2 was damaged by Flak every 2/3 sorties, the loss rate was 1 for 36 missions. I assume the fact that a written-off plane for the 3 VA is not always written off for the VVS: it could be transmitted to PARM's, or industry, be repeared at 2nd or 3rd maintenance echelon level and see combat later elsewhere.
Maybe combat effectivness was at that price?

I don't think a single P-47, Typhoon or anything else would survive in such combat conditions.


Regards

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Glider
I only gave the penetration power of the normal AP shot to show that Vickers S gun was capable to pierce side and rear armour of all German AFVs but that of Tigers even without Littlejohn adapter. IIRC Littlejohn adapter was not used in combat by RAF and it seems that its use would not have changed much. With it the effectiveness against Tigers would have been very marginal and the normal AP was powerful enough against other German AFVs. RAF to my knowledge didn’t even use Littlejohn ammo without the adapter which trick seems to have been unofficially adopted by some armoured car crews.
And you are absolutely correct that 4x20mm Hispanos was enough against “soft” targets.

Hello Nifty
Vickers S gun, being a long recoil design, didn’t produce nearly so bad nose down pitch when fired than for ex Soviet NS-37 cannon used in some Il-2s. And even if Merlin didn’t allow engine gun installation, it was possible for ex in DB 601, DB605 Hispano-Suiza, Klimov M-105 etc, for ex Yak-9T had the same 37mm NS-37 cannon firing through spinner as the A/T Il-2s had.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello VG
On Il-2 losses, IIRC in 43 it was something like 1 in every 35 sorties.

On fighter losses, it also depended what was counted as sortie, were PVO’s patrols included etc and anyway, even if general loss rate was low, some units still took fairly heavy losses in 44 at least.

Low flying Il-2s on the other hand had not much to fear from heavy AA which inflicted many losses to US heavy bombers and because escort fighters flied in relays and the bomber formations were hundreds of kilometers long, LW could generate local numerical fighter superiority over the escorts in given place and time if fighter control worked well.

Mustang wasn’t a typical fighter-bomber for Allies but it is true that one pass was the norm. And Finnish experience was that Il-2 attacks looked more terrible than their actual material results were but that was true to most of CAS work, much of CAS effectiveness was based on psychological impact and same goes to artillery preparations, that’s why it was important that the ground attack followed as soon as possible the CAS attack and /or the artillery preparation.
Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Would you please provide a source for your information, Nifty, as it differs fundamentally from that provided by Christopher Shores' 'Ground Attack Aircraft of WWII'. Shores places the blame for the demise of the Hurricane IID on men in England and not the pilots. I have trusted Shores, and my opinions have been formed on the facts he has supplied. One of you is wrong.

On page 58 Shores stated that "no additional armour protection was fitted to this aircraft (Hurricane IID) to protect the engine, cooling system and pilot from the high volume of ground fire it was likely to counter".
On page 66 of this book, Shores repeated that the Hurricane IIDs lacked any protective armour to the underside of the engine or fuselage, and therefore suffered heavily in the Mareth battle of March 21-25, 1943. They suffered again in April during the Tebaga Gap battle. Then the finger pointing at the Air Ministry; "Efforts were made to provide armour for the Hurricane IID in England, but this was never to reach units in the Mediterranean, and the 'tank-buster' disappeared from Allied service here during May 1943. The British and Americans were unwilling to direct effort to the production of an armoured ground attack aircraft of this nature, as the new rocket projectile was at that time offering promise as a viable anti-tank weapon, while the flexibility of the fighter-bomber appealed more to Allied thinking. However the Hurricane IID was to prove the most accurate aerial anti-tank weapon of the war for the RAF, and the failure of the Anglo-American aviation industry to produce an equivalent of the Il-2 or HS 129B was to be a matter of some regret to a fair proportion of high-ranking Army opinion".

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Tony
the info on the Hurricane IID armour in my message #66 is from the leading Hawker and Hurricane specialist late Francis K. Mason, more specifically from his article on Hurricane Variants in Wings of Fame Volume 2. He also noted that also the GB based 164 and 184 Sqns got the lightly armoured early production version. IMHO when we are talking on Hurricane Mason is better source than Shores.

And as have been told, armoured Hurricane IV was the ultimate CAS Hurricane, it could and did use 40mm Vickers S gun in combat till 1945.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Tony
You have made a number of claims without support in this thread as well. A number of specific questions were asked in http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showpo...7&postcount=69 If you could support your statements it would be appreciated.

Glider

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Thank you for that nugget. The order for Wings of Fame Vol 2 has gone in.
This subject is a minefield if you can't trust the experts on the facts - judgment remaining the reader's responsibility.

But correcting that mistake leads straight to the question who decided 2TAF should use the crap Typhoon RP rather than the proven and accurate Hurricane IV, and when did they decide that and why, and was the decision ever re-visited, and if not why not. This opens a whole new can of worms. The work by Shores and Thomas is a prime source for 2TAF equipment, so you can't avoid Shores. I hope Mason deals with this.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

OK, I will treat it seriously - I thought you were ranting.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Tony
if you are interested in Hurricane, Mason’s Hurricane book might be a good buy, even if rather old and I don’t know how easily one can find a copy. I haven’t seen it.

I have not believed everything what Mason has written on Hawker planes but he had studied extensively the subject. The fact is that best way to find out facts is to consult several good sources and then try to weight evidence on matters on which there are conflicting info or go to primary sources and try to find the truth by oneself.

IMHO Hurricane IV was too slow and underpowered to work with acceptable loss rate in ETO. But I haven’t studied the matter so its only a hunch. But for ex 184 Sqn ORBs are available online, so if you are interested in the question, read through the ORBs from late 43 to March 44 and make your mind on it. I can only say that the two Mk IV losses I know, one crashed during exercise in GB and one was shot down in NW France, both were powered by Merlin XX even if Hurri IV should have had more powerful Merlin 24, at least according to many reference books. The early production Hurri IV lost in the accident doesn’t prove much but the probably later production (according to serial number) lost in operation is a odd case. The flight leader of the pilot during the accident thought that the reason to the accident was that the pilot, while not inexperience Hurri pilot was new on Mk IV and so was surprised by its slugginess. The plane hit ground during low level mock attack on a vehicle convoy.

Usually Shores is a good source, no doubt on that. But if there is a conflict between a reliable writer who has written on wide variety of subjects and a reliable writer who is specialized on the subject in hand as a rule of thumb I tended to believe the specialist. But it is only a rule of thumb and one must weigh the matter case by case and the best way is to try to find a third opinion, in Hurri IID case that might be a sqn history of the 6 Sqn, if there is a good one around.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I went with Francis K. Mason. The Hawker Hurricane (Aston Publications, 1987). This is what he writes, word for word, on page 160:

" … Meanwhile in Libya No. 6 Squadron, which had suffered the loss of 14 Hurricane IIDs and seven pilots in the course of more than 300 sorties in October and November, was temporarily withdrawn to fly defensive patrols over Cairo and the Suez Canal in Mark IICs while stocks of the anti-tank aircraft were replenished and modifications made to the aircraft; these included re-rating their Merlin XXs to give more power at sea level (increasing their low-altitude speed by about 40 mph) and providing some armour for the engine and radiator. In February the squadron received these modified Mark IIDs and was back in Libya on 2 March, 1943, now commanded by Sqn Ldr Donald Weston-Burt, DSO …"

Thence on page 162:

" … Nevertheless Hurricanes did operate from Italy, beginning in February 1944, when No. 6 Squadron, now fully rested from its hard work at Alamein and afterwards, and now fully trained and equipped with Hurricane IVs, flew to Grottaglie. Stocks of 3-inch rocket projectiles had built up in the Mediterranean and it was customary to fly with a single 40-mm gun and four rockets; later the gun was discarded altogether owing to the considerable nose-down pitch when firing (with nose armor the Mk IV's cg was very close to the forward limit in any case) …"

I'm sorry if you are disappointed with his findings that RAF pilots wanted the 40mm S-gun removed from the aircraft. This weapon was killed by battlefield reality, not evil Trenchard-mongers.




Did Shores also supply the names of these alleged guilty parties who were nowhere near Italy at the time? Better yet, you could write to his publisher asking him to supply us with some photographs of knocked out Panzer IVs, Panthers, or Tiger tanks that have visible holes which were clearly made by 40mm aircraft guns.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Tony
Appreciate it and I await your comments with interest. Re the use of Hurricanes in the GA mode in Europe. RP armed Hurricanes IV's were used in Europe for a short while in early 1944 against the V1 sites. Losses to AA fire were huge and they were quickly withdrawn and replaced with Typhoons.

I don't pretend to know the difference in performance between a Hurricane IV with Rockets compared to one with 40mm S guns but would expect them to be in the same ball park. With that in mind the omens for gun armed Hurricanes over Europe would not be good and their replacement understandable.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Everyone, I think it's time to stop quoting old books at one another and get down to archival material. Much more material is now available than when inspirational pioneers such as Chris Shores and Francis Mason first took up a pen. If answers to the Hurricane gun/RP question are to be found, they are likely to be in Squadron ORBs, Air Staff correspondence, armament test reports (Boscombe Down, Farnborough?) and anything that the Operational Research people produced. Just run a few keywords through the National Archives' online catalogue search and see what comes up.

I'll make a couple of points on the discussion so far. To engage a tank, you first had to see it and this may have been much easier in terrain such as the Western Desert or Steppes than it was in Normandy, Alsace or the Rheinland. Second, battlefield support is only part of the story; interdiction of supplies matters too. You don't need to kill tanks if you've destroyed or even delayed their fuel and ammunition trucks and mobile workshops.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hei.

Well of course the United States also dabbled with 37mm aircraft guns. In case anyone plans to ask, I sourced the following technical data from photo copies of the original U.S. government ordnance manuals.

At 213 lbs. the first type (M4) was a relatively lightweight cannon for the P-39 Airacobra, with a good high-explosive round, but somewhat lacking in penetration power against hardened steel plating. One of the original requirements was to minimize recoil effect and muzzle blast at the propeller hub, which in turn limited the amount of propellent charge behind the projectile. The exit velocity of the AP M80 round was only 1,825 feet per second. It could penetrate up to 1 inch of armor plate at 500 yards, depending on the angle of impact.
The later variety of 37mm (M9) was much larger and weighed 398 lbs. The shell casing contained more propellent, with a higher recoil. The AP M80 round was now driven at the increased muzzle velocity of 3,050 feet per second. The gun could penetrate up to 3.1 inches of armor plate at 500 yards, but it was too hefty and powerful as a nose gun for the Airacobra. I suppose that Bell could have tried hanging a pair of M9 guns under the wings, but given the problems with the Hurricane IID and Hurricane IV, I think it would have been a waste of time. I'm not sure if Eglin or China Lake ever tested the M9 as a outboard cannon for airplanes, but it was adopted as a standard deck gun on U.S. Navy PT Boats.

I just dug out a nice photo of a RAF Mustang I with 40mm S-guns, as the pilot was banking away from the camera to show off the installation. It was tested in May 1943, apparently at Boscombe Down. Though I have not read the full test report, it is not surprising that this type was rejected for mass production.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

[quote]
Might be, but off-topic. I let someone else answer
Moreover, i told the TBO was 100 hours for the AM-38, it's true for le last ones, first ones had only 50 hours TBO.
So considering 3rd army statistics, if 50 % of Il-2 returned from a mission with battle damage, with 2,8 % (1/36) of sturmoviks actally lost, it means that each plane was repeared 18 times for dozen and hundreds man hours each time, only for 36 combat sorties and 41 hours of combat flight.

Do you think it was usefull to repear again the flying colander for the remaining 4-5 combat hours? 5 others flying hours at least were used for training and service missions...


Off-top. There's little wonder about that routine PVO's sorties were not considered a combat ones. Call on (fake or real) alert, certainly.
All is relative (Einstein), heavy losses in 44 compared to what?


Have you got statistics on US heavy bombers losses by heavy FlaK?



Juha, you suggest what, that 6 passes buy soviet SBD "slow but deadly" Il-2 (precisely "deadly" because it was "slow"), are less effective than one pass peformed by an allied fighter-bomber?

Regards

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Glider,
You have made a number of claims without support in this thread as well.
Such as


If you could support your statements it would be appreciated.well
Have you got turn rate, turn radius, hight gain on a chandelle, or combat turn, roll rate etc.?

Regards

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Reponse to Six Nifty 50’sand to MW Giles
Actually, i guess that Il-2 survived and was produced up to 36 163 planes, because it was neither a Ju-87, nor a Battle.

In fact, first serial planes reached 423 (sometimes written 433) km/h at SL and 451 at 2 500m at 5 335kg clean. So it was as fast as the Hurricane tested in NII-VVS at Low Level, about 100 km/h (60 mph)faster than Stuka, Battle and Dauntless, HS-129 around 0-7 000ft. Was highly manoeuvrable, well protected and could operate from short unprepared airfields previously used by I-152 or R-Zet. So far the best of it's category...

Comparing it with Typhoon, can be usefull but it's like apples and oranges again...

Regerds

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello VG
checked the average Il-2 loss rate in 43, it was 1 in every 26 sorties.

All is of course relative but for ex over Karelian Isthmus on 28 June 44 196 IAP lost 5 Airacobras, 159 IAP lost 5 La-5s and 29 GIAP lost 4 Yak-9s, of which one was reportedly shot down by a La-5.

IIRC I have seen statistics on US heavy bombers losses to heavy Flak, but just now I don’t have time to find them.

On effectiveness of CAS by VVS vs that by Western Allies. Now the statements by Germans, who after all were in the best position to know the answer, I have seen claimed than the latter was more effective but because they made their statements to westerners they might be a bit biased. Anyway, there were successful air attacks on German armoured formations on both fronts and on both fronts there were cases that German units could move rather unhindered. As I wrote, Finns were generally not overly impressed to the effectiveness of Il-2s. And fighter bombers made time to time several passes, all depended on intensively of AA, importance of target and the attitude of pilots

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

probably a bit of a mistake to focus on heavily armoured vehicles like tanks in this context, tanks are actually the minority on the battlefield even in armoured divisions!

there are vastly more utility, artillery,transport, engineering and logistical vehicles, not to mention light armour, and in this context I would suggest the rocket projectile with its much more destructive warhead would be a more versatlile weapon than the S gun?

maybe a look at the devestation caused at Falaise, and when the weather cleared during the battle of the bulge would shine more light on the effectiveness of CAS provided by the RAF and USAF!

after all look at the struggle that ensued during the opening phase of market garden , the CAS controllers vehicle was hit almost at the start leaving 30 corps with no ability to direct the Typhoons onto ground targets, it's well documented as this being pointed to as a major cause of the failure of 30corps to move fast enough link up at Arnhem!

the reality on the ground in Europe post June 1944 suggests the RAF/USAF close support was critical in interdicting and defeating the german formations, I would argue the RP and the bomb were a successfull combination!

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Yes Kryten
the fact that the timing of the Ardennes offensive in Dec 44 was based on a weather forecast promising a long period of bad weather showed that German High Command had a healthy respect on Allied tactical air power.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

A fair comment and admit that I don't have any detailed turn rates for the Il 2.
Would you settle for as the IL 2 is approx 150 mph slower, 7 ft longer, 6 ft wider, had a loaded weight of approx 2,000lb more, combined with a lower powered engine and wasn't designed as a fighter, its a fair assumption that the IL 2 was a much easier target for AA fire?

If you or anyone else has similar examples please let me know. I will support or explain any fact or statement that I have made, on any posting on this thread, will withdraw any that I am unable to substantiate and apologise for any confusion. I don't think that I can be any fairer than that.