Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

This proves entirely nothing. They simply could consider radial engine simplier to maintenance. I never did mean P-47 was useless at all, I did mean it did not fit needs of long range escort duties as found on ETO. From this standpoint, Mustang is clearly superior at all views.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

This proves entirely nothing. They simply could consider radial engine simplier to maintenance. I never did mean P-47 was useless at all, I did mean it did not fit needs of long range escort duties as found on ETO. From this standpoint, Mustang is clearly superior at all views.
PS Gents, leave me some time to do reading. There was indeed some conflict in regard of army aviation.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Now you are saying the "overcomplicated" P-47 is easier to maintain than the P-51?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

By the time the P-51s were flying escort to Berlin, in numbers, so was the P-47.

The P-47N gave excellent service escorting B-29s to Japan from the same bases P-51s were flying from.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

But do read what most German veteran memoirs say about the respective combat prowess of US and Soviet soldiers. E.g. Otto Carius makes some very interesting remarks. Overall, it can be said that Yanks (all possible insults intented) let the others do the bloodiest work. To put these "huge" losses of 180,000 KIA in perspective: it is only slightly over 2 times the KIA suffered by Finland and less than a third of the losses of the ACW. The US was the only major combatant whose existence was not in slightest jeopardy even after the direst military defeat (if FDR´s One World dreams are not counted as such).

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

But Hastings is one who would say the Battle was obsolescent. So we have gone full circle, and are back at the beginning. The Battle was a newer design than the Bf109 for example.
BC was not 'ill-prepared' except in the sense that its tactics and philosophy of war were wrong. BC believed in a strategic air force when what was needed was all-arms.
BC was not 'largely ill-equipped' unless you think the Battle was obsolescent.
BC was ill-equipped only in the sense that it lacked the weapons to do what it wanted, which was to knock Germany out of the war through bombing. And that was pure and unadulterated crap.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Graham.

You are completely and slanderously wrong.
3rd British Infantry Division had not fought since Dunkirk, so how could it have been over-used and experienced after fighting through Africa and Italy?
Ditto the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division.
These were the two tasked with taking Caen on D-Day.
And there was no significant CAS on D-Day or for days afterwards.

You are probably thinking of the 7 Armoured Division, the Desert Rats, who were worn out and should never have been sent. But they had nothing to do with Caen.

Tony

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Franek.

Is there any way of getting to see your article-summary in English?
If you ever publish anything on the IL-2 in English then please put me down for a copy.

The RAF lost 47,000 aircrew, some say 55,000. Compare that with the 30,000 killed in the U-Bootwaffe.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

It is immaterial that the Battle's design was newer than the Bf 109, it was obsolete because by May 1940 it didn't have a prayer anywhere in daylight where there were Bf 109s above it or Flak concentrations below it. It was neither suitable for the environment it had to fight in nor did it have the development potential to make/keep it viable.

I say that Bomber Command was ill-prepared to conduct the war it had dreamed of fighting since, according to Hastings, it appears not to have tested the concept in any meaningful way and then taken steps to adapt to the lessons learned. It seems rather to have placed its faith in prophesies (Douhet, Mitchell, maybe even H.G. Wells for all I know). Being properly prepared to conduct strategic bombing still doesn't mean it'll work of course.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Thanks for your correction: I was indeed thinking of unit(s) within the 7th Armoured. However, this does not change the fact that the landing plans called for the capture of Caen on the first evening, and that the capture of Caen and the surrounding plains was of great importance for the operation of 2TAF in support of the Army. Hence the diferences that arose within the Allied Commands.

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

Re Right of the Line: this is a book that gives full backing to the strategic bombing offensive that you castigate, and completely fails to cover operations outside the UK, with the all-important emphasis of tactical operations and the cooperation between ground and air developed under Tedder, Coningham and Montgomery. I don't believe that the author has grasped wider issues of air power, particularly in this key matter.

Re the long range fighter: I stated that the matter of a long range fighter was continually raised in the highest quarters, not that Portal was personally in favour. The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events. Given that the RAF did not have long range bombers operating in daylight, it is easy to understand why the creation of a long range fighter escort force was not a priority, but neither was it totally ignored.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Hi Graham,

"The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events."

No. 11 Group was providing Mustang escorts for daylight Bomber Command raids from late 1944 onwards. Although I don't have figures immediately at hand, I can say that, as an example, the RAF raid on Hamburg on 31/3/45 was escorted by "12 squadrons" of RAF Mustangs.

Cheers

Rod

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Yes, but the orders were placed long before then. The RAF were supplied with limited numbers of P-51B/C fighters from 1943, but priority was given to the 8thAF. I feel that this was the correct priority for the overall Allied cause, but it gives a misleading impression of a lower RAF interest in long-range fighters than actually was the case. The numbers of aircraft supplied to the RAF rose after D-Day, permitting the conversion of more squadrons to the P-51: there is a suggestion that some of these were 8th AF veterans but I don't think that has been verified.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

You say 'ill-prepared'. The mot juste is 'incompetent'. The RAF had failed to test the software 'concept', but hadn't tested the hardware either. Example: the bombs with 11-second fuses dropped on the Admiral Scheer on September 4, 1939 at great cost by Blenheims failed to explode because they hadn't been tested. Example: the Wellingtons had no self-sealing petrol tanks and no waist gunners; etc.

But putting aside semantics, we have found agreement.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The first RAF base to receive Mustang IIIs was at Gravesend in Kent. The Mustang III initially equipped No. 65 Squadron in late December of 1943, followed by No. 19 Squadron in March of 1944. Later the Mk. III also equipped Nos 64, 65, 66, 93, 94, 112, 118, 122, 126, 129, 165, 234, 237, 241 249, 250, 260, 268, 306, 309, 315, 316, 345, 430, 441, 442, and 516 Squadrons and No. 541 Squadron of RAF Coastal Command.

The RAF Mustang IIIs began operations late in February 1944, escorting US heavy bombers as well as both US and RAF medium bombers.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony,

"You say 'ill-prepared'. The mot juste is 'incompetent'. "

Based on this 'measurement' it stands to reason that the army was incompetent for not being equipped and ready to effectively counter the Blitzkrieg, or incompetant in the defence of Greece, Crete and Singapore. Then again, the navy must have been incompetant for allowing the successful 'Channel Dash', losing the Repulse and Prince of Wales, and not being able to effectively deal with the U-Boat threat between 1939-41.

Cheers

Rod

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The first P-39C (Ser No 40-2971) flew in January of 1941. The Army discovered almost immediately that the P-39C was not combat ready, since it lacked armor and self-sealing tanks.

Gee, your much toted P-39 did not have armor and self-sealing fuel tanks and flew some 17 months after WW2 had started. :rolleyes: One would think that lessons would have been learned by then and been incorperated in the design from the start.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.
There were lots of 2TAF RP Typhoons around on D-Day, but no forward air controller. There was a naval liaison officer with 3 Div but he was killed, so no 11-inch guns could be used. There was no Flak to worry Vengeances had they been released from target-towing duties in Devon. RP Typhoons were unavailable but were not the answer. Sherman tanks were available but likewise not the answer. Maybe bombs delivered by the Vengeances were also no answer, but they were the best bet after ships' guns.
The infantry should have had dive-bombers under command, as the Royal Artillery had Austers under command flown by gunners but supplied and serviced by the RAF. Gunner forward observation officers lived with the infantry battalions who felt they had their 'own' troop of three 25-pdrs. The FOO had only to call in an emergency and the troop would always drop what it was doing and come to the help of 'its' infantry battalion. If the threat was severe, the FOO could call on a battery, or a regiment, or higher. The FOO's decision was never questioned - unlike the case in the US Army which never trusted their FOO's with that discretion.
The Army tried to develop this kind of unit relationship between squadrons and brigades, and between sections and battalions. But the RAF always categorically refused. All they would allow was the permament allocation of a Group to an Army. So Typhoon pilots never met the infantry they supported, and never got their feedback.
The wrong aircraft with the wrong weapon in the wrong organisation gave the wrong result.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony
“The RAF lost 47,000 aircrew, some say 55,000. Compare that with the 30,000 killed in the U-Bootwaffe.”

What the h… is the meaning of that comparasion? One can compare the losses of RAF vs LW or vs. VVS or losses of U-Bootwaffe vs Submarine servises of RN, USN or Soviet Navy but are you next time comparing losses of LW to the losses of Submarine service of RN?

“And there was no significant CAS on D-Day or for days afterwards.”

Sometimes I seem to be able to agree with you by some extent!

IIRC 12. SSPzD sent a recon detachment to the coast while waiting Hitler’s permit to attack the Allied beachhead. These armoured cars and armoured half-tracks arrived without too much inference by Allied a/c and were able to give useful info to div HQ.

And when the CO of 21. PzD finally arrived and started act correctly, the div was able to disengage from the eastern bank of was that Orne, move back to Caen, drive through that town and attack against advancing Commonwealth forces without too much inference by Allied a/c. IIRC it lost some 8 tanks in Caen or just outside it, but the attack of the tank-heavy Kampfgruppe was stopped by Commonwealth anti-tank screen with a loss of IIRC some 30 PzIVs. The infantry-heavy KG got to beach between two Commonwealth invasion beaches but was withdrawn because a supply drop to the British Airborne Div was interpret as an airlanding against their LoC. Now IMHO is that the KG would not change the course of battle because at least naval artillery would have made their life miserable near beaches but anyway they would have been a potential threat to the troops on nearby beaches.

So it doesn’t seem that the CAS on June 6th, at least outside landing beaches, was very effective. And it’s ironic that the clearly most effective CAS a/c was the transport planes, probably Dakotas, on that day.


“There was no CAS available to help the Suffolks take the Hillman concrete strongpoint that held up 3 Div throughout D-Day. Therefore Caen was not occupied and no airfield like Carpiquet became available for 2TAF.”

IMHO you give too much importance to Hillman debacle. And Vengeances would not be able to help because to problem was lack of info. But you are right that the basic problem was the lack of RAF control team, what they were called, FAO?

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The policy of 'Limited liability' meant that almost all the money went to the RAF throughout the 1930's rearmament. The RAF got what it wanted. That is the basis of the charge of incompetence. The RAF was not constrained. They wanted Fairey Battles and they got them; Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons, Spitfires, Hurricanes - anything they wanted, and as many of them as they wanted.

The army got very little until the last moment. The RAF fought against all attempts by the army to get money, and they succeeded. The RAF claimed it could sink battleships, so the RN did not need money for new battleships. That was why Bismarck and Tirpitz were the largest battleships in the world when they were launched. Think of that. And how long did it take the RAF to sink the Tirpitz? You know the answer. Was it 5 years?

The RN was convicted of incompetence over the Channel Dash. But where were the bombers that the RAF promised could sink any battleship nearing Britain's shores? The money had been spent on bombers. Where were they?

The sinking of POW and Repulse was due to the weakness of the RAF in Malaysia. There were masses of RAF fighters whiling away the time on tarmac in Britain with nothing to do because their enemy was fighting the Russians. The RAF should have been in Malaya.

The RN lacked escorts in 1939-41 to sink U-boats. Churchill begged FDR for 50 rust bucket three-stackers from FDR. Why was the RN short of escorts? You guessed it. They had been denied the funds because the RAF had to have the money, and with it the RAF would destroy any threat up until the moment they were sked to deliver on their promises Then, oops, the excuses started, such as the excuse that the Fairey Battle was obsolescent.

As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony
If I recall, 30,000 German sailors were some 3/4 of the force. How about RAF losses?
Concerning Il-2 article, I would have to finish it, add some new and astonishing details, and then translate to English, but who would be interested in publishing it?
Concerning deliveries, no RAF did not get anything they wanted (and there were serious conflicts as what they wanted), and not in quantities. Several aircraft were simply failures, say eg. Battle, Defiant, Warwick, other not available in quantities. Nonetheless RAF should not be blamed for incompetence of Army and Navy in their orders.

Concerning escorts, Polish Mustang Wing was operational in April 1944 and flew escorts deep into Germany. During Normandy and following diver campaign they were in the other duties but reverted to escort in the Autumn 1944.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Hi Tony,

yes, yes, it is obvious where you think all ills with British arms lay, but no consideration as of the state of army/navy doctrines (strengths and weaknesses) and arms (strengths and weaknesses) at the start of the war has been presented to provide context.

The weakness with the Prince of Wales and Repulse did not lie with the RAF, but rather with inadequate anti-air capability within the RN, just as the same lack of capability was an early weakness of the army.

While the RAF wasn't successful during the Channel Dash, the RAF is not to blame for the lack of success of the navy.

Considering the increase in strength of the Luftwaffe in the late thirties, it is hardly surprising that an air arms race in terms of quality and quantity developed between Britain and Germany - yet you seem to be suggesting that Britain should have done nothing to counter the German air arm other than to concentrate on CAS aircraft. Thus, I don't believe some arguments have been presented in a full context.

If naval-history.net is to be believed, the British/Commonwealth had the largest navy in the world in September 1939; Britain did not have the largest air force. Again, what is the true context of the rapid increase in the RAF in the late thirites, and how well prepared was the 'largest navy in the world' to confront the operational requirements that it would be faced with?

"As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF"

While this is arguably true for army co-operation and the role played by the FAA, such a generalisation isn't worth further comment.

The Battle aircraft was a failure; it wasn't the first weapon to prove to be such at the start of the war and it wasn't the last - that is the nature of warfare - and to rag solely on the RAF for such a failure (ignoring the subsequent development of successful weapons and without the benefit of a major scientific study that looks at the percentage of operational failure of all arms produced in the UK during the war to provide a wider context), as part of an overall campaign to completely discredit the RAF, is hard to justify.


Well, at least these threads remain highly interesting.

Cheers

Rod

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony
I agree with Rod and to add a few thinks. Naval AA was weak because of the wrong HA fire-control system selected and wrong weapons. 133mm gun (5,25 inch) and its twin turret were too heavy but admirals insisted them because its shell had more stopping power against enemy destroyers and 2pdr pom-pom had too low muzzle-velocity and .5 inch mg was simply too ineffective against modern a/c. I think its wrong to blame RAF for those mistakes.

In Britain there was no eagerness to massive land operations in Continent and French army had the reputation of being best in the world, so it was not surprising that British army has not high priority before the war. When the BEF went to France it was IIRC the most motorized army in the world. That generals had put so much of effort to motorization wasn't RAF's fault. On the other hand France and British were the countries which had largest proportion of their tanks designed to be well armoured, British infantry tanks were only tanks in service in 1939 that fullfilled your wishes. Soviet and Germans were occupied by Blitzkrieg or deep strike theories which you seems to dispise. OK I admit you have noticed that the key of German success was the all arm idea. That is right. British formations were too tank heavy and French too specializes. But still in 1940 the side with flimsier tanks which were concentrated for deep trust clearly won the enemy with better armoured tanks of which great portion was dispersed for close infantry support. How this could happen?

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The British gave no priority to the army or to all-arms because of RAF politicking by the usual suspects.
Gp Capt Harris, the later Butcher, wrote this in September 1936 to Ellington about the Air Staff's veto the Army's plane for a force to occupy the Low Countries to prevent a knockout blow by the LW against London. Harris said the RAF wuld not need the Low Countries for long because of the increasing range of the new bombers. He called the army's sneaky plan, "a Bogey employed to stampede us into maintaining the intention and cadre of a future national army....The War Office would be bound to experience natural difficulties in obtaining sufficient morons willing to be sacrificed in a mud war in Flanders in endless marching upon short rations with an mg bullet in the stomach and a shell hole to lie in as the only possibility of relief". In 1936 the RAF helpfully suggested that the army should be trained for "protecting our naval and air bases". The RAF sold a prospectus to politicians which had a big bomber force and no army, because Britain could not afford both.
The RAF refused to believe the evidence from many sources and from its own discussions by the Secretary of State for Air with Stumpf in 1937 that the Germans planned no knockout blow. And not until well into 1938 did the Germans begin to think of strategic bombing, and then only when they realised how terrified the British were of it. That was the real reason behind Munich and Peace In Our Time because Hitler realised he could play on this British fear which Hitler knew was irrational. Hitler said in 1939 (quoted in Galland) that "a country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. If the LW attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate". But the British, and Ismay said as much, always believed that Germany MUST be planning a knock-out blow. They thought the bomber would always get through, and the only defence against it was deterrence. Hence the order for 2,500 Battles and an AASF stationed around Lille for strategic retaliation against the Ruhr.
How, you ask, could it happen that balanced all-arms Blitzkrieg could defeat a fractured scratch British force in the early stages of rearming with few modern Bren guns and 25-pdrs, and no 5.5-inch or CAS like the Stuka, and few Matildas. And this was the state of affairs because Britain had spent its resources on a bomber force to retaliate against a non-existent threat of a knockout blow. You only have to phrase the question properly to answer it for yourself.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Sorry for the garbled second sentence. It should have read:

Gp Capt Harris, the later Butcher, wrote this in September 1936 to Ellington about the Air Staff's veto of the Army's plan for a force to occupy the Low Countries to prevent a knockout blow by the LW against London.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

And not until well into 1938 did the Germans begin to think of strategic bombing

This not quite right.
The first chief of staff, Walther Wever, launched a programme, called "Ural Bomber", which led to the Do 19 and Ju 89, both "stragetic bombers".
The programme was cancelled after Wever's death in 1936.
Better read (again) Williamson Murray.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

I would say that tcolvin does not know that that the Ju-87 began having its dive brakes removed and became a level bomber beginning around the time of Kursk (July 1943).

On Oct 5 1943 dive bombing was officilly abandoned by the LW, with units having their designator name changed from StG to SG to reflect their new role of low level ground attack.

Increasingly, the Ju-87 was being replaced by Fw190 fighter bombers in the daylight attack role.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tcolvin: Please read at least one book on the RN's ship building policy, particularly battleships, between the wars before blaming everything you see as wrong with British war preparedness on the strategic bombing policy. The newer British battleships were designed within the constraints of international treaties, in the context of a shipbuilding industry (and national economy) in deep depression, in a reluctance to invest in new gun and armour foundries, with the constraint of the lack of large drydocks in and outside the UK, and even a fear of torpedo boats. There were enough funds between the wars to build some new battleships: their size was chosen for doctrinal and industrial reasons rather than because of specific funding limits caused by the handful of heavy bombers. I rather doubt that the entire RAF Strategic Bomber force in 1935 cost as much as one battleship.

Perhaps you could also quote the real ratios of funds given to the Army, navy and AirForce in the 1930s?

You seem to have lost contact with reality. No one can just take an aircraft in use for target towing, strap a bomb on it, find some convenient airmen and send them out against an inconvenient bunker! You want a dive bomber force (in itself an perfectly arguable option) then you start preparing for it two years in advance to select the aircraft (which the RAF had, as a back-up policy), then select and train your crews. Could you perhaps tell us the thickness of this bunker, and then let us judge whether the bombs from any divebomber could have made any impression at all? If the firepower from the massed ranks of warships could not have been brough to bear because of the loss of the ground control, how was this nebulous force of divebombers with non-existing concrete-busting weapons to be brought to bear?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

"Gp Capt Harris, the later Butcher, wrote this in September 1936 to Ellington about the Air Staff's veto the Army's plane for a force to occupy the Low Countries to prevent a knockout blow by the LW against London"

Tony, read a good book on British political history on 30s and you will see that the possibility to get funding for a ground force to invade the Low Countries was nil in 1936. RAF meddling or not.

"from its own discussions by the Secretary of State for Air with Stumpf in 1937 that the Germans planned no knockout blow"

Now do you really believe that if the LW had had plans for a knockout blow against UK, Stumpf would have admited it to British in 1937 when asked on it? So if Stumpf said that LW had not such a plan, it didn't matter.

Remember, Germans defeated both the French and British armies and the British were very junior partner in ground war then. Just as the British had hoped. It's not because of RAF, historically British didn't like permanent armies and over that came the experiences of WWI trench warfare.
IIRC Germany had 136 divisions, British had 10-12 in France. BEF was small as it had been in 1914, the idea was that the French carried the main burden of ground warfare, after all the fight was in France. BEF role was to show commintment to common cause, of course also to help French, but its role was that of minor partner.

And the French had more guns and clearly more heavy guns than Germans and lot of tanks which were better armoured than the best of German tanks and most of their tanks were designed to use as infantry support vehicles, so what went wrong?

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Oh dear. It wasn't just Stumpf. Canaris and Milch said the same to Col Malcolm Christie. Maj Desmond Morton was reporting the same. Hitler said it also, and offered to exchange production data with the British to prove it. And it was also true. And the RAF toured German factories, and watched their manoeuvres in which they practised all-arms with the LW giving tactical support. It was obvious then and it's obvious now.

What is your problem? Do you thnk the RAF was right to believe the Germans were hatching a knockout blow and were right to believe all the evidence against it? If you must argue each point please say why. Don't just repeat RAF propaganda. It is obvious in hindsight that the RAF played politics, and would say anything to keep money coming in to pay for their Bomber Command fantasy. Even if it meant Britain had no army.


Juha.
You're wrong and all other contributors who deny it are also wrong; the army suffered because of RAF promises. Germany very nearly won the war because of RAF promises that were not worth a damn.

From 1933 to 1936 Montgomery-Massingberd was CIGS. He wrote this: "I feel that the biggest battle I have had in the last three years is against the idea that on account of the arrival of air forces as a new arm, the Low Countries are of little value to us and that therefore we need not maintain a military force to assist holding them. Those belonging to this school of thought desire therefore to concentrate all our efforts on a strong air force firstly to act as a deterrent to Germany, and if that fails as our sole contribution to making good our guarantee under the Treaty of Locarno. The dangers of such a policy and the importance of the Low Countries to us I have pushed forward again and again, but the elimination of any army commitment on the Continent sounds such a comfortable and cheap policy to those who are ill informed as to its real implications, that from time to time it gains fresh adherents especially amongst the air mad".

Do you recognise yourself as being "amongst the air mad"? If not, then perhaps you and the others can agreed that air madness is perhaps the longest-lived delusion of all time. It continues to this day.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony
now Hitler was a reliable fellow? Read all things he promised in 30s.

Now if Hampden and Wellington could be used in knockout blow what prevent use of Do 17 and He 111 in a like attack? British knew that Germany had a lot of twin-engined bombers.

Happened You notice that British had the BEF, almost totally motorized force, so it had a army after all.

Have You notice that most of your premises had proven to be wrong? Was that Rod who wrote that at that situation is time to check your hypothesis. Not meaning your opinion on Battle, I also think it was a product of bad specification, but most of your claims are shown to be wrong, from vulnerabilyty of Typhoon to German fighters to invulnerability of Il-2s and to the claim that all British tanks in 40 were flimsy cruisers. British army had in France only light and infantry tanks, 1st Armoured Div was still training in GB. Not to say a word on your naval claims.

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

From 1933 to 1939; RN got £273.5 million; RAF got £260.9 million; and the Army got £162.8 million. Source: http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK...duction-1.html

You miss the point entirely. A British Army Air Corps would have used the Vengeances for CAS at no extra cost to Britain since they were being misused to tow targets on D-Day. The Army had the responsibility for taking Caen on D-Day, but it was denied the all-arms means enjoyed by the Wehrmacht and the Soviet Army.
The question is why?
Hillman sits to this day above Sword Beach. Worth a visit.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Could you perhaps tell us the thickness of this bunker, and then let us judge whether the bombs from any divebomber could have made any impression at all? If the firepower from the massed ranks of warships could not have been brough to bear because of the loss of the ground control, how was this nebulous force of divebombers with non-existing concrete-busting weapons to be brought to bear?

Good question Graham. Would like to see an answer.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

I know the plan fell through on the day but are you saying that gunfire from capital ships (which were designed to deliver plunging fire on to heavily armoured moving structures - viz. other capital ships - were they not?) wouldn't have been a suitable means of destroying a heavily armoured static structure like a bunker complex? Sounds pretty much ideal to me.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Of course naval guns were effective and therefore ideal.
But you don't plan to get to Berlin by relying on gunfire from battleships, monitors and cruisers, which are only good for the first 15 miles. And on this occasion they were unavailable.
The army needed CAS every step of the way to Berlin, including the first small step for mankind. You can't take enemy positions without it.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The first 15 miles is where the Atlantic wall ("Hillman" included) was and that's what I thought we were talking about. I don't recall there being any comparable fortifications between there and Berlin, the Westwall (Siegfried Line) having been stripped of men and weapons in favour of the Atlantic Wall.

The plan to use naval gunfire against coastal defences appears to me entirely rational.