Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum - Bomber Command failure at Urft Dam.

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Re: Bomber Command failure at Urft Dam.

Quote:

Originally Posted by tcolvin (Post 89669)

Graham.

Why the word 'slur'?

Did you read the following in the website I quoted? Note especially the comment about tactical freedom, which was obviously missing when 617 Squadron tried to bomb the Urft Dam but could not find enough clear sky to establish the required length of SABS bomb run, and so failed the mission.
The RAF were obviously concerned about the best (SABS) being the enemy of the good (MkXIV/T1.

"Two other precision bombing squadrons were formed based upon the Mk XlV bombsight, and in the period of February to March 1945 their average error was 195 yards. It is not surprising that when the Norden was offered to the RAF later in the war it was rejected.

Less than 1,000 SABS bombsights were manufactured and after the war great difficulty was experienced in finding sufficient sights to equip two Lincoln squadrons for precision bombing against Japan. Compare this with the 23,000 T1 sights manufactured in America.

There was in Bomber Command at the time much discussion on the comparative merits of the two bombsights. The SABS, although potentially more accurate, lacked the degree of tactical freedom afforded by the Mk XlV/T1. As a result the Mk XlV/T1 was known to Bomber Command as the ‘area’ bombsight of the RAF and the SABS as the ‘precision sight.’

It was a much more complex sight to use and to maintain than the Mk XlV/T1 and required more man-hours in manufacture. For the majority of the squadrons in Bomber Command the Mk XlV/T1 was still the preferred sight."
source: http://www.geocities.com/skidaddy20000/Air-Bomber.html

And I did mean Holland, where 2TAF were experimenting with MRCP and radar controlled bombing at Erp. 2TAF and BC were in the same organization fighting on the same side, but that didn't mean they necessarily spoke to each other.

As for your question about Oboe, I do not know the answer. The RAF had another, and similar system, called GEE-H, which became standard post-war, AFAIK.
The RAF was at the cutting-edge of navigation and bombsight technology. Hence my continued surprise that the cutting-edge 617 Squadron should have been stymied by 10/10th cloud in December 1944. But that's no more than a statement about my ignorance, which has been considerably lessened by this discussion, for which many thanks.

Tony

Tony,

With regards of G-H, the decision to equip No.3 Group with GH the sole Bomber Command exponent was taken in late 1943, the first GH operation was carried out on November 3rd / 4th 1943 against the Mannesmannrohrenwerkes situated on the outskirts of Dusseldorf. The attack carried out by Avro Lancaster-equipped No.115 and 514 Squadrons was a complete success. The success was however short lived, as GH was hastily withdrawn on the orders of Air Marshall Sir Arthur Harris on the grounds that there were insufficient sets available and that until such a time as there was, no further operations over occupied Europe with the equipment would be undertaken. The other and perhaps more far reaching reason was the ever-present danger that such a valuable piece of equipment could fall into the hands of the Germans, allowing them to create a counter-measure and thus thwarting it’s true potential from the outset. It was re-introduced to the Group’s aircraft from early 1944, but predominantly to assist Mine laying operations. It would be much later in 1944 before the Group would re-equip on a large scale with "G-H" and use it against large German targets. No.218 (Gold Coast) Squadron was the leading exponent of the device and did much to iron-out the initial problems.
　
On October 18th 1944, 128 Avro Lancaster’s drawn from nine squadrons carried out No.3 Group’s first independent "G-H" bombing raid. The attack carried out in daylight was directed against the German town of Bonn and was a complete success. The reason for the choice of Bonn was simple, it had until then received relatively little damage from bombing, and as a result of this raid the very heart of Bonn was burnt out and destroyed. For the next seven months almost daily raids were made against Germany’s railway networks, marshalling yards, synthetic oil and benzol installations and communication networks. All of these targets received extensive damage due to the accuracy of GH.
Not only did the "G-H" equipped Lancasters of the Group mark and attack their own targets independently of both No.5 & No.8 Groups, but they would often lead other bomber Groups. Unlike other Groups who were restricted by bad visibility, 10/10th cloud cover over the target area did not cause any unnecessary problems, as a visual identification was not required with GH. Especially trained "G-H" Leader crews would bomb on their equipment and the following gaggle would release instantly the G-H crew bombed, and the results were often impressively accurate. There are a number of occasion when accuracy was less that 50 yards.

Regards

Steve

Re: Bomber Command failure at Urft Dam.

Hi all.

Allthough this tread has been dormant for some time, here is the explanation of what went wrong with the attacks on these dams. From AIR 24/206 (Bomber Command ORB – Operations Branch January 1944 – May 1945).

During the period October – December, 1944, serious consideration was being given to the destruction of two RUHR River Dams (URFT and SCHWAMMENAUEL) in support of the Army advance on RHINE. Both Dams were belived to have been mined by the Germans with a view to their destruction at such time as might be tactically suited to the German Forces operating to the West of those Dams. The project was first passed to this Command on the 25th October, 1944, for information only. All available target material and the latest P.R.U. photographs were collected, however, and passed to No. 5 Group for study. On the 6th November, 1944, further details of the Dams were recived from Bomber Command Advanced confirming that 9th Air Force had been informed by S.H.A.E.F. that the water in the Dams was too low to admit of successful attacks and that they would not be attacked by this Command unless changed conditions warranted it. On the 29th November, 1944, a request was recived from S.H.A.E.F. through Bomber Command Advanced for an attack on the RUHR Dams as soon as the weather permitted. The decision as to which or both of the Dams would be attacked rested with this Command. Replying by signal on the 30th November, 1944, this Headquarter stated that the position of the front line troops prohibited a blind attack by G-H, but that a visual attack on both Dams would be undertaken by the first opportunity. A new bomb line was recived from the 9th Air Force on the same date, however, and it was found that the troops were further away from the target than had been thought and a blinf G-H attack by No. 3 Group was therefore planned for the 1st December, 1944. This attack was cancelled owing to weather conditions at 0730 hours on that date. The two Dams at that time under consideration were the URFT (No. 1 Dam) and the SCHWAMMENAUEL (No. 2 Dam). Between the 1st and 10th December, 1944, no less than 13 operations were laid on against these Dams involving a total of 1656 aircraft, 1476 aircraft on the URFT and 180 aircraft on the SCHWAMMENAUEL Dam. Of this total, 800 aircraft were cancelled before take-off; 856 were cancelled or went to the target and brought back their bombs pwing to adverse weather conditions. Only 152 aircraft dropped their bombs.
The plan of attack against both Dams was a low level attack first with samll bombs to peel off the air face of the Dam, followed by a low level TALLBOY attack also against their face. At that time, it was considered that an attack on No. 2 Dam (SCHWAMMENAUEL) was unlikely to be very effective owing to the low level of the water. Following the unsuccessful attemptss indicated above, consideration was given to an attack against the URFT Dam using the UPKEEP weapon, but for various reasons this was not considered practicable. At Encl. 67A is a personal signal from the C-in-C to A.V.M Orland at Bomber Command Advanced which states that it was apparent that the URFT Dam could not be broken by bombing and that there was not sufficient soace to allow for the use of UPKEEP. It was hoped, however, by bombing the spillway to break the lip and masonery floor with the object of using the overflow to erode the hillside. The C-in-C pointed out that this would only be practicable if the hill was composed of earth and boulders and not rock. He considered that if the operation was successful, it would be possible to lower the water level in the Dam to below the point where it remainded a threat. Provided the enemy did not become aware of the intention and use sluices, he hoped that the released water might fill the bottom Dam (SCHWAMMENAUEL) sufficiently to make it vulnerable to bombing. He therefor started his intention of continuing to attack the URFT Dam until the trial had proved that the hillside was solid rock and would not erode. He pointed out that should the enemy use the sluices to keep the water below damage level, there was no hope of success. Between the 11th and the 13th December, 1944, three further attacks were laid on, but two were cancelled owing to weather and of the 684 aircraft detailed for the 11th December, 1944, only 183 attacked. At the Air Commander’s Conference at S.H.A.E.F. on 15th December, 1944, the Deputy Supreme Commander requested that no further attacks be made on the Dam.

All the best,
Bengt