Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Bill, the RCAF in Canada were seriously considering a squadron or two of the Vengeance's on the west coast for work up in the Aleutians and the same for a couple of the six squadrons that were sent over in late '43. For some reason this never materialized.

If memory serves me right, the RCAF in Canada, were expecting to receive 60 airframes from the Americans.

Again, you go with what you got and at the time, the Spitfire, Typhoon and Tempest were the best options available for ground attack.

Stephen

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Apologies again for going off topic...

What the RCAF requested/expected at various times during the war is a fascinating story in its own right, and would deserve a book some day. Besides Vengeances, the list includes Stirlings, Maurauders, Mustangs and Lightnings, plus helicopters and blimps for the RCNAS. The Liberators and Fortresses they did received were the result of long, convoluted negotiations, and they were never received in the numbers requested.

Many of these requests resulted mostly from desperation, and don't mean the aircraft involved was considered superb in any way. The Vengeances would have replaced float equipped Blackburn Shark biplanes, so they would have been seen as a step up. In early 1942 the entire Canadian fighter presence on the east coast was also biplanes, so the RCAF regularly requested anything with wings.

RCAF history and Canadian history could have been much less pleasant if the Home War Establishment had been severely tested, beyond the U-boat wars on both coasts and the minor Japanese raids into Alaska.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

I cannot see how you can pin responsibility on Hitler for the RAF's choice of equipment. The “mess” you mention was entirely of the RAF's making, having promised that its strategic bombers, (Battle, Blenheim, Hampden and Wellington) would attack the Ruhr and the German fleet in daylight. The Advanced Air Striking Force went to France not to help the British and French armies but to place its short-range strategic bombers within range of the Ruhr. (Richards, Vol 1, page 32). They were not designed for tactical use against bridges in support of the army but to bomb objectives in Germany, "not only to damage the German war machine in general, but to force the Germans to withdraw fighters and flak from the front to the rear, and to divert their bombing offensives to objectives in England". (Portal quoted by Terraine, "The Right Of The Line", page 145).



Sholto Douglas knew the RAF was responsible for the disastrous Fairey Battle, a strategic bomber misused as a tactical bomber. The RAF should instead have built a Stuka; “When those (Battle) squadrons were put to the test and they suffered so disastrously I could not help thinking with the deepest regret that it would have been so much better if, years earlier, we had developed a dive-bomber along the lines of Ernst Udet's Ju-87, the Stuka, instead of devoting so much of our resources to the design, the development and the production of those wretched Battles”. (“Years of Command”, page 55).


And yes, the Vengeance would have done well in Europe just as it did well in Burma in May 1943. 7 Squadron (Indian Air Force), after a few months of training, “could place their 500-lb bombs within 15 yds of the target”. (Peter C Smith, “Vengeance”, page 75). This was because the Vengeance dived at 90 degrees with nil angle of incidence at a terminal velocity of 320 mph. Spitfire fighter-bombers, Bombphoons and Typhoons firing RPs could not achieve anything like this accuracy, as Fighter Command had discovered in January 1943 when Mustangs and Typhoons were sent against a mockup of a German divisional artillery of 48 guns and inflicted only 'negligible damage', even though 'every effort was made to assist the fighter-bombers in their attack'. 2TAF's OR Section found there was little improvement during the following year. (Copp, “Fields of Fire”, page 88).


When the great success of the Vengeance in the Far East began to be reported on the BBC, the RAF withdrew them from front line service to save themselves from embarrassment. (Smith, “Vengeance”, page 104).


Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

How did the aerial opposition the Vengeance faced in Burma compare with what the Luftwaffe could put up in Europe in 1943?

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

A more realistic comparison to Burma in '43 would have been the use of the Vengeance in 1944. And in that period the Vengeance effect would have been far more effective, accurate and devastating than Spits, Tiffies and Thunderbolts. In all likelihood the dive bomber tactic would arguably also have resulted in less aircraft lost to AAA.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

We've entered into the "what if" part of this discussion. It's apparent that Tony knows more than he's letting on to.

Stephen

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony
Quote:” “could place their 500-lb bombs within 15 yds of the target”. (Peter C Smith, “Vengeance”, page 75). This was because the Vengeance dived at 90 degrees with nil angle of incidence at a terminal velocity of 320 mph. Spitfire fighter-bombers, Bombphoons and Typhoons firing RPs could not achieve anything like this accuracy, as Fighter Command had discovered in January 1943 when Mustangs and Typhoons were sent against a mockup of a German divisional artillery of 48 guns and inflicted only 'negligible damage', …”

What was mean accuracy of the fighter-bombers in Jan 43 test? After all, Finns with limited experience with Stukas, in 41 while attacking with their support and in late 44 as their targets, seems to have concluded that Stuka was mostly a moral weapon, when used against troops, in fact that was also what Heer told them. Ju-87s didn’t do so much material damage but terrorised effectively troops unused to them. During summer 44 Gruppe sized attacks of Stukas were clearly better moral-risers to defending Finnish troops than Staffel sized attacks made by Fw 190 fighter-bombers, mostly because much higher flying slower Ju 87s were seen by much larger number of Finns and Soviets were probably able to put more AA against them than against lower flying much faster Fw 190s. But both were able to knock-out bridges.

Dive-bombers with well trained crews were effective against ships but tanks were generally too small and hard targets even for them, that’s why LW went to Ju-87G. Maybe RAF did a mistake that it didn’t employ some sqns of Typhoons with Vickers 40mm “S” guns, they could have handled vast majority of German AFVs. Only Tigers and Jagdpanthers would have been too thick skinned for them during Normandy fighting. “S” gun was much more accurate than RP and Typhoon would have been able to carry some extra armour while carrying two “S” guns.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Jim Oxley gave the same answer as I would have made to Nick Beale.


In an earlier post I wrote that 2TAF by Shores and Thomas described 'what was', and that I wanted to move the discussion on to the normative question of 'what should have been'.
I suppose that is what SMF144 means by saying I have moved to “what if”.
Some say that 'what was' and 'what should have been' with regard to 2TAF were the same; I don't subscribe to that.


Juha questions the mean accuracy of dive-bombing with Spitfires in January 1943 compared with 7 Squadrons mean accuracy of 15 yards with the Vengeance.
I don't know, and have searched the OR Reports in Copp's “Montgomery's Scientists” and cannot find a figure.
Simpson in “Spitfire Dive-Bombers Versus the V2”, page 114, states that in a Spitfire Mk XVI “an experienced pilot could bomb accurately to within 25 to 30 yards”. I suggest this is the answer.


Juha states that Stuka and FW-190 could knock out bridges. To my knowledge the FW-190 failed to knock out Nijmegen Bridge and Remagen Bridge, and not through want of trying. The Stukas, I believe, never got through the fighter defence. 2TAF and Bomber Command failed to bring down the bridges at Wesel during Veritable in spite of intensive attempts and the absence of fighter defences.
It is my belief that fighter-bombers were not reliable bridge-busters.
But Skua dive-bombers brought down bridges in Norway in 1940 (as well as sinking the Koenigsberg) and Vengeances brought down bridges in Burma, so it is my belief that specialised dive-bombers were reliable bridge-busters.


Juha believes that 2TAF would have had more luck against AFVs with a gun. I agree entirely.


Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Quoting Tony …

"Jim Oxley gave the same answer as I would have made to Nick Beale."

I'm not sure how what Jim said was an answer to my point. Had you used the Vengeance in Europe in 1943 or '44, I'd imagine it would have not have been self-defending, so it's arguable how much of the existing tactical fighter force could have been dispensed with/replaced. They'd still have been needed for escort/air superiority work.

"To my knowledge the FW-190 failed to knock out Nijmegen Bridge and Remagen Bridge, and not through want of trying."

Sonderverband Einhorn did manage to put a couple of holes in one of the Nijmegen bridges, rendering it u/s for a day or so but they didn't try a second time. The problem of destroying bridges was never really solved until the first laser-guided weapons in the Vietnam War — you really need to hit the right structural spot, not just perforate the decking.

Can I change the question? Why did the USAAF give up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47?

.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Possibly because the P-47 could be multi role - air to air when that was needed, air to ground when that was needed. One type in the development pipeline, the production pipeline and the training pipeline could adapt to whatever the needs were long after the development/production/training began.

Perhaps the Typhoon and Spitfire had the same advantage over the Vengeance.