Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Juha
[quote]
No, it was from 01.08.42 to 01.06.43.
Your previous post was much closer to the truth.

Your source please?

What a pity... it's hard to find accurate datas with partition.


Regards
VG

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

[quote=glider1;128186]
A fair comment and admit that I don't have any detailed turn rates for the Il 2.

If you don’t have any turn rates, nor for a Il-2, neither for the Typhoon you can at least use some estimative methods. So between numerous factors playing parts in the turn rate (or climb rate) of a plane, ther’e 2 main ones: the wing loading and power/mass ratio.
So for the Il-2: it’s 138 kg/m² and 3.37 - 3.2 kg/hp*
For the Typhoon: 226 and 2.9 - 2.66 Kg/hp** (supposing that Sabre had about 2000 nominal hp for 2200 max)

Once that made, you can see at least there is no evidence, even for ill educated people in mechanics of flight matters, to state wich one should be more agile than the other.

It means that (using approximate formulas) Il-2 probably was a tighter turner (radius, ToT) due to his very low power request (low wing load), even if is power available curve was lower too. Typhoon should be better in verticals due to it’s high power/weight ratio, but it’s high W.L would be a hudge handicap in sustainted turning circles.


* http://www.airwar.ru/enc/aww2/il2.html
**http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fww2/typhoon.html


Concretly, browsing soviet documents and russian forums i can say: ToT was about 22, 23 s for early Shtormoviks, 28 in mid war and about 30 for the late Il-2 tip 3 at 6360 kg (165kg/m², 4.1 kg/hp) and a lot of underwing loads perturbating wing lift capabilities.

I don’t have precise numbers for the Typhoon, but I bet il was close to P-47: about 26 – 30 s at 3034 ft high.

Moreover the Il-2 turn was performed at lower speed than Typhoon's one, so at lower turn radius.





[quote]
Would you settle for as the IL 2 is approx 150 mph slower, 7 ft longer, 6 ft wider, had a loaded weight of approx 2,000lb more, combined with a lower powered engine and wasn't designed as a fighter, its a fair assumption that the IL 2 was a much easier target for AA fire?

Was it 150 mph slower during it's attack at low level? What was the speed used by the Typhoon for this missions.

Have you got valuable statistcs about both planes in their survivability vs german light AA weapons?

Why do you think that Il-2 was exactly as vulnerable to them, than the Typhoon due to it extra size and under-speed.
Why even no more vulnerable, or no less?

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

ok bit baffled by the relevance of maneuverability in this context?

you can't drop bombs, fire rockets and guns or strafe ground targets whilst flying in circles or maneuvering, I would argue the speed approaching the target and ability to clear the defended area quickly, get in hit the target and get out, would have a much higher bearing on survivability than quoting a turn rate?
a plane in plan view in the turn would be a larger target for a start!

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

A couple of points.
It is a serious mistake to equate lower turn radius as being the same as agility, it isn't. In 1941 Fw 190's were all over the Spit V which clearly had the tighter turn radius.
Its also a mistake to only rely on calculations mentioned when thinking about turn rate as in the real world other factors come into play such as roll rate. Before you turn you have to lift the wings. An example, I flew gliders for many years and would defy any powered aircraft to stay with me in a turn. However the roll rate seemed to be almost as bad as an airliner so I would not be able to stay behind a Cessna as they would start turning well before me.
Another reason for not just relying on calculations when thinking about the real world is design. A bomber is designed to be stable and in particular an IL 2 that spent most of its time at very low altitude had to be stable in the rough air you get at that height. A fighter has a different basic design requirement, to be quick in responding to the controls and light to the touch.
Other factors important to agility include acceleration and drag, both of which I would expect to be in the Typhoons favour.

At the end of the day if you seriously believe that a Typhoon in less agile than an IL 2 then thats your choice

Speed of the attack. Interesting question but as most attacks were dive bombing attacks in an aircraft without dive brakes in an aircraft well known for its speed in a dive, you are going to be coming down at a rate of knots. Escape was at low altitude and at full boost after the dive so 400+ on the way out is understandable. I have read reports where a pilot realised that he was touching 500 mph in the dive which was unwise.
Do you know the attack speed of an IL 2? it would be interesting to know this.

Vulnerability to light AA weapons isn't known, but we do know that the 20mm would penetrate all areas of both aircraft with the exception of a high deflection hit on certain parts of the IL 2. I have admitted that the IL would probably be able to take more hits than the Typhoon but would be more likely to be hit.
Are you saying that you believe that on average the IL2 would take less hits than a Typhoon?

Which brings me on to the last point you made.
I believe that I said that I considered that the factors of higher speed vs slower larger targets would probably balance out. I certainly could be wrong on this, but its an unknown as they didn't fight in the same area of battle. It seems a sensible, fair statement, without bias to either aircraft which no one has questioned.
Do you have any views?

Edit
If it helps in tests between the Fw190 and the Typhoon there was little if any difference in their turn. Hope this helps

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Sir, I read all of your debating points, and in my opinion you greatly underestimate the importance of speed in any combat situation.

If you were a foot soldier who must cross a field under enemy fire, would you want to be lightly equipped so that you run as fast as possible? Or would you prefer to wear a very heavy flak jacket, swing a heavy machine gun over your shoulder, and walk across the field instead?

Bear in mind that it would not help much to walk around in tight circles in the middle of this field when the enemy is aiming shells and bullets at you.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Ladies and Gentlemen!

:) My intention was just to react on some prejudices written during cold war in the west from dumbs to dumberers!

As the Stormovik was a cumbersome, slow but heavily armored & armed, vulnerable etc...In fact, it was just not as cumbersome, not as slow and not as armored and armed as it was said before

Each plane is a compromise between speed, manoeuvrability, protection, armor, arms etc: Il-2 was a kind of compromise between all of this parameters, Typhoon another one...

No glider, i did not confuse the box (manouvrability) and it's contents; read my previous posts.

Are you sure to do not underistimate the importance to hit the target from time to time?

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I understand where you are coming from but it was your emphasis on turn rates that caught my attention.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

German ground attack pilots were able to speak with some authority about this and some did not agree with your opinions about Russian air force tactics. One was Karl Stein, who for 18 months piloted Stukas and Focke-Wulf 190s with SG 1. This time I won't retype all the text (there is three pages) but I'll hit some of the highlights:

1) In the spring of 1945, Karl Stein found himself in a position to compare the efficiency of the VVS with the Western Allies. He insisted that British and American fighter pilots were better trained, more aggressive, and more dangerous than the Russians. Though SG 1 flew the heavily loaded fighter-bomber version of the Fw-190, they still had the confidence to dogfight with VVS fighters, but not with the RAF or USAAF. "Never!", as he put it, and Spitfires were the most feared of all enemy fighters.

2) It was obvious to Stein and his colleagues that Yaks and Lavochkins could easily out-turn and out-climb the Focke-Wulfs, but the Russian pilots seldom pressed home these advantages. "Our thought was that they had beautiful airplanes but they do not know how to fly them". The Russians "just made one pass and were gone. They always opened fire from too far away and were hopeless at deflection shooting. Almost always they would just throw on the power and pull back on the stick". The Germans believed that poor quality of Soviet pilot training was the main cause for all this.

3) From his Stuka days, Karl Stein was even more familiar with the Illyushins. The Ju-87s would often pass Il-2s going in the opposite direction. No shots were fired by either side and sometimes the Germans waved. Apparently it was a case of empathy due to shared suffering. He remembered that the Shturmovik had formidable protection against light flak guns and always posed a serious threat to German infantry, but the Russian pilots would have done far more damage if they used better tactics. For example the Shturmoviks always struck columns at right angles, preferring a single quick hit and run to the more dangerous and effective lengthwise attacks employed by the Germans. When SG 1 attacked enemy airfields, they preferred to split up the flights in two-plane elements to attack specific targets in multiple passes. The Shturmoviks bombed airfields in massed flights, dropping on cue and departing immediately. The German pilots were very dismissive of that method as a waste of resources and firepower.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

For the RAF the ideal attack against MT and trains was from 30 degrees ahead against the length of the target. Some units when attacking trains had a section of four fly alongside then attacking broadside on, one for the engine and one each for the three flak guns normally carried on the train. After that the train was wide open.

Tony
Would appreciate your comment on the questions raised earlier.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello VG
Greetings from Russia, I spent a long weekend around Jänisjärvi NW of St Petersburg.
The Il-2 loss rate I gave was from Gordon’s and Komissarov’s Il-2 and Il-10 book. The IAP losses are from Keskinen’s and Stenman’s Suomen Ilmavoimat VI 1944 and their sources are documents from Russian military archives.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello
A clarification, I read again the info on the IAP losses, it seems that it might well be that 29 GIAP lost 4 Yak-9Ds in aerial combats plus one more was shot down by a “friendly” La-5. The text is not altogether clear on 29 GIAP but it is more likely that this is the right interpretation.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

It's known for the Il-2 at least. It's unprotected against 20 mm shells but once hitten they do not destoy it the same way as the Typhoon. The armored box aborbing shock, even itself being destroyed, the "post shell crossing destructions" are lighter. First the shell itself is suffering too, often up to destruction for explosive ones, and even the issued speed after the shock on armour is to low to inflict (but not always) at engine and other vital parts of the plane damages that lead it to destruction.
Of course armor percing shells are more dangerous under the armor, but not on the wooden structure of the plane, only making holes without significant issue. In a working monocoque structure, that is a kind of "geodetic one" in better, there is no place bearing more efforts than an other. At the opposite, a hit on the dural frames, spars and other struts of the Typhoon's fuselage, are considerably weeknessing the structure.


I know that an early Il-2 can withstand mid-statistically 7-9 20 mm hits before being shooted down (800 Kg armor) , much more (maybe ~ 11-13) for the later ones, (up to 1100Kg) and doubled commands.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

VG
Thanks for this, its what I expected.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

German ground attack pilots should rather speak with some autorithy about their own mission.
So browsing a book written by "mister kit", edition atlas, about FW-190 Jabos, we can read there were using close to soviet combat techniques. Flying low at 400 km/h once the target seen, they were making a chandelle or a combat turn, then attacking by shallow dive at 25-30°.

The same as for Il-2, except that it's speed was about 330-360 km/h. No much difference for the AAA.

Don't have much time to describe numerous Il-2 missions profiles, but they have obviously nothing common with Stein's doubtfull beliefs.


I mean just one soviet Il-2 pilot , manual, mission profile, mission briefing, mission debrieffing, post-op. camera pictures are dozen times more informative than dozens and dozens of Steins.

We are in 2011 now. There are some books written obout the subject, for instance Yefim Gordon's (Midland Publishing) one. Some Emelianenko memors (Svastika in the Gunsight) and maybe more i don't know.

Numerous stories and conversations sometimes translated in english related in magazines (at least in europe) and in the net.


For instance browse http://mig3.sovietwarplanes.com/pilots/pilots.htm there are Il-2 pilots inside, airforce ru and others.

regards

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Russian fighter pilots quickly adopted the Luftwaffe Finger-Four combat tactics so that does not surprise me.

Stein was not alone in his beliefs, but I don't think that any German pilot thought of himself as an expert about the entire catalogue of techniques tried by the VVS at various times and places. They could only form opinions based on personal experience and eyewitness accounts from their comrades.

Their own airfields were attacked by Russian aircraft and the victims described it as it happened. They were sometimes able to watch German ground troops while under attack by the Shturmoviks. If I were to read all operational histories of German flying units, I would surely find varied opinions about the Russian air force. But there was a consensus among the pilots of both SG 1 and SG 2 that Russian fighter pilots were not very aggressive and usually did not attack the Focke-Wulf fighter-bombers when they had opportunity to do so.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Nifty
thanks for the quotes from Hurricane and P-47 books.

On Soviet pilots, Finnish fighter pilots tended to rate at least Soviet fighter pilots higher than the pilots of SG 1 and 2, especially after late 43 when the average shooting skills of Soviet pilots improved significantly. Before that their accuracy wasn’t on average very high and they tended to open fire from too far away and tended to fire too long bursts and so tended to waste their ammo.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Juha

Quote:

Hello VG

A nice place, i bet. I hope you have enjoyed your WE!


They should be more carefull the next time they will “copy & paste” russian sources.

I have baught this book some years ago. The chap. V about winter war is from Keskinen and Stenman works.
http://www.aerostories.org/~aerobiblio/article17.html
The I-16 losses inside are not often corresponding to real ones in russian archives, provided later by Oleg Solonin and other russian authors. AFAIK, the “community” is unfortunatly (for us, as for Keskinen and Stenman) frequenting russian archives, vey small and nobody saw them there.

All i can see, they were just making some “arrangements” ( -you call it that way if your’e kind, or “falsifications” if you’re rigourous) with some fragmentary historical facts they had.


Might be, copying some reliable and recent russan publication they could be right this time about your example just by accident, but they are not still not relevant to me.

Whatever Juha, even if you have provided some erronated data, i’m sure that they were taken from your best available sources, and so your “fault” being completly involuntary is fully “excusable”!

Regards

VG

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello VG
Yes I enjoyed my WE, even if small roads in Russian countryside are hard to lower back and to bullocks without saying anything on the suffering of vehicles.

I‘m not sure what you meant, if you meant that nobody have seen Keskinen and Stenman at the Central Military Archives in Podolsk, that would not be surprising because they have got their info on Soviet side via Geust, Bykov, Dikov, Kiselev and Mikhailov.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello
II./Schl.G 1 summary of ops – 1942 from Pegg’s Hs 129 book
at that time the Hs 129s of the Gruppe seldom carried the 30mm cannon and vast majority of Hs 129 ops were bombing and strafing attacks, ie same type of ops as were those flown by unit’s Hs 123s and Bf 109Es

Hs 129 3.138 sorties
Hs 123 1,532 sorties
Bf 109 1.938 sorties

Bombs dropped 1,386,5 tonnes

Casualties:
Hs 129 20
Hs 123 5
Bf 109 16

Soviet a/c destroyed:
52 shot down
55 destr. on ground

Tank claims and M/T destroyed:
91 tanks
1,081 light M/T
273 other vehicles

Not so big difference in loss rates between Hs 129 and Bf 109E and the loss rate of Hs 123 was only about the ½ of that of Hs 129. No wonder that in 1943 von Richthofen wanted the Hs 123 production restarted.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

And why is that? The problem with the 2nd TAF's fighter bombers were three-fold:

1, Complete lack of armor protection making their operations highly risky
2, Lack of accurate delivery of ordonance to target
3, Lack of the ability to carry suitable ordonance

None of these above problems exists in the case of dive bombing, armored Stukas dropping 1800 kg bombs, for example. FBs could fire up trucks and other soft targets on the roads, but there was a clear gap in ability in the West between shooting up things that couldn't shoot back, and and smashing big targets like marshalling yards and railroad junctions.

The Typhoon, Spitfire, or for that matter the P-51, P-47, P-38, Bf 109, Fw 190A (note that the ground attack 190F series were properly armored) can be considered completely unprotected for even small calibre ground fire, let it be infantry SMGs, rifles or MGs.

All the protection afforded was limited to a relatively thin plate behind the pilot's back and head, and an armored glass in front of cocpit. The engine, fuel tank, radiators, the pilot - in short, all vital components - were completely vulnerable to ground fire of any caliber, as there was no armor protection from hits from below, or the sides, and in most of these components, behind. The British had a practice of fitting rather thin plates in front of cannon ammo bays,, but only from the front, and these were hardly good for anything else but fragments and non-AP rounds; their protective cover was also extremely limited.

I did not find a complete armor diagram for the Typhoon, but from British tactical trials of the Tempest, but it is said to be the same as the Tempest - which was again marginally armored, typical for a WW2 fighter:

http://www.hawkertempest.se/TacticalTrials.htm


Armour

Of a similar design and installation as on the Typhoon aircraft, with the exception that the head-piece is a trifle larger in size.
Thickness of headpiece - 9 mm.
Thickness of back pieces 6 mm.
All fuel tanks are self-sealing. Bullit-proof windscreen is of "Dry-cell" type. Front side of outer gun ammunition tanks have a piece of 1/8" armour plate.

If you mean from interception, it's true - but it's also true for bomb-laden Typhons or any other fighter bombers, they are easy targets for opposing fighters, being both slow and unmanouverable and if they drop their bombs to engage, its a mission kill.

Secondly, there's a reason why ground attack aircraft are slow. Effective, accurate shooting is helped if the weapons platform is stable, and well controllable during the firing pass. Low attacking speed is also a requirement as otherwise the pilot simply does not have sufficient time for aiming and also, to observe his enviroment. This means that it has to have great slow speed control characteristics and stability - which for example both the Stuka and the Stumovik had - and this generally requires generous wing area, which in turn will invariably reduce speed. This is the exactly at opposite requirement as with fighters - the Typhoon was meant ;) to be an interceptor after all - which require high speed above all else. As a consequence, their low speed handling will suffer.

But, appearantly every air force in the world in convinced that speed does not make up for the lack of armor - a few hits will be always scored. The Soviets had their Sturmoviks, the Germans choose to up armor their Stukas, Hs 129s and Fw 190s for ground attack task, and the trend is still present today - see the massively armored A-10 and Su 25, not to mention armored attack helos.

The simple reason that using unarmored aircraft for lowly tasks like air support against ground units, is that there will be far too many enemy weapons capable of bringing them down. And as aircraft are expensive, both in material and training effort, whereas ground targets are generally cheap, the cost-benefit analysis will soon reveal that attacks against such targets is prohibitively expensive.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I suggest you take a look at the experiences of the Ju 87s sent against the Remagen bridge in daylight. They missed and they lost many aircraft to Flak.

Summarised from Heinz Jirousek's »Flieger Schicksal immer noch nicht geklärt« (Jägerblatt, February/March 1991) regarding an action by NSG 1 on 8 March 1945:

"Late afternoon (while still light) Ju 87s approach Remagen at low level from the south east, in the face of heavy AA defence. Two were shot down immediately while two more pulled away smoking over the [Erpeler] Ley. A further attack was similarly a failure.

NSG 1 losses: 3 missing from 1. Staffel; 1 from 2. Staffel; 1 from 3. Staffel. One a/c each from 1. and 2. crashlanded at base with the crews unhurt."

NSG 2 fared no better when they tried it, incidentally. In fact the German bridge-busting efforts in 1944–45 were hardly a triumph: Ranville, Pontorsson, Nijmegen (damage inflicted at least), Remagen, Stolzenau, Lauenburg. Granted a Mistel got one Oder Bridge (Steinau?) but that was it IIRC.

BTW there's talk in this thread of a Ju 87 with an 1800 kg bomb — can you imagine how slowly that would fly? Sonderverband Einhorn tried the same load on Fw 190 F-8s but rapidly gave up in favour of 1000 kg weapons.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Without doubt these attacks were unsuccessful, but I think the point is rather how what weapons system/doctrine is better suited for such task in general (rather than in single cases). A lone 109E Jabo finished off a cruiser for example at Crete in 1941, but it was a lucky hit, and would make a very exceptional case for Jabo effectiveness. They had their place of course, and planes dropping bombs were certainly better than planes dropping no bombs.

The SC 1800 was one of most widely used bombs on the Eastern Front. I have a table somewhere about the number of bombs dropped, and the SC 1800 was indeed dropped in insane numbers (not only by Stukas, as 111s, 88 etc. were also well capable of carrying them). As for the speed loss, it was a big bomb for sure, but I am not sure OTOH if it had any more serious effect on speed than the other common load of three 1x500 + 2x250 kg(or2x500kg) bombs. As for the 190F, the SC 1800 was possible, but honestly a quite a bit of an (impressive) overload for such a small fighter, not only due to weight but also because of limited ground clearance with such an enormous bomb, whereas the Stuka was much bigger and could handle it well.

Secondly the Stuka was slow in cruise, no matter what it carried, generally trotting around at 250 km/h or so. The bombing runs from steep or later in the war, more gentle dives were made at high speed though.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

But there is no record of it ever being dropped by the Ju 87-equipped NSG units in the West or in Italy, log books and operational reports never speak of a weapon larger than 500 kg that I am aware of.

I was making the point that whatever the virtues of the Ju 87, neither it nor anything else the Luftwaffe had in the late war period was a reliable weapon against bridges.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

I would say that this is most likely an effect of NSG targets in the West. Marching coloumn and relatively light targets do not call for an 1800 kg bomb.

Aye, bridges are difficult targets, as they are hard to hit and also to destroy. I would think that the weapons available were suitable, but the task would be still difficult and impossible to guarantee. This is especially true as the lack of trained personnel and fuel made the use of the most effective weapons like, ie. apart from the Stuka the conventinal bombers and controlled gliding bombs were near impossible and suicidal, in face of Allied air superiority.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

This is indeed extremely surprising for me, i.e. as
- pictures with SC1800 loaded on planes or lying around are very rare
- all KTBs / Leistungsbücher / .. I know don't contain such entries.
I was under the impression that SC250 and SC50 were most widely used. I'd be happy to see the table you mention.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

But they also attacked the bridges at Nijmegen, Remagen and Stolzenau.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

My wrong, it seems my memory is failing me; managed to find the table, it certainly wasn't used in insane numbers, but still, in surprising numbers I'd say. Of course most targets did not require it.

As per the an 1 April 1940 document about what bombs to be used against what targets, steel bridges called for SD 1000 or SC 1800 from high altitude attack from apprx. 1000 m altitude, no delay; beton and stone bridges for SD 500 or PC 1000 from high altitude or diving attacks, apprx. 1000, with delay fuse.

Below is the monthly avarage of SC 1800 and other types in Q3 1941 and Q1 1942: roughly 50 were dropped per month. OTOH the PC 1000 was indeed used in large numbers. Source u/k; I pulled it off from a forum years ago.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Kurfûrst
as you can see from message #6 in this thread, at least some CAS Typhoons had substantial extra armour, more specifically according to older message by Chris Thomason 26th July 2007 17:11, see:Impact of Allied fighter-bombers (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=9525)

Quote: “…the Typhoon was armoured. Mod 346 (55 lbs of fixed armour) and 347 (496 lbs of removable armour) were introduced in spring 1944. I am not sure of the exact disposition of this armour but photos show trial installations of sheet armour applied to the cockpit sides and floor and around the radiator…”


Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello again, Kurfürst
thanks for the bombtable, it is very interesting.

Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Thanks for the heads up. The key sentence seems to be (continued): "...Nor do I know to what extent this armour was employed on operations. However many photos of Typhoons from D-day onwards show stencilling on the radiator fairings - "This fairing is armoured" - as a warning to groundcrew who might be removing the fairing.'"

If it was present, common etc. it would certainly make them as armored as say 190F Schlacht planes (400 kg or about 850 lbs iirc), protecting engine, pilot from below, sides from small caliber fire.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

1, The Typhoon did carry a respectable amount of armour. There are photos in the 2TAF of Typhoons with the armoured sides, one after crash landing
2 Comments have been made about the failure of the JU87 when attacking bridges
3 The 2TAF had the ability to deliver any weapons needed and those it didn’t have the ability to destroy could be given to the Heavies to carry out up to and including the Tallboys
I certainly agree that intercepting the Typhoon would be a mission kill, the difference of course is that the Ju87 or IL2 when intercepted had a significant chance of being an aircraft kill, not just a mission kill



When was the last time you saw an A10 or Su25 being operated where they didn’t have control of the air? Also, when I last counted it was ONE western air arm (hardly every airforce in the world) that went down this route and even here, the US Marines who know a thing or two about Ground Attack, went for the Harrier not a naval version of the A10.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

1, Uhm, no to the first part. We know that the basic Typhoon carried very little "armor" (though the airfame was tough). From the GA POV, it was unarmored. As Juha pointed out however, we know there were two mods designed, one with a small armor augmentation, and another which was quite serious. Now we have to know how service planes looked like, and how many were modded etc.

2, Exceptions to the rule can be made, being better for the role does not guarantee success. The Halifax was much better for night bombing, both in load capacity and navigation/aiming aids than say BoB era Do 17s, but there are cases where the Halifax did very poorly. Back to the topic, I do not think that anyone could seriously claim that any fighter bomber was better at destroying pin point targets than the Stuka.

3, I beg to disagree. First of all the weapons available for the Typhoon were quite unsatisfactory for many tasks. Rockets were far too inaccurate, the bombs it could carry were way too small for bigger targets, and only simple HE bombs were developed, lacking much more effective bomb types like German or Soviet AP and AT cluster bomb containers. There were no large caliber autocannons for tank destroyer operations. They could fight soft targets like trucks, which was very damaging overall indeed, but there was a serious lack of capability in CAS. Typhoons had no staying power over the Battlefield like Il-2s did. After all, it was not built for this, but pressed into a role as it wasnt very good in its original role of as fighter, and it was available, and could carry more ordonance to a decent, than the Spitfire. Its basic limitations are still appearant.

Heavies couldn't close that gap, as they neither had staying power, neither could respond on a short call for support, and could only operate in pre-planned missions, for which opportunity was rarely presented. Accuracy was absymal from their dropping heights - even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter - and low altitude bombing is a stupid thing in a heavy bomber. It didn't work out for He 177 for sure, they are huge targets for AAA.

Every aircraft can be shot down of course. The point is that Ju 87s or Sturmos could carry on with their task even they were intercepted, keeping in formation, and provide themselves with defensive fire. They could also stay above the battle and provide continous support or suppression (Il-2s for example often did this). They can also attack more effectively, part a, because they can operate slower b, had less concern to ground fire c, at least in the case of Stuka, there were proper aiming sights, not just guesswork with the reflector sight.



They always had control of the air, just like the Allies in 1944. It simply follows that the Allies could use a dedicated GA plane.

Quote:

Also, when I last counted it was ONE western air arm (hardly every airforce in the world) that went down this route and even here, the US Marines who know a thing or two about Ground Attack, went for the Harrier not a naval version of the A10.

The USMC operates the Harrier within a special scope, for them its a hybrid between an attack chopper and a fighter. The main advantage of is that it can operate from small carriers and from frehsly seized land bases, something the A-10 can't do. But compared to the A-10, its tactical qualities are in every aspect inferior. Its a useful specialist tool for a specialist force.

Now as for the Su 25, unlike the A-10 it is freely available to anyone with the $$ in the pockets (long live the Perestroika!), is very popular abroad and is in service in about a dozen countries. Its quite clear that there is need for such plane - this is especially true in light of current COIN operations.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Sorry tried to ignore it but cannot let the following go

Every aircraft can be shot down of course. The point is that Ju 87s or Sturmos could carry on with their task even they were intercepted, keeping in formation, and provide themselves with defensive fire. They could also stay above the battle and provide continous support or suppression (Il-2s for example often did this). They can also attack more effectively, part a, because they can operate slower b, had less concern to ground fire c, at least in the case of Stuka, there were proper aiming sights, not just guesswork with the reflector sight.

Neither aircraft could carry out their task even when intercepted, they were both hacked out the sky in large numbers. Like everything else,they did the Russians just kept producing more and more until they bludgeoned the opposition into submission (quite an effective solution if you have the numbers to start with and don't have to worry about winning elections)

After 30.06.40, in just which western front battlefield did the Ju87 just stay above and provide support or suppression?

These systems only work where you have some sort of air superiority, which is why the Il-2 improved significantly in effectiveness as the war went on, it had more space to work in. The Ju87 disappeared as the Luftwaffe lost control of the skies

Martin

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

After 30.06.40, what western front battlefields are you aware of until four years later..?

Dismissing the whole Sturmovik and Stuka operational records and characterizing it as human wave attacks and 'being hacked from the sky' is ridiculus, really. The whole point of the thread is that the Western Allies could use a dedicated ground attack aircraft, which they lacked. And if you continously miss the point arguing that 'these aircraft need air superiority', because the Allies had this in 1944/45..

BTW which aircraft operates well when the enemy controls the skies? Hmm?
Even B-17s could not..

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Very interesting discussion!

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kurfürst (Post 129205) After 30.06.40, what western front battlefields are you aware of until four years later..?

What’s about the war in Nord-Africa as well as the campaign against Malta? In both cases Stukas did not make a lasting or decisive impression.
But you have to admit they needed just 2 hits to sink the mighty Tirpitz hence mission accomplished!

It is possible that the 2TAF was fighting with “inferior” weapons such as Typhoons and Spits but history shows they accomplished the job! Theoretically there is a possibility that a better result could be achieved by using airplanes like Il-2 and some sort of dive-bomber, obviously not such outdated models like the JU 87 or A-31 Vengeance, a Douglas A-1 Skyraider would be ideal but this type was not available 44/45. But these types were not available hence 2TAF had to operate with available resources.

With current knowledge of the ETO outcome it is very easy to propose strategy changes but these types of suggestions are always some sort of what-if and they cannot rewrite history.

IMOH it’s not fair to blame this situation on the 2TAF commando. Fact is they made the best out of the situation und supported ground troops as best as they could.

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

With the moods as you said yourself, the Typhoon had a similar scale of protection as the Fw190 which is sufficient to give significant protection against light weapons, all aircraft were vulnerable to 20mm+ but clearly IL2 and Hs129 could take more hits on average.A previous posting listed 6 bridges so failure in this role on the western front was not a one off.

I cetainly agree that the 2TAF lacked weapons against individual tanks but this was a deliberate decision. A Tempest was trialed with 40mm but the decision taken was not to procede. Large scale tank battles with hundreds of tanks in the open as seen in the East did not happen in the west so their value was less.

You are the first person I have known who has said that the Lancs of 617 and 19 squadron were inaccurate. I think I can say that they had an unequalled record of destroying the pin pont targets assigned to them. However you miss the reason why I said Tallboys, they didn't have to hit the target, they were earthquake bombs and a near miss was equally effective.You forget that GA strikes had been going on through 1942 and 1943 with cross channel raids with Typhoons and Whirlwinds


First I am confident that if they had wanted the A10 it could have been made carrier capable, second, the Harrier can and did operate where control of the air is not assured, the A10 cannot.

So every other country in the world is now down to 12-15, so how many airforces does that leave who don't operate A10/Su25 type aircraft?
Also if there is one country in the world that appreciate the need for air support its the Israeli Air Force and what do they use?

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Hello Kurfürst
re your message #150, that’s was why I began my message #148 “…at least some CAS Typhoons…”

Your message #152“…even elite Lanc Squadrons with Tallboys had great difficulty in hitting the Tirpitz, a static target of 250x40 meter…”
In fact 617th and 9th had no great difficulties to hit Tirpitz if they saw it, on the first attack one of the first bombers which succeeded to drop the Tallboy towards rapidly under smokescreen disappearing Tirpitz put the end of Tirpitz career as a seagoing warship and when Germans were surprised and there was no time to generate adequate smokescreen, Tirpitz was sunk rapidly.
On CAS planes from 60s to 80s. RAF and French AFs used Jaguar for decades as their main CAS/Battlefield interdiction a/c, RAF alongside it Harrier, standard NATO CAS plane for long time was Fiat G-91, IAF used A-4s etc.
Juha

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Its still a question wheter this was a paper mod fitted to a handful of planes, or regular mod. FW 190Fs with extensive armor were serial produced. I've been trying to identify pictures of Typhoons with extra armor, but could find none so far. So I am inclined to believe that most Typhoons went into the battle naked.

And the listing of 6 bridges that weren't destroyed by Stukas does not, for even a brief moment, put into question wheter the Stuka was a much superior ground attack and precision bombing instrument than converted fighters of the 2nd TAF.

Hmm... so what was Monty doing at Caen for two months, a town that was to be seized on, uhm, in six days? Were large scale tank battles involved perhaps?

I am not going to blame them, they had very little experience, only mimicing with the 2nd TAF what they did in NA: use a Hawker fighter that did not turn out to be so great as a mud mover, for the sake of utility.. they had limited experience, and limited foresight. OTOH, the Soviets had even less before the war and figured it out right..

Facts on Tirpitz raids:

1st attack: 17 bombs dropped, one hit on bow
2nd attack: 32 TB bombs dropped, one near miss
3rd attack: 29 TB bombs dropped, one near miss, two direct hits

Well, it only took 3 months and 78 bombs dropped to make a static, unmanaevring ship on mooring to be sunk. So the best of the best could hope to place 3 bombs out of 80 into a target area 250 meters long and 40 meters wide - the size of a rather large bridge, say the Elizabeth bridge on the Danube, which is somewhat larger than the Tower Bridge in London. Wait.. does that sound like precision bombing or carpet bombing to you..? I am sure that was impressive, by Bomber Command's stadards, that is... Yet Roma was sunk by a couple of Do 217s with much smaller bombs, and Marat by a handful of Stukas, in a single attack for comparison. It didn't took 3 months, it didn't took giant bombs, or huge amount of effort spent. So I DO question the RAF's capacity about dealing with pinpoint targets.

Certainly they had results, as in their usual pig-headed way, they kept trying and trying and trying, until achieved success or bled dry while trying. But that's not capacity, that's exactly the kind of human wave attack the VVS was supposed to be doing.

Sure, its like saying that someone who finishes a single university in 20 years unequalled record of completing his/her studies. After all he/she did complete them in the end?

True, no doubt.

And the point is...?

Uh, I suggest you look up what role the USMC uses their Harrier IIs. Not on carriers, but on rather small size hybrids of "LST-Carriers": the Wasp class amphibious assault ship. Its a troop ship that can make landing, support the USMC force with ie. medical care, and provide limited air support with six Harriers and a number of helos.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...Wasp_LHD-1.jpg

Do you think that any kind of aircraft, save Harriers and the like can take off from that thing? That's the only reason they use Harriers, they're still better than attack helos. Other than that, Harrier IIs are obviously inferior to A-10 in just about every respect. They are slow, have very limited range, and uhm, no, they don't really have any better A-2-A capabilities, and but the fraction of the A-2-G capabilities of an A-10. They are splendid little things no doubt, and very useful in this purpose. But they have sacrificed a lot to get a very special ability.

Enlighten us - besides the fact that these type of aircraft are extremely popular in South America, for example? Besides the fact that these aircraft were product of Cold War, where everyone was aware that in an armed conflict, they could count on that the Big Brother's A-10s/SU 25s would appear in hundreds above the battlefield?

Enlighten us. Besides I find it equally puzzling why the USMC and IAF are the final words in the world of GA aircraft. The IAF and IDF weapon procurements are special cases, everybody knows why..

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Glider, to respond to your questions of May 15.

1. The construction of the Wesel bridges was not the problem. Nor, as Kurfuerst says in Post 140, was it lack of the right ordnance. The problem was 2TAF's lack of an accurate delivery vehicle and/or procedure to deal with Flak. Shores & Thomas state that “all types of bridges could succomb to dive-bombing (they mean glide-bombing) but it required a high degree of accuracy” which of course 2TAF lacked with its glide-bombers. 2TAF's answer was to ask for Heavies that could fly above the Flak, but the B-17s and B-24s failed.
2. “Postwar they plumped for Mediums.” This statement was misunderstood by you. What happened was that a postwar RAF audit decided 2TAF should have used its own Mediums on the Wesel bridges and not relied on the strategic Heavies. The Mediums were even less accurate than Heavies, so it was no real answer.
3. I neither rate nor overrate 2TAF's Flak suppression. 2TAF saw nor need for a Flak suppression capability, relying on aircraft speed rather than armour. Arsenal in this thread has been posting overdue correctives to the predominant RAF opinion. IMHO the RAF should have armoured and up-engined the Fairey Battle while dropping two of its three crew members, to create a British IL-2 that could have done the job of concerted Flak suppression. In the air-superiority environment that existed in NW Europe, the field would then have been clear for the Vengeance dive-bomber. Shores & Thomas would presumably agree with this conclusion, stating that “it was not considered advisable to take on Flak positions in a direct attack unless absolutely necessary as the odds favoured the gunners”. The obvious need was to create a combination of equipment and technique that would move the odds in favour of the attackers, but 2TAF never addressed the problem and thereby showed it was unfit for purpose.
4. You contradict my statement that MGs and PAKs were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing, and you believe a fast in-and-out pass by 4 x 20mms could destroy them. Such an attack might puncture the tyres of a PAK, I suppose, if caught in the open, but entrenched MGs and PAKs needed accurate bombing. Shores & Thomas would seem to agree; “Typical targets for the Spitfires would be strongpoints, dug-in tanks or artillery, while the Mustangs and Typhoons with their ability to carry 1,000lb bombs would also take on more durable or larger targets such as bridges, HQs or communication centres”.
5. I don't need to provide examples of calls for support being declined to justify the statement that 2TAF's Spitfires and Typhoons would not press home attacks against defences heavily defended with infantry weapons. The RAF reserved the right to decide how to respond to calls for support, and losing a Typhoon to an MG42 would not be risked if the support could be delivered outside MG42 range. The ORB wrote up such missions as having been successful simply because ordnance had been carted to the map reference provided by the Army. Accuracy and effectiveness never part featured among their success criteria.
6. Therefore the Typhoon pilot downed by an MG42 was not unlucky but rather had miscalculated. (You state 2TAF's FBs were well-protected against LMGs, but you will have to provide some evidence; eg the Spitfire lacked all armour except the pilot's seat-back). The comparison is between the Typhoon and Spitfire's tentative and rapid in-and-out and no-going-back attack with the slow and methodical triple-run attack of the IL-2 described by Arsenal as being the norm.
7. Hardened defences were beyond 2TAF support. You ask for an example; how about Hillman. 2TAF's weapon of choice was a Medium and not a dive-bomber with a bunker-busting hollow-charge bomb that we discussed above.
8. You ask for specifics about Mediums, but I can't help and neither can Shores & Thomas who exclude Mediums from consideration in their Chapter 12 'Operational Techniques and Tactics”.
9. You are right in general that the Hurricane IV replaced the Hurricane IID, but wrong in implying that this occurred in Europe.
10. The relations between 2TAF and 21AG were flawed at the personal level (Coningham hated Montgomery and the feeling was mutual), at the operational level (decided at nightly meetings at Army/Group level which was far too elevated for effective cooperation at the unit/squadron level), at the relationship level (2TAF was 'in support' and not 'under command' so the Army had to accept the air's ineffectiveness and could never insist on an operation being repeated even when it could be proved to have failed) and at the equipment level since the RAF refused categorically to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft in spite of Army pressure to do so.
11. Slow speed in terms of vulnerability to enemy fighters was not an issue in an environment of air superiority, and nor would it have been an issue if 2TAF had taken seriously its obligation to find a way of suppressing Flak, so your objections to the Vengeance hold no water.

Tony

Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
 

Again I thank you for the effort that has gone into this. I may not agree with some of it but the effort is appreciated. Taking them one at a time

The Issue I had was that you used the Wesel Bridges as an example of the failure of the 2TAF. However they were never attacked by the 2TAF, the 2TAF were never asked to attack them during the battle and in the Air Plan decided before the battle it was assigned to the 8th Airforce so I don't see how it could be seen as a failure of the 2TAF. I agree with you that the mediums would not have been sufficient. The Wessel Bridges were exceptional structures and a medium wouldn't have been sufficient As I have said before I would have dropped the battle pre war and replaced them with Skua's. For the 1943-45 period aa defences were such that an armoured Typhoon was in my opinion a very good option. Dive bombers or IL 2 aircraft would have had serious losses. On this we will have to agree to disagree With the tyres go the crew but you supply the details in your posting. You keep calling a 2TAF fighter bombers glide bombers, a 60 degree dive attack is no glide, I have done similar approaches a number of times in gliders and feel as if you are going straight down. I believe that these are accurate enough but agree a 90 degree dive would be slightly better.
The 2 TAF were as accurate as most, examples include the following attacks XV Armee HQ 23rd October Amsterdam Gestapo HQ November and Rotterdam Gestapo HQ all individual building, if you could hit these then an individual strong point is just as vulnerable. I do belive that you need to support this accusation. Of course the RAF reserved the right to have the final say as other things can get in the way such as other missions, availability, weather. I can only repeat that German airfields and shipping were being attacked on the last day of the war, the most heavily protected targets around, to say they were afraid of losing aircraft because of an LMG is beyond the pail.

1. Quote:

   Therefore the Typhoon pilot downed by an MG42 was not unlucky but rather had miscalculated. (You state 2TAF's FBs were well-protected against LMGs, but you will have to provide some evidence; eg the Spitfire lacked all armour except the pilot's seat-back). The comparison is between the Typhoon and Spitfire's tentative and rapid in-and-out and no-going-back attack with the slow and methodical triple-run attack of the IL-2 described by Arsenal as being the norm.

Typhoons were well protected, the modified armour fitted to these was on a par with the Fw190F, Spits were as far as I am aware were not. PS there is a photo of an armoured Typhoon that has crash landed in Shores and Thomas. Hillman wasn't attacked by the 2TAF, neither was it requested. However I do agree that a hollow charge bomb would have been ideal.

The 2TAF had one squadron of Hurricanes which was quickly replaced with Typhoons but these were mk IV I certainly agree that Coningham and Monty were at each others throats But the evening meeting was also to ensure that both the RAF and Army knew what was happening the next day/days so plans could be made by both parties. If the Army were asking for something that couldn't be done then that was raised then and adjustments made.

I have never heard of the Army suggesting what aircraft the RAF should be equipped with, have you any example? Sorry but on this I firmly believe you are wrong. Slow Speed at low altitude in an unarmoured Vengence after coming out of a dive, is a recipe for disaster, the AA fire would tear you apart. I still feel that you exagerate how easy it is to supress flak, its very difficult.

David