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Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Dear Peter
One thing is for sure, the loss reports for July 1940 are confusing to say the least. My information is mainly from the following contemporary documents: KTB for General der Luftwaffe beim Oberkommando der Marine KTB for Oberquartiemeiser/General der Luftwaffe beim Oberkommando der Marine KTB for Seenotzentrale (Luft) Nord Loss list from Gen.Qu. 6. Abt. I have had no access to the NVM reports. In addition I have noted info from previous postings on this forum. Since I made my last posting, I have found that one of the aircraft reported lost on 28.07.40 actually was shot down on 27.07.40. This from a radio intecept at 00.05 on 28.07. with info that a white seaplane had ceashed into the sea and exploded on impact. I believe that only one aircraft was lost on 20.07., one on 27.07. and one on 28.07.40. I do have information about the He 59 that was sent off to assist D-ASUC on 28.07. My info says that the plane was damaged, no percentage given, by a british fighter and that two crewmembers were injured. I have not seen a loss report that can identify this aircraft. What is the source for your information ? It would be great to get these things correct once and for all. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Seaplanes,
Thanks for the clarification. As you say, the records are a somewhat confusing but I feel that we are very close to nailing these losses once and for all. Agreed there was only one loss on July 20, 1940. The original entry in the QMG Returns (#4 of 22.7.40) was duplicated (#18 of 3.8.40) and later rescinded 25.10.40. But my question remains, is there any document that confirms this was indeed an SNFKdo.1 loss rather than SNFKdo.4 and what time it occurred ? There are two RAF claims on the day that could relate. Yes, I was confident that the loss of Oberlt Chudziak and crew was on July 27 and subject of later reporting in the QMG Returns. Finally, the casualties to SNFKdo.1 on July 28, 1940, are recorded in the QMG Returns (#21 of 3.8.40) with additional details provided via Winfried Bock. Hopefully, somebody will still come up with the KTB entries or the NVMs to resolve these questions beyond dispute. Thanks for your input and also that I received in a PM from Brian Bines. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Infantrymen running from an enemy advance even if they have discarded their weapons are still fired on as are tank crews jumping from destroyed tanks. It is quite logical to seek to kill enemy aircrew who otherwise will return to attack ones country although not a choice everyone would make.
with the slight difference that when the SND plane appears , battle is over , it seems that this case hv to be compare with action of sanitary services in the field , noone take excuse of the fact that the salvaged wounded will probably be in action later to shot at these men, seems to be the original cause of the red-cross building, WW2 move day after day to an "unlimited" war, shooting at ambulance planes seems to be a typical down-step from civilized war, giving rationnal reasons to explain that means that some other down-step are very near remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
remi,
Read Bruce's post, #36, on page 4, and that will explain all. It shows the SND aircraft did not always arrive after the battle was over, and that definite confirmation was gained that they were also doing intelligence gathering. It's not a step down from civilized war, it's a case of attacking an enemy's participating aircraft. Participating, in the sense that they are taking an active military role in the service of their country in a combat area. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
I read the post, but I have already answered , there is always an explanation, it also makes sense to kill the workers in the factories , to add that the war in the air with limited combattants made the fight appearing less as mass-killing, for sure that was the feeling that had the airmen at that time.
remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
I Hv to add that post of Bruce , gave lot of brut informations, after they could be interpreted differently,
Do18/ nd majority of He59 don't wear the red cross, The post of Brian give full of goodsense reasons to minor the role of these planes if they hv any in gathering data missions The losses occured in july at that time attacking convoys , is just a little bit more than kill time nd give some experience to crews in these matters, seems the strategy of the germans was nt well established... The channel is a straight in july for the 2/3 of the day trying to hide convoys is quite a waste of energy Did they really broke codes in july 40 ?? Ops began beg. of july the first losses beg. of july, so in quite a few days man hv to believe that they amassed informations, analysed them nd take a decision ???? coastal convoys that could only have come from aerial observation, and the only German aircraft in the area had been rescue craft ?????? Some kids could believe that.... were not in an area where a rescue was needed ??????? Remi |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
"Some kids could believe that.... "
Ah, how nice to be mistaken for someone young. Coastal convoys were predictable, but their composition was not. The Kreigsmarine were unable to spare craft for any meaningful recon, and there were no agents on shore radioing convoy details. Radio traffic was practically nonexistent among the ships and escorts, and the coastal routes covered hundreds of miles (not just the bit in front of Dover), German radar was not a factor, and that leaves the Mark 1 eyeball as the only solid source available to Luftwaffe Intelligence. It was only from human observation that the composition of the number, size and escort of a convoy, together with their position and formation could be reported, and this is what was happening. The orders posted by Junkers show that the rules were respected and followed by the Luftwaffe in the middle of June, but the events in question happened the following month after the decision to utilise the Seenot aircraft as spotters was initiated by orders from the highest command. The British considered the coastal trade convoys too valuable to sacrifice, and the RAF were obligated to defend them. There was no viable alternative means of transport in Britain at this time of the war, so the convoys sailed with whatever escorts could be scraped together. The Luftwaffe used them in attempts to draw out the defending fighters. Both sides read basic R/T codes instantly in most cases from the Battle of France onwards, as these of necessity had to be simple and based on plain language. British Intelligence began reading higher level German traffic, including Enigma encoded messages, before the Munich Crisis. And, of course, as explained earlier the WAAF listeners heard radio traffic from Seenot aircraft where there were no aircrew to be rescued. Whether these were marked with the Red Cross or not was beyond them to establish conclusively, but by June they were very good at knowing what units they were listening to. The reconciliation of the Y Service, radar and combat reports was usually completed by the night watch of Air Intelligence and hence available for the following day. Bruce |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
remi,
After Bruce's latest post (#47), quit while you're behind, and not totally out of sight... |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
If the reason for shooting down Seenot. aircraft was that they were spying on Convoys then attacks on them should surely have reduced with the drastic cutting of Channel convoys after July. Many of the later attacks on Seenot. aircraft were carried out when they were operating near the French coast with no convoy in sight. There was a view expressed by, as I remember, a former British merchant seaman in a book in the 1950's which claims the channel convoys were run as a politcal gesture to show the English Channel was still British. He claimed the convoys could have gone up the west coast, and goods been distributed by Britains then extensive Rail network without the need to get seamen killed ( I have no idea if this was a valid or practical arguement). He also praised the Luftwaffe for looking after its aircrew by setting up an extensive ASR network with launches, aircraft, rescue bouys , marker dye one man dinghies etc.
Which ever view on the discussion a person has I suspect it will be hard to convince them to change, and there is probaly supporting evidence for both views at different stages of the Air Battle of 1940. It has been said that in war the first causality is the truth. |
Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
Many thks , Bruce these explanations hv worth, at least for me , ...nd for John, I am still not fully convinced, nd maybe the truth is in-between, Brian gives also strong arguments, maybe a look at Söhnke Neitzel book could give some fuel to this debate...
remi for the moment I stay behind but at sight.. |
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