Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

Hello Brian, Remi, John et al
Truth was indeed a casualty. I can’t comment with any facts on the later Seenot losses, but I should imagine it unlikely as the Battle of Britain grew in intensity and invasion fears mounted that anyone would consider issuing an order to not engage any German aircraft. The genie was out of the bottle.

The air and naval campaigns over the channel in the summer of 1940 are completely intertwined. Many people believed the coastal convoys could be re-routed, but this was not a practical alternative mainly because (A) the lack of available naval escort craft for the significantly longer route proposed and (B) the burden already placed on the railway system. This is more plainly visible when it is seen that the bulk of the cargo carried in the southern routes was destined for the Thames area, much of it being coal in dedicated colliers, and the railways to and from the west were already under emergency war scheduling to accommodate the needs of the armed services. The southern part of England was very much dominated by anti-invasion measures. Much of the railway capacity was taken up carrying (and being available for) personnel and equipment. As I understand it, between September 1939 and the summer of 1940 the use of rolling stock had increased in efficiency by around 30% and there still wasn’t enough to make a difference to the supply of coal in the industrial Thames area (can’t carry coal in passenger coaches, no time to make new coal hopper cars).

There was an element of arrogance in the ‘English Channel shall remain English’ approach, but it didn’t matter: there was no alternative. The RN was ill equipped for Channel operations and every destroyer assigned to the channel wasn’t protecting an Atlantic convoy, where the larger threat lay. Whalers, tugs, trawlers and everything but the grandchild’s waterwings were given guns and scratch guncrews and pressed into service as channel escorts, and the convoys continued. By June a crisis was averted through more efficient management of the composition and routines of the coastal convoys, and the bare beginnings of an effective overall control system, but the Luftwaffe still had plenty of targets and the RAF and FAA had to respond.

Regards,
Bruce

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

Hello Bruce,

This is probaly one that will never be completly resolved, but the denying of aircrew to the Luftwaffe still seems the main aim of the Shoot-down order. Probaly hastened by the attempt of some Seenot. aircraft to make rescues close to the English coast. At the time much of the Luftwaffe Radio transmissions from bomber, recon and fighter units would have some mention of convoys because that is where the action was. An aircraft ditching may well have used the position of a convoy as a reference point for where it was coming down. Equally a Seenot aircraft is likely to have made for the convoy position and back-tracked in its search for the crew, transmitting its location as it progessed. A captured Observers log was also suppoed to be part of the evidence against the Seenot. but did not all Air Forces navigators/observers keep a Flight Log on their flight noting all events as the aircraft flew its mission. Another point as aircrew could survive in a dinghy for some time after ditching would this explain why Seenot, aircraft operated on days when there was no or few air operations.
It would be interesting to know whether the WAAF's listening in were picked solely for their langauge skills and what sort of knowledge they had of Luftwaffe operations. Did they merely translate into to English with more senior officers putting what was heard into reports. If so it would not be too difficult to produce a spying report from trawling the various transmissions if producing the evidence was ordered.
As regards the convoys after July they were reduced so was the coal getting through on individual sailings, or was alternative routings found. I believe the Escorts were diverted to Atlantic duties with this convoy reduction.
As with all servicemen Luftwaffe aircrew would be subject to a wide range of orders issued from Staffel level up to the RLM, has any specific ' Spy on the convoys' order ever turned up.
Anway the reason for a discussion forum is to hear both sides and it tends to give a wider view on the subject to all those interested,

Regards

Brian Bines

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

It is so easy to be wise after the event. Please remember that Gt Britain was engaged in a fight to the death with the most unprincipled enemy, so tree hugging rules did not apply.

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

As allready said in my earlier post the Seenotdienst-Aircraft were strictly forbidden to transmit anything that could be laid out as if they were engaged in warlike activeties. Also that Luftwaffe were in no doubt that these Red-Cross aircraft did not fall in under the Geneva Convention. And yes at least 1 He 59 did on once break these rules, and the Luftwaffe did assume that it was shot down because of this. See the attached copy from KTB Seenot Nord, in my earlier post.

Junker

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

Most succinctly put, Peter. In other words, if our two countries are at war, don't come crying to me if I knock out some of your stuff, whatever it is.

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

John, I would agree with Peter completely, in my posts I am not trying to deny the right of the RAF to stop enemy airmen from returning to operations. What I am hoping is that someone can come up with some evidence as to whether the reason given for shooting down these aircraft was valid on not. It is likely the spying story was for public/world consumption including the USA who may have viewed the British action as firing on ambluances thus losing us the moral high ground. At this time we desperately needed US support when a lot of US politicians had written us off. Personally I think the Luftwaffe were very optimistic in hoping to operate these aircraft without any RAF reaction, and ultimatly as the war progessed all sides had no qualms about shooting at rescue aircraft/launches or in some cases airmen in the water,

Regards

Brian Bines

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

To add that if relations between Luftwaffe nd RAF , were pretty bad at that time, between Luftwaffe nd Kriegsmarine, it was hardly better....


remi

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

Well I don't agree!
"tree hugging" pleeese!
When a country signs the Hague and Geneva conventions they agree to ALL the protocols and don't pick and choose which they will follow.
Shooting unarmed civilians in war is a warcrime. SO is shooting ANY medics who are unarmed and wearing the Redcross symbol (or the vehicle they are in).
Yes, murders still happen in war. Yes the victors write the history and often don't prosecute their own side for such events but on occassion they do as decisions have consequences that may put you in court.
You might not like it or agree but the idea of 'rules of war' is to maintain some form of civility in an otherwise barbaric event. It maintains some hope that there can be life or help and prevents the slide down the slippery slope to being barbaric which is why they were written in the first place.
Certainly all soldiers in the Australian Army (and all Western armies too) have a number of lessons on the conventions and the 'rules of war' and how it affects them. Needless to say there are a LOT of "what happens if...." questions. And a lot of disbelief but it at least makes them think. And I hope for your and my sake that they do think if put in that situation.

regards
Peter

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

Good thread.
The rules to which Peter refers work both ways: if you want the status and protection of a non-combatant then you cannot carry out military tasks. The orders produced by Junker show that the Luftwaffe was following proper procedures in May, but orders are orders and they were changed in July. The existence of the earlier orders adds to my belief that the July orders were in response to the lack of progress.

It isn’t that big a leap to believe that the German forces used this ruse in July, on orders from Berlin. There are several first hand accounts of the ground forces advancing into France during May and June using red-cross marked vehicles ‘inappropriately’.

Brian has quite rightly questioned whether or not the mention of a convoy constitutes ‘spotting’. The allegation is that the red-cross marked aircraft were sent to look for convoys. There were no transcripts of the German R/T conversations that originally raised suspicion among the WAAF Y Service listeners, but their professionalism by this stage was well established. It would be difficult to state that they had misunderstood or over-reacted without casting doubt on every other report they turned in during the same period. This simply was not a factor. Their training and experience ensured that the Y Service reports were taken at face value by the entire Intelligence and Operational structure even at the height of a crisis. The fact that other independent intelligence sources corroborated, and amplified, the suspicions of the listeners should underline the solid nature of the information they passed on.

It seems clear that the RAF shot down these aircraft, and it may be in dispute as to how many were actually marked with red-crosses, but surely we are not discussing who had the moral high ground? The war had claimed all of Britain’s allies and the German thrust was pointless unless Britain surrendered: the stakes were high on both sides and the odd punch ‘below the belt’ should not surprise anyone. I am not justifying either the misuse of rescue aircraft or shooting them down, but in this case I am satisfied that German red-cross marked aircraft were used for convoy spotting and were therefore ‘fair game’.

Regards to all,
Bruce

Re: Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940
 

Hi guys

What a fascinating response and discussion, with so many of our 'experts' chipping in. Thanks a million!

I have trawled the responses and have extracted much of the relevant information for the relevant chapter of my draft. I have acknowledged accordingly.

I did not have personal knowledge and certainly didn't wish to plagiarise, therefore I have decided to use this vital information and conclusions verbatim, with accredited footnotes. I do hope that none of you has any objection.

In Chris Goss' excellent 'The Luftwaffe Bombers' Battle of Britain' mention is made of the loss of a white-painted, Red Cross-marked Do24 (D-APDA) on 17 August. Were other such-marked Do18s and Do24s lost?

Does anyone know approximately how many aircrew - German/British - were rescued by the Luftwaffe seaplanes during the Battle of Britain?

Cheers and thanks again
Brian