Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I really don't have much to add other than this is a very interesting thread and I've been really reading it thoroughly. It's very thought provoking.

And thanks, kild, for not forgetting that there are some ladies on here *wink*

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Ok Juha not the bestest, although they hv the best material available, but the Ost-front could wait for better days, just a bit more attention was paid than to Italy, or Jugoslawia where half of the country was pretty insecure, keep in mind than germans with forces equal to France+Gr.Britain finished the mai 40 campaign in 5 weeks, nd arrived in front of Moskau in 5 months, by september 44 at that rythm the allies would hv to see the leaves falling down unter den Linden...

Rémi

New thread "Soviet army Myths"

The only way to beat Gr.Britain was at sea..

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I agree that it wasn't a half-hearted attempt, but just like it took a couple of years for Britain to gear up for the strategic bomber campaign, so it would have taken at least a year if not more to switch the German war economy from a continental strategy based on the army to a strategic force able to deal effectively with Britain. It is that gap in force balance and full potential on one side and what Britain really had to face that I am aiming at.

Let this not detract from British (and Commonwealth) achievement in WW2, but if it really was a narrow margin and if Churchill didn't exaggerate the U-boot menace, it is surprising that the Germans did as well as they did waging strategic warfare in the first couple of years of the war.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Gents,

IMHO, the main reason of the failure of the LW was a lack of a long-term strategy. The Allies had a strategy and built their air forces around it. The LW was a victim of its belief in "der große Schlag" that was supposed to give them air superiority long enough to win the campaign. German easy victories in Poland and France led them to think they were right. But they were not, as "Barbarossa" will prove it.
Even so, the LW had no plans beyond the "großer Schlag" and did not know what to do after air superiority was gained in a campaign that lasted more than they thought at the start. They were kind of a chess played who wouldn't know what would his next move be once he claimed "check".

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello RT
IMHO even claim that SS had best equipment was myth, it depended the date, which units were just got rest and refitment. Just before D-Day the two best equipped PzDs in West were Heer’s, then came three SSPzDs but the problem is how to value 21.PzD, it had 98 PzIVs plus 23 French Somuas and 88 SP guns on French chassises, maybe it should be placed after all on 4th or 5th place. But two weakest were Heer’s 9th and 116th PzDs. I cannot remember the equipment level of Heer’s 11th PzD at the time but IIRC it had more or less same number of tanks as the weakest SSPzD (2nd). OK, so much on ground forces.

But on the subject, LW was the only AF which had real armoured division plus some 20 infantry divisions in its strength. RAF Regiment had rather small ground combat capacity when compared with that. And the fact is a good indication to the byzantine structure of 3rd Reich.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I don't know if this is 100% correct, at least it isn't if you look at Vom Luftkriege, which forms the theoretical back ground. The extend to which this was put into official planning is something else.

There certainly was a gap between theory, planners and administrators though. Barbarossa doomed the over-stretched Luftwaffe to the support role, having caught a bear by the tail and not being able to let it go.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

There was an earlier post which sought to counter my doubts as to the true validity of some of the amazing Luftwaffe "kill" claims. This individual brought up the point that by staying in the war more or less continuously, this allowed Luftwaffe "experten" to gain so much experience that their kill scores were perfectly believable. This view, although certainly having some validity, is in my opinion, at its core, partially flawed. Allow me to explain.

"Experience", in the normal arena of human pursuits is much to be admired. The more a certain craftsman practices his trade, the better he is likely to become. In this sense then the experienced plumber, carpenter, surgeon or computer programmer is likely to get better the more he practices his art. But in the case of the Luftwaffe, we are talking about a very different kind of experience; namely mortal combat. With increased exposure to this ambience, a warrior would indeed enhance his prowess and even his deadliness, but only up to a certain point. There comes a time when the law of diminishing returns must be invoked since with experience there comes too, a constant exposure to violent death. Do you believe that any human being could long remain immune from the sheer psychological stress imposed by such a daily occurrance? There was bound to be a mistake, a slight oversight, an error in judgment which could (and repeatedly did) send even the most experienced fighter and bomber pilots to their deaths. Again, if I may invoke the experience of Japanese ace Saburo Sakai, he told me personally of the heated arguments he had with his girl friend over his refusal to marry her as long as the war persisted. He tried to explain to her that all of his victories in essence counted for naught. On his very next flight, death could come from anywhere at any time. He was bound to make a mistake; it was inevitable.

This is powerful stuff. The psychology of watching good friends perish in grisly fiery deaths would weigh heavily. The constant need for alertness, coupled with the rigourous demands of flying, would also result in physical fatigue. No man could possibly withstand this. As the physical world of Nazi Germany shrunk further and further, matters would have steadily deteriorated. There were no safe havens. Even a fledgling student, from his very first flights in a 'Jungmann' would be exposed to attack, and his experienced instructors had to be aware of this.

Let me give you a real world example. If I may for a moment digress to the other side of the world and to the United States Navy, you may get a better grasp of what I am espousing. Commander Sam Dealy of the USN Submarine USS Harder was an extraordinary submarine skipper. He has gone down in history as being one of the most resourceful and aggressive commanders in the history of the US Navy (in this regard, successful submarine captains shared a great deal in common with their aerial counterpart; the fighter pilot). Commander Dealy actually managed to destroy five Japanese destroyers in rapid succession; an absolutely unheard of, and never repeated, fete. This was akin to a bomber pilot attacking and destroying fighter aircraft. And yet on his next to last war patrol, Commander Dealy found himself utterly exhausted up to the point where he actually had to be temporarily removed from command. The man was simply worn out. He was killed on his last war cruise and awarded, posthumously, a much deserved Medal of Honor.

In this same vein then, Luftwaffe fighter pilots fighting a constant battle would have been fighting not only the odds, but also the sheer physical denouement which was part and parcel to a never ending exposure to death. No one was immune to it. During the Battle of Britain, when some Luftwaffe crews were flying three or even more missions per day, the exhaustion and fear reached unmanageable proportions. One fighter pilot wrote of this somewhat whimsically, and asked the question at large, "Why not just wander off somewhere and wait out the day's battle, and then return to base? Who would know?" Indeed, who would know? How widespread were these same sentiments, and how often were they acted upon is a question almost certainly lost to history.

In the end, fate and circumstance affected all. A green bomber crew or novice fighter pilot could get the chop as easily on his first mission as he could on his last. There is an old axiom in aviation circles which says, "I'd rather be lucky, than good". It is quite humorous, but also conveys a certain element of truth, and even of the dread implicit of never having total control over one's fate. I think any individual long involved in combat would certainly acknowledge that on top of all the experience one accrued, a healthy dose of luck was often needed to see him through.

The race does not always go to the swift, nor the battle to the brave.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
more or less agree. One must anyway to remember that as a continental power Germany had excellent army and thanks to Prussian heritage excellent general staff from which also LW benefit.

On the other hand as a maritime power UK had excellent navy and one cannot built a good navy in couple of years and without it it would have been risky to invade UK. Airpower wasn’t able single-handedly to subdue a major power before the arrival of nuclear weapons. Of course it might have been possible to force UK to compromise peace but IMHO Churchill’s strategy was based on hope that in a long run USA or USSR or both would side UK and so UK’s side would win. Hitler saw this and this was one reason behind Barbarossa, besides the ideological and economic reasons.

One more thing, LW seemed to lack the singlemindness of RAF. BC boundered Germany years even if in times losses were prohibiting. During the BoB LW changed it's targeting often while trying to find the Achille's heel of UK. I'm not sure was the area bombing a right solution but at least BC understood that there was no easy way to subdue a major power.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

My pleasure to do so Madam Baroness.
And how do you know that I am not Baroness myself?!

One can never be certain about these things...
;)

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I'm inclined to agree. The main advantage held by certain Waffen SS units was not in tanks or other equipment. It was sheer manpower. This was more obvious in the last year of the war. The SS divisions usually had more infantry and other ground troops, which allowed them to sustain higher losses and therefore stay in the front line for longer periods than a smaller army division.

Most of the SS divisions had fewer draftees than the traditional army divisions, and that was probably the most important distinction.

I do not believe that SS officers tended to be better leaders than "the regulars". But any organization filled with volunteers is always more motivated to pursue its goals, and typically performs more effectively than conscripted workers.