Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

What I put up in post #18 was a humourous riposte to a comment made by the thread starter in one of their previous posts. Ostensibly, it was nothing more than that, which I'm sure most (if not all except you) saw it as such. What you posted were serious comments about ground forces, which merited the comment I made. Too bad if you didn't like being called out for them.

What you do not know is the content of the PM that passed between myself and the forum owner regarding the initial thrust/purpose of the thread. If you did, then my post #18 would make more sense.

Complain all you like, I don't give a shit. But do try to follow the humour also...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

That's why Barbarossa is the most crucial turning point. With a clear back, the dream of German military planners since modern times, and access resources in the occupied territories, neutral or sympathetic countries, and even the Soviet Union, Germany could have waged war on Britain with completely different playing cards.

Nick, on your suggestion I bought Tooze, but if his thesis excludes ANY realistic scenario for German victory I am not going to agree with his work.

Besides there are more books of the genre (even have one or two still unread).

As for freezing the thread?

Why, perhaps splitting and/or moving parts of it. I hope there is room for more varied discussion on this board...

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

To the OP and his latest theory.

Until now the accepted line of thinking revolves around a couple of variables:

In the Jagdwaffe there wasn't a tour system like the Anglo-American AF. German pilots generally flew until exhausted, with some short home leave in between. Only higher command, recovery from wounds or exhaustion were their route out of combat. Recovering pilots might wind up with training duties. The other way out was death or captivity.

Combine this with opportunity. Just compare the target rich environment of the German Jagdwaffe with that of their Allied counterparts. In many cases Allied pilots flew entire tours with practically no enemy encounters. The mediocre might have enough time to build the experience needed when they finally did encounter the enemy. The Jagdwaffe was a hard school, as the war progressed their pilots received less and less operational training before being exposed to combat. Those who survived long enough were both lucky and good. They didn't call them Alte Hasen (or old Hares) for nothing.

That old hare having flown hundreds of missions knew his a/c and his own abilities through and through, now compare that with an pilot on his first tour and first mission with enemy contact (or at best after a couple of earlier encounters). Even with a lot of operational training on the side of the Allied fighter pilot there is bound to be a gap. If the tactical situation was anywhere equal and their aircraft of relatively similar performance, I'd know where I'd put my money.

Like I wrote earlier the Luftwaffe isn't about the Jagdwaffe, and the Jagdwaffe isn't about Hartmann. Even if you ignore the top third of high scoring Jagdwaffe Experten, you are still left with a lot of high scores.

Franek made a point that multiple kills don't necessarily mean a successful mission. OTOH in terms of the battle of attrition it is all about kills. If the main target is heavies, but you manage to take steady heavy toll of the escorting fighters, you will influence the effectivity and efficiency of the escorts. One major mistake by the Luftwaffe leadership was its insistence on getting at the heavy bombers and neglecting the escorts. This removed one element of initiative from the defenders. Even in defence the fighter must always attack.

PS. I don't believe in Uebermenschen nor that the Jagdwaffe Top Experten were a breed apart, just that they experienced a unique set of circumstances that enabled them to achieve such high scores. Putting a guy like Chuck Yeager or even our own Art Fiedler in that place might have resulted Experten-like numbers, or their demise.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

My only point was that a discussion of the evidence in the book — which, as someone said is outside the Luftwaffe researcher's usual territory — might be more interesting.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
I generally agree with your messages #82 and 83, very good thinking IMHO. Only point I’d like to make is that IMHO you underestimate a bit the importance of good training, good teamwork and aggressiveness plus good communications. Because of these USAAF escort FGs did remarkably well. One must remember that escort fighters flew in relays and had at least hundred mile long bomber stream to protect against an enemy who could concentrate it’s fighters against single section of bomber stream.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I agree with you Juha, completely. Just one minor side comment.

In general those German fighters were concentrating their effort on fighting the heavy bombers, often leaving the initiative to the American escort fighters. Call it orders, lack of training or Jägerschreck*.

This fact itself was a force multiplier in favor of the American escort fighter, especially from early '44 and onward.

Of course as in any generalization, there will be many examples of the opposite, but I still think the general point stands firm.

But, please let me stress that I don't think that this lessens the overal achievement of the American fighter escorts. No lack of fighting spirit and aggressiveness. Perhaps sometimes modesty, but that may be forgiven :)


*As explained by Mike Spick in his Ace Factor, the first encounters are crucial for the development of the fighter pilot.
Again this favored the American escort fighter.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Hello Ruy
I agree completely. Agressiveness and taking initiative are very important ingrediences for success in air combat.

Juha

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Nick
Not much details, this is a general observation based on identified crashsites or accounts. Actually, the whole front in Poland was covered by just only two Geschwadern, JG 51 and JG 52, and occasionally a group from another Geschwader. Only in about April 1945 more fighters appeared, but as the front was on Oder, I presume they could fly on both fronts at once. General feelings of pilots were that there was no Luftwaffe, and that the one must have been very careful to avoid unexpected hit and run attack. In regard of SG units, I think M Holm's site is most informative.
You are missing the entire point. Germany simply wasted a lot of its resources, and failed any long term plans, which (fortunately) ended in a catastrophe.
All of the German allies who dropped out, did that when the war was already lost, but Yugoslavia, which fell under German attack after coup d'etait. It is interesting to note, that Germany did nothing to improve equipment and technology of its allies, this being a short seeing policy.
[/quote]I agree that the leadership of the Luftwaffe was poor at the highest echelon, but they had many outstanding commanders, especially in the field. To simply imply that the German pilots were a bunch of overrated overclaimers is a gross simplification of the truth and a besmirching of the memory of thousands who fought and died bravely.[/quote]
The discussion is about the real view of Luftwaffe, and not a sweet propaganda that continues since creation of Bundesluftwaffe. The real Luftwaffe was incompetent at all levels, and ultimately led to a collapse during 1943. Otherwise it is always worth to remember what for they were fighting.
In 1939-1940 production of heavy bombers like Halifax, Manchester/Lancaster or Stirling was being prepared. Obviously, designs were of 1930s rather 1940s, so it clearly contradicts your thesis. RAF won the battle and ultimately the war because proper decisions were taken already before the war, and in the early part of war it was a matter of surviving the time needed to make the thing work. Germany tended to war much earlier, hence it was better prepared, initially.
I may understand that you do not like preemptive attack theory, but why are you ignoring it at all? Do you think that Hitler contradicted himself without the reason? Do you believe Hitler would remain at power if getting crazy to attack SU without any reason?
Actually, it is a model case. Germany put lots of effort into introducing aircraft not fit for operational service, and more, without any prospect for development. No 1946 German aircraft would fly, because there were no 1946 engines for them. To the contrary, there were several matured designs on the Allied way, like Fury/Sabre family. They were put into production just when they were ready.
Not exactly.

The training system was just hopeless. That is one of the reasons Luftwaffe collapsed.
Have you ever tried to compare flightime of Allied and German aces and number of take offs in a day? You would be surprised. The point is that by 1944 RAF fighters were led by seasoned veterans of several campaigns, who were able to take care of their fresh and well trained pilots, and get them through the war unscathed. In the meantime, German aces lost the technical edge, and were sitting ducks, while rookies were just hopeless.
Yes, but kill what? The war was won by bombers, not fighters. Destruction of one factory and associated labour meant more than loss of a few fighters that could have been easily replaced.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

I remember reading some time ago that the reason that Goering insisted on the fighters attacking the bombers over Europe was because in North Africa the fighters would attack the escort fighters and would be letting the bombers get through to their targets too easily.

Re: Luftwaffe Myths
 

Except when surprise was on their side, escort fighter pilots (of any air force) rarely held the initiative if flying top cover.

The bombers were the attackers, while the fighter escort mission was largely defensive in nature. When and if the numbers of fighter escorts increased dramatically, some might venture further afield to hunt for targets of opportunity. Otherwise the escorts could only react to enemy counterattacks, which tended to occur at a time and place of the enemy's own choosing.

To radar interpreters, all this looked much like a naval battle, with destroyers and other small ships trying to form a screen of protection against intruders. The principles did not change so much as the machinery.