FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Gents

Had the pleasure this weekend of being introduced to a former US Hellcat pilot who served in the Pacific.


Unlike most Americans, he played down his wartime exploits and was fascinating to listen to. :) Over a number of pints in our local RAFA Club I began to warm to our American friend and his not so humble son.



However the subject was raised about our own FAA and it’s supporting role in the Pacific and Indian Ocean campaign. I was somewhat taken aback when the same mild mannered Hellcat pilot stated that our FAA was badly lead, used inferior tactics against the Japs and our pilot’s training left a lot to be desired. The most critical remarks we left for the Seafire.:o



Being a humble RAF Bomber Command researcher I kept silent. :rolleyes:



The Hellcats pilots remarks were not said to offend but given in a honest matter-of-fact way.



I would like to know more about this, was our FAA that bad in this theatre of operations. I don’t want a US v FAA debate just some simple answers.



A confused Limey. !!!!



Smudger

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

I think you mainly have to take that for a piece of oral history from a real participant, for what it's worth. Do you doubt an FAA vet would disagree?
I assume from a fighter pilot these were mainly fighter capability comments.

The FAA didn't operate against the Japanese in prolonged large scale combat before the British Pacific Fleet ops in 1945, only a bit more action before that in real combat than USN non-jeep carriers saw in the Atlantic. Anyway I'm guessing this period is the likely point of reference of this pilot's personal experience.

Most of the BPF carriers had Hellcat or Corsair fighter contingents. Usually it was Indefatigable w/ Seafires and 3-4 others F6F/F4U. So Seafire not a central issue. It was an inferior offensive carrier fighter to the US types because of short legs, but a potentially useful one for defence.

The lower vulnerability of the BPF carriers themselves to kamikaze hits is often remarked on, but I don't know an objective assessment saying the BPF fighter/radar teams were better or worse than USN ones on defence. On offense, the BPF carriers didn't meet much Japanese fighter opposition, especially in the last stage of ops when they operated with the USN off Japan proper in the last weeks of the war. Brown's "Carrier Operations of WWII" mentions only 2 real fighter scraps by the BPF, over Palembang in Jan '45 and one over Japan right at the end of the war. FAA claimed victory in both, but even with benefit of real Japanese losses in each (I don't know them) it seems way too small a sample to analyze v. hundreds of air battles by USN fighters in 44-45.

Generally late WWII USN pilots had more hours upon entering combat than other air arms, often 450hours. I've seen personal accounts of pilots who had 700. I don't think it means FAA pilots were "poorly trained". I don't know the cross section of experience levels in the BPF air groups. I'm going to guess they were generally similar to new US carrier wings at that time, mostly new men, leavening of returning multitour men. But as far as returning men the USN had many more and a much higher % who had seen heavy fighter-fighter combat by 1945 than the FAA had, especially against the Japanese which the FAA had encountered only a handful of times before 1945. Plus other US air groups around when the BPF joined up with the US fleet had seen months of furious combat and were ready to rotate home; I don't doubt those seasoned groups were much more effective than BPF groups, or green US ones (except again the "green" US groups had the benefit of a much larger pool of men who'd seen extensive air combat against the same adversary).

Joe

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Just to add to what Joe has written, please note that FAA pilots flew Corsairs from carriers much earlier than their US colleagues did. Apparently someone forget to tell them it is not suitable to do so.
The real question is, however, what was the basis of your's vet opinion. Where did he met British sailors, who they were, had he served in combat with them, etc. Various factors mixed with high elan and espirit de corpse could have contributed to such and no different opinion.
PS The bible has quite interesting comments on Seafire IIRC.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

There isn't much written material out there on either the FAA or the BPF's involvement in the Pacific War.

But what is out there is a real eye-opener.

Three books that are a 'Must Have' for anyone who is interested in this subject are:

They gave Me A Seafire, by Mike Crosley. Excellent book that covers his service from the Malta convoys, Torch and through to wars end in the Pacific. He is very critical of the tactics employed by the BSP commanders, in particular Admiral Vain (of Cossack fame) who was Carrier Fleet Commander. His descriptions of combat against the Japanese is rivetting.

Barracuda Pilot, by Dunstan Hadley. Trained on the ungainly Barracuda Hadley formed a very strong attachment to this plane - warts and all. His tour of duty was mostly confined to the Pacific, and his vivid recounting of raids on Sumatra and Sigli are great reading. Interestingly Hadley too is very critical of the use Britiah Admirals made of the FAA in the Theatre, and draws several cutting comparisons between how the FAA was utilised and how the USN applied their aircraft.

Grave Of A Dozen Schemes - British Naval Planning and the War Against Japan, 1943-1945, by H. P. Wilmont. Definitely read the other two books first, at least that way you will enjoy them. Because after reading this book you will be far to amazed and frustrated by how inept the planning staff and admirals were in trying to conduct an offensive war against the Japanese, and their total lack of understanding on the proper utilisation of air power (FAA).

The history of the RN in the Med and Atlantic is rich and glorious. But in the Pacific in the late war years it was plagued by poor leadership, outmoded planning, political manoeuvering and downright ego posturing. The last in trying to compete against the far better equipped and more experienced USN.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

I'll have to add those books to the list. But it seems the criticisms you mention tend to be on the level of strategic/operational employment of the FAA, perhaps the fact that by any account it had a minor role in the Pac War when perhaps it could have played a bigger one. But I assumed from the opening post a USN vet would be criticizing on a more tactical level (but maybe a well read vet criticizing on a higher level). For example "poor leadership" I took to mean perhaps sdn CO's or even division leaders as opposed to admirals. Here's where it seemed to me the limited action the FAA saw, which itself might be criticized in terms of its potential, especially in offensive fighter ops (the truly devastating forte of the USN air groups v. the Japanese), would make it hard to assess that. Beside the obvious disparity in cumulative experience in that regard by 1945. As mentioned the FAA had glorious achievements in Europe but relatively little offensive fighter or really much of any fighter v fighter action in WWII (some incidents but tiny fraction as many as USN, carrier war in ETO/MTO a very different one than PTO).

Unless he was commenting on defensive actions against air attacks on the carriers, where as I said I've never seen a comparison. Ca. 1942 Med convoys the RN was ahead of the USN in fighter/ship radar intercept, in 1945 the USN generally had better radars and a lot more cumulative volume of experience, perhaps this reversed.

Again maybe I'm jumping to a narrow conclusion what the F6F pilot meant.

Joe

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Gents,



In fairness to the F4F pilot (who’s name I am withholding for obvious reasons) his main criticism was directed at the attitude of the RN / BPF admirals and their rather snobbish and opinionated attitude. ( Nothing new there :blink: )



His opinions were formed I believe from a joint British / American operation in July / August 1945. I have no other details.



We did not discuss the attributes of the FAA over the Atlantic or in Europe.

From what I have read of the posts, there is some truth in his opinion. :)

A question if the BPF were operating similar aircraft types as the Yanks, on similar operations, against similar targets, why was our tactics so very different. :confused: Did we not take advice from our American Allies, it would not be the first time after all. ?

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

The whole set-up of the BSP was totally at odds with the highly sophiscated and extremely advanced USN operation.

The RN, although they had lead the way of carrier development in WWI and the early 20's, fell well behind in design and tactical application from the early 30's, and never regained that prominance. By the start of WWII both Japan and the US were streets ahead in all areas.

The RN used, poorly, it's carriers in penny packet operations. A Malta convoy containing 2 carriers was considered a very large task force. There was no Fleet practice, or Task Force. It's aircraft were of short range, were poorly designed, it had almost no radar control defence system and the powers that be held the belief that in anti-aircraft defence the AA gun was superior to using it's own aircraft. Hence RN carriers had a preponderence of strike aircraft as opposed to fighters on board. And it's aircraft carrying capacity was limited to aproximately half that of IJN or USN Fleet carriers. In addition RN carriers were of limited range, and relied on replenishment from bases on shore. there was no fleet replenishment, and no fleet train. Also RN carriers had no provision for air-conditioning, of which both the IJN and USN did.

Even at the start of the war both the IJN and the USN were more advanced in the use of carriers - the IJN especially so. The USN quickly caught up tactically. More importantly the USN, operating in the Pacific over vast differences, had two years to develop a very sophiscated supply chain that could replenish carriers well away from base, could replace aircraft and crews at the front (wherever it may be), carry out minor repairs and maintain the fleet.

The BSP had no such organisation, worse it had made no effort to develop one. Given that the BSP had been based in the Indian Ocean since 1942, and was fully aware of the trend of carrier application as used by the USN, makes this oversight all the more glaring. Admittedly the BSP had to fight London for any resource allocation of ships and material, being lowest on the priority list. Nevertheless it was a failiure by RN staff.

After June 1944 the Admiralty could allocate many ships to the BSP, and did so. The FAA was finally receiving dedicated naval aircraft in quantity eg F6F, F4U, TBM etc. Spitfires were still retained, as were the Barracuda. When the BSP finally started major offensive operations in 1944 against the Japanese it still had some many problems.

Logistics remained the major limitation. A patchwork quilt of ships was put together for supply, drawing on basically an free merchantman in the pacific under British control. Sydney was the closed major base for the RN, thousands of milse from the front by late 1944. Aircraft carrying capacity remained a bugbear, and the AAA capability of a RN carrier was well below that of a USN carrier. In several instances it was the armoured decking of the RN carriers that saved them when confronted by kamikaze in '45.

And only one carrier captain was a flyer. All other, including commanding admirals, were not carrier qualified. And this often led to a lack of appreciation of the problems of aircraft operation from carrier decks, affecting tactic's, comditions of operation and most importantly por co-operation when involved with USN carriers.

Yet despite all this the FAA did achieve many great things in the Pacific. And developed a record it can be justly proud of. It is understandable though that in American eyes the BSP is seen as rather ineffective.

After all the USN by 1945 was fielding a navy of almost 600 ships at the front (well over a thousand if supply ships are counted), including 30 odd carriers of various sizes. By comparion the BSP had 6 carriers and less 100 ships (including supply) under it's control. Barely a Task Force by USN standards.

Phew! :) A bit long winded. This is just touching on the subject. Read the books mentioned for a far greater appreciation of the trials and tribulations of the BSP. Additional to those are a few more.

The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 - 1945, by Guy Robbins

Sunburst - The Rise Of Japanese Naval Airpower 1909 - 1941, by Mark Peattie.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Maybe you will find this rather long article/report interesting from London Gazzette. It is a report by Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, K.C.B. , C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, written on 14th March 1945. The article/report describes the British carrier attack on Palembang, Pladjoe and some other targets on Sumatra in January - February 1945.

URL: The carrier-borne aircraft attacks on oil refineries in the Palembang (Sumatra) area in January 1945

Hope this helps to answer some questions. ;)

lp,

Klemen

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Picked up an interesting Magazine/Book a few years back.

"The British Pacific & East Indies Fleets-The Forgotten Fleets" 50th Anniversary

It has a number of articles by various contributors, plus a lengthy list of vessels involved.

One major thread is that the RN Carriers had short endurance and the Fleets Train to support the BPF was hastily cobbled together.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Sorry But I’m about to have a massive rant.And I Can’t Stop when I get going.

In my opinion the FAA in the Pacific went pretty well.Considering the fact that
They weren't in the "Pacific War"in the actual Pacific Ocean for as long as their US counterparts(or contributed as much).The FAA aircraft managed to shoot out of the skies 112.5 Japanese aircraft.And the FAA in the invasion of Okinawa subduing Japanese air activity from the airfields located on Okinawa Itself.And the SeaFire proved itself as a fighter when it shot down 12 Japanese aircraft with the loss of only one Seafire.TAnd the BPF possessed better armoured carriers than the Americans, The BPF carriers had armoured decks which helped against the kamikaze attacks whereas the Americans had lightly armoured decks which proved critical later on.he FAA were also involved in the attacks on Sumatran Oil Fields.http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/sh..._Meridian1.jpgThe Picture shows an attack of the FAA on the Sumatran Oil Fields.
http://www.fleetairarmarchive.net/sh...cFleet1945.jpgThis Picture Shows F4u Corsairs of The Royal Navy In British Pacific FLeet markings.There were 42 FAA squadrons serving in the Pacific aboard 17 aircraft carriers.They FAA did a whole lot more in the Pacific but I don't have time to type up stuff about them because I'm late for a School Function.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:F...444-047%29.jpg HMS Formidabble going through the Anti- Submarine boom in Sydney Harbour.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:H...carrier%29.jpg The Carrier HMS Collossus Which served in the BPF.


http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/i...efatigable.jpg HMS Indefatigable In Sydney Harbour.

http://www.microworks.net/PACIFIC/ba..._of_japan6.jpg

The deck of a British Carrier off the Shore of Japan.

So you see the FAA Served well in the Pacific and Gave a great much of assistance and help to the Americans by using their own[FAA] aircraft to
take out other targets while the US took out other targets without having to stretch themselves to thin.And The FAA also provided invaluable air cover over the allied fleet.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

I don't want to comment too much on the American pilot's opinion otherwise I might end up in a rant too. This type of derision is common in AVG (Flying Tigers) writings about their RAF counterparts in Burma. Suffice it to say that Franek's observation hits the button.

Books to add to Jim's list are:

'Carrier Pilot' by Norman Hanson (about flying the Corsair - training in USA and BPF ops. Well written and illuminating personal account)
'The Forgotten Fleet' by John Winton (comprehensive classic account of BPF)
'Task Force 57' by Peter C Smith
'Corsair KD431 - The Time Capsule Fighter' by David Morris (fascinating forensics on the FAA's surviving F4U + veteran pilot's recollections of flying)

Two further observations:

1. FAA were first at sea with the bent-wing bird - after USN said it couldn't be flown from carriers
2. FAA Avengers at Palembang were observed being flown "like fighters" and scored victories over Japanese fighters using their forward armament.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

It should be pointed out that the US pilot's comments on BPF leadership, and specifically the handling of aviation, are echoed by the comments of FAA pilots. Read Crosley or David Brown on Vian. The comparative levels of training, experience and operations are simply a matter of very obvious record. Achievements on a tactical level do not cancel out failings elsewhere.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Anecdotally, and having nothing whatsoever to do with FAA performance critcism, my father who was, at the time, Jimmy Thach's assistant in the TF-38 ops shop had the opportunity to speak with an FAA F4U driver who had landed aboard Shangri-La in the late summer of 1945. The conversation was inconsequential, but my father, at the ripe old age of 29, was amazed by the apparent youth of the RN pilot, obviously in his very late teens . . . it struck home to him then that the British had really been at war for a long, long time for their pilots to be so young.
He later flew over to and landed on one of the British carriers and was somewhat relieved to find that most of the pilots were not quite so young, though there was an identifiable population of youngsters.

For what's worth.

Rich

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

In The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy, Clark Reynolds devotes a chapter to the RN's participation alongside the USN in the Pacific. He discusses some of the initial difficulties and familiarizing that the BPF faced in order to operate at the pace the US Pacific Fleet was used to, including at-sea refueling techniques that were inferior to USN methods. Quoting one British author, he notes that "the actual technique of attacking airfields and the aircraft upon them was something fairly novel to the majority of the Fleet Air Arm." One thing he credits the RN with is superior fighter direction techniques, due to their experience at intercepting LW aircraft; Reynolds states that Commander Lewin, who was Vian's FDO, needed a smaller number of defensive fighters than the US was using. Reynolds also points out that RN carriers' armored flight decks could better absorb a kamikaze hit in case their fighter direction let one slip by.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

It is worth adding that the Seafire L.III, despite (or perhaps because of) its known handicaps of range and strength, was faster and better accelerating at low-level than either the Hellcat or the Corsair, thus being better suited to the close-CAP role.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Hello Gentlemen,

I just came across this thread - at this late stage I feel that it is also worth noting that by 1944/45 the U.S. firmly believed that the War against Japan belonged exclusively to the U.S. and accordingly only grudgingly allowed the B.P.F. to participate in what was basically a supporting role.

Cheers

Bruce Lander

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

VERY good thread guys. Well done. Heavy discussion w/o personal attacks!


Keep one thing in mind regarding the armored deck RN carriers versus the non-armored USN decks: the USN carriers could be (and were) built much quicker w/o that armored flight deck, and held more a/c (always important), so its problematical whether those trade-offs were worth the occassional loss of a carrier due to Kamakazi attacks. I hate to be cold-blooded, but maybe it was better to have more a/c and more carriers.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

I haven't had time to read this entire thread yet.

After reading the book "The Seafire, The Spitfire that went to Sea" by David Brown, certainly makes the Seafire seem un-impressive.

Taken from the book,

" it will come as a surprise that Seafires were delivered to the Royal Navy in greater number -over 2000- than any other aircraft in the Service's aviation history.

in nearly three years of action and over 50 operations from the Arctic Circle to Tokyo Bay, the Seafire engaged enemy aircraft in fewer than 50 combats, in which it destroyed 37 and damaged another 26 fighters, bombers and reconnaissance aircraft."

Regards,
Mike

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Thank you all for this very interesting topic
As an indication, how many flight hours had British FAA pilots before going to combat ?

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Mike: I think you'll find that similar actions/scores were made by most of the FAA's aircraft. It was largely a matter of opportunity. The Seafire was too late for the comparatively intense European fighting of the early war and the more powerful US fighters saw most of the final year's actions - though it was the Seafires that saw the last dogfight.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Graham,
The last FAA claims, on August 15, 1945, by 887 and 890 Seafires, and and 820 Sqn Avenger, are at 0545. The last USN claim on that date is at 1400, There is a USN claim at 0540, and again at 0545, and starting at 0640 (until 1400) there are claims for 25/2/4 victories. There is also an uncredited claim by a P-61 (chasing an Oscar into the water) at about 1900 that evening. (I suspect it is uncredited more because "the war was over"; it is not anecdotal, as there is a combat report, and reference to it in the Okinawa Air Defense daily report).

Frank.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

I did only mean the last FAA fight - however, the Russians were tangling with the Japanese later still.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

For most part of the war, RAF ETO pilots had a total of 600+ hrs before entering the combat. It is a little bit more than 450 hrs.
Concerning Seafire, it was mostly used in Europe, because US types were considered no match for Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs. Therefore the number of credited victories seems not an argument when discussing quality of aircraft.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

It is certainly untrue that the FAA Corsairs and Hellcats were thought unable to cope with Luftwaffe fighters. It is more the point that the US fighters were mainly used on the fleet carriers, and these saw few operations in Europe in the period (only very late in the war) when the US fighters were available in significant numbers. The few combats that did take place, mainly over Norway, suggest they managed perfectly well enough. USN Hellcats clashed successfully with Luftwaffe Fw 190s in operation Dragoon, the invasion of the south of France.

Personally, I would accept that the heavier USN fighters do seem to be slightly inferior to the Fw 190, if not the Bf 109G, but not sufficiently so as to make any great combat difference given average pilots on both sides.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

I believe the bible provides extract from a report clearly stating only Seafire could match with German fighters.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

USN units involved, dates, places, times?

There were precious few Fw 190s there to shoot at and the only USN claims I was aware of during DRAGOON were by VO-1 and VF-74 against He 111s, Ju 88s and Ju 52s.

I'm always happy to add to what's on my website, so you've got my curiosity going now.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Given that the Seafire was only an overweight Spitfire Mk.V with a low-rated engine, some doubt must be cast on such a simply-expressed opinion. At very low level the aircraft should not be under-rated, as proved in the BPF's CAP mission (trying to drag the discussion back to the original point!).

Perhaps the most critical judgement that can be made on the USN fighters is that they were not much more superior to the Seafire, given their later design period and much greater power. However, some of this has to be credited to the specifically naval requirements. The need for a big wing does reduce the top speed, but improves manoeuvrability. The combination of a big wing and a big engine is a fairly good recipe for a fighter, although small size and light weight often gives better point performance numbers. The lighter weight of a landbased fighter will provide an advantage - but so will a 2000hp R2800!

In mid/late 1930s terms, that's exactly what a Spitfire was - big wing and big engine. But for the early 1940s a Griffon was needed - to my mind the big mistake of the Admiralty was not the second man in the Firefly but that the engine would have been better employed in Seafires....but that is being even more digressive. Sorry.

Edit after crossposting: apologies, Nick, I thought that they did make claims against Fw190s in an encounter during Dragoon.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

Nick,
The unit designation was VOF-1 not VO-1. It became VOC-1 when it moved to the Pacific.

Frank.

Re: FAA Role in the Pacific.?
 

And no, neither VOF-1 nor VF-74 encountered any German fighters in Operation Dragoon, this the only USN F6F combat operations in the the ETO.

There were no encounters between FAA F4Us and German fighters, though FAA F4Us served as high cover in the Operation Mascot strikes on Tirpitz. USN F4U squadrons only saw combat action in the Pacific theaters.

The only encounter, fighters-vs-fighters, involving F6Fs and German adversaries, of which I am aware, occurred on 8 May 1944. F6F's from the Fleet Air Arm's No. 800 Squadron (Lieut Comdr SJ Hall, DSC, RN), off HMS Emperor, while escorting a flight of Barracudas was attacked by a mixed group of Me 109's and FW 190's. Two F6F's were lost, one, probably, to anti-aircraft fire (one source indicates that both F6Fs were lost in a mid-air collision, not to any German fire of any kind); the Germans lost 2 Me 109's and one FW 190. The FW 190 was claimed by Sub-Lieut Ritchie. Luftwaffe losses in the area for this date were noted as three 109G’s, # 14697 (Ofw Otto) and #10347 (Uffz Brettin) both from 10/JG5, and another from 8/JG5 # unknown piloted by Fw Berger; there no record of an FW 190 loss. On the Luftwaffe side, Uffz Hallstick claimed two F6Fs and Ltn Prenzler claimed one.

There was at least one other instance of FM-2 operating off HMS Searcher going up against Me 109Gs in March 1945, being bounced by the Germans while escorting a TBM strike, and apparently coming out of the fracas in better shape than their German adversaries.

As has been noted, encounters were few, certainly not enough to provide data for any sort of statistcally based conclusion, but annecdotally, Hellcats and the Wildcats tended to come off well against their German opponents.

Rich