German & Allied radar
 

An excellent short overview by an author who is unknown to me:


http://www.radarworld.org/radarwar.pdf




Ed

Re: German & Allied radar
 

indeed an excellent overview for radar-specialists. Amazing the editors note at the end:

happen to Europe after the war?”

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hi Ed,
It is a very fine find. This kind of info is rarely found on-line.
The author sadly -as usual - have not got HIMMELBETT straight. Please see:
http://www.gyges.dk/Himmelbett.htm

bregds
SES

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Some other sites to look at:

http://www.hnsa.org/doc/radar/part4.htm#pgMK3MK4-1
http://www.radarpages.co.uk/index.htm

and

History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy
http://earlyradiohistory.us/1963hw.htm

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Amazing indeed. When it comes to airborne radar, the RAF's first kill by a radar carrying night fighter was on 22/23 July 1940 (according to "Night Fighters" by Bill Gunston) and the Luftwaffe's was quite a long while later, wasn't it?

Re: German & Allied radar
 

The authors comments quoted are in line with the political views expressed in the body of the document.

Having said that, it is a very interesting and useful site for technical information. I am now keen to know more about the statement that German radio transmitters were all retuned to the same frequency at the outbreak of war.

Bruce

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Another site with details about British jamming equipment:

http://www.infoage.org/elec-01-1946-p97-rcm.html



Ed

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Political views? It is a Nazi German propaganda! Look what is written there about Polish Campaign or sinking of Bismarck.
Otherwise, I am not sure of accuracy of the text. There are mentioned British pilotless drones in combat use back in late 1944. Never heard of them, but I know that Britain had pilotless aircraft already before the war. The same about captured Polish aircraft with a radar device. This would be just sensational. Also, the text does not mention any samples of British Radar flying control. Apart of defence system, British radars controlled aircraft movements over France, and RAF Squadrons were both warned and directed towards the enemy. I believe this was far superior of German systems of the time.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

According to Aders the first German radar kill was completed by Oblt Ludwig Becker, in a Do 215B-5, on 10 August 1941. The a/c carried a prototype Lichtenstein B/C (FuG 202) radar. This radar was initially not to be produced in quantity, since the FuG 212, the production version of the FuG 202, was supposed to be ready for production in Spring 1942. In fact, through company screw-ups, the set wasn't ready for production until mid-1943, and in fact, the FuG 202 was put into production, and produced until 1944.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

What's the mystery about pilotless drones? A few were sent against the U-boat pens in France, and a few were used in an operation called Noball against V-1 ski sites in France.



Ed

Re: German & Allied radar
 

In fact, Germany did not have technical superiority at any time in the war. This is much like the myth of overwhelming German armoured superiority in the 1940 attack on the west, both in numbers and quality -- neither of which was true. Most of the tanks used by the Germans in that attack were Mk. 1 and Mk. 2 tanks that were only ever to be used for training. Nor did the Germans have numerical or qualitative superiority over the RAF during the Battle of Britain. And, of course, the British also had a complete radar intercept system (something the Germans would not have for another couple of years) in conjunction with its enigma interecepts. In fact, the Germans had lost that battle even before before it began. And, from then on things just went downhill for them.

The night fighter control of the Germans was far more complicated than the comparable British system. One British publication mentioned that this was due to the higher quality of training of British personnel. Their problem was not helped by the fact that their intercept system was basically set up for their Flak, and was not provided with 360 degree scan and PPI scopes for their Freyas which would have reduced the number of radars and personnel needed for interception purposes. But, the Germans bounced back quickly from the disaster of Window in July 1943 with both a new airborne intercept radar and two new types of intercept control. Which ain't bad. Of course, there was no way to recover from the loss of territory beginning in June 1944.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Well, this was so called Operation Aphrodite, hardly a British one. Otherwise it does not fit the description in the thesis.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hello George,


Obviously a tangent for another thread, but I have just finished rereading a 1947 American publication outlining German technical (not numerical) superiority in the air war.



Regards,
Ed

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Undoubtedly an interesting read, Ed. But, you will notice that I defend the notion that any talk of German technical superiority is myth. I contend that we always feel better about ourselves when we can show that we won inspite of the technical superiority of the enemy.

As a simple example, there is always talk about what the great gun the German 88 was, and yet the Brits had a more capable 3.7 gun that they just didn't use in mobile land warfare. And that was where the 88 really made its reputation. First, as a last ditch anti-tank shield in the French (1940) campaign, using emplaced flak batteries of 88s against advancing British tanks (21 May 40, Arras), and then as a part of the mobile forces after that. So, not better technology, but better use of the technology they had.

All the best,
George

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Not forgetting the Pz.Kw. 38(t) which was a Czech tank which they acquired through invading that country. You see a lot of them in the newsreel footage.

By what measures did the Germans not have numerical superiority in the battle of Britain, though? I agree that the Luftwaffe was not as big as the RAF originally thought and that German production didn't keep pace with losses, but still …

I think that you could argue technological superiority in the BoB in a narrow sense. The Ju 88 was probably the best medium bomber around (perhaps because it was the newest?) and the Bf 110 had no British equivalent. As for the rest, the fighters were closely comparable (with pros and cons to all of them) and in an He 111/Wellington/Hampden/Whitley or Do 17/Blenheim comparison — is the difference that marked?

Re: German & Allied radar
 

In my opinion, the two best studies of the 'myth v. reality' versions of the Second World War are ...

'BLOOD, TEARS and FOLLY: An objective look at World War 11' (1993, Jonathan Cape & 1995 Pimlico p/b) by Len Deighton

and

'BLOOD, SWEAT and ARROGANCE and the Myths of Churchill's War' (2006 Weidenfeld & Nicolson) by Gordon Corrigan

Both address the technology clashes and both, especially Deighton, are convincing in their conclusions. Corrigan (a lecturer at Sandhurst) has a bit too much fun with pulling Churchill's tail but both make it plain that it was the British systems INTRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO THE WAR that defeated the German systems which suffered fragmentation after a potentially dominant beginning.

(IMHO) they should be considered essential reading.

Bruce

Re: German & Allied radar
 

I have seen this stated before and if one looks at the respective OoB it is true but the fighting was done over southern England mostly by 11 Group with some help from 10 and 12 Groups vs. Luftflotte 2 and 3, which certainly had a numerical advantage.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hello George,


As I wrote, you could start another thread. I've just read far too many references to buy the word myth. In fact, in my time researching this subject matter, seeing the word myth just spurs me on to look further. My own personal motto is: Look, and if there's nothing to find, you won't find anything. Case in point, last week, a large group of American OSS files were released. I'll be digging through them.



Regards,
Ed

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Except that the British Chain Home radar-based defensive system was being installed before the war — in response to the threat posed by Nazi Germany. Whittle was working on jet engines before the war (as were the Germans, of course). The Spitfire and Hurricane were prewar types and the list goes on.

British work on the cavity magnetron (centimetric radar) was certainly stimulated by the outbreak of war and the Germans never came close. Gyroscopic gunsights - widespread use by the Allies, tentative and belated introduction by the Germans. Nuclear weapons? Programmable electronic computers?

If we are simply speaking about technology (rather than military organisation), in what areas did Germany have a significant lead on 1 September 1939? I would certainly expect Germany to have been more ready for war since national policy was directed toward having one (albeit in the east, not the west) and Allied policy in the 1930s was about trying not to. The Germans were certainly ahead with nerve gas, I'll grant you that. In infantry weapons the MG 42 and the Sturmgewehr 44 were probably ahead of the pack. Blind bombing aids were certainly a case of an initial lead that they lost during the war.

The book to read in my view is Adam Tooze's "The Wages of Destruction" which dispels a lot of myths about German industrial strength.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

I see I chose my words poorly, which is always a mistake when surrounded by people who know what they are talking about.

To clarify:
The systems to which I refer were those methods and means within both the Allied and Axis wartime organisations charged with (A) technical research and development and (B) integrating technical developments into the operational fields where they could produce the most benefit.
The Allies first: The British military and naval hierarchy was as hidebound as any other on earth and squandered many opportunities to use information (and equipment, such as the artillery already mentioned) available in the early part of the war. The intelligence and, for example, rdf resources of Britain at September 1939 were in essence underfunded ‘clubs’ of dedicated and knowledgeable amateurs guided by a few professional serving officers. Neither of these began the war with adequate resources or an organisational structure adequate for the immediate task, yet they both grew from a few people who knew what they were doing into large and ultimately successful organisations, with government support that was only forthcoming once the Munich Crisis made war inevitable. (Yes, I know Bawdsey was set up much earlier but it relied on volunteers and couldn’t afford coal for the hut’s pot-bellied stove)
Both intelligence and scientific research were enormously expensive in materials and tying up the best personnel yet they flourished in wartime and (here is the point) both made the most of the best people available, whether they were civilian, military, naval, Jewish, male, female, ‘unconventional’, foreign or previous political opponents. The main reason for the success of the Allied systems was patronage: Winston Churchill sat on committees that directed the British scientific efforts and he loved the ‘whizz-bang’ notions that were put before him, plus he recognised the need to exploit even modest gains in fighting effectiveness that might be gained. Through Lindeman and Tizzard, and later RV Jones, he had a constant view of the progress made (and also that which was deemed feasible pursue) in the area of technology. The same applied to the vast investment in intelligence technology maintained by the British until the American commitment was secured. Once the Washington Mission had achieved it’s goals of engaging the American scientific establishment in joint r&d ventures, the ‘open forum’ principals were quickly embraced in North America and progress was rapid.
This is quite different from the situation in Germany where political ideals were applied to scientific endeavours, and only contributions from acceptable sources were allowed. Germany entered the war well prepared for the immediate goals associated with a series of short, rapid advances, especially in the field of communication, but no central conduit for intelligence or military use of her scientific strengths. Germany had an incredible advantage in a war of technology, for she had overhauled her educational system to give the sciences and engineering priority two generations earlier. The two factors that stifled the enormous potential of the German scientific community were (1) directives from the top to limit research, and (2) segmentation of the whole process into ‘customer driven’ projects. Typically, a military or naval department would specify what they wanted and a research team would set about producing something to do the job, usually in isolation from other branches of the armed forces. This is in sharp contrast to the British, and later unified Allied, methods of pooling information and encouraging suggestions to be passed around, and the policy of interservice adaptations of basic equipment designs. (It was 1942 before the Kreigsmarine adapted an outmoded Luftwaffe nightfighter radar set for use in S-boote, despite her capital ships having been radar equipped since 1939).
The strengths and weaknesses are well illustrated by looking at the ‘window’ problem. By 1943, when both sides had known of the potential of this simple radar jamming device, but neither had used it, the British moved first. The British Chiefs of Staff, lead by Churchill, decided on June 23rd to use ‘window’. This was done at the direct urging of Dr RV Jones, invited to the meeting expressly to present an informed opinion on the pros and cons of introducing this new countermeasure. Churchill was swayed and gave the order. The result? Paralysis of the German radar system with disruption to both Wurzburg and Lichtenstein sets. Use of window became standard practice and Goering was quoted as saying “ …In the field of radar they [the British] must have the world’s greatest genius. They have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops…” It was November before an effective program to counter ‘window’ was in place.

The system used by the Allies was superior to the system used by the Axis. Therefore, the early advantages of the German Luftwaffe in blind flying and navigation, which were potentially huge, were lost. Likewise, the earlier German work on shorter wavelength radars, and the emphasis on portability that had been evident early on, was overtaken by British researchers because of a more efficient use of the research facilities and the knowledgeable people in them.

Nick, you are right to point out the the development of the cavity magnetron, but it is an excellent example of my theory on the superior Allied system: it stemmed from research funded since 1938 by the Admiralty to exploit microwave technology on behalf of all three services: there was no equivalent German interservice research project that I am aware of.



Bruce

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Referring to the late 1930s:

"German radar was concentrated for the moment in two companies, GEMA and Telefunken, each with a basic design. GEMA had two bands, 80 cm for Seetakt and 2.4 m for Freya. Telefunken used 50 cm for the Wurzburg and the decimeter communication relays.

When the Luftwaffe became an independent arm of the Wehrmacht it obtained from the Army the AA artillery. Initially, it did not have an organization to evaluate new weapons other than aircraft, so it relied on an army agency, the Heereswaffenamt (Ordnance Department) for judgement about its AA guns and, when the matter arose, for radar. This office arbitrarily classified the early sets into three types. For various reasons they referred to GEMA's Freya as A-1, to Lorenz's Kufurst as A-2 and Telefunken's Wurzburg as A-3. Initially this coincided with A-1 for early warning, A-2 for searchlight direction and gun laying and A-3 for local observation and tracking respectively.

As the importance of radar became more obvious. Goring wanted it added to his beureacratic empire and had it moved from the Heereswaffenamt to the Reichsluftfahrtsministerium...

It is scarcely necessary to point out to the reader the parallels in American and German work. The earliest work started in service radio laboratories with heavy emphasis on microwaves. Both dropped these wavelengths in their prototypes for want of transmitter power, although retaining some research. This resulted in excellent meter-wave equipment: XAF/CXAM for the US Navy, SCR-270 for the US Army, Freya for the Luftwaffe and Seetakt for the Kriegsmarine. The approach to decimeter waves by Bell Telephone Labs is remarkably similar to the path followed by Telefunken and probably came about because both had tube laboratories. The Bell FD/mark 4 was the equal of the Wurzburg, indeed its design cousin; it was with modification the US Navy's AA gun-laying radar throughout the war. The Wurzburg was a better gun-laying set than the SCR-268, and the American equivalent, FD/mark 4, was used only by the Navy. On the other hand the SCR-268 functioned also for distant target acquisition, which the Wurzburg did not. The Germans were generally about a year ahead of the Americans.

In 1939 the German and American prototypes were superior to the British except for CD/CHL, which was a typical dipole array on 1.5 m. Neither Germany or the United States had a significant number of operational sets in 1939..."


Please pardon the lack of umlauts. Excerpted from A Radar History of World War II by Louis Brown, published by the Institute of Physics Publishing, Bristol and Philadelphia.



Ed

MG 42, St.gw. 44
 

- I think you're aware that these weapons didn't exist 1939, not even 1940 and that the number (42 or 44) refers to the year in which they were first introduced (I think). Mind you, I am certainly not an expert!

The MG 42 was, and still is, a remarkable light infantry machine-gun with the standard German calibre of 7,92 mm (which certainly was changed in other countries after WW II). All other usual light machine-guns (French, British, etc.) had a rate of fire of 1,200 rounds per minute (20 per second) which probably was determined by some physical or technical factor, for otherwise various countries would have had various rates of fire. The Soviet ShKAS (7,62 mm), though, designed for aircraft, had a rof of 1,800. The MG 42's rof was 1,500 (25 per second), which was a sensation for infantry weapons at the time and made it very effective. It had been specially designed for simple production, replacing all machining of parts (cutting, drilling...), if possible, with stamped steel-sheet parts. Their production is much more simple and cheap. Of course not the barrel and the mechanical parts (breech etc.). After WW II the MG 42 was copied virtually all over the world. Even today we can often see the typical muzzle and barrel radiator of the MG 42 on TV pictures from Iraq, Afghanistan etc. Ex-Wehrmacht MG 42s were still being used for a very long time after WW II in all countries where Wehrmacht units were stationed.

I understand the Sturmgewehr 44 was the result of complaints by German soldiers having to perform the actual, very hard fighting against the Red Army, that the "Rotarmisten", the red soldiers, were equipped with assault rifles whereas they had to contend with their old carbines etc. I think it was a good weapon but came somewhat too late. The Soviet Kalashnikov was almost ready for WW II but not quite.

It has to be noted that most Soviet weapons, if not (almost) all of them, were better than their German counterparts, probably with the exception of the universal 88. The Soviet infantry sub-machine-gun was far better and much more reliable than the German one, which didn't take kindly to mud etc., and German soldiers always tried to lay their hands on one. The standard Soviet Army gun, the 76,2 mm field gun, was far better than anything the German army had got. Its shell had supersonic velocity, so that the German "Landser" (soldiers) at the receiving end heard its explosion first, then the firing noise and called this gun "Ratschbumm" (pronounce "Ratshboom"), a nickname emulating both noises which followed one another. The German 37 mm antitank-gun was useless against French and Soviet tanks (not against infantry, trucks, buildings etc.), so that the angry German gunners called it "Heeresanklopfgerät", "Army Device for Knocking at Doors" - so harmless it was against armour. The "Heer" (Army) was compelled to have a better antitank-gun designed and produced (47 or 50 mm I think) for the very heavy and very expensive 88 couldn't be everywhere. When the Red Army engaged T-34 tanks already 1941 - and they were almost perfect - German soldiers were horrified, sometimes in despair. Nothing seemed to be able to stop these monsters except the 88 and gallant individual attacks by isolated infantrymen with explosives, mines etc. Only very poor Soviet strategy and tactics saved the Germans already 1941 (not unlike what happened in France 1940, the French having superior weapons, in particular tanks, and the Germans (generals) being much more clever).

Hitler and Göring made a mistake when considering the Russians "illiterates".

All right, I am leaving the field of airpower - sorry! But as you know "even" the USSR had got quite a few good combat AC types. Too bad they served mainly Stalin and the other blood-thirsty lunatics.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Grozibou, you are dead-on correct, especially about the MG 42. It is probably still the best in the world. Our M60 and successors are not even close in terms of usability and effectiveness.

I have asked people why the US did not adopt a clone of the 42 and the answer always is that they, espcially, the Springfield Armory, did not like the stamped metal and thought it was cheap. the result was to continue to use machined (albiet beautiful) parts in weapons that were not that effective or useable and in the case of our M16 had all sorts of problems, even today. I guess us taxpayers have to suffer the egos of Army types and government bureacrats who don't want to admit that something "foreign" is better. too bad.

Re: MG 42, St.gw. 44
 

Yes, I was trying to say that with these weapons the Germans were setting trends for the post-war era as you have written.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

John
this is off topic but IIRC USA copied and tested MG 42 for possible adaption for the Army but there happened or "happened" a small error when they converted from mm to inch metering in the chamber and as a result the test weapon suffered badly on stoppages. So the idea was dumpped. Again IIRC the designers of M60 borrowed some features from MG 42 and some others from FG 42.

Juha

Re: German & Allied radar
 

This part is not particularly true. I am not sure about the US radar deployement (obviously there wasn't much a threat either), but German radar was deployed and working at the start of the war. Freya's development and deployement went exactly parellel to the CH system, only that Freya was a much superior system, both in resolution and because it covered a much greater area, as it could be rotated 360 degrees. At the start of the war, there were 20 or so Freya sets available, the first wartime interception being made sometime in 1939 against RAF bombers attacking Kriegsmarine targets. At the same time CH consisted of a similiar number of sets, but they had some major limitations, most notable their large 'blind zone' at low altitudes, and the fact that they could only search the area they were facing, ie. the sea, and the whole 'radar coverage' went totally nil and blind asa enemy aircraft passed the radar towers, as they couldn't rotate. Effectively, the whole CH system offered little more than early warning, other than that the British interceptions relied on human observers and telephone wires over England, just like any other country. AFAIK Würzburg was just begun to be deployed in 1939, and some 200 were produced by 1940, if my memory serves me right and if Ian Hogg`s information is correct. Of course, Britain's unique geographical position was a great advantage for building out an early warning radar system, even with primitive radar sets, because of the ease of radar detection over sea.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hello Ed, I read your extract from ‘A Radar History of World War II’ and have a problem with accepting the conclusion stated without some qualification. I find the parallels described in the quote from ‘A Radar History of World War II’ surprising. In 1939 America had nothing comparable to the various German sets. These were operational at the same time as the American sets which were, at best, undergoing operational testing. Much as Kurfürst has already said, one party was at war and the other wasn’t. If one looks ahead, there was no superiority (or parity for that matter) of US equipment until later with the introduction of the 10cm sets.

Choosing a date is important if the intention is to compare progress, and as far as American progress in radar development goes, the most significant point in time is more to do with funding and patronage than with a single technical breakthrough. In the spring of 1941, funding was agreed, from official as well as private sources, for MIT to continue the Radiation Laboratory work on 10cm equipment suitable for mass production. By autumn, military reticence was fading and orders for operational, not experimental, sets for ground, sea and air service were realistically expected. The source of future funding now shifted from ‘discrete sources’ (the White House under-the-counter budget) to Congress. The vast manufacturing facilities of the US could now be applied to radar, enabling equipment to be installed on aircraft production lines instead of by specialist technicians after acceptance at squadron level. (This is a slightly oversimplified version as there were other factors, but this was where the main savings in aircraft installations were to be found) Even though they hadn’t yet materialised, making it possible to accept Lend-Lease orders for radar equipment was part of FDR’s plan to prepare America for war and this meant appointing a supremo to oversee all of America’s war-related research and development. The man who took on this role was Vannevar Bush, chairman of the National Defence Research Committee (NDRC) since it was formed in June 1940. Virtually every American radar research project with military applications lived or died on his word of approval, and he was the right person for the job.

The unification and monitoring of the industry under the NDRC brought an efficiency and focus to the separate endeavours of the R & D labs around the USA. One of the first tasks of the NDRC was to conduct a survey of Army and Navy research activities and evaluate where the strengths and weaknesses lay. Most importantly, he ensured that the pure gold delivered by the British Technical and Scientific Mission (commonly known as the Tizard Mission) of August/September 1940 was put to best use, for example by preventing duplication of effort and also pairing up separate investigations that had common elements. Both the US and Britain had independently developed systems, CXAM and CHL, almost identical to each other and each completely unaware of the other. The US had better receivers, the British had airborne radar and IFF, but the star of the show was the cavity magnetron, which produced power approximately 1000 times greater than the best vacuum tube available at the time for use on US 10cm radar devices. Bell Labs, MIT and Stanford University had all been conducting advanced research on microwaves and they were able to immediately take on board the British data. The cavity magnetron was now out of the hands of the hard-pressed British labs and was eagerly adapted by a well directed organisation dedicated to finding as many uses as possible for this new wonder.

When war came to America, the many different universities, corporate labs and independent scientists were already gelled into a network of unparalleled potential. By 1942 mass produced Allied radar components were a fact of life and their superior characteristics were the result of the joining of forces of the British and American products.

Bruce

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Thanks Bruce for an excellent summary of the technical situation.
I think where the British had the beating of the Germans in the field, was in the command and control system, because we were definitely behind technically until the 10cm magnetron was developed. The command and control system used the CH and other reports intelligently and was able to put the fighters where they were needed, with some exceptions. The Germans of course were far too regimental and did not really get their act together until Kammhuber got organised.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

The difference being that CH was part of a fully integrated warning, command and control system. And it worked when it was needed.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Kurfürst
I you had read carefully Ed's message You had noticed that Ed wrote on CD/CHL not on CH, and CHL had rotaring antenna so it had 360 deg scanning ability.

Juha

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hello Peter,
For reference, the RAF set up the worlds first Filtering Room at Bawdsey Manor in August 1937: it was initially an experiment, but it's value was soon recognised and it continued in use at Bawdsey until moving to Bentley Priory in 1938, by which time there were five CH stations on 24 hour duty.

Bruce

Re: German & Allied radar
 

These Chain Home Low stations consisted of two separate aerial arrays, one of the transmitter and one for the receiver, mounted on 20 foot high wooden gantries, with the equipment housed in a hut undeneath each gantry. Since C.H.L. operated on a wavelength of 1.5 metres the aerials were short enough that the arrays could be rotated, which was done by hand. It was not until well after the Battle of Britain that power turned, single arrays (which combined transmitting and receiving) were introduced.

The performance of C.H.L. can be seen from the following data from 1940:
Aircraft Height / Detection Range
25 - 30 miles
1,000 feet - 40 miles
2,000 feet - 50 miles
4,000 feet - 55 - 60 miles
15,000 feet - 107 miles

http://www.skylighters.org/radar/index.html

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hello Kutscha
on CHL, it is better say that in 1940 rotation was done manually, look for ex.
http://www.radarpages.co.uk/mob/chl/chl1.htm

Juha

Re: German & Allied radar
 

That is what 'which was done by hand' means, as in hand cranked.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Hello Kutscha
read a bit further, I'm cycling myself and I know that the feet do most of the work in that and as the quote says on results "her bulging calf muscles..."

Juha

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Juha it is an idiom:

by hand - by using the hands; manually

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Just shows how us useless Brits got by with improvisation and lashups, not waiting for all the bells and whistles.
I cannot count how many PRACTICE interceptions I did under Bawdsey control (in the 50's). We even had a visit to the place to have it all explained to us.
So glad I was too young to do my time in the 40's.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Yes, German radar was deployed and working at the start of the war, but not in any numbers, and not under central control. And, yes, the Freya could be rotated 360 degrees, but it needed to be done manually just like the CHL units. And, PPI scopes and machine driven rotation didn't come until 1944.

All in all, the British were better prepared for a defensive campaign than the Germans in 1939-40. It has often been said that this was because the Germans, during this period, saw themselves to be on the offensive, so why should they prepare for a defensive campaign that they felt would not develop.

Re: German & Allied radar
 

More info about German radar:


http://www.cdvandt.org/jagdschloss.htm



Ed

Re: German & Allied radar
 

Thank you, Ed, for the manual on the Jagdschloss (FuMG 404). It was probably the first production German EW radar with motorized 360 degree sweep. Unfortunately, its production began only in late 1943. It had a max. range of 80-200km depending on target altitude, and 80 were built in two frequency ranges.