Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Has anyone come across a document which:

- Explains why the attack on London 10-11 May 1941, exactly a year after the attack in the west, was chosen on this date and was so heavy?
- Explains why after 11 May 41, targets were then mainly airfields/nuisance raids, then coastal and shipping targets (Bismarck breakout coincides with this) with the occasional attacks on cities?

Was it simply that Barbarossa was approaching, the tactic was failing or what?

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

I just reviewed KTB/OKW from 1 May to 20 May 1941 and found no mention of any conscious decision to make the London raid of 10/11 May the last one on that target (600 aircraft, 12 lost the entry says). But the raids for the 10 days prior to that and the ten days following were clearly on other targets in the U.K. (unless I missed one). The daily entries are mostly about "Marita", the forthcoming mission to Iraq, getting Vichy approval to transit Syria, "Merkur" planning, AOK 12's boast of having "342 Offiziere, 10 340 Mann Engländer gefangen" as of 13 May. On 19 May under the sub-heading "Westen", the entry reads, "Geringe Tätigkeit der eigenen Luftwaffe wegen Erholung." Now one doesn't have to read too hard between the lines to imagine that all this "resting and refitting" in the West may be related to the impending movement of the Luftwaffe's big bomber fleet to the East for "Barbarossa". So the documents you seek may be in the Luftwaffe Annex of the "Barbarossa" planning documents. There it would give a specific date for the termination of large-scale raids on the U.K. so the bomber fleet could be prepared for the transfer. I remember these planning documents from my research many years ago and they do include milestones and termination dates like that.

Larry

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Larry: Interesting. For starters, I have just looked at Jun 41 from Luftflotte 3's perspective. For example, 1-2 Jun Manchester was the target (with diversion of Bristol) and involved I/KG 55, I/KG 54, III/KG 27, III/KG 26, KGr 806, II/KG 53, I/KG 28 and II/KG 1 but Brighton, Plymouth, Liverpool, Penzance & Falmouth were also attacked by those that failed to find the target. Similar for 4-5 Jun (Birmingham) with 9 other locations being bombed. Then 6-7 Jun was shipping, 11-12 shipping but also Birmingham with bombs being dropped at 7 other locations. Then 13-14 Jun London, 14-15 Jun was Filton, 16-17 Jun Gloucester, 18-19 & 19-20 shipping and finally 21-22 Jun was Southampton

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

To reinforce my point, Luftflotte 3 alone tasked 291 bombers in the first wave and 71 in the second wave to attack London on the night 10-11 May 41 then Luftflotte 2 & 3 tasked 241 aircraft the following night to attack airfields all over England

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

I think you will find both events were a consequence of the planned arrival in Scotland of Hess on May 10, 1941.
The result of his arrival was a secret type of armistice between Churchill and Hitler mediated by the Hamilton and Haushofer groups.
The armistice involved:
- the changes to GAF targeting that you detail
- reduced number of RAF raids on Germany with cessation of attacks on civilians not resumed until after Stalingrad
- cancellation of FDR's speech on May 12, 1941 and its replacement on May 27 by a virtual declaration of war on Germany.

I recommend you read 'Double Standards' by Lyn Picknett, Clive Prince and Stephen Prior. They concluded;
“It seems that in the aftermath of of Hess' arrival, Churchill played a cunning game by fostering Hitler's belief that his Deputy's proposals were being seriously considered. The reduction of British air raids on Germany might have been, like the German cessation of the Blitz, a gesture of 'good faith'. This ensured that the Fuehrer felt able to concentrate on the USSR in the belief that Britain would no longer be a problem”.
This was also how the Russians understood it. The Soviet judges at Nuremberg argued that Hess's mission had been 'undertaken in the hope of facilitating the aggression against the USSR by temporarily restraining England from fighting'. This seems to be referring to ..... what actually happened” - not to the aims of the mission which was for Britain to make peace with Germany and adopt benevolent neutrality (wohlvolende Neutralität) while Germany defeated Russia.

By the way, Hess arrived without a copy of the peace document – it may have been burnt in his Me-110. According to 'Double Standards', the bulky peace document in German and English versions was personally handed over to an RAF officer by Heinrich Schmitt, who flew a Do-217 from Aalborg to land at Scampton on May 20, 1941. Schmitt later defected in a Ju-88 fitted with the latest radar. In the 1970s, Schmitt said in an interview that the 1941 flight was an official LW mission, adding; “It was all part of the grey war that existed at the time. I wasn't the only German pilot to land, by arrangement, in Britain, and several British pilots made landings in Germany which were known to the people who mattered. It was well known that Hitler was prepared to pay a high price to make peace with Britain, and the secret flights only ended when we attacked Russia, and Britain and Russia became allies”.

Tony

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

I also recommend you read The Holy Blood and The Holy Grail, the truth behind the faked US landings on the moon, those books which describe that Jesus did not die on the cross, that Hitler knew nothing about the concentration camps and escaped to Brazil after the war to raise an army of clones. Oh, and there is a Lancaster on the moon.

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Page 510 of 'Double Standards';
"In chapter 15 we saw that when the Foreign Office finally released its files relating to Hess's flight in 1992, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd kept one back on the grounds that it contained 'records which still pose a risk to national security', and we asked what risk a fifty-year-old file could possibly pose to modern Britain. Since the first edition, we have been informed by a senior Foreign Office source with access to this file what really lies behind Hurd's curious statement. The 'file' is in fact a box of several individual files, each of which contains a single sheet of paper stating that the contents have been transferred 'on permanent loan' to the Royal Archives in Windsor Castle.
Obviously we have not been able to verify this for ourselves, but if true it has enormous implications. Unlike government records, the release of material in the Royal Archives at Windsor is not covered by Public Records legislation, but can be made public only on the personal instructions of the Queen. What better way to keep compromising information out of the public domain, and to prevent any future government from releasing it?..........
Our informant also tells us that the documents missing from the Foreign Office files are kept in a special section of the Windsor Archives, together with other docments relating to the activities of the Royal Family during WWII, such as the letters retrieved from Germany by Anthony Blunt in 1945. These include letters written by the Dukes of Windsor and Kent .... to Hess, Goering and von Papen, and their replies, together with letters to the Dukes from Hitler, written on his gold-embossed notepaper - and even Christmas greetings from him!.
We have no way of verifying what our informant told us because the other source of information, the Foreign Office files, are also resolutely closed to the public. The very existence of such carefully cultivated black holes for compromising material is nothing less than a scandal in today's allegedly open and democratic society. Those in power who pour scorn on 'conspiracy theories' have a very simple means at their disposal for killing them off for good; open the files...."

Gradually the effects of Picknett's books (including 'Friendly Fire' and 'War of the Windsors') seem to be having a small but noticeable effect on the 'reputable' historians. A case in point is Sir Max Hastings' new book on Churchill being serialised in the Daily Mail. Yesterday he wrote this about Churchill-FDR relations;
"The key to understanding it is to strip aside the rhetoric of the two leaders and acknowledge that it rested, as relations between states always do, upon perceptions of national interest.

As for the individual personalities involved, there was some genuine sentiment on Churchill's side, but none on Roosevelt's.

The U.S. President had always viewed himself as the senior partner. He paid scant attention to British claims that for years before the U.S. joined the war Britain had played the nobler part, pouring forth blood and enduring bombardment in a lone struggle for freedom.

He paid only lip service to the collective gratitude owed by the democracies to Britain for single-handedly standing up to Hitler.

Churchill liked to assert that, far from owing a huge cash debt to the U.S. when the war was over, Britain should be recognised as a creditor for its lone defence of freedom in 1940-41. This was never plausible.

Polls showed that most Americans - 70 per cent - were implacable in their belief that at the end of the war the British should repay the billions they had received from the U.S. in Lend-Lease supplies. They stuck to the notion that Britain was a wealthy nation. They failed to grasp the extent of her financial exhaustion.

In fact, Roosevelt felt scant sympathy for his transatlantic ally. He had visited Britain several times as a young man, but never revealed much liking for the country."


Tony

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

No. I do not recommend those.

Tony

Re: Change in Bombing Priorities 1941
 

"Obviously we have not been able to verify this for ourselves, but if true it has enormous implications" That says it all really, "we have no actual evidence, but imagine if we had ..."

Also, the second half of what Tony quotes only has a tenuous relationship to the first bit. Whilst it's true that the British Establishment is always concerned to protect the symbolism of the Monarchy, the idea that any Nazi sympathies on the part of any one member of the Royal Family would have been allowed to influence the conduct of the war is laughable. Time and again throughout British history, a group of powerful figures has got together to choose and install the next monarch and that very process suggests that its the idea of the monarchy that is important to them, not reverence for the individual selected or his/her opinions.

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Regarding these German bombers landing in the UK a few years ago I read somewhere that on 14/15th.Feb.1941 a He111 landed at RAF Debden. It apparantly taxied over to the Control/Watch tower and quickly took-off again. the article also claimed a German bomber landed at Feltwell the same night. Has this story ever been comfirmed. As far as I knew apart from the Dyce defection and the late war ones most of the other landings were navigation errors by Bf109's and Fw190's.

Re: Change in Bombing Priorities 1941
 

Nick, the fact is that the Hess files are closed, and that egregiousness makes the subject interesting.
No one should accept the fact of the files remaining closed, and certainly not Sir Max Hastings, who when he was being knighted could have said; "Your Majesty, about the Hess files. The integrity of WWII historiography requires they be open to historians. As your trusty servant, may I please have your permission to drive over to Windsor to examine them and report their contents to your subjects."

However, Chris has got an answer of sorts, so mission is accomplished. For that is what most people want from this site - help with ideas and references. I was well satisfied with the results of raising the subject of the Roer Dams and Rhine bridges.

Anyone interested about the unresolved issue of Hess can read 'Double Standards' and make up his/her own mind. I thoroughly recommend it. The book is apparently well-researched, and its conclusions are explosive.

Tony

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Tony: In all honesty it does not answer my question. Following 10-11 May attack on London, other attacks do occur (11-12 May airfields; 12-13, 13-14, 15-16 coastal targets; 16-17 Birmingham; 17-18, 18-19, 19-20 coastal) before (reduced) city attacks recommence in June. Could it be that coasatl/shipping attacks were simply in advance of and in support of the escape of the capital ships and the general reduction in response to the mass movement of yet more bomber Geschwadern to the east/Balkans and Mediterranean?

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Hello Chris.

Maybe there is nothing special about this date (10-11 may 41)?

To thwart the inflation of the night missions of the LW, RAF Command created the "Fighter night" (march 41). It consisted to make a grid (over London) of flights separated of 300 meters from east to west and 200 meters higher other flights from north to south. For the RAF the "Fighter night" were considered as offensive missions.

During the 2 days before and the 2 days after the full moon (as 10-11 may 41), some Fighter squadrons had their Hurricane painted with a black semi mat washable painting (type DTD 441), before to participate to these "Fighter night".

with a good weather and a full moon, the meeting between RAF and LW was effective.

For the 16 april, another massive attack (+ 600 bombers) against London, there was no meeting, because no "Fighter night".

Thank you.

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Hi Chris
Not specific, but if my memory serves me right, in the World at War, Adolf Galland says that Hitler told him and his assembled Luftwaffe officers that there would be a final heavy air raid to distract attention away from German preparations re. Barbarossa.
Incidentally, re. 'secret files': now we all know authorities can be trusted as far as they can be (over)thrown, but I've often heard the rumours about empty box files with a note in saying 'documents transferred/removed' etc. If authorities really wanted to cover up something, surely they'd replace the papers with fakes or simply just steal/destroy/chuck the whole file away?
Austin

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Chris, maybe, but the Germans were worried by carriers and not land-based aircraft, and the carriers were beyond the GAF's reach.
Hitler had the Taranto raid in mind, and was worried about an attack on Bismarck by carrier-based torpedo planes. He told his naval aide that he had foreseen the torpedoing of Gneisenau at Brest.
Hitler visited Bismarck on May 5, and was dismayed to hear Luetjens point out that though Bismarck need fear no other capital ship, there was a threat from enemy carriers and their torpedo planes.
However, before May 20 when the Admiralty received evidence from the Swedes that Bismarck was in the Kattegat, BP detected increased LW activity pointing to a major naval operation.
I do not know how BP made that connection.
This and the thought on the Hess connection represent the sum of my knowledge on this subject.

But while I have you on, so to speak, I have just consulted your book, 'Luftwaffe Hit-and-Run Raiders', to see if there is anything to be added to the following extracts from my book on the battles of Kervenheim and Winnekendonk. Specifically do you have any information about the identity of the pilot who shot up the Kervenheim road on the night of March 1/2 and the pilot who dropped the bomb on the Winnekendonk cross-roads on the night of March 2/3. Also, do you know if these pilots were operating out of Germersheim, Bonn-Hangelar, Twente or Zwolle? And do you have any observation to make about these two attacks? The one on Winnekendonk almost obliterated 2 Lincolns' Battalion HQ, and was an extraordinary piece of flying.
I have identified the places in the attached Google-Earth map.

Kervenheim, March 1, 1945
At last light the Germans supported by 50 howitzers were holding Kervenheim strongly, especially Müsershof, Rittergut and the cemetery. Their departure as they slipped away during the night was not noticed by the extensive patrolling of the Warwicks, nor did a unit from 53 Division realise that Weeze was emptying. Two Warwick patrols, which must have gone out early in the evening before the Germans disengaged, reported that both Oberfeldshof and Müsershof were occupied by the enemy at 5.45 am. But one hour later, the G Ops log records that returning patrols had found the Germans gone from there and from Müsershof. It had been reduced to a burnt-out ruin containing the charred corpses of five German soldiers. Oberfeldshof was also empty and the patrol heard motor transport in the area. The Germans had slipped away just before first light rather than earlier, ensuring that the British focused on their set-piece attack to give the Germans several hours’ grace before the advance could be continued. Likewise Weeze was found to be very quiet with all its bridges blown.
While the Germans were preparing to leave, at 2 am (March 2) a German aircraft machine-gunned transport on the track running from the Üdem-Weeze road towards Kervenheim, alongside the wood where RW Thompson and the Norfolks had spent their long wait. This could have been a deliberate attempt to create a diversion. The Duty Officer of 185 Brigade was convinced it was a German aircraft and informed G Ops 3 Division who checked with Corps. They replied that it was definitely enemy action. A discussion then took place between Division and Brigade about dispersing vehicles when possible, but with their air superiority unchallenged the allies had long before decided to ignore the Luftwaffe..................

Winnekendonk, March 2, 1945
George Wall of 2 Lincolns recounted what happened after dark in Winnekendonk;
'During my advance I had been joined by another soldier from where I don't know. Anyway, he stayed with me until I asked 'Mousy' from Bermuda if I could help him as he had been shot through the leg. I asked if he wanted my first aid. He replied: "You had better get down or you'll be shot". By then I had swapped my rifle for a Bren gun. It was whilst talking to 'Mousy' my Bermuda friend that I saw the KOSB putting in their attack with the bagpipes playing. I made my way into the white house, to be confronted by an officer. Seeing I had a Bren gun, he shouted: "Hey you, cover that window with your gun, there will be a counter-attack any minute". I took up my position looking into the yard where three British soldiers lay dead. One was a blond youth of about 18 years old. I remember him well by his blond hair. He was always asking us when we would be having a go at the Germans - and there he was a few weeks later laying dead on German soil.
Whilst all this was taking place I was peering out into the yard all night. I was told the Germans might send bombers over to bomb the village. I didn't believe that - not their own village. Just after midnight I heard the drone of a single engine plane go over the village. He made a pass then came back. I heard a plonk! never giving thought that it would be a delayed bomb. It dropped right on or near the crossroads about 50 to 100 yds from the white house. There was a terrific explosion. I should imagine the pilot intended to drop it in the field. We were told the next day, had it not been on clay soil it would have collapsed the house we were in. Come daylight we were stood down. There was still spasmodic firing - I handed over my Bren gun to a white house Sgt who pointed out there were only seven rounds in the three magazines. Terrible wasn't it?”
The German attack was by a FW 190 G of NSG 20 dropping an SC 1,000 Kg general purpose bomb. The Luftwaffenkommando West War Diary contains the following on the raid: "40 Fw 190 (NSG 20). Attack on enemy concentration in Goch-Üdem area. On the target: 38 aircraft from 1845-0043 at 1800-700 m. Explosions and several fires observed. After discharging bombs, road traffic shot up without any special results being observed."
Nachtschlachtgruppe 20 was commanded by Maj Kurt Dahlmann, who had received the Knights Cross as commander of I/Schnell-KG 10 on June 27, 1944, and Oak leaves on January 24, 1945. The aircraft were based 300km from Winnekendonk at Germersheim, where they had been since January 1945, or they had just moved to Twente or Zwolle in the Netherlands at a distance of only 100 km.”

Tony

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Tony: I am afraid that all the information I have is included in my book and I cannot add anything more

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Like you, all I have is that during the night of 1/2 March, NSG 20 sent 40 Fw 190s against concentrations in the Goch - Udem area, two breaking off with technical problems. Explosions and several fires observed. After dropping their bombs they shot up road traffic without observing the results. 23 sorties were flown by NSG 20 against targets west of Cologne.

It looks like aircraft were out practically from dusk to dawn. AFAIK at this period all these operations would have been from Twente. I don't recall that Germerheim was ever an operational base. NSG 20 went from Bonn-Hangelar to Limburg on or about 11 January. A detachment of 8 Fw 190s stayed at Bonn until the 23rd. The transfer of the entire Gruppe to Twente was in progress on the 27th and completed by the 30 January but for a Restkommando of 13 aircraft.

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Thank you both.
Sorry to impinge on Chris' thread; I will start a new one.

Tony.

Re: Change in Bombing Priorites 1941
 

Perhaps an irrelevant point, but regarding Germerheim (Germersheim), I have two citations for it in our history of NSGr. 20:

NSGr. 20
11 November: transferred to Germersheim to support Heeresgruppe G along the upper Rhine area but thick fog prevented operations.
----------------
13 January: transferred from Limburg-Linter to Germersheim for assignment to II. Jagdkorps, then returned to Bonn-Hangelar on 27 January.

Sources:
(1) ULTRA signals HP7399, BT521, BT930, BT1264, BT2025, BT2074, BT3777, KO2010.
(1) Schwendtmayer flight log.
(3) Möller, Christian. Die Einsätze der Nachtschlachtgruppen 1, 2 und 20 an der Westfront von September 1944 bis Mai 1945 – Mit einem Überblick über Entstehung und Einsatz der Störkampf- und Nachtschlachtgruppen der deutschen Luftwaffe von 1942 bis 1944. Aachen: Helios Verlag- und Buchvertriebsgesellschaft, 2008. ISBN: 978-3-938208-67-0.

So Germersheim did see some use by NSGr. 20 but not at the time of the attack under discussion, as Nick pointed out.