Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hello One & All,

I recently bit the bullet and have started to go through the ULTRA decrypts in the DEFE 3 series from the PRO.

For the record, being in New Zealand, this has meant ordering duplicates of the relevent microfilms. As a sampler, I obtained DEFE 3/517-518, which covers 15th-20th March 1945 (6 days) at a cost of GBP55 plus postage. It took just under a month from payment to receive the duplicate and the British National Archives website and ordering system is first class. Obviously, obtaining duplicates for a wider time frame will be very expensive (but, still cheaper than hiring a researcher to combe through the material).

Allied with further material at the PRO on Luftwaffe W/T radio traffic, it has been possible to build up a good picture of operations (specifically, Nachtjagd operations Jan-Apr 1945).

Anyway, for those with vastly more experience of this material, I do have a couple of questions:

1. A straight abbreviation of "ARC" is often used. Does anyone know what it means?

2. Keywords are often repeated (i.e. "Rheine & Rheine"). Does any know the reason for this other than to add clarity.

3. From what I have seen, it appears that the decrypts are not reproduced verbatim (in decoded form). Therefore, I get the impression that some information may have been left out at the discretion of the intelligence staff. Is this a fair assumption and, out of interest, do the original (full) decrypts still exist?

Cheers

RodM

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi RodM,
I cannot answer any of your questions, but this may ad to solving some of the puzzle:
Names and callsigns for Luftwaffe JK and JD control centers (Gefechtsstände):
http://www.gyges.dk/Luftwaffe%20comm...facilities.htm
you will see some blanks. I would be grateful if you, based on your material, could help fill these.

Operational brevity code used for radio traffic by Luftwaffe nightfighters and control centers:
http://www.gyges.dk/Operational%20brevity%20code.htm

Command and control arrangement for II JK spring 1945:
http://www.gyges.dk/II%20JK%20spring%201945.htm

bregds
SES
www.gyges.dk

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

1. ARC=airfield regionel command/Flughafenbereich.
2. It is for clarity. This method is still in use in radiocommunication today!
3. Yes they are not translated directly, but nothing important was left out, as these were used by those "who needs to know", and who had to make decisions based on what was picked up by Ultra!!

Junker

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

I've been using Ultra since about 1990 (unlike you I'm only 300 km from London). Like you say, there's rather a lot of material...

ARC isn't the only abbreviation you'll find. Another is "Able Oboe" = AO = Air Officer in Command = Kommandierender General. "Nan Sugar" for Nachtschlachtgruppe, "Jig Dog" for Jagddivision and so on.



Signals weren't verbatim translations of the original, they are described as "reports to Allied commands". Partly this is for security - if the enemy suspects you have re-broadcast his exact message, it gives him a possible break into your own code. Some Ultras have lines from popular songs inserted into the text for added security.



Also, German code names were substituted by British ones. You need to find the message with the fist mention to find out what the German name was. "Einhorn" became "Salter" for instance.



Another reason was that the originals would be unintelligible to anyone but an expert. The originals are supposed to have been burned in 1946 (see the Channel 4 documentary "Station X" if you can get the video).

BUT in series HW1 are files with a daily selection of Ultras (maybe 4 or 5 a day) that were brought to Churchill's attention. These contain the verbatim translation and the signal as issued to Allied commands. You quickly find that there were codes within codes: GAMOZ and GEKOZ were Luftwaffe command echelons (I forget which) for instance.
Finally: I'd recommend "Enigma" by Sebastian Sebag-Montefiore. It's mostly about naval Ultra but it does explain a lot about how the system worked.

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Thank you SES, Junker and Nick for your replies.


Firstly, SES, the reports that I have so far looked at in detail for night-to-night information on Nachtjagd operations don't really give any information on the ground control structure in use. Mention is made of beacons used and the number and type of transmissions jammed. The rest of the information concerns the movement in the air of night fighters and how the controllers reacted to the raids (ref: Air Ministry W/T Intelligence Service Daily Summaries (AIR 22/503) / Bomber Command: Signals Intelligence & RCM Reports (AIR 40/2370) / Bomber Command Interception Tactics Reports (AIR 14/3745)).

I do have an Operational Research Section Report - "Benito" and "Egon" German route tracking and R.C.M (AIR 20/1654) - it reports on German efforts to gain better tactical information from signals intelligence and efforts at jamming Oboe. Having seen your site, I don't believe the report has anything to add as, it should be remembered, the Air Ministry intelligence service was really making educated "guesses", sometimes with limited information. For example, one theory in the report concerns Luftwaffe efforts to deduce the path of the bomber stream by analysing the patterns of the high and low Mosquito intruders. I will provide some specific detail from the report in a further post below...

There are other potentially interesting reports at the PRO but I haven't got around to ordering them yet.

Junker and Nick, thank you for your explanations.

One reason why the "ARC" abbreviation stood out was because, in the 25 Nachtjagd messages extracted from the six-day period concerned, it was the only abbreviation NOT given in the phonetic alphabet.

I must say that the ULTRA material is a perfect example of a "follow the bread crumbs" senario, especially with one signal leading to reference to another signal - I can see the "hunt" becoming very addictive (and expensive!)...

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi Rod,
Glad we got in touch. Are controller callsigns specifically mentioned or do they use "the controller at such and such a division"?

bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

For SES, extracts from Air Ministry Report:


Air Scientific Intelligence - Report No. 83 - Recent Developments in German Route Tracking and RCM (dated 26.3.45)

Since report No. 73 (July 1944) new developments highlighted -

1. formation of specialist RCM unit
2. spread of route tracking to GCI stations
3. use of listening recivers for guiding long-range radars

It notes that the function of the RCM unit is largely deployed in the problem of jamming Oboe.

1. RCM Development - History

Nov 1943, special detachment of German Air Signals Experimental Regiment established near Duisburg for investigating methods of defence against Oboe. The unit was able to cover most Oboe transmissions in Germany from Duisburg.

During 1944, transmissions were plotted successfully by listening and Oboe Mk I was then successfully jammed. In May 1944 the unit was commended for it's work during a big attack on Duisburg.

The unit had managed to identify and plot Oboe Mk II transmissions and thusidentify the main raids from the spoofs - being the only unit which gave a clear picture of the Duisburg raid.

The techniques developed were then passed on to the whole route tracking organisation.

In the second half of 1944, a jammer against centimetic Oboe was introduced. The unit is began to develop counter-measures against other navigational aids.

2. Deployment

Very little info known (since the intelligence service had difficulty tracking movements via ULTRA because of a change in unit nomenclature by the Germans). Unit concerned was IVth Abteiltung of LN Regiment 351 with 25 to 30 stations in Western Germany. Most stations were deployed in the valley of the Rhine. With Allied advances, units were forced to withdraw and deployment (at date of report) not known. Units were mobile and it was assumed that because of fuel shortage, mobile generators were not an option so they would have to be positioned close to a electricity supply.

3. Listening

New procedure developed where unit claimed to be able to give "10-15 minutes" warning of target.

It turned out that new method was simply listening to W/T traffic between Oboe ground stations (presumedly on the continent), so Oboe procedure was tightened up and land lines used for communications more often.

4. Jamming

Method of jamming Oboe Mk I was relatively simple to achieve. Modified Freya used to interrogate the a/c set, wait unit the the a/c was close to the release point and then jam the signal.

Equipment used to jam centimetic Oboe was device called "Ali-Baba Gerat" - at least three versions produced to cover metric and centimetic Oboe. This device seen as centimetic jammer employing two methods to jam -

(1) straight interrogation
(2) Method known as "Ball" - Korfu D/F sets are used to try to lock in on the signal (cm Oboe transmissions narrower and more directional making it hard to stay focused on the transmission).

Thus two techiques comprise 1. above: unlocked pulses due to straight interrogation of the set and 2. above: locked pulses were the jammer is tracked using "Ball".

Only in late Feb/Mar 1945 did RAF BC No. 8 Grp and USAAF 8th AF notice increased jamming. RAF No. 60 Grp took ranges and bearings on locked pulses and found originating location was at a known jamming site (location of which not given in report).

Apparently the unit mainly works during the day, according to the report, presumedly because more jamming was encountered then.

5. Aids to Flak

Refers to map captured near Duisburg which basically showed technique whereby Oboe plotting data could be fed in to flak predictors.

The map showed the positions of Allied Oboe stations and thus, the Germans would have to guess which stations were being used at a given time for the technique to work, The report adds that two Oboe sites on the map were at locations were no Oboe station ever existed.

6. GEE

IV LN Reg 351 believed to be involved in tracking and jamming of GEE

7. GEE-H

In Oct 1944, captured equipment finally gave Germans clues about GEE-H system. Some Ali-Baba Gerats then converted to GEE-H frequency. It was thought that by then using "Ball" technique, it should have been possible to commence jamming of GEE-H transmissions but no effective jamming had been encountered to date.

8. SS LORAN

Germans started jamming SS Loran in Feb 1945 using noise modulation. One such jamming station identified was connected by land-line to nearest station of IV LN Regt 351.

9. Route-Tracking & GCI Stations

According to the report, the Germans had held the opinion for some time that analysing correctly the movements of the Mosquito night fighters, especially distinguishing between high and low patrols, would enable them to deduce the intentions of the main bomber force.

In Sep 1944 a special detachment of the German Air Signals Experimental Regiment was provided with "Naxburg" and told to investigate the 10cm AI signals from RAF night fighters. Work of this unit apparently successful as most GCI stations in Western Europe issued with Naxburg and Heinrich sets.

According to the report, the Heinrich sets could be used to D/F the 'Jostle' support aircraft in the bomber streams, carrying jammers on the 38-42 Mc/s band. Thus it was assumed that the GCI stations were taking part in the route tracking of the RAF night fighters and 'Jostle' aircraft, while the actual analysis was still performed in the plotting stations.

10. Use of Listening Receivers in Conjunction with Long Range Radar

In Nov 1944, a number of long-range radar sets (i.e. Wassermann, Mammut) in the coastal sectors were issued with Korfu 812 D/F sets. These were to be used to guide the radar sets onto the bombers and not for route tracking. It was thought that because RAF bombers were forbidden from using H2S until close to the German frontier, the sets were being used to guide the radar on to USAAF 8th AF Bombers during their assembly over the UK.

That's it in a nutshell

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi SES,


in answer to your question, the reports mentioned in my post do not go into such detail, only occasionally identifying controllers by Jagd Division.

It should be remembered that these reports are interpretations of the signals intelligence data and not the raw data itself.

I am expecting a load of No 80 Signals Wing reports any day now, although I have no reason to expect them to be any more specific.

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi Rod,
Thank you, I can go endleslsy, when you or the forum get's fed-up please say so and we can go off-board.
I have some comments.
For SES, extracts from Air Ministry Report:


Air Scientific Intelligence - Report No. 83 - Recent Developments in German Route Tracking and RCM (dated 26.3.45)

Since report No. 73 (July 1944) new developments highlighted -

1. formation of specialist RCM unit
2. spread of route tracking to GCI stations
3. use of listening recivers for guiding long-range radars

It notes that the function of the RCM unit is largely deployed in the problem of jamming Oboe.

1. RCM Development - History

Nov 1943, special detachment of German Air Signals Experimental Regiment established near Duisburg for investigating methods of defence against Oboe. The unit was able to cover most Oboe transmissions in Germany from Duisburg.

During 1944, transmissions were plotted successfully by listening and Oboe Mk I was then successfully jammed. In May 1944 the unit was commended for it's work during a big attack on Duisburg.

The unit had managed to identify and plot Oboe Mk II transmissions and thusidentify the main raids from the spoofs - being the only unit which gave a clear picture of the Duisburg raid.

The techniques developed were then passed on to the whole route tracking organisation.

In the second half of 1944, a jammer against centimetic Oboe was introduced. The unit is began to develop counter-measures against other navigational aids.
Correct, please see:
http://www.gyges.dk/jamming_service%20Oboe.htm

2. Deployment

Very little info known (since the intelligence service had difficulty tracking movements via ULTRA because of a change in unit nomenclature by the Germans). Unit concerned was IVth Abteiltung of LN Regiment 351 with 25 to 30 stations in Western Germany. Most stations were deployed in the valley of the Rhine. With Allied advances, units were forced to withdraw and deployment (at date of report) not known. Units were mobile and it was assumed that because of fuel shortage, mobile generators were not an option so they would have to be positioned close to a electricity supply.
Incorrect. Some of these units were in the middle of nowhere.

3. Listening

New procedure developed where unit claimed to be able to give "10-15 minutes" warning of target.
Correct. The morse signals exchanged between the aircraft and the ground station gave a count down to bomb release starting 10 min out. At this point the target was also frequently identified and warned, often through The Ruhr Stab. The air raid warning was sounded and the facility evacuated.

It turned out that new method was simply listening to W/T traffic between Oboe ground stations (presumedly on the continent), so Oboe procedure was tightened up and land lines used for communications more often.
Didn't help. The germans exploited the Morse signals as described above.

4. Jamming

Method of jamming Oboe Mk I was relatively simple to achieve. Modified Freya used to interrogate the a/c set
Incorrect. The reciever was a modified Würzburg Dora called the Naxburg.

, wait unit the the a/c was close to the release point and then jam the signal.

Equipment used to jam centimetic Oboe was device called "Ali-Baba Gerat" -
The German SIGINT name for Oboe was Bumerang. The jammer was thus an Anti-Bumerang Gerät. So you have the A & B. If Ali-Baba was a German nick-name I don't know.

at least three versions produced to cover metric and centimetic Oboe. This device seen as centimetic jammer employing two methods to jam -
Correct, please see link above.

(1) straight interrogation
(2) Method known as "Ball" - Korfu D/F sets (Naxburg) are used to try to lock in on the signal (cm Oboe transmissions narrower and more directional making it hard to stay focused on the transmission).

Thus two techiques comprise 1. above: unlocked pulses due to straight interrogation of the set and 2. above: locked pulses were the jammer is tracked using "Ball".

Only in late Feb/Mar 1945 did RAF BC No. 8 Grp and USAAF 8th AF notice increased jamming. RAF No. 60 Grp took ranges and bearings on locked pulses and found originating location was at a known jamming site (location of which not given in report).

Apparently the unit mainly works during the day, according to the report, presumedly because more jamming was encountered then.

5. Aids to Flak

Refers to map captured near Duisburg which basically showed technique whereby Oboe plotting data could be fed in to flak predictors.
Correct.

The map showed the positions of Allied Oboe stations and thus, the Germans would have to guess which stations were being used at a given time for the technique to work,
Incorrect. It was the signal from the aircraft which was intercepted and exploited.

The report adds that two Oboe sites on the map were at locations were no Oboe station ever existed.

6. GEE

IV LN Reg 351 believed to be involved in tracking and jamming of GEE
Correct, please see:
http://www.gyges.dk/jamming_service%20GEE.htm
and this ocured earlier than jamming of Oboe.

7. GEE-H

In Oct 1944, captured equipment finally gave Germans clues about GEE-H system. Some Ali-Baba Gerats then converted to GEE-H frequency. It was thought that by then using "Ball" technique, it should have been possible to commence jamming of GEE-H transmissions but no effective jamming had been encountered to date.

8. SS LORAN

Germans started jamming SS Loran in Feb 1945 using noise modulation. One such jamming station identified was connected by land-line to nearest station of IV LN Regt 351.

9. Route-Tracking & GCI Stations

According to the report, the Germans had held the opinion for some time that analysing correctly the movements of the Mosquito night fighters, especially distinguishing between high and low patrols, would enable them to deduce the intentions of the main bomber force.

In Sep 1944 a special detachment of the German Air Signals Experimental Regiment was provided with "Naxburg" and told to investigate the 10cm AI signals from RAF night fighters.
Never heard of this, technically feasible using Naxburg.

Work of this unit apparently successful as most GCI stations in Western Europe issued with Naxburg and Heinrich sets.
Not correct. Cannot be confirmed in German sources and the Naxburg was produced in fairly small numbers. Heinrich is the name of the GEE jammmer and this was employed in special sites. It is also the D/F part of the Y-Linien (Benito) system. And all Himmelbett Stellungen was equipped with these systems.

According to the report, the Heinrich sets could be used to D/F the 'Jostle' support aircraft in the bomber streams, carrying jammers on the 38-42 Mc/s band. Thus it was assumed that the GCI stations were taking part in the route tracking of the RAF night fighters and 'Jostle' aircraft, while the actual analysis was still performed in the plotting stations.
Incorrect. The Heinrich-Peiler might be able to take bearings on the jamming, but neither the Flugmeldemess Stellungen, nor the Jägerleit Stellungen were affiliated with the Funkaufklärungs Dienst.

10. Use of Listening Receivers in Conjunction with Long Range Radar

In Nov 1944, a number of long-range radar sets (i.e. Wassermann, Mammut) in the coastal sectors were issued with Korfu 812 D/F sets.
New to me, but I know for fact that one Stellung in Denmark (RINGELNATTER) as the only one was equipped with a Korfu.

These were to be used to guide the radar sets onto the bombers and not for route tracking. It was thought that because RAF bombers were forbidden from using H2S
Slightly odd comment. The Pathfinders in the Bomber Stream used H2S to find and mark turning points, and it was this indiscrimite use of H2S, which enabled the Luftwaffe to track The Stream from very early on during the approach.

until close to the German frontier, the sets were being used to guide the radar on to USAAF 8th AF Bombers during their assembly over the UK.

That's it in a nutshell

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

For instance I am not fed-up at all. I look at your discussion with great interest.

Would you please help me with guidance how to identify and order ULTRA files related to Luftwaffe?

thanks in advance for advice

Jan

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi Jan,
Glad you are not fed-up yet, but to some this is a very special subject, which is just a very small part of a very large picture.

I'll leave it to Rod to answer your ULTRA question.
bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Thanks SES, but I think that sooner or later I would need your consultation(s) as soon as I will go into ULTRA stuff ...

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Jan, you are more than welcome on or off board.

bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi,

The ULTRA I have is from HW 5, which is on paper at the National Archives. It seems to be the low-level material, while HW 1 is the high-level material sent to Churchill.

For those working on aircraft databases and loss databases, the ULTRA in HW 5 is an essential source. For example, from HW 5/473 is the following (undated, but approximately 20 April 1944):

Undated: Germany: FW 190 A-6 W.Nr 551 130 ‘Yellow 2 + ’ of III./J.G. 1 (Lippspringe) 65% damage, sent for repairs after forced landing.


Also in HW 5/473 is this:

16.04.44: Eastern Front: I. Fliegerkorps IA to Jafü Fliegerkorps 1 Mamaia. 7 FW 190s for I./S.G. 10 are ready for collection from Foscani North.


Daily strength returns from Luftwaffe units very often feature W.Nr and marking details, and mention losses as well.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

"You'll never silence the voice of the voiceless" - Rage Against The Machine

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Guys,

thank you guys, would you please describe me the procedure how to pucharse ULTRA microfilms?

thanks

Jan

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

I think that the UK National Archives website will explain the ordering system.

If it wasn't clear from the other posts, the file series with the "Main series of reports to Allied Commands" is DEFE3. (This is the series that I have spent most time with).

Details of each file are on the NA website.

Someone mentioned that the messages are in date order but that is the date the decrypted report was issued. This could be some days after the original message was sent, so if you are interested in a particular event, you may need files for a few days later to see if there is a decrypt.

Files contain 250 signals each (usually the traffic from about 3 days) and there can be from one to four files on a single reel of microfilm.

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hello!

Excuse me stepping into your thread. I'd like to use the opportunity to as a ULTRA question from mr. Beale.

Do the ULTRA decrypt messages catch anything of the transfer of Stab., I and II Gruppe SG 4 from Italy to Baltic area? Transfer taking place 1.7.1944 (July 1st). I would be especially interested if there is anything about the markings (changes) of the planes.

Photos also show SG 4 Fw 190s in field apllied (brown?) camouflage just before the period (May-June?) and it is of interest if this was retained. Similar interest for the I/SG4 (Stab?) Mickey Mouse emblem.

Yes, I have asked this even before. Lost some data in HD crash year or two ago plus am interested if anything new has appeared since.


With Best Regards,
Kari Lumppio

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Thanks, I go ahead with 1.8.1943 :twisted:

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Firstly, SES, thanks for your feedback on the Air Ministry report. As mentioned previously, such reports are the best estimate of what Air Ministry Intelligence thought was going on and you have highlighted perfectly the pitfalls of using such material - it can be used as a starting point but all such information should be checked and validated against another independant source.

Anoher such example are the Operational Research Section estimates of cause of loss for missing Bomber Command aircraft on night raids (as contained in the ORS Interception Tactics Reports and Final Reports of Night Raids). Of course, these are based on reports by returning crews but even in March 1945, for example, 30-50% of losses at night are still attributed to flak. IMHO, this figure includes attacks by night fighters from below using dim tracer (and thus being described as light flak by returning crews).

However, some clarifying points:

The intrepretation by ADI of the captured Duisburg flak map was that it had the potential Oboe course lines marked on it, based on the positions of the Oboe ground stations. It was assumed that to correctly predict the course of an Oboe-equipped aircraft, the broadcasting stations being used would have to be known in order to know which course lines were being used. It was further assumed that this technique could be more accurate than straight plotting by interrogation. I am not saying this is neccessarily a correct assumption but only what the report is saying.

With regards to the late war H2S usage, the operational orders and Interception Tactics reports that I have for Jan-Mar 45 make it clear that signals silence was imposed up to the frontier so that H2S etc was only used in enemy territory. In March 1945, for example, the PFF was generally NOT laying ground markers for turning points (and I have confirmed this with ex-aircrews) and the radar signals ban equally applied to them. Of course, individual crews did break the rules and thus gave the Luftwaffe the opportunity to detect signals. In the main, many bomber streams, based on W/T sigint, were not clearly plotted early, or at least not until after they had passed through the mandrel screen and when the usual tactics of ,firstly, sending in a shallow penetrating force, followed by a deeper penetration force, both via France and/or Belguim, the latter force was usually not heard to be plotted until well over the frontier. The trend that followed is that if the initial penetration was shallow (i.e. to the Ruhr), losses where generally light as the night fighters could not get into position to intercept in time but when the penetration was deep, or took a deeper route, the first bomber stream often suffered heavy losses while the later stream had a comparitively easier time of it.

IMHO, some of the successful inflitrations of night fighters into the bomber stream in March 1945, owed just as much to fortuitous initial positioning of n/fs around beacons and/or correct analysis of intentions (based on repeated operational patterns of Bomber Command) as to early and clear detection of the bomber stream route.

If you are prepared to wait for the publication of Dr. Theo Boiten's 'Nachtjagd War Diaries', late next year, you will find some quite detailed descriptions of the course of some of these nightly air battles, including details of the moves by the fighter controllers.

For Jan,

With regards to ordering microfilm duplicates of ULTRA from DEFE 3 at the British National Archives, firstly, you will need to find the files that you are after in the online catalogue. You can either search or browse the DEFE 3 entries (of which there are many!). To search, for example:

http://www.catalogue.nationalarchives.gov.uk/search.asp

Word or Phrase: German
Year Range: the year range you are interested in
Department or Series code: DEFE 3

Such a search should bring up all the entries for that year so you need to find the correct dates. Beware, any reference you find must be under the "MAIN SERIES OF SIGNALS CONVEYING INTELLIGENCE TO ALLIED COMMANDS. BASED ON INTERCEPTED RADIO MESSAGES." - you can verify this if you open an individual entry and look under the 'Full Details' Tab.


Copies of documents, in paper, microfilm and digital format can be ordered via:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/r...e=ddmenu_shop3

You will have to register first to make a request for an estimate. The ordering system is easy to navigate and:

1. a request for an estimate for paper copies costs GBP10 (deducted from total payable if you go ahead and order). Copies from up to five different files can be requested.

2. a request for an estimate for microfilm costs GBP20 (deducted from total payable if you go ahead and order). With ULTRA, the microfilm original already exists and thus costs GBP1.80 per metre to duplicate (where no microfilm exists then it costs an arm and a leg to get a file microfilmed (GBP58 per hour) so whoever gets it done first pays and 'arm and a leg' while anyone requesting a copy once the microfilm is made will only pay GBP1.80 per metre!). Because the DEFE 3 ULTRA material is in roughly 3-day lots, it would pay to get material for at least a week after an event you are looking for and even that is no guarantee that the material is there.

Once you make an estimate and payment is processed (by either credit card or cheque) it will take up to two weeks for the estimate to be completed. You will be e-mailed once it is done so that you can login to their ordering system to view the estimate. Then you can make the order and payment. Once you place an order and they have processed the payment, the target turn around time for duplicating the microfilm is 19 days.

'hope this is of assistance...

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Firstly, SES, thanks for your feedback on the Air Ministry report. As mentioned previously, such reports are the best estimate of what Air Ministry Intelligence thought was going on and you have highlighted perfectly the pitfalls of using such material - it can be used as a starting point but all such information should be checked and validated against another independant source.

How truly spoken. I was trying to make this point in another thread, but it got lost in personal quarrels. “These accounts cannot be trusted without cross reference to original German documents on the same subject”. http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=1874&page=2&pp=10



Anoher such example are the Operational Research Section estimates of cause of loss for missing Bomber Command aircraft on night raids (as contained in the ORS Interception Tactics Reports and Final Reports of Night Raids). Of course, these are based on reports by returning crews but even in March 1945, for example, 30-50% of losses at night are still attributed to flak. IMHO, this figure includes attacks by night fighters from below using dim tracer (and thus being described as light flak by returning crews).

Yes a very odd conclusion. How on earth could anybody believe that 20 mm Flak could make it all the way to 20.000 ft AND be effective? But both parties did. During allied raids the light Flak was firing madly and I guess ineffectively, and allied crews concluded that 20 mm holes had been made by Flak.

However, some clarifying points:

The intrepretation by ADI of the captured Duisburg flak map was that it had the potential Oboe course lines marked on it, based on the positions of the Oboe ground stations. It was assumed that to correctly predict the course of an Oboe-equipped aircraft, the broadcasting stations being used would have to be known in order to know which course lines were being used. It was further assumed that this technique could be more accurate than straight plotting by interrogation. I am not saying this is neccessarily a correct assumption but only what the report is saying.

The Naxburg was very accurate, 1 degree in azimuth and elevation is the quoted figure, but the true give away was the Morse signals exchanged between the ground station and the aircraft.



With regards to the late war H2S usage, the operational orders and Interception Tactics reports that I have for Jan-Mar 45 make it clear that signals silence was imposed up to the frontier so that H2S etc was only used in enemy territory.

When doing shallow penetrations, the Stream was over newly liberated territory most of the way, here GEE and radio beacons could be used for navigation. For deeper penetrations H2S was used over enemy territory.

Signal silence may have been imposed by the higher-ups, but each crew had their personal opinion and it seems to me that they exercised that. A grievous example was the use of IFF. Early on a superstition spread among bomber crews that the IFF had some sort of interfering effect on the Würzburg used for directing Flak. So the crews left it on and the sets were even modified with a “J”-switch in order for the equipment to transpond even if it was not interrogated. This led to the German development of the Freya Flamme, which could receive the transponded signal and thus track a/c’s utilizing IFF.

I June RAFBC conducted an evaluation of the Luftwaffe Control and Reporting organization (Exercise POST MORTEM). The system was intact in Denmark and all the personnel had been retained with this exercise in mind. The evaluation consisted of a number of raids being flown by about 200 a/c with or without ECM support. “In all exercises except (1), (11) and (12) radio silence is to be imposed i.a.w. normal BC practice” (quote from OPORD). In spite of this IFF and H2S was intercepted and exploited by the German organization on almost all the exercises. Old habits die very hard indeed.



In March 1945, for example, the PFF was generally NOT laying ground markers (my understanding is that the route markers were Skymarkers) for turning points (and I have confirmed this with ex-aircrews) and the radar signals ban equally applied to them. Of course, individual crews did break the rules and thus gave the Luftwaffe the opportunity to detect signals. In the main, many bomber streams, based on W/T sigint, were not clearly plotted early, or at least not until after they had passed through the mandrel screen and when the usual tactics of ,firstly, sending in a shallow penetrating force, followed by a deeper penetration force, both via France and/or Belguim, the latter force was usually not heard to be plotted until well over the frontier. The trend that followed is that if the initial penetration was shallow (i.e. to the Ruhr), losses where generally light as the night fighters could not get into position to intercept in time but when the penetration was deep, or took a deeper route, the first bomber stream often suffered heavy losses while the later stream had a comparitively easier time of it.

I agree completely with this assessment.



IMHO, some of the successful inflitrations of night fighters into the bomber stream in March 1945, owed just as much to fortuitous initial positioning of n/fs around beacons and/or correct analysis of intentions (based on repeated operational patterns of Bomber Command) as to early and clear detection of the bomber stream route.

And you cannot argue with success. If in golf you do a “worm-burner” of 125 yards it’s actually immaterial how the ball got there. You are 125 yards closer to the pole (almost).

If you are prepared to wait for the publication of Dr. Theo Boiten's 'Nachtjagd War Diaries', late next year, you will find some quite detailed descriptions of the course of some of these nightly air battles, including details of the moves by the fighter controllers.

I will look forward to that with great expectations.
bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi SES,


thanks for your reply. I should point out that many of the raids analysed in March 1945 re: the L/F claims were relatively low level affairs (i.e. 8,000 - 14,000 ft). In one case the ORS made the statement that the L/F reported by crews for one loss could've been actually a night fighter.

Also, on the scant number of reports that I have, the ORS damage teams who inspected damaged bombers that returned home, were well aware of the damage caused by night fighters and the calibre of the weapons used. An interesting ORS Report, finished in May 1945, analysed in detail the contributory factors that lead to the loss of the bombers shot down during 'Gisela' on the 3/4 March 1945. It was seen as an unprecedented opportunity, mainly because they could analyse a number of shot down aircraft that they normally wouldn't have access to (for obvious reasons!).

The report concluded from inspection of the wreckage and interrogation of surviving crew members that:

(i) fire is the major agent for the destruction of aircraft shot down by night fighters (as opposed to hitting the pilot or a vital aircraft component)

(ii) there was no significant difference between the damage suffered by the shot down bombers and the damage suffered by bombers returning from raids

(iii) a significant proportion of fighter attacks are a complete surprise to the crew.

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Thanks Rod,
Yes the Schräge Musik was a nasty piece of kit.
bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi SES,


some of the following files from the British National Archives may be of interest to you. These are files that I have noted but have not investigated yet. I should add that there is a whole range of technical files in AIR 40 series, that I haven't noted, dealing with specific radar and radio devices. The last two are listed for the benefit of the board community:

AIR40/1394 Germany: the history of German night fighting; A.D.I.(K) Report No. 416/1945 1945 Dec
AIR40/1395 Germany: G.A.F. night fighters; developments in night fighting and organisation and control on the Western Front 1945 Jan.- Mar
AIR40/1386 Germany: report on G.A.F. night fighter system; a post mortem 1946
AIR40/1343 Beacon Bible : German visual and radio beacons, code-names and locations 1944 Apr.-1945 Feb
AIR40/2472 History of German night fighting 1940-45
AIR14/1377 Countermeasures against transmissions to enemy night fighters
HW13/64 German RDF and techniques for control of interceptions of bomber formations 1940-41
AIR13/65 Surveys and analyses of German night defence methods
AIR14/2503 Enemy night fighter defences
HW2/99 Reports on enemy a/c activity in response to Allied operations. Reports by Det ''A'', Cheadle Apr-May 45
AIR51/292 Intelligence section: Signals: German Air Force radio telegraphy (R/T) activity: night fighters 44-45




AIR40/1691 Official regulations re credit for victories achieved by the G.A.F. and associated arms. Translated from Luftwaffen Verordnungsblatt 28 April 1941
AIR40/1471 Translations No. 86: German combat reports Aug. 1944 - Feb 1945




A couple of late additions in response to the request on your web site for more info about operating procedures re: Jagdschloss. The following files, especially the first listed, may have information relevant to what you are looking for:

AIR 40/321 Germany: air scientific intelligence technical translations and interim report Jagdschloss 1944 Oct.-1946 Feb.
AIR 40/3019 Interim report: Jagdschloss (new German ground radar) 1944 Jan 01 - 1944 Dec 31
AIR 20/1689 German "Jagdschloss": report 1944 Oct.
AIR 20/1701 "Jagdschloss": report 1945 Apr.
AIR 51/290 Intelligence section: Signals: Enemy radar apparatus: ground Jagdschloss 01/10/1944 - 31/03/1945

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi RodM,
That was very kind and very useful, will certainly procecute. London is not THAT far away.
bregds
SES

Tease: Have you figured out where I live?

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi SES,


in response to your tease and in an effort that could lead to public embarrassment if I am wrong, I would say Denmark! However, I will not state this with authority as I usually like to confirm any information against two independant sources!

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi Rod,

Clue 1: 05 ON LT 8

Clue 2: http://www.gyges.dk/LUMA%20Guide%20ver%202.pdf and http://www.gyges.dk/LUMA.xls

just me feable way of anouncing a very useful research tool, which recently became available through a tri-lateral effort.

bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi SES,


that appears to place you at or near Årestrup...

Cheers

Rod

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi,

Not too bad, actually it's 5 km NE of the GefStd of Jafü Däne.
bregds
SES

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

I plan to put something about SG 4's last days in Italy on my website before too long. I have not got all the data in order yet but Ultra gives a lot of information on the markings of aircraft as the I. and II. Gruppen were rebuilt on airfields in northern Italy. These are mostly data I collected in the early 1990s when researching "Air War Italy" so I din not pay much attention to what happened after units moved elsewhere, I'm afraid. I can't say for certain whether Ultra covers the period of the transfer.

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Of the SG4

Thanks in advance, mr Beale. I'll monitor your great site - have been doing so all the time anyway.

As of the unit's actions in Baltic area, unfortunately in the material I have it is mostly impossible to sort out the individual SG units. And during July-August there was many of them in the Luftflotte 1 area: SG 3 and SG 4 in the whole plus I/SG5 and III/SG2 (the latter for a shorter time).


Regards,
Kari Lumppio

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi Rod

it´s very interesting for me to read about the Funkmeßbeobachtungsstelle KOMET near Duisburg-Huckingen in this report.
Do you know the report No. 73 from July 1944?
Maybe there are some more information about this German Route Tracking method.

Kind regards, Eric

Re: Luftwaffe data from ULTRA
 

Hi

I´m not sure, if everybody knows this part of an american reconnaisance picture from May 1944.

First of all: On this picture you can see the junction of the B288 with the B8. The place is directly to the city limit Duisburg/Düsseldorf.
The so called Groß-Freya-Gerät is to be seen in the right top of the picture, in center of the partly finished and at that time so called Reichsstraße 288.

Hope we can discuss this topic a little again...;)

Cheers, Eric