RAF and dive-bombing.
 

So much past ink and emotion have been spilt on this board over the RAF's refusal to countenance dive-bombing in support of the army, that we have no need for a rehash.

But I have been knocked out of my socks by a book casually picked up last Friday, and then immediately bought, by Bill Simpson, called 'Spitfire Dive-Bombers Versus the V2' (Pen & Sword 2007). What was so arresting was Simpson's view that dive-bombing requires by definition a dive angle of 70 plus degrees, and that what passed for dive-bombing in 2 TAF – a 30 to 40 degree dive angle – was just inaccurate 'skip-bombing' and should never be called 'dive-bombing'.


Simpson quotes Clostermann, who referenced Sqn Ldr Max Sutherland (453 Sqn). Sutherland “evolved a method for delivering a 500-lb bomb from the fuselage centre line (of a Spitfire IX or XVI) .... he dived at an angle of 75 degrees (from 12,000 ft) with the target in the gunsight and at full throttle. At 3,000 ft he would begin to pull out, count three and release the bombs (sic – presumably two 250-lb under the wings and one 500-lb on the centreline). Eventually, with practice, the pilots could place them within a 450 yd circle”.


Simpson quotes Fl Lt Raymond Baxter (yes, that one) (602 Sqn).....”approach made at 8,000 ft .... never below 5,000 ft .....speed reduced to 200 knots ..... rolled ..... target lined up in the centre of the unlocked gyro-gunsight .... throttled back and trimmed into what was effectively a hands-off dive at about 70 degrees .... Once trimmed, and with the throttle pulled back, the Mk XVI held very steady when hurtling groundward, which allowed you to make full use of the excellent Mk II gunsight ...... the gunsight graticule was brought to bear on the target .... We never really monitored our dive speeds .... I think 360 mph was a typical maximum ..... bombs (presumably only 250-lbs under the wings) usually released at 3,000 ft – no lower than 1,500 ft – and the aircraft was then pulled out to escape at low level. An experienced pilot could bomb accurately to within 25 to 30 yards”. If the bombs failed to release, then the aircraft would usually break up during the attempted pull-out.


Now, if a very slippery aircraft like a UK-based Spitfire Mk XVI of 12 Group, Fighter Command, without airbrakes, and without a cradle to ensure a bomb carried on the centre-line was released outside the propeller arc, was used as a true dive-bomber against V2s launched in the Hague in an environment of intense light Flak in order to minimise collateral damage to Dutch civilians, (while 2 TAF refused requests from Fighter Command to use Belgium-based Mosquitos employing skip-bombing because of the risk to aircrew of exploding rockets), then many questions arise both about 2 TAF's refusal to dive-bomb in support of the army, and about the universally accepted view that dive-bombing needed a specialist aircraft and could not be performed by fighters.


The only conclusion I can reach from Simpson's book is that the RAF's (and 2 TAF's) views about dive-bombing were as wrong as their views about long-range escorting of bombers by fighters; viz: a long range fighter (like the Me-110) was no good as an air-superiority fighter. It was only when the USAAF sent Thunderbolts and Mustangs on long-penetration flights into Germany that the RAF accepted that they had been wrong all along for years.


Fighter Command (and ADGB) Spitfire pilots privately discovered a way of solving the problem of the V2s through the trial-and-error development of dive-bombing. They didn't know it was 'impossible' and 'forbidden'.



The RAF and 2 TAF never looked for, and therefore never found, a way to solve the Army's problem of accurate battlefield dive-bombing. To save face the RAF were willing to suppress news of the success of the Vengeance in the Far East and to turn a blind eye to Max Sutherland's tactical introduction of Spitfire dive-bombing by Fighter Command.


It is most peculiar that the story of true dive-bombing by Spitfires did not come out until 2007. The reason must be because it was not regarded as interesting and wouldn't sell. Simpson is interested in the men and the machines and the minutiae of their lives, and seems to be completely unaware of the controversy over how the RAF got away with only going through the motions of providing air support to the army.


This is extraordinary, and ultimately baffling.


Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Tony, assumptions and the purchase of secondary sources aside, have you consulted any of the primary reference available?

Stephen

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Stephen; I would hope to think I've consulted all or nearly all of them.
Do you think my post shows a lack of awareness of them?

Would you know, by the way, of any source, primary or secondary, that would explain:

a) why Raymond Baxter could dive his Spitfire Mk XVI at 70 - 80 degrees and maintain a maximum velocity of 360 mph without airframe damage (which was constantly being checked according to Simpson), while 43 Sqn's pilots in Italy in Spitfire Mk VIIIs found that "at such angles, speed could build up rapidly, going off the clock to around 600 mph, and a certain amount of wing root stress was encountered. Buckling was quite common..." - source (secondary): Peter C. Smith 'Dive-Bomber", or

b) why Fighter Command/ADGB implemented dive-bombing with Spitfires while 2 TAF would not. Peter C. Smith in 'Dive-Bomber' mentions the campaign against the V2s and the dive-bombing of the Calais guns, which I don't know, but guess was also performed by Fighter Command (if not, I would certainly like someone to put me right). I would guess the answer to the question is the differing attitudes of Roderic Hill and Mary Coningham towards the army.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony
if in the book the author calls glide-bombing as skip-bombing, which is entirely different thing, I’d be a little careful with his conclusions.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Yes, Juha, I agree.

But Sutherland's bombing of the BIMA building (aka Shell House) in the Hague, which is described, was genuine skip-bombing, with the bombs fused for 11seconds delay and dropped at 400mph from a height of 100ft onto the ground 300yards from the building.

However, the book (which is expensively produced and well-illustrated) contains dicey sentences which raise questions about the author's knowledge; "Typhoons and Tempests were legendary in their ground-attack support of the Allied armies in Europe, but much of this would be 'skip-bombing' and strafing with rockets and cannon rather than dive-bombing".

The Raymond Baxter quotation about maintaining a speed of 360mph in a 70 degree dive is a problem, and cannot be correct. Baxter's autobiography, 'Tales Of My Time', might clarify the matter. You can buy it for £1.20 from Amazon, but I'll get it from the library.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Tony,

In spite of what appears to be a pissing match developing here, considering the argument is based on the recollection of ‘a’ veteran, this might be of interest to you.

A few snippets Taken from the Royal Air Force paper TC-33 “The Use of the Spitfire-Bomber (Bombfire), dated April 1943.

Introduction: As time goes on in this war we have been finding that aircraft have been subjected to all sorts of queer roles. The old idea of the Fighter being the destroyer of enemy bombers alone has changed, and we now find that we have to cope with anything from the heavily defended bomber down to the lightly defended motorized column. The fighter-bomber has proved itself to be worth its weight in gold and you, the Spitfire pilots, are about to use your aircraft in the role of the fighter-bomber. Set out below are certain points which you must familiarize yourselves with if you are going to cope effectively.

Methods of Attack: Spitfires cannot be used for precision high level bombing because of the enormous bombing errors involved, but with practice, accuracy can be achieved in dive and low level bombing. The methods of attack are as follows:

High Dive Bombing: …It will probably be found necessary to begin the attack off a turn, in order to lose sight of the target. The angle of (the) dive must not exceed 45 degrees in order to ensure that the bomb clears the airscrew bales and also to ensure that the bomb does not oscillate after release. The bomb should be aimed with the gun sight, and the nose of the aircraft must be eased up just before the bomb is released in order to allow for trail of the bomb.

Low Dive Bombing: This form of attack consists of a dive down to the minimum safety height for the type of bomb and fusing employed, the technique and angle of (the) dive being as given in sub-para (i) above, (which is High Dive Bombing)

Low Level Bombing: This form of attack is made from the minimum safety height for the type of bomb and fusing employed. It is usually delivered after an approach at nought feet…

In a supplement included with TC-33 entitled; Further Information on the Use of Fighter-Bombers (Spitfire and Whirlwind), here are few more snippets.

….When the target re-appeared behind the trailing edge, the bombers turned on to the target in a dive of about 75 degrees. They commenced pulling out at 13,000 feet.

Tactics used by No.249 Squadron:

The Officer Commanding No.249 Squadron, Krendi, states that the best results were ultimately obtained by using the following tactics:

…The resultant dive was 80-90 degrees. The bombs were released at 10,000 feet….


Tony, I am not sure what to make of your comment about 2nd T.A.F. not implementing dive-bombing. Surely, you must be joking? I hope you are.

Stephen

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Stephen

Quote: ” In a supplement included with TC-33 entitled; Further Information on the Use of Fighter-Bombers (Spitfire and Whirlwind), here are few more snippets.

….When the target re-appeared behind the trailing edge, the bombers turned on to the target in a dive of about 75 degrees. They commenced pulling out at 13,000 feet.”

Sounds much like what G/C H. F. O’Neill wrote on dive-bombing in Sicily in 43 in Aeroplane Monthly Sept 88 while serving in 1435 Sqn at Malta. They crossed the coast of Sicily at appr. 23,000 ft then approached the target in a gentle descent so to arrive above it at 20,000 ft. When the target appeared at the root of his port wing trailing edge, the pilot stall-turned into near vertical with engine throttled back and the gun sight lined up on the target. No release altitude given but Spits would join up in open tactical formation at about 12,000 ft on a reciprocal course for Malta. Bombload was one 250lb under each wing. According to O’Neill bombing accuracy wasn’t very high, targets were area-type, like the harbour of Catania and airfields and attacks were mainly of nuisance value with fluke hits on ships or parked a/c now and then. One must note that O’Neill used often understatements.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

SMF144.

Firstly, let's agree there is no room for a pissing match. We discuss only to search after facts we can all agree on - that is by you, Juha, hopefully Chris Thomas, and anyone else interested, and myself.

Secondly, let's define terms before deciding whether 2TAF implemented dive-bombing or not.

For me, an aircraft can be defined as dive-bombing when all of the following are present, with the aircraft:
1. equipped with dive brakes
2. diving from a minimum of 5,000ft
3. releasing its bomb/s at no higher than 1,500ft
4. diving at an angle steeper than 75 degrees.

Do you, and others, agree with this definition?

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello
I’d define dive-bombing simply a bombing attack made by diving at an angle of 75 deg or steeper and with a loss of height during the attack at least say 1000-1500ft. Initial and release heights are tactical questions. Of course a long dive with a plane using dive-brakes and releasing at low level gives prospects of clearly better accuracy. But IMHO those Spits using high dive-bombing tactics were dive-bombing, they were not glide-, skip- or level-bombing.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Mmmm, Juha.

In your definition does the angle of the aircraft have to be 75 degrees at time of bomb release, because Sutherland started the pull out from 75 degrees before release and counted to three. He would therefore have released at some unknown angle that was less than 75 degrees, which explains the poor accuracy. He did this to ensure the centre-mounted bomb did not hit the propeller. The dive was only his method of tactical target-approach.

The point of my definition was to limit dive-bombing to a technique that delivered bombs accurately and repeatedly on target. Yours does not do so, as you admit, and might be defined as "steep glide-bombing".

I think, however, my definition should be revised to 70 degrees or steeper, since the Luftwaffe, RN, Imperial Japanese Navy and USN all considered 70 degrees as the ideal angle of dive.

In the late 1930s, RAF doctrine, according to Smith, restricted the dive angle to 50 degrees and refused to use the term 'dive-bombing', referring to it as "losing height bombing".

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony
if 70 deg was seen as optimal by AFs practicing dive-bombing, I’d say that dive bombing was a bombing attack made by diving at an angle of 60 deg or steeper. And I mean the angle of dive when it was stabilized, not at the moment of bomb release.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

OK, Juha, we can't agree, but we know the reason.

Under this definition 2TAF and every other air force practised dive-bombing, which to me is steep glide-bombing.

BY the way, what would you call my definition, as practiced by what are universally called the "dive-bombers" of the LW, RN, IJN and USN?

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

It is all just words guys, and the words mean what you want them to mean. Words have value for communication when we can agree on these meanings. This value increase as the the meanings converge, but the words still have some value whenever the meanings are close (but not identical).

After many years writing specifications for military equipment, I can't buy that it isn't "dive bombing" if the aircraft doesn't have dive brakes. I would call an aircraft with dive brakes "equipped specifically for dive bombing". You can still dive bomb without them. Similarly, a crutch that lowers the bomb before it separates improves dive bombing, but you can still dive bomb without it. Whatever you mean by dive bombing, of course.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Exactly, Bill, it's all words in one sense.

But it's worth recalling that these mere words carry a large amount of historical baggage.

They determined bombing accuracy which decided whether some lived or died on the battlefield, and these words are therefore charged with emotion - just read Peter C Smith's books.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

The He 177, Ju 88 and Do 217 were all considered dive bombers, and fitted with dive brakes, by the Lw, yet the their respective dive angles were 60*, 45*, 50*.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

I don't really see the point in this debate, nor in setting the limit on what should be considered dive-bombing. Different aircraft, different theatres demanded different techniques.

I did refer to the CFE's post-war report on tactics used by the 2nd TAF, hoping for the final word. It certainly detailed (to some degree) the methods used by Spitfire and Typhoon fighter-bombers and 'dive-bombing' was the main technique used on both types (as opposed to 'low-level bombing').

For Spits the dive angle was quoted at 60 degrees for the lead aircraft, with lesser angles for successive aircraft in the formation. Release at 3,000 feet. (Starting level was not given but approach to the target was c.5,000ft). For Typhoons, surprisingly, no figures were given, merely recommendation of 'a good steep dive' for accuracy. However many pilots have told be that 60 degrees was the norm and that seemed steep enough! They usually started about 8-12,000ft. 438 Sqn's notes for new pilots recommends 60 degrees for accuracy.

Incidentally, accuracy, if you can count APC results, was a lot better than Clostermann suggested.
CT

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hi Tony.
Just saw your note and don't know if I am able to give some new evidence of dive bombing in Spits.
I immediately phoned a friend of mine who flew Mk IX's in 4 sqdn (KJ) SAAF in 7 wing.
I asked him about dive bombing as I have heard DAF members talk about it many times before, and asked him for some info.
He told me the following.
The DAF started of by using single 500lb bombs under the fuselage, and eventually ended up with 2 x 500 Lb under the fuselage.
Used to fly line astern, bank over in steep dive, not predetermined, but quite steep.
Starting altitude was variable according to the target, and even the angle varied due to the amount of flak.
Used to pull the nose up through the target and as soon as the target dissappeared under the nose they released the bomb.
Accurasy varied, but some guys ie Maj 'Bomb" Finney and Maj Johnny Seccombe became quite good at it.
We all have seen the praise the DAF got from the Brass at Desert A/F HQ, so it must have worked.
The altitude at which they dropped depended on the pilot.
I have some photos of those Spits with bombs under the fuselage.
I have seen documents on tactics in our archives but have never copied or read them.
(Kick myself)
Hope it helps.
Stefaan Bouwer

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony
IIRC usually 60deg was seen as divine between dive- and glide-bombing. Anyway, if the main users of dive bombing saw 70deg dive angle as optimum, IMHO it’s a bit silly to claim that 69 deg dive angle means that the plane wasn’t dive-bombing but glide-bombing.
IMHO dive-bomber is a category of planes, dive-bombing is a category of attack methods.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

I think we should probably leave it there.


We know 'what was', ie what 2TAF did, due to the good work of Chris Thomas and Christopher Shores; there are no questions and no debate about the results of their research from me.


We don't know, however, “what ought to have been”, which is a normative question, and cannot follow from “what was”.


Thr normative aspect is raised because claims made by RAF and USAAF pilots of 2TAF (firing RPs) , IXTAC and XIXTAC (both of which were “dive-bombing”) were proved by 2 ORS investigators to be overstated by a factor of at least ten. Source: Joint Report No. 1 by 2 ORS which examined an area in the Ardennes Salient where pilots claimed 90 AFVs destroyed. 2 ORS found 101 destroyed AFVs, of which only 7 were due to air attack. 2 ORS interviewed captured Germans; eg “Signaller W of 130 Pz Regt said that when conditions were favourable they were attacked from the air as often as 3 times a day. No tanks had been put out of action by the air force. A bomb fell 10 metres from his tank but no damage was caused”.


All of this is old hat to most/all of you, and no excuse for starting this thread.


However new information appeared - Bill Simpson's book, which is not about 2TAF but about Fighter Command and their task of stopping the V2 launches from the Hague. The rockets were terrifying and killing large numbers of Londoners (over 2,700). The army had messed up by neglecting to free the Scheldt and liberate northern Netherlands, and instead run into a brick wall at Arnhem. Six squadrons were used against the V2s, and were at it for a period of over 5 months. They did everything they could with the equipment at their disposal. Not for them 2TAF's 60 degree dive angle with release at 3,000 ft, but 70+ degrees with release sometimes as low as 1,500 ft and straight into heavy Flak. They failed almost completely, according to Bill Simpson, who shows that V2 launchings continued even when the RAF was overhead in strength, (although the Spitfires did cause the Gemans to fire more at night, which probably reduced casualties because Londoners were not so concentrated together in groups as they were during the day).


The RAF had always rejected specialist dive-bombing, and managed to fight off all demands from the Army for its own air corps equipped with specialist dive-bombers. The RAF claimed complete vindication when they shot the Stukas out of the skies over southern England. They never publicly wavered in their rejection of specialist dive-bombers, although they had to suppress the news about the success of the Vengeance in the Far East which achieved the required accuracy and performed far better than was possible with the abused Spitfires. However, when faced with the demand to hit V2 launchers in the woods surrounded by the built-up area of the Hague, RAF Fighter Command was forced to try and achieve the accuracy of specialist dive-bombers without the kit. Ditto 2TAF who had to support the army by destroying tiny targets such as tanks, anti-tank guns and machine-gun nests using kit without the necessary accuracy. The Allies enjoyed complete air superiority, so the Stuka excuse was irrelevant.


It seems to me indisputable that the RAF should have been using their Vengeances over North West Europe and especially the Hague. These would probably have needed teaming with Austers and Stinsons (notoriously difficult to shoot down) to spot V2 launcher movement in the Hague, in air-to-air communication with a cab-rank of Vengeances. Maybe this would have shut the V2s down, or maybe not. The point is, it was never even raised AFAIK.


And, to repeat, history shows it would be wise to leave it there.


Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

If dive bombing Spitfires were shot down by flak then why would your Vengeance a/c not suffer the same fate?

If the 300+mph Spitfires were shot down by flak, then so would your much slower Austers and Stinsons which also would be operating well behind the front lines.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Slightly off topic, but ...

AOP aircraft rarely operated behind enemy lines, except when flak and enemy fighter aircraft were absent. Standard AOP procedure was to fly just behind the front line to observe and correct their own gun fire, and to fly well behind the line, observing enemy shell strikes from as close to directly above as possible, in order to plot a line back to the enemy guns.

The Stinsons in Burma were on a different mission, supply and communications behind enemy lines, but again they were very careful of flaks and enemy air operations.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Tony
I dug out my copy of Peter C. Smith’s, the great devotee of dive-bombing, Dive Bomber! from my attic and yes, according to him (p. 7) Shallow Glide Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was descending at an angle not greater than 20deg. Steep Glide Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was descending at an angle of between 20deg and 60deg. Dive Bombing: bombs were released while the a/c was in a dive at an angle of between 60deg and 90deg. And yes, in the book there is 3 pages on Spits dive-bombing in Italy and of course 7 pages on use of Vengeance by RAF and RAAF.

I don’t see it very fruitful to develop new, different definitions to those already in common use only to prove one’s own theme.

Secondly, clear Allied air-superiority over NW Europe was achieved only in spring 44 after bitter fight between LW vs. mostly 8th FC with big help by LW attrition in MTO and in East. So much planning and training for invasion was made before the air superiority was established fact, that’s why British Armoured units had those AA Crusaders at the beginning of Invasion, they were later dropped out from establishment when it was seen how small the danger of LW fighter bomber and dive bomber attacks was, even if there was isolated fighter bomber attacks on British tanks.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Your answer is through organised and very heavy, indeed overwhelming, Flak suppression.
Remember the V2 launch sites in the Hague were the number one priority target for the RAF.
The RAF had an overwhelming number of aircraft and complete air superiority.
German Flak in the Hague was associated with the launch groups, and would not fire until these had been spotted and the Spitfire was in the dive - according to Simpson.
The RAF operated no Flak suppression - Fighter Command and 2TAF pilots were ordered not to hunt for Flak because the contest was too one-sided.
V2 launchings were defended by 37-mm Flak on half-tracks which Spitfires couldn't hit, but the Vengeance could.
Also the Vengeance was more Flak-resistant than the Spitfire and Typhoon.
The Germans would not have fired at Auster and Stinson spotters for fear of revealing the position of the launch groups and attracting heavy Flak suppression and attacks on the launchers. They played possum.
It keeps coming back to the need for an accurate dive-bomber, which the RAF refused to operate for well-known dogmatic reasons - they would not cooperate with the Army except on their own terms of complete independence, lest the Army "become drugged with bombs" and dependent on the RAF.
There was only a limited number of mobile Flak and launch groups available to the Germans in the Hague.
The RAF should have concentrated on taking most of them/all of them out - once they were gone they were gone.
The RAF had the means.
They had the Vengeance in numbers, but used them for target-towing in Devon.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

So we agree? - 2TAF therefore didn't do dive-bombing.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony
I cannot recall exact details of attack tactics of 2TAF but if its fighter-bombers always used dives less than 60deg, yes, we agree, but at least led Spits used to dive at 60deg as were Typhoons, according to Thomas' message, so I'd say that 2TAF did at least some dive-bombing

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony and others,

Interesting topic. I wrote a book about the RAF operations (both Fighter Command and 2nd TAF) on Leiden railwaystations in 1944-1945; "de 'vergeten' bombardementen, de Britse luchtaanvallen op Leiden 1944-1945" (Leiden, 2008). For this book I researched various sources. You may find it interesting to study/consult:

NA (PRO) Air 41/55 The Air Defence of Great Britain, vol VI, the flying bomb and rocket campaign 1944-1945;

Graig Cabell and Graham A. Thomas: Operation Big Ben, the anti V2 Spitfire Missions 1944-45 (Stroud, 2006).

Basil Collier: The defence of the United Kingdom (London 1957).

Best regards,
Rob

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Thank you, Rob.

The blurb for Cabell/Thomas claims dive-bombing was done at night in the Hague, and presumably without the benefit of something like the Leigh Light. That's interesting because, according to Simpson, the Germans thought night brought relief from the attention of the Spitfires.

Did your researches make any suggestions about how Fighter Command might have done things differently to counter the V2 Launchings from the Hague?

2TAF's contribution of course led to the disaster in Bezuidenhout on March 3, 1945 (535 Dutch killed, 432 missing and 235 seriously wounded), which was not the first mistake by mediums - Horrocks had banned them a few days earlier, if I remember correctly, for repeated incompetence leading to the death of his troops.
BTW, if you didn't know, Simpson gives the reasons for Bezuidenhout.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony,

I will take the liberty of quoting from Air 41/55 where I found some interesting data:

Page 255:
Counter-Measures to Rockets
Just as counter-measures against flying bombs fell largely upon the air defences of Great Britain, so thoese against rockets were principally carried out by Fighter Command. 2nd Tactical Air Force assisted in the work of armed reconnaissance by attacking transport targets over much of Holland, leaving the rocket launching areas used for the attack of London to Fighter Command. But these activities were part of the constant offensive by continentally based aircraft against communications between the battle area and western Germany…

The heavy bomber forces were not used in the period directly against rocket targets.

(…) page 258

… the offensive took the form of sweeps and reconnaissances in which fighters and fighter-bombers attacked targets of opportunity rather than specific, pre-selected objectives. This was work better suited to 2nd Tactical Air Force than Fighter Command: first, because to be effective a large number of sorties was needed – and 2nd Tactical Air Force was a much stronger force than Fighter Command; second, because 2nd Tactical Air Froce was continentally based within easy reach of the areas to be attacked, whereas Fighter Command squadrons had to fly over a hundred miles across the sea before they reached western Holland. The sorties flown over Holland and north-west Germany by the two forces reflect the differences: for the period 15 October – 25 November they were only six hundred by Fighter Command and nearly ten thousand by 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Page 261
Air Marshall Hill wrote to the Air Ministry on 17 November, making his letter the occasion for a thorough review of the difficulties under which Fighter Command had been operating. He pointed out that the armed reconnaissance had to be carried out by Spitfires in daylight whenever weather permitted, and as winter approached their scale of effort was being seriously affected. Moreover, the majority of sorties had to be flown at low altitude if the pilots were to identify suitable targets and attack them with cannon and machine-gun fire; and this in an area where the Germans had deployed a large number of light anti-aircraft guns was a dangerous proceeding. (…) Here, Bomber Command and 2nd Tactical Air Force could help, though so far they had done very little. A number of sorties were also being flown by bomb-carrying Spitfires of Fighter Command whose pilots were, however, under strict instructions not to bomb if there was any risk of causing civilian casualties. It was particularly in this last connection that Air Marshal Hill wanted a revision of policy. (…) at a conference on 21 November (…) and members of the Dutch Government were present. The latter agreed that of bombing attacks on launching points and storage sites were indeed considered necessary and likely to prove effective they would raise no objection at this stage. (…) Hill was therefore given authority to undertake such attacks even against targets near built-up areas, provided he considered them “reasonably discriminating”. This applied only to Fighter Command and its fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft. No alteration was made in ‘Crossbow’ policy as it affected 2nd Tactical Air Force and Bomber Command. Air Chief Marshal Tedder put the claims of the battle on land on 2nd Tactical Air Force higher than the needs of rocket counter-measures.

And on it goes in air 41/55. Trust the above is of interest.

Best regards,
Rob

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Thank you, Rob.
Simpson makes those points so must have been using the same source.

Simpson's conclusion is unequivocal. Fighter Command and 2TAF were just going through the motions, and their results were spun by the RAF and the government;
"as the rocket campaign gained momentum and the numbers exploding on London increased, the Government had to be seen to be doing something.The hard fact was that the V2s could only be stopped before being fired, and it was very difficult to do this, but the authorities could never have admitted that they could not stop them. It would have been an admission that Britain's capital city was completely at the mercy of a ruthless enemy who, it was being said, was on the brink of defeat".
Simpson states the pilots "did their best within the limitations of the equipment they were given".

The question comes back every time to the equipment used by Fighter Command and 2TAF.
The responsibility for that deficiency lies with the RAF top brass and Churchill who gave them too much rope.

Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

A proper root cause analysis will lay a fair bit of blame on Herr Hitler, and the 1920s and 1930s European governments that did nothing to enforce the Treaty of Versailles. RAF top brass, Churchill, and the 2TAF did what they could with the mess they had been handed.

I have a hard time understanding why you keep bringing up the Vengeance. The Americans had a lot of them too, and found they couldn't stand up to Japanese air power. Do you really think they would have done much good in Europe? Personally, I view them as a slightly updated Fairey Battle, with all the same potential for greatness.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Bill, the RCAF in Canada were seriously considering a squadron or two of the Vengeance's on the west coast for work up in the Aleutians and the same for a couple of the six squadrons that were sent over in late '43. For some reason this never materialized.

If memory serves me right, the RCAF in Canada, were expecting to receive 60 airframes from the Americans.

Again, you go with what you got and at the time, the Spitfire, Typhoon and Tempest were the best options available for ground attack.

Stephen

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Apologies again for going off topic...

What the RCAF requested/expected at various times during the war is a fascinating story in its own right, and would deserve a book some day. Besides Vengeances, the list includes Stirlings, Maurauders, Mustangs and Lightnings, plus helicopters and blimps for the RCNAS. The Liberators and Fortresses they did received were the result of long, convoluted negotiations, and they were never received in the numbers requested.

Many of these requests resulted mostly from desperation, and don't mean the aircraft involved was considered superb in any way. The Vengeances would have replaced float equipped Blackburn Shark biplanes, so they would have been seen as a step up. In early 1942 the entire Canadian fighter presence on the east coast was also biplanes, so the RCAF regularly requested anything with wings.

RCAF history and Canadian history could have been much less pleasant if the Home War Establishment had been severely tested, beyond the U-boat wars on both coasts and the minor Japanese raids into Alaska.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

I cannot see how you can pin responsibility on Hitler for the RAF's choice of equipment. The “mess” you mention was entirely of the RAF's making, having promised that its strategic bombers, (Battle, Blenheim, Hampden and Wellington) would attack the Ruhr and the German fleet in daylight. The Advanced Air Striking Force went to France not to help the British and French armies but to place its short-range strategic bombers within range of the Ruhr. (Richards, Vol 1, page 32). They were not designed for tactical use against bridges in support of the army but to bomb objectives in Germany, "not only to damage the German war machine in general, but to force the Germans to withdraw fighters and flak from the front to the rear, and to divert their bombing offensives to objectives in England". (Portal quoted by Terraine, "The Right Of The Line", page 145).



Sholto Douglas knew the RAF was responsible for the disastrous Fairey Battle, a strategic bomber misused as a tactical bomber. The RAF should instead have built a Stuka; “When those (Battle) squadrons were put to the test and they suffered so disastrously I could not help thinking with the deepest regret that it would have been so much better if, years earlier, we had developed a dive-bomber along the lines of Ernst Udet's Ju-87, the Stuka, instead of devoting so much of our resources to the design, the development and the production of those wretched Battles”. (“Years of Command”, page 55).


And yes, the Vengeance would have done well in Europe just as it did well in Burma in May 1943. 7 Squadron (Indian Air Force), after a few months of training, “could place their 500-lb bombs within 15 yds of the target”. (Peter C Smith, “Vengeance”, page 75). This was because the Vengeance dived at 90 degrees with nil angle of incidence at a terminal velocity of 320 mph. Spitfire fighter-bombers, Bombphoons and Typhoons firing RPs could not achieve anything like this accuracy, as Fighter Command had discovered in January 1943 when Mustangs and Typhoons were sent against a mockup of a German divisional artillery of 48 guns and inflicted only 'negligible damage', even though 'every effort was made to assist the fighter-bombers in their attack'. 2TAF's OR Section found there was little improvement during the following year. (Copp, “Fields of Fire”, page 88).


When the great success of the Vengeance in the Far East began to be reported on the BBC, the RAF withdrew them from front line service to save themselves from embarrassment. (Smith, “Vengeance”, page 104).


Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

How did the aerial opposition the Vengeance faced in Burma compare with what the Luftwaffe could put up in Europe in 1943?

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

A more realistic comparison to Burma in '43 would have been the use of the Vengeance in 1944. And in that period the Vengeance effect would have been far more effective, accurate and devastating than Spits, Tiffies and Thunderbolts. In all likelihood the dive bomber tactic would arguably also have resulted in less aircraft lost to AAA.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

We've entered into the "what if" part of this discussion. It's apparent that Tony knows more than he's letting on to.

Stephen

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Hello Tony
Quote:” “could place their 500-lb bombs within 15 yds of the target”. (Peter C Smith, “Vengeance”, page 75). This was because the Vengeance dived at 90 degrees with nil angle of incidence at a terminal velocity of 320 mph. Spitfire fighter-bombers, Bombphoons and Typhoons firing RPs could not achieve anything like this accuracy, as Fighter Command had discovered in January 1943 when Mustangs and Typhoons were sent against a mockup of a German divisional artillery of 48 guns and inflicted only 'negligible damage', …”

What was mean accuracy of the fighter-bombers in Jan 43 test? After all, Finns with limited experience with Stukas, in 41 while attacking with their support and in late 44 as their targets, seems to have concluded that Stuka was mostly a moral weapon, when used against troops, in fact that was also what Heer told them. Ju-87s didn’t do so much material damage but terrorised effectively troops unused to them. During summer 44 Gruppe sized attacks of Stukas were clearly better moral-risers to defending Finnish troops than Staffel sized attacks made by Fw 190 fighter-bombers, mostly because much higher flying slower Ju 87s were seen by much larger number of Finns and Soviets were probably able to put more AA against them than against lower flying much faster Fw 190s. But both were able to knock-out bridges.

Dive-bombers with well trained crews were effective against ships but tanks were generally too small and hard targets even for them, that’s why LW went to Ju-87G. Maybe RAF did a mistake that it didn’t employ some sqns of Typhoons with Vickers 40mm “S” guns, they could have handled vast majority of German AFVs. Only Tigers and Jagdpanthers would have been too thick skinned for them during Normandy fighting. “S” gun was much more accurate than RP and Typhoon would have been able to carry some extra armour while carrying two “S” guns.

Juha

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Jim Oxley gave the same answer as I would have made to Nick Beale.


In an earlier post I wrote that 2TAF by Shores and Thomas described 'what was', and that I wanted to move the discussion on to the normative question of 'what should have been'.
I suppose that is what SMF144 means by saying I have moved to “what if”.
Some say that 'what was' and 'what should have been' with regard to 2TAF were the same; I don't subscribe to that.


Juha questions the mean accuracy of dive-bombing with Spitfires in January 1943 compared with 7 Squadrons mean accuracy of 15 yards with the Vengeance.
I don't know, and have searched the OR Reports in Copp's “Montgomery's Scientists” and cannot find a figure.
Simpson in “Spitfire Dive-Bombers Versus the V2”, page 114, states that in a Spitfire Mk XVI “an experienced pilot could bomb accurately to within 25 to 30 yards”. I suggest this is the answer.


Juha states that Stuka and FW-190 could knock out bridges. To my knowledge the FW-190 failed to knock out Nijmegen Bridge and Remagen Bridge, and not through want of trying. The Stukas, I believe, never got through the fighter defence. 2TAF and Bomber Command failed to bring down the bridges at Wesel during Veritable in spite of intensive attempts and the absence of fighter defences.
It is my belief that fighter-bombers were not reliable bridge-busters.
But Skua dive-bombers brought down bridges in Norway in 1940 (as well as sinking the Koenigsberg) and Vengeances brought down bridges in Burma, so it is my belief that specialised dive-bombers were reliable bridge-busters.


Juha believes that 2TAF would have had more luck against AFVs with a gun. I agree entirely.


Tony

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Quoting Tony …

"Jim Oxley gave the same answer as I would have made to Nick Beale."

I'm not sure how what Jim said was an answer to my point. Had you used the Vengeance in Europe in 1943 or '44, I'd imagine it would have not have been self-defending, so it's arguable how much of the existing tactical fighter force could have been dispensed with/replaced. They'd still have been needed for escort/air superiority work.

"To my knowledge the FW-190 failed to knock out Nijmegen Bridge and Remagen Bridge, and not through want of trying."

Sonderverband Einhorn did manage to put a couple of holes in one of the Nijmegen bridges, rendering it u/s for a day or so but they didn't try a second time. The problem of destroying bridges was never really solved until the first laser-guided weapons in the Vietnam War — you really need to hit the right structural spot, not just perforate the decking.

Can I change the question? Why did the USAAF give up on the A-36 in favour of the P-47?

.

Re: RAF and dive-bombing.
 

Possibly because the P-47 could be multi role - air to air when that was needed, air to ground when that was needed. One type in the development pipeline, the production pipeline and the training pipeline could adapt to whatever the needs were long after the development/production/training began.

Perhaps the Typhoon and Spitfire had the same advantage over the Vengeance.