The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I have just been reading online "Britain 1939-1945; The Economic Cost of Strategic Bombing", by John Fahey at http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/664

This remarkable and original thesis of over 450 pages presents detailed evidence that BC cost the British taxpayer the enormous sum of £2.803 billion (£2,803,942,474) to £3.5 billion - out of a total defence expenditure of £23.1 billion and total government expenditure of £28.7 billion.

Britain was bankrupted by the war. Its wealth declined by £7 billion while its external liabilities increased by £2.9 billion - by coincidence the exact cost of BC. Britain ended the war as a client of the USA.

The 7,377 Lancasters that were built cost £477 million. It is interesting to me that the 7,368 Churchill tanks that were built cost by comparison only £82 million. Switching the money spent on Lancasters to Churchills would have given the Army 43,000 of them. This would have enhanced the chance of ending the war in 1944.

Another major point made by Fahey is that 30 to 40% of the bombs dropped by BC failed to explode because of faulty fuses, and were wasted. To this waste can be added those that were dropped on the open countryside. Therefore well over half of the £2.8 to £3.5 billion spent on BC was wasted, including half the 73,471 BC casualties, enough manpower to form three armoured divisions.

Does anyone know of any comment on, or critical review of, Fahey's work and conclusions?

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hi,
This can easily turn into one of these "what if threads", but please allow me a few comments. Without total air supremacy over the beachhead on 6 June 1944 those 43,000 tanks would never have come ashore. RAF BC contributed to the attainment of that.
The V-1 sites were being constructed from the end of 1943 and would have been ready to fire before the invasion - against the ports in Southern England, had it not been for the effort of BC.
bregds
SES
www.gyges.dk

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Rod.
I agree the percentage of faulty ordnance will never be known.
But it's clear the problems existed throughout the war.
Harris knew the problem was serious, and called those responsible 'incompetent'.
According to Harris, the problem with the common No. 30 Pistol that was, he said, used in all medium calibre HE bombs throughout the war, were recognised only when BC started daylight bombing in the autumn of 1944. Crews now saw bombs exploding as they left neighbouring aircraft. No fix to this problem was found before the war ended. How many aircraft were in fact destroyed by premature bomb explosion rather than by the official explanation of Flak?

(And, by the way, why did BC never re-engineer the Lancaster to make it easy to bale out of compared with the Halifax? I found that statement by Fahey disturbing, and wonder how it could be true. I know the reason the crews called him "Butcher" Harris was because he butchered them).

That there was something very wrong with BC's bombs was clear from the first attack on September 4, 1939 when bombs were dropped by Blenheims on the Admiral Scheer in the Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven and failed to explode. Contrast that with the bombs dropped by two Russian SB-2s (an aircraft equivalent to the Blenheim) off Ibiza in May 29, 1937 that hit Scheer's sister ship Deutschland, killing 23 and wounding 83 members of crew.

Fahey suggests the ordnance problems in BC were endemic not just through poor design but also because;
- no one in BC coordinated the design and manufacture of the equipment needed to move and lift the bombs into the aircraft. So the stations created their own jury rigs that stressed and damaged the bombs
- HE Bombs were rolled along the ground, picking up mud
- the trolleys pulled by tractors also threw mud from the wheels onto the bombs and containers and into the fuses
- the AAEE, who were responsible for testing, were denied unrestricted range time by BC which monopolised the ranges for training
- there was no systematic evaluation of bomb types and therefore no way of identifying and correcting problems. I suppose this was because BC, like the whole RAF, was run by pilots who looked with scorn on civilian scientists. Manufacturing mistakes would have been picked up during this extensive testing that never happened.

By the way, the RAF was told by Zuckerman in his study of the total effects of air raids on Hull and Birmingham dated April 8, 1942, that heavy bombing did not break down civilian morale, and neither did it destroy productive capacity since; "The direct loss of production in Birmingham was about 5% and the loss of productive potential was very small."
The RAF dissed Zuckerman's report, and Lindemann misrepresented it to Churchill.

The evidence seems to be in that the strategic bombing campaign by BC was almost certainly worse than a crime, it was a futile mistake that ended up bankrupting Britain. The ultimate responsibility for that, of course, lay squarely with Churchill.

Fahey is, then, truly the first to quantify the total cost of BC's campaign.
That fact is significant given the great amount of work done on this subject.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Ses; no one I know suggests there should have been no BC.
The suggestion is that BC should have been a tactical rather than a strategic force.
V1s used tactically against the embarcation ports would naturally have been their responsibility.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I can't agree with this statement. BC did tremendous damage on Germany and surely was one of the greatest assets which Britain had at disposal to win the war. Casualties of the crews were undoubtedly heavy, but in just three BC raids (Hamburg, Dresden, Pforzheim) were killed more people, then the BC lost during the WWII including training losses. (Of course, it's not totally correct to compare aircrews and mostly civilian casualties and their impact on the war effort, but this figures helped to understand the scale of the campaign). The sacrifice of BC aircrews also helped to reduce Army casualties by direct support and by damaging German industry, which produced arms and equipment, helped the RN to win Battle for the Atlantic by forcing German capital ships to abandon bases in France and bombing of U-Boat bases, it also helped to save many civilians in Britain (Penemunde and campaign with USAAF against NOBALL targets). The great part of Germany's war effort was spent in attempt to counter BC campaign by exapntion of Nachtjagd, radars, flak, building of permanent shelters etc, and also required a great number of people to counter the threat, thereby reducing German potential on the other fronts.

In other words, BC was expensive for Britain, and in human lives too, but it caused far more damage and casualties to the enemy then it absorbed itself and if the Britain would not have the BC, the cost of victory would be undoubtedly much higher

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hi Tony,

you seem to imply that BC was the only user of bombs and fuses, while forgetting that the RAF in Europe and other theatres were using the same ordinance.

That there was a percentage of faulty ordinance is undisputed, and that a percentage of this faulty ordinance caused the loss of aircraft and crews is also undisputed, but it was not solely a problem in BC.

I find it interesting that you are prepared to take Harris' word as gospel for some facets of the bombing war and not others.

My own belief is that the role of BC was indespensible, but that Harris (and to a very much lesser degree the USAAF also in 1945) devoted too much effort to area bombing of cities in the last seven months of the war, when the means for greater precision were available.

As to the years 1939-43, that was the cost of waging war. I don't see anyone suggesting that the British army should have been completely dispanded and the available resources put in to the RAF because of Dunkirk, Greece, and Crete...

Cheers

Rod

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hi Tony,
Engagements and battles are won through attacks on targets with a tactical importance if the right effect is inflicted.
Wars are won by succesful attacks on targets of strategic importance.
bregds
SES

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Ses, you've lost me.

The RAF's doctrine, developed in the 1920s, was based on the proposition that the objective of all three Services was the same - to defeat the enemy nation, and not merely its Army, Navy or Air Force.
But, said the RAF, the Army in order to defeat the enemy nation, had first to defeat the enemy's army, while the RAF was different.
The RAF could defeat the enemy nation without defeating its armed forces first. It did so by destroying the enemy's warlike resources and the morale (will to resist) of its citizens.
Trenchard and the others foresaw opposing bomber fleets passing each other in mid-Channel on their way to bomb their opposing factories.
(In the 1920s the supposed enemy of the RAF was France).
The country with the stronger bomber fleet would win the war because its opponent with the weaker bomber fleet would be the first to cry uncle at the destruction of its warlike resources. It would be forced to withdraw its aircraft from attack and place them in defense against enemy bombers.
That's why the RAF built up its bomber fleet and was unhappy at releasing resources to Fighter Command. BC stationed its Fairey Battles in France in an AASF within striking distance of the Ruhr in order to dissuade the LW from attacking Britain's industry.

As for your "targets of strategic importance", consider this;
Britain won against Napoleon by defeating his army in the field and occupying Paris.
Britain won WWI by defeating the German Army in the field. President Wilson's Fourteen Points were supposed to compensate for occupying Berlin.
Russia won WWII by defeating the German Army in the field and occupying Berlin.
The 'target of strategic importance' is therefore the enemy's army in the field.
Hence my assertion that a tactical BC costing 10% of Harris' BC, together with a much larger and better equipped British Army would have given Britain more bang for its buck, and saved us from bankruptcy (together with other decisions).

The RAF stuck to its Trenchard doctrine; "The aim of the RAF is to break down the enemy's means of resistance by attacks on objectives selected as most likely to achieve this end".
The "means of resistance", however, ceased to be factories because BC couldn't hit them.
BC sold Churchill on the proposition that it would break Germany's means of resistance, and so end the war, by bombing/dehousing German civilians through area bombing; BC could hit cities.
Zuckerman had shown that bombing did not destroy the morale of the citizens of Birmingham, Hull and Coventry who continued to manufacture weapons under the bombs. Germans were no different.

The hypothesis has now been framed by Fahey that BC actually did more harm to Britain than it did to Germany.
As evidence compare the postwar Wirtschaftswunder in Germany and Britain's post war stagnation and fate of becoming the 'sick man of Europe'.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony, you say SES has lost you with his statement that War is defeating the enemy strategically, then immediately state exactly that!
Your contention is that the fuses were faulty, therefore Bomber Command should not have used bombs. What should it have used, then?
You fight the enemy with the best weapons at your disposal.
As Andrei points out, without Bomber Command, Germany would have had her manpower and industrial capability freed to be more effective in all its campaigns.
Germany never freed its bomber force from that of the Army or Navy and never put into service an effective strategic bomber. BC aircraft carried a greater weight of bombs with a smaller crew than the USAAF.
One other aspect regarding "faulty" fuses might be explained by aircraft being damaged and jettisoning bombs unarmed.
Your take on this has been to swallow whole one aspect, being faulty fuses, and throw the baby out with that bathwater.
Why not ask why the RAF didn't simply mass produced thousands more Mosquitoes, only 2 crew, faster and with the same bomb load as a B17!! Mix night fighter variants with the bombers to pick off intruders and the War might have been won in 1944, without the need for all those Churchill tanks!!
Rather than re-engineer the Lanc for better crew escape, a more pertinent question would be the failure to provide heavy bombers with a ventral, not a nose, turret.
I remain convinced that BC was the War winning element, maybe not used as effectively with benefit of hindsight, but in the best way known at the time.
The courage of those young men to take to the skies night after night, contending not only with a determined enemy but also weather, navigation and formation problems is akin to those poor soldiers in WW1 on the Western Front.
Incidentally, faulty fuses were as great, if not greater, issue in WW1 artillery, so perhaps you'd give us an assessment of that?

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

So Tony, the American bombers (B-17, B-24, B-29) were also a massive waste?

ETO losses
B-17 - 4,754
B-24 - 2,112

That is almost the same as the number of Lancs built.

Only because of the massive amounts of money was spent on the RN. Was the RN a waste?

One German leader (Speer?) said that the SBC cost the Germans 30% of its manufacturing production. That is 30% more guns, tanks, airplanes that the 1,000, 000 persons that the Germans had manning the Flak, fighting fires, clearing rubble and so on that could have been better used on the front lines defending the Reich.

How were the petro and chemical industries to be knocked out without the bombers?

What did it cost the Soviets in their tactical ground war against the Germans? Would the British population have supported such massive causalities?

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Andreij.
Richard Overy in “Why The Allies Won” argues your point that the strategic offensive played a significant role in defeating Germany by diverting essential manpower and weapons from the fighting fronts to homeland defence.
But this argument is a rationalisation.
And Overy never calculated the high cost of BC.

It cost Britain £2,911 to drop one ton of bombs, and much more than £6,000 to kill one German civilian.
The cost of a Churchill tank was £11,150 - two dead German civilians, or 3 tons of bombs.
The Churchill tank was a much more effective and much cheaper weapon than area bombing, which had little effect at vast cost.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony

BC not only killed civilians, but damaged industry and property far from the front lines and disrupted German economy. Production of tanks in great numbers could not inflict comparable ammount of damage and casualties upon the enemy.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

War is not a question of how much one kill or destroy and what it cost. War is a question of inflicting the effect desired on the enemy centers of gravity.
The Strategic Bomber Offensive had a tremendous direct and indirect impact on the entire Wehrmacht's ability to wage war. There was loss of production of every sort of weapons systems, POL and diversion of manpower and resources to air defence.
BC was instrumental in the delay of the operational introduction of V-Weapons.
From late 1944 fuel was a major - if not THE major limitation in the Wehrmacht's ability to conduct operation. This limitation had been achieved through strategic bombing.
bregds
SES

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hi,

To be complete, you have to estimate the cost of BC and fighting against BC for Germans:
_ direct military losses (at least 3000 NJG aircraft lost, and 3000 aircrew killed, thousand more of soldiers killed in strategic raids).
_ military resources used against BC (thousand of guns, millions of shells, etc...)
_ manpower hours lost, or used to repair railyards/factories hit by raids.
_ production lost during the dispersion of factories.

I agree that until the summer of 1943, Bomber Command was not able to really hit hard Germany economy, but starting from there, it was able to devastate cities (starting with Hamburg) on an increasing rate. I guess that the devastation of Hamburg had a net impact on German war production.
But before 1943, having thousand more tanks will be of little use for Britain too.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Interesting thread, can I also throw into the pot another thing to consider.

Without wishing to travel into the emotive subject of Dresden too deep as it generally ends in a big argument, I am in favour of the theory that Dresden was mainly to show the Russians that the massive city destroying capability of BC existed and would be unleashed against them if they carried on into France when Germany was beaten.

The cost has been pointed out but what cost can you put on winning a war?

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Wars are colossal wastes of material, let alone human life. Why else would the exceptions, where the pinpoint target was hit, the crackshot, the ace be so celebrated? These were the exceptions.

Were fighters worth building when the majority of pilots never shot anything down? Most torpedo aircraft never scored a hit, were they worth building? Were ships worth it when most escort sank a U-boat? Were armies worth it when postwar studies showed a high percentage of infantry never even fired their rifles? When most landmines were never trodden on, sea mines never struck?

The point was not what the war or any aspect of it cost in money, for Britain in 1940–42 it was the determination to do whatever it took to hit the enemy. With France out of the war, the arithmetic was transformed and the course embarked on then is wholly understandable. Britain could never raise a field army big enough alone to defeat a German one (too great a population disparity). The RN couldn't overcome the military capacity of a continental power occupying the greater part of Europe to its West and occupying or allied to everything to its east. And the people who'd been Blitzed understandably wanted to hit back.

I suspect that a partial dilution of BC's strength in favour of Coastal Command might have done Britain more good c. 1941–43 than sending that extra (say) 100 machines over Germany. Clearly there was obstinacy over various elements of strategy, tactics and equipment (highlighted by Max hastings and Bill Gunston amongst others) but hitting German with the means at Britain's disposal was a rational choice in the circumstances of the time. The later insistence on hitting cities with a force that had meanwhile developed enough accuracy to hit oil targets etc. is what I find inexplicable.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I had the privilege of doing an interview with John Kenneth Galbraith many years ago (he was one of the authors of the USSBS.)

As regards Hamburg, Mr. Galbraith pointed out that the Germans were very slow to mobilize their war production. Hamburg was a thriving city, with a great deal of civilian economic activity. Once Hamburg was bombed, all that civilian infrastructure was destroyed, so that all the shopkeepers, hairdressers and other non-military activity ceased. As Mr. Galbraith put it, the British created an idle workforce. The Germans, realizing this, put them to work in military industries.

Keep in mind that peak German military industrial output came not in 1941, but in 1944, after several years of BC attention. That is not to say that they accomplished nothing, but just that they did not single-handedly bring down the German war machine.

One other note, both Mr. Galbraith and several other sources pointed out that German war production could have been brought to its knees fairly quickly if Bomber Command had focused on the power grid in Germany. Aside from the raids on the Ruhr dams, very little effort was made to destroy German ability to generate and distribute power to factories throughout the Reich.

Any weapon can be effective, but only if it is used properly.......

Paul

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony,

To answer your original question first no critical review of Fahey’s book is known to me. As for the conclusions you’ve made:

1. I totally agree with you that given the vast resources at its disposal BC’s contribution to the ultimate victory inadequate although by no means negligible. Had the only goal been to defeat Germany as quickly as possible then BC would be a horribly inefficient tool. However, there was broader strategic planning at work there. In terms of casualties BC’s campaign was a cheap way of showing good will to Russians. It enabled Churchill to stand by and watch Russians and Germans to slaughter themselves which he undoubtedly enjoyed. From this point of view bombing Germany for four years from 15 000 feet above was a very smart thing to do.

2. I can not agree with you that BC’s campaign or even WWII bankrupted Britain. Surely there was some loss of wealth as in most wars and yes, Britain was in huge debt after the war, but so were most other countries and this situation had been there before. War debt did not make UK the sick man of Europe as there were many other and more important factors at play that caused steady decline of Britain’s economy. The only country that really got bankrupted by the WWII was Soviet Russia. For many reasons combined it was unable to ever fully recover from the damage war brought about. The GDP per capita gap between USSR and the West kept widening after WWII which finally led to collapse of the Soviet block.


Jan

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Are you seriously suggesting that Britain alone could have raised and equipped an army sufficient to take on the Germans in Western Europe and win? Britain's entry to the war was predicated on an alliance with France and its (on paper) very powerful armed forces. When the greater part of those forces were taken off the board, Germany and the USSR were still in a non-aggression pact. Other than surrender, what were the viable options for Britain at that time?

I think you might also find that, at considerable cost, Britain and the USA poured material support of all kinds into the USSR to sustain it against Germany.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

After having a read of the thesis, my own opinion is that it is an important addition to the debate of the strategic air offensive.

Having said that, I feel that the author has missed the point in several areas and not delved into several complex issues.

I actually find it offensive that the author should emphasize a calculation of the cost for each German civilian killed, as if this is the marker upon which the success of the SBC should be judged. In fact, the calculation is completely irrelevant. Of more importance would be comparing the cost to Germany of defending against and repairing the damage caused by the SBC, not to mention the simple expedient that Bomber Command was an offensive weapon that, along with the USAAF, diverted a fair portion of German output to defence - output that otherwise been used for offensive over the British Isles. I would maintain that Germany's failure to mount a proper and sustained strategic campaign against the UK as a base of war operations was a grave mistake. Whether Germany could have mounted such a sustained campaign, considering that it had ultimately 'bitten off more than it could chew' once America had joined the European war, is another matter.

In terms of the construction and maintenance of airfields and infrastructure, I don't believe that one can separate the needs of Bomber Command from that of the USAAF. To that end, if the investment had not been made in Bomber Command, how would the USAAF strategic bomber force have fared in establishing itself in the UK? The USAAF in the UK relied heavily on RAF support in a number of areas, including the infrastructure set up to aid Bomber Command. To suggest that the investment in Bomber Command infrastructure was a cost that Britain could not afford, would automatically call into question the parallel USAAF SBC. I don't believe these two issues can be separated.

Nor do I see detailed analysis of the offsetting of costs against reverse lend-lease. A question I would be asking is did Britain get full economic value from technological advances and research shared with America? While the military value of this sharing undoubtedly bore fruit in American manufacturing of and improvements to British technology in the fields of both the aeronautics and electronics, to what extent did America economically profit to the detriment of Britain in the post-war years because of technology provided to the Americans for no real direct economic recompense?

The author also places emphasis on the wastage due to the dissolution of a substantial portion of Bomber Command in the immediate post-war years, without exploring the late-war requirements of fighting Japan, and the planned deployment of 'Tiger Force'; plans only made redundant by the Japanese surrender after the Atomic bombings. That Britain could reduce this war material to scrap only came about because the Allies defeated the Axis powers and the Soviet Union did not 'liberate' western Europe.

Tony, most of your theories are based on the notion/belief that Bomber Command operations had no political or material effect against Germany and its ability to wage war, and were thus a complete waste of effort. Many people flatly disagree with this notion, including Webster/Frankland in the Official History (which, in my view, is one of the most forthright and courageous Official Histories ever published by any country. If you haven't done so, I suggest that you read all four volumes from end-to-end, and not selectively take what suits your own hypothesises).

What most people now agree on is that with hindsight the British SBC could and should have been more effective than what it was. This is obviously different from suggesting that Britain should not have embarked upon a SBC at all. Should Britain not have done so then I would suggest that the economic cost to Britain could have been much more dire because the war might have been lost.

Cheers

Rod

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Nick,

I do not want to add any more heat to the thread. This has always been a very friendly board and discussion on a topic like this can easily get out of hand which is unnecessary. We are talking history here and it will be always open to different interpretations. Russians will always feel that the Western Allies could have done more and the Western Allies will always argue that they did what they could. I think that this is one of the matters on which there will always be split opinions. One of the reasons is that people in the West never came to fully understand the extent of the carnage on the Eastern front. The Russians really fought a completely different war out there.

Jan

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Jan, I admire your wish to keep the mood of this board amicable. I am less impressed by your throwing out an intemperate accusation which you then completely fail to justify, preferring instead to withdraw from further discussion. I can only hope that this is because you now regret what you wrote although it is difficult to see how "We are talking history here and it will be always open to different interpretations" could suffice either as an explanation or an apology.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I have been thinking about an approach that might move us all closer to a consensus, and I would be interested in your responses.

We can all agree that the Air Staff, Air Ministry, RAF and Churchill failed to deliver on their original promise that the RAF could win the war for Britain by destroying German morale and will to continue without the cost of committing ground forces in battle. It was claimed to be the economic option.
But although their programme was revealed by events as bogus wishful thinking, BC has never lacked for defenders, including many on this board, whose mouthpiece surely is Richard Overy in this opinion piece; (Source: http://warbirdsforum.com/showthread.php?t=1334).
"Bombing: The Balance Sheet. The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses .... The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours ..... Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.
The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely (my emphasis). But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, without expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.
Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. ........."

Overy's opinion is not supported by the British Bombing Survey; “In terms of overall production decrease resulting from the RAF area attacks, the US survey, based upon limited research, found that in 1943 it amounted to 9% and in 1944 to 17%. Relying on US gathered statistics the British survey found that actual arms production decreases were a mere 3% for 1943, and 1% for 1944. However they did find decreases of 46.5% and 39% in the second half of 1943 and 1944 respectively in the metal processing industries. These losses resulted from the devastating series of raids the Command launched on the Ruhr Valley at these times.” (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Bomber_Command)

The evidence that strategic bombing had only marginal effect on arms production was predicted in Zuckerman's report on the bombing of Birmingham and Hull dated 8.4.1942 (source: 'From Apes to Warlords' page 405). His conclusions were misrepresented to Churchill by Lindemann. But Zuckerman's results were repeated in Germany, and negated the strategic bombing campaign.
His Summary of Conclusions;
1. Social Effects and Morale
a) The factor most affecting the population is the destruction of houses.
b) 35 people are bombed out for everyone killed.
c) Dwelling houses are destroyed by HE and not by fire.
d) Large towns have a high capacity for absorbing their bombed out population.
e) Other raid effects such as stoppage of water or gas have little effect on the population.
f) Steady employment and a high rate of wages are the major stabilising factors for the population.
(h) There is no evidence of breakdown of morale for the intensities of the raids experienced by Hull or Birmingham.
II. Production
a) Machine tools are rarely damage by HE but very extensively by fire.
b) Loss of production is caused almost entirely by direct damage to factories.
c) Factories are more seriously damaged by fire than HE. In Birmingham 30% of factories were damaged – 10% seriously (8% by fire and 2% by HE)
d) Most fires could have been prevented at the scale of fire attack encountered.
e) Indirect effects of raids on labour, turnover, health and efficiency are insignificant.
(f) The direct loss of production in Birmingham due to the raids was about 5% and the loss of productive potential was very small.
g) Transport activity is only partially interfered with and recovery is rapid in the absence of continuous raiding.
h) Docking was not interfered with and docking potential was diminished by about 10% in the raids on Hull.

It is surely up to Overy and those of his view to prove Zuckerman wrong and to quantify their Balance Sheet rather than just expressing an opinion.
I have quantified the balance sheet with respect to Wilhelmshaven. It is consistent with Zuckerman's report and shows a significant negative imbalance to Britain between the costs and benefits of strategic bombing. Those who want more on Wilhelmshaven can read my article published in Issue 148 of After The Battle Magazine.

Wilhelmshaven was throughout the war a priority target, being BC's first target (on 4/9/1939), and the first target in Germany attacked by 8USAAF (on 27/01/1943). The disaster of the Battle of Heligoland Bight in December 1939 drove BC to abandon day-bombing for night-flying. Fahey's analysis showed the total cost of bombing Germany was £2,911 per ton of bombs dropped. The 19,048 tons of bombs dropped on Wilhelmshaven, therefore cost £55.5 million. I show below that the cost of military damage in Wilhelmshaven was only £8.3 million. Extrapolating the Wilhelmshaven experience to the whole of Germany shows that while BC cost Britain £2.78 - £3.5 billion, it caused a maximum of £0.5 billion to the German military economy. This was not a viable method of waging war. Several cheaper and more effective methods can be listed.

Wilhelmshaven was the closest major German military target to the airfields of BC and 8USAAF. The target presented a clear image on H2S. Built of non-inflammable Victorian brick, it had an efficient fire-fighting service with plenty of water - there were no uncontrolled fires. Wilhelmshaven contained valuable military targets concentrated in the small area of the Bauhafen shipyard, including Tirpitz (cost £15.2 million) that was fitting out until 9/3/1941 and attacked unsuccessfully by BC in 17 raids with 281 sorties. Wilhelmshaven was the home port of Scharnhorst (cost £12 million) and a destroyer flotilla until 1941. 29 U-boats worth £370,000 each were launched from 16/11/1940 to 17/6/1944, of which only 2 were destroyed by 8USAAF and none by BC. Some 90 units of Section 2 of the eight sections that were assembled in Bremen and Hamburg into Type XXI Electric Boats, (each complete boat costing £483,000) were built in Wilhelmshaven without loss. Production in Wilhelmshaven was never interrupted except for periods of an hour or two when a raid was in progress. Loss of production in the shipyard was much less than the 5% in Birmingham reported by Zuckerman, with negligible destruction of productive potential. The shipyard functioned fully after the war until it was dismantled and shipped to Russia as reparations.

The area of Wilhelmshaven and the Jade was the second most defended locality in Germany after the Ruhrgebiet. The cost of LW Fliegerhorsts at Jever and Nordholz are excluded from the balance sheet. Outside Wilhelmshaven, Kriegsmarine Nord HQ in Sengwarden and the Aurich arsenal were never bombed.

In attacking Wilhelmshaven, BC and 8USAAF:
- despatched 5,668 sorties (BC 3,580 and 8USAAF 2088)
- lost 146 bombers (BC 97 and 8USAAF 49)
- lost 856 aircrew killed (BC 406 and 8USAAF 450)
- dropped 19,048 tons of bombs (BC 13,676 and 8USAAF 5,372)
- killed 452 Germans on the ground (358 civilians and 94 military)
- wounded 1,125 Germans on the ground.
NB: nearly twice as many aircrew died in the air as Germans on the ground.

Bombing Wilhelmshaven cost £8.3 million, comprising;

• • Loss of production of 2% of a total production due to disruption from air raids and the threat of air raids. The value of war production in Wilhelmshaven was £41.1 million, comprising Tirpitz (£15 million), Type VII submarines (£10.7 million), Section 2 of Type XXI submarines (£5.4 million) and sundry shipbuilding and repair (£10 million). The 2% loss of production was £0.8 million. Note that Birmingham's loss of production was 5%, but Wilhelmshaven had bomb-proof bunker air-raid shelters for every inhabitant close to home or place of work, which minimised disruption, and fires were quickly extinguished n the shipyard.
  • Damage estimated at £0.01 million (£10,000) was caused to the cruiser Emden on 4/9/1939 with 11 sailors killed and 30 wounded when Blenheim N6189 flown by Lightoller of 107 Squadron was shot down and crashed into it.
  • U-769 and U-780 (Type VII), costing RM4.4 million each, were damaged on the stocks beyond repair by 8USAAF on 27/1/1943. The maximum total cost, assuming they were completely ready for launch, was RM 8.8 million = £0.7 million.
  • Mariensiel arsenal was destroyed by luck on 11/02/1943 in probably the biggest explosion ever caused by BC. The arsenal was over 3kms downwind of the aiming point in the shipyard and it was blowing a NE gale. The explosion had no impact on military operations because the destroyed ordnance comprised surplus shells for the much diminished surface fleet and sea mines. Flak munition and current naval munitions were dispersed in a dispersed arsenal at Aurich that was never identified or bombed.
  • On 11/06/1943 two out of nine oil storage tanks were destroyed by 8USAAF. No record exists of how much oil they contained or its value, which is guessed at £0.2 million.
  • The Flakship Medusa was badly damaged in Jade Bay on 19/4/1945 by 15 RP Typhoon fighter bombers of 2TAF, killing 22 and wounding 41. These casualties are not included in the statistics as they were not caused by BC. The wreck was towed into Wilhelmshaven and decommissioned. The ship had been built in the early 1900s as a Gazelle Class cruiser costing £0.4 million but had no military value when it was destroyed because Allied air raids had ceased.
  • The cruiser Köln, which cost £3 million in 1930, was sunk in the Bauhafen by 8USAAF in their last raid on 30/03/1945. But the cruisers' guns were fired later against the Polish Armoured Division in April 1945 so its insignificant military value was not affected by its sinking.
  • Also sunk on 30/03/1945 was the Fleet auxiliary Drachenfels which cost perhaps £0.4 million in the late 1930s but had no military value when it was sunk. A training submarine and sundry lighters and tugs were also sunk, but had negligible military value.
  • Likewise the destruction of the liners Tanganjika and Monte Pascoal in air raids had minimal military value, although they were used as naval accommodation ships. The liner Nyassa was damaged, but functioned as Naval HQ after the destruction of the HQ buildings. 36,000 buildings were destroyed in the air raids, but few had military value.
  • Wilhelmshaven, the Jade Bay and Schillig Roads were defended by 2 Marineflakbrigade of 5,000 -7,000 troops (male and female) equipped with 60 searchlights, 6 early warning Freya radars, 92 units of 105-mm Flak, and 20 units of 128mm Flak in 24 batteries and two Flak ships all with Würzburg gun-laying radars. The price of an 88mm Flak 18 was £2,822. Assuming the 105-mm cost twice the 88-mm, the 128-mm cost three times as much as an 88-mm, the searchlight cost one quarter of an 88-mm, and the Freyas and Würzburgs cost the same as an 88-mm, then the total equipment cost of 2 Marineflakbrigade was about £1.0 million. The cost of the equipment's concrete emplacement, of ship conversion and of communications is guessed at £0.5 million. Ammunition expended is guessed at costing another £0.5 million. An unknown proportion of 2 Marineflakbrigade comprised women and Kriegshilfseinsatz der Jugend bei der Kriegsmarine, popularly known as Flakhilfer such as Pope Ratzinger, who were recruited from those born between 1926 – 1929. These men and women were not diverted from war work. The total Flak cost is estimated at £2.0 million.

1. Smokescreen generators were installed around the town in 1942. Actual cost is unknown, with a guess of £0.1 million.
2. A balloon barrage was installed in 1940 with perhaps 30 balloons. Actual cost is unknown , but guessed at £0.1 million
3. A decoy site was built on reclaimed marshes to the North of Wilhelmshaven at unknown cost. Also large numbers of reflectors were built and installed to try and disguise the port's H2S signature. The total cost is guessed at £0.2 million
4. Air raid shelters were built for the entire population of 120,000 at a cost of RM34 - 50 million = £4.2 million. The population actually declined to 80,000 by war's end so there was plenty of spare bunker room.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

"Extrapolating the Wilhelmshaven experience to the whole of Germany …"

And for me, that's where your methodology breaks down.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Fascinating discussion.

But how can we discard the waste of ressources and young men of Fighter Command sent in useless missions such as Rhubarb, Rodeo or Circus over the continent for over three years? No more than mosquito stings on an elefant's back.
Moreover with such an unsuitable aircraft as the Spitfire with its limited range and ordnance load.

When you have at hand thousands of aircrews and aircraft available, you just cannot let them idle about when the enemy is knocking at your back door.

The Air Ministry, the RAF and WC built up BC.
What else could they have done with BC?
They all were trapped inside their own strategy.
It's easy to blame WC or Harris, but the fault rests on Trenchard's shoulders.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I would concur with Nick, I feel that this sort of extrapolation would definitely have an extreme bias one way or another, certainly no balance.

Again , hindsight is a wonderful thing. At a Military college seminar several years ago many of the things that Tony mentions were discussed and consideration as to what would have happened if all that was known now was known back in WWII. The consensus was that individual items might have been useful but that a fuller knowledge could have lost the war for the Allies. Sounds perverse but there are occasions when too much knowledge dilutes the overall will to fight, especially where there appears to be no major need to put in 100% effort. Guess what can happen then?

David

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

An extrapolation from facts is surely infinitely more valuable than the expression of an opinion based on no facts and contrary to some known facts.
Is that what you are denying?

I would let Zuckerman have the last word about trying to break enemy morale through area bombing;
"All the participants in the debate (about area bombing in WW2) were wrong. As we now know, bombing at about a hundred times the intensity of anything ever suffered by European cities during WW2 at no moment broke the spirit of the people of Vietnam against whom the American forces were fighting between 1964 and 1973. In those nine years, seven million tons of bombs dropped on South Vietnam (which received about half the total), North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia - three times the total tonnage of British, American and German bombs dropped on European soil in WW2. And the seven million tons brought no victory - only death and destruction".

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Hi Tony,

as had been pointed out by others, taking extreme and specific examples doesn't provide balance. In the case of Wilhelmshaven, one could equally pick a target such as the oil refinery at Politz and prove via extrapolation that the overall BC SBC was considerably more effective than it really was.

As a New Zealander, I could take a similar (and unfounded) stance as yourself with regard to the British army, since The United Kingdom had a habit of committing the soldiers of my country to ineffective and costly land campaigns (Gallipoli, Passchendaele, Greece, Crete, Singapore). If I looked at these periods in isolation, I'm sure I could produce a theory that the British army and its command should have been disbanded because all it did was provide raw materials and labour to the enemy. I could look at the overall cost of the British army, especially between 1939-45 and find that most of the money was wasted because only a small proportion of the army actually met the enemy in battle during the war, and only a small proportion of those actually defeated the enemy in battle.

As to the breaking of morale, this was policy decision made above the auspices of Bomber Command, and few would disagree that in itself, it was a rather pointless and misguided exercise (based, IMHO, on some rather elitist and frankly quite racist assumptions about 'the Hun'). The fact is that from 1944 onwards, BC was able to significantly move away from solely targeting the enemy's 'morale'. Zuckermann's pronouncement in comparing Vietnam and Germany, while valid to a degree, is actually very misguided because the two cannot be compared. The United States never sought to systematically destroy the cities of North Vietnam in the same manner as had occurred in Germany and Japan.

I don't believe that the true effect of the British SBC can ever be precisely quantified other than to say that the campaign was considerably less effective in the years 1939-43 than in the years 1944-45. In addition, parts of the campaign (such as the area bombing of cities, and by this I mean when the aiming point was clearly the civil heart of a city, not industrial or military areas within a city) cannot be used in isolation to pronounce on the overall effectiveness of the whole campaign, especially in the 1944-45 period, when the SBC of both the British and Americans actually began to have a significant effect.

As Webster/Frankland point out, the USSBS didn't set out to really explore the city area bombing campaign in great detail, and the differences of opinion between both the USSBS and the BBSU highlight some of the assumptions that had to be made in attempting to quantify such a complex issue (by the way, I believe it is no co-incidence that Prof. Zuckermann sought control of the BBSU and then that body just happened to reach a conclusion that vindicated Zuckermann's theories. Thus when individuals or bodies that had a vested interest in the direction of the SBC pronounce on it, one should always ask in terms of what they had to say, "who benefits?").

I doubt that too many people would disagree that had BC been better directed from mid-1944 onwards, the collapse of Germany could have been brought about slightly quicker. This in itself clearly pronounces on the debate as to whether BC should have existed or not in the first place.

Cheers

Rod

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I'm not "denying" anything, I am disputing an assumption. Specifically that extrapolation from the case of a particular city yields a valid result for the entire campaign any more that extrapolating from the Great War reliably predicted casualties in the Blitz.

You would have to show that the case of Wilhelmshaven was in some sense average or typical and that could be difficult. One might as well extrapolate from Pforzheim or Darmstadt to demonstrate that the campaign was utterly devastating and firestorms a regular occurrence but I suspect that an altogether more sophisticated approach is needed. For all I know, attacks on coastal targets could have been half as effective as those on inland targets (if X% of bombs fall within a notional circle, for a coastal target half that circle will be water). Did the local soil (Berlin is built on sand for instance) influence the number of UXBs or the propagation of shock waves from explosions? The potential number of variables in immense, I suspect.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Nick,

It was not meant to be apology of any sort but merely an acknowledgement of the fact that we will probably never reach an agreement on this topic. I am comfortable with that. History is not algebra which has a unique and correct answer for each problem. There is no “true story” hidden and waiting to be found in historical events. All we can do is take the data we have and proven or assumed relations between the agents in play and put them together in more or less coherent hypothesis or interpretation.

Your premise here, I suppose, is that Britain stood under-manned and ill-equipped against a stronger opponent and that more than three long years were needed to overcome this. For my part, I can not endorse with this picture. As in 1940, the population of UK was 48,2 million with total GDP (in 1985 international dollars) of 236,8 bn.$ and per capita GDP 4 910 $. For Germany, respective numbers were 69,8 millions, 273,1 bn.$ and 3 910 $. From 1941 on some two thirds of German war effort was vectored to the East, so corresponding portions of German figures for population and GDP should be subtracted. Thus UK was significantly wealthier, more productive and had an advantage in manpower over its opponent and yet it was unable or unwilling to wage a full scale war against Germany until mid-1944.

Now my interpretation of its low activity is that it was geopolitically-driven strategy behind it. Letting Soviets and Germans bleed to death in intense and bitter fighting in the East meant to improve Britain’s position after the end of hostilities. I’m sure you will have quite a different interpretation of the events and that you have compelling arguments to support it. For reasons stated above I can fully accept that you’ll adhere to your viewpoint and I will hold mine.

As for the Lend-Lease I am fully aware of it but you may have overlooked the reciprocity of the problem summed up candidly by Truman. Lend-Lease dollars were aimed at saving American lives: every Russian, British or Australian soldier who went into battle equipped by means of American aid reduced the danger to young Americans.

As for the efficiency of the bombing, the average GDP growth of UK between 1940 and 1944 was 2,75% per year, while in case of Germany it was 3% per year. Throughout this period Germany´s defense outlays as the percentage of national income increased from less than 50% to around 70%. It wasn’t until 1945 that German GDP decreased in year-to-year comparison. Strategic bombing campaign might have reduced productive capacity of Germany by a slight margin but it seems it was far from what was being expected.


Jan

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

I see the problem; you are using the word 'extrapolation' statistically while I am using it evidentially.

I have quantified, rightly or wrongly, the effect of aiming 19,000 tons of bombs onto an area of 0.72 sq kms (the equivalent of 67,000 tons/sq mile).
BC & 8USAAF never put the shipyard out of action and never killed any of the workers, although much repair work was needed, because they were notoriously inaccurate.
They destroyed only two military targets of significance (U-boats on the stocks) in the shipyard. Significantly, this was done by 8USAAF operating in daylight and using their Norden sights.

Wilhelmshaven's shipyard was not egregious, but typical of what strategic bombing could achieve in 1939-45, or the LW in Birmingham, Hull and Coventry.
Pictures showed the roofs off the buildings and general dereliction.
Harris showed Zuckerman his famous Blue Book that was filled with such pictures of destruction, but both Zuckerman and Harris knew that reports coming out of Germany showed that all the while production was increasing despite the apparent devastation.

This effect is now quantified, as Fahey has quantified BC's costs.
BC's effectiveness was not static, and did improve over time.
But in Wilhelmshaven's case, as in most others except a virgin target like Dresden, BC's nightly visitations just made the ruins in the city centres bounce once more.
If you think Darmstadt was different, then there's nothing to stop you doing the analysis.
I'll warrant you'll find no difference.
BC knew their dossier was dodgy, but continued because they were convinced Germans couldn't take it and their morale was about to crack. Ditto the USA failing in their effort to bomb the Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony - you probably should be more reserved in this 'analysis'.

When PACAF was finally unleashed in 1972 during Linebacker II and destroyed strategic targets in Hanoi brick by brick, the North Vietnamese did come to the bargaining table - making one wonder what would have happened if all the Joint Chiefs of Staff and McNamara had died in an auto accident in 1967 - and quit acting as Wing Operations Officer for every Navy and USAF Wing.

Regards,

Bill

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Thanks for the correction, Bill.
In future I'll stick to what I think I know something about.

BTW, would you agree there's a disconnect between BC's and modern munitions?
If so, then Vietnamese-era munitions were presumably in the transition period.

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony,
You are missing the point. The success and strategic effect of Linebacker II was a question of targeting, hitting the enemy where it hurt the most. Much of the ordnance used was no more advanced than that used during WW II, but the ability to find and hit the target had increased by orders of magnitude since WW II.
By mid 1944 RAF BC had the capability to actually hit specific factory areas and even pin-point target using Obee, this capability was not exploited due to the strategic guidance, which was partly beyond BC influence.
bregds
SES

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Tony - SES correct - the Linebacker II results were far more dictated by a.) 'correct' targeting of key industrial targets and b.) much better bombsight/flight control systems in the B-52.

Additionally, and somewhat important is that the bombs used were the low drag Mk 82 (500lb), 83 (1000lb), 84(2000lb) and 118's(3000). They are a better munition aerodynamically speaking than the GP types used during WWII.

Regards,

Bill

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Ses, a free-flight bomb is inherently inaccurate, and they were still being used in Vietnam.
Theoretically BC hit pin-point targets using Oboe, but in practice BC continued to rain down thousands of bombs onto a single target in 1944.

The US/UK Pointblank Directive was implemented by the USAAF making precision day attacks on specified German aircraft plants and airfields, while BC made 'area-attacks' by night on German towns immediately concerned in aircraft production. (From Apes to Warlords page 222).

In the preparations for Overlord, Zuckerman calculated from the photocover of the precision attacks on V1 sites, that "on average as many as fifteen hundred bombs would have to be aimed at a single coastal battery to give a reasonable chance of it being significantly damaged..... I was emphatic that visual daylight bombing would not be adequate, and that if the attacks on the critical batteries were to succeed, the bombing aid called Oboe would have to be used at night, and then only by the specially trained 617 Squadron known as the Dam Busters....I find it extraordinary when I am reminded today (1978) that on the night before D-Day each of ten batteries in the assault area was bombed by more than 100 aircraft of BC, and that this single operation involved the whole of the Command's effort for the night, at an expenditure of some 6,000 tons of bombs" (ibid page 260).

Tony

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

Maybe Zuckerman knows more than I do, but I was under the impression 617 never had Oboe.

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

But those free fall bombs still had the effect desired, because they were droped against the right targets.

Not until the advent of laser and GPS guided bombs was it possible to take out a gun in a bunker, which will withstand an overpressure of 6,000 psi. So if those batteries were to be taken out, there was no other option than to turn the entire battery area into a moonscape and hope that some guns would be damaged.
bregds
SES

Re: The momentous cost of Bomber Command.
 

mhuxt, Dave Wallace on this board implied that 617 Squadron might have had Oboe in Post No. 28 here; http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?p=90002

"617 Squadron Lancasters that carried tallboys could not be equipped with H2S. I have correspondence from Harris, Cochrane, Bennett, Saundby and others discussing this and also equipping Lancasters with Oboe, which also could not be fitted on a Lancaster with H2S.
While Oboe equipped aircraft could drop bombs or target indicators with the same accuracy in any type of cloud (the Oboe crews never used any visual references on a bombing run), the main force aircraft bombing the Oboe TIs were greatly affected by cloud. Sky marking was much less accurrate than groundmarking and the winter season Oboe attacks were on the whole less successful due to the weather. "

This makes sense. To achieve accurate aiming of large bombs, 617 Squadron would need to bomb with Oboe rather than bomb the markers dropped by Oboe Mosquitos.

Tony