new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Dear all.

I would like to share a small part of my research with regards to the responsibilities concerning the readiness state and logistics connected to replacement aircraft in the Luftwaffe.

Sadly - as you all probably know - large amounts of Luftwaffe related documents were destroyed during (as a natural part of a running military security regime - report, consume, destroy) and in the aftermath of the World War II.

To get a broader picture with regards to what information was required and was available at the time, we have some scraps left, and these are often found in strange places, for example as copies used as attachments to letters concerning a given topic .

One such scrap of information that will be described in full in an upcoming article is the 'Erfassung des Flugzeugbestandes un Neuregelung der Ersatzgestellung bei Frontverbänden' - loosely translated to ' Reporting of aircraft inventory and new routine for requests for replacement aircraft for the frontline units' - a letter to the Luftflotten and other high level commands (30 copies...!) from the General Staff.

In this letter the role of the Generalquartiermeister in the General Staff as the responsible unit with regards to both upholding the operational strength of the units, but also the centralized control of the flow of replacement aircraft is made totally clear (as opposed to earlier comments by others on this board dismissing the Gen.Qu. as a statistics unit only...). The O.Qu. or Oberquartiermeister has as relayed in this letter the same responsibility in the Luftflotten.

One very important sentence reads (for those of you fluent in German):

"Um sicherzustellen, dass Verbände nicht mehr Flugzeuge anfordern als ihnen rüstplanmässig zustehen und um eine laufende Kontrolle über den Bestand an Flugzeugen zu besitzen, wird die Führung von Bewegungslisten bei den Staffeln, Gruppen, Geschwadern und Luftflotten bzw. beim Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.H. und Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.M. befohlen."

Again, loosely translated to : in order to have an overview of the different units aircraft strength and to ensure that the units does not request a larger number of aircraft than they are entitled to according to standards, the Staffeln, Gruppen, Geschwadern and Luftflotten and the Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.H. und Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.M. are all required to deliver lists of their aircraft inventory with changes.

These lists are to be made in 5! copies, split into List A with operational aircraft and list B with all other aircraft present in the unit.

The Verteiler or distribution of the lists were:

1. Geschwader
2. Fliegerkorps or Division (dependant on chain of command)
3. Luftflotte, Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.H. und Gen.d.Lw.b.Ob.d.M. (dependant on chain of command)
4. Reichsluftministerium L.E.2

Last copy stays at the unit.

And now to a very interesting part - all aircraft leaving the units for any given cause is to be reported with Werknummer, and all communication with regards to the replacements are also to include the Werknummer.

And so to the final proof of the pudding my friends, and to show that the discussions we have had over the times with regards to what real importance and impact for a unit the loss lists kept by the Gen.Qu. had:

"In jedem Falle bleibt die werknummermässige Verlustmeldung die alleinige Unterlage für die ordnungsmässige Regelung des Nachschubes an Flugzeugen."

translated to

The loss report by Werknummer (serial number) will in every aspect be the basis for the request of an replacement aircraft.

There are further enhamncements which will be relayed later which underline this even more.

I hope that this small part of my research will enable us to come to terms with how the system was intended to work, and what responsibilities the different parts of the command chain had.

There were of course descrepancies and errors made, some even anticipated and importance of actions to reduce them outlined, as you will see from the full article.

Regards,
Andreas B

PS! The example report attached to the letter is a beauty... and this was to be used as a template

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Thanks Andreas!

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Very interesting, Andreas, but I have an extra question: what was the date of this document ?

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

September 1940. In my opinion these new systems were a result of difficulties when the number of losses increased, as well as the complexity of the entire Luftwaffe.

I am searching for information leading up to this and other letters, as I am sure it was discussed at length a bit earlier.

And of course it coincides pretty well with the inclusion of Werknummer in the GenQu lists.

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hello Andreas,

Thank you for this enlighting piece of information ! The List A (operational aircraft) and List B (all other aircraft within that unit) can be found too in the monthly inventories of the Feldluftpark.

Feldluftpark 5/Holland (RL 25/77 up and including 25/88) shows for each unit within the boundaries of Luftgaukommando Holland, the number of each aircraft types and subversions (unfortunately no Werkenummer), operational and non operational and the number/types of the respective engines. For 1942 only the inventories of February and December survived, for 1943 it is nearly complete and for 1944 only January and February survived WW-2.

All the best, Marcel

PS. how is the 1944project going?

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Very interesting Andreas

Is it possible to verify if this order is the reason why all of a sudden WNr is quoted on the loss lists? Perhaps this has been discussed before, but it has always puzzled me why no such details had been given before in Luftwaffe's loss reports. But if the document Andreas is quoting can be linked to this fact, then at least I have a good explanation....:)

Cheers
Stig

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi Andreas,

even ULTRA provides a clue to the wealth of detailed information that was lost. Many detailed daily returns can be found in HW 5 relating to various units whereby the strength and operational serviceability/readiness in aircraft and aircrews is given. These returns also list, by WN, new aircraft taken on-strength, aircraft off-strength, and aircraft unserviceable.

For I. and III./NJG4, for example, it is possible to build up a daily picture of operational serviceability, and this indicates, among other things, that many instances of damage to aircraft that could be repaired on-base were simply never reported in the surviving Gen.Qu. returns. Also indicative are the vaious causes of unserviceability due to various mechnical faults or problems with electronic/radio equipment, which at times could lead to an aircraft being unserviceable for a long period of time.

Although I don't have the specific details in front of me, I clearly remember a signal from the likes of a JD to a JG unit in 1945 complaining that the last return was not accepted because of numerical discrepancies and the lack of detail provided by the JG on unserviceable aircraft.

Cheers

Rod

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Vielen Dank Andreas. That explains what has puzzled me in the ULTRA intercepts, the inclusion of Werknummern in the loss reports.

Alles Gute

Andreas

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Thank you Andreas. Very interesting piece of info regarding early losses reports. Seems this branch is more important to researching than previously thought.
One I thought of reading this, this then must increase also the value (or Official "exactness" as closer to source) of the new aircraft distribution lists to the Luftflotten compiled by "Gen.Qu.(6. Abt. III C)" like these found for late 1944 early 1945 (RL 2 III/619, 620 and 621).

Do I understand correctly, then before September 1940, aircraft were simply drawn as needed from the Luftparks (with or without centralized control)?

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi, Ed

It more or less seems to have been the case - that requests were made directly to the Luftpark - possibly via the Luftflotte - but that they did not keep a very tight leash on this.

I would assume that the mounting losses due to the involvement agains England - and the corresponding continous demand on the Luftpark for replacements were an issue in developing a new system, and I will follow this issue when I return for my next research visit in Freiburg.

I guess you can imagine the situation when a pilot appeared at the Luftpark to pick up an aircraft that his colleague down the road just took off in - because two different clerks had 'given' two different units the same aircraft...

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

As an "information management process" specialist, it seems to me that the inclusion of the WNr in the loss report is a classical exemple of a process well designed for low activity, but not being able to sustain the
real workload, until more information is included in the system.

In this case, when the WNr was not reported, a given unit will report for example "three Bf 109 E damaged 10% in landing", then ten days later will send a message saying "increase one Bf 109 from 10% to 20%", and then the office will receive the same message the same day... Does it mean a second Bf 109 should be increased to 20%, or it is a repeat of the first message ? Either the clerk will spend time trying to solve his question (so generating more messages in both ways, and possible confusion) or he will try to solve it himself by choosing one of the options, and so possibly make a mistake. With the WNr included, corrections and additions are easier to manage (the fact that the WNr may be wrong, and was in many cases, being another matter).

With low level of loss during the first months of war, such cases were rare and could be managed manually. But with the losses mounting in May 1940 with the campaign in France, Belgium and Netherlands, it certainly became more problematic. 10 May 1940 was one of the worst days for the war fro the Luftwaffe in number of lost aircraft, and even if much of them were Ju 52s, there was still a lot of paperwork involved, especially as in this case many crew were missing for some days and then back, aircraft having landed on beaches and fields and declared missing may be repaired and so, and so....

While the introduction of the WNr was during the Battle of Britain, the reason could be in my humble opinion the losses suffered in May-June 1940. To modify a bureaucratic process is neither easy nor quick, and so if the new instructions were given in September, I suppose the thinking behind it was started some weeks or months before.

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi, Laurent.

I believe you can be right, and will be looking for information leading up to the implementation in September 1940.

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Andreas. Thanks for info. I for one is quite interested in the assignments of (new) Ju 88´s from the Luftpark´s prior to this period (August 39 to August 40). I belive some Luftpark documents survive but have not had the oppritunity to look at these. I do have partial index of RL documents but word "Luftpark" in the .pdf file produces no results. Any have list of other Luftparks not mentioned in this thread?

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hello Ed!

The Luftparks are under RL 25 in Freiburg and the findbook is only available there.

Regards

Dirk

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Thank you Dirk. I know about the RL 25/75 - 82 Feldluftpark 5(III) ones. Any available for period 02.43 to 07.43 regarding transfers to "Luftflotte 4 Öst". Need find out dates/locations/assignments regarding Ju88D-1/trop 430650 NP+MK (in Romania/Ukraine area or Luftparks "servicing" that area).

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Ed, I checked in Freiburg some of the Luftpark files (Jüterbog, Paderborn, Pori)
but there is nothing, what you are looking for.
Maybe in RL 24 are many reports from Lzgr. and there can something be found.
Dirk

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

The summer 1940 Ultras include some messages allocating specific aircraft to a unit or to a Luftflotte Reserve.

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

The summer 1940 Ultras include some messages allocating specific aircraft to a unit or to a Luftflotte Reserve.


Summer 1940 ??? How they are labelled ?? hw5...

Rémi

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Files HW5/1 - HW5/6 cover the period from 6 February – 2 December 1940.

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi Andreas,

In Gen.Qu.6.Abt returns from early October 1940 was added after damage percentage a note (Er.), which means "Ersatz notwendig, d.h. Flugzeug kann mit Truppenmitteln nicht wieder hergestellt werden" (replacement necessary, because the aircraft cannot be repaired by the unit). This is occasionally used, if percentage was below 60 % (for higher figures all losses were to be replaced with new aircraft anyway). Could this change in reporting be connected to the letter you are refering to?

Matti

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hello, Matti.

I would dare to say so:

"In der Verlustmeldung an Genst.Gen.Qu.6.Abt. ist bei Brüchen unter 60%, sofern Wiederherstellung durch Truppenmittel (siehe oben) nicht möglich ist "Er." (gleich Ersatz) zu schreiben, damit L.E. in der Lage ist, seine Kartei auf dem laufenden zu halten."

The "(siehe oben)" is with regards to earlier parts of the text describing the distinctions and routines with regards to the units vs the industry.

As stated I will be coming back to this in a forthcoming article, hopefully I will be able to publish part I by mid-April.

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Andreas - when an a/c was damaged to point of not being repairable at the Stafeln or Gruppen level Service Center, it should be noted somewhere- by Werk No and cause - and by disposition, shouldn't it?

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi.

drgondog - I am not sure I understand your question - in that case if I understand you correct the aircraft in question would be reported up through the chain of command in the standard loss records way - primary first nucleus of this being the office of the Oberquartiermeister of the units Luftflotte (or unit at that level).

This office was again responsible for reporting to the Gen.Qu.6.Abt.

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Andreas - more specifically say a 109 based at Salzwedel was deemed 40% damaged, theoretically repairable, but not repairable at Salzwedel - requiring transportation to another site.

a.) was it then stricken from the assigned fighter unit, b.) assigned into category 'out of service - but not possible to service locally' and c.) Logged out of Salzwedel inventory to repair facility 'ABC',transported to ABC depot where it was received and logged into a category 'damaged-received from Salzwedel', d.) tracked by Werkno as WIP until repaired, and e.) logged into another category 'repaired/ready for assignment, f.) Shipped to 'XYZ" unit, g.) logged by 'XYZ' as a 'new inventory item-ready for duty>

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi.

Nearly. Exchange Salzwedel with the 'Halter' - for simplicity lets use 3./JG 5, and you are nearly there.

As stated earlier - more to come!

Regards,
Andreas B

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Note however that this seems to not always have been applied religiously. ;)

All the best

Andreas

Re: new research - readiness state, losses and logistics
 

Hi.

I would in fact use this as an additional source to the fact that there was a definite focus on the maintaining of the routines.

What I read from this text is that the operational units on the front had been drawing on the resources with regards to both aircraft and personnel from units under establishment or undergoing conversions and/or reequipment, and that this practice was to stop immediately - with very few exceptions.

Routines will always be just that, adapted in lesser or larger degree in a given situation. My point has always been that the framework was there, and a rather strict one at that, and this can be a basis for Research as it is possible to deduct where one should look for further information.

We all know that in many situations the armed forces of Germany in WWII used ad-hoc units, and special units put together for short durations or specific operations. This of course also happened in the Luftwaffe, will be back with more on this also.

Regards,
Andreas