Unresponsive VVS.
 

Richard Simpkin in "Deep Battle: the Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii", published in 1987, wrote on page 64;
"Despite its lavish army aviation resources, the Red/Soviet Army never seems to have come near to achieving the speed and intimacy of fixed-wing air support which the Wehrmacht possessed, and the Western Allies developed ..... The reasons for this shortcoming are twofold. One factor (which also affects artillery support) is that a request for additional support coming up from a subordinate commander was - and apparently and astonishingly still is - a one-way ticket to the nearest penal battalion. The second reason is organisational. Although the control organisation for tactical aviation is capable of putting out a tactical headquarters to army and tentacles to division, resources are concentrated in the air army under the control of front, and are not normally farmed out on an on-call basis".

Mindful of the Red Army's adoption of 'Auftragstaktik' when switching to Tukhachevskii's Deep Operation Theory in 1942, I share Simpkin's astonishment that the VVS and artillery should have remained under the failed practice of 'Befehlstaktik'.
Did Simpkin miss something?

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Did he write about the various radio communications networks in the Soviet armed forces?

Many tanks, aircraft and infantry units did not have tactical radio sets, or a sufficient supply of parts and service technicians trained to maintain the equipment. The Russians did receive a large amount of lend-leased radios but I have not found a thorough study of how this was put to use.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

LOL!:D
Tuchachevskii has nothing to do with Deep Operation Theory. The author of the concept was Vladimir Triandafillov.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

You may be right, Igor, that Triandafillov invented deep operation theory, but this does not appear to be Simpkin's view (page 36);

"One at first gets the impression that, about 1931, this development took a sudden ninety-degree turn from 'broad' to 'deep', in tune with Triandafillov's 'second stage of development'.......... That this impression of a sudden change of direction may be wrong is largely due to the tendency of some Soviet writers to confuse 'deep battle' and 'deep operation'. In fact so eminent an authority as Losik at one point writes of ".....the deep battle, more correctly called deep operation theory". As we shall see, the 'deep battle' at tactical level was a first stage in the evolution of the 'deepening idea', leading to 'deep operation theory' and thence towards a 'theory of operational defence'. Isserson confirms this by stressing that the elements of the deep battle concept are reflected in the 1929 Field Service Regulations".

I do not, however, dispute your view because I do not speak Russian and must rely on secondary sources like Simpkin and his translation of the originals, and on you and others of course.

It might interest you, though, to know how Simpkin described the relationship between Tukhachevskii and Triandafillov (page 32);

"The intellectual relationship between T & T was a complex one. In effect Triandafillov the thinker was sandwiched between Tukhachevskii the dreamer, lover of the arts and of beautiful women, and Tukhachevskii the man of action. Isserson highlights the 'sweep of Tukhachevskii's operational thinking' and his intense technological awareness, and tells us that Triandafillov 'concretised' Tukhachevskii's ideas, thus allowing the latter to implement them".

This is slightly reminiscent of the relationship between Slessor and Trenchard, or even more slightly that between Coram and 'Forty-Second Boyd', in that the thinking of Trenchard and Boyd are known to us through others.

Finally, perhaps you would be good enough to comment on Six Nifty's interesting suggestion that a third reason for the unresponsiveness of the VVS and of the artillery arm could have been the backward state of Russian radio technology.

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

tcolvin, though I also do not read Russian, but "request for additional support coming up from a subordinate commander was - and apparently and astonishingly still is - a one-way ticket to the nearest penal battalion." sounds absurd to me

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony,

I don't know Richard Simpkin's book, but only one sentence about "penal batalion" move his work to non-read category. I don't know on what sources his researches are based but definitive not on russian archives, which are only now free for access.

About air support of soviet air force. Could you define the criteria for good or bad performance? If yes, we can go through these and look if soviet air force fullfill the points or not. From my point of view in the second part 1944 and in 1945 the soviet air force developed very formidable methods for massive support of soviet ground force and was key element for their success on the ground. The air support was concentrate primary on the domination over battle field and in the second line the cutting of supply lines and isolation of battle field. And if I understand correct this is the main difference to the air support method of western ally.

The situation with radio equipment is the same. The main problem was solved in the second part of 1944. BTW, if you read "The german air war in russia" by Richard Muller, you will see, the Luftwaffe suffered a problem with the communication equipment in 1941-42 and could not adequate communicate with ground forces

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Simpkin's 'Deep Battle' was written with John Erickson's participation, and much of the material on which it was based was originally researched for Erickson's 'The Soviet High Command and the Road to Stalingrad' and/or for Simpkin's own 'Red Armour' and 'Race to the Swift'. Simpkin wrote before the Soviet Archives were opened, and used the periodical 'Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal'.

Simpkin and Erickson were important in the development of western understanding of maneuver warfare leading to Airland Battle Doctrine - see the sources quoted in www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/maneuver_warfare.

Simpkin's view was that "no reasonable person can question that Soviet writing on the operational art is streets ahead of anything produced by the Wehrmacht or in the post-war West".

The criteria for good performance of an air force in maneuver warfare is, IMHO, the speed and effectiveness of its response to the presence of enemy anti-tank weapons and machine guns. This was first defined in 1918 by the British. It requires real time action that is dependent on direct communication between CAS and ground troops, and it is best provided when the CAS is under command of ground troops.

The RAF's 2TAF in WW2 was deficient both in speed and effectiveness, and was never under command of ground troops. My specific interest is to find a comparison with that provided by the VVS which was, of course, an army airforce.

Tukhachevskii himself stated "the paradox between centralised direction and low-level freedom of action".

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Statements that 2TAF was somehow deficient in speed and effectiveness do not seem to reflect the contemporary opinions on the troops on the ground, but post-war manoeuvring for funds and squabbles among theorists over "ownership". It should be pointed out that the Army has many tools of its own for dealing with enemy AT guns and machine guns, such as mortars, tanks, and artillery, without necessarily calling on rare and expensive assets such as aircraft at every stumbling block.

There seems to be considerable difference in appreciation of the difference between what nowadays are termed called Close Air Support and Battlefield Interdiction. The former is definitely dependent upon good radio contact with the forward troops: if this was lacking in the early years of the Great Patriotic War then there is no way that good CAS could be practised, and the most efficient use of ground-attack aircraft was in Battlefield Interdiction. This involves attacking targets behind the front line such as headquarters, supply dumps, mobile forces and supply lines such as roads and railways. This is largely dependent upon good intelligence, but where such supply lines are few and spaces open, good results can be obtained even without this.

Of course, the successes obtained this way are largely invisible to the troops on the ground, and therefore ignored by critics of airpower to whom only aircraft seen directly overhead actually count.

It's not clear to me how the Soviet approach differs in principle from Western air force tactical operations. Beyond the tactical area, however, the near-complete lack of operations at any distance from the front permitted much more freedom of movement for the Germans in re-organising to reduce the effect of breakthroughs. In this case the Western forces had the luxury of an extra weapon not available to their Soviet or German counterparts.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony,

I would say, the reaction time from 1944 was "good enough". I have not exact numbers, but we have many samples how even for single tank or bunker or AT position the shturmoviks were dispatched by air controllers on the ground. In many cases the ground controlles redirect the attacking groups in the air to the target with higher priority. Such close cooperation was one reason for the high losses in soviet airforce, the common formation with 2-6 Il-2 and 2-4 fighters was very vulnerable against german jäger, which often flew in bigger formation(at least it was reported by soviet pilot)

IIRC the air controller on the ground was assigned on the level of infantery/tank corps and it is clear, not every single company could call CAS.

The main problem of soviet CAS and also fighter protection occurs at the end phase of front operation. In some cases the ground forces moved hunderds kilometers to the west and the air force unit could not move so fast with their air fields and infrastructure and on the other hand the soviet plane have very limited action range. Therefore in such cases the situation for the ground forces was not much better as in 1941-42. The examples are either the end of Bagration operation, where soviet 2nd tank army suffered under german air attack or german attack on the bridgehead on the Oder river in february 1945.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

The Western forces used fighterbombers on patrol ready for almost immediate response to the call - the Rover David or Cabrank tactics. Although diversion from planned attacks was possible, generally it was not needed. By using fighter bombers rather than more lumbering types they were much less vulnerable if attacked by the Luftwaffe - where it still existed, as it did on Western Europe if not in Italy. The main losses came from flak, despite armouring of vital parts of the aircraft.

The early North African campaign gave much the same result of the army outrunning their air support, but after this RAF fighter and fighter-bomber units were trained to rapidly move to advanced strips to maintain the pressure on the enemy and support the army. I believe (but don't know for sure) that the US 9th, 12th and 19th AF were the same. It may be that the deciding factor in the Soviet inability to achieve this was the logistic factor in supplying such bases, rather than the immediate transfer of the fighting unit.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Is he giving some concrete examples or just saying that with the same cleverness as "farting in water"?

I don't have the complete respunse but is seems from Perov & Restrennin books that delays for Sturmoviks intervention were reduced from some days to some hours in 41-43. So we cannot statue about VVS response (or unresponse) without considering where and when, in what conditions...

Moreover, in his book the famous anti-soviet dissident Viktor Nékrassov "In the tranches of Stalingrad" remembered that for his attack mission on german lines at night, he was (personnaly) helped by two Po-2 night bombers. Considering that his combat section (he was a second Leutenant) was reduced to 9 rifles (a combat group), and german lines were distant at about 20-30 yards, i don't see in what army the air support was that close or even closer and delegated as such low subordination order...(A 2d lieutenant leading a sergeant mission).

Of course, the mission was planned and not impovised, and no question about any radio connection. However...

Regards

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Graham is right that any difference between the VVS and 2TAF does not lie in the nature of their tasks. 2 TAF routinely performed CAS and interdiction on the German side of the lines.

Rather the differences in question are related to a) the responsiveness in real time to what was happening on the ground, and b) the effectiveness of that response.

From first principles the VVS should have performed better in both regards.

The VVS was an army airforce, and played an integrated role in an all-arms approach. 2TAF never subscribed to all-arms, but operated independently 'in support' and never 'under command' of 21 Army Group. The soldiers and airmen who did the fighting never met face-to-face and there was no tactical coordination between them. Graham reflects this view; "the army has many tools ......... without necessarily calling on expensive assets such as aircraft at every stumbling block". I believe that in every Russian operation, the Schwerpunkt force would have identified the PAK front and given the task of its destruction to the VVS. This never happened with 2TAF.

The VVS, unlike 2TAF, was equipped with aircraft designed for CAS; the armoured Il-2 had enhanced resistance to FLAK compared with the Typhoon and Spitfire, and the Pe-2 dive-bomber could, although the literature is silent on whether it actually did, bomb accurately in an 80 plus degree dive on enemy field positions, which was the only accurate method in WW2 for delivering high explosive.

Graham correctly states that soldiers were generally, but by no means universally, enthusiastic about seeing the German lines being pounded by the RAF; for example they stood on the parapets of their slit trenches and cheered as Bomber Command destroyed Caen. They were not informed of Zuckerman's post-operational audit which revealed no German assets were destroyed or even damaged. The army's enthusiasm was due to ignorance. The RAF might, and indeed did, state that military morale-boosting and German civilian morale-destruction was their main if not sole business, but few argue that point today.

The RAF identified their task as being to "cart bombs" to German cities and to the German front-line. The ORBs of 2TAF's fighter-bomber squadrons are replete with the word "success". By this they meant that they navigated to the target, dropped ordnance, and returned. It meant nothing more. If the StuG, PAK or MG continued to fire after being attacked by 2TAF, there was no obligation for the attack to be repeated; 2TAF had done its job, and in fact never returned to a protected target after the FLAK had been aroused.

One example must suffice. The Germans stood in February 1945 on the west bank of the Rhine. They were supplied for a month during Operation Veritable mainly over the heavily defended Rhine bridges at Wesel. The destruction of these bridges was the task of 2TAF, which they failed to perform, the bridges eventually being destroyed by the Germans after they had withdrawn on about March 10. 2TAF's lack of an effective armoured Il-2 or of a dive-bomber had serious consequences.

I suspect the VVS would never have got away with that, and they would have been ordered to return until the bridges were down. I suspect, furthermore, that the high Il-2 loss rate was due to an uncompromising insistence that the VVS perform without excuses. The RAF, on the other hand, had been traumatised in 1940 when its strategic Fairey Battle force had been 'diverted' from attacking the Ruhr to attacking the Meuse bridges with great loss. There were two consequences; the RAF refused to operate dive-bombers or armoured aircraft, and insisted on having the final say about whether an Army request was 'reasonable'.

Igor's comments on all of this would be interesting.

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

I think that the Russians probably did the best they could with the equipment and training then available. The soldiers and airmen were sometimes at the mercy of politics but that is a separate issue.

The British Air Ministry learned the hard way that adding more armor or guns sometimes overloaded the airplane and made it more vulnerable to interception (e.g. certain versions of the Buffalo, Hurricane, and Tomahawk).

On the Western Front, the Junkers 87 had a brief career because it was a deathtrap. Based on Korean war experience, I don't believe that the Il-2 Sturmovik would have fared much better.

The USAAF had Mustangs with cut-down superchargers and dive brakes (A-36) and the RAF had its Hurricane IID with 40mm gunpods. These airplanes were used on a limited basis because the advantages were outweighed by the disadvantages. After those types were retired, the standard fighters were used in the dive-bombing role all the time. Tank-busting rockets were carried in place of heavy cannons.

Today, the sound of the A-10 Warthog, AC-130 Spectre, and Apache helicopters are music to the ears of American ground troops. These dedicated Close Air Support aircraft have been very effective. But we cannot expect to use them without interference in the kind of high threat environment where enemy fighters outnumber friendly aircraft. If faced with that situation, fast jets will take over the CAS role in the same way that the Germans used Focke-Wulf 190 fighter-bombers to replace the Ju-87.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

In other words, Nifty, you are saying that day bombers without escort or in conditions where they do not enjoy local air superiority, are vulnerable to fighters.
This is true but irrelevant in 1944 after the USAAF's Thunderbolts and Mustangs had achieved air superiority over Europe by destroying the GAF.
The British Ju-87 could then have done its accurate work unhindered by enemy fighters, and the British Il-2 would have been more effective than Typhoon and Spitfire because of its resistance to FLAK.

In any case, 2TAF's equipment proved not only to be inaccurate but also deathtraps. So much so that in early March 1945, 2TAF drastically curtailed its fighter-bomber activities - as we have seen in the matter of the Rhine bridges at Wesel - because of high losses from FLAK.
AFAIK the VVS with the right equipment never restricted its activities.

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Air superiority is not the same as no opposition. German fighters attacked Allied fighter-bombers often enough to make it very dangerous for them to fly a much slower and less manueverable airplane. If the RAF was flying a ground attack plane like the Stuka in 1944, they could lose an entire squadron in just one mission.




I've read the same kind of hyperbole about the P-47, though it is true to some extent because the Thunderbolt did not have a liquid-cooling system like the Junkers 87 and the Ilyushin Il-2. Photos are available showing Thunderbolts that returned to base with multiple cylinder heads shot away, or missing large pieces of the airframe. The Stuka and the Sturmovik would crash with the same type of damage.




Still not buying it. Several thousand Il-2s were lost in battle and I have watched 1950s USAF gun camera film of Sturmoviks bursting into flames and getting shot to pieces by .50 caliber guns, so I have doubts about your beliefs on the flak resistance of Il-2s.

Of course cherry-picking through anecdotal evidence isn't enough. You would need a lengthy scientific study (ORS investigation) to prove your case.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

There is little unknown about 2TAF, Nifty. We even have Operational Research Reports on its ineffectiveness, let alone the encyclopaedic reference books by Shores and Thomas, and shelves-full of memoirs.

We also know that Martel as military attache in Moscow in 1943 heard about the high regard in which the Il-2 was held by the Russians for its effectiveness. He raised the matter with the General Staff in London. Their response was the predictable "Nothing to see; pass along please".

This thread is an attempt to pause, and not to pass along, but to identify what is known about the VVS in its CAS role.

All I have read is that VVS CAS was unresponsive - and I assume Simpkin had his source for that statement, even if he did not reference it.

On many grounds, some of which I have mentioned, I find it difficult to imagine that the VVS was as ineffective as 2TAF.
But it's likely that there is no one in the West who can answer that question.
Perhaps someone in Russia has some of the answers?

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Can I ask about the attacks on the Wesel Bridges by the 2nd TAF. My understanding was that the attacks were undertaken by Bomber Command on the 16th - 19th February not 2nd TAF but admit to not having the exact details of 2nd TAF missions so if you could supply any dates it would be appreciated.

I admit that I wouldn't expect fighter bombers of any type to have any success against a bridge of that type. Bridges were always hard to destroy as the blast effect would be minimal and the the bombs not heavy enough to damage the foundations. The Il 2 may well carry more effective weapons but I don't know of what nature. Are there any examples of the VVS destroying similar bridges.

Lastly the impact of the IL 2 serving with the RAF or USAAF would be difficult to guess. The IL 2 was better at resisting damage but its a lot slower, a bigger target and less manoeuverable making a lot easier to hit. Typhoons were well protected with armour beneath, behind and to the sides of the pilot which isn't bad. At a guess the factors would probably balance one another. However if an IL 2 or Typhoon were intercepted by Me109 or Fw190 the Typhoon stood a much better chance, well able to evade or join combat but the IL 2 would be little more than target practice and hope the rear gunner is having a good day.

Its also true to remember that the concentration of AA guns against the RAF and USAAF was much higher as the distances on the ground were smaller. This is the only way I could see the Ju87 staying in front line service as long as it did. Operating by day over the western front would be suicide.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony, perhaps you could quantify what you mean by the term "ineffective" in relation to the 2TAF, or other tactical air forces of other combatants of the period?

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Please could we stop using modern hindsight as a factor that planners apparently should have taken into account in their decision making processes

In mid 1942, which is about the time a commitment would have to be taken to produce the British Stuka or Il-2 in time for full squadron service in mid 1944, would anyone really have placed those orders?

The Ju87 had been shot out the sky and withdrawn from the action in the BoB. The Il-2 may have been wonderful, but they had been shot down in droves in the German advance into USSR which was still rolling eastwards (650+ Il-2, R-3, V-11 and ZKP-57s depending on what they called them claimed by Jagdwaffe by 30/6/42).

The home grown Fairey Battle had been a death trap.

Who is going to bet on the USAAF shooting the Luftwaffe out of the sky so that the RAF can waft about in safety. Not even the USAAF would have placed money on that outcome, they were firmly wedded to the bomber always getting through.

Martin

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Sorry for the delay (due to travelling) in replying to the many interesting comments and questions. This will attempt to cover all outstandings.

1. Igor stated that VVS ground controllers were assigned at the infantry/tank corps level. A 1944 Russian Mechanised Corps contained 16,438 personnel and 246 tanks, equivalent to an Anglo-Canadian armoured division of 14,964 personnel and 290 tanks. Like the VVS Ground Controllers, 2TAF's FCPs (Forward Control Posts) were also assigned to corps HQs, but remember XXX Corps in Operation Veritable had 6 divisions and 3 Armoured Brigades under command and was the same as a Soviet Front. However, 2TAF provided Contact Cars to divisions with visual control posts which were allotted aircraft and sometimes a cab rank. There was therefore no difference between the modi operandi of the VVS and 2TAF.
2. Igor stated that it was only in the end phase of front operations that the VVS became detached from the forces it supported due to the distances advanced. With the exception of the Normandy breakout, this was not a factor in the West because of the much slower rate of advance. Had the advance been faster, 2TAF would have had a problem because the Typhoon, unlike the Il-2, could not operate from open fields. It required hardened runways, minimally PSP/Marsden Matting but usually reinforced concrete or brick.
3. Glider asked about the attacks on the Wesel bridges by BC. The task was in fact given by SHAEF to 3 Air Division of the US 8th Army Air Force. They attacked on five days with 377 sorties dropping 887 tons of bombs, as follows; 1 February (139 a/c dropped 381 tons); 14 Feb (37 a/c and 110 tons), 16 Feb (63 a/c and 189 tons); 19 Feb (68 a/c and 184 tons); and 24 Feb (70 a/c and 23 tons). They succeeded on 14 February in bringing down a span of the Wesel road bridge, leaving two bridges that survived to the end.
4. Glider doubted whether any fighter bomber could hit a bridge. 2TAF normally used mediums for attacking bridges. They flew above the FLAK and were notoriously inaccurate. I believe bridges were targets for the Il-2, but certainly benefited from the accuracy of dive-bombing. It was so normal for the GAF to attack bridges that the Soviets invented a method (unique AFAIK) of underwater bridging. That the famed Norden bomb sight with the claimed ability of placing a bomb in a pickle barrel from 17,000 ft was obviously the wrong tool at Wesel was neatly demonstrated by the GAF when on 24 February they destroyed at night two American bridges over the Roer (Operation Grenade). In a post-war analysis of the Wesel bridge fiasco, the RAF concluded that Mediums should have been used, which confirms they lacked the right equipment.
5. Glider's priority in a CAS aircraft is safety from enemy fighters. This was the RAF's reasoning for not operating dive bombers (Ju-87B, Pe-2, Mustang, Vengeance), armoured bombers (Il-2, He-129B) lightly-armoured bombers (Fw 190F) or large-gun carriers (Ju-87G, He-129B-3, or even Hurricane IIE which was rejected by 2TAF). However this policy threw the baby out with the bath-water. Because on most of the occasions when aircraft with dive-bombing or big-gun accuracy, or with resistance to FLAK, were desperately needed, there was little risk of GAF fighter interception. I will give just one example; the Hillman strong-point above the landing beach of La Breche held up 3 British Infantry Division all day on D-Day due to the inability of 2TAF to destroy it. The measurable consequences of Caen not being taken on D-Day, was due almost entirely, IMHO, to the absence of the Vengeance dive-bomber which could have destroyed Hillman. The Vengeances were on target-tug duties in Devon because they refused to operate dive-bombers.
6. The answer requested by Simon E as why 2TAF was ineffective is that it refused to operate the correct equipment for its assigned tasks. From the time in 1939 when ordered to France, the Army demanded its own air force equipped over time with dive-bombers, armoured aircraft, and aircraft equipped with heavy guns. The RAF's reply was that the Army need not worry, because if ever it got into difficulties the RAF would drop everything and devote its strategic bomber force to the Army. The RAF regarded specialised CAS aircraft as coming at the cost of strategic bomber numbers. But, as we have seen, strategic bombers were not the right equipment to take out the Wesel bridges. The RAF equipped 2TAF, with botched up air superiority fighters that could not deliver bombs vertically and accurately, and were equipped with unreliable RP (which suffered gravity drop when leaving the rails). Furthermore, since the RAF insisted on its independence and on delivering support to the Army only on its own terms (and Churchill let them get away with it), 2TAF's ineffective support was not always provided in a timely fashion.
7. Finally Giles believes the RAF is being condemned here retrospectively and presumably unfairly. But these matters were thrashed out at the time amid anger and recrimination. The Army nearly got its own air force (Brooke persuaded Churchill), and there was even IIRC discussion about producing the Il-2 in Britain. Martel reported on its use in Russia after discussions with Shaposhnikov; “The discussion on armoured forces ended this series of conferences with the Russians. Certain points stood out. First of all, it was clear that the Russians set great store by the Sturmovik aeroplane. No other nation had developed an aircraft which was armoured in this way. Were they all wrong and the Russians right? We made further enquiries as regards casualties in these aircraft from flak. This was not very easy to assess. The troops on the Russian front were not nearly so well equipped for producing flak. This question of using armoured aircraft was clearly very important, and we decided that we must take every opportunity of studying this matter and obtaining further information”. Dive bombers were bought from the USA by Beaverbrook at the demand of the Army, but never used in Europe and reports of their good performance in Burma were deliberately suppressed by the RAF. The very possibility of a long-range fighter that would protect the bomber was dismissed from first principles by Portal, leaving the Americans to develop the Thunderbolt and Mustang in that role and to destroy the GAF. That situation should have prompted the RAF to release the Vengeance for CAS use in NW Europe. But the RAF could never abandon Trenchard's article of faith (strategic bombing could win the war by destroying enemy morale without the need to engage the enemy forces), nor the Royal Tank Corps that of Hobart's (mobility with firing on the move). RAF and RTC thus showed themselves to be cults oblivious to reason, and wrapped up in their own illusions.

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

The early P-47s had only a few extra miles of range over the Spitfire of the time period. Btw, the Spitfire was over Berlin years ahead of any American fighter.

The Mustang was built at the request of the British and the two that the American got from the British order languished at W-P for around a year until the USN needed some weapon testing done. It still wasn't an a/c that would be of much use in long range escorting at 20,000ft plus. No British order,then no American P-51.

When the Vengeance would have been operational in the ETO, the German fighter force was still a force to be recond with (1942-43). They were sent to theaters where they could survive better.

So the Germans destroyed 2 of the 19 temporary bridges that the American had constructed to get across the Roer.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Before I start I must thank you for the time and effort you clearly put into the replies, its much appreciated.

As I understand it then, it wasn't the failure of the 2 TAF that the bridges were not destroyed, but the responsibility of the 8th Air Force with B17/B24 to destroy the bridges. I admit to not being suprised about the difficulty. B17/B24's didn't carry big enough bombs to damage the foundations of such bridges and had to rely on a direct hit. You then have the problem of the low payload of the US bombers limiting the number of bombs carried and the normal carpet bombing approach of the USAAF depending on the lead bomber which would spread the bombs over an area the sixe of the formation. I didn't doubt the ability of the FB to hit the bridge, I doubted the ability of a FB to carry a big enough bomb to damage the foundations. I didn't say it but agree with you when you say that a FB lacked the precision of a dive bomber. Unless you hit the span square on then most bombs would have a limited effect.
From what I have heard the medium bomber would have been the right weapon and in particular the 4000lb cookie in a mosquito, but these were not used. Its also truer that from what you say, the 2TAF never tried to destroy the bridges so its a bit off to say that they failed. If they had given the job to 2TAF the result might have been different as they did have the right tools.

My statement was intended to point out that an IL2 was just as vulnerable as a Typhoon to AA fire, the Typhoon being smaller, faster and more manoeverable and more difficult to hit but more vulnerable when hit. Whereas the IL 2 could take more damage but was much easier to hit. Its only a guess but the pluses and minus' would even out. However when faced up against fighters the Typhoon had all the advantages.

As for the vulnerability of the dive bomber. You are correct when you say that the danger from fighters was low there is still the danger from AA fire. After droping their bombs dive bombers were low, slow and very vulnerable. The losses to AA fire sufferred by all the allied airforces would be magnified for dive bombers due to their low performance. A couple of points on this.
1) There is no doubt that Hillman wasn't badly damaged by the landing bombardment from sea and air. But others were and some surrendered as soon as the ground forces attacked..
2) Why would an IL2 do better than a Typhoon against a heavily protected bunker system?
3) As far as I can tell Hillman wasn't attacked directly by the 2TAF once the landing was underway. With that in mind I don't see how it can be used as an example of the failure of the 2TAF.
4) Typhoons were used in support of the attack on Hillman with some success in just the role that some people believe they had little impact. You will notice the phrase 'Typhoons dive bombed Tanks as they moved up'.

Soon after four o'clock a troop of the Staffordshire Yeomanry scouting ahead reported enemy tanks advancing from Caen. The squadron with the Suffolk at Hillman strong-point was hastily moved to Biéville and had just taken up position to the west when about forty enemy tanks, moving very fast, attacked. Two were knocked out by the Yeomanry and two by the Shropshire anti-tank guns and the enemy turned away into the woods. They were pursued by the Yeomanry and by field-gun fire, and when they showed again some more were destroyed. They swung off again and were joined by others, and making a wide détour they came in towards the Périers ridge. There they met the squadron of the Staffordshire posted at Point 61 for just such an occasion. Three more were knocked out and again they drew off. Thirteen had then been knocked out to our knowledge (our only loss was one self-propelled gun), but they had already been persistently harassed by aircraft while they were south of Caen. On the western outskirts of the town eight Typhoons of the Second Tactical Air Force had dive-bombed tanks moving up to join the fight and had left two in flames and four others smoking. Feuchtinger has since said that his division started the day with 124 tanks and by nightfall had only 70 left. In view of his figures British records were over-modest

http://warchronicle.com/british_3rd_...ctorysword.htm

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

I cannot understand the points you are making, Kutscha.

1. Long-range air-superiority fighters.
The Spitfires over Berlin were stripped PR machines with extra internal fuel tanks - designed by a civilian to show the disbelieving RAF what was possible. What's your point?
The Americans adapted two Spitfires to fly the Atlantic in a vain attempt to prove to Portal that it was possible to design long-range fighters. He wouldn't listen.
All the action on long-range air superiority fighters came from the Americans. Are you disputing this?

2. The Mustang was built to a British order, and re-engined with a Merlin. And your point?

3. Most of the Vengeance dive-bombers were sent to Devon in South-west England as target tugs, while the Normandy campaign was being fought with Allied air superiority and without dive bombers. Devon was not a theatre of war. So both your point and your meaning are unclear.

4. Yes, the American bridges destroyed by the GAF were temporary. Again, what's your point?

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Glider, I now see the difficulty.

It was always 2TAF's responsibility to destroy the Wesel bridges. It was their decision to ask for Heavies rather than use their own glide-bombing Typhoons and Spitfires or Mediums. The failure of the Heavies was not the responsibility of VIIIUSAAF - they did what they could with an inaccurate weapon system, and they did it frequently and whole-heartedly. The failure to destroy the bridges remains at the door of 2TAF. The postwar audit confirmed this when 2TAF decided they should have used their own Mediums.

You think Mediums were the right tools? I beg to differ. The Medium was only a small version of a Heavy with the same inaccuracy. 2TAF's Mediums were notoriously inaccurate, destroying vast areas of housing around all of the bridges they did take down - the Dutch were particularly scathing, and Dutchmen I've spoken to said whenever they saw an Allied medium they'd dive for cover. I guess you know that Horrocks, OC XXX Corps, banned the Mediums after they had twice bombed his troops in Operation Veritable.

The problem of the Typhoon was its vulnerable engine. The great Eric Roberts, CO 609 Squadron, was brought down by a solitary MG42 on the barge he was attacking on March 9, 1945. He had been given the OK to attack the barge by Johnny Baldwin, who was present, ironically because there was no FLAK; defended targets had been placed out of bounds in order to cut down the pilot loss rate. The only possible conclusion is that the Typhoon was not fit for purpose. It can be said with a certainty that no Il-2 could not be brought down by an MG42.

There was no FLAK at Hillman. But even if there had been, a non-frivolous 2TAF under Army control, would have devised a drill for neutralising FLAK before sending in the Vengeance dive-bombers. These were, in any case, less vulnerable than Typhoons to FLAK.

The question to be answered is why 2TAF chose the Typhoon and Spitfire for CAS. I suggest the reasons were both psychological and philosophical. The psychological problem resulted from the trauma of 1939/40 when the cream of the strategic bomber crews were killed in daylight when flying Wellingtons in the Heligoland Bight and Battles against the Meuse bridges. They said never again, and took to the night. When they had to destroy the Wesel bridges, they passed the parcel to the Heavies. The RAF's philosophical problem was due to the teaching of Trenchard that air power was unique in that it could succeed without needing to engage the enemy's main force. Instead it would attack the enemy's means of production. When ordered to accompany the Army or be broken up, the RAF, like the tanks, grasped at the panacea of mobility; a 400mph Typhoon would survive where a 250mph Battle could not (a 30mph cruiser tank would survive where a 12mph Infantry tank could not). When the Typhoon loss rate from FLAK reached an unacceptable level, 2TAF simply withdrew the Typhoon and Spitfire from defended targets.

Concerning the Typhoon's claims against 21 Panzer Division on D-Day, I would question that Typhoons dive-bombed (sic) tanks and left two in flames and four others smoking. Such claims (eg around Mortain in July), when investigated by Operational Research teams, were almost always reduced and the destruction ascribed to anti-tank guns.

Tony

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony
I still don't see how you can blame the 2 TAF for not attacking the bridges when they were not asked to attack them in the first place. According to the records I have seen (which are not conclusive I admit) the 2 TAF were never asked, tasked or ever planned to attack the bridges. It wasn't a case of the 2ATF passing the buck, they never had the buck to pass over in the first place.

Its a similar situation re the Hillmen strongpoint. How can you blame the 2TAF for not knocking it out when no one asked for it to be attacked? Had they been asked to so, then they would have attacked, flack or no flack.

I didn't know about Gen Horricks decision to ban mediums but I do know that 38 Brigade prepared a detailed report on the fighting and no problems with the air support were mentioned.
http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_R...d%20Report.htm

No one would deny that the achilles heal of the Typhoon was its radiator, the same wen for the Tempest and P40, all of which performed well in the GA role. However I would still argue that its smaller size, higher speed and better maneouverability would balance the additional vulnerability. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter and if he hadn't hit the radiator, the german would not have done much apart from knock a couple of holes in the plane.
As has been pointed out a large number of IL2's were shot down but the Finns who were on the receiving end of the IL2 noted that against pin point targets they were pretty ineffective due to a lack of accuracy.

As for why the Spitfire and Typhoon were chosen for GA I believe there are two different reasons.
Typhoon because it was fast, robust, well protected, exceptionally well armed and capable of carrying a heavy payload plus, by RAF standards it had a good range.
Spitfire, because we had planty of them, and as time went on the Mk IX could carry a respectable payload but not as much as the Typhoon or P47, whilst the XIV became the fighter to give top cover.

Finally can I ask where you get the information that the Typhoon and Spitfires were withdrawn from attacking defended targets?
I say this as on the last day of the war Spits and Typhoons were attacking ships and airfields both of which were amongst the most heavily defended targets you could find.

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

see above

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Tony
On Il-2 vs Typhoon. Typhoon was vulnerable to rifle calibre fire but much less vulnerable to Bf 109s and Fw 190s. Both were vulnerable to 20mm AAA.

Il-2 was interesting solution to CAS problem but if you look the Soviet losses in men and material in 44-45 and compared those to losses of Western Allies in ETO in 44-45 you can see that it wasn’t a magic weapon. One could not fight a cheap war against an army like WM.

On Hillman. I cannot follow your logic. If British had known how difficult object it was they could have softened it by heavy naval fire, for ex from HMS Rodney. 1 Suffolks had had easy job to reduce Morris shortly before (white flag went up before 1 Suffolk even had begun their attack on it). and it dawned to them that Hillman would be a totally different game only after their point platoon and parts of the second were inside Hillman. A bit late if one was not totally callous to the life of his own troops to deploy heavy support fire, dive bombers, BB main armament fire etc at that point.

Juha

Re: Unresponsive VVS.
 

Guys, this thread has really strayed from its original subject. I'm closing it down. If you want to start a new thread on the subject being discussed in the last posts, please do so, but keep on subject.