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Response to Glider and Juha.
Glider's question;
Tony I still don't see how you can blame the 2 TAF for not attacking the bridges when they were not asked to attack them in the first place. According to the records I have seen (which are not conclusive I admit) the 2 TAF were never asked, tasked or ever planned to attack the bridges. It wasn't a case of the 2ATF passing the buck, they never had the buck to pass over in the first place. Its a similar situation re the Hillmen strongpoint. How can you blame the 2TAF for not knocking it out when no one asked for it to be attacked? Had they been asked to so, then they would have attacked, flack or no flack. I didn't know about Gen Horricks decision to ban mediums but I do know that 38 Brigade prepared a detailed report on the fighting and no problems with the air support were mentioned. http://www.royaltankregiment.com/9_R...d%20Report.htm No one would deny that the achilles heal of the Typhoon was its radiator, the same wen for the Tempest and P40, all of which performed well in the GA role. However I would still argue that its smaller size, higher speed and better maneouverability would balance the additional vulnerability. Typhoons were well armoured for a fighter and if he hadn't hit the radiator, the german would not have done much apart from knock a couple of holes in the plane. As has been pointed out a large number of IL2's were shot down but the Finns who were on the receiving end of the IL2 noted that against pin point targets they were pretty ineffective due to a lack of accuracy. As for why the Spitfire and Typhoon were chosen for GA I believe there are two different reasons. Typhoon because it was fast, robust, well protected, exceptionally well armed and capable of carrying a heavy payload plus, by RAF standards it had a good range. Spitfire, because we had planty of them, and as time went on the Mk IX could carry a respectable payload but not as much as the Typhoon or P47, whilst the XIV became the fighter to give top cover. Finally can I ask where you get the information that the Typhoon and Spitfires were withdrawn from attacking defended targets? I say this as on the last day of the war Spits and Typhoons were attacking ships and airfields both of which were amongst the most heavily defended targets you could find." My responses: 1. On the Wesel bridges' question, 2TAF was asked to destroy the bridges. In the planning of Veritable, 1 Canadian Army asked for the destruction of the Wesel bridges by air attack. All air support of 21 Army Group was the sole responsibility of 2TAF, and the only place 1Cdn Army could address its requests. If 2TAF wanted Heavies, then they put the request either to the BC LO at 2TAF, who passed it on to Harris, or to SHAEF who passed it on to VIIIUSAAF. If the answer was no, then 2TAF had to find another way from its own resources. 2. On the questions of Horrocks' banning all air support including Mediums, and the restrictions placed on CAS, I will quote from my draft book if you don't mind; At this time (February 28) stresses long in the building came to a head. Their genesis can be traced to events earlier in the month. Horrocks was never happy with his decision to use heavies to 'take out Cleve', as Crerar described it. Horrocks wrote in 'Corps Commander' that he felt almost physically sick when he saw the bombers do another Caen. His rationalisation was that he was in a race to the Nutterden feature, and destroying Cleve might give him an advantage by slowing up the German reserves. This was the same argument used for the destruction of Caen and Winnekendonk. His overriding objective was to save British lives. He added that he was blessed with too much imagination and that it was fortunate for the British Army that he never rose above the level of Corps Commander. For years after the war Horrocks had nightmares about Cleve, and the destruction turned out to have been far worse than he had imagined because the RAF used HE instead of the incendiaries he had specifically requested. Even worse, the craters held up his advance and cost British as well as many German civilian lives. The destruction of Cleve was on February 8. A fortnight later on February 21, 2 Group despatched a box of mediums comprising 35 Mitchells and Bostons to attack Weeze. Due to a mistake in navigation, thirty aircraft dropped 96 bombs on British troops in Goch and Üdem. Horrocks exploded, having, 'a sudden revulsion to all types of air support and requested the removal of all 84 Group assistance from his Corps front. This outburst of indignation upset the planning and consequently aircraft of 131, which were to have attacked strongly defended positions and troop concentration areas on the front of 51(H) Div, were diverted to alternative targets at Weeze and Sonsbeck'. Source: 84 Group ORB Both Horrocks and Shores are silent about this in their books. 2 TAF was overstretched and its commanders were worried about losses. On March 1, 84 Group's Ops' Log reported a conference during that night with the Army, leading to a decision to impose a severe restriction on the, 'liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots. The automatic use of aircraft in the counter-battery rôle, for instance, would be discontinued during static or semi-static periods, and indeed only accepted in special cases in an advance when our artillery could not take on the rôle, or if the menace of enemy guns was having a really serious effect. Moreover, the prolific use of Rocket Typhoons in cab rank under FCP control would have to be reduced and the scope of the FCP limited to a definite sector of front; for example a Div(isional) or B(riga)de front rather than as at present on an entire Corps front. A further check was to be kept on the acceptance by GCC of targets so that effort would not be wasted'. Ironies abound in this assessment of chickens roosting noisily. The high speed of unarmoured Typhoons and Spitfires was now recognised as providing no defence against the powerful Flak defending German gun batteries, so 2 TAF simply abandoned that most important target without mentioning their previous refusal to consider aircraft armour. It was back to 1917. Furthermore, 2 TAF now mentioned the idea of supporting specific divisions or brigades when previously no formation smaller than a corps or army had been recognized. 2 TAF had been defeated and withdrew as surely as the U-Boats and the Flying Fortresses had been forced to do in 1943. I would now add this; A clue as to how the decision of the conference on March 1, 1945 was interpreted can be found in Ziegler's 'The Story of 609 Squadron', on pages 312/3. Squadron Leader Roberts checked with Group Captain Baldwin as to whether it was alright to attack, and was given permission because of the absence of FLAK. “.....on 9th March, 609 had lost yet another CO on a supposedly 'easy' mission against barges ..... Johnny Baldwin, who had recently succeeded Desmond Scott as airfield commander, decided to 'go along for the trip', and here is part of the last entry in Eric Roberts' diary: “Because of the lowered cloud base I checked with Baldy as to whether to attack, and received the expected OK owing to the scarcity of FLAK. Turning west, I spotted the barges and led the boys down”. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Juha's questions;
Tony, On Il-2 vs Typhoon. Typhoon was vulnerable to rifle calibre fire but much less vulnerable to Bf 109s and Fw 190s. Both were vulnerable to 20mm AAA. Il-2 was interesting solution to CAS problem but if you look the Soviet losses in men and material in 44-45 and compared those to losses of Western Allies in ETO in 44-45 you can see that it wasn’t a magic weapon. One could not fight a cheap war against an army like WM.On Hillman. I cannot follow your logic. If British had known how difficult object it was they could have softened it by heavy naval fire, for ex from HMS Rodney. 1 Suffolks had had easy job to reduce Morris shortly before (white flag went up before 1 Suffolk even had begun their attack on it). and it dawned to them that Hillman would be a totally different game only after their point platoon and parts of the second were inside Hillman. A bit late if one was not totally callous to the life of his own troops to deploy heavy support fire, dive bombers, BB main armament fire etc at that point. Juha 1. On the Il-2, I would quote Walter Schwabedissen whose conclusions appear to differ from yours. I look forward in your comments; "All German commanders describe the IL-2 as a highly useful airplane for ground-attack missions. Owing to its good armour plating, the plane could only be brought down by very well directed ground fire. It had a speed of 210 mph. General der Flakartillerie a.D Wolfgang Pickert adds that the IL-2 was impervious to light 20-mm armour-piercing or 37-mm shells. The same views are expressed by General der Infanterie von der Groben, who emphasises the nose armour and remarks that direct hits with 20-mm shells frequently had no effects on the plane. The experience of the 54th Fighter Wing also shows it was hardly possible to shoot down the IL-2 aircraft in an attack from the rear, because of its excellent armour protection." Source: Walter Schwabedissen: The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders. 2. On Hillman, IIRC there was an attack from the air planned which was delayed and ineffective. I seem to remember it was from Heavies. I will have to check and get back to you. I can't answer about naval support. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Tony, you are again picking and choosing quotes that suit your purposes. Here is a quote I have picked about the Il-2:
"As revealed in Rastrenin's book, it took horrendous IL-2 losses before VVS Shturmovik units developed effective ground-attack tactics. The book is replete with countless missions where poorly-trained IL-2 crews, usually without fighter escort, hurled themselves at Axis forces only to be slaughtered by flak and Luftwaffe aircrews." From a review of the book "Il-2 Shturmovik Guards Units of World War 2" by Oleg Rastrenin. You are also again making broad over simplified statements without any support. For example, your quote from your upcoming book "..so 2 TAF simply abandoned that most important target without mentioning their previous refusal to consider aircraft armour. It was back to 1917." I hope you realize there was no 2 TAF in 1917. I hope you realise that the Typhoon did have some armour, as did most RAF combat aircraft. Like everything else crammed into a warplane, armour must be traded off against other equipment and structure to keep the thing flyable. We can second guess the designer's decisions from our arm chairs today, but just "adding armour" to any aircraft is quite a bit more complicated than you may understand. The questions you pose are very complex, and deserve more than the simple quotes you or I can throw at them here. I hope your upcoming book uses a wide range of sources. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
On the Wesel Bridges My probably incorrect understanding of the planning of the operation was that a joint meeting was held at which the Army USAAF and RAF were represented and the allocation of resources was made at that meeting. The air plan was put together before the battle atarted and the USAAF 8th air force had the target from the begining.
Your book looks interesting but ypur comments raise some questions. Some units of 2TAF (122 wing) were told to ease up for a short while around 1st March but in addition some Typhoon units were reequiping with Tempest which took them out of the action (485 and 349 squadron) others were transfering from rocket firing to bombing which needed re training, (183 squadron), some were disbanding (257 Squadron). Some Spitfire units were re equiping with Spit XVI (74 Squadron) plus the weather was very poor and after a period of intensive operations I would expect that the aircraft would need some TLC and the pilots a rest. As I pointed out and no doubt you are aware, operations did continue at a high intensity and on the last day included Airfields and shipping strikes. As you are well aware airfields and shipping strikes are arguably the most dangerous targets around. To dismiss this as a defeat and withdrawal from combat is just wrong factually. If I am incorrect then please explain these attacks. The combat diary is interesting but when you remember that a low approach was the most dangerous and the low level of the cloud would dictate a low approach the amount of AA fire becomes a factor. You seem to have a great belief with the Dive Bomber, its worth remembering that the Vengence was replaced in the Far East with a FB the P47. Re the difficulty in shooting down the IL 2. If it was so impervious then why were approximately half of IL 2 losses caused by Flak? Finally to call the Typhoon unarmoured is just wrong. It had the normal armoured seat, armour either side of the pilot and the engine in front of him. Some reports have mentioned an armoured floor but I have not been able to check up on that so will leave it open. Either way the pilot was very well protected. It may not have been proof against a 20mm but I suspect the Il 2 wasn't either, see above comment. Going back to the Wesel bridge. How would the Russian forces have destroyed it. The IL didn't carry a big enough bomb and would have been shot to bits by AA fire. The Pe 2 didn't carry the right weapons so what are you left with? |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello Tony
On Il-2 vs Flak, IIRC Raus in Panzer East noticed that at first Il-2 was a great shock because it seemed to be impervious to 20mm AAA fire but they then discovered than 50-50 mixture of 20mm Minen and AP ammo was effective against it. Same finding was made by Finns, a 50-50 mixture of AP and HE made 20mm AAA guns effective against Il-2s, it was called “Murha-sekoitus” (“Murder-Mixture”) by Finnish gunners according to Biaudet, a 20mm Breda(Italian gun) troop and later a battery CO during 44 and the writer of a good book on Finnish AA during the Continuation War (1941-44). In fact Finnish AAA batteries found a way to use their twin 7,62mm AA-mgs against Il-2s. While the main guns of light AA batteries (20mm and/or 40mm) fired on incoming Il-2s the AA-mgs opened fired on them as they overflew the batteries, their mission was to kill the rear gunners. Il-2 vs fighters, now Il-2 was not a easy kill but many pilots made multiple claims on them, appr 8 claiming 50 or more, IIRC the top Il-2 killler was Otto Kittel with 94 Il-2 kills, he happened to be a JG 54 pilot. Finns thought that Il-2 was a difficult target to Bf 109G but fairly easy target to Bf 109G-6/R6 (ie 109G with two extra 20mm in underwing gondolas) so the success of Kittel who was a Fw 190A pilot (4 20mm) is not surprising. Juha |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Glider,
1. Armour on the aircraft types under discussion was as follows; Typhoon 1B: 551 lbs, covering radiator, cockpit sides, cockpit floor and 8mm seat back. Ju-87G-1: 1,540 lbs; 8mm ventral armour and armoured radiator; 4mm armoured pilot's seat with 4mm side and 8mm back armour. 75mm armoured windscreen; 8mm armoured rear bulkhead 5mm armoured floor for gunner. Il-2m3: 2,092 lbs; nose and centre section pressed from 6mm rolled armour around the engine and crew; 8mm ventral armour around oil cooler ; 55-65mm armoured windscreen glass; 8mm armoured canopy roof; 13mm armoured bulkheads behind gunner and spinner. Hs-129B: 2,370lbs; spot-welded nose and centre section of 6 - 12mm armour plate; 75mm armoured windscreen in 6mm armoured frame. It is reasonable to call the Typhoon 1B unarmoured; the Ju-87G-1 armoured; and the Il-2m3 and Hs-129B heavily armoured. 2. I recommend you read any of Peter C Smith's books on dive bombers. His best summary, IMHO, is 'The History of Dive Bombing. A Comprehensive History from 1911 Onward', published in 2007. I can warrant it will change your views on dive bombing. 3. Re Hillman; there was in fact no air strike planned or made. Support was available from naval guns, but the Naval FOO was killed in the attack on Morris. My point is that had there been an Army Air Force instead of 2TAF, then the Vengeances would have been on stand-by for just such an eventuality. Stukas, I believe, had an SD-500 HL (Hohl-Ladung or Hollow Charge) bomb which was reputed to penetrate 11½ ft of reinforced concrete, which was possibly good enough to neutralise Hillman. The Vengeance could lift 1 ton or two such bombs. source: http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/t...rge-bombs.html 4. These bombs would also have done the trick if used on the Wesel bridges. Or the Vengeances could have used the American 1,600lb AP bomb, or any of the other bomb types, such as the 500 lb SAP, that were dropped on the Tirpitz in April 1944. 5. It may smack of hyperbole, but a reduction in operations forced by FLAK losses is reasonably termed a defeat. 6. I do not know, frankly, what to make of the IL-2 losses. We need someone to get a grip on the subject. I am, however, persuaded that the VVS operated to a different standard of army support compared with 2TAF, and their high losses reflect this. In other words, if 2TAF had attempted what the VVS achieved, they would have been forced early on to cease operations. The payoff for the Soviets from the VVS losses was that they took Berlin and achieved their war aims. 7. I think we have reached the stage where John Beaman thought we were at yesterday when he closed the thread. I'm not sure I have anything more to contribute, and the objective to get a handle on the VVS has not been, and seemingly cannot be, achieved. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello Tony
on Hillman, with the only FOO dead, no matter what support one had, dive bombers, heavy artillery or battleship on call, there would have been great difficulties to utilize it on a specific target. Ju 87s were rather ineffective against Maginot line forts with 500kg (1100lb) bombs in 1940. I cannot say if a 1600lb AP would have been adequate against Hillman, at least on Tirpitz it was incapable to penetrate her armour deck (some splinters of a bomb that exploded on the upper deck pierced the armour deck) or main turret roofs. Of course in Tirpitz attack Barracudas dropped their bombs from rather low altitude in order to secure hits but that was a usual dilemma in divebombing, lower release height, more hits, higher release height less hits but better penetration. 500lb SAP IMHO would have been too light. German bombs would not helped British, British had some special AP bombs but those I can recall were too heavy for Vengeances. IMHO the main reasons of Hillman debacle were the lateness of tanks (because of the congestion at the beaches) and too few FOOs around, on which Vengeances would not offer any help. BTW a british 16” AP shell weighted 2048lb and 15” 1938lb, entry speed and entry angle depended on range. Smith’s book is good but IMHO has rather strong pro-dive-bomber POV,, I’d not base my opinion on dive-bombing solely on it. Soviet tanks losses, as you see, Il-2s were not able to give free ride to Soviet AFVs, in fact losses were very heavy. 1944 Tanks: 16900 Heavy: 900 , Medium: 13800, Light: 2200 SP guns: 6800 Heavy: 900 , Medium: 1000, Light: 4900 1945 Tanks: 8700 Heavy: 900 , Medium: 7500, Light: 300 SP guns: 5000 Heavy: 900 , Medium: 1000, Light: 3100 Juha PS Il-2 loss info According to Yefim Gordon's Il-2 and Il-10 book, the Il-2 suffered the following losses: Red Army: 10759 (24% to fighters, 43% to AAA, 32% failed to return, 1% on the ground) Naval Forces:807 Here is the statistics of Il-2 losses, according to Hans Seidl: Year - Total Losses - To Enemy Action - % of Strength at Hand ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1941* - 1100 - 600 - 73.3% 1942 - 2600 - 1800 - 34.2% 1943 - 7200 - 3900 - 45.0% 1944 - 8900 - 4100 - 46.6% 1945** - 3800 - 2000 - 27.3% --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total: 23600 12400 70.3% * presumably from June 22 ** until May 10 Therefore, over 50% of losses [not counting the 'worn out' category] was due to enemy. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Mr Colvin
Have you looked at the US Air Force studies series and in particular study 175 U) The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of the German Commanders, by Walter Schwabedissen, edited by Edward P. Kennedy (1960). 434 pages. It is interesting to read German thoughts on the Russians as presented to an American audience, but might get you further with your question about the VVS. Too much for me to summarise in a thread like this Downloading the PDFs is free http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numb...ies151-200.asp Regards Martin |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
What a site.
Tony Items 1 and 2 I will look into and thanks for the suggestion Item 3 - If the GA attack aircraft were not put on standby then I don't see why Dive Bombers would have been Item 4 - On this I believe you to be wrong. An AP or hollow charge bomb would simply punch a hole through the span and do little if any damage. Bridges of this type were notoriously difficult to destroy. If people wanted to get serious then the only more or less guaranteed way of destroying this type of bridge would be to use a Tallboy. You have chastised the 2 TAF for not destroying a target that they never attacked without saying how the Russian Airforce would attack them. Item 5 - This is hyperbole and very wrong. You have assumed that the reduction was due to losses, without proof. The facts that squadrons were out of service for good reason and that aircraft need to be maintained, crews rested is very different to the reduction being due to losses. Item 6 - Your approach is almost from the Napolionic Wars , when the scale of your Victory was measured by the size of your losses. The fact that the IL 2 had such severe losses seems to prove to you that this was because they were more effective and operated a higher standard of support to the Army. To me its quite possible that the huge losses were due to the IL 2 being getting shot down, the effectivness of the attack compared to the losses we don't know. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Glider you are right, but surely unreasonable, when you state I have 'assumed' reduction in 2TAF support was due to losses, without proof.
The ORB states the reduction was in the, "liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots." I cannot see how the shortage of aircraft could have been due to anything except heavy losses. Shortage of spares? servicing capacity? - I don't think so. And surely a reading of the memoir literature explains that the "weariness" of the pilots was a euphemism for shattered morale due to FLAK. Pilots reported being physically sick when being briefed for ops, and of inability to sleep, from fear of FLAK. Incapacitating fear was the inevitable result of flying unarmoured aircraft vulnerable even to rifle fire, and the reason why pilots never went round again after missing the target - something the VVS, AFAIK, would not countenance. Secondly I think you are wrong about the Wesel bridges. The RAF destroyed every one of the Seine bridges, and many many more all over Western Europe that were not strongly defended. They knew, as the VVS and GAF knew, how to destroy bridges - that was not the problem. The problem with the Wesel Bridges was that they were very, very strongly defended, like the Meuse bridges in 1940. For this reason 2TAF asked SHAEF for USAAF Heavies to undertake the task in daylight on their behalf, since Heavies could fly above the FLAK and plaster the site with Nordensight-accuracy, and they succeeded in bringing down one span. As far as the Heavies were concerned, the lack of GAF defence and the lack of very heavy immobile FLAK (like the twin 128mm FLAK equipment defending Hamburg, Berlin and Vienna) meant the Wesel Bridges were in effect undefended. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Thanks again, Juha.
You have provided much food for thought. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Juha, thank you for the Il-2 loss statistics. Pretty scary stuff. We need to remember that the Russians had the relative luxury of a single front war. Could the RAF have sustained fighter losses like this in western Europe, and still have fought in the Mediterranean and the Far East?
The Russian victory in the east, and the Allied victory in the west, was in the end a result of combined air and land operations. The allocation of resources between air and land, and between competing resources within the RAF and within the Army, was decided years before D-Day (given the lag between decision to field a new weapon or tactic and its actual wide spread usage). We can always second guess these decisions knowing what we know now. The fact remains that the Allied decisions made at the time, with the information available, was good enough. Even the Germans couldn't stop the Allied advances in the West or the Russian advances in the East. All of this resulted in huge casualties on all sides. Some different mix of air and land resources may have shifted these losses around, but they still would have been huge. Final point: one of the main opponent of both Typhoon and the Il-2 was the German Tiger series. The armour on these vehicles weighed tens of tons. Relatively speaking, both the Typhoon and the Il-2 were virtually unarmoured when facing opponents like this. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
I do not doubt that the ORB states the reduction was in the, "liberal use of aircraft in support rôles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots."
Weariness means weariness i.e. tiredness, lack of sleep, need to relax some R and R. Had the reason been losses, then I have no doubt they would have said losses. There is no shame in that and a number of RAF sqadrons were withdrawn during the war from the battles in 1940 to the Battle of Britain, the far east and the RAF never hesitated to say, losses were the reason. Aircraft wear out, they need regular maintanence, you can push an aircraft past its regular servicing schedule so far, but sooner or later it needs to be done. As mentioned in my earlier posting I gave examples of squadrons being pulled out of the front line for reequipping, retraining and even one wing that was told to hold back due to losses. This was 122 wing and they were told not to go out in groups of less than 16 for a short period of time. With reduced resources you have to cut your cloth for what you have available and the decisions seem sensible to me. If you have artillery that can do counter battery work then let them have first go, why not, thats what they were designed to do. You keep going on about unarmoured Typhoons and that clearly isn't the case they were well protected against mg fire, with the obvious radiator problem. Obviously they were not as well protected as the Il 2 but that doesn't mean that they were lacking protection. You have not denied that the IL 2 would have been a much easier target to hit, as well as the losses, the availability rate for the IL 2 units might make interesting reading. They may well make it home when others wouldn't but those holes need to be repaired, and that takes time. I could be wrong about the Wresel Bridge but my understanding was that these were more akin to a viaduct with massive foundations and the actual spans being some 75 meters in the air. Should this be the case an AP bomb would simply go through it and explode below with little impact on the span. Should you hit the foundation you would need some serious explosive to do any damage, a 1000 lb wouldn't even come close. The Seine Bridges were a lot smaller and closer to the ground/water. Also most of them were stone bridges not steel bridges. With a stone bridge the blast will do a lot of damage to the stone structure, with a steel bridge the blast will simply go past the girders doing little if any damage. Eventually you can wear them down but the Allied forces put a lot of effort into detroying those bridge with little benefit and I cannot see how the VVS would have done any better, they didn't have the equipment. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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I did read Schwabedissen years ago in McMaster University Library, and quoted it in an earlier posting, but never obtained a copy. The problem is that for many, including Bill Walker, Schwabedissen is not treated as authoritative but just part of the noise. I hope one consequence of this thread, which rarely and thankfully for those I initiate has not collapsed in acrimony, will be that someone will pick up the subject of the comparison of the VVS with the UK/US TAFs, and make sense of it. It's an important gap in our knowledge. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Not part of the noise Tony (at least to me), but one of many different views, expressed from many different backgrounds. The truth lies somewhere in the mix. Or maybe the truth is the mix.
Schwabedissen, and others in the German high command, may have been more worried about the VVS than the RAF. And it was the Russians who got to Berlin first. But the Germans were still unable to stop the RAF in the West or the Mediterranean. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello Glider
on Soviet options to attack heavy bridges, the re were some but none optimal. 1) Pe-2s, some soviet units were very good in hitting bridges but the bomb load of Pe-2 was light, even against German AA-ship Niobe, which Soviets thought to be Finnish coastal BB Väinämöinen, the bomb load of attacking Pe-2 dive-bombers was 2 x 250kg (550lb) and 2 x 100kg (220lb) per plane. 2) Tu-2 level bombers, it was a fast plane and could carry 1000kg (2200lb) bomb, standard level bomber of VVS in 45. 3) If nothing other worked there were possibility to use Pe-8/5000kg (11000lb) combination even if I recall only night bombing ops by this combination. On Il-2, even if its armour limited its ordnance carrying capacity it made it invulnerable against rifle calibre fire and that was good for the morale of the crews and bad for the morale of enemy infantry because it had no effective way to return fire. Il-2 was the main reason why Finns modified their obsolete 20mm A/T rifles to capable to automatic fire and distributed them to troops as an ad-hoc infantry AA weapon so that infantry would have something which would hurt Il-2 if one was able to hit one. Juha |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hi Juha
As ever all good points. I have to doff my hat to the Finn's they always seemed to make something out of nothing. Can you imagine the recoil of an auto AT rifle. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
1 Attachment(s)
Hello Glider
On 20mm modified A/T rifle. The idea was to chop a young tree, fix the rifle on the top of the remaining trunk and voila, you have 20mm automatic AA gun ready to fire. Soldiers could carry the weapon, 2 men job, where ever they went. If I succeed to upload a picture, You can see how it was meant to be used. On recoil, one young lieutenant, who was once my temporary troop CO (during my compulsory military service) once told me that when he first time fired an unmodified 20mm A/T rifle it broke his collar bone. He made a mistake to fire while standing in a narrow trench without being well enough prepared to the kick. Juha |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Sorry Juha, no disrespect intended but I couldn't resist this one ...
I now have this image of two poor guys on the edge of a field, surrounded by a hail of exploding cannon shells all around them from the Sturmovik diving down on them, desperately trying to chop the top off a tree so they can tie their A/T Rifle to it and fire back! (Joke, honest!) Ian :rolleyes::D |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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Penetration capabilities of a single .50 caliber M2 AP round fired from a 45-inch barrel. Range > Armor Plate (homogeneous) - Armor Plate (face-hardened) 219 yd (200 m) > 1.0 in (25.4 mm) - 0.9 in (22.9 mm) 656 yd (600 m) > 0.7 in (17.8 mm) - 0.5 in (12.7 mm) 1,640 yd (1,500 m) > 0.3 in (7.6 mm) - 0.2 in (5.1 mm) |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello Kustcha
one must remember that usually AA hits hit at shallow angle when armour gave much more protection than when hits were at near normal angle. Juha |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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And, the armor certainly doesn't protect the rest of the a/c from damage |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Yes, you are right, Kutscha, but you do not spell out the result that this made the Il-2 but not the Typhoon immune to all German infantry weapons, which were a maximum 7.92mm (0.3inch) calibre.
Remember Eric Roberts' fate. Russian and US infantry were much better equipped with both medium 0.3inch and heavy 0.5inch (12.7mm) MGs - the 0.5inch Browning and 12.7mm DshK. It is therefore surprising to read this memoir; Luftwaffe Russian-front veteran is shot down on his first attack against American troops. On December 3, 1944, Luftwaffe planes came over 3rd Armored positions in numbers during the grind toward the Roer River. It was one of the few times that they dared to show themselves at low altitude. It was a stormy day, and the clouds offered good cover at a low ceiling. An M-16 half-track from Battery A, commanded by Cpl. Joseph Makauska, was in position on a wooded strip between two open valleys. Tec 5 Dominic Rizzo was manning the quad-.50's. The majority of the enemy planes came down the valley to the M-16's rear and out of the field of fire. Suddenly an ME-109 dropped out of the clouds and came directly toward their vehicle. Rizzo opened fire just as the plane dropped its wing bombs and banked away. The bombs caused no casualties, but the .50's had found their mark, and the 109 was smoking. The pilot made a forced landing in a field between 3rd Armored outposts and the German lines, and the infantry captured him. He told interrogators that he had made 268 missions over Russian lines without being shot down, but this was his first and last trip over American territory. Others on the M-16 crew were Tec 5 Albenie Dubay, Pfc. Thomas Skidgel, and Pfc. Abraham Schiller. source: http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/feat...ple.action.htm Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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"Il-2 suffered the following losses: Red Army: 10759 (24% to fighters, 43% to AAA, 32% failed to return, 1% on the ground)" From the loss list in the Thomas/Shores Typhoon-Tempest book I counted 1475 Typhoons lost to all causes. Of this number 525 had 'flak' mentioned in the reason for the loss. This is 36% lost to flak compared to 43% for the Il-2. Why is the loss rate, to flak, for the heavily armoured Il-2 greater than the unarmoured Typhoon? |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello,
Not intending to get involved in this thread, I just wanted to clarify a point Kutscha made : the figures he quoted are not comparable. The figure for Typhoon losses includes losses to all causes, whereas the Il-2 losses are including only combat losses. Comparing the proportion of these losses suffered to AAA makes no sense. And you'd have to integrate a number of factors such as the intensity of enemy fighter activity, the losses to sortie ratio, the period of the war in which these losses were suffered,... Another interesting point : I didn't know about the Finnish use of AT rifles against aircraft, but it's an interesting fact that the Soviet troops reportedly did also occasionally use AT rifles (14,5 mm) against Luftwaffe aircraft. I would need to check my sources to give more details, but I think this use of AT rifles was mentioned during the Battle of Stalingrad. Besides, I think this thread is going nowhere. What exactly is the question being discussed ? May I suggest to clearly define the subject of new threads, such as "effectiveness of armor on WWII combat aircraft" or "results of air attacks against ground forces in WWII" ? Both subjects would be interesting, but such a discussion would require solid sources (such as loss reports from ground unit indicating the number of losses to air attacks, or BDA data collected after the occupation of formerly enemy-held territory). Regards, Kolya. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
As far as I am concerned, the matter under discussion is how the VVS compared with the Anglo-Canadian-American TAFs in fulfilling CAS and interdiction.
IMHO the thread can go nowhere, and is futile, for two reasons; 1. There is no agreement about the obligations or the effectiveness of the Western Allies' TAFs. The data is available, but the subject is emotionally charged with tribalism. One side of the comparison is therefore in dispute. 2. An understanding of the Russian language is necessary even to know what data is available about the VVS. The other side of the comparison is therefore unknown. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello Tony
I’d say that the situation isn’t so impossible. If you cannot lay your hand on Soviet operational studies or if you cannot read Russian, read several German memoirs of men who fought on both fronts in 43-45, after all the men in receiving end had the best knowledge on the effects of CAS. There are also a few good books on Il-2 in English and also a must is "Red star against the swastika" by Vasily B. Emelianenko, very good memoirs of an highly decorated Il-2 pilot. Juha |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Hello Kolya
yes Soviet used sometimes their 14,5mm AT-rifles agaisnt LW planes. Also Finns sometimes used their 20mm semi-automatic AT rifle against a/c before the introducion of the automatic AA rifle version. But the low practical rate of fire, appr 15rpm, and the heavy recoil made hitting on a/c with the 20mm A/T rifle very difficult. On the other hand its ammo was effective. Juha |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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Then I don't see why you tried to make a cost/benefit analysis with so little information. You did not compare survivability rates of one aircraft against the other when attacking the same type of air and ground defenses. You did not have a handle on losses in Russian and German ground attack aircraft units, nor did you have them categorized by cause. You did not write anything concrete about their state of morale. You did not write much about the perceptions of Russian and German troops on the ground; including those who were attacked and those who profited from it. You did not identify any documents or case studies that might tell us how their experience with Close Air Support might have differed significantly from that of the RAF and British Army. So your strong opinions were based on what? Quote:
It cannot be disputed that the Luftwaffe, once the most staunch proponent of specialized dive bombers, was forced to accept that it was a technical dead end. Quote:
In any language, air attack on surface targets was a very expensive option to other methods and I believe that there were few exceptions. A small group of assault infantry or demolitionists could eliminate certain types of bunkers and fortresses that aircraft units could not destroy at any cost. It was also learned that a well-planned grid of minefields could sink more enemy ships (and for less capital investment and fewer lives spent) compared to attacks on shipping by aircraft. Quote:
There is a massive amount of data which proves that no type of manned aircraft from the 1940s was cost effective as flying artillery. A lack of precision guided weapons caused a need for repeat attacks on most hard targets. Aircraft cannons up to 50mm were usually not effective against pillboxes, bunkers and most tanks of 1944 vintage. Post-battle field inspections and training exercises showed that the projectiles would deflect off harmlessly unless the firing angle of impact was ideal. In the context of weight of fire, or accurate placement of unguided rockets and free-falling bombs, you are hairsplitting about the Typhoon, Stuka, and Shturmovik. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Nifty,
My strong opinion against the Typhoon and Spitfire is based on accuracy. Dive bombing was the most accurate method of bombing in WW2. This was acknowledged by all those who operated dive bombers - GAF, VVS, USN, USMC, IJN, FAA, Regia Aeronautica, Flygvapnet, and probably more. Only the RAF refused to operate dive bombers. Perhaps you (or anyone) would care to give the real reason for the RAF's refusal, rather than the rationalisations put forward by the RAF - such as Dowding's argument that inaccuracy is desirable for its own sake, or the argument that dive bombers are liable to be shot down by fighters. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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I agree that your reason is the only one that explains the high Il-2 loss rate compared with that of Typhoon and Spitfire. If what you say is a fact, and we know for a fact that 2TAF made it policy never to go round again because of the risk from aroused FLAK, then we have an explanation. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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Would you please recommend the best books on the operational use of the Il-2 (is Yefim Gordon's book more than a picture book?), and relevant German memoirs. I have been told there are US translations of Russian analyses of the VVS on the web which should be consulted. By the way and off subject, I was lectured at by a Finnish woman and her husband this afternoon on, "Saviours or Intruders? Operation Barbarossa, German troops and Finnish Civilians". She is Una Heiskanen from the University of Helsinki. Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Tony, do you know why the Ju-87 had its dive brakes removed?
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Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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I don't pretend to know why they were replaced by Fighter bombers but presumably they had good reasons. At a guess the FB was more flexible having considerable firepower as well as a heavy payload, one crew member instead of two, faster cruising speed which made it easier for the escort and no doubt others. Just one clarification which I admit is off topic. You may get the feeling that I am anti dive bombers which I assure you isn't the case. In debates around the start of the war I am the first to say that the Battle of France might have been very different if the RAF had equiped their light bombers squadrons with Skua's instead of Battles. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
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And precisely what do you mean? The war has just ended and three airplanes in mint condition arrive over a target practice range for tests and evaluation. A Typhoon, Spitfire, and Stuka of the variants most commonly seen in 1945. The three test pilots (the Stuka man is ex-Luftwaffe) were properly trained for this kind of mission, with average ability, and a similar number of combat dive-bombing sorties. All the planes carry the same type of bomb, so what will be the % difference in probability of hitting a target the size of medium tank? Quote:
The path of your logic is not unlike suggesting that because a Gladiator biplane could easily outmanuever a Spitfire in a dogfight, the Gladiator must be the better fighter. And therefore the RAF would have been better off keeping biplanes in front line service for as long as possible. Quote:
Costs vs. Benefits. |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
You ask, Glider, what I mean by 'accuracy'.
My answer is identical to that given by Squadron Leader Arthur Murland Gill of 84 Squadron RAF (who experienced operating Blenheims and Vengeances) when interviewed by Peter C Smith; "Dive-bombing with the Vengeance in Burma taught us what it meant to be accurate. For example, to take out vital bridges, I could usually send a couple of Vengeances in with the almost guaranteed certainty that the bridge would be demolished, whereas with the Blenheim I could take the squadron against the same target day after day and rarely, if ever, score a hit." Tony |
Re: Response to Glider and Juha.
Kutscha asks if I know why the Ju-87 lost its air brakes. I don't know they did, so please explain, Kutscha.
Nifty says it's indisputable the Luftwaffe accepted that dive-bombing was a technical dead-end. Really? Then how could Hermann Neumann in an escorted Stuka destroy the permanent and defended Oder bridge at Aurith on April 16, 1945 with an 1,800 lb bomb when pilots of Me-109s and Fw-190s with 1,200 lb bombs had to fly their aircraft into the bridges? Naumann said in an interview; "So, I flew to my target, which was the bridge at Aurith, just south of Frankfurt on the Oder. When I got there, it was almost sundown. I did not have that long a flight. I think it took me about 20 minutes. Before I got there I waved away my escort. When I got to the bridge, I went up to 6,000 meters, went into a dive and dropped my bomb. They did not know what hit them. That was the only time I blacked out from the G forces. When I came to, I saw the bridge breaking up. If you look at a map of Germany today you will notice that the bridge has not been rebuilt, even though the road still goes to the river. " source: http://www.tarrif.net/wwii/interview...nn_neumann.htm Tony |
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