Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Big question here, I hope the experts on the list will consider the question and respond.

Pertaining to the pilots of the Jagdwaffe circa January, 1944, Defense of the Reich / West: What was on their minds?

I've got:

Determination, in slowing the bomber campaign and saving German cities

Resignation, in knowing that they couldn't.

Desperation, at the growing imbalance of power.

Frustration, with their own organization.

Confidence, in their abilities.

Was there anger? Was there irrational thinking yet? Were they hyper-focused on the mission, to their commitment to the people in the cities?

What was the essence, the major themes in their thinking at this critical time?

Was there a feeling that they were losing; was there a growing sensation that all was lost in January, 1944?

Bronc

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Surviving.

Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Surviving. I've been thinking about that, but how was that imperative displayed on the ground and in combat? You could only have certain amounts of engine trouble before everyone was looking at you. The only example I can find in combat is A LOT of pilots did a split-S after a single pass on the bomber streams. A split-S ended the mission because the fighter could never get back up to altitude.

Anyone?

Bronc

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

I suggest reading Ian Kershaw's book "The End" for a discussion what kept the German war effort going in the last months of the war.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Over on AHF just a week ago there was a thread about "survival" attitudes among Luftwaffe fighter pilots during the last year of the war. According to after action reports, diaries and postwar interviews with American fighter pilots, "it was not uncommon" for Luftwaffe fighter pilots to bale out as soon as an enemy fighter got on their tail. Although there were a few cases of this, I think all of us know that this was not "common" practice. Most of the pilots, especially the new ones, were far more afraid of what would happen to them if they refused combat and got caught. Morale in the Jagdwaffe stayed pretty high right to the end of the war. But it was mainly loyalty to their unit and Kamaraden rather than to A.H. or Fatboy Hermann that kept them fighting.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Ok usually not just one Allied fighter, many allied fighter. And to 'bail' without combat damage was NOT for the most part being afraid, Combat ready German Pilots were few, German planes were many.. save your arse and fight another day. The 'ONLY' thing Luftwaffe pilots were afraid of was pulling their ripcords EARLY.

There were many cases of 9th (15th? Can't remember off-hand) AF B-24 that the crew bailed when a single 109 pulled onto thier six o'clock too.

Gruppen leaders were starting to ignore stupid/pointless orders from up high, and were concerned about the survival of there men. It does not mean they were cowards, not at all.

Anyways, what changed for 1944 heres a couple of points:

~ conversion of Fw190 units such as Jagdgeschwader 300 to the Sturmbock role. For example, on 7 July 1944 Eighth Air Force bombers belonging to the 492nd Bomb Group were intercepted unescorted. The entire squadron of 12 B-24s were shot down. The USAAF 2nd Air Division lost 28 Liberators that day, the majority to a Sturmbock attack

~ Ignoring Göring's lunitic fringe

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Yes. Thank you, Oberst.

Beyond the famous, "You will shoot down a bomber on every mission or die trying," order, are there other examples of stupid/pointless orders that would be illustrative?

Bronc

Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Question: I've seen more than a dozen examples in gun camera film (1945) of outboard 20mm or 30mm ammuntion boxes detonating violently on FW-190 A-8's when under fire from behind from .50-cal. The wing shears off in a massive explosion when that happens.

If a pilot (or unit leader) wanted to delete those outboard cannons on the FW-190 to remove that specific danger AND improve the flight performance of the aircraft, did they have the authority? Would they have gotten grief from higher authority for wanting to do that?

I've read that Pips Priller and other Experten did exactly that--remove the outboard cannons.

Bronc

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Yeah sure, General Galland's famous refusal of Göring's orders, the pilots revolution, etc.. Prime example of stupidity is Operation Bodenplatte.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

January 1944 was probably not as great a psyhological problem as May 1944 when the full shock of the P-51 had made the practice of staging for bomber attack out of range of escorts very difficult.

Only one Group of P-51s was operational in January 1944. Only five at the end of April - but they were credited with more LW fighters than all the ETO P-38s and P-47s combined by early June.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Sources for B-24 crews bailing.. yah, ask all the members who got banned at wwiaircraft.net. Your agenda is too one sided.

My appolgies to OP for off topic.

Kindest regards.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

I don't think I stated or posed an 'agenda' - just asked for substantiation for your comments and noted that your comments regarding LW pilot concerns regarding opening chute too soon had an analogue with Allied pilots...

not to mention the dangers of surviving long enough to become a POW when confronted by local citizenry or Wermacht/SS that didn't wish to waste time with prisoners.

As to wwiiaircraft.net my experience with those who were 'banned', like you, were unable to contain themselves when warned by moderators to cease and desist with flame wars.

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Oberst, don't you think it would have been more effective simply to provide some sources when asked? I think TOCH embers generally understand that if you're going to post here, you don't import conflicts from elsewhere. Just stay polite and if you have relevant information then share it with us all.

Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Hi guys

In The Luftwaffe Over Germany by Caldwell and Muller there is a section focused on motivation and morale. Factors that influenced the generally high level of morale in the Jagdwaffe even late in the war included: innate German discipline, youthful spirit, love of flying, patriotism, ignorance of the direction of the war, comfortable living conditions and the effects of propaganda. Regarding the removal of the outer cannon it is true that many aces flew these without such as Bär, Priller and Weiss to mention a few but on the other hand Unteroffizier Ernst Schröder (7 victories) of 5./JG 300 is quoted that he was refused permission to remove the outer cannon of his famous Fw 190 A-8 "Red 19" (W.Nr. 172 733) in Focke Wulf Jagdflugzeug by Rodeike.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

So, Leo, by implication, Don and Rich are suggesting that loyality to unit and devotion to comrades had little to do with morale in the late-war Jagdwaffe? Wow! That would largely contradict Jochen Prien and about a thousand other impeccable sources. It would also contradict my own 11 years of experience in the military.

Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

Hello Larry

Of course loyalty to their comrades was a factor as well a sense of duty and a desire to defend their homeland and its people in addition to those that I listed in my previous post. However, there were other factors involved. Caldwell and Muller note that studies on the morale of the German military demonstrate that such remain high even though normal primary group cohesion was destroyed by the high casualty rates suffered in the last years of the war. They also mention that interrogation reports from captured German pilots indicated not only good morale even after D-Day and the willingness to obey orders and join combat even though they were fully aware of the odds against them but also a certain distrust among them regarding their comrades. The more experienced pilots felt that newcomers were not as capable as their predecessors and for their part the more recent pilots felt a certain lack of confidence in their leaders due to the shortage of section, flight and squadron commanders. Therefore, there was a certain lack in mutual confidence among the members of a unit caused mainly by the high losses suffered. One unit that comes to mind that exhibited a marked case of the above was III./JG 26 where there was considerable distrust among the enlisted men and their officers to the point that the former did not invite any of the latter to their post-war reunions if I am remembering correctly.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Thinking of the Jagdwaffe (West) circa January, 1944
 

I agree at the 80% - 85% level with your comments, Leo, but I would add that unit cohesion and trust is developed through leadership at the officer and NCO level. That this quality was beginning to fragment in some units during the last 6 months or so of the war is quite understandable, but there is a big difference between a gradual depletion of confidence and the onset of distrust, and the much more severe case of unit dissolution with large number of men stealing off into the night and going AWOL or refusing to obey their officers. As Caldwell and Muller seemingly admit, the Wehrmacht units largely maintained their morale and stuck it out to the bitter end, fighting whenever they had to. The late war ADI(K) and CSDIC reports and the postwar special "hidden microphone" reports do tend to confirm this.

Larry