Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

A volume of 284 B24 Liberators with their revolutionary Davis Wing were delivered to the RAF in 1941. Of these aircraft, 120 had been ordered by France. But instead of being stationed in Iceland (occupied in May 1940) and used to close the mid-Atlantic air gap to defeat the U-boats, all B24s were converted in Montreal into transports for VIPs and also used to ferry pilots across the Atlantic. Kapitän Werner Furburger predicted in a pre-war exercise that Britain would need two years to assemble the anti-submarine assets required to force the fleet of Type VII submersibles - they were not true submarines - to stay submerged. This would destroy their productivity and make them both ineffectual and sitting ducks ripe for destruction. Had Coastal Command been assigned the 284 B24s, then Furburger's forecast would have been achieved. As it was, it took until mid-1943, four years rather than the two forecast by Furburger, to finally close the mid-Atlantic air gap. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

About the only correct statement is that the B-24 had a Davis wing, the rest is rubbish.

AM258 to AM263 (Liberator LB.30A) 6 a/c delivered Mar 41 to May 42 - used by Ferry Command

AM910 to AM929 (Liberator LB30B/Mk I) 20 a/c delivered Apr 41 to Aug 41 - mainly used by 120 Sqn Coastal Command

AL503 to AL641 (LB.30/Mk II) 165 a/c ordered but only 85 delivered between Sept 41 and May 42 (rest retained by USAAF after Pearl Harbour). At least 15 went to Coastal Command

LV336-46 - (Liberator Mk III), not delivered until Mar 42
FK214-45 - (Liberator Mk III), not delivered until Jun-Nov 42

So up to August 41 had 26 Liberators and around 100 by the end of the year. On arrival in UK/Canada they had to be fitted out so delay between leaving factory and entering active service with units

The LB30 was definitely underdeveloped and not fitted in 1941 with all the anti submarine bells and whistles that they got later in the Mk III and V

Even if all engaged in anti submarine warfare they were unlikely to close the gap

Regards

Martin

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Thank you, Martin. Would you not agree, however, that RAF tests showed the B24 was not suitable for bombing Germany - no self-sealing fuel tanks, slower than quoted speed - while these factors were not relevant for Coastal Command's anti-submarine patrols. Was therefore the need for speed, requiring a change of engines, rather than lack of operational range the reason why the LB 30 was judged 'underdeveloped'? Does anyone know of any historian of the air gap? Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

I have to agree with Martin, the above statement is a complete fabrication. The very first official op carried out by the B-24 was on 20 September 1941 when Liberator I AM924 D/120 carried out an anti-submarine patrol from Nutts Corner, Norther Ireland. The RAF even beat the US with this first OP.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Do you do any research Tony before you start a thread?

http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_bombers/b24_5.html

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

I suppose it depends what was searched.

I search for things on the web with a question and get nothing, then re-phrase and get what I want.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

One significant point worth raising is whether the operation of a transatlantic communications link, including the recycling of ferry crews, was not every bit as much as important at the time?

There is also the question of just how useful a handful of B-24s would have been without the parallel success in breaking the German Navy's codes, and the equally delayed strengthening of the convoy escorts. I don't think the Battle of the Atlantic was won, nor could have been won, by any single factor.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Hello,
If you are restricting the question to deal with B-24 Liberator II's only.

These were those in the RAF serial number range "AL" with one aditional replacement aircraft in the "FP" RAF serial number range.

86 Liberator II's ( B-24B's) delivered to the RAF between September 1941 and May 1942 to contract F-677.
It is believed that AL642 through to AL667 (25 a/c) were not built.

86 + 25 = 111 a/c
Balance of an order for 165 a/c diverted before delivery.
165 - 111 = 54 a/c (Retained in the US ?).

I have arrived with this "AL"list plus 1 "FP" :

1 – AL503 crashed into San Diego Bay during acceptance flight, killing all aboard including Consolidated chief test pilot William Wheatley.
2 - AL507 repossessed by USAAF. Turned over to Britain Mar 25, 1943. To BOAS Aug 1, 1944 as G-AHYC. Bellylanded Heathfield Oct 2, 1946 and salvaged.
3 - AL508 repossessed by USAAF. (7th BG, 11th BS) arrived in Java from Darwin via Pacific route Jan 26, 1942. Based at Jogia from Jan 27, 1942. Crashed at Essendon airfield May 18, 1942 on takeoff. Condemned May 15, 1943
4 - AL515 commandeered by USAAF. Arrived via Pacific Route via McDill Fl, Hamilton CA, Hickam Hi, Palmyra IS, Canton Is, Nausori (Fiji), Garbutt(Townsville Qld), Darwin (NT) to Malang, Java. Last LB30A
out of Java on Mar 2, 1942 in 7 hour flight to Broome, landed, refuelled and flew on to RAAF Pearce before the Broome Raid the next day. Returned to Broome to evacuate survivors of Raid to RAAF Pearce. Left RAAF Pearce to RAAF Laverton Vic Mar 6, 1942 taking 8Hours 20 mins. Surviving 3 Pacific based LB30A's were established into a flight within the 435th BS/19thBG at Garbutt, Townsville. AL515 eventually went on to bigger things,
but bellied in at Milne Bay airstrip on the Aug 20, 1942. Was stripped, but a week later was strafed by Japanese and destroyed on Aug 27, 1942. Condemned Aug 28, 1942.
5 - AL521 requisitioned by USAAF. Lost in Japanese raid on Darwin, Australia Feb 19, 1942.
6 - AL527 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked near March Field, CA Jul 1, 1942 when crashed and burned after takeoff
7 - AL532 requisitioned by USAAF. To C-87 with USAAF. To RFC at Kingman Oct 5, 1946
8 - AL533 requisitioned by USAAF. Arrived at Darwin Jan 30, 1942, to Jogia, Java. w/o in combat when strafed and destroyed at Jogjiakarka Mar 1, 1942.
9 - AL535 requisitioned by USAAF. Damaged by fighters and force landed on beach at small island of Greater Mesalembo Jan 18, 1942. Crew picked up by PBY Jan 25, 1942. First USAAF Liberator combat loss.
10 - AL539 requisitioned by USAAF. Crashed Jun 8, 1943. Condemned Jun 9, 1943.
11 - AL543 requisitioned by USAAF. Surveyed May 29, 1943
12 - AL567 requisitioned by USAAF. Destroyed on ground by strafing attack on Jogiakarta Feb 22, 1942.
13 - AL568 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Walnut Ridge Jan 13, 1946.
14 - AL570 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Walnut Ridge Jan 9, 1946
15 - AL572 requisitioned by USAAF. Hit by bomb in hangar Jogiakarta Mar 1,1942.
16 - AL573 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked Jan 1, 1942 at MacDill Field when gear unlocked during landing rollout. Repaired. Became transport in Australia as VH-CBM. To RFC at Walnut Ridge Jan 17, 1946.
17 - AL575 requisitioned by USAAF. Landing gear would not extend, crew bailed out Jan 2, 1942, San Diego, CA
18 - AL576 requisitioned by USAAF. Arrived via Africa Jan 12, 1942 at Malang, Java. Later forced landed at Makassar, Jan 7, 1942. crew picked up by US Navy PBY and returned to Malang, Java.
19 - AL583 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Walnut Ridge Jan 15, 1946. To civil registry as NL4674N, later RX-102 (Transportes Aereos de Panama).
20 - AL586 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Kingman Jan 9, 1946
21 - AL589 requisitioned by USAAF. Lost with 5th BG on raid from Midway to Wake Island Jun 7, 1942. MACR 600. General Clarence L. Tinker was on board.
22 - AL594 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Kingman Oct 8, 1946
23 - AL596 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked at Westover Field Jan 31, 1943, converted to ground training aircraft Feb 5, 1943.
24 - AL598 requisitioned by USAAF. to RFC at Kingman Oct 6, 1946
25 - AL601 requisitioned by USAAF. Crashed into hill Jun 4, 1942, Hamilton Field, CA. 14 on board killed.
26 - AL602 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked at Kodiak, Alaska May 22, 1942 when overshot landing and fell into ravine
27 - AL604 requisitioned by USAAF. Exploded in midair north of Rio Hato AB, Canal Zone Jun 15, 1943. 2 killed, 3 parachuted to safety.
28 - AL605 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked in landing accident Jun 17, 1943, Rio Hato AB, Canal Zone when landing gear collapsed.
29 - AL606 requisitioned by USAAF. Ditched between Palmyra and Canton Islands Jan 31, 1942. Only 2 survived. Condemned Oct 31, 1944.
30 - AL607 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked 5 mi S of Hanna, WY when abandoned by crew during ice storm Jun 27, 1942.
31 - AL608 requisitioned by USAAF. Used to evacuate General Wavell to Ceylon Feb 26, 1942. Condemned Oct 31, 1944
32 - AL609 requisitioned by USAAF. Destroyed in strafing attack Mar 1, 1942.
33 - AL611 requisitioned by USAAF. Salvaged Jul 31, 1945
34 - AL612 requisitioned by USAAF. Damaged Jan 12, 1942, broken left wing on landing. Salvaged for parts at Malang. destroyed in strafing attack Feb 27, 1942.
35 - AL613 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Kingman Jan 9, 1946
36 - AL615 requisitioned by USAAF. Condemned Oct 7, 1944.
37 - AL617 requisitioned by USAAF. Salvaged Jul 31, 1945
38 - AL618 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked Panama Apr 9, 1943, SOC May 6, 1943.
39 - AL621 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked at Tucson, AZ during force landing and hit a house Dec 23, 1942. Surveyed Jan 1, 1943.
40 - AL622 requisitioned by USAAF. Condemned at Kodiak Oct 30, 1943.
41 - AL623 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked in landing in Carribean Dec 13, 1942.
42 - AL626 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked Mar 29, 1942 at Patterson AAF, OH when nosewheel collapsed, but repaired. SOC as worn out by Dec 31, 1945.
43 - AL628 requisitioned by USAAF as C-87. To RFC at Walnut Ridge Feb 1, 1946.
44 - AL629 requisitioned by USAAF. Condemned Oct 7, 1944, Salanis, Ecuador.
45 - AL631 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked on beach at Buenaventura, Columbia Apr 14, 1942. SOC Jun 10, 1942.
46 - AL632 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC at Kingman, AZ Jan 12, 1946.
47 - AL633 requisitioned by USAAF. Condemned in Hawaii sometime in 1945.
48 - AL634 requisitioned by USAAF. Wrecked in landing accident Dec 31, 1942.
49 - AL637 requisitioned by USAAF. Converted to C-87. To RFC at Cincinatti, OH Jan 31, 1946.
50 - AL639 requisitioned by USAAF, converted to C-87. To RFC at Cincinatti, OH Jan 10, 1946
51 - AL640 requisitioned by USAAF, converted to C-87. Salvaged as C-87 Nov 3, 1945
52 - AL641 requisitioned by USAAF. To RFC as C-87 Walnut Ridge, Ark Jan 7, 1946.
53 –FP685 Replacement for AL503; to USAAC 12.1.42.



Thanks to the JB website and AB's books.


Alex

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Thanks all. The usual prickly responses galvanised me to get the answer, which seems to be as summarised below in seven points. I look forward to having holes picked in it, but please be specific and leave out unhelpful words like 'rubbish'. However, I cannot respond for the next eight days as I shall be hors de combat in the Perche district Normandy.

1. According to Air Marshal John Slessor, when he became AOC Coastal Command on February 5, 1943, a maximum of 100 B24 Liberators were needed to close the Air Gap - source Edward Offley: 'Turning the Tide'; page 47.

2. But although by this time 3,500 B24s had been built, Slessor could not get his required number released even though the Casablanca Directive of January 1943 gave absolute top priority to victory over the U-boats. Harris would not make available his B24s, and Churchill supported Harris whilst also signing the Casablanca Directive. As Americans say - Go figure.

3. Any Mark of B24 could be turned into a VLR. To achieve the required range of 2,300 miles (endurance of 20 hours), any B24 had to be stripped of armour, of self sealing gunk around the petrol tanks, and of gun turrets, while radar needed to be installed, an additional fuel tank fitted in the bomb bay, and anti-submarine munitions such as bombs and depth charges loaded.

4. Also required was a crew willing to undertake 20 hour mind-numbing flights circling a convoy. This was unacceptable to those trained in the ways of Bomber Command who liked to see a bang for their efforts. They suggested, and won the day, that instead of escorting a convoy, they should patrol the trackless ocean searching for U-boats. So this was what Coastal Command did in the Bay of Biscay, hoping to catch a submarine in transit to its base, even though Operations Research demonstrated that a kill on such a patrol absorbed 4,020 hours, while a kill on escort duty absorbed only 120 hours.

5. 111 Liberators were delivered by May 1942 according to Alex Smart (thank you Alex!). However, 111 were more than enough to close the Air Gap (see Point 1), which would therefore have been closed by mid-1942 instead of mid 1943, saving many lives and much treasure. All it required was for the Minister of Defence to send the RAF an 'Action This Day' note instead of humouring them.

6. "This confusion between various Allied commands over the allocation and proper deployment of B24 aircraft almost cost the Allies victory in the Battle of the Atlantic", wrote David Syrett in 'The Defeat of the German U-Boats', page 16.

7. So, instead of being used to close the Air Gap, the first Liberator II to reach England was converted into a VIP transport for Churchill - the RAF being long practised on keeping that sybarite on side. According to Joe Baugher (thanks Kutscha) some were delivered as unarmed transports, some used to ferry pilots, and some were operated by BOAC, no doubt to ferry top RAF and other influential personnel. A few went to Coastal Command who misused them as explained in point 4, while others to Bomber Command but not for night bombing because of their flame trail. Happy New Year everybody, including the moderators and the website owner who keeps this indispensable show on the road. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Oh brother, here we go again.

The RCAF had more experience than just about anybody in long range operations over the North Atlanitc early in the war. They gave up on close escorts of conveys after finding that patrolling at higher altitudes over a broad area, rather than just close to a convoy, gave much better results. I guess they were all idiots too, Tony?

Can you provide a source for that "kill every 120 hours" on close escort? Using that math, the RCAF alone should have got several kills a week in 1940 and 1941 on close escorts. Instead they averaged more like one every two or three months. Switching to wider ranging patrols in 1942 got that up to one a month. Something doesn't add up here.

The majority of the long range transport conversions of Liberators with BOAC were used to return ferry pilots from the UK to North America for the next delivery. Closing the air gap wouldn't have helped much if the Luftwaffe had air superiority over the harbours in the UK, where all the "saved" ships ended up. Air defence of the UK required aircraft as well, and many of them came from North America.

Your point four makes no sense. Coastal Command and the RCAF regularly flew 20 hour plus patrols in 4 engined aircraft and Catalinas/Cansos. Are you claiming some crews refused to fly 20 hour patrols?

Tony, wars are very complicated. Don't believe anyone who tells you one little fix here or there will change everything.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

"111 were more than enough to close the Air Gap"

Slessor certainly ought to have known but I'd like to know his underlying calculations. Presumably we're talking about round-the-clock operations and so you'd need the serviceability rate achievable in that context; % of strength devoted to training/conversion; estimated attrition per 100 sorties; transit times to and from the gap itself and so on. So given an initial strength of 100, I wonder how many aircraft could have been maintained over the gap on patrol at any given time and how effective that would have been (obviously better than nothing) given the square mileage of ocean concerned and how much of that was visible (to the eye or to radar) from each aircraft at any one time.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Yes Bill. I can give you a quote for every statement made. I do not make things up. It was either in Offley: Turning The Tide or in Syrett: The Defeat Of The German U-boats. Both books are available online in reply to a Google search of 'Atlantic Air Gap B24 Liberator", or words to that effect. I must go as its an early start for me to get the ferry. I'm really sorry to leave a discussion I've started for a week - it's not my style. I'll be back. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Hello Tony,
Thank you for your reply.
It does clear up the points of your arguement on the Use or rather non-ues of the early B-24's in RAF use.
However, if you would look at the answer I gave, I did (I thought) make it clear that 86 a/c went to the RAF and that 25 a/c (AL642 to AL667) were not built and also that 54 a/c were retained in the USA. Total 165 a/c.
That is (25 + 54) a total of 79 a/c that can be struck off the total number of 165 a/c.
79 + 86 = 165 a/c.
The breakdown of the 86 a/c was as follows:
1 - AL596 crashed in the USA.
5 - AL530;566;574;577 & 569 went to the MAAF(Mediterranean Allied Air Forces) AL569 crashed in Africa on Nov 25th 1941.
11 - went to 45 Group(Canada) and became Transport a/c.
86 - 17 = 69 a/c
This brought the number down to 69 a/c that might have been in the on RAF Squadron strength and serviceable at some date in the time frame you have suggested.
But remember deliveries were from September 1941 and not all were delivered until at least May 1942.
Also while in RAF squadron use things happened such as the following which brought down the number even more.
1 -AL504 set aside for Churchill.
2 -AL505 DBR Boscombe Down Aug 42.
3 -AL509 DBR Aqir, Aug 42.
4 -AL511 Missing Tripoli May 42.
5 -AL513 Forcelande in Spain Dec 42.
6 -AL516 crashed into sea off Gibraltar Oct 42.
7 -AL519 flew into hill Ballykelly Nov 42.
8 -AL520 Flew into hill in Transjordan Dec 42.
9 -AL531 crashed in Karachi Nov 42.
10 -AL534 Missing Benghazi July 42.
11 -AL537 Shot down Tobruk Aug 42.
12 -AL538 DBR near Lyneham Oct 42.
13 -AL542 Heliopolis heavy landing not repaired July 42.
14 -AL546 Wing collapsed abandoned over Dorset Mar 42.
15 -AL548 Missing (Maleme) Oct 42.
16 -AL549 DBR Polebrook Apl 42.
17 -AL552 Heavy landing Fayid Jul 42.
18 -AL553 SOC Jul 42.
19 -AL554 Out of fuel forcelanded Palestine Jul 42.
20 -AL556 Hit obstruction landing Thruxton Jan 42.
21 -AL558 flew into a hill in May 42.
22 -AL562 caught fire and went into sea off Burrow Head.
23 -AL566 was shot down Benghazi July 42
24 -AL574 was DBR caught fire in Egypt in Feb 42.
25 -AL577 was desroyed in Eire in June 42.
26 -AL588 lost its tail and crashed in Aug 42.
27 -AL595 flew into the ground at night in Nov 42.
28 -AL624 flew into a hill in Scotland in Sept 42.

69-28 = 41a/c

So by the end of 1942 there may only have been 41 a/c in RAF service and some of those may not have been serviceable.
By US standards I expect not even one squadron in a/c strength.
But other later B-24 models were on stream by then.

Best wishes to you ALL for a great New Year.

In the end I agree with both Graham and Bill in this but I appreciate your input that highlights the issues raised.

Alex

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Tony, you might be interested in reading original sources rather than popular histories. From the USN post war analysis, what closed the mid ocean gap was short range carrier based aircraft, not long range aircraft. Take a look at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/...-51/ASW-6.html . Some interesting statistics here, from 1944 when the mid ocean gap was shut down.

Carrier based aircraft in mid 1944 made one sub sighting every 600 flying hours. 60 out of 68 sightings resulted in attacks (88.2 %). 40% of attacks resulted in a sinking. In other words, one sinking for every 600/.882/.4 = 1700 flight hours.

This is short range aircraft, with 1944 radar and searchlights, launched in response to nearby sub sightings. How can we reasonably expect a 1941 long range land based patrol aircraft, with lengthy transit times, to sink subs at 10 times this rate (according to your numbers)?

This same document has some interesting words for the British intiated practice of standing patrols over the Bay of Biscay in 1943:

"Allied antisubmarine forces inflicted the greatest damage on the enemy in the Bay of Biscay and its approaches as 14 U-boats were sunk in the Biscay-Channel Area and another six in the Gibraltar-Morocco Area. Although aircraft crews had to face the increased antiaircraft fire of surfaced U-boats proceeding in formation during the daytime, this presented them with a large proportion of Class A targets and over 25 per cent of the attacks resulted in the sinking of the U-boat. The crowning success of the month occurred on July 30 when a whole group of three outward bound U-boats was sunk, two by Coastal Command aircraft and the third by the Second Escort Group."

"
Four additional U-boats were sunk in the Bay of Biscay by Coastal Command aircraft during the first two days of August, and the U-boats were forced to change their tactics in making the transit of the Bay. They reverted to surfacing at night for the minimum time necessary for the charging of batteries and, in addition, hugged the coast of Spain to get as far as possible from Allied air bases."

The same source discusses the North atlantic sub battle in earlier years. Start at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/...-51/ASW-1.html , and read through to ...-7.html. The mid ocean gap was only one relatively small part of the total war in the North Atlantic. Closing the mid ocean gap earlier in the war could only have been done by moving resources from other tasks. Like your lengthy discussions of the land war in Germany late in the war, you keep suggesting one fix for one problem that could have lost the war for the Allies because of moving of resources from other problems. It ain't that easy.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Going for the boat now. Alex: Slessor said that 100 maximum would close the gap, and probably fewer would have sufficed. Perhaps 86 was that number. If the RAF had been more insistent, perhaps the USAAF might have been shamed into giving them more - they were after all an RAF order. But the B24 was not suitable for night bombing, so the RAF's interest was minimal. Bill: the heavy losses of submarines in the Bay of Biscay due to the RAF wa a temporary aberration by the Kriegsmarine deciding to stay on the surface and fight it out in the Bay. When they stopped that suicidal course of action, sub losses fell away significantly. The effect of an aircraft overhead a convoy was extraordinary. U-boats seen in the distance manoeuvering disappeared and the RAF was cheered to the gunwales. A U-boat on the surface made 17 knots, while one submerged was lucky to make 3 knots and only for a short period. Their effectiveness disappeared when aircraft were about. The RN were at fault for not putting escort carriers on until 1943 and messing about with flying Swordfish off grain carriers, but the single most effective means of neutering the Wolf packs was the B24, and that could have been done in 1942. I'm not sure what your beef is, apart from a need to justify the RAF's tunnel vision. Of course there were many aspects to the complete destruction of Doenitz' fleet: HuffDuff, Enigma, Escort carriers, and the B24! Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Where were these escort carriers to come from?

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Hello Kutcha
yes, Tony has again problems with facts, the first US made RN escort carriers were commisioned in early 1942, but were mechanically unreliable, so their effectiveness was at first impaired, look e.g. the service history of HMS Archer.

Juha

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Easy, just cancel the B-24 program. It never did anything but deliver Churchill's silk underwear anyway.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Tony, even if the Coastal Command would have had 100 VLR Liberators in mid-1942 they would have achieved almost nothing because the U-boats weren't operating against the North Atlantic convoys at all, but found plenty of easy targets off the US East Coast and the Caribbean.

Although the few available VLR aircraft made some impact during the large convoy battles in the winter 1942/43, the Admiralty recognized that it was not possible to maintain the needed continous air cover over a convoy in the Mid-Atlantic gap with those aircraft. Often the aircraft had difficulties to find the ships they were supposed to cover, expended their depth charges quickly in one or two attacks and the convoys were inevitably left without air cover if one of the VLR aircraft had to return to base for one or the other reason. The Admiralty clearly preferred the aircraft from escort carriers as air cover of a convoy as they could be used for defensive patrols around a convoy, but also offensively against U-boats located by HF/DF or ULTRA.

The Coastal Command played a major part when the tide eventually turned in the Battle of the Atlantic in May 1943, but it weren't its VLR Liberators. During that month almost no U-boat could leave or reach its base in France without having been attacked at least once by an aircraft during the transit of the Bay of Biscay, caused by the deployment of ASV Mk.III fitted aircraft on continous patrols at day and night. Not getting an allocation of a certain aircraft type well suited for anti-submarine patrol was bad for the Coastal Command, but the true scandal is that the rivalry between the RAF services almost led to a stop of the development of the airborne centrimetric ASV radar that proved to be decisive to beat the tactics employed by the the type VII and IX submersibles.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

As a (slight) side note, an interesting account of Churchill's B-24 VIP transport here:

http://www.airspacemag.com/history-o...Churchill.html

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

The following is sourced from Capt. Roskill:The War at Sea and Richard Overy:The Bombing War, as well as from Alex Smart's posting.

March 1942. Both the Admiralty and RAF agreed that convoy losses could be reduced "by largely increasing the strength of our land-based air forces over the sea" in Pound's words. The requirement "to provide air cover over the Atlantic was for 70 VLR aircraft against an actual availability of 20 VLRs in the RCAF. The Air Ministry accepted the numbers and said they would be met with US deliveries, but not for the first half of 1942. They insisted that only radar-equipped VLR aircraft would be used for maritime patrols, and since radar had fallen badly into arrears this was the limiting factor. Until radar was available, it was better to use VLRs to bomb Germany offensively rather than use them for 'defensive' patrolling. The RN disagreed that hunting U-boats was 'defensive'.

April 1942. Slessor transferred four squadrons of Wellingtons and Whitleys to Coastal Command for patrolling, but the Navy was not satisfied by this sop. June 1942. 'Planned Flying and Maintenance' was implemented in Coastal Command to increase operational availability; this successful reform was later extended to Bomber Command.

July 1942. Slessor offered a half-measure of a fixed weekly number of sorties against U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. August 1942. Trenchard waded in with a paper (undoubtedly written by Slessor since Trenchard couldn't string a sentence together - why did anyone listen to that fool?) defining "two-dimensional air operations in the Atlantic as purely defensive in nature...... The place to hit the submarines was where they were made and to mine the seas where they emerge instead of hunting them over the illimitable sea". Unfortunately for Bomber Command, the number of submarines was rising fast because bombing had failed to destroy any of them, or their shelters on the Atlantic coast, and the best place to attack submarines was in the vicinity of the convoys.

August 1942. The Cabinet Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee met for the first time, and it included the Americans Harriman and Stark. 243 U-boats were operational, production was running at 20 to 30/month, while since the start of the war only a maximum of 203 submarines had been destroyed. So only 33% of U-boat monthly output was being destroyed, and the situation looked dangerous. The Committee decided that closing the mid-Atlantic air gap was the priority and that 40 radar-equipped VLR aircraft were needed plus more and longer patrols in the Bay of Biscay. The only alternative to the B-24 was the Lancaster now entering production, but it was fitted only for land bombing. So the only source for VLR aircraft was the USA. The trouble was that the USAAF was taking most of the B-24s for the Pacific war. The PM agreed to ask the USA for 30 VLR B-24s, and the USAAF responded by sending two of their squadrons including crews. The problem was now considered solved. Only it wasn't.

January 1943. The Casablanca Conference declared that destruction of U-boats was the priority. It was agreed that 80 VLRs should be used to plug the Greenland Air Gap. The Conference made area bombing of the French ports Bomber Command's priority after warning the citizens. This was because neither the RAF nor Bomber Command had suggested bombing the U-boats bomb-proof shelters while they were under construction. By end 1941 shelters had been constructed at Lorient and La Pallice to service 2 Flotillas at each place.

Mid 1942 similar shelters had been completed at Brest and St Nazaire, and by mid 1943 a shelter for 1 flotilla would be completed at Bordeaux. Bombing the shelters was a waste of time - no bomb ever penetrated them, but from January to May 1943, 98 aircraft were lost bombing these U-boat bases, and 168 lost bombing U-boat construction yards, all to no effect.

February 1943. The problem of VLR aircraft became hot again. The Casablanca Conference had approved 80 VLRs to close the Greenland Air Gap, but most of the B24s were being allocated to the USAAF mostly for recce duties in the Pacific. The USN employed 52 B24s at end 1942. (By July 1943 they had 209 when Coastal Command had only 37).

March 1943. An Atlantic Convoy Conference re-arranged responsibilities with the USN withdrawing to the south and Canada becoming an equal partner with GB in the North Atlantic, effective April 1. It was decided to increase the number of VLRs in Newfoundland to 4 squadrons (48 aircraft) but for them to work to their patrol limits and not to respect the Chopline. March 1943. The USN had a change of heart after FDR made enquiries about the destination and use of newly constructed B-24s. 112 B-24s had been delivered to the USN by March 19, 1943 and more than 70 of them were operating in the Pacific. The Americans agreed that the Mid-Atlantic Air Gap should be closed with 255 B-24s - 75 provided by the USAAF, 60 by the USN, and 120 from British allocation. In February 1943 there were 9 VLRs in Iceland, and 9 in 15 Group for a total of 18 operating. There were none on the western side of the Atlantic. By end March there were 20 VLRs and by mid-April 41, all with British crews.

May 22, 1943. Doenitz ordered the U-boats back to base. "The conflict between the desire to devote the maximum strength to bombing Germany and the Admiralty's deep anxiety regarding our losses from U-boats was thus reopened in March 1943. As the Admiralty saw it, the whole grand strategy of the Allies depended on defeating the U-boats....In addition to bombing the U-boat bases.... the crucial needs were, in the Naval Staff's opinion, to provide more VLR aircraft, to expedite the entry of escort carriers into service, and to gain the use of bases in the Azores. Bomber Command and the Air Staff considered that the 'softening process' , which could only be applied to Germany by the persistent use of the heavy bombers against land targets, was the essential preliminary to victory. Against that the Admiralty argued that the art of grand strategy was to employ all our forces in furtherance of a common aim, that the accepted aim was the strategic offensive by all arms into Europe, and that the destruction of the U-boats was the necessary prelude to the successful mounting and maintenance of our offensive plans. Such was the problem which the Cabinet ........ had to resolve. In effect it was resolved by something of a compromise. The Admiralty's needs were met, though not as quickly as that department wished, the U-boats were defeated - though only after they had inflicted terrible losses on us and our allies - and the bombing of Germany continued. Whether final victory would have come sooner had our forces been differently allocated at an earlier date is likely to continue to be a subject of dispute. For what it is worth this writer's view is that in the early spring of 1943 we had a very narrow escape from defeat in the Atlantic; and that, had we suffered such a defeat, history would have judged that the main cause had been the lack of two more squadrons of very long range aircraft for convoy escort duties": Roskill: The War At Sea. Volume II, page 370-371.

Conclusions:

1. Merchant shipping losses in the North Atlantic Jan to May 1943 were 1,336,650 tons (228 ships) January 172,691 tons (27 ships) February 288,625 (46) March 476,349 (82) April 235,478 (39) May 163,507 (34)

2. The March number was at an unsustainable rate meaning convoy was failing and would have to be suspended even though there was nothing better to replace it.

3. How many fewer ships would have been sunk if those B-24s listed by Alex Smart had been used to close the air gap: AL504 used to transport Churchill's silk underwear (according to Bill Walker), the 26 that were destroyed in accidents, the 6 sent to the MAAF, and the 11 to 45 Group (Canada) to become Transport aircraft - a grand total of 44 B-24s that could have been converted to VLR? Would these have saved 1 ship? 20 ships? 200 ships? Have a guess!

4. What would have been the effect on sinkings if the first Lancasters produced in August 1942 had been converted to VLR (removing gun turrets, armour, self-sealing tanks, and fitment of extra tanks in the bomb-bay, depth charges, bombs etc) and used to escort the convoys from September 1942 onwards when shipping losses were 1,644,142 tons (286 ships)? September 473,585 tons (95 ships) October 399,715 (62) November 508,707 (83) December 262,135 (46) Have a guess about how many ships would have been saved by 70 Lancaster VLRs! How about half (143 ships)?

5. "The resources devoted to strategic bombing might more usefully have been used in other ways: providing large tactical air forces; strengthening air-sea collaboration (NB); producing more and better tanks; or, above all, concentrating research and production on high-quality air technology (long-range fighters, for example, or guided weapons), which might have made bombing a more effective campaign for all three states that tried it." Richard Overy: The Bombing War, page 633.

6. Richard Overy has moved on from trying to defend the indefensible. His latest book has caught up with common sense that the area bombing campaign was The Greatest Miscalculation (page 607). Hopefully the prickly contributors to this website can now make a similar mental leap.

Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Ah, Tony would you mind editing your post to include some line spacing as line after line after line of text is very hard to read.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Here is some data acquired many years ago (source forgotten):

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)

1939 700/5 (.71%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

The most comprehensive inet source on U-boats is http://www.uboat.net

Please take a look Tony, especially http://www.uboat.net/technical/shipyards/ for the number produced by each shipyard.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

I would if I could, but I can't. I've tried twice and it won't accept the changes. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

You're too elliptical for me, Kutscha. The production figures you asked me to look at in the well-known U-boat.net give 238 in 1942 and 286 in 1943, which is 20/month in 1942 and 24/month in 1943, where Roskill gave 20 to 30/month. So what's your point? Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

The strategic bombing had to have some effect as in 1944 only as 229 were built. 19/month

1943 With the biggest convoy battles of the war and the highest number of boats at sea, stakes were high. In May 1943 the biggest loss to befall the U-boat fleet came with loss of 41 boats. Overall losses in 1943 were 243 U-boats. A increase of 43 over losses.

In 1944, 249 were lost, for 229 built.

No comment on the ships arriving/losses?

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Yes. The numbers for shipping losses in the North Atlantic which I gave were copied from Table II. British, Allied and Neutral Shipping Losses from Enemy Action, according to Theatres, which is Appendix O of The War At Sea by Capt Roskill, which is the Official History. If www.uboat.net has different figures, then uboat.net is simply wrong and perhaps you should inform them of that fact and point them to the definitive source. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

The numbers were from a different source.

Maybe you should contact uboat.net and inform them where their errors are.

This is for Jan 1943, and the other months are also available, http://www.uboat.net/allies/merchant...?qdate=1943-01

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Kutscha. You're confused. U-boat.net gives all losses as 49 in January 1943. I'm talking of the North Atlantic where the Air Gap was. Roskill gives all losses as 50, with 27 in the North Atlantic where the Air Gap was, 4 in UK waters, 3 in the South Atlantic, 14 in the Med, Nil in the Indian Ocean and 2 in the Pacific. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B-24?
 

It's just a matter of posting, then using the "Edit" button. Make the changes and hit the "Save" button.

That's what worked for me. You might want to try it by going back in and cutting out that snarky last sentence in your post.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

I'm already reading it here, so there is no need to inform uboat.net that you are comparing different numbers. The numbers of shipping losses stated in the Appendix of "The War At Sea" counts losses due to all causes in each theatre, while we on uboat.net only show the ships attacked by German U-boats.

Lets take a closer look on January 1943:
We list 49 ships hit by U-boats, but in fact only 35 merchant ships were sunk by U-boats during that month (subtract the ships that were only damaged, the warships and the small sailing vessels).
15 of these 35 were sunk in the South Atlantic, Caribbean, Freetown area, in the Med or in the Arctic, so 20 merchant ships sunk by U-boats in the North Atlantic during January 1943. Only 9 of these 20 were in a convoy when sunk and 7 alone were from the important tanker convoy TM-1 heading from the Caribbean directly for Gibraltar.

In January 1943 about 270 merchant ships were sent from Canada to the UK in eight HX & SC convoys and the 30+ U-boats trying to intercept them only managed to sink 1 ship in convoy and 5 stragglers while losing 1 U-boat.

Even the Coastal Command wasn't sure about the correct use of the Liberators. Initially they converted all available Liberator Mk.I & Mk.II to VLR, but when the first batches of Mk.IIIA arrived they weren't converted and used to patrol the Bay of Biscay instead. If it was so urgent to get more VLR aircraft, why it still took more than 30 days to convert Liberators to VLR configuration in early 1943?

PS: Roskill is a good source but no longer a definitive one because it was written before the extend of Allied code breaking and its huge impact on the Battle of the Atlantic became known.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

By the way, please don't forget that the strategic bombing offensive was the main reason why the type XXI U-boats came too late into service. These submarines were able to remain submerged during the whole patrol and would have rendered the air cover of a convoy ineffective because they were fast enough to get into a favorable attack position while submerged.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Rainer; You say bombing was the main reason for the delay to the Type XXI Elektroboot. You ignore the fixation on the Walther propulsion system and complacency when the war was going well for Germany. It was in 1941 that someone suggested eliminating the Walther engine with its problems and using large electric motors and batteries instead: Project XVIII gave birth to Project XXI. But there was no urgency to get XXI off the drawing board until the defeat of the submarines in May 1943. Then the design was dusted off and rushed to completion in late 1943, having lost two years. There was the main reason for the delay. The second main reason was the choice of sub-contractors by Speer who had no experience of shipbuilding, which meant a large amount of rework, and delays. Wilhelmshaven was bombed heavily throughout the war. The only damage to U-boats on the stocks was by the USAAF, which destroyed two Type VII in one raid, not to be repeated. Wilhelmshaven became a supplier of Type XXI sections which were barged to Vegesack. As far as I know not one was damaged by bombing. Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Thank you. Nick. But there is no edit button whereby I can accommodate your wishes. So perhaps you could oblige me by removing the last point. Being snarky is in the eye of the beholder, and beholding it in this thread (posting number 18) I preferred to call it prickly.
Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Tony, are you saying that when you view a posting, your own included, that after you actually post it there is no "edit" button in the lower right of your screen or also a "quote" button along with two other buttons? When I view your posts, the buttons are there. Please explain what you see on your screen.

As for being snarky or "prickly", those have no place on this forum.
Be careful.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

John, I have logged on and can see no edit button.
There was an edit button at one time because I 'edited' the post twice, but the edits would not save.
There seems to be a time window for editing, and that window appears to be different from the time window for saving.
You and I agree there should be no place for 'snarky' or 'prickly', but also no place for labelling my postings on this thread as 'rubbish' and 'here we go again', which is verbal harrassment and lowers the tone of this site. One rule for everyone posting here is all I have ever requested, and have expected the moderators to enforce.
Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Tony, I wrote that the strategic bombing was the main reason for the delay to get the type XXI into service - not for the whole project.

The developement of the Walter propulsion had no high priority in the Kriegsmarine and it was in November 1942 when they decided to design the type XVIII to test if the propulsion could be used operational. Its double-hull design inspired two engineers (the same guys that designed the type VII) to replace the fuel tanks for the Walter propulsion with additional batteries, an idea which eventually led to the type XXI. But this took place in January 1943 and not already 1941, the design was finished in June 1943 and presented to Hitler on 8 July 1943. So the development of the XXI came just in time for the Kriegsmarine after their conventional submersibles were defeated in May 1943.

Speer's planning of the production reduced the time to built one type XXI from 18 to 6 months. Of course there were some serious troubles with the sub-contractors initially and the timely delivery of the components to the shipyards where they were assembled until these problems were largely solved in mid 1944, but at that time the strategic bombing campaign began to effect the completion of the new U-boats badly and hampered the training of the crews. At least 60 type XXI under construction were destroyed by Allied bombing raids together with 14 of the 118 U-boats of that type that were commissioned. In fact, only two type XXI had reached operational status when the war ended.

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

OK, Rainer.
If Doenitz, Raeder and Hitler had listened to Furburger, they would have given the Type XXI priority in 1940, which comes back to my posting that started this thread. Two years was the maximum the Kriegsmarine should have expected the Type VII to remain a viable weapon, and the reason it lasted for two years longer than that was Allied incompetence - lack of support for the RN by Bomber Command as mentioned critically in Richard Overy's latest book 'The Bombing War, and especially the absence of VLR patrolling.
You mention the Fuehrer Conferences. That of May 31, 1943 started with Doenitz's report: The substantial increase of the enemy Air Force is the cause of the present crisis in submarine warfare. By means of sound detection it has been determined that as many planes now pass through the narrows between Iceland and the Faroe Islands , as only recently appeared in the course of a week.
Finally, a question for you. The removal by Doenitz of Type XXI production from the K-Amt and its replacement with Albert Speer's Department of Armament and a fire-truck manufacturing wizard (Otto Merker), was bound to give problems, bombing or no bombing. It is rather too easy to blame bombing when Doenitz turned U-boat manufacturing upside down in 1943, and surely it is not surprising that in the end he got next to nothing as a result.
Tony

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

Hi Tony,

by way of example, following are some paraphrased translations of Luftwaffe situation reports and civil defence reports relating to damage from Allied air attacks. These are just what I have on-hand and the Luftwaffe source of the translations was comprehensive for the period Feb-Apr 1945 (i.e. it is only possible to quote from those German/Luftwaffe sources that survived the wholesale destruction of records prior to the capitulation):

24 February 1945 - Bremen
A U-boat was sunk at the A.G. Weser works of Deschimag

11 March 1945 - Bremen
The Weser AG was most seriously damaged....it was not possible to estimate the decrease of production at the time of the report

30 March 1945 - Bremen
At the A.G. Weser most severe damage was reported to buildings and material. Seven U-boats were sunk and another severely damaged.

17 January 1945 - Hamburg
Severe damage was caused to the following firms:
Blohm & Voss, Steinwaerder...destroyed No 7 Ship Construction workshop and electrical crane installations, Heavy damage was caused to a number of workshops etc etc

7-8 March 1945 - Hamburg
At Blohm & Voss a 75 ton floating crane was sunk and severe damage was caused to a number of workshops and plant.

11 March 1945 - Hamburg
Blohm & Voss was hit...destroying...a tools store, a 250 ton crane, and a 3000 cu. metre. gas container. A number of workshops and the oxygen and hydrogen plant were severely damaged and 3 U-boats were also damaged. A number of ships in the dock at the Howaldt Works were sunk, including a U-boat and lifting tackle which capsized.

20 March 1945 - Hamburg
Blohm & Voss suffered severe damage. In the harbour a mine-sweeper and 2 other vessels were sunk and 2 U-boats damaged.

30 March 1945 - Hamburg
Blohm & Voss and the Deutsche Werft were the chief targets hit...two U-boats were sunk and 4 capsized.

8-9 April 1945 - Hamburg
Among the targets hit were Thenania-Ossag, Blohm & Voss, Deutsche Werft etc, etc. At Blohm & Voss...serious damage to all parts of the yard and dock installations and a salvage vessel. Several boats were sunk, including 3 U-boats and a further 5 were damaged. The shipyards of Howaldt A.G. were hit...and widespread damage was caused to various departments. One U-boat was severely damaged and two capsized while two floating docks were sunk. The U-boat bunker was also severely damaged.

9 April 1945 - Hamburg
The U-boat pens Nos 1, 2 & 5 at the Deutsche Werft in Finkenwaeder were pierced by several H.E. bombs.

I have no pretence in understanding how these quoted reports affected production of the Elektroboote, and due to my limited knowledge on the subject of Elektroboote production have only included info on the prime shipbuilders and not sub-contracted component manufacturers. Compilations of similar sourced and translated German reports for bombing in the years 1943 and 1944 are available as AHB translations from TNA, Kew. These translations are limited to major raids only (i.e. were the number of participating aircraft and/or bomb load carried was significant enough for inclusion in the compilations).

regards

Rod

Re: Is this a true statement about the B24?
 

It's worth taking a look at "The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy" by Adam Tooze. He discusses some of what went wrong with the production of the Type XXI. IIRC there were cases where the prefabricated hull sections didn't match up.