Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

I'm looking for information on how Allied fighter pilots viewed their IJN and IJA opponents, specifically, which of the two did they think was more formidable.

I'm trying to think of a campaign where both IJN and IJA fighter pilots were regularly engaged at the same time--I'm not that well versed.

Anyway, I'm hoping someone has something on this.

Thank you in advance!

Bronc

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Bronc

I am not the one to comment on this since my knowledge of the Pacific War is somewhat limited but from my reading on the subject I get the impression that most Allied pilots considered the IJNAF to be the more challenging opponent. However, it should be pointed out that much of this was based on considerable misunderstanding as in the early stages of the war it appears that there was considerable confusion among the Allies regarding which Japanese air force where they engaged with. For example, both the RAF and AVG over Malaysia, Burma and China often claimed that their opponents were naval types when in fact their opponents were almost exclusively IJAAF aircraft - the Nate, Oscar, Sally, Lily and Ann to name a few. It appears that responsibility for the South Pacific theater generally was left to the IJNAF, however, the IJAAF had a number of units stationed on New Guinea by spring 1943 although these were rapidly worn down by combat attrition and supply difficulties. It is my understanding that the IJAAF and IJNAF were engaged alongside each other in the Philippines campaign and the defense of the Home Islands in the later stages of the war. It should be pointed out that at the beginning of the war both air forces had accumulated considerable combat experience as a result of the actions against the Chinese and Russians so in truth its hard to tell if one was "better" than the other. Hopefully, others can add more to this interesting subject.

Horrido!

Leo

Hard Question to Answer
 

It's a hard question to answer--probably impossible. However are these statements correct?

1) Allied fighter pilots in the Pacific didn't begin engaging IJAAF fighters pilots until late 1943, and maybe even 1944. Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz and the whole of the Solomons campaign was fought almost exclusively against the IJNAF.

2) The AVG/Flying Tigers never flew against the IJNAF.

3) The RAF in Malaysia/Burma never flew against the IJNAF.

4) By the time USN and USAAF began engaging IJAAF fighter pilots in any numbers, they were flying Hellcats, Corsairs and P-38's. (Planes that dramatically out-classed IJAAF aircraft.)

Thanks!!

Bronc

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Bronc

I will try to answer as to the best of my knowledge which is not the greatest since the Pacific War is not my forte but hopefully others can correct any errors.

1) I agree that the Americans generally fought against the IJNAF in the early campaigns in the southern Pacific. The IJAAF did participate in the conquest of the Philippines and as pointed out before had a number of units based on New Guinea in mid-1943 but for the first two years of the war the Americans mainly fought against the IJNAF.

2) That is my understanding.

3) What I have read of the RAF in the early period of the war is limited to the Buffalo squadrons stationed in Malaysia and Burma and in the defense of Singapore these did engage IJNAF units on at least two occasions that I am aware of. Generally, though, they were confronted by the IJAAF.

4) I honestly have no idea which were the principal American types used in the southern Pacific at that time but I believe you are correct. I am almost certain that some USAAF units were still equipped with the P-40 and others with the P-47 and likewise some USN units were still equipped with the Wildcat. It would be hard to say just how these types compared to their opponents such as the Oscar and Tony of the IJAAF and Zeke of the IJNAF; generally I believe that pilot training was the critical factor for success in aerial combat. I have read that based on fighter losses suffered by both sides the first six months of the Pacific War were a period marked by decided Japanese superiority. However, from the Guadalcanal campaign on through the end of 1943/beginning of 1944 fighter losses were quite balanced after which the Allied units began establishing a notable dominance.

I hope this is accurate and if not any corrections or additional comments would be greatly appreciated.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hello Bronc.
From early 1942 until late 1943, the Allied Air Forces fought a predominantly defensive air war over Northern Australia and New Guinea. This threw the USAAF, RAAF and Dutch NEI flying units in against both Japanese Army and land-based Navy squadrons. It was probably the longest continuous period of time when both the Japanese air arms operated “together” in the same campaign. (Though, “together” is a loose definition – more like benign tolerance of each other, rather than active co-operation.)
A quick rough-guide to Japanese operations would indicate (though not definitive in any way):
- raids against New Guinea targets initially IJNAF, then heavily augmented by IJAAF, then reinforced by IJNAF;
- raids against Darwin (and other Australian targets) predominantly by IJNAF units, with a number of autonomous raids by IJAAF units.

If you are looking for aircrew opinions on the relative merits of Japanese Army and Navy air units, then looking into the unit diaries or biographies of the following units might be useful:
- 49th Fighter Group USAAF (originally destined for Java, but remained in Australia defending Darwin in 1942, before moving to New Guinea and subsequently the Philippines);
- 75 Squadron RAAF (defending Port Moresby in 1942);
- 75 & 76 Squadrons RAAF (defending Milne Bay in New Guinea);
- the Spitfire Wing defending Darwin & Northern Australia in 1943.
I’m sure there are many other units which would provide an insight.

It is my “impression” that poor initial Allied intel on the potency of the Japanese aircraft and units, couple with the similarities in Japanese aircraft types (e.g. Army Ki-43 Oscars cf Navy A6M Zeros; Army Ki-27 Nates cf Navy A5M Claudes; Army Ki-21 Sallys cf Navy G3M Bettys) probably led to great confusion over what units were operating in-theatre. My reading of the last few years has concentrated on the Allied fighter operations. I don’t recall any specific mention of operational orders or aircrew opinions which favoured concern over one Japanese unit over another – e.g. unlike European theatre concerns voiced over the yellow nose Bf109s of the “Abbeville Kids” (JG26?). Mind you, when I was reading up on my interest in the subject, I wasn’t looking subjectively at Allied opinions regarding Japanese Army vs Navy capabilities, so more subtle references would have been lost on me.

Regards,
...geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

The book of Nicholas Millman "Ki-27 ´Nate´Aces" may give some light.

Millman shows that IJAAF units flying near-obsolete but still surprisingly well-doing ´Nate´ made quite well against Allied pilots in 1941-1942.

Action over the Philippines saw two Ki-27 IJAAF units participating and were able to bring down some American P-40 E´s and alone P-35. It seems that IJAAF pilots did make well against American foes who had more advanced planes. American pilots learned that the "obsolete" Nate with its fixed landing gear was still a dangerous plane in the hands of skilled pilot.

IJAAF ´Nate´pilots took further part in the Malaya, The East Indies and Burma campaigns doing rather well against the Brewster Buffalos, Hurricanes and P-40´s of RAF/USAAF/AVG.

RAF ace Barry Sutton about his IJAAF opponents over Burma in 1942 and what the real combat situation made him to think about pre-war newspaper article claiming that Japanese pilots were unable to perform aerobatics: "Many times since I have thought I would have liked to cram the man who wrote that article into the cockpit of my Hurricane as I twisted and turned, trying to dogde the front end of those slippery little 97´s (Nate) as they clawed themselves around incredibly tight corners at a couple of hundred miles a hour"

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Looking back on it, and knowing what we know now, is it fair to say that the cadre of fighter pilots that the IJNAF started the war with were objectively THE BEST in the world, bar none? (I'm not dissing IJAAF fighter pilots, I just know very little about them.) But looking at the Guadalcanal campaign, where IJNAF fighter pilots were flying missions that were approaching 1000-miles round trip, that is very strong evidence for this proposition is it not?

To some extent, this discussion is like nailing jello to a tree, however, it is a historical fact that in pre-war Japan, circa 1937-1940, the IJNAF and IJAAF were engaged in an extraordinary amount of realistic operational training, not to mention operational flying in Manchuria and China.

Bronc

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Bronc,

You can nail jello to a tree with relative ease if you put it into the right container first. Just like being able to juggle 24 eggs at one time is quite easy – if you tape them into the cartons first. ;) It also means that you make a bigger mess when you get it wrong!

I think you need to frame the context of the combat in order to look at areas where a truer comparison of the IJA and IJN capabilities can be drawn. Leo & Guerra have made true statements but which may not lead to any comparison. Let me expand on my thinking (and it is only my opinion now).

Early in the Pacific war (i.e. December 1941 to about mid-1942) the war was very fluid, and the Japanese capabilities very poorly known (or perhaps more correct to state – poorly appreciated) by Allied planners. The performance of the Allied fighters (P-40s, Buffalos, Hurricanes, F4Fs) did not differ greatly from the Japanese Zeros, Oscars and Nates. The advantage would have been to the attackers, able to direct greater numbers to a specific area and overwhelm the defenders for local air superiority. You see these tactics used to advantage in Malaya/Singapore, the Philippines and Java. Under the circumstances where the defending force is constantly spread thin and under local pressure, losing airfields and being pushed backwards….it becomes much more difficult to understand how well you are (or not) actually performing. So then it becomes difficult to hold a true appreciation of the quality of the enemy. Hence the Allied opinion expands to favour an enemy who is filling the skies with Zeros (despite the fact that these aircraft can be Army Oscars and Nates…..a kind of Zero snobbery perhaps).

It’s only when the Japanese started attacking fixed targets where air superiority is contested over a period of time – e.g. the AVG and RAF defending Rangoon, the RAAF over New Guinea and the USAAF over Darwin – that you get a better impression of what the Allied pilots thought about their opposition. The air battles over Rangoon were exclusively a IJAAF affair, though there is some thought that the AVG squadron remaining in China may have encountered IJN aircraft occasionally. So for the early battles, I think you need to look at the RAAF over Port Moresby and the USAAF over Darwin to get a defending force encountering both IJA and IJN air units, and able to hold their own long enough to for a subjective opinion.

The USAAF units that moved into New Guinea for the late 1942 and early 1943 campaigns would also be a good source of opinion – as they would also have encountered both Japanese army and navy air units on reasonably even circumstances. I think the US Army and Marines over Guadalcanal may have been facing mainly IJN air units and may not have encountered sufficient IJA opposition to help you answer your question subjectively.

The RAAF defending Darwin in 1943 (initially with P-40s and then substantially with Spitfires) encountered over 50 “significant” raids (i.e. bombers escorted by fighters or fighter sweeps), but only about 5 (from memory) were IJA raids. Their opinions may be useful in that they were defending from a secure position with little chance of a Japanese invasion, so they may be afforded greater subjectivity in their reports of enemy capabilities. The thing to watch out for here is that the Spitfire wing flew with Bader big-wing tactics, and tended – under the circumstances – to overclaim in the same manner as the RAF big-wings during the Battle of Britain. I think it’s more a result of putting large numbers of defending fighters over a relatively small patch of sky. If six fighters fire at a vic of three bombers – each can be aiming at a separate target, but if one bomber starts smoking…..all six fighters are probably going to claim it. Not dishonesty, just over enthusiasm perhaps.

By the time you get to the 1944 Philippines Campaign and the US carrier raids over Japan, the average quality of US aircraft and aircrew is so much better that the IJA/IJN, the Allied pilots are more thinking of finding the enemy in order to shoot them down, not so much concerned about whether the opposition was any good.

My opinion only - hope it’s of some use.

Regards,
…geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

As far as US Navy carrier pilots are concerned I have not come across any reports that seek to compare IJNAF and IJAAF pilot abilities: what I have seen reported is when enemy pilots of unusual skill or aggressiveness have been encountered, whether Army or Navy. Of course, particularly in combat Japanese aircraft, and hence the operating service, were often misidentified.

As a general point, US Navy carrier pilots considered themselves superior to those of the Army and so would no doubt have had the same expectation of their Japanese adversaries.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Bronc

I for one am very wary of using terms such as "the best" when discussing virtually any subject as more often than not it reveals one's prejudices more than anything else. Regarding the level of Japanese pilots and aircrew at the beginning of the war by all accounts it was very high indeed. One source that I have seen states that army and land-based navy pilots had an average of 500 to 600 flight hours; carrier-based navy pilots an average of 800 flight hours. Approximately 50% of army pilots had seen action in China and against the Russians and about 10% of land-based navy pilots had seen combat in China as well. As I wrote before these men did very well in the initial stages of the war and were certainly capable of holding their own in the mid-war period. For example, the Oscar units of the IJAAF in Burma performed well against a variety of opponents in 1942 and 1943 until the arrival in number of improved Allied types began to change the situation in 1944. On the other hand, in the great naval battles of 1942 such as Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz the Japanese consistently lost more aircraft than the Americans and it should be noted that the USN and USMC held their own against the IJN in the Guadalcanal campaign even though the Wildcat was and is generally considered to have been inferior to the Zeke.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

I have read that the Japanese fighter most successfull in terms of downed enemy planes is Oscar (Ki-43) - and this could show something about the abilities of IJA fighter pilots! Of course there is a problem to figure out how many of the claims of Ki-43 pilots are legitimate (to be verified by Allied loss records). And the same problem goes also for the claims of Allied pilots vs. Ki-43.

When it comes to airwar, more interesting is my opinion the turning point in late 1942 or early 1943 than to analyze the rather onesided airwar of 1944-1945. At the late stage of war Allied had all the advantages: better planes, more tech and human resources, better average pilots etc. Only the very few remaining Japanese aces were still able to survive from combats and score occasionally.

Japanese as well as Germans were broken down by the war of attrition against superior enemy. One thing to add to Japanese misery was the prewar combat training program - in IJN case it was focused to produce small number of professional combat pilots but neglected the need to train decent reserve pilots for the long term war (the idea was that war would be a quick win so small number of elite pilots was enough). When this mistake was realised, it was already too late. When experienced pilot was lost, there were no decent replacement but only little trained novices available.

At the late point of Pacific War the average skill of IJA/IJN pilot was already so low that from the Japanese point of view it did not make much difference to send hastily trained novices to normal combat mission (in which they would be shot down in first air combat) or to kamikaze mission.

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Here’s a quick (“Reader’s Digest style) snap-shot summary of the pre-1941 air war over China.

In 1937, IJA operations centred round the North of China, crossing over from Manchuria towards Beijing in early July. IJN centred their operations around Shanghai in August 1937. The bulk of the better-trained pre-war Chinese aircrews were stationed in the south to defend the major centres (Shanghai, Guangzhou/Canton, and the then-capital Nanking). It was also Chinese government philosophy to fight the battle where western reporters could see the effect (and encourage more sympathy). Hence the major defence of Shanghai – especially directly across the river from the International Settlement. Almost all of the pre-war Chinese fighter strength was gathered around Shanghai. So, initially the Japanese army aircrews had a much “easier” time with more and more land-based (and floatplane) Japanese navy air units became involved in operations over Shanghai.

It was a stalemate for almost 2 months, with the Japanese Naval Infantry unable to break-out, and the Chinese divisions unable to remove them. It took further naval landings to outflank the defenders, and the subsequent inclusion of Japanese army troops (though I’m unsure of the exact timeline of their involvement) to push the Chinese defenders back along the Shanghai-Nanking-Wuhan axis. Almost all the Japanese involvement over this theatre of air operations was IJN, mainly land-based G3Ms and A5Ms, and some carrier-based A4N biplanes.

The next major air battles occurred in the defence of Wuhan Jan/Feb – October 1938. Initially some of the Chinese squadrons began re-equipping with Soviet-supplied fighters (Polikarpov 15s and 16s). Subsequently in mid-1938, two Soviet-manned fighter groups joined the fighting. At this stage the air operations in the south (around Wuhan) were still IJN based. The IJA units (starting to re-equip from the Ki-10 to the Ki-27) were based in the north, especially around the Manchurian-Soviet border, where incursions and skirmishes were taking place.

The main IJA air battles did not take place until the massive Nomonhan/Khalkhin-Gol air battles in late 1938 and early 1939 against Soviet fighters and bombers across a 100-mile front.

The impression I have from my reading (and this is from memory now), it that the pre-1940 Japanese army and navy air arms were relatively small. It would appear that in the course of operations between 1937-1939, the bulk of the pre-war IJN fighter force was rotated through the southern China theatre of operations. The 1937 to early-1938 air battles against pre-war Chinese fighter pilots (home-grown and American-Chinese volunteers, and predominantly German-trained) was a close-run thing until the IJN threw in large numbers of A5M fighters for escorts and fighter-sweeps. It became more evenly matched again when the Soviet “volunteers” arrived. It wasn’t until 1940, with the withdrawal of the Soviet aircrews and the arrival of the experimental A6M Zero squadron, that the IJN gained air dominancy in the south.

The IJA air units did not engage in significant air battles (mainly due to a lack of opposition) in their northern area of operations until the air battles against the Soviets over Nomonham. Almost the entire available force of Ki-27 fighters (supported by a few Ki-10 units) would be involved in the fighting. The Soviets would throw in larger numbers of reinforcements. Both air and ground fighting took place over a small patch of territory (the front was of the order of 100 miles). Both sides over-claimed dramatically in the air – again as a result of the very large numbers of aircraft involved over a small front. I don’t recall the exact numbers, but the leading Japanese ace claimed 93(?) kills. Total Soviet air losses were of the order of 100 aircraft. Both sides over-claimed in a big way, so I’m not just singling out the IJA crews.

From all that, I concluded with the opinion that by 1941, the IJN aircrews had a much longer period of air combat experience. The longer pre-war training process, which Leo indicated previously, meant the IJN land-based crews had as much flight experience as their IJA counterparts, and the IJN carrier capable aircrews were “a cut above” as with most naval aviation organisations…..and rightly entitled to swagger down the street (or is that just getting back on dry land again).

So all other things being taken into account, in December 1941, I would rate the average IJN aircrew being better than their IJA counterparts – better training, and more time to incorporate combat lessons learnt. The downside of being an IJN aviator, is that eventually you run up against similarly trained enemy (i.e. USN), and when your airfield (the floating one) is sunk, you stand less chance of surviving. At least an IJA aviator stuck on the ground and being bombed on his runway, can take shelter and live to fight another day.


...geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

This thread has been generating some great posts, (all but mine because I don't know anything) and to one and all, I say thank you.

There was racism, a lot of racist propaganda that was directed against the Japanese prior to, during and throughout the war--for home consumption. However, each of the Allied nations had a military attaché exchange program with the Japanese in the late 1930's, no? The actual abilities and capabilities of the Japanese army and navy air forces had to be known (should have been known) to someone in the British and US military pre-war, no? And if not, why not?? (The standard narrative is that the Japanese came as a big surprise to the British and Americans. The Zero certainly was. Were the Japanese THAT successful in hiding their abilities in the late 1930's?)

Bronc

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hello Bronc,

In the context of the timeline, the Japanese capabilities were not really known. If you compare the pre-1930/40, French and British near-hysteria about the Luftwaffe super-fighter – the Bf110 (and subsequently the He113), information wasn’t really at a finger’s keyboard touch or book-search away. I mean how well do we really know about the JSF or the F-22 or Chinese J-20 and Russian Su-37(?) (Russian stealth-ski?)?

The Western powers had observers in the International Settlement in 1937 during the Battle of Shanghai. A Dutch Colonel (*) wrote a series of lengthy reports for his government (and I believe it was shared to some extent with other western governments), so Japanese naval infantry tactics were quite well known. Claire Chennault and his team of technical people were on the ground (and in the air) training and organising the Chinese Air Force, so there was a steady flow of information back to the US.

The Chinese ground effort in Shanghai was hampered by the lack of heavy weapons, and co-ordination between various divisions (lack of willingness to share the limited heavy artillery, lack of coordinated air force/army co-operation, etc). The Japanese naval infantry/ship/airpower coordination was superb – possibly more integrated than any other armed forces until the US Marines after Guadalcanal. Where the Japanese Naval Light Infantry didn’t have land heavy artillery, they had heavy cruisers and destroyers moored in the Whangpo River. I guess the Western army planners may well have decided that the Japanese only succeeded in Shanghai because of the lack of Chinese heavy weapons, and that a Western army with integrated infantry and artillery with tank support would hold out easily. Besides….everybody knows you can’t drive tanks in the Malayan or Burmese jungle (or the Ardennes Forest!). The Chinese air effort wasn’t noticeable over the city (except when their bombs overshot the Japanese cruiser and hit the International Settlement) – in much the same way the troops at Dunkirk didn’t notice the air battle 20-30 miles away.

Chennault’s insights would have been useful, but he was on the outer with US Army General Staff (considered a bit of a maverick because he thought a credible fighter force could actually intercept heavy bombers and cause significant casualties). Only at Presidential level was there an amount of support for him, but then Roosevelt would not have dealt with relatively minor combat evaluation reports on the Japanese Naval Air Arm.

The Soviets – through their “volunteers” in China and through their combat in Nomonhan – would have gathered a reasonable amount of intel, but considering the massive overclaiming at Nomonhan, and the state of the Soviet AF in 1939 (notable in the Russo-Finish War as well), I’m not sure how well they would have evaluated the info.

So although there was data out there in 1939-40, I don’t think Western military planners would have really recognised the significance of much of it. In the main part, they had their own fixed ideas about air operations – Douhet’s theory about the bomber always getting through, etc – and a small conflict in the exotic far east between a couple of non-Western countries wasn’t going to change any opinions….yet. The racist element – Japanese pilot’s are all myopic and can’t fly at night, and all their aircraft are just rip offs of the junk we sold them, i.e. Vought 143s, Seversky two-seater fighters, etc – was perhaps evident at the squadron level; but the planners sent Buffalos to the Far East because that’s all that was available at the time against a potential enemy. The top-line Spitfires and Hurricanes and P-40s were being used against an actual enemy.

By the way, the Dutch Colonel’s notes (*) have been compiled into a book “A Dutch Spy in China”. It makes for a good read. The book’s quite expensive to buy, so one for the inter-library request system perhaps.

...geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

One thing that may give food of thought is how much combat experience Japanese pilots (IJN/IJA) actually adquired in China before the Pacific war. I came accross of this when I did read the interview of a Japanese bomber pilot who served in China in late 1930´s and early 1940´s. He told that he was never attacked by Chinese fighter or even saw one during his missions.

It may have been rather limited experience in China due to limited chances of air combat. For example it is known that IJN´s "Claude" fighters were equipped with drop tanks not only to escort bombers but also to force Chinese in air combat as Chinese usually avoided air combats near front lines. There were also repeated bans from Chinese Air command to be involved in combat with Japanese fighters (it was more important to shoot down bombers and not waste the limited number of planes in fighter vs. fighter combats).

The Chinese Air Force was hit pretty hard already by 1937, and the appearance of Soviet planes and volunteers did not turn the balance. In 1940-1941 Zero pilots managed to have very few combat opportunities against Chinese and they were probably the most one-sided air battles of all times. IIRC, Chinese lost in two combats 27 of their fighters while Zero losses were 0 (the only Zero loss in China in 1940-1941 was due to AA). This created the myth of "invicible Zero" - based on couple of combats against less trained and less experienced enemy flying inferior planes.

So I think that Chinese experience is somewhat overestimated as a practical school of Japanese fighter pilots. Of course some important tactical lessons were learned like the adoption of "loose V" formation which was a significant step ahead from traditional stiff "vic", which Japanese were using still in late 1930´s.

The Nomonhan war against Soviets in 1939 may have been actually more challenging school of combat as Japanese pilots had to fight against numerically superior enemy with technically equal equipment (I-16, I-153) compared to their own planes (Ki-27, Ki-10). It is also important to note, that among Soviet pilots there were battle-hardened veterans of Spanish Civil War (and China). It is a myth that Soviet pilots were all rookies. The best Soviet pilots were at least as good as their Japanese counterparts.

Leaving the massive (and even ridiculous) overclaiming of Nomonhan air war aside, the tactical result in fighter vs. fighter combats in Nomonhan favoured IJA pilots as IJAAF lost 63 fighters in air combat and Soviet fighter regiments lost 130 planes in combat. These figures are based on official loss records of both sides and thus give more reliable picture than the exaggerated claim records of both sides.

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Guerra,

Don’t be too dismissive of the learning potential of the IJN air combat over China. In the air battles for Shanghai, formations of unescorted Japanese bombers were caught by the cream of the pre-war (and quaintly many were trained in Germany) Chinese AF fighter pilots flying Hawk II’s, III’s and Boeing 281s (export P-26s) and subsequently Gloster Gladiators. They caused sufficient losses for the Japanese Navy to replace the few squadrons of A4N biplanes with larger numbers of A5M monoplanes. Once the A5M “Claudes” arrived in numbers with better trained Navy pilots, the losses suffered by the Chinese fighter force was unsustainable, hence the temporary withdrawal to re-equip with Russian Polikarpovs. The Soviet volunteers also had reasonable numbers of Spanish Civil War veterans, including the Group and Squadron commanders.

You are quite correct in saying that even the arrival of the Soviet volunteers didn’t turn the tide, but it did mean the re-equipped Chinese fighters and the Soviet air groups were competitive. The air battles over Wuhan in 1938 were certainly not constantly one-sided Japanese victories. The Japanese Navy aircrews with similar quality aircraft and better average quality pilots did hold the upper hand. It is also reasonable to say they held local air superiority over the battle field most of the time, but it wasn’t until the arrival of the experimental Zero Squadron in 1940, that the IJN achieved dominance.

The bans against defending fighters from taking on attacking fighters is common sense. No one seems to blame the RAF in the Battle of Britain or the Luftwaffe over France in 1941/42 from refusing to be drawn into intercepting fighter sweeps. You will find that up until the appearance of the Zeros in 1940, escorted Japanese bombing raids over Nanking, Wuhan and Chungking were contested and the comparison of losses (you’re correct that losses better indicate comparison than claims) was not totally one sided.

Hakan Gustavsson’s website gives a good day-by-day account of the air battles over China from 1937-1945.
http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sino-japanese.htm

By the way, I think the myth of the “Invincible Zero” was more a result of the successes the Navy Zeros and Army Ki-43s achieved over Malaya, Java and the Philippines. No one in the RAF and USAAF seemed to be paying attention to the happenings over China in 1940.

Regards,
...geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

The one-sided air combats of Zeros vs. Chinese-flown Polikarpov fighters in 1940 and 1941 created the myth of Zero´s unbeatable combat performance among Japanese pilots, not among Western observers. It also made them to convert more easily from the A5M4 (in which they were used) to more modern plane. In mock-fights the older Claude did beat Zero for being more nimble again and again. Zero was manouverable plane, but Claude was that even more. The mock tests therefore did not convince IJN pilots.

Japanese pilots were in fact quite conservative - initially they liked more of Claude with its open cockpit (good visibility) and fixed landing gears (easy landing and take off) and Claude had even better aerobatic qualities! But when Zero demonstrated its superiority over Polikarpov fighters, which had been challenging opponents to Claude, IJN pilots realised its potential and were willing to convert in more modern "unbeatable" plane.

I have not gone through the records of early Pacific war to see how Zero pilots made it initally against P-40E´s flown by Americans or Brewster Buffalos flown by British/Dutch. The common claim is that Zero and its pilots were superior in all aspects, but I´m not sure how true that assesment is. For example the probable kill/loss -ratio of Dutch Buffalo pilots was not that bad (IIRC, nearly 1:1 against Zeros/Oscars). Buffalo was a better plane than its reputation, when it was handled properly (like by Finns). Perhaps the Allied pilots in late 1941/early 1942 earn more respect than is usually given them. More of this theme:
http://www.amazon.com/Bloody-Shamble.../dp/094881750X

And if we go through the kill/loss stats of Wildcat (USNAF/USMC) vs. Zero (IJNAF) stats, they seem to show that it was about 1:1 during the mid and late 1942 air combats. This despite Zero´s better performance in speed, rate of climb and manouverability. The American Navy/Marine pilot program was not so harsh as the IJNAF program, but still it produced decent pilots who with right tactics could hold their own vs. elite pilots of Japanese Navy.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Bronc

Prior to the war Chennault warned the US War Department of both the Nate fighter of the IJAAF and the Claude fighter of the IJNAF noting that not only did these possess excellent performance but also equally noteworthy being the fact that these were autonomously designed and constructed by the Japanese. He also passed along information concerning the Zeke estimating its top speed as 322 mph and its maximum climb rate as being over 3,500 fpm as well as the type's incredible maneuverability. The US Navy Fleet Air Tactical Unit Intelligence Bulletin of 22 September 1941 estimated the Zeke had a top speed between 345 and 380 mph, a cruise speed of between 210 and 250 mph and an armament of two 7.7-mm machine guns and two 20-mm cannons. It was these estimates that led to the development of the Thach Weave as a tactical counter to enable USN fighter pilots to engage the Zeke on somewhat level terms. Another aspect that should be mentioned that proved crucial to the ability of USN fighter pilots to hold their own against a well-trained foe with a superior aircraft was the emphasis the USN placed on training in deflection shooting which was unique in the world.

Hi GuerraCivil

The latest estimates that I am aware of have Dutch pilots claiming some 15 to 20 victories with the Buffalo. Unfortunately, I do not have losses of these units at hand but the usual estimate is some 30 or so. I do agree that the type actually was not that bad as is commonly thought; RAF/RAAF pilots over Malaysia and Burma felt the aircraft was faster than the Japanese fighters they encountered although inferior in climb and maneuverability. They quickly learned that to engage in a classic dogfight was suicidal and that the correct tactic to deal with the enemy was to engage only when enjoying an altitude advantage and to avoid turning combats. Unfortunately, due to the lack of advance warning or ground control, such a favorable situation was rarely to be experienced often resulting in the Buffalo units being bounced by the Japanese fighters while still attempting to gain altitude. It should also be pointed out that inevitably the Buffalo pilots of both the RAF/RAAF and KNIL met the enemy in conditions of numerical inferiority; the British, for example, never succeeding in putting up more than a dozen fighters in the air at any one time. The five RAF/RAAF squadrons equipped with the Buffalo lost 28 aircraft in aerial combat over three months which actually was not excessive when one takes the situation in the theater the Allies found themselves into consideration.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Leo,
I imagine that the US War Department would have passed the infomation on to both USAAF and USN. So I find it interesting that the USN found it necessary to develop tactics to benefit the F4F, whereas not a great deal seems to be written about any initial changes in USAAF P-40/P-39 tactics (apart from Chennault's directives to his AVG pilots).

Do you think it was because the USN had more time to reflect lessons learnt at Pearl Harbor before the next carrier clash in May 1942? Perhaps the USAAF in the Philippines being caught on the hop in December 1941 weren't in a possition to impement changes....and subsequently fighting on a withdrawal weren't able to make wholesale changes to tactics (i.e. heavy losses, lack of air raid warning, lack of numbers in the air, etc)?

Hi Guerra,
I see your point about the Zero Invincibilty Myth being in the mind of the IJN. I don't recall any changes in the manner that the navy fighter tactics operated. The IJN pilots always favoured manouverabilty, which was fine when you had large numbers of highly trained pilots, less fortunate when you had large numbers of rookies. Their flight discipline was always pretty good (I think) ....except when their Carrier CAP patrols all decided to chase after the Devestator torpedo bombers at Midway. The IJA flight tactics at Nomonhan (the large swirling bird-cage tactics) seemed to be similar to the ones Chennault reported over Rangoon. He (or one of his biographers) commented that it was like Samurai tactics of old....taunting the enemy to engage in one-v-one combat. The IJA seemed to dislike the AVG's "running away" hit-and-run tactics.

...geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

To my knowledge is that at least US Navy Air Force had knowledge of the existence of Zero fighter by the early 1941 and accurate intelligence report was already circulating in USNAF units by the spring 1941. I do not know how it was with USAAF/RAF/NEI. When it comes to P-40 vs. Zero, I think that P-40´s reputation has suffered too much for the reason that so many P-40´s were destroyed on the ground in Pearl Harbor and Philippines. One should not look the stats of lost P-40´s on those grounds but analyze more the real Zero vs. P-40 air combat situation.

The problem as usual is the gross exaggeration of kill/loss -stats of both sides. If you read the book Samurai, it gives an impression that Zeros destroyed plenty of P-40/P-39 with very small losses of their own. But if you look the stats of Allied side, it gives opposite numbers. I have seen even a claim that for each lost P-40 Warhawk at least five Zero´s were shot down!

To confuse the matter more are the comments and stories of the pilots of both sides.

John Thach after Midway battle: "Any success of our fighter pilots may have against the Japanese Zero fighter is not due to the performance of the airplane (Wildcat) we fly but is the result of comparatively poor marksmanship of the Japanese, stupid mistakes of the Japanese by a few of their pilots and superior marksmanship and team work of some of our pilots."

A further American claim (Edward M. Young) is that Japanese lost 43 Zeros in aerial combats of Coral Sea / Midway while US fighter losses in those combats were only 31 Wildcats. The "best elite" pilots (air carrier Zero pilots) of IJN did not make it so well if the kill/loss stats are true. But this is an American claim, can we trust that it is 100 % neutral and that also Japanese sources have been consulted?

When it comes to air combats over Guadalcanal in late 1942, I think that some things should be considered. It was a great disadvantage for Japanese air units that they had to fly very long journey to get over Guadalcanal and getting back. I have read that Zero pilots could ever not afford to drop their extra fuel tanks in combat as they needed every available drop of fuel! For Americans it was the opposite - they flew near of their own bases and got warning of approaching Japanese formations usually well in time so they were already waiting Japanese in advantageous position. I have also read that the medical supplies of Japanese were scarce and their healthcare less good than that of the Americans, who were much better supplied. Many Japanese pilots were forced to climb in cockpit despite being sick and weakened by malaria.

If you have read the book Samurai! (Caidin), in it Saburo Sakai makes couple of comments on shooting skills of American pilots mentioning how they tended to overshoot (and these I believe are genuine Sakai comments not Caidin´s inventions). And these comments were made on US Navy pilots who were supposed to have practiced very much deflection shooting! Of course these quotes do not necessarily mean that American pilots trying to shoot down Sakai were poor but that Sakai was a pilot with good survival skill and thus difficult to shoot down.

But if we are to believe the story of Sakai surviving alone from the attack by 15 US Navy Hellcats which did not manage to get a single bullet hole in his Zero, it does not give a picture of good skills when it comes to deflection shooting. This is not the only story of its kind - another Japanese pilot told in afterwar interview that he managed to survive from the attacks of several Corsairs while flying a Val divebomber in a hopeless mission. Corsairs shot two of his wingmen down rapidly but found the remaining third Val difficult as the experienced pilot did the best tricks that he knew to safe his and gunners´s skin. Somehow Corsair pilots managed to overshoot and miss every time when they attacked his alone Val. Was it that he was simply so good or were Corsair pilots rookies like those Hellcat guys who did not manage to bring Sakai´s Zero down?

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi guys

To be honest I have no idea why the USAAF did not attempt as far as is known to me to develop any specific tactics to deal with the known capabilities of the Japanese. It should be pointed out that the development of the Thach Weave was an individual initiative of John Thach and not an official affair. It also should be pointed out that contrary to popular opinion, IJNAF training emphasized teamwork and hit and run tactics rather than dogfighting. They also made use of deflection shooting although problems arose with the fact that the Zeke was an inferior gunnery platform compared to the Wildcat. Visibility over the engine was not as good making full deflection shots difficult and poor aileron control at high speed made aiming in diving attacks difficult. It is true that the IJNAF pilots faced great difficulties in the Guadalcanal campaign but the same can be said for the USN/USMC pilots based on the island. Conditions were primitive in the extreme, sickness was rampant, supplies and spares in very short supply and let us not forget that Henderson Field was routinely bombarded by the IJNAF, the IJN and the IJA, not to mention a number of ground offensives designed to retake the airfield. Anecdotes are interesting but it should be always kept in mind that these are highly subjective personal accounts and may or may not be reflective of the general situation. I have come across comments by Japanese pilots that engaged the enemy over Guadalcanal that make reference to the excellent teamwork and shooting of their opponents so one can find any number of personal accounts that support this or that point of view. Finally, some numbers. According to John Lundstrom, the IJNAF lost 14 Zeke and three Claude fighters while the USN lost 10 Wildcat fighters in aerial combat up through Midway. He states that the IJNAF lost 25 Zeke fighters whereas the USN lost 31 Wildcat fighters in aerial combat over Guadalcanal. According to Richard Frank, the IJNAF lost approximately 70 Zeke fighters versus 70 USMC Wildcat fighters in aerial combat over Guadalcanal. These figures are based on the losses, not claims, of both sides so should give us a quite accurate idea of the state of fighter versus fighter combat between the IJNAF and US/USMC in 1942.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

To conclude it was about equal between Japanese Navy and US Navy pilots and their machines in 1942. By the late 1942/early 1943 the war of attrition started to show their toll on Japanese and the balance turned decisively in favour of US and other Allies.

Japanese had also much greater difficulties to maintain their supply lines, fuel reserves and spare part services than Americans and Allied (and not least because of US uboats sinking Japanese supply vessels).

At the late stage of Pacific war even the technical reliability of Japanese planes was questionable while Allied in general flew with more reliable new planes. One IJA pilot commented that his Ki-84 was excellent fighter if one forgets such little things like take off and flying.

The Guadalcanal air combat 1942/1943 was in my opinion advantegous for US as there was clear homebase advantage - perhaps even more clear than the one which RAF enjoyed in Battle of Britain. There were also some USAAF units with P-39´s, so all the fighting was not left solely to the resources of Wildcat pilots. As a war of attrition it was the US which had more resources and therefore better chances to win.

For what I have read the USAAF pilots did not make it so bad with much maligned Airacobra P-39 in 1942. It may well be that Airacobra pilots managed to shoot at least as many Japanese planes as they lost themselves in combat. To tell the difference against IJA or IJN units may be difficult as Oscars were so often misidentified as Zeros.

However Japanese accounts (both personal and official) considered P-39 units to be easy opponents as well as those flying with P-40. After the war some P-40 pilot veterans studied Japanese records and found it strange how low Japanese combat reports valuated Warhawk units when compared to their own experience. They were not wiped out of sky and managed to inflict losses to Japanese.

The stats study of USAAF/Allied P-40/P-39 units vs. IJN/IJA units may give more balanced view in future. The little that I have read about this subject shows both sides to have shot down more planes than they lost themselves!

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi guys

I think that the crucial difference was that the Americans utilized their resources to better advantage than the Japanese did. At that stage of the war the IJN actually outnumbered the USN in the south Pacific yet it was the Japanese failure to develop forward air bases that ultimately cost them the campaign. Pre-war doctrine held that the Japanese were to hold their conquests through a series of bases supported by the fleet and at Guadalcanal they were to see this policy vindicated but at their expense by the Americans who used their land- and carrier-based air power to neutralize the IJN. It is true that there was one P-400 unit, the 67th Fighter Squadron (aka the Jagdstaffel), but after a disastrous aerial combat on 30 August 1942 where four were shot down and another five written off these were utilized in the ground-attack and anti-shipping role with considerable success as they were considered to be completely unsuitable for engaging enemy fighters.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

There's a couple of points here. One is that the Japanese did not have the resources that the US did. They didn't develop more forward bases because they couldn't. The other is that the Russians found the P-400/P-39 perfectly capable of dealing with enemy fighters, so this kind of sweeping generalisation just isn't right. The important point being perhaps that they were not dealing with the same fighters.

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

GuerraCivil, the "Samurai!" is more close to a finction novel than a biography, though there are some real personal experience in that book, but be very careful if you want to use it as your source because Mr Caiden was a little bit too creative while writing this book, for example, it was Mr Caiden invent that Sakai shot down 64 allied aircrafts in the WWII, to be sure Mr Sakai never claimed he had 64 kills in the war, he was actually puzzled by this claim, according to Japanese records, Mr Sakai shot down around a dozen enemy planes.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi guys

I am not making a sweeping generalization when stating that the Americans considered the P-400 unsuitable for aerial combat over Guadalcanal. For example, Vandegrift reported to Ghormley on 2 September 1942 that "P-400 entirely unsuitable for operations. Will not be employed further except in extreme emergencies." Commander, Aircraft, South Pacific Force evaluated the P-400 as "No good at altitude and disheartening to the brave men who fly them." The 67th Fighter Squadron's historian wrote "We can't manoeuvre and dogfight with the Zero - what good are we?" As regards to the limited Japanese capability to build forward bases it was not just a matter of limited resources but also the result of a lack of attention before the war to logistics and the development of airfield construction techniques and equipment, as well as the units, necessary to build air bases and maintenance facilities. The Japanese had built a network of excellent bases before the start of the war but it was their lack of foresight regarding forward based heavy maintenance and engineering units with heavy earth moving equipment that limited their ability to construct bases not to mention the chronic shortage of shipping to transport these. Logistics and supply may be less glamorous than offensive action but if you wish to prevail in a war with a modern industrial power it is a vital aspect to consider and the Japanese failed to do so.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

I'm sidetracking a little from the original question, but heck – when it’s interesting, let’s go with the flow.

I think there’s a more fundamental reason for the Russian success with the P-39/P-400. They wanted to fly them! The USAAF in the Pacific, always operated P-39s under disadvantageous conditions – climbing to combat, bounced by endless numbers of Zeros, unable to reach the bombing altitudes of the G4Ms, suspicions about tumbling instability in manouevring flight, etc, etc. It’s not unnatural that they would wish to be flying something else…P-40, P-38, P-47, P-51….almost anything else.

The Soviet VVS considered the P-39 as an upgrade from their Polikarpovs and early MiG-3s. There are two biographies of Soviet Airacobra (*) pilots where it was said that the superb radio set up of the Airacobra was as much an advantage as flight performance and firepower. The way in which the Soviets used the P-39, was for mainly fighter sweeps, bomber escort or air interdiction over the battlefront. So they were able to put reasonable numbers of P-39s into the air at any time. They took heavy losses, but were able to inflict reasonable losses on the Luftwaffe. Over a length of time in an attrition battle, the P-39 Regiments (together with the modern Soviet Yaks, Lavochkins, etc) would eventually gain an upper hand.

...geoff


(*) Attack of the Airacobras is one book. I can’t think of the name of the second.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Hi Geoff

I honestly can not really comment on the Airacobra in service with the VVS but Christer Bergström is on record as having stated that he did not have the impression that Russian pilots generally had a good opinion of the type nor that it performed particularly well on the Eastern Front. I do not have any data on claims recorded by the units equipped with the type but known losses in combat per year regarding the VVS-KA (Army) were:

1941: 0
1942: 49
1943: 305
1944: 486
1945: 190

Those regarding the VVS-VMF (Navy) were:

through 21 June 1943: 17
from 22 June 1943 through 21 June 1944: 77
from 22 June 1944 through 4 September 1945: 30

He goes on to state that he seriously doubts the Airacobra units were able to bring down an equivalent number of German fighters and that combats between the Airacobra and German fighters usually ended in favor of the latter.

Horrido!

Leo

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Howdy Leo,

I don't disagree with you in an overall sense. In terms of an exchange rate of losses, the better trained Luftwaffe pilots are going to be on top. But when you consider what the exchange rate is between the earlier Polikarpovs vs Bf109E/Fs, being given a faster, heavily armed and radio equipped P-39 was a major step up for the VVS pilots.

The French Normandie Regiment were given their choice of fighters to operate, selected the lighter, more nimble Yak-3s in 1943. So better Soviet-produced aircraft were eventually available, but for a time there, the P-39 was available in nimbers and better than most of what the Russians had (including Hurricanes considered too lightly armed, and the P-40B/C's which had major engine unreliablily issues in the Northern/Lenningrad Front).

What Christer Bergström had read & researched on the subject would be in greater depth than my knowledge, so I'm happy to defer to him on the matter, but it would be interesting to see if those Soviet pilot opinions are dependant on the timescale of the conflict (i.e. consistently evident in 1941, 42, 43, 44, or whether they were dependant on the availability of other types)?

Food for thought anyway.
...geoff

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

The airwar over South Pacific and German-Soviet front was different. Airacobra was quite decent plane in low and medium altitudes, which were the most common battleground over German-Soviet front whereas over West Europe and Pacific the combat took place at higher altitudes unsuitables for Airacobra. Soviets also removed wing guns from Airacobras making them lighter and more nimble than the planes used by US pilots at Pacific. The main technical problem was the Soviet fuel quality which was unfriendly to Allison engine.

Not all US pilots in South Pacific considered P-39 terrible and many pilots said probably more bad words of the type than it actually deserved. Although personal opinions of different pilots are subjective, Charles Yeager considered the that at low and medium altitudes Airacobra was as good as the pilot who flew it. The main technical problem was the poor performance at high altitudes. Boyd D. Wagner stated that Airacobra was excellent interceptor up to 5400 meters and that P-39 was better than Kittyhawk/Warhawk (opinion shared by Soviet pilots who flew both P-39 and P-40). Charles King stated that skilled Airacobra pilots could hold their own against IJN and IJA pilots and were able to achieve about 1:1 score against them. The problem was that Airacobra was not good enough for clear air and technical superiority like Hellcat, Corsair or P-38 could do vs. Zero/Oscar.

When it comes to IJN/IJA pilots, I´m aware of the dubious nature of Caidin book Samurai! Sakaida book Winged Samurai has been more recommended as more accurate, but it has been out of print long time. However the claim in Samurai! that IJN pilots were better than IJA pilots due to better training might be true to some extent but I do not believe that the difference was big. However Zero was better plane than Oscar (and Nate). Modified land-based version of Zero would have been better standard equipment for IJA fighter units than Oscar.

One could speculate how well AVG with its Tomahawks would have done against Zeros flown by some top IJN unit like Tainan Kokutai. Anyway IJA did not lost as many planes to AVG as AVG pilots claimed - the overclaim ratio of AVG may have been about 3:1 - quite normal overclaim ratio in WW2 - based on good faith and optimistic interpretation of combat results. Japanese (both IJA and IJN) overclaimed often much more. This has been a problem recognized by Japanese airwar historians and they have in many cases dropped the number of confirmed personal and unit air victories to much lower level than the official wartime figures.

At the beginning of Pacific War IJA pilots were pretty well trained and their average skill level probably near of IJN pilots. Sakai (?) claim that IJNAF pilots were better (?) than IJAAF may have something to do with the traditional controversy and competition between Navy and Army - making Navy guys telling that they are better than Army guys.

During the course of war IJA had same problems as IJN - most of skilled pilots had to flew up to the point when they were KIA, MIA or WIA. And as there was not enough trained decent reserve, the average skill level of IJA dropped gradually.

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Guys, this is a great thread, but we seem to be coming repetitive. I do not think this will ever be resolved, per se, one way or the other.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

I didn't abandon you guys, I've been reading every word. I just don't have the knowledge to say anything smart. (I'm better with Luftwaffe stuff.)

Bronc

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Here is an interesting article about the air combats between AVG and 64th Sentai of IJA, which was one of best IJA fighter units: http://forum.warthunder.com/index.ph...5#entry1153396

The bias is on Japanese side, but still it helps to get somewhat more balanced view than the official AVG story - one should remember that the spring time of 1942 was bad time for the Allies and AVG´s success story was very much needed. In that situation everyone was just happy with all air victory claims and the scrutiny to check them was less than for example in some units of Luftwaffe. As Carl Molesworth puts it in his book on Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk:

"The AVG was officially credited with 297 enemy aircraft destroyed, 229 in the air... the true figure - whatever it might be - is irrelevant. The AVG successes gave the American people something to cheer about during dark days of (early) 1942 when war was going very poorly for Allies."

Well, I do not agree with Molesworth. I think that it is a duty of any serious airwar historian or aficionado to try to dig out the truth and figure out the true level of air victory records - they are not irrelevant! IIRC, the verified AVG victory record is nowadays recognized to be around 100-115 destroyed Japanese planes (which is still a good record for AVG).

But going back to 1942 and the way how things were thought at that time, Molesworth makes very good point of the attitudes and propaganda needs of the wartime. It certainly does boost morale up more to have a record 300 destroyed Japanese planes than a record of 100.

Japanese had those same needs and overclaiming was accepted more easily than by AVG side. IIRC, IJA pilots destroyed the whole AVG plane inventory more than once if we are to believe their claim records. At one point IJA pilots may have felt that there was a unlimited supply of shark-mouthed P-40´s fighting against them! Maybe Japanese commanders knew that the air victory claims of most of their pilots were not accurate, but nevertheless accepted them.

I have no problem with AVG overclaiming rate - it is actually quite moderate. More troublesome is the much more massive Japanese overclaiming which makes me to wonder what there was behind their official air victory records. Simply erroneus assesments made in good faith by IJA pilots or something else?

I think that Chris Shores has put it quite well about the overclaiming: http://www.warbirdforum.com/claiming.htm

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

GuerraCivil,

Your last post is quite good.

I have talked with Dan Ford often about the AVG claims. He says that at the most recent (late '90s, early 2000's) reunions (they do not have them these days), the AVG pilots are claiming over 600. When confronted with the actual Japanese loss records, the pilots claim the Japanese faked their losses for fear of loss of face. Well, I do not know of any commander, Allied or Axis who would do that, as one wants replacement a/c and pilots ASAP! If their propagandists want to fake, then fine, but at the unit level, no.

I agree the AVG actual loss/claim record is quite good considering the circumstances, but apparently the vets want to delude themselves.

The Allies did the same thing. Recall the first 8th AAF raid on Lille when bomber gunners claimed 102 German planes? (More than the strengths of JGs 2 and 26), and the actual loss was 2. The Allies knew the true losses, thanks to ULTRA, but decided to leave it for "morale" purposes.

Every nations' AF and Navy units overclaimed, mostly in good faith. That's WWII before electronic intel verification. The worst Allied over-claiming was the 5th AAF with Kenney. I recall a statement from Life Magazine, saying, in 1950, "for once the Japanese out-Kennyed Kenny" in claims!

BTW, I heard that Air Marshall Johnny Johnson, did not believe Pips Priller's claims against the RAF, but his own review and digging verified the claims. Is this true?

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

I have read that Johny Johnson indeed found Pips Priller´s claims to be accurate. However, he was very doubtful with Marseille´s claims (specially remarkable one day records) and made sceptical comments on them in his memoirs.

Going to IJA / IJN pilots, I do not know who of them or which units have been found to be the most accurate claim records. Who is the top Japanese ace or which is the top IJA/IJN unit by the verification of Allied records? It would be interesting to know - it might well be that the top pilots and top units were other than those ranked by official Japanese records!

I happen to know parallel from the Soviet-Finnish Winter War 1939-1940. Very top Soviet fighter unit was 7 IAP with 68 "confirmed air victories". The recent studies (using Finnish data) have dropped that figure to 9 verified air victories. Other Soviet unit 49 IAP was less successfull in Winter War with 16 "confirmed air victories". However 49 IAP was quite accurate in its claims and Finnish records have confirmed 9 of its air victories. 49 IAP was less rewarded and less famous than 7 IAP, but it destroyed equal number of Finnish planes as 7 IAP. The real difference between the two units was in their way of confirming air victories.

There may have been similar differences in IJA/IJN units depending on the commanders and some IJA/IJN pilots may have been more accurate in their claims than others.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

I've been reading John B. Lundstrom's, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign : Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 which is superlative. (I read it cover to cover, and then immediately began reading it again.)

Lundstrom mentions an interesting fact: in the after-action reports of the fighter squadrons that fought in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (24 August, 1942) "several officers commented on the visible deterioration of enemy pilot skills."

Already, in late August, 1942, the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Indian Ocean raid, the Battle of Coral Sea, Midway and Aleutian Island foray had taken a visible toll on the quality of the naval aviators of the Kido Butai.

And the battle was only beginning in the Solomons. I never realized how utterly devastating the attrition in the Solomons was to Japanese naval aviation. By late September, Japanese commanders in Rabaul were worried by the quality of Japanese replacement pilots, and by late October of 1942, they were alarmed.

Bronc

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

One often forgotten factor is that the medical supplies and maintenance reserves of Japanese frontline units in the Pacific were less than those of the Allied units. For example many Japanese fighter units lacked quinine or other medicines to treat malaria - this was a big problem already in 1942 when Japanese supply lines were already over-stretched. The situation got worse with time when Japanese supply lines came under growing pressure and were often cut by the continuing sinking of Japanese cargo ships by US submarines and aircraft attacks.

At the average level Japanese pilots were more sick and less supplied than their Allied counterparts (who also suffered considerably of the trophical diseases). Many otherwise well-trained and experienced Japanese fighter pilots had to climb to the cockpit of Zero (or Oscar) being ill and almost all Japanese pilots at the South Pacific were weakened by malaria. I have read about some pilots going to combat even when they were suffering of fever. Perhaps this was not so much of stubborn "samurai/banzai" attitude than a reflect of the grim situation when even sick men were forced to combat by their superiors.

You can hardly expect them to have been in top-form in air combat - the sick man in the cockpit is slower to react in combat situations and his instincts are less sharp than those of the healthy (or less sick) pilot.

This may have been a considerable handicap for the overseas IJA/IJN units in South Pacific and one of the very reasons why the combat skills of Japanese pilots seemed to go down already during the mid/late 1942. When it comes to the training level and average skills of IJA/IJN pilots by late 1942/early 1943 I guess that they were still higher than by late 1943 and 1944.

Re: Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

For that Japanese can only accuse the shortsightness of their high command, in late 30s Java produced some 97% of the world's quinine supply, so they had lots of quinine available and could have transported it to the SWPacific area if they had decided so, on subs if necessary.

Allied Opinion of IJN vs. IJA Fighter Pilots
 

Another interesting fact contained in John B. Lundstrom's, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign : Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942 is the incredible distance Japanese pilots were flying to engage marine and navy F4F Wildcats, all of 560-miles ONE WAY (Lakunai airfield, Rabaul to Lunga Point.) The marines went ashore on 7 August, (Henderson Field became operational on 20 August,) and by 12 September, after only thirty-six (36) days of flying that enormous distance back and forth, mission after grueling mission, Base Air Force Rabaul was down to 97 operational aircraft from a pre-invasion T.O. of 277 aircraft. (45 operational Zero fighters, out of 106 operational Zeros on 6 August, (BUT only 17 of these were Type 21's that could actual get to Guadalcanal, the rest were Type 32's,) and 30 operational Bettys out of 120.)

Japanese planners took giants steps down the Solomons...without constructing intermediate support bases and airfields!

Bronc