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Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Concerning the aerial OOB's during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, Here is the data I collected so far:
1) From wikipedia: " […]The only positive was the presence of the 700 aircraft of Luftflotte IV including the veteran air units of VIII.Fliegerkorps. However, due to the chain of command, Harpe could not directly control the Luftwaffe units without much communication through the Nazi bureaucracy. The Soviet forces under Konev outnumbered the Germans considerably. The 1st Ukrainian Front could muster over 1,200,000 men, 2,050 tanks, 16,000 guns and mortars and over 3,250 aircraft of the VVS. […]" In the book "In der Südwestrichtung" by a soviet Army commander who was involved, it is shown that 1.Ukrainian Front had 2 & 8 VA subordinated. 2) This would mean 2 бак , 1 сак, 3 шак, 3 иак, 6 бад, 9 шад, 12 иад, 1нбад, 3 рап, 2 крап which would be ca. 900bombers incl. 100Po-2 for night, 1100Sturmos, 1200fighters= 3200 planes if one aerial regiment is taken as 25 A/C. Probably it was slightly less bombers and more Sturmos/fighters, but figures fit, so I am content. 3) German VIII. FK had the OOB at the very bottom in June 1944, which contains only 280 A/C (including only 8 fighters :rolleyes: ), not 750. Maybe Wikipedia includes the whole LF 4. Nevertheless, I know that parts of JG52 (II & IIIGruppe) were transfered to Poland in July, meaning ca. 60 fighters more. So, questions are: - which other Luftwaffe-units were moved in the area in July? - which planes did the below mentioned VVS-units use? - any details on aerial battles known? VVS-details: 2VA: 4 бак (202, 219, 321 бад), 1 гв. шак (8 и 9 гв. шад, 12 гв. иад), 8 шак (224, 227 шад, 236 иад), 5 иак (8 гв., 256 иад), 10 иак (10 гв., 235 иад), 10 гв. шад, 6 гв. иад, 208 нбад, 98 гв., 50 рап, 387 оапс, 1554, 1555, 1578, 1605, 1613 зенап 8VA: 1 гв. сак (5 и 6 гв. шад, 11 гв. иад), 2 гв. бак (1 и 8 гв., 244 бад), 5 шак (4 гв., 264 шад, 331 иад), 7 иак (9 гв., 205, 304 иад), 8 рап, 100 крап, 678 трап 1254, 1561, 1577, 1603 зенап which is altogether Lw-details: Fernaufklärer: 2. (F) / 11 Jasionka 9 Ju 88 2. (F) / 100 Lublin 7 Ju 188 Nahaufklärer: Stab / NAGr. 2 Strunybaby 5 Bf 109 1. / NAGr. 2 Stry 11 Bf 109 2. / NAGr. 2 Strunybaby 13 Bf 109 Schlachtflieger: Stab IV. (Pz) / SG 9 Lysiatycze 6 Hs 129 12. (Pz) / SG 9 Stry Hs 129 13. (Pz) / SG 9 Lysiatycze 16 Hs 129 Stab / SG 77 Jasionka in Umrüstung I. / SG 77 Jasionka in Umrüstung II. / SG 77 Lemberg 33 Fw 190 III. / SG 77 Cuniow 42 JJu 87 10. (Pz) / SG 77 Starzawa 19 Ju 87 Ung.S.St. 102/1 Cuniow 11 Nachtschlacht: Stab / NSGr. 4 Hordinia 4 Go 145 1. / NSGr. 4 Hordinia 28 Go 145 Bomber: 14. (Eis) / KG 27 Krosno 15 He 111 Fliegerführer 102 Ungarn - Labunia Nahaufklärer: Ung.N.A.St. 102/1 Labunia 8 (I guess Fw189) 7. / NAGr. 32 Labunia 11 Bf 109, Fw 190 Jäger: Ung.JSt. 102/1 Zamocz 8 Bomber: Ung.KSt. 102/1 Klemensowa 5 Schnellbomber: Ung.SKSt. 12 (I guess Me410) |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
bump?
Does this "no answer" mean that I am the only expert in this field :rolleyes: ? Cannot really believe that ;) ... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
According to Soviet stats (Krivosheev), the soviet lost some 289 during the operation itself (13/07 to 29/08).
German losses remain unclear as there aren't many sources and they are reportedly incomplete but their losses have been quoted as approximately 1150 destroyed and 800 more damaged for july and august 1944, by wihch time 4 major soviet ops were going on (in which the soviets lost some 1550 planes, plus those lost during operationnal pauses). That's not much but still it can be start, I hope this can help you... P.S. : there may be some ambiguity in the sources, but as far as I understand it, for the year 1944, approximately 45 % of soviet combat losses were during strategic ops..., though as several of these were simultaneously going on in july- august, we could perhaps speculate that for this period, this proportion was higher... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Jörg, the Hungarian 102/1. Fast Bomber Squadron was equipped with Hungarian manufctured Me 210Ca-1's, not with Me 410's.
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Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Thanks Kolya1! Can you specify "Soviet stats (Krivosheev)" a bit? I'd love to read through this!
Quote:
PS: In the meantime I found out that 2 groups of JG52 were moved to that area in July. So I would add 60Bf109G-6 to the german OoB. |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
[quote=yogybär]Thanks Kolya1! Can you specify "Soviet stats (Krivosheev)" a bit? I'd love to read through this!
These figures come from an online book (although I think there was also a printed version) realised under direction of Gal. Krivosheev which provides compilations of russian and soviet losses in wars of the 20th century, along with a few other statistics... They used internal military documents, and seem really credible. The whole book : http://www.rus-sky.org/history/library/w/ The page where you can find the info I quoted above : http://www.rus-sky.org/history/libra...tm#_Toc2489830 Unfortunately AFAIK, there's only a russian version, but it's not too hard to understand the tables... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
OK, maybe we can find out about VVS:
Which AIP / BAP were in 2VA: 202, 219, 321 IAD 12 GIAD, 236 IAD), 8 GIAD, 256 IAD, 10GIAD, 235 IAD, 6 GIAD 8VA: 11 GIAD, 2 GBAK(1 GBAD, 8GBAD, 244BAD), 331 IAD), 9 GIAD, 205IAD, 304IAD), as a start. And the go on at least to types of AC... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
The first edition of Krivosheev book is translated to English:
Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, edited by Col.Gen. G.F.Krivosheev, Greenhill Books, 1997 (ISBN 1-85367-280-7). There is also an updated Russian version, which to my knowledge has not been translated. Carl |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Below is what I found out about the eqiupment of the IAPs. Please excuse bad format etc, it is from my own notes.
From this data, I would get/assume/estimate the following distribution of fighter types: 11IAP-P39, 6Jak9, 2Jak7, 2Jak1, 1Jak3, 5La5 SUM=26 450P39, 280Jak9, 90Jak7B, 90Jak1b, 50Jak3, 240La5 I find it very interesting that there is such a high number of P-39-equipped IAPs... Maybe only these units were "very good" and thus concentrated in the area of offensive operations like here? Can anyone comment on this? 2VA 12GIAD= 272IAP, 247=156G-IAP: Lagg-3 Jak1+Jak9 270=152G-IAP: И-16, ЛаГГ-3, Як-1, Як-7, Як-3 516=153G-IAP: И-16, ЛаГГ-3, Як-1, Як-3. 8GIAD= 40IAP=41GIAP: И-16, а с 1942 г. Ла-5 141IAP=40GIAP: I-16+MiG-3; 9'42=LaGG3-La5, 12'44=La7 166IAP=88GIAP: I-16, 6'42=LaGG3, x:La5, 3'34: La7 256IAD= 32IAP:октября 1942 Як-1, 43 Як-7, ... Як-9 728IAP: ?Jak9? 10GIAD= 13IAP=111GIAP: И-153, И-16 и МиГ-3; 9'41=Jak1@Krim, Sommer42=Lagg3@Stagra, 11'42=La5, E44=La7 437IAP=113GIAP: I-16, LaGG3, La5, 7'44La5FN, ...La7 236IAP=112GIAP: I-16, 5'42=Jak1, 2'45=Jak3 235IAD= 46IAP: I-16+153, 8'41=LaGG3, 6'43=Hurri, 8'42@Stagra, 9'42=Aira 436IAP: Jak1, 42=Hurri, 10'42=P40; später ?P-39? 180IAP: 10'41MiG3+LaGG3, 3'42=Hurri, 3'43 P-39 181IAP: LaGG3, La5 239IAP: La5 6GIAD 296IAP=73GIAP: I16+MiG3; 2'42=Jak1;43=Jak1,Jak7; Jak1+Jak9 .... 8VA 11GIAD= 129IAP=5GIAP: I16+MiG3; 11'41=LaGG3, 12'42=La5; 1'45=La7 814IAP: 4'42=Hurri; 10'42=Jak1; 1'43@Millerovo; 3'44=Jak1,Jak7, ...Jak3 867IAP=И-16, МиГ-3, ЛаГГ-3, Як-1, Як-9, Як-3 331IAD= 122IAP=I153+I16+MiG3, 6'42=Jak1, 43Jak7B, 44Jak9 9GIAD= 55IAP=16GIAP: 12'42=P39 8IAP=42GIAP: И-16, а с 1942 г. Як-1, позже Як-7, Як-9 36IAP=57GIAP: I-16, 4-7'43: Spit5, 9'43=P39 45IAP=100GIAP: Jak1, 3'43=P40+P39 205IAD= 508IAP: LaGG3, 1'43=Jak7, 10'43=P39 27IAP: I16+MiG3, Kaliningrad, Mig3, 6'42=Hurri, 9'42=Jak1, kurz später Jak7, 8'43=P39 304IAD= 38IAP=21GIAP: I16, 12'41=LaGG3, 4'42=Jak1, 12'43=P39 10IAP=69GIAP: I16+MiG3; 3-7'42=LaGG3 @ Kaliningrad; 10'42=P40; ... P39 9IAP=211GIAP: I16, 4'42=Hurri @ Südwestfront |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
I should check further but as you can see there are a number a guards units there, among the P-39 units, 9 GIAD, and more particularly 16 GIAP (3rd scoring soviet unit of the war) and 100 GIAP are very famous units.
But the Lavochkin-equipped 5 GIAP was also one of the best fighter units of the VVS (2nd scoring of the war). I don't know if there is any particular reason for the concentration a P-39 units... Maybe most of them were concentrated in certain VAs in order to simplify the supply system... Besides, there were several simultaneous major operations at the time, if some units were better than others, they were probably not all concentrated on the same offensive, but this remains speculation... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Yes, at least the 9.GIAD (Pokryshkin) was moved from Bessarabia northwards especially for the Lvov-Sand.-operation. They were not sent there because of being equipped with Airacobras, but because they were such a crack unit, I assume.
It's just strange, because in May/June '44 in the region of Jassy, there were also more P-39 then soviet-built types... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
The interesting thing is that 9.GIAD was based in the very South (Bessarabia) before they were sent for support of Lvov-Sando.
Also, later 9.GIAD was sent to a Belorussian front for support of the Berlin operation, but by then flew La7 afaik. That means, the VVS took over the german flexibility of moving units among the front to where they were needed. Above that, still, it is really astonishing that a) the guards units flew the P-39 with such success in spite of its bad performance. b) such a big number of this "bad" planetype was concentrated in an important (offensive) area. |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Quote:
Hello Jörg, The 9 GIAD flew P-39s until the end of the war, although there may have been suggestions that they convert to the La-7. As regards flexibility, I don't think there is much a of a case to be made for it on the basis of the 9 GIAD's experience, since it spent considerable periods away from the front and was conspicuously absent from many battles, most notably Kursk. To substantiate this, here is some data on the divisions' sucesses: August-December 1942 in the Caucasus - 130 victories, March-June 1943 on the Taman' peninsula - 187 victories, 21 August-10 September 1943 in the Donbass - 130 victories, September-November 1943 on the Molochnaya river - unk victories, 10 May-5 July 1944 near Yassy - 128 victories, July 1944 during the L'vov-Sandomierz operation - 93 victories, 12 January-16 April in Poland - 30 victories, 16 April-8 May during the Battle of Berlin - 56 victories (All figures taken from "One 'MiG' in a thousand".) The successes of the 9 GIAD are open to question, as they may have overclaimed wildly, just as many other VVS units. In fact, this is a topic of current discussion in Russia. Similarly, until the introduction of the La-7 in mid-1944, the P-39 was one of the two best fighter aircraft available to the VVS, along with the La-5FN. This explains why it gained such prominence, despite its relatively small numbers. Yours sincerely, Jack Sanders |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Me 210Cs had DB605s
Me 410s have DB603s |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Hi Jack,
Quote:
12'42--> 3'43 = conversion to P39 11'43--> 5'44 = ?? 8'44--> 1'45 = conversion to Lavotchkin. They did definitely convert to Lala's, because i.e. one of the biggest aces died during a landing accident (somersault during landing, "famous" problem on La5-7). What is this MiG-book about? Quote:
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Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Quote:
The second and third periods of inactivity illustrate my point. The 9 GIAD was effectively in a general strategic reserve both times, without there being any need for such a reserve and while some sectors of the front needed additional fighter cover. There was no conversion to La-7s, for reasons that are not clear, but one of the common myths about the 9 GIAD is that Klubov's (the ace you are talking about) death in that landing accident led to Pokryshkin forbidding conversion to other fighters. The MiG book is effectively a piece of 9 GIAD promotion by a famous journalist, Yury Zhukov, which contains very little useful information apart from the above statistics. Yours sincerely, Jack Sanders |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Hmm... the information about the death of an ace (may be Klubov, don't know the name right now) is taken from Pokryshkins memoirs iirc. I have them in my bookshelf.
But anyway, how do you interpretw the "idling around"-times? |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
According to Dmitriy Loza's book about the Airacobras of 9 GIAD, Klubov was indeed killed in an accident on a training flight with an La-7...
I had also read about the fact that a planned conversion on La-7 was cancelled after the accident, although the causal link between the two events remain unclear. As a matter of fact, by the end of the war, AFAIK 9 GIAD had only P-39s and reportedly a few P-63s arrived in april 1945, though I don't remember any mentions of combat flights with this plane... The times when the division was not at the front were "resting" time, while not engaged in strategic operations, the air units completed their staff and equipment and retrained for the next large scale operations... It was linked with the idea of massing and engaging fresh units in massive numbers for major ops in order to get overwhelming superiority at the time of large breakthrough attempts... P.S. : the success of the P-39 in soviet service must be linked to the different fighting conditions on the Eastern Front. At low-level, the P-39 was one of the best american fighters (in 1943, below 10,000 ft, it accelerated and climbed faster than any other american plane except the Corsair, according to comparative tests made in the US (in the context of the comparative testing of in service planes with a capteured A6M Zero)). And most of the operations were flown over short ranges... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Quote:
It is my opinion that the cancellation of the conversion due to Klubov's death is a myth, as even a thrice HSU had no such powers. The 9 GIAD and numerous other units were held back in reserve even while "strategic operations" such as the battle of the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket and the battle of Debrecen, for periods far exceeding those needed for re-training. This indicates that Stalin had special reasons to maintain a large reserve, quite separate from force regeneration needs. Pinning down exactly what made the P-39 a good fighter in the East is difficult, but I would strongly suggest that it was a better fighter than the Yak-9. The reasons are its superior diving performance and zoom climb, which meant it could be used as a "boom and zoom" fighter of sorts. Its aerodynamics also led to less energy loss, helping vertical manoeuvrability. If weight reduction is factored in, the superiority of the P-39Q over the Yak-9M or D becomes even clearer. Yours sincerely, Jack Sanders |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
Yes, indeed Pokrshkin doesn't write about the final refitting with La7, and I didn't find any otehr trace for this.
This is for sure (somehow) linked to the various problems which the La7 had at the start. Anyway, now with the VVS-statistics, I can realitively good check wether my assumptions on OOB Lvov-Sando. are OK. WIll do that later. |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
I don't know, how long do you thing a division needs to be fully combat ready again ?
From a material point of view, I'd agree with you, but the men also need rest, and as there were no tours of operations in the VVS, pilots flew until the end of the war or until they died or were unfit for flying... The only time during wich they could rest were these "pauses", AFAIK in the RAF or USAAF, individuals were rotated and their units remained while in the VVS, whole units were rotated. That being said, the VVS, having suffered a lot early in the war when the combat power of some units was uselessly wasted and became unavailable when necessary (e.g. : in the Crimea in early 1942), had the habit of creating huge reserves during the second part of the war (either for breakthrough ops or "just in case")... I don't think there were other particular reasons about the reserve systems, except perhaps a pathological habit Stalin had, even before the war, to make reserves of everything (I read this once or twice), or his personnal paranoïa (although, in the second part of the war, the military was mostly in charge of the conduct of the war, and was spared the level of intervention imposed by Stalin in the beginning)... |
Re: Lvov-Sandomierz operation July 1944
I agree with Kolya.
German individual pilots also stayed "at home" for long times, i.e. Lipfert two months in early 1944 etc. Whole german units were ordered to do so if necesssary or unavoidable, i.e. III/JG11 after their horrible fight against VVS in late summer 1944, JG3-Gruppen after the Normandy-onslaught or II/JG52 in winter 1941. The VVS had the opportunity to give "sufficient" rest to "exhausted" units, whatever that means exactly. And they did so. |
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