The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

I am re-reading E.R. Hooton's, "War Over The Steppes ~ The Air Campaign on the Eastern Front 1941-45.

Page 166: "...the desperate need for them (Russian replacement pilots in 1942) meant the 'foals' (sherebyat) went to reserve units for operational training sometimes with as little as three (3) flying hours in their log books, while others as late as 1943 had just 15-20 hours. There was little gunnery or aerobatic training, which some schools banned, and to increase their flying hours 'foals' ferried aircraft. Even operational training was restricted to an average 12.5 hours for a combat pilot (fighter, assault, bomber) in 1942, rising to 17 in 1943 and 20.5 in 1944."

Next paragraph describes how student pilots were nutritionally starved during flight training, "...one pilot reported he and three (3) comrades had to share a loaf of bread and a tomato, (for the day) while others survived on weak pea soup that left them without the strength to fly. At one gunnery school students lived on cabbage leaves and potato peels (scavenged) from trash bins."

The next paragraph explains that *on any given combat mission* in 1942, 1943, and 1944, well over half (1/2) of the Russian pilots were flying their very first combat mission.

And, "...in May 1943, in Sudet's 237th ShAP/305th ShAD all but two (2) airmen were flying their first combat mission."

*** So...if any of the above is factual, I'm moving back into the, "maybe Hartmann, et. al., were not over-claimers after all," category. (I'm thinking maybe the Russians were lying after all in their record-keeping.)

An experienced Luftwaffe fighter pilot would be scoring at will, no? Every day--every mission--even 5, 6, 7 victories a day. (It wasn't really "aerial combat," more like aerial murder, and simple aerial murder at that, no?)

Also, this explains why so many Experten in the East *died almost immediately* after being transferred to the West--they never developed the skills--didn't have the experience--to kill wolves, because they had spent the last few years murdering lambs.

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Surely the truth is in the losses.

We pretty much see the same amount of overclaiming in the west as what we do in the east.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

It is highly unlikely. Service histories of Soviet warplanes, tanks, etc. are well documented from the factory gates to their loss. Especially from 1943. The Soviet loss records do not lie, because they are the prime documents which help to identify missing and recovered aircrews based on reported engine numbers, AC serial numbers. (We also saw plane recovery where we already knew what the IL-2 engine number should be prior to digging it out - and it was a 100% match to the Soviet loss-report which pointed to that location.) And most importantly the same sets of reports confirm some Axis pilots' claims to over 90%, while for only 20, or less % for others... But this information has been on this forum for many years now.

Experten stories are only 'cosmetics' which cannot hide the massive overclaim rate of some pilots let it be in the East, or in the West.

Gabor

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Exactly

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Fighter pilots have HUGE egos and that leads to wild exaggeration and outright lies on the part of some.

L.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

A combination of competitive young men, few women, horsepower, adrenalin and benzedrine, I suspect.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Very well. The Russian records are correct and certain Luftwaffe pilots were dishonest in their mission reports and victory claims. Bottom line: an enormous amount of time and work has been expended in answering this question (by multiple historians on this forum) and I believe and trust the results of their dedicated investigative efforts.

But now we have a new--rather obvious--mystery: *why didn't* the Luftwaffe produce multiple Experten with 300+ historically verifiable victory claims? In all honesty, there should be at least one with 500 historically verifiable victory claims, no?

The Luftwaffe went east with a core number of fighter pilots who had combat experience in Spain, Poland, France and Britain. And from the very beginning, in 1941, the Russians were putting up poorly-trained (barely able to fly) pilots that were flying vastly inferior aircraft, in astonishing numbers.

This trend continued in 1942, 1943 and 1944. On any given combat mission in 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944, well over half (1/2) of the Russian combat pilots (in a vast formation) were flying their very first combat mission. In May 1943, in Sudet's 237th ShAP/305th ShAD all but two (2) airmen were flying their first combat mission.

** In these circumstances, why didn't the Luftwaffe produce Experten with incredible but valid victory totals?

We are missing a piece of the puzzle, I think...

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Note food was in short supply in the USSR in WW II/GPW period see the book "A Taste of War". I would also like to point out there were a lot of under trained RAF and USAAF aircrew thrown into combat during the 1940-43 period.
As for the IL-2 many of their gunners according to BCRS Vol 4 lacked training and some got sent there because they had done something wrong that would have got them sent to a penal battalion. The BCRS volume also talk about the lack of training of a lot of VVS aircrew.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Hello Bronc,

Maybe you remember the thread of 2017 with your participation about "War Over The Steppes:
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...ht=War+Steppes
The beginning of that closed thread is more or less informative.

I should add that the book in question is full of strange statements.
For example the statement "On any given combat mission in 1941, 1942, 1943, and 1944, well over half (1/2) of the Russian combat pilots (in a vast formation) were flying their very first combat mission" is absolutely incorrect. To date on https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/ has uploaded a lot of scans of regiments' diaries with day-by-day list of missions with the names of all participated pilots in each mission. You can personally check whether the statement you quoted is true.

There were definitely serious problems with training etc., but still the picture was less apocalyptic than can be concluded from the book.

It is unclear where he got the idea that young pilots were called "foals". It sounds strange. Pilots who were not put into operation yet or inexperienced pilots were called "young pilots" or, more unofficially, youngsters. This Hooton's statement is a trifle, but it creates an additional feeling of falseness.

The same is for the statement "... two aircraft ("para"), commonly described by the very un-socialist term of ‘Master’ and ‘Slave’ (vedushchiy i vedomyy)".

"Vedushchiy" (= ведущий) is a leader or, literally, "the one who leads", vedomyy (= ведомый) is a wingman or, literally, "the one who is being led. It is a great error to translate it as "master and slave" with the emphasis on the "non-socialist" nature of the terms. Neither in the Soviet nor in the Tsarist Air Forces, the terms "master and slave" were impossible in principle.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Hello Andrey,

Thank you for this clarification.

Best,
Ed West

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Dear Andrey,

I am asking questions that pertain to the Luftwaffe's Experten. Most specifically, I am not trying to insult the Soviet Union or its air force.

Here is another example of what I am talking about.

Russian Combat Methods in World War II, Department of the Army pamphlet No. 20-230, Washington D.C., November 1950, written by Generaloberst Erhard Rauss, Commander, Fourth and Third Panzer Armies.

The Red Air Force - Chapter 14 - A Luftwaffe Evaluation

[...] The Russians were in a fair way to lose their last aircraft by this completely futile commitment in detail. True, the Russian Air Force was able to replace the lost planes, but it never did recover from the shock effect of the German fighters. The superiority of German fighters over Russian planes of any type was evident right up to the end of the war.

[...] In conclusion, it may be said that the Red Air Force, although conceived and built up on a large scale, was very primitively trained. Its will to fight, its aggressive spirit, and its mastery of technical aspects left much to be desired. Although constantly superior in numbers to the Luftwaffe, it was always inferior when it came to combat. Usually a small number of German fighters sufficed to clear the skies of Russian planes.

If Generaloberst Rauss's assessment is correct, the mystery remains: why didn't the Luftwaffe produce multiple Experten with 300+ historically verifiable victory claims? And in all honesty, there should be at least one with 500 historically verifiable victory claims.

Once again, the Luftwaffe went east with a core number of fighter pilots who had combat experience in Spain, Poland, France and Britain. And from the very beginning, in 1941, the Russians were putting up poorly-trained (barely able to fly) pilots that were flying vastly inferior aircraft, in astonishing numbers.

When the Japanese tried this it resulted in The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot where, "four Japanese air strikes involved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 243 were lost and 130 returned to the carriers; many of them were subsequently lost when Taiho and Shōkaku were sunk. After the second day of the battle, [Japanese] losses totaled three carriers, more than 350 carrier aircraft, and around 200 land-based aircraft." {For a loss of approximately 40 US navy aircraft lost to enemy action.}

Why didn't the Luftwaffe record multiple Turkey Shoot days?

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Dear Bronc,

In short, he is basically wrong.

On average, one German plane and one German pilot were more effective than one Soviet plane and one Soviet pilot, indeed. But the war isn't a tennis competition.

It is simply untrue. Usually German fighters, in small number or not, couldn't clear the skies (though they could inflict some losses, sometimes heavy). And it was a permanent problem for German Army (Heer).

Apparently because the real situation wasn't so grotesque.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Yup, that nicely sums it, Nick.
I had lots of daily contact with the young Republic F-105 Thunderchief pilots from the 388th Tac Fighter Wing at Korat RTAFB/Thailand in 1967 and they were all of what we said above - a real handful.

L.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Phillips Payson O'Brien in his 626-page masterpiece, "How The War Was Won," (Cambridge University Press) mentions something that bears on this topic.

Page 65: [...] "There is something absolutely perplexing about the lack of damage that the USSR was able to inflict despite having so many planes. From early 1942 onwards, The Eastern Front was, even during the height of the Kursk campaign, a minority front for the Luftwaffe. For the rest of the war, between 80 and 70 percent of the Luftwaffe, numerically, was always deployed against the British and Americans. And the loss rates for the Luftwaffe fighting against the British and Americans were much higher, even considering that the best pilots and equipment were sent to the west. The Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front was therefore made up of the less-skilled German pilots, often flying out of date technology that had proved to be ineffective during the Battle of Britain in 1940--such as the JU-87 (Stuka) dive-bomber and the HE-111. Yet, even with the Soviet's overwhelming numerical superiority the loss rates they were able to inflict on the Luftwaffe were modest to say the least. Much of that seems to be down to two elements: the relatively poor performance of Soviet aircraft and the weakness of their pilot-training schemes."

So please bear with me. I only know what I read...

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Correction the book was "The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food" Lizzie Collingham

online at afhra.af.mil are USAF historical studies no 169 is Technical training within the German Luftwaffe and many others on the Luftwaffe

then there is the book "The German Air Force 1933-1945 an Antomy of Failure Mathew Cooper

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

A highly dynamic situation cannot be boiled down to a few words or even a few books. Thanks to recent research, the situation on the Eastern Front is becoming clearer.
Planes were not just shot down by other planes. And the Soviet Union, along with England, could place an order with the United States for replacement, or additional aircraft through Lend-Lease.
If pilots were lacking, the U.S. had plenty. Immediately after the war, a photo was published of a large number of finished but not delivered B-17s. One-sided comparisons are rarely helpful.


Ed

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

There are no American aces with a 100 or even 50 victories; why would you expect Lw aces with 500? Their scores on the Eastern Front were very high, compared to any other front or theater.


On July 5 1943, first day of Kursk, the Soviets did lose a number of aircraft comparable to the Japanese losses on the first day of the Turkey Shoot.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Dear Bronc,

Don't know why the author of masterpiece gives the wrong data.

Ju87 had proved to be very effective in May-Jun.40, had proved to be ineffective during BoB few months later, then proved to be effective in Mediterranean against the same RAF. What an unstable weapon!

But it is off-topic. Meanwhile, the author actually gives an answer to your question ("Why didn't the Luftwaffe record multiple Turkey Shoot days?"):
You can undoubtedly evaluate the accuracy of this conclusion yourself.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

In 1942 over half of the LW losses occurred on the Eastern front up to middle Sept 42 and again in Dec 42 and Jan 43. And usually the Eastern Front was somewhat safer for LW aircrews so probably strength figures were even more focused on the east. in July 1943 a little over 30 % of the LW Jagdgruppen were stationed in the East but because most of the bombers, ground-attack and dive-bombers were there as were almost all army co-op units and all Störkampfstaffeln, so even if almost all night fighter units were in the West or in Reich IMHO one can say that well over 33 % of the combat a/c of the LW were stationed in the East at that time.

It is true that Germans were able to used Ju 87 Ds and He 111 Hs in daylight in the East much longer than in the West. But Ju 87 Ds were deadly effective in the Aegean even in October 1943. And I wonder the claim that “the best pilots … were sent to the west.” I have not hear that the Allied pilots thought that e.g. the pilots of JG 77 and II./JG51 they met over Tunisia were somewhat second-rate. And late war Soviet planes as Yak-3s, La-5FNs and La-7s or Tu-2s were not bad planes.

The Finns, they fought in the sector which was seen as secondary by VVS during most of the war, saw that during the early part of the Oper. Barbarossa VVS pilots were still well trained and tenacious. In 1942 and up to mid-1943 many Soviet pilots were poorly trained and their morale varied, sometimes fighter escort ran away when Finnish fighters attacked leaving their charges to their own devices but sometimes the escort fighters fought to the end, effectively protecting their charges. Also Germans warned Finns in late 1943 that Soviet had very well trained units which could execute well-planned effective strikes against important pin-point targets. Finns also noted that in 1943 Soviet pilots were tactically sound but still usually their shooting skills were poor. In 1944 even that was improved.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

For page 65 of, "How The War Was Won," Phillips Payson O'Brien lists the following citations:

174. Muller, "The German Air War in Russia" (Baltimore, 1992,) pp. 192, 221.

175. See Galland Interview in Spaatz MSS 134. (Galland Report, The Birth, Life and Death of the German Day Fighter)

I don't have the details of either.

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

So.... How long time (months ? hours ? ...) did last the training for a Russian fighter pilot ? Before and during WWII.
Phil.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

I'm sorry, it's pretty hard to take this thread seriously when the opening comments are completely idiotic. The Soviets were never 'lambs to the slaughter' or any such nonsense.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

It might be an issue of 'florid prose'; the Soviet Airforce took a beating early on just due to the technical 'gap' and the lack of experience for lots of pilots. Later, when their tech and training time improved and surpassed the LW, there was still the issue of overcoming a sense of inferiority in the newer pilots at least until a bit later in the war. As for the 'Experten's' sense of superiority against the Soviet Airforce, I'm not sure that ever went away, until the Soviets were right on the border.


I remember reading that 'somewhere': was it Loza's books, the rereleased version of Red Phoenix, the Time/Life WW2 series or somewhere else I cannot say.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Since this thread does deal with VVS pilot training, here are a few sources and comments that might be useful. A tiny sample of the information found in the sources:

Elementary Flying Schools

Pilot cadets were required to have completed at least 9 years of formal education, be members of the Communist Party youth organization (Komsomol), and have completed 25 to 30 hours of Po-2 primary instruction at one of the many aero clubs. This latter requirement, however, was abolished in 1943. Elementary training lasted from 9 to 14 months, after which the graduates were send on to the fighter, bomber, and ground-attack schools. There were at least 114 elementary flying schools in operation during the wartime years, and possibly as many as 162.

Fighter Schools

Fighter pilots were trained at some 60 fighter schools, with the average course of instruction lasting between 12 and 14 months. The principal aircraft used by the schools were the Yak-1, Yak-7 and the Yak-7b.


The sources contain details on just about every one of the hundreds of elementary, fighter, bomber, ground-attack, reconnaissance and specialty flight and ground support schools in the VVS and VMF, their location, organization, number and types of aircraft, number of students and cadre/instructors, commanders, etc. The information was gathered from captured documents and thousands and thousands of interrogations of Soviet airmen taken at the front and at Abt. Ic/Genst.d.Lw. Auswertestelle Ost.

Sources:
(1) NARA WashDC: RG 242/T-321 roll 92, Folder OKL 130: “SU Fliegertruppe: Fliegerschulen, Ersatz- und Lehrverbände.” Dezember 1943. Fremde Luftwaffen Ost/Lw. Führungsstab Ic, in: T-321/roll 92 – frames 403-459.
(2) NARA WashDC: RG 242/T-321 roll 91 “Ausbildungswesen” (VVS), 2.44.
(3) NARA WashDC: RG 242/T-321 roll 91 “Ausbildung d.Jagdflieger" (VVS), Folder OKL 108, 10.44.
(4) NARA WashDC: RG 242/T-321 roll 95 Folder OKL 2340 "Ausbildungsanweisung d.Sowjet Jagfwaffe", 15.11.44.
Also see:
Timin, Mikhail. Air Battles Over the Baltic 1941: The Air War on 22 June 1941 – The Battle for Stalin’s Baltic Region. Warwick (U.K.): Helion & Co., Ltd., 2018. ISBN 978-1-911512-56-1. Hb. Dj. 400p. c.200 photos. 37p. Of color aircraft profiles (3 or 4 per page). 9 color maps. 12 tables. 4 appendices. Index. [This outstanding study has 50+ pages on Soviet fighter pilot training during 1940-41.]

L.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Excellent !!! Thank you very much indeed.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

The question at hand is, given the circumstances of the Eastern Front, why didn't the Luftwaffe produce Experten with incredible *and verifiably valid* victory totals?

And beyond the hurt feelings and the nationalistic pride, I think the question is a valid one. After all, E. R. Hooten, Generaloberst Erhard Rauss, and Phillips Payson O'Brien are not making those historical facts up.

To answer this question, I have re-read Helmut Lipfert's, "The War Diary of Hauptman Helmut Lipfert - JG 52 on the Eastern Front - 1943-1945," and while it provides much clarity, it raises more questions than it answers.

~ Part 1 ~

At 26, Helmut Lipfert entered combat fairly late, both in age and date, December 18, 1942. He ended the war with 687 combat missions and 203 victories. And most importantly, Lipfert is considered to be an honest claimer.

* The most relevant passage that bears on the central question appears on page 114-115 of his book. On May 29, 1944, Lipfert was flying his 496th combat mission with 117 confirmed victories and, [...] "We soon learned that there were Russians in this combat zone who could fly as well as we." He was engaged by four (4) aggressive Airacobras in a 4 vs. 2 dogfight that he couldn't handle. "...several Airacobras jumped us from above and gave us such a scare that it was not until the flight home that I really recovered my senses."

* On the third sortie of that day (498th combat mission) Lipfert writes, "But once again we didn't even reach the front. All I saw was Airacobras above. Once again they forced us to flee. [...] I was furious when I landed. ** Never before had the Russians simply not allowed me to get into attack position." **

* Lipfert was just shy of 500 combat missions on the Eastern Front before he finally encountered Russian pilots who would not let him motor up to 50-100 meters behind them and shoot them down.

On page 62, Lipfert writes, "The claim that the Russians were poor flyers is false. I can only repeat that the beginners among the German fighter pilots were just as awkward in the air as the Russian beginners."

The awkwardness of German beginners is amply demonstrated on page 11-12 of the book. Lipfert went to the Eastern Front as the leader of a detachment ferrying new Bf 109 G-2s to Russia. None of the new pilots had ever flown a 109 G-2 before. They took off on the last few days of November, 1942. "Already it was evident that our training as fighter pilots had been too short and that we were not qualified. As proof of this, only three (3) pilots from my detachment reached the front by the turn of the year 1943. Ten (10) further pilots reached their units by March 1943 after making emergency landings. Four (4) of those who took off never reached their destinations."

End Part 1.

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

~ Part II ~

Apparently, the Luftwaffe never developed navigational aids or instrumentation for use on the Russian Front. Over and over and over again, Lipfert writes that Russian railroad tracks were the only reliable navigational aids on their maps and if railroad tracks were not visible: they were mostly lost.

On his second combat mission, December 19, 1942, Lipfert's, Yellow 2, developed engine trouble and he made a wheels up, forced landing close to the railroad tracks he was following to get home.

On his 17th or 18th combat mission, Lipfert scored his first victory: a LaGG-5 ** who innocently flew up and tried to get into formation with him. **

On his 28th mission, Lipfert was flying with Oberleutnant Denk, (76-victories, Knight's Cross.) Denk is killed strafing a Russian airfield; Lipfert escapes by following railroad tracks to the southeast, but crashes into a house after running out of gas and not getting so much as a scratch.

Months later, (no date) Lipfert crashed a new Bf-109 when he forgot to lower his landing gear.

September 12th, 1943, Lipfert lands a piston-seized, burning Bf-109 at Poltava.

Between December 18, 1942 and September 10, 1943 his unit lost five (5) pilots who had between 30-76 victories. Only Denk's demise was a known cause.

Lipfert writes again and again about being lost in the air and landing at the wrong airfields in the September to October 1943 timeframe.

On page 61, Lipfert talks about trying to shoot down Russian weather reconnaissance aircraft (which he never did.) He would send his wingman up to circle and watch, the Russian would do the same, and then the two would go at it--in a duel. Never once was Lipfert successful, "Each man tried every conceivable trick to get the other in front of his guns, but always without success. Russians who allowed themselves to get involved in such experiments were experts and handled their machines magnificently."

End Part II

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

~ Summary of Part I and II ~

For the first 113-pages of the book, in every aerial combat that Lipfert describes, (sans the Russian weather reconnaissance aircraft,) with very few exceptions, once Lipfert got on the tail of a Russian aircraft, the other Russian aircraft in the formation fled the scene and disappeared. On the rare occasions where all the Russian aircraft did not flee the scene, Lipfert was able to shoot down a second aircraft.

Therefore, honest claiming Luftwaffe Experten would have found it very difficult to score 3, 4, 5, 6 victories against Russian beginners in a single mission. And Generaloberst Erhard Rauss was mostly correct. [The Russians] almost never did recover from the shock effect of the German fighters.

Once again, on May 29, 1944, Lipfert was flying his 496th combat mission with 117 confirmed victories before he learned that there were Russians in his combat zone who could fly as well as he could. On that day, he was engaged by four (4) aggressive Airacobras in a 4 vs. 2 dogfight that did not flee, that could fly well, and he could not handle. "Several Airacobras jumped us from above and gave us such a scare that it was not until the flight home that I really recovered my senses." On the third sortie of that day (498th combat mission) Lipfert writes, "But once again we didn't even reach the front. All I saw was Airacobras above. Once again they forced us to flee. [...] I was furious when I landed. Never before had the Russians simply not allowed me to get into attack position."

And, during all this time, if Lipfert wasn't flying directly over a set of railroad tracks, he was mostly lost. He had to be--and was--exceedingly careful in the air.

Also--and this is a key point--on almost every single mission there were only two (2) German aircraft in the engagement. There couldn't be a "turkey shoot" on any given day.

Furthermore, The Bf-109 G was not an ideal fighter aircraft, to say the least. Lipfert writes that they were hard to see out of, they didn't stay in the air for long and they were hard to take-off and difficult to land.

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

~ Part III ~

Second most relevant passage:

Page 113: "On May 24, 1944, I climbed into a Messerschmitt again for the first time since the Crimea tragedy. At first I was only allowed to make five practice flights. ** Four (4) days later an order reached the Gruppe, according to which a Staffel was to be detached to the Reich Defense. We knew all too well that it was a virtual death sentence for anyone who had to move to the Reich. But none of us thought of refusing. 6 Staffel had the most pilots and it seemed likely that it would be chosen for this reason alone. [4 Staffel gets chosen.] I must admit that the news took a load off my heart. Naturally I would have flown against the heavy bombers and Mustangs and would probably would have shot some down. But the outcome of this affair was predictable. Everyone who flew in the Reich was "burned" sooner or later. The same thing could happen any day against the Russians, but here there was a much better chance of getting home again in one piece."

At the time, on the Eastern Front, Russian fighter aircraft outnumbered Luftwaffe fighter aircraft by 8 to 1, at least, and the true number might have been 10 to 1.

Kommodore Kurt Buhligen's (JG 2, 112 victories all in the West, 24 heavy bombers) famous quote is very applicable here. "All the pilots who came to me from the Eastern Front fell on the Western Front."

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

I just finished reading Lipfert's book again.

~ Part IV ~

Important Takeaways

1) The poor (and shockingly unreliable) armament Bf/Me 109 G2-14 was a major factor in all of this. Lipfert thought firing at a Russian aircraft from 250 meters was something only a rank amateur would do. Meanwhile, the guns on the P-47 and P-51 were sighted in at 300-yards, no? At 200-meters, Lipfert thought the armament of his aircraft "was ineffective." Lipfert held his fire until his weapons were effective: 100-meters or less.

2) The 20mm cannon on his 109 was unreliable from his first mission to his last and so was the 30mm when he got one of those. And both his machines guns were less reliable than either cannon. ** He writes in amazement every time all his weapons were working at the same time. **

** Lipfert would have scored between 250-275 confirmed victories if his weapons had been reliable, and as late as March 17, 1945 he writes, "air combat with Il-2s and LaGG-5s, 1 Lagg damaged--only one machine gun would work."

3) Bf/Me 109 aircraft repaired in Russia, sometimes in the field, and often in depots were unreliable, dangerous and sometimes deathtraps. Once when returning from leave, Lipfert was given two (2) different 109s to fly back to his unit. Both nearly killed him and ended up taking a train and then a truck back to his base.

4) Every morning the ground crews and support staff would watch each Staffel take off with great interest. Apparently, there was a 'Dead Pool' on each of the pilots, the bet being who would die that morning trying to take off. Same thing with landings. Lipfert writes, "Our new airfield was called Belobek. [...] If I as an experienced flyer felt a certain trepidation before every landing, how must have the beginners among us have felt. Often we stood in front of the tent and watched the landings. About every third one resulted in a crash [...]

Lipfert writes about drawing straws with Barkhorn and five other Knight's Cross holders over who would take off first on a wet, soggy airfield. Lipfert loses the draw and crashes into a truck while trying to take off.

5) The Bf/Me 109 had nothing but a compass to navigate with and it was hard to see out of so dead reckoning navigation was difficult. While in Russia, as Lipfert tells it, he was lost, or mostly lost in the air *about every other mission.* On one mission he landed at two different airbases before he found his.

Once, when his Staffel was transferred to Poland to rest and refit, he wasn't given a map or even a compass heading to fly there. Instead, he was told, "just fly NNW and sooner or later you're bound to find Poland."

6) The red (low fuel warning) light was on A LOT. And when it went on, it was often at a really, really inconvenient time.

The Bf/Me 109 was definitely a major hindrance to a Luftwaffe victory in the East--and West.

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

First I have to say, my English translation of Lipferts' book didn't have that 'dead pool' story; I guess parts of the original were left out.
Secondly: I figured the unreliability of Lipfert's guns might have been due to maintenance issues, IE: airfields in rough conditions, sometimes kind of at the end of a rather tattered supply line.
As for the lacking maps/navigation aids, I recall a story of post war LW pilots who were being trained in the US and how THEY could no longer just 'seat of the pants' it, they had to go thru a 'preflight check list' before even starting the plane up. I think a few even said, it took a lot of the joy out of flying.

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Page 44. (First mention of it.) "Things went somewhat differently with my interrupted "ascension to heaven party." On the advice of Fw. Heino Sashenberg, known as "Wimmersal," I had left 200 Marks in the mess cash box with instructions that it was to be used to buy drinks should I fail to return, so that my soul could arrive in fighter pilot heaven in style. Yes, traditions were so strong there! [As every pilot had done the same.] As Heino repeatedly let me know that I wouldn't be around much longer I increased the fund to 250 Marks just to spite him. In fact Heino could have been proven right had I not been unbelievably lucky once again."

All my Best,

Bronc

Re: The Victories of Luftwaffe Experten (Ost) - New Considerations
 

Oh...well I do recall THAT entry.