Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

I wonder if anybody can help me address questions about comparative air crew survival rates (i.e. across nationalities, during different operations throughout WWII). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is in the specific context of my ongoing research about ‘Steinbock’. (see other forum threads) But it would be interesting to have reference points from other Luftwaffe, or Allied, operations between 1939 and 1945.

As far as I can tell, the Luftwaffe lost about 275 aircraft destroyed during the ‘Steinbock’ raids (interpreted widely to include the Bristol, Hull, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Torquay and Falmouth raids as well as the 14 attacks on London, but EXCLUDING planes lost in transfer flights as well as aircraft destroyed in Steinbock-related training or Allied attacks on bomber unit airfields). One can certainly argue about that figure – for example, it includes KG 51 Me 410s lost when they were part of a ‘main raid’ attacking force, but excludes them when they were involved in a ‘harassing raid’ or intruder mission; it also excludes Fw 190 types entirely. However, given that discrepancies between sources are unlikely ever to be fully resolved, 275 two- and four-engine aircraft seems like a reasonable basis to work from.

From the (approximately) 275 two- and four-engine aircraft lost during the ‘Steinbock’ raids, there were 130 survivors who became prisoners (131 if the survivor from a 1./F)/121 recce aircraft sent to photograph the results of the first Portsmouth raid is included). These came from:

KG 2 = 35 PW / number of planes from which at least one PW survived = 15
KG 6 = 25 PW / 15
KG 30 = 12 PW / 6 (incl. 1 plane that returned to base)
KG 40 = 6 PW / 2
KG 51 = 0 PW / 0
KG 54 = 27 PW / 10
KG 66 = 4 PW / 3
KG 76 = 4 PW / 2
KG 100 = 17 PW / 6
KG 101 = 0 PW / 0

So that’s a total of 130 PW from 59 different aircraft (or 131 from 60 if the 1.(F)/121 aircraft is counted). As a proportion, that means that about 21.45% (59 of 275) of the two- and four-engine aircraft destroyed during ‘Steinbock’ produced at least one prisoner.

From 275 planes lost, as far as I can tell, the entire crew survived (to become PW) from only FOUR of the 59 aircraft that produced at least one prisoner:

2./KG 2, Do 217 M-1, U5+DK (23/4 February, abandoned plane that subsequently glided to Cambridge).
5./KG 2, Ju 188 E-1, U5+EN (27/8 March, first Bristol raid)
6./KG 30, Ju 88 A-4, 4D+EP (27/8 March, first Bristol raid)
3./KG 54, Ju 88 A-4 Trop, B3+PL (18/19 April, last London raid, crash-landed at RAF Bradwell)

From 275 planes lost, as far as I can tell, the entire crew was KILLED when the aircraft was destroyed in the following cases:

KG 2: 32 aircraft
KG 6: 40 aircraft
KG 30: 21 aircraft
KG 40: 1 aircraft
KG 54: 34 aircraft
KG 66: 17 aircraft
KG 76: 2 aircraft
KG 100: 3 aircraft
KG 101: 4 aircraft

That’s 154 aircraft. Really, to this figure should be added KG 51 Me 410s lost in the ‘Steinbock’ main raids. It’s a bit difficult to isolate these from aircraft lost in harassing raids and intruder missions, but I reckon about 9 Me 410s were lost in the ‘Steinbock’ main raids. So that would raise the overall total from 154 to 163 aircraft. As a proportion, 163 of 275 is a little over 59%.

Self-evidently, that means that about 19.3% of Steinbock aircraft losses (275 minus 59 minus 163 = 53) produced neither any prisoners nor involved the loss of the aircraft’s entire crew. This is explained by those aircraft that made it back to NW Europe, permitting crew members either to bale out before their plane crashed or to survive a crash-landing that wrote off the plane.

So, to my questions:

A. Please can anybody provide me with comparative data for other reasonably large-scale Luftwaffe bomber campaigns? I guess the most obvious comparisons would be with earlier raids against the UK (1940-41 or Baedeker raids?), but sustained operations over other areas of enemy-held territory (especially USSR) might also be interesting.

B. Please can anybody provide me with comparative data for broadly comparable Allied bombing operations? It would be interesting to know, for example, the proportion of British or U.S. bombers that were lost over enemy-held territory from which the entire crew survived, or the proportion that produced at least one prisoner, or the proportion that were lost along with their entire crew.

C. In the absence of ready answers to the above questions (which would be understandable, for several reasons), please can anybody suggest focused sources that I might look at that could help me? I don’t have the resources (time etc) needed to carry out detailed research, but it occurs to me that TOCH forum users might either have carried out similar research about Luftwaffe operations other than ‘Steinbock’ and know about relevant publications, or know of sources of consolidated (but not-yet-analysed) data about Allied bombing operations that I could use for my own purposes.

Whatever the case, I hope the information presented above is of interest to some forum users and perhaps it might prompt research into other Luftwaffe operations about which users are already knowledgeable, but about which I know very little indeed.

Thanks,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Simon,

If memory does not fail me "Middlebrook's works" did have some kind of statistic behind its massive information and first hand accounts. This is not 100% what you are looking for (Steinbock raids), but can gives you an overall picture.

Of course, statistics varied during the war years and stiffening (or not) of the defences...so maybe you will need more precise data (guess unavailable) for the period in question you are looking for (RAF versus LW KG units versus USAAC - 8th AF for instance).

If you have not read yet, I do recommend "Bomber Command War Diaries" from Middlebrook and another historian, whose name I forgot by heart now.

There was even a study about the % of crews that survived bailing out from Lancasters or Halifaxex and Stirlings. The chance of survival if one had to bail out from those machines. I have read it somewhere and quoted on the biography of a Bomber Command Wing Commander and CO, but do not have it now at hands.

Maybe you could, in the futur and your coming book, add something about the survival probability and chances for each LW sub-type of bombers used on Steinbock campaign. It would be a good suggestion and welcomed.

I guess that at least one member of this board is writing about the BAEDEKER RAIDS or to publish something about.

Humbly yours,
Adriano

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Thanks Adriano,

I had a quick look at Middlebrook (& Everitt) before I posted. He/they say that 47,268 Bomber Command air crew were killed in action or (I guess a fairly small number) died as prisoners of war. Against this, there were 9838 prisoners of war.

Superficially, that suggests that about 1 in 6 Bomber Command air crew survived the loss of their aircraft and became prisoners, although if some thousands of the dead actually died in crashes NOT over enemy territory (i.e. over the North Sea or UK) then it might be more like 1 in 5.5.

As far as I can tell (my figures are not precise and I doubt it is possible to come up with absolutely accurate data), around 900 Luftwaffe air crew died during 'Steinbock' (just on operations - at least another 125 died in accidents, transfer flights, training sorties that went wrong and Allied attacks on bomber geschwader airfields). If 130 survived to become prisoners, that suggests that about 12% (or 1 in 8) of the Luftwaffe's 'irrecoverable losses' during Steinbock survived to become prisoners.

So a very superficial comparison suggests that for the war as a whole (there must have been some significant differences between different bomber campaigns, as well - as you indicate - some differences between survival rates for different aircraft), 1 in 5.5 RAF Bomber Command air crew survived the experience of having their aircraft destroyed over enemy-held territory and became prisoners, whereas about 1 in 8 Luftwaffe air crew involved in Steinbock did so.

One can speculate on reasons for this. It's evident that quite a few Steinbock air crew had the misfortune to come down in the English Channel or North Sea, and I suspect that in January or February 1944 that was pretty much lethal (though a few seem to have been rescued both by the British and Germans). So they survived the loss of their plane but not the bit that followed. I also imagine (I've never tried it) that landing by parachute at night is more dangerous than during daylight. That might explain some of the difference too (bearing in mind Bomber Command's various day-time raids at various points in the war). It might also be relevant in the context of comparing USAAF bomber air crew losses with RAF Bomber Command and Luftwaffe ones.

Another thing that might be relevant is parachute failure. There are certainly accounts in the British intelligence sources of finding the bodies of Steinbock air crew who managed to bale out, but whose parachutes failed them. More research needed here too.

I agree that it would be interesting to compare survival rates for various types of German bomber, and I'll try to do that. I'm also working out whether survival rates differed according to where one sat in the plane and the job one did. I would imagine that being the pilot reduced one's chances, as these people often needed to (or chose to) stay with their stricken aircraft in order to give their crew mates the chance to bale out. Having said that, there are certainly pilots among the 130 Steinbock prisoners and at least one case where the only person who survived from the crew was the pilot.

I'd be interested to hear if you recall the source that relates to Halifax / Lancaster / Stirling survival rates.

Any equivalent data about USAAF heavy bomber crews, comparable to Middlebrook's about RAF Bomber Command, would also be interesting.

Thanks again for the suggestions and thoughts.

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Survival rate studies (for lack of a better term) were done for both RAF 'heavies' and USAAF 'heavies', in both cases by type of bomb and crew position.

It's been quite a number of years since I read either of them so I may be wrong but I think I read the one for the RAF in Bomber Command by Max Hastings.

For the USAAF it might have been in one of Freeman's books, maybe The Mighty Eighth War Manual.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Steve R,

Thanks for the suggestions. Logical that those books should contain that sort of information. I have both in my work office and will have a look when I'm next there.

Best,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

I think that Len Deighton's novel "Bomber" also quoted some figures.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Thanks Nick, I'll look at that too.

Just by way of an update.

Of the 130 PW (excluding the Me 410 recce survivor):

22 were pilots.
30 were observers.
35 were wireless operators.
15 were Bordmechaniker (not a role identified for Ju 88 crew, therefore not possible to be a Ju 88 Bordmechaniker prisoner).
28 were air gunners (bearing in mind that He 177 had two, not one of these).

Of the 59 planes from which they originated:

32 were Ju 88.
13 were Ju 188.
8 were Do 217.
6 were He 177.

This is just the raw data. Much more analysis is needed to make any sense of this, and some of that is more than difficult. For example, one would need to know precisely how many sorties were carried out by each type of aircraft during 'Steinbock' in order to establish the ratio of PW survivors per type of aircraft per loss (Ju 88s were most common but some units switched plane types during Steinbock and lots of Ju 88s were switched to Italian operations in late January). I doubt that it is possible to establish that. And as noted above, the data for Bordmechaniker prisoners is rather affected by the fact that Ju 88s didn't have them (at least, insofar as British interrogators were concerned). And some Ju 88s were S-1s with only three, not four crew. And so on.

Still, a superficial glance suggests that since every plane had a pilot, observer and wireless operator, plus at least one air gunner, being a pilot was the 'least survivable' position to occupy in a stricken aircraft, whereas being a wireless operator was possibly an enhancement to survival chances. And since more than half of all aircraft from which survivors originated were Ju 88s, the proportion of Bordmechaniker who survived also seems (at least in relative terms) quite high. Wireless operators and air gunners seem to have been somewhere in-between, and since He 177 had two of these I'd be inclined to guess that it was marginally better to be a wireless operator than an air gunner.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Sorry, towards the end I meant observer and air gunner, not wireless operator and air gunner. And marginally better to be an observer than an air gunner.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Ju 88s did have Bordmechaniker-some times recorded as BS. The deeper one digs into such raw data, the more muddied the water. I am a firm believer in such matters as keeping it simple! BF on the Ju 88 tended to jettison canopy and go out that way while the BM/BS went out through the gondola. However, this depended on who was still alive/capable and the orientation of the aircraft

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Simon, I shall dig that info for you.I will be on short holidays from next Monday, so please do allow me some days to find on some HD's and books. But it was a nice statistical report (study).

Chris, I bet you are right! On this kind of situation (gladly we had never to face this kind of situation whilst flying), one tends to save his skin (and quickly as possible)! I remember a HUET training I did some years ago, simulating a night landing on the "Drink" or sea (wearing full painted black swimming glasses)..in spite of all the theoretical training, just before the events, when the hull capsized and turned upside down, I unbuckled my seat-belt and went the other way, passing in front of the "Captain" and exiting through his door (instead of mine) in record speed time (like a Champagne cork), to breath freely over the water some meters above....Boy, I doubt if Michael Phelps would have beaten me this day....

A.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Simon,

Survival rates for crew positions in Wellington, Halifax and Lancaster during the period January-June 1943 can be found in The Crucible of War 1939-1945 (RCAF history) page 755: https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/th...39-1945-18.pdf

Regards,
Peter

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Peter,

Very nice DATA. Thank you for sharing that with us.

Adriano

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Chris, Peter, Adriano,

Thanks very much for this, most helpful and informative.

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

A little more on the age profile of Steinbock air crew, for anybody who might be interested and/or inclined to comment:

From ADI(K) reports, dates of birth (in one or two cases, just ages at time of capture) are known for 126 of the 130 Steinbock prisoners, and also for 64 dead air crew; a total of 190 persons.

Although that is not a massively large sample, my instinct (statisticians can advise otherwise) is that this is a large enough sample for the data to be reasonably illustrative of the Luftwaffe airmen who flew in the Steinbock raids.

Taking the age of the 190 persons on 21 January 1944, the day Steinbock began (and the day on which at least one man had his birthday), these are some of the figures that fall out from a little bit of analysis.

The average (mean) age of air crew was a little over 22.5 years.
The median age was 23 (almost 24).
The modal (most common single) age was 21 (this was 48 of 190 airmen for whom the age is known).

Also:

117 (61.6%) of the 190 men were 21, 22 or 23 years of age.
The youngest for whom the age is known was 19 (7 out of 190 men)
The oldest was 31.
29 men were 25-31 years old when Steinbock began

Slightly to my surprise, pilots tended to be young; mostly 20-22 years old and one of them was 19. Having said that, the oldest man was a pilot (Uffz Boetsch, pilot of 2./KG 66 Ju 188 Z6+HK, lost 24 February).

The highest ranking prisoner was Hauptmann Oben, also a pilot (aged 29; pilot of 6./KG 6 Ju 88 3E+AP, lost 24 March; according to the ADI(K) report, known to be Operations Officer of II./KG 6 in February 1944).

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Hello Simon, for the dead crew, using Volksbund and the death cards on fold3 should give you far more birth dates.

You have also the link below that gives you the list of German buried in Cannock Chase War Cemetery, where most German who died in UK in WWII are buried: https://fr.findagrave.com/cemetery/2...search#srp-top. Almost all the WWII entries have a date of birth.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Excellent ideas, Laurent, thank you for those (and for the link). I have Fold 3 membership (for FMS manuscripts, mostly) and although I was aware of the Cannock Chase cemetery it hadn't really crossed my mind to use it in the way you suggest.

I don't know quite what limits to set - I don't have any intention (or need, I think) to clarify the age profile of a very large proportion of Steinbock air crew. But using the methods you suggest to find out information about maybe another 100 airmen would be sensible. And if the things I've already found out turn out to be challenged by the additional data, then some work beyond that might be justified.

Thanks again,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

First, thanks to Laurent for his suggestions – which I followed up – and also to Brian Bines for sending me some NVMs as a source of additional data and for pointing out that the I./KG 66 loss lists in RL 10/638 (which I have) contain DOBs, something I had failed to notice.

As a result, I now have dates of birth for 126 of 130 prisoners plus 218 dead Steinbock airmen; a TOTAL of 344 men. This compares with my previous sample of 190 men (126 prisoners + 64 dead airmen).

Having analysed the data, there are no significant changes from my previous figures, which suggests that the initial sample was sufficient to provide a reliable guide.

The average (mean) age for the 344 airmen was 22.5872 years; in my initial sample (190 airmen) it was 22.5842 (i.e. an almost identical figure).

The median age is 22. I made a stupid mistake in my previous calculation; in the sample of 190 airmen the median age was also 22, not 23 as stated.

The modal age (73 out of 344 airmen) remains 21.

200 (58.14%) of the 344 airmen were 21, 22 or 23 years old on 21 January 1944.

The lowest age I found was 18 years (one man out of 344). There were eleven 19-year-olds. The upper age increased from 31 in my previous sample to 36. Of 344 airmen for whom ages are known, 11 (3.2%) were 30 years or over on 21 January 1944 (six 30-year-olds; two 31-year-olds; one 32-year-old; one 34-year-old; and one 36-year-old).

I also did a bit of analysis of pilot ages. I found dates of birth for 79 pilots. The youngest on 21 January 1944 was 19 years old. The oldest was 32. Of the eleven men who were thirty years or older on 21 January, five were pilots. Three of the seven 29-year-olds were also pilots. But the average (mean) age of pilots was 22.898 years old (i.e. marginally older than the average age for air crew). The median age was 22 and the mode (20 out of 79 pilots) was 21 – i.e. the same ages as for the group as a whole. Of 79 pilots, 45 (56.96%) were 21, 22 or 23 years of age at the start of Steinbock.

I hope this of interest to a few people. I would be very interested to learn if any published sources contain similar data for other periods of the war (e.g. bomber crew members during the Battle of Britain), or if any TOCH forum contributor has carried out similar number-crunching for other Luftwaffe operations.

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Simon,

As far as I remember (and memory can play tricks) there is nothing compared with what you are doing, on LW books that I may have read. I may be wrong or missed something.

If memory is not faulty, I believe that Middlebrook did insert something about age or average on some of his works.

Your study is interesting because it shows that "probably" most of the airmen involved were "fresh from Training schools" or only recently "operational" (18,19, 20 years old). Of course, there were some veterans amongst them, specially the Staffelkapitän and Gruppenkommandeure and others.

MAYBE if you could pick up one of those youngsters and follow up his career, maybe we would have more clues (or not) about this probability/theme.

You are doing a fantastic work there. Keep going!

A.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

A little more on the 'profile' of Steinbock air crew, this time dealing with rank distribution, for those who are interested.

Sample is 350 airmen (130 prisoners + 230 dead).

Gefreiter 28
Obergefreiter 44
Unteroffizier 175
JUNIOR NCOs 247 (70.6%)

Feldwebel 38
Oberfeldwebel 22
Fahnenjunker / Oberfähnrich 3
SENIOR NCOs (including officer candidates) 63 (18%)

Leutnant 30
Oberleutnant 8
Hauptmann 2
JUNIOR OFFICERS 40 (11.4%)

SENIOR NCOs (as defined above) are 'distributed' evenly among the dead and prisoners. They made up 18% of the total air crew figure, 17.7% (23 men) of the prisoners and 18.2% (40 men) of the dead. JUNIOR NCOs were 70.6% of the total, but made up 75.4% of the prisoners (98 men) compared with 67.7% of the dead (149 men). JUNIOR OFFICERS were 11.4% of the total sample, but only 6.9% (9 men) of the prisoners, compared with 14.1% (31 men) of the dead. The sample here might be too small to draw any conclusions, but I find it interesting that officers are 'under-represented' among the prisoners (twice as likely to die as be taken prisoner). A hypothesis might be that officers felt some sort of responsibility to remain with their stricken aircraft until other crew members had evacuated, and were therefore more likely to be killed as the plane fell apart or G-forces took hold?

Question - please forgive my ignorance, but in a stricken aircraft, who had the authority to order crew members to bale out - the pilot or (if one was present and he was senior to the pilot in rank) the officer?

I note that of 61 destroyed aircraft that I looked at (of about 275 destroyed in combat during Steinbock), about half had one officer on board (27 planes) and half were all-NCO crews (31). One plane carried an officer and an officer candidate and two planes (5./KG 30 Ju 88 4D+BN lost 15 May) and 2./KG 66 Ju 188 Z6+EK lost 19 March) carried two officers. I ignored Ju 88 S types and Me 410s as they only had three and two crew respectively; I wanted to focus on bombers with four, five or six crew members. The fact that about half the planes had one officer on board and half were all-NCO crews is of course no surprise if roughly a tenth of all airmen were officers and a 'typical' bomber had a crew of 4 or 5 men (He 177s with six but not a large number of those involved).

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Typo above, sorry. Sample is 350 airmen (130 prisoners +220 [not 230] dead).

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Taking things in a different direction, again for what it is worth, if anything.

This time, looking at the experience of Steinbock aircrew, as indicated by medals and war flight awards.

I get the impression that one reason sometimes suggested for the lack of success achieved by the Steinbock crews was their inexperience and poor levels of training.

I wonder if this is true. Certainly, there were some very inexperienced men among those who were taken prisoner - among them, some who were on the first or second war flight when shot down.

But there were also many prisoners who were decorated airmen and who appear to have flown quite large numbers of war flights.

Some data and examples:

Among the 130 prisoners, 63 (i.e. almost half) were identified by interrogators as holding at least the EK 2 and/or WF Bronze (in other words, a decoration or award of some sort). There were 36 EK 2s and 31 EK 1s (11 men held both, so there were 25 men listed with just the EK 2 and 20 with just the EK 1 = 56 Iron Cross winners in total).

WF awards included 13 Bronze, 2 Silver and 9 Gold (24 total). Of the 9 Gold WF holders, 5 were identified as also holding the EK 1 and 2. There was one Deutsches Kreuz in Gold recorded.

This information is likely to be a minimum statement of the decorations and awards held by these 130 survivors (prisoners). For example, Oberfeldwebel Gopp, wireless operator in 9./KG 100 Do 217 6N+IT, captured on 30 April after the raid on Plymouth, was identified by interrogators as holding the Deutsches Kreuz in Gold. But since he also claimed Luftwaffe service since 1940 and 449 war flights, he must have had the WF Gold award and probably other decorations too (since he served in Spain with the German Army, he probably held decorations from that conflict too). Likewise, the three surviving crew members of 3./KG 2 Do 217 U5+CL, shot down on 24 February, were all identified as holding the EK 1 and 2 (as was the fourth, dead, crew member); yet despite the fact that all claimed to have flown 21 operational flights together as a crew since July 1943, no reference is made in the ADI(K) report (#93) to any of them holding the Bronze WF award – for which they were all presumably eligible. As another example, none of the three surviving crew of 3./KG 54 Ju 88 B3+AL, shot down 29/1, are listed as having any award. Yet at least two of them (the wireless operator and air gunner) claimed 42 war flights since autumn 1942, which suggests that they should have had the WF Bronze award and probably some EKs too. Likewise, of the six crew (four of whom survived) of 1./KG 40 He 177 F8+HH, lost 21 January, only one (the wireless operator) was explicitly stated to have received awards (EK 1 and 2 plus WF Gold). Yet from what it is stated in the report about the experience of almost all his other crew members (three of whom were prisoners) it is difficult to believe that they were not also in receipt of a range of decorations and awards.

Another way of quantifying the experience of crews is to look at the proportion of aircraft from which prisoners were taken (59 aircraft in total) which are believed to have included at least one (often several) members – both alive and dead – who bore some sort of decoration. In this case, the figures are as follows:

KG 2: 9 of 15 aircraft
KG 6: 7 of 15 aircraft
KG 30: 5 of 6 aircraft
KG 40: 2 of 2 aircraft
KG 54: 5 of 10 aircraft
KG 66: 1 of 3 aircraft
KG 76: 1 of 2 aircraft
KG 100: 3 of 6 aircraft

TOTAL 33 (55.9%) of 59 aircraft from which at least one prisoner survived had at least one crew member with an Iron Cross and/or Bronze WF badge.
Again, this is likely to be an under-estimate. To give one example, ADI(K) 214 lists no award or decorations for the crew (two of whom survived to become prisoners) of 1./KG 6 Ju 188 3E+MH (lost 15 May). Yet given the description of the career of the pilot, Oberleutnant von Manowarda (Staffelkapitän of 1./KG 6) available at https://www.ww2.dk/Lw%20Offz%20-%20L-R%20Apr%202022.pdf, I struggle to believe that this was an aircraft whose crew bore no war flights awards or medals.

As always, more work needed, but I can't help feeling that along with some interesting information presented in some ADI(K) reports about the quite lengthy training undertaken by even the less operationally experienced airmen, there is room here for some challenge to the view of Steinbock airmen as under-trained and inexperienced, or at least a bit more nuance?

As before, constructive criticism and suggestions for angles on this topic / sources of additional information, is very welcome.

Thanks,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Crikey this is going deeper than I would ever have thought! I should say that EKI and EKII were commonplace and not much indication of experience while the wound badge was not an award per se but recognition of what one had experienced in combat. Frontflugspange are a better means of judging experience but the mention of the Manowarda crew is a good example of how imprecise this can be. Manowarda, who I knew well, first flew operationally in October 1940 and his logbook (copy of which I have to October 1943) gives a good idea of what Frontflugspange he wore (albeit photos I have of him only show him with the EKI & EKII). EKI and EKII were awarded to him early on and it would appear he only received the Ehrenpokal the day he was shot down. Perhaps it was because he was Austrian and according to members of his staffel with 1./KG 6 that he spoke his mind. Don't forget also that some POWs received decorations after their capture

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Hi Simon.

Interesting research!

Just a few points to add on the awards. All men with the EK1 will have had the EK2 as well (the EK1 was only awarded to those who already held the EK1 - on very rare occasions they could be awarded together).

All men with the DKiG and Ehrenpokal would also have had the EK2 and EK1. Again, they were prerequisites for the higher awards.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Chris, Tim,

Thanks for these thoughtful and helpful responses. I'm most grateful. I thought one would have the EK 2 if one also had the EK 1, but I'm grateful for the confirmation.

I do apologise if some of my points appear naïve or not as well-informed as they might be. I've spent the last 30 years working mostly on land warfare topics (as a War Studies lecturer at The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst). My PhD was about the resistance movements in wartime Yugoslavia (not a huge amount of air power there) and my first degree was in International Relations (which I also taught for a while at Keele University). None of this is necessarily the best preparation for a foray into Luftwaffe operations in 1944. But I'm genuinely interested in the topic - which has grown out of my main focus on the 1944 Normandy campaign - and trying to get my head around some interesting material found in ADI(K) and other intelligence sources. In that respect, I must again express my gratitude to those who made my membership of this forum possible, as well as those who are taking the trouble to reply to my postings.

The point about EK 1 and 2 being "commonplace" is intriguing, and begs questions. Was this because the awards were "easy" to get? Or was it because the things required to get them were within the compass of those who went through the selection process to get in positions to earn the awards in the first place? Or was it because those responsible for writing up the recommendations found the right 'format' for doing so (in this respect, I'm reminded of the spectacular differences indicated by one of the appendices in the First United States Army Report on Operations for June and July 1944, which shows that some divisions - 1st US ID being a classic example - secured spectacularly more medals of certain types for their soldiers than divisions that were new to combat, and who hadn't quite worked out what combination of nouns, verbs and adjectives were most likely to get the desired results)? or was it largely about inter-service (or intra-service) politics?

I guess an obvious observation is that if the medals were 'easy' to get, then why did quite a few airmen not have them?

In my various attempts to number-crunch stuff, I'm partly influenced by ideas developed in Mullers' 'Elite des Fuhrers' - a book about German land forces who fought in Normandy, but which deploys some interesting analytical tools.

Anyway, enough rambling from me. I'll keep on plugging away at trying to 'profile' the Steinbock airmen and continue to appreciate the feedback.

Bye for now,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Link to 'Elite des Fuhrers' = https://www.amazon.co.uk/Elite-F%C3%...s%2C61&sr=8-26

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Simon,

Both EKII, EKI and further awards were "recommended for" or "suggested" to the High Command by the Staffelkapitän or Gruppenkommandeur. There were variations in terms of number of sorties and number of victories to be awarded with the EKII (generally after 2-3 victories) and EKI (I have read variations from 7 victories up to a bit more).

For the Kampfgeschwader airmen, it was in terms of number of sorties and, of course, success (ships sunk, or bridges destroyed, etc.).

Some airmen seems to have been "persecuted" by some of their senior officers....so even though they had the number of sorties or victories to receive the awards, the Officers did not push the "paper ahead"....It ocurred also in the RAF and USAAC as well...as far as I remember reading on "war diaries", books, etc.

Your work seems really incredible and be sure that you will have support from me and others. KEEP GOING....it gonna be a "helluva of a book" when published.

Adriano

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Simon

It is a bit of an over-simplification but broadly speaking it is true to say that Commonwealth and US bomber crew served for a tour of typically 25 or 30 missions. They then often went off to instruct for anything up to a couple of years before doing a second tour and some went on to do three tours (or maybe more). German airmen typically continued to fly until they were killed or became instructors at the end of their careers, often when highly decorated. It is therefore not surprising that those that survived (and many who died) typically got both the EK2 and EK1 as they would have flown the equivalent of 4x, 10x or even more missions than might result in a DFC or DFM for a Commonwealth airman. Large-scale awards of the EK were also made for the conquests of Poland, France, Crete, etc. in recognition of unit successes. This explains at least in part why these awards were so commonly encountered.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Again, thank you for the replies, and apologies for the delay in responding (domestic duties over the long weekend).

Tim, Chris (or any other forum contributor): please can you help me understand a little more clearly? Tim, you seem to imply that EKs were basically a form of recognition for operational experience (including participation in early-war air operations). Yet Chris, you say that they were "commonplace and not much indication of experience". This difference in perspective may be more apparent than real, but can you help me square this circle? For example, would it seem reasonable to suggest that even quite high levels of experience on one front (e.g. the Mediterranean, Russia) would not be especially helpful in preparing air crew to deal with the specific challenges of operations against a well-integrated air (and civil) defence system, in bad weather, during 'Steinbock'?

I suppose it's stating the obvious, but what I'm trying to get straight in my mind is the degree to which the failures (from the German perspective) of 'Steinbock' should be credited to the skill and achievements of the defender(s), and the degree to which they represent German 'deficiencies'. Clearly, these are not mutually exclusive and lots of things (and the relationships between these things) matter in explaining the outcome of any military operation, not just this one. It's just that I think it's reasonable to suggest that there is a tendency in some sources to push towards the 'inexperience and poor training of Steinbock air crews' explanation, and I continue to wonder if this is at least a bit of a distortion, if not inaccurate per se.

On another (albeit related) matter, and again for what it is worth, if anything:

ADI(K) reports contain information about the security-consciousness and morale of all but five of the 130 prisoners taken from among ‘Steinbock air crew. Of the 125 about whom information is recorded:

Seventeen or eighteen were said to have low morale, although this did not always equate with poor security. Several airmen with low morale appeared resistant to interrogation.

Approximately sixteen men were regarded as having medium or ‘fair’ morale. Again, some of these were quite (or very) secure.

The balance – certainly, over ninety men – were stated to have high or very high morale (some of them were also stated to be ideologically ‘fanatical’ and/or insolent in their behaviour). Almost without exception, these airmen were stated to be secure under interrogation – at least, initially.

A few impressions might be worth recording:

First, there appears to be no significant diminution in morale or security-consciousness from January to May (inclusive) 1944. In particular, those prisoners stated to have low morale and/or a tendency to be insecure were spread reasonably evenly across the months, rather than concentrated in March, April or May 1944.

The largest number of prisoners with low or only fair morale was in March. But this is also the month in which the largest number of prisoners (46) were taken (c.f. January = 22; February = 30; April = 23; and May = 9). As an overall proportion of prisoners, although there was certainly a tendency to record slightly lower morale in March compared with January or February, there is no evidence of anything resembling a ‘collapse’ in morale in March. And even if morale ‘sagged’ a little among prisoners captured in March, this was certainly not the case in April or May, when 29 of 32 prisoners were described as having high morale and/or good security.

Some crews contained prisoners with differing levels of morale and security-consciousness. There were seven cases where differences could be described as significant, meaning that at least one man in a crew was described as having low morale but at least one other from the same crew was described as having high morale (1./KG 40 F8+HH, lost 21/2 January; 5./KG 2 U5+LN, lost 20 February; 3./KG 2 U5+EL, lost 24 February; 4./KG 6 3E+AM, lost 25 March; 5./KG 2 U5+EN, lost 28 March; 2./KG 54 B3+FK, lost 28 March; and 2./KG 100 6N+AK, lost 19 April). In most cases, however, where more than one man from a crew survived to be taken prisoner, morale tended to be similar across the crew. For example, all three survivors from 3./KG 76 F1+BL (lost 22 January) were described as being insecure, whereas all four prisoners from 3./KG 54 B3+PL (lost 19 April) fell towards the opposite end of the spectrum.

‘Lone survivors’ tended not to show much evidence (in terms of low morale or tendency to break down rapidly under interrogation) of the shock of losing friends and all their immediate crewmates. They tended to have high morale and to be secure, even in cases where they bore quite serious injury. For example, the only men to survive from 4./KG 6 3E+LM (lost 21 January), I./KG 66 Z6+HH (lost 13 February), 6./KG 54 B3+MP (lost 20 February); 4./KG 30 4D+DM (lost 14 March); and 5./KG 2 U5+EN (lost 26 April) were all described as exhibiting quite or very high morale and/or security-consciousness.

Among the relatively small number of prisoners who were described as having poor morale and/or a tendency to insecurity, there is no evidence of any particular unit being ‘over-represented’. Admittedly, three of the four prisoners taken during ‘Steinbock’ from I./KG 76 were described as insecure. But all three came from the same aircraft (see above) and the morale of the fourth prisoner (from 2./KG 76 E1+AK, lost 29 January) was described as “very high indeed, and he refused all information” (ADI(K) 51). With such a small sample from this unit, and the variation in the morale among even this very limited number of prisoners, it would seem odd to draw any strong conclusions about the morale in KG 76.

All of this ‘observation’ needs to be balanced, of course, against the considerable detail contained in many ADI(K) reports. Evidently, at least in some cases, prisoners who initially showed high morale and pronounced security-consciousness later provided quite large amounts of information; the contents of the ADI(K) reports were not simply the products of the revelations of the ‘weaker vessels’ or of information revealed by monitoring reports of secretly-recorded conversations. AIR 40/2636 (‘Intelligence from Interrogation’ ADI(K) report) is of course a useful source in explaining the reasons why.

Thanks again,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Hi Simon

As Chris mentioned in a previous post, if experience is what you want to assess it would be better to look at the Frontflugspange (FFS - Operational Flying Clasps). These tend to be a reasonably accurate way of assessing experience rather than EK 2, EK 1, etc. as there are so many variables around why EKs were (or were not) awarded. The FFS were issued from spring 1941 so work for your period of interest.

Two extreme examples from my collection of why this is a better method:

1. An Oberfeldwebel Bordfunker with 5./KG 54. Awarded his first FFS on 23 June 1941. The award was new at this time so his first award was in Gold as he had been in action in Poland and Norway and had completed 131 Frontflüge by that date. Unusually he was not awarded the EK 1 until 4 July 1941 - he had completed 144 Frontflüge by then.

2. A Feldwebel Bordschütze with 8./KG 55. Awarded the FFS in Bronze on 13 May 1941. He only flew over Britain and had completed 24 Frontflüge when he was shot down over Britain and made a POW on 12 May 1941. He had already been awarded the EK 1 on 11 May 1941 with 'just' 22 Frontflüge completed.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Again, Tim, thanks very much for your help.

I take your point (and Chris's) about the Frontflugspange. I referred to these (using the term adopted in the ADI(K) reports of 'war flight' awards) in my post of 28 April. A problem is that like the information about the medals (but I think even more so), the ADI(K) reports are clearly incomplete in their coverage of who had what. So although 13 bronze, 2 silver and 9 gold operational flying clasps are explicitly mentioned (24 total for 130 prisoners or 18.5%), it is evident from other information presented in the reports that there were some airmen (possibly quite a lot of airmen) who had flown enough operational missions to have awards of this kind, but for whom no information on this specific topic is provided.

I would be grateful for tips about how to proceed with getting more information on this subject. I'm guessing that it is a lot easier to find out things about this topic when it comes to officers (about 11% of the Steinbock aircrew, as previously mentioned) than NCOs?

I'll be pleased to do what I can to pursue this matter, but I'm still getting the sense that imperfect evidence though it is, the quantity and type of medals awarded (EK etc) is a useful secondary indicator of personnel operational experience. Clearly, one would benefit greatly from knowing the specific circumstances leading to the award of EKs (and I guess there are some TOCH contributors for whom this is a particular interest), but does it seem fair to suggest that if a substantial proportion of air crew had EK 1s, they can hardly be described as 'novices'?? Put another way, is it reasonably safe to assume that they had at least a handful of war flights behind them? Or was it really possible in the Luftwaffe to get the EK 1 without having acquired any operational experience whatsoever?

Best wishes,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Another way to approach the question of experience (or at least professional competence) is look at the Luftwaffe's results in the campaign. Their ability, or perhaps willingness, to find even a major city was so poor that the British sometimes had to guess the intended target.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

..Balke in his history of KG 2 (p414 Teil 2) states that a study of III./KG 2 from December 1941 indicates 140 erfolgreich durchgeführte Feindflüge was the requirement for the DKiG (pilot) and 200 for a crew member. 75 DKiG were awarded in KG 2 up to September 43.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

FalkeEins - thank you very much for that reference.

Nick - Impossible to disagree. If anything, I possibly went even further in one of the paragraphs of the original book proposal:

"Operation ‘Steinbock’ was a disaster for the Germans. The Luftwaffe’s under-trained and (in many cases) inexperienced bomber crews were out-thought and outfought by their opponents, who combined electronic warfare with powerful night fighter and anti-aircraft defences, and effective civil defence measures, to frustrate and hurt their enemy on almost every occasion they ventured in strength across the English Channel or North Sea. Although a few raids in February 1944 caused significant damage to small parts of London, some attacks missed their target completely and German airmen often struggled even to find the English coast, let alone drop their bombs accurately. Attempts to copy or adapt British methods of night-time target marking and other bombing procedures, and to utilise new navigational tools, proved largely unsuccessful. German losses were heavy, while British morale – though potentially vulnerable to effective bombing – remained mostly unaffected. With barely a whimper, Luftwaffe operations petered out at the end of May. By then, however, hundreds of aircraft and their crews had been lost, seriously weakening the Luftwaffe’s ability to launch offensive operations when the Allies stormed ashore across the beaches of Normandy only a few days later."

"... often struggled even to find the English coast" is possibly a little unfair, although given the difference between German figures for bombers despatched and British figures for aircraft crossing the coast, maybe not.

You have of course written at length on an example of the very worst of the Steinbock performances - the final raid on Bristol (http://www.ghostbombers.com/kf4/West/bristol1.html)

And several other raids (notably the other raids on Bristol and those against Hull, but also the first four London raids) fall into the same general category.

But not all of them; as the (RAF) Director of Intelligence 6 April 1944 report (AIR 40/2019) states, after the first four raids "the standard of performance improved to a marked extent, the fifth and sixth raids being particularly successful... With the renewal of the attacks on night 14/15 March the standard again improved and was well maintained with the following two raids."

I guess that in developing this thread, I'm partly challenging my own assumptions (as expressed in the second sentence of the paragraph reproduced above). Maybe it's only me, and it reflects my naivety, but I was a bit surprised when I started going through the ADI(K) reports in detail and began to think that a not insignificant proportion of the captured airmen (and dead crew members about which information was recorded) actually seemed to be reasonably experienced. Of course, and as some replies to my queries indicate, I could be very wrong about this (in which case better to find that out now than in any reviews that the book might get). Still, it seemed to be an avenue worth exploring.

Anyway, I'll keep on hacking away at trying to explain (rather than just describe) the Luftwaffe's poor performance in Steinbock, and see where I end up.

Thanks as always for the feedback,

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

..so Ultra wasn't providing objectives/targets for each night along with the forces to be deployed ?

re the lack of experience of the KG crews - on 18 April a KG 66 Ju 188 was shot-down by day over the UK, the crew transferring for a night mission thought they were still over the Continent..

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

Hinsley Vol 3 Part 1 p.325:

"Because the Germans had concentrated the bombers in conditions of strict W/T silence at the last possible moment, intelligence gave no tactical warning [of the first raid on 21-22 Jan 1944]."

Ibid p.326:

"The Enigma... provided little intelligence about the offensive once it had begun. It occasionally confirmed that the GAF's radio aids had been rendered ineffective by jamming. Before the FX raid of 29-30 April [against Plymouth] it disclosed that FX bombs had been brought into Bordeaux and that the GAF had knowledge of battleships in Plymouth..."

Ibid p.327:

"But... a variety of other sources frequently gave the defences notice of a raid one or two hours before the early-warning radar could do so. Kingsdown obtained such warnings from its interception of signals in which the GAF notified Flak units in the Channel Islands and ships and naval stations between Dinard and Nantes that its bombers would be passing over, and also of signals... in which in advance of a raid the Safety Service in France requested the activation of beacons and other navigational aids.... the surviving records suggest that tactical intelligence had little impact on operations, the weakness of the German offensive being largely due to lack of experience, poor training and limited resources" [this last section indicating that Hinsley is one among several sources that focus on alleged 'lack of experience & poor training']

Having seen HW 13/38 and 39, I'm aware of quite frequent references to one of the 'cues' for a raid being a request to German units to winch down barrage balloons over the Channel Islands. But fairly obviously that cue was only relevant in cases where bombers were routed over or near the Channel Islands, which didn't apply in all cases.

I haven't yet gone through all of DEFE 3 and HW 5 to confirm this impression, but what I have done so far does not indicate much foreknowledge at all.

Hope this helps.

Simon

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

And re the Exbury Junkers (18 April), John Stanley, who seems to have investigated the matter closely, concludes (p.86 of his book on the incident) that the reason was "a compass malfunction, which had caused it to stray wildly off course." He notes that the evidence suggests that the plane flew off course from the moment it took off from Avord (p.83). He discounts 'meaconing'.

If he's right, the implication would be that the crew flew in ignorance of the problem, but in good faith. I don't know the degree to which crew experience or inexperience would matter in such a case?

Simon

If you relied solely on ULTRA you'd think Steinbock didn't happen ... well almost. There are after-action reports for the May raids on Bristol and Portsmouth plus a few from II./KG 51 intruder ops late in the campaign but that's about it.

The Germans were operating from established bases in France and the Low Countries and able to communicate by landline, so not much traffic was left to intercept.

I have gone through all of the HW 5 for the period and I quite agree.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

PS on the Exbury Junkers. Stanley has researched the crew (and passengers) (pp.37-44). He is cautious about saying whether or not they were an experienced crew but he concludes they had been together as a crew for a year and had very likely flown (with 3./KG 6) on operational sorties before they were transferred to KG 66. The observer was the oldest member of the crew (23 years) and I think it is fair to say that he was experienced. He flew on operations with 6./KG 26 from May 1941 to January 1942 and attended many training courses as well as gaining operational flying experience.

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

interesting, thanks!

Re: Analysing survival rates among Luftwaffe air crew in 'Steinbock' and other operations
 

As to getting compass bearings 180 degrees out, this happened regularly to experienced and inexperienced crews