US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hello!

The US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 (The Defeat of the German Air Force) states the following about the production of fighters in 1944 (sorry for the long quote):

********************
14. There can be no exact assessment of the number of fighter planes "lost" ... as a result of Allied attacks on production ... The claimed production of some 36,000 single-engine fighter aircraft in the year 1944 greatly exceeds the number of aircraft which can be accounted for in Luftwaffe units and by records of losses.

16. The mystery of "where were all the aircraft going which were claimed to be produced?" requires examination. ... GAF fighter battle order on all fronts increased in 1944 only from 1,500 to some 2,200, while S/E fighter "production" exceeded losses in first line units in the same period by more than 16,000. At the same time, fighter school commanders were complaining that there was a serious shortage of operational types of aircraft on which to train. Oberst Littman, commanding offlcer of Straubing Airport flying school, stated that he was told lies about the number of aircraft in the Luftwaffe ...

17. Even if all fighters damaged more than 10 per cent are added to lost aircraft, more than 8,000 fighter aircraft remain to be accounted for. This means that, if all aircraft receiving anything more than superficial damage were scrapped, there would still be over 8,000 which disappeared.

18. The conclusion - or perhaps "suspicion" is the better word - is that nowhere near so many aircraft were produced ... "Further sources of error are to be found In the way aircraft under repair were accounted for. There were three possibilities of repair which had to be considered: "a. Repair with the troops (not counted in the statistics).
"b. Repair requiring up to 1,000 man-hours, which went to the repair shops. At first, these repairs were counted as stocks. After the crucial period In 1943, they were no longer considered In the statistics.
"c. The normal case: 'Extensive repairs,' which meant that the planes went back to the manufacturers and were counted both as losses and, later, (when they cams back) as new production."

19. Unquestionably there exists, in German aircraft statistics a discrepancy between claimed new production when compared to losses and the strength in units of the GAF. Production of all operational types of aircraft in 1944 was claimed at some 39,000 ... Strength in units at the end of 1944 was virtually unchanged from the beginning of the year. With aircraft written off in 1944 totaling 21,946, there remains unaccounted for a difference of some 17,000 planes; ie, the excess of claimed production over aircraft written off. It is unreasonable to believe that 17,000 planes were destroyed outside of units. A possible partial answer is furnished in the statistics which show 5,689 more aircraft going into repair than were returned for allocation to units. Part of these may well have been repaired, marked as "new production" aircraft and entered in the accounting system as such. In addition, the statistics show that 25 to 30 per cent of the so-called new production aircraft was allocated to "sundry and modification" instead of to GAF units. The records show the assignment of a negligible number of aircraft from modification to GAF units. There is a strong supposition that aircraft came out of modification again marked as new production
********************
Full text:
https://dracobooks.com/The%20Defeat%...r%20Force.html

Has anyone researched this problem? There should probably be a more plausible explanation than just a lie.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi, Calum Douglas brings this issue up in his book "The Secret Horsepower Race" as well. The USSBS No. 4 and BBSU use the same figures, however these are off from the post-war assessment (summer 1945) from Gen.Qu.6 based on remaining period documents which can be found in BAMA. In it they state that some of their data is guesswork as the original papers were lost/destroyed. This link wrote out the numbers but there are a few typos and didn't site the source (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German...g_World_War_II). These numbers are different from the USSBS No.4 + BBSU studies.

Cheers!

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

"Has anyone researched this problem?" I do not remember seeing any research that addresses this specific question. "There should probably be a more plausible explanation than just a lie." I have worked with the USSBS for over 60 years, It has been and still remains one of the best documentary sources related to the Luftwaffe available in the USA. It was never a propaganda activity, but a serious attempt to determine the effectiveness of a form of warfare for which there was really no historical precedence for internal US military use. Thus, immediately assuming that an report is a lie, for me is a bit off the scale.
I believe the first line of the document really answers what this particular document represents,"This report was written primarily for the use of the US Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey." So you are looking at a preliminary report which specifically defines the limits of its' validity.
Before closing, the USSBS data, working files and draft reports still exist at USNA College Park. The original documents, unlike most USA collections appear to be essentially intact, none having been returned to Germany. Thus, this represent a source that contains some data that may not be available At BA. Just as a teaser, perhaps copies of the C-Amt Monatsmeldung from 1941 t0 1944 missing only one month?
Your original question, ""Has anyone researched this problem?", is good and valid. It would probably be a good start for someone's PhD. thesis. As I approach 90, I have other projects to work on.

ArtieBob

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

I do not think he was suggesting that the USSBS was a lie, rather that the figure of 36000 new s/e fighters in 1944 is a whopper

Martin

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

A tip of the hat to ya', Art. At 85½, I thought I was just about the oldest still participating here, even if a lot less frequently than before. Tally-ho.

Larry deZ.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Yes, "lie" - it is opinion of Oberst Littman, quoted by USSBS, not my opinion. I think there must be other explanation.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Gabor,

Thank you for the tip!
What is it BBSU?

I saw RL2-VI/202 and 199. Do I need to add something to this list?

According to this table, only 4 BV 222 were produced. I'm afraid that many, if not all, other figures are equally "reliable".

Cheers,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

ArtieBob,

thank you for the additional info about USSBS

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

BBSU - British Bombing Survey Unit.

Some actual research needs to be done as opposed to guessing.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Thank you!

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

I have seen posts here showing W.Nr. blocks for Bf 109 production at various locations. Perhaps this can help solve the problem.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Andrey,
Yes RL 2-VI 199 and 202. The link appears to have used these numbers but I've only noticed similarities so perhaps the entire table is filled with more errors. I go by the BAMA docs anyway.
Calum Douglas writes on the issue only so much as a comment outlining the very same concerns report No. 59 lays out, then ties in some inner Luftwaffe politics to demonstrate how there were problems with the new leadership, aircraft production quality, and performance development.
It is interesting that within the USSBS the total production numbers are both stated and questioned... probably a sign of good analysis and keen eyes.

As to why the numbers don't match, I do not know and am trying to figure it out too.
Cheers!

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

In 1944 Germany lost a huge amount of territory and many aircraft were left behind in a more or less damaged condition, and probably most of them were not declared as total losses (at least if was the case in late 1942 in Stalingrad area and in 1943 in Tunisia and Sicily, where loss files are available). Still it won't explain why 40% of 1944 production is missing, but it could explain some thousands of them

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Gabor,

Can you specify the pages or at least the chapter where he writes about it?


:)

Cheers!

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hello Laurent,

I agree with you.
I think the "disappeared" can be divided into 4 main groups:
1) Planes under repair in Industrie or on the way to it lost for various reasons (including during the retreat) - were not included in GQM returns, and therefore the USSBS authors didn't find the info about that losses.
2) New planes produced and accepted by Luftwaffe, but didn't reach the units - due to air raids and for other reasons.
3) Losses within units not mentioned in GQM returns. As far as I noticed, the omissions happened primarily with losses on the ground, but sometimes in other cases up to combat sorties. I think since 1944 it was a more or less noticeable share, but even before that there were cases of quite a lot of missed (you rightly mentioned Stalingrad and Tunisia)
4) Planes received for repair in Industrie, but used (cannibalized) for the repair of other planes or even partially for the production of new planes.
Maybe I missed something and not sure that this list would completely cover the shortfall.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Andrey,
It can be found in page 400 of his book, footnote 117 of that chapter, quotes some text from Report No.59, and states a few names (Karl-Otto Sauer and Speer) from the Luftwaffe higher ups as being responsible for counting the production.

Cheers!

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Thank you, Gabor!

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Gabor,

As I see, Douglas accepts the USSBS's version "as is". And what's more, he doesn't present it as a hypothesis, but as a fact. Maybe it did really happen, but that requires proof.

Cheers,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

I wonder if anyone has checked if the numbers within the article itself agree. From the same USSBS No.59:

S/E fighters accepted by the GAF in 1944 ... [month by month] sum=25 921 (max in September = 3031).
This is almost the same as in RL2-VI/199: 25 914 Neubau (Bf109 (incl. close recce versions) + FW190 (incl. ground attack versions) + Ta152 + Me163).

But after a few paragraphs , the statement follows:
The claimed production of some 36,000 single-engine fighter aircraft in the year 1944 greatly exceeds the number of aircraft which can be accounted for in Luftwaffe units and by records of losses.

If ~26 000 were actually produced, and not 36 000, the problem of "disappeared" S/E fighters looks different.

The statement in the USSBS that a total of 39 000 of all operational types of aircraft were produced in 1944 also does not correspond to the statement about 36 000 S/E fighters.
Maybe 36 000 = 3000 (September's peak) x 12.

I'm using the online version of USSBS-59:
https://dracobooks.com/The%20Defeat%...r%20Force.html

Is a usual copy without OCR available?

There is a reference in the text to a German document "Averages of actual strength and monthly losses of aircraft and crews". What is this document and is it available now?

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Perhaps the following will be helpful.

https://www.archives.gov/research/gu...roups/243.html

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Thank you, Ed!

Unfortunately, they write about USSBS: "not digitized".
Since a more or less normal copy is available online, it makes no sense to order a microfilm.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Gentlemen,

This is a question I'm currently digging into as part of the work going into my forthcoming book covering the origins and development of the Bf 109. Without giving away the farm, so to speak, there have been an awful lot of interesting things which have surfaced regarding wartime Bf 109 production in the course of reviewing/tabulating all the primary source documents I can lay my hands on, including RL 2-VI/202, the USSBS "accepted aircraft" production summary, USSBS reports for WNF/Erla/Messerschmitt, Rüstungsinsepektion KTBs, meeting notes from the Rüstungsamt and Jägerstab, and a very, VERY curious document from the Hauptausschuß Flugzeugbau found in a collection of Speer's notes at R 3/1926, page 0088.

I'm mentioning that particular page here because Oberst Littman's accusation of lies being circulated regarding aircraft production may be closer to mark than we know. The report states that no fewer than 2,300 Bf 109s were produced in Nov and 2,360 produced in Dec 1944... this is not a mix of Neubau and Reparatur figures, these figures are intended to reflect "accepted deliveries". This exceeds the highest credible numbers for those months by almost 1,500 fighters. And more interestingly, the numbers for July through October align perfectly with the overall accepted numbers reported in the USSBS summary grid.

I can tell you that I have not found a single document - not ONE - which has anything close to what this document is claiming in terms of Bf 109 production in Nov and Dec 1944. In fact, based on all available evidence, I would go so far as to state these figures are outright fabrications. The numbers for Fw 190 production in those months are also similarly exaggerated, but I am not knowledgeable enough about 190 production to offer an informed opinion as to whether they're factual or not.

Link to the aforementioned document (scroll to page 0088):

https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/inve...-eb1e853a2ad4/

Best regards,

Lynn

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hello,

On this forum, I have seen detailed lists of manufacturers broken down by werknummern blocks assigned to them. Taken together, this could be another source of comparison for determining total production numbers for the Bf 109.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Yes, the Aenderungs-Anweisung of 1 Jul 43 has proven very helpful in that regard. As mentioned, my forthcoming book will have extensive coverage of production across all facilities, including a detailed look into the Frontreparaturbetriebe involved in rebuilding damaged 109s.

Lynn

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hello Lynn,

thank you for the pointing on R3/1926!

The date of the document is unclear. Maybe the numbers for November-December are planned, not actual?

Also, judging by the table header, these are Zellen = airframes, not finished planes. If there was a shortage of motors (for example), some of these Zellen may have become finished planes later or never at all.

Reading Speer's memoirs, one realises that he and other actors theoretically had reasons to lie about the number of aircraft produced. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that the lie was not revealed immediately.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Andrey,

Yes, agreed, they're "Zellen"... but again, the numbers for July, Aug, and Sept match *exactly* with the quoted "accepted" figures in the USSBS report, so either the USSBS report was tabulated with incorrect data, or false data was used in this report.

But wait, it gets better... the USSBS "accepted" figures do NOT match with the "Durch Gen.Qu.6 verfügt" numbers quoted in RL 2-VI/202... the USSBS numbers are around 300-400 aircraft lower each month than that quoted in the BA-MA document.

The actual, honest answer to the question of "how many Bf 109s were built during the war" seems to be "who the hell knows", LOL. One can make a very well informed, educated guess... but there is just too much variance in the numbers reported by the Germans themselves to state a firm production number with 100% certainty.

Cheers,

Lynn

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Lynn,

I have been doing research for a long time. And it is time consuming. There is no way around that. In cases where two sources differ, it is important to convey the facts to the reader. Example: Source A gives this number while Source B gives another. Just reading what you wrote, the German supply system has to be taken into account. Aircraft components would have been shipped by train. Allocating the right number of train cars and scheduling pick-up and delivery would have occurred. In other words, if there was a discrepancy, there would be other ways to find out. Any falsehoods between airframe orders and actual deliveries would have been recorded. Messages from Luftwaffe units waiting on their aircraft would have been sent. Yes, transfer flights occurred, but the entire "supply chain" would have been affected. It is easy to assign bad motives to the enemy, but I suggest giving them a fair trial in the interest of historical accuracy. In other words, if there is no available evidence then no firm conclusion can be drawn.

Best,
Ed West

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

I went to click "like" on your post, then remembered where I was... :)

You are of course correct on all counts - the Nachschub system is also coming in for some examination in the book, particularly as subcontractor supplies were so important to the overall production picture for all manufacturers. And I've got a fairly massive spreadsheet on which I'm tracking every instance of a monthly 109 production count that I find in various documents... the numbers are fairly consistent and within what I'd describe as a reasonable margin of error up through the end of 1943. The wider discrepancies start to appear after the introduction of the Jägerstab in March 44, but even then, they're not THAT bad (relatively speaking), considering how frantic the production effort became... variances around 30-50 aircraft between reports aren't uncommon, and one could make a solid case that those might have been in the Einflug process and therefore didn't get counted on one report versus another. On the whole, everything seems to line up more or less between all the reports... except for Nov and Dec 44 in R 3/1926. We know that Saur was absolutely intolerant of any perceived failures on the part of the factory leadership; on 22 Aug 44, we find the following in the Jägerstab Sammelberichte:

"The works representative WNF, Dusl, is relieved of his post by order of HDL Saur with shame and disgrace. Likewise the work deployment engineer WNF."

You're right that we have no way to prove WHY the numbers were so inflated - guesses, no matter how educated, are not evidence - but we also know there was an ever-increasing atmosphere of fear at this point in the war. The theory that factories might have padded their production numbers in order to tell the Rüstungsstab what they wanted to hear, preferring to risk later punishment to avoid certain immediate punishment, is not entirely unfounded. But again, we cannot PROVE that.

What we CAN prove, though, through the recollections of the increasingly disillusioned men at the front, is the perception that the production numbers they were hearing were considered to be complete fantasy - witness the Major's comments in the USSBS report, or the oft-repeated joke about aircraft identification: "If it's shiny, it's American, if it's camouflaged, it's British, and if it's invisible, it's German." So, apologies for the long-winded reply here, but that's really all I'm trying to say - that those observations may not have been ENTIRELY baseless, based on the Bf 109 Neubau numbers reported to the Hauptausschuss Zellen for Nov/Dec 1944.

Cheers,

Lynn

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Lynn,

Yes, in January-October 1944 the difference between the number of Bf109 (J + NA) according to RL2-VI/202 and Zellen according to R3/1926 was from minus 3.5% to plus 18.3% in favour of Zellen. This can well be explained without resorting to the hypothesis of deliberate lying.

In November and December, this difference increased to 54.9% and 116.5%. It seems to me that this can be explained (besides lies) by two reasons:

1. It is possible that planned numbers are given for November and December, and not actual ones. We do not know the date of this document.

2. Increasing logistical problems may have prevented the timely transformation of Zellen into fully completed Bf109s to a greater extent than it was prior to November.

Cheers,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Gentlemen,


The use of terms like "logistical problems" should be avoided and replaced with what can be shown in contemporary documents. After the RAF raid on Peenemünde in August 1943, construction of underground facilities began. SS General Hans Kammler was tasked with moving V-2 (A-4) production underground. By March 1944, the SS was involved in creating underground installations for the production of fighter aircraft, and in August, 1944, took over operational control for launching the V-2. The Allies realized the Germans were moving men and equipment at night and developed photo-flash bombs designed to work with a camera mounted on an aircraft. Final assembly of fighters also occurred inside unused railroad tunnels. I have seen an unpublished photo of several Fw 190s just outside a tunnel opening.


Best,
Ed

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Ed, there is no better way to describe the primary situation facing German production facilities in late 1944 other than "logistical problems". To satisfy your request though, I offer the following from page 1152, reel 12, frame 6580 of the Milch notes - a verbatim translation of the stenographic notes of the 9 Dec 1944 Rüstungsstab meeting:

"Dr Holzknecht reports on the expected slump in the output of 109, 190 and 152 as a result of transport difficulties due to insufficient urgency. Decision by HDL Saur as to whether program breaks can be accepted or whether transportation can be brought forward at the expense of other production."

So yes, "logistical problems" would certainly be a proper term to describe the myriad problems facing German factories and subcontractors in late 1944.

As an aside - an important one - Andrey's response prompted me to look back through the entirety of R3/1926 and I think I may have found the answer to the question of why those Nov/Dec 44 numbers are so far removed from reality. It's complicated, and required cross-referencing a number of other documents, but the short version is this: Andrey's proposal that they may represent PROJECTED completion numbers may be correct, based on other information in the 9 Nov 1944 Rüstungs-Notprogramm and a separate document found in T77-0032 covering projected fuel use requirements for 1945. And if it is correct, whomever put that chart together on page 88 of R3/1926 should be slapped. :) I'm working on a post which ties all this together... more soon.

Cheers,

Lynn

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Lynn,


Thank you for your reply. I don't wish to add further complications but other means had to be employed to continue aircraft assembly. I submit that as control of production was ceded to the SS, then operations like Bodenplatte occurred in 1945. Saur was only one component in a changeover in duties created by a situation of great urgency. This occurred at a time when it was assumed the Luftwaffe was starved of fuel and supplies. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that synthetic fuel and lubricants were available.

American G.I.s thought they'd be home by Christmas, 1944. They also did not expect the Wacht am Rhein situation.

Finally, I only mentioned "logistical problems" for the reason of providing context to your readers. Sometimes, people hear terms like this and don't really understand them.


Best,
Ed

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hello Ed,

Undoubtedly, a lot of logistical problems were caused by air raids. It's obvious.

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Lynn,

That's very interesting! I'm looking forward.

Cheers,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Good morning gents,

Well, the more I look at other production planning and delivery documents from late 44/early 45, the less I understand about the Nov/Dec 1944 figures in R 3/1926, pg 88. Andrey's suggestion that they could possibly be projected delivery figures is probably the best assumption, but in order for that to be true, we would have to ignore all previous precedent in how Luftwaffe production targets were documented.

The entire report deals with the potential impact of a 25% cut in production targets across the entire German armaments industry for the Rüstungs-Notprogramm of Nov 1944, as a result of material shortages; a header sheet for the report and subsequent Anlagen is found on page 72, dated 9 Nov 44. On page 83 we find a line concerning the Bf 109; it lists the production deliveries in July, Aug, and Sept and they all match perfectly with the report on page 88. So far, so good. It also notes the decreased monthly delivery target from 450 (Altes Soll) to 300 (Neues Soll) monthly... the intent was to run out production of the 109 in favor of the 262 and Ta 152.

However, a separate report dated 30 Nov 1944 which projected fuel needs for 1945 lists something entirely different (see attached). This document, found in NARA T77-0032, lists a monthly "Ausbringung" (output or delivery) for all Luftwaffe types still in service as of that date, and the projected delivery totals in that document seem to be much more in line with previous monthly deliveries; Dec 44 shows an original projected count of 1426 Bf 109s, and a 25% reduction changes that target to 1070. January 45 went from 1850 to 1388, Feb 45 went from 1860 to 1395, etc. All of those numbers fit with the production numbers from the first half of 1944, and also show a gradual decrease through 1945 as 109 production is wound down in favor of more effective aircraft.



So I don't know if the projected figures in R 3/1926 were intended simply as a "trial balloon" or what... nothing seems to fit. The numbers for other aircraft in Nov and Dec 44 are entirely reasonable - 35 Ar 234s each month, 325 Me 262s in Nov and 500 in Dec (this makes sense in the context of what they were hoping to achieve), 17 Ju 388s in Nov and 20 in Dec... those all seem reasonable. So why in the world would the 109 and 190 counts be so wildly out of line with everything else? I don't know that we will ever get a good answer to this, but there are enough other documents out there to state that R 3/1926's projections for 109s in Nov/Dec 44 would have to be considered outliers.

https://live.staticflickr.com/65535/...32658c41_k.jpg

But we have to at least consider whether the info in this doc somehow made it down to the troops, even in the vaguest of terms. (Yes, I know it says "Geheime Reichssache"). If we look at the distribution list for this report, no one from the Luftwaffe is on it! Look at R 3/1926 pg 74 and 75... the distribution list goes to OKW (Oberkommando Wehrmacht), GenStdH (Generalstab des Heeres), and so on. Seems like we can't entirely discount the possibility that Army leadership said "Hey guys, just hang on, we're going to be seeing thousands of Messerschmitts and Focke Wulfs ANY DAY NOW", setting an expectation which could never be met. (Again, this is merely a hypothesis based on the facts we know)

Anyways, it's a very interesting topic- Andrey, I appreciate you bringing this up!

Cheers,

Lynn

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Hi Lynn,

thank you a lot for the pointing to T77-0032. A very interesting roll.

page 86, not 83

Since the document is dated 9.Nov.44, it is clear that the figures for November-December were projected indeed.

October 1944:
1642 Bf109 accepted by Luftwaffe (or, more accurately, so many Bf109s went through Lw.Gen.Qu, there could have been more in total) - according to RL2-VI/202;
1836 Zellen of Bf109 were produced, according to R3/1926.

So the 2,350 Zellen planned for Nov.44 don't seem like such a fantastic number. Undoubtedly, in reality they were produced much less, but other German plans during this period also came true poorly.

I think at that time the role of the last hope (game-changer) was performed by the mythical Wunderwaffe, and not by the countless fighters that were about to appear. But this, of course, is just a guess.

Cheers,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Dear Andrey,

I have been pretty busy lately and I also cannot locate the scan files of the documents I have discussed with you.
My wife and I will be out of the USA for a few months and during that time, I will not have access to material other
than what I have on my computer. So what I am doing is sending a summary sheet which gives month by month totals of
Bf 109, FW 190 as reported in the C-Amt Monatsmeldung and the totals distributed as reported the Flug-
zeugverteilung. Hopefully that will give you the basic information you have requested.
1944 1945
Production Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar
Bf 109 Neubau 932 715 804 1006 1055 1120 1237 1430 1511 1503 1312 1086 1266
FW 190 Neubau 383 301 573 690 841 554 752 930 855 678 997 1248 982
Neubau(Schlacht) (1) 390 515 511 536 413 294 (1) 367

Me 262 Neubau 5 19 52 101 125 160
Distribution
Bf 109 Neubau 642 634 629 685 970 1151 1105 926 1105 1488 1279 996 1189 862 615
Rep. 338 176 221 232 257 398 412 445 412 326 348 378 309 48 14
FW 190 Neubau 204 160 305 531 410 552 751 862 751 671 990 906 843 443 219
Rep. 162 49 68 130 72 144 179 159 179 79 210 181 195 21 6
Neubau(Schlacht) 93 (3) 282 252 322 390 511 472 499 403 293 311 365 303 384
Rep.(Schlacht) 11 (3) 32 16 46 67 73 58 54 113 168 99 154 89 88

Me 262 Neubau 51 78 114 148 212 231
Me 262 Rep. 1 3 17 14 11 8

Not included: Me 163, Ta 152, and He 162 as these came very late and in small numbers, but if you really want them,
I have incomplete data for them.

My opinion, since the Production and Distribution numbers for a given type and month are never the same, they must
come from different source documents. However, the order of magnitude stays about the same, and although all
quantities are subject to many kinds of errors, my sense is they are the best we probably have available. I eventually
will compare this information against some other raw data I have and see if it appears there are inflated production
numbers during late war.

Best Regards,

Artie Bob


Note (1) Jan-May and Dec 44 FW 190-Fighter and Schlacht Nuebau production totals combined.

Note (2) When posting, columns will not remained aligned. To align numbers, start from right side. C-Amt rows (production)
end in Jan 45, Flugzeugverteilung (distribution) rows end in Mar 45.


Note (3) Data Missing.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Dear Art,

thank you very much!

What month does the Me262 production start in your table? The columns have shifted, so it's not clear.

Me 163, Ta 152, and He 162 are also interesting.

Merry Xmas!

Best regards,
Andrey

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

An observation if I may. Assuming the word "inflated" actually applies, a few thoughts. Those units waiting for new and replacement aircraft were ignored? There were no requests for updated information? I find it hard to believe that commanders in the field were given "inflated" numbers followed by greatly reduced deliveries. If I were in their shoes, I would contact anyone and everyone to get to the bottom of this.

Re: US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production
 

Andrey,


I have tried several times to edit my post with regard to column alignment and it just doesn't work (just did another attempt). Follow the rules in note(2). Using the Me 262 as an example, take the number on the right and that will be January 45 for production and the number on the right will be March 45 for distribution. Think about it, there was no production output for Me 262s early in 1944, so those are the blank months.



Ed,


It was probably not so simple for operational units to compare production to what was in the field, distribution in late wartime Germany was probably difficult to track, going in both directions.


ArtieBob