stupid strategic question
 

I have been reading the new book, Dragons On Bird Wings (well-done BTW) so, I’m going to ask a stupid question about USSR strategy in 1943. In the spring, after the elimination of the Stalingrad pocket and other places, the Red Army was sweeping westward, albeit with hiccups here and there. They had isolated German forces in the Kuban peninsula and according to this book spent an enormous amount of army and air force resources trying to push these German forces out or eliminate them. Losses seem to have been very high.

My stupid question is: since Soviet forces were driving west north of the Sea of Asov and would cut off German forces, anyway, why spend all that effort to eliminate a small (relatively) bridgehead that the Germans were very unlikely to use as a springboard to a renewed attack into the Caucasus? Why not just let these German forces wither on the vine and keep them from retreating to the Crimea by airpower? Surely, Soviet forces employed here could have been better used elsewhere?

Thanks

Re: stupid strategic question
 

John,

There are no stupid questions, just dumb answers and this might be one of them. Hindsight being 20/20, I could only imagine that intelligence of the time persuaded the top brass to make such moves? It might be as simple as that?

Stephen :)

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Withering on the vine might not have applied in this case. Any strong enough presence could serve as a springboard, a threat on the flank or in the rear. Hitler saw it in the same light, Crimea and Kuban as an alternative path to the Caucasus.

With 20/20 you might reason that the Kuban could have been ignored by the Soviets, but not at the time. A regenerated Wehrmacht in the East would have exploited the bridgehead for a renewed drive towards the Caucasian oil fields.

There simply is no substitute for the Army when it comes to continental warfare. IMHO the same still holds true today.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

At the very least the Luftwaffe may have been able to use the Kuban for forward bases to bomb the Caucasian oil fields with better aircraft like the He 177, thus denying the Soviets this vital resource as Germany was probably incapable of ever capturing the Caucasus by this stage of the war.

Maikop was wrecked at this time and Grozny was damaged. These two fields together accounted for about 10% of production but the real prize would have been the destruction of the Baku fields (80% of Soviet oil). The Soviets could not afford to let this happen.

Best Regards

Andy Fletcher

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hello Andy!
As I read the Caucasian oil wells were mainly undamaged even after some month of ground combat. Oil storages and some plants completely destroyed, but most oil still delivered to not Caucasian plants were in crude condition. As most pipelines destroyed, oil delivered by tankers through Kaspean Sea and Volga river to Saratov and norther.
Anyway, Soviet oil production suffred heavy (I have not figures right now), but not enough for any operation limitations.
Therefore I think Germans could force Soviet oil industry only by mine-laying. And really they done it according to their airpower on hand.
Moreover Luftwaffe only few times attack any sort of main Soviet plants. It happen in mid of 1943 with great success. If Luftwaffe could find main Soviet rafinery and attacked it periodically the result can be achieved also.
But seems LW not recognized rafinery location at all.
Regards.
Igor.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hi Igor,

It was the Soviets themselves that destroyed most of the oil facilities at Maikop to deny the Germans its use (poured concrete down most of the well heads, by German estimates it would take at least 6 months to start production and a year to restore a viable output). In October when it became apparent to the Germans that they would be unable to take Grozny they tried to bomb the oil facilities there but by this time the forces to do this adequately were not available, though they did cause a lot of damage. Baku the real strategic prize was never seriously damaged and as you say most of the crude was shipped across the Caspian. Oil bound for Moskow, Gorki regions was shipped to Astrakhan and then up the Volga and oil bound for the Urals and Siberia was shipped to Gurev and then by pipeline to Ufa and then onwards by train.

As you say mining the Caspian (and bombing Baku port facilities, oil terminals etc) would have been a viable German strategy if they could have reached them. All the more reason for the Soviets to try and elimate the Kuban bridgehead.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hello
IMHO Ruy is right. Germans were able to stop Soviet offensive in Spring 43 and push Soviets back in places, for ex. recapture Kharkov. Also some Soviet tank spearheads were badly mauled in the progress, losing almost all of their equipments even if most of men succeeded to withdrew to Soveit lines by foot. After that Soviet decided to play backhand during Summer 43, ie they allowed Germans to attack first (Kursk battle July 43). So Soviet had forces available for a limited offensives in Late-Spring 43 onwards. Also Stalin was cautious and Kuban bridgehead was a potential threat. After all the reason of its excistence was the Hitler's hope to use it in future as a springboard for a new attack towars Caucasus. Stalin's overenthusiasm had forced Soviet armies in overstreching states in Spring 42 and early Spring 43 with rather disasterious consequencies so Soviets decided to play it safe in this time. So attack on Kuban makes sense in this frame of mind.

Andy, there might be some truth in Your argument but Kuban was not so important in that sense because Germans had the Crimea with its good airfields anyway. BTW, there were some minor oilwells in Kuban also which had some minor importance to Germans.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Yes there were excellent airfields in the Crimea but the problem for the Germans if they wanted to attack oil (and for all intents and purposes this meant Baku) was range, Baku was over 1,200 km from the Crimea.

All the oil wells in German occupied territory in the Kuban had been thoroughly destroyed by the retreating Soviets. The Germans had a special Brigade for the exploitation of Soviet oil that was deployed to the Caucasus but the amount of oil extracted was negligible. It was estimated that it would take at least six months of repairs to extract a worth while quantity from Maikop (then there were the problems of transporting it back to Germany or at least as far as Rumanian refineries, there was no spare shipping capacity in the Black Sea or Danube).

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hello Andy
my point is that because Crimea and Kuban are next to each other there was no big difference whether bombers started from Kuban or from Crimea for Baku, especially IMHO the best attack route was over Black Sea to somewhere around Batumi and then to Baku.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hi Juha,

I agree the Crimea and Kuban are very close together but the Kuban offered a bridgehead for possible expansion by the Germans which may have enabled them to operate bombers from bases nearer to Baku (even 200 km closer would significantly reduce flying time), this I believe is what the Soviets were worried about.

Best Regards

Andy Fletcher

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hello Gentlements!
Prepared some figures not directly about thred theme but hoped may be interesting enough.
USSR oil production in 1940-1945
1940 whole year 31,1 mil. ton
1941 1-st half 17,3 mil. ton
1941 2-nd half 15,7 mil. ton
1942 1-st half 11,7 mil. ton
1942 2-nd half 10,3 mil. ton
1943 1-nd half 8,8 mil. ton
1943 2-nd half 9,2 mil. ton
1944 1-st half 8,9 mil. ton
1944 2-nd half 9,4 mil. ton
1945 1-st half 9,3 mil. ton
1945 2-nd half 10,1 mil. ton

Above figures well shown USSR oil production reduced after Caucasus Battle to little above 50% of prewar level (1-st half of 1941) and not restored until war end. Nevertheless Soviet Army never suffered from lack of fuel oil even tank and airplane numbers grown in times compare to 1941.
The reason were in refinery effectiveness grown generally in 1,5 times: all grades of gasoline production extracted from crude oil was 5,76 % in 1940 then increased to 8,36 % in 1944 and even more for aviation gasoline – from 2,56 % in 1940 to 6,15 % in 1944.
Soviets starts to partly restore oil industry in Maicop - Grozny region since spring of 1943, but without serious result. Much more notable point was four Lend-Leased modern refinery plants built in Orsk, Guriyev, Krasnovodsk and Kuibyshev according to GKO directive from April 1943. Its annual capacity were 240 000 tons of B-78 aviation gasoline, 35 000 tons of aviation lubricating oil, 600 000 tons of another grades of gasoline. This is 22,2% of whole USSR gasoline production in 1944 (3 773 400 tons – highest war production level).

Most vulnerable points of Soviet oil industry – 4 Lend-Leased refinery plants seems never recognized by Germans. In mid of 1943 Luftwaffe tried to strike another one – oil shipment but failed due to absolutely insufficient attack scale.
In 1942 Soviet fleet shipped by sea (mainly Caspian Sea) 8,8 mil. tons of oil, but in 1943 figures increased up to 13,1 mil. tons. Shipment by rivers also increased in 1,5 times - from 5,3 mil tons to 7,5 mil tons.

Regards.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hi Shikhov,

Thanks for the figures. Can you tell me when construction of the Orsk, Guriyev, Krasnovodsk and Kuibyshev refineries actually began (did work actually start in Apr43) and when it was completed. Also any other info on where other main refineries where located would be appreciated as I know next to nothing about Soviet refining capacity during the GPW.

Best Regards

Andy Fletcher

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hello Andy,
Let me indicate some info in addition. Also I trying to find data when refinery plants production starts.

USSR crude oil production in 1938-1945
whole USSR Baku region
1938 - 30,2 mil. ton n/a
1939 - 30,2 mil. ton n/a
1940 - 31,1 mil. ton n/a
1941 - 33,0 mil. ton 23,5 mln. ton (71,2%)
1942 - 22,0 mil. ton 15,7 mln. ton (71,4%)
1943 - 18,0 mil. ton 12,7 mln. ton (70,6%)
1944 - 18,3 mil. ton 11,8 mln. ton (64,5%)
1945 - 19,4 mil. ton 11,5 mln. ton (59,3%)

USSR aviation gasoline production in 1940-1945
1940 - 889 thous. ton
1941 - 1269 thous. ton
1942 - 912 thous. ton
1943 - 1007 thous. ton
1944 - 1334 thous. ton
1945 - 1017 thous. ton

1941-1945 total production was 5538 thous. ton. In addition 82,5 thous. ton captured in East Europe 1944-45 and 2586 thous. ton delivered from USA, Canada, Great Britain.
But 90-92 % of Lend-Leased high grade oil material were used for Soviet aviation gas production. Therefore 1.7.1941 – 1.5.45 USSR production estimated around 4,2 mil. ton of aviation gasoline, but 2,3 mil ton was Lend Leased high octane components included.
Therefore of 4,54 mil. ton all air gas produced. captured etc., Lend Leas share was 57 %.

P.S. Recently l pickup an interesting website, but still not it studied.
Perhabs may be usefull.
http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/sovprod.html
http://orbat.com/site/sturmvogel/SovOil.html

Best regards.
Shikhov Igor.

Re: stupid strategic question
 

Hi Igor,

Many thanks for the additional data and the links and for looking for data on refineries for me.

Best Regards

Andy Fletcher