Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Originally, this was part of my latest posting to the “Tunisia thread”, but when I tried to post it, I got the message that it was too long, so I make a separate thread of this:

In the final chapter in “Fighters over Tunisia” (by Shores, Ring & Hess), “Conclusions”, there are some quite interesting pilot comments on the various fighter planes used. With earlier discussions on the Airacobra in mind, it is interesting to note that there are several pilot remarks on the Airacobra, and none of them is kind. In fact, no fighter type is torn apart to such an extent by the pilots interviewed in “Fighters over Tunisia” as the Airacobra.

Jerry Collingsworth, who flew as a Lieutenant with US 31st FG in Tunisia, is quoted saying:

“The P-39 [Airacobra] was a miserable fighter for Tunisia; we used to have to escort them because the Me 109 and Fw 190 outperformed them in every conceivable way; dive, climb, manoeuvre, speed - you name it!” (p. 416)

Wg.Cdr. M. G. F. Pedley, who served as a Wing Leader in 323 Wing in Tunisia, is quoted on the same subject:

“P-39 Airacobra . . . Its rate of climb was poor, armament inefficient and engine unreliable.” (p. 424)

John L. Bradley of US 33rd FG is quoted to say this on the Airacobra:

“I flew a couple of escorts for P-39s during my tour. Many of the pilots on these aircraft were afraid of them and figured they didn’t have a chance if they were jumped by enemy aircraft without top cover.” (p. 404)

There is not one positive word on the Airacobra among these harsh condemnations. Hardly suprising, since by looking up the two Airacobra units operating in Tunisia (81 FG and 350 FG) in the index of “Fighters over Tunisia”, one gets the impression of a fighter plane which was badly mauled by Luftwaffe fighters without any chance to pay back. In late February 1943 350 FG was withdrawn from first-line service and degraded to coastal patrols with the North-West African Air Force. A little later, the other Airacobra unit, 81 FG, was badly beaten up by II./JG 77.

On 13 March 1943, Bf 109s of II./JG 77 - possibly reinforced by some Bf 109s from III./JG 77 - attacked 12 Airacobras of 81 FG, provided with top cover by Spitfires of 307 and 308 Sqns. In the ensuing combat, seven of the twelve Airacobras were shot down without any loss to the Germans. The shot down Airacobras were piloted by Lt. Murray, Lt. Turkington, Lt. Smith, Lt. Leech, Lt. McCreight, Lt. Lewis, and Lt. Lyons. The Eastern Front veteran Ernst- Wilhelm Reinert scored five victories against Airacobras (at 1744, 1748, 1756, 1756 again, and 1800 hours)

(Earlier that day, II./JG 77 had clashed with 34 P-40 Warhawks of US 57 FG and shot down four of these against one own loss. II./JG 77 claimed to have shot down five Warhawks, including two by Ernst-Wilhelm Reinert; thus, the Eastern Front veteran Reinert scored seven victories against US fighters on 13 March 1943, increasing his total victory tally to 135.)

All of this, including Reinert’s feat, is a perfect illustration of the Luftwaffe Eastern Front veterans repeating what they previously had accomplished on the Eastern Front against the same kind of fighters.

To compare with the Eastern Front, 216 SAD, equipped with Airacobras and Warhawks, sustained five Airacobras and a Warhawk shot down in a similar outburst of air fighting on 15 April 1943.

However, to be fair, it should be noted that only a few days before II./JG 77’s massacre on US-piloted Airacobras, other Airacobras flown by Soviet pilots of 19 GIAP managed to shoot down three of III./JG 5’s Bf 109s in a single engagement (against only one own Airacobra lost). Lt. Jakob Norz’s Bf 109 F-4 (WNr 13108), Lt. Gerd Grosse-Brauckmann’s WNr 10183, and Fw. Ernst Schulze’s WNr 10122 were all reported destroyed as a result of that combat. Without drawing any far-fetched conclusions, I can only note that AFAIK the American Airacobra pilots never managed to accomplish anything similar against Luftwaffe fighters.

In any case, shortly after it had received such a bad beating by II./JG 77, this US Airacobra unit also was withdrawn from first-line service and joined the other Airacobra unit in coastal patrols with the North-West African Air Force - where they were saved from encountering any Bf 109s or Fw 190s.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Christer,


Its not surprising that the Airacobra suffered heavily over Tunisia, Its more surprising that it was more effective over the Eastern Front.

?? Of the claims made by Russian pilots, were many against Ground Attack/Bomber types, surely the 37mm Cannon would have been effective if hits were made. Whereas over Tunisia/SW Pacific, the far more agile bf109, FW190 & ZeroSen made mincemeat of their pilots.

From memory, the units which defended Port Moresby achieved some success against Japanese bombers.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I’ve been always amazed by the different accounts you can find on the Airacobra, depending on weather is an American pilot speaking or a Soviet one. While it’s well known the dislike of the USAAF pilots for the P-39, which eventually lead to its retirement from front-line service, it’s also known that Soviet pilots employed many lend lease P-39s with success.

There’s a very interesting interview of a VVS pilot who flew the Airacobra during WWII in http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/english/articles/golodnikov/index.htm.

I’m quoting from the article:

A. S. Nikilay Gerasimovich, could the Cobra really contend with the Bf-109G and FW-190 in aerial combat?

N. G. Yes. The Cobra, especially the Q-5, took second place to no one, and even surpassed all the German fighters.

I flew more than 100 combat sorties in the Cobra, of these 30 in reconnaissance, and fought 17 air combats. The Cobra was not inferior in speed, in acceleration, nor in vertical or horizontal maneuverability. It was a very balanced fighter.

A. S. This is strange. In the words of one American pilot, the Cobra was an airplane “suitable for large, low, and slow circles”. To go further, if we judge by references, then the maximum speed of the Cobra fell below that of the Bf-109F, not to mention the later German fighters. The Allies removed it from their inventories because it could not fight with the “Messer” and the “Fokker”. Neither the British nor the Americans kept it as a fighter airplane.

N. G. Well, I don’t know. It certainly did well for us. Pokryshkin fought in it; doesn’t that say something? [Aleksandr Pokryshkin was the number 2 Soviet ace at the end of the war and flew a P-39 from late 1942 to the war’s end – J.G.]

It seems that everything depends on what you wanted out of it. Either you flew it in such a manner as to shoot down Messers and Fokkers, or you flew it in a way that guaranteed 120 hours of engine life.

Let’s take the speed of the Cobra and the Messer. I had a Q-25 Cobra, with cameras for reconnaissance. Behind the engine were a vertical AFA-3s and two oblique AFA-21s. I simply flew away from a group of Bf-109Gs in this airplane, admittedly in a dive. Perhaps a single Messer could have caught me, but I flew away from a group.



How can you explain such a different point of view about the same machine, being the positive feeling above expressed shared by many others VVS fighter pilots?

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Isn't the performance of the Airacobra in Tunisia also related, heavily, to the level of experience and skills of the American pilots? This was their first action, against experienced German pilots and they suffered accordingly much like the VVS pilots in 1941. In Tunisia, P-40 pilots also suffered as did P-38s and even USAAF Spitfires flown by Americans. Experience makes as much difference as basic airplane performance (within reason). Look at the number of I-16 pilots who did well when flown by an experienced and aggressive pilot. On the other side, look what happened the the inexperienced German pilots in 1944/45.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Good point John, incidentally talking of Ratas, they were still considered worthwhile adversaries into the spring of 1942.

Die geheimen Konferenzen des General-Luftzeugmeisters, p. 34

14-04-1942
"Die Rata macht an die front noch erheblichen Ärger. Wenn sie stärkere Motoren bekommt ist sie bestimmt nicht angenehm."

Interesting point made on the same page about Airacobras.

1. those from Britain had British instruments and Russian guns and radio.
2. those that came from the US retained all their US equipment.

Could possibly illustrate that the difference did not lay in home made improvements, since the Soviets clearly appreciated the original US equipment.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

That could be a good reason. Sometimes experience made more difference than aircraft performances, as pointed out by John Beaman ...

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

As I always say, the study of WWII air combat across theaters, and in detail about real losses rather than claims in each theater, is an immensely rich subject.

But your underlying thesis in these discussions seems to be, rather than studying these Western cases for their own merit per se, that they can be used to judge the relative effectiveness of western Allied and Soviet air forces through each's performance against the LW. If this is the goal, surely we would have to include the performance of a western AF directly against the Soviets in a relatively large scale and prolonged air campaign, in Korea in 1950-53. And here, assessing based on documented losses, there was nothing like a general equivalence. The best Soviet units and pilots were pretty capable, but overall the exchange ratio was quite decidedly in favor of the USAF, even aside from its victories against less capable and experienced allied AF's of the Soviets, which together with the Soviets put the USAF at a position of numerical inferiority (as regarded air superiority a/c, mainly in pure battles between such a/c).

If one completely avoids this point whenever it's brought up I think it says something about the quality of the argument being made via WWII. Again, if our purpose is purely to analyze various WWII combats, then the point I make is off topic and not relevant. But if, as seems clearly the case with many recent threads, the point is mainly or importantly to gauge the effectiveness of Soviet and Anglo-American AF's against *each other* with the LW as merely the (inherently imprecise) yardstick, then a discussion of the direct results on USAF-Soviets in the same era is quite relevant and needs to be addressed.

Joe

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Gielle, I don't have the impression that Soviet pilots in general liked the Airacobra. For instance, Arkadiy Kovachevich - who commanded the Airacobra-equipped 9 GIAP at one stage - said that he found it to be a cumbersome machine, quite inferior to the Bf 109s. He said that the only chance the Airacobra pilots had was to climb to a very high altitude before combat, and then make one diving attack against German fighters below. Kovachevich also said that he liked the comfort of the space in the cockpit, but he had to evaluate the aircraft from other angles too. . .

Golodnikov's statements are typical for a fighter pilot with a high self esteem who attains success on a fighter plane and because of that comes to love it. You can find people saying the same about most fighter planes. Read through the entire interview, and you will find that he claims that the The I-16 types -28 and -29 were superior to the Bf-109E; that the I-16 was not outclassed as a fighter until the end of 1942; that the I-16 type-28 and -29 were arguably equal to the Bf-109F; and that the P-40 could contend on an equal footing with all the types of Messerschmitt 109s, almost to the end of 1943.

Of course a skilful pilot can outweigh tecnical inequality between two fighters - just like some of the German veterans managed to do when they fought Mustangs with their Bf 109 G-6s. However, I don't think it is a coincidence that so many first-line pilots expressed their dislike for the Airacobra.

I don't either think that the Airacobra was particularly successful in Soviet service. (I have examined the claims made by a certain Soviet Airacobra unit, and I can tell you that they are not impressive when one examines the actual number of German aircraft shot down by this unit's Airacobras.) The example which I gave of a Soviet success was not typical, but I felt that I had to mention it before anyone would come and ask me why I only described cases when Soviet Airacobra units were badly beaten. (Hence my remark: "However, to be fair. . .") Still, the clashes between German fighters and Airacobras generally ended to the German favour - regardless if the Aircobras were piloted by Americans or Soviets. I will provide evidence of that elsewhere.

I'm not sure the Korean air war can provide us with many valuable conclusions regarding the efficiency of the Soviet air force in the defence of the motherland in 1941 - 1945. I think that those German airmen who faced both the VVS and the USAAF/RAF are the best to judge. My posting was not aimed at proving that either of the Allied air forces was better than the other; rather, I wrote that in early 1943 the differences were not that large as sometimes is assumed - "the Luftwaffe Eastern Front veterans repeated in Tunisia what they previously had accomplished on the Eastern Front against the same kind of fighters."

Anyway, to return to the Airacobra, I don't think that there is any other WW II fighter plane which has been so critisised by its pilots as the Airacobra. Is there any other WW II fighter plane which is so broadly rejected by the men who had to fly it? When I pointed out that in one of my books, I thought it was quite uncontroversial, but since then I have learned that there are some Airacobra fans out there.

Personally, I have one favourite machine - the Mitsubishi. That is natural because I know it better than any other type, and I feel that I can do almost anything with it. I would be prepared to say that it is better than most other types. Of course I'm talking about my Mitsubishi Colt. :)

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I thougth you meant the Mitsubishi A6M Zeke :D
To be serious, maybe we can agree with the above post by J. Beaman, who underlined the importance of experience above performances.
Golodnikov was an ace, so he felt confortable even in the Airacobra ..., as was B. Safonov, who achieved more than ten kills with an I-16 against Bf 109 Es.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Some interesting statistics regarding the Airacobra in Soviet service:

Combat losses among Airacobras serving with VVS KA:

1941: 0
1942: 49
1943: 305
1944: 486
1945: 190

Combat losses among Airacobras serving with VVS VMF:

Through 21 June 1943: 17
22 June 43 - 21 June -44: 77
22 June - 44 - 4 Sept 1945: 30

(VVS KA = AF of Red Army; VVS VMF = AF of Soviet Navy)

It is interesting to note that while the Soviets recorded around 500 Airacobras lost in combat in 1944, the Luftwaffe meanwhile claimed to have shot down around 900 Airacobras on the Eastern Front. Let's assume that some 400 Airacobras were shot down by Luftwaffe fighters in 1944. I strongly doubt the Airacobras managed to shoot down 400 German fighters in 1944.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I must say it's seems to me a very selective assessment of what are accurate and inaccurate bases of comparison. Your argument seems to be that a very direct head to head, planes lost in reality each side, tells us little about AF effectivenes because of some abstract motivational factor that was supposedly different, but the numerous variables between east and west in WWII as far as exchange ratio's, timelines (of when operations started and when combat experience was gained) or even subjective quotations of particular pilots, provide a better comparison. With all respect to your knowledge of WWII air combat, I really doubt it.

Anyway I also doubt anyone has ever claimed, except at a pretty low level of familiarity with the topic, that USAAF performance v. the LW at the very start of their confrontations, as in late '42-mid '43 in MTO, was far more successful than VVS performance 2 years into their war. However not long ago you yourself kindly posted exchange numbers indicating on their face (that is, assuming the majority supposed "unknown" VVS combat losses were mainly in air combat, and making no assumptions about supposed LW loss understatement without specific fact) that seem to show the LW fighters achieved a few:1 ratio against VVS fighters even in 1944, when exchange ratio's had turned against them v. the USAAF. This is broadly in line with the Korean experience of several:1 against the VVS in more or less equal a/c and numbers and tactical situation (partial sanctuary, short range to bases) certainly not against the VVS. I'm not sure given the timelines of WWII that the early Med experience illuminates this comparison better, it's seems in fact much more obscure and indirect.

Joe

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I agree. The same type of controversy exists with the Brewster Buffalo. The Finnish air force found a way to fly it effectively, but the Western Allies gave up on the Buffalo early on, and sometimes used that plane as a scapegoat to direct attention away from other problems...like inexperience and inadequate training.

Maybe the most important difference was that the Western Allies had the luxury to withdraw the Airacobra and Buffalo after a short-lived period of frontline service, while the Soviets and the Finns could not.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I have heard such an opinion more than once, hence my little remark in the Airacobra posting.

With all respect, Joe, but that is another topic. If you want to start a thread on that topic, please do so, and I will provide you with an answer which will explain what you now obviously regard as a contradiction. However, I have examined the reasons to this well-known fact quite recently on this board. In order to avoid straying from the topic (Airacobras in Tunisia), I will confine myself to giving you a hint by referring to my article on the effect of numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944 on the website which is linked below in my post. You can also read this article: http://www.bergstrombooks.elknet.pl/bc-rs/text.html

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I guess that's part of the fun, we can always find an offsetting reason, numbers in Normandy (but also over the heart of Germany in any individual given encounter?, I don't think so, that requires a lot of revision, overall OOB numbers are not the major determinant of exchange ratio's anyway), something special about "defending the motherland" in 1941-45 that somehow didn't apply in 1950, etc. to counter the seemingly relatively clear basic fact: once the USAAF fighter force had gained significant combat experience, it seemed to be more effective than the VVS against the LW in WWII. And then this was further clarified when the two met head to head in Korea.

Joe

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

As I wrote earlier, in late February 1943, the Airacobra-equipped 350th FG was withdrawn from first-line service and degraded to coastal patrols with the North-West African Air Force. It is not quite correct to state that "it returned to front line action", as you will see below.

In fact, the 350th FG Airacobras never were sent back to regular first-line service. From February 1943, their dominant task would remain coastal patrols in the rear area. In November 1943 it was transferred from North Africa to Cagliari/ Elmas, Sardinia.

Out of a total of 19,750 sorties on Airacobras which pilots of the 350th FG flew during the war, 15,900 were defensive sorties. It simply was judged that the Airacobra was not suited for offensive missions in an environment where there was a risk that superior Luftwaffe fighters could be encountered. (Only when 350th FG was equipped with P-47s later in 1944 did it start to fly regular offensive operations - for the first time since February 1943. I think that is quite revealing. 350th FG's pilots flew 17,270 sorties on the P-47 - of which 90 % were offensive sorties.)

In his excellent "Air War Europa", which Juha quotes, Eric Hammel (incidentally my former publisher) notes for 9 February 1944: "Corsica: 350th FG, which is still flying P-39s bolstered by a few P-38s, is transferred from Sardinia [to Corsica] to undertake coastal defense flights closer to the European mainland". When Juha quoted Hammel's note for 6 April 1944 - "mounts all-out effort against German Army lines of supply and communication...the group mounts 75 sorties in ten missions" - he forgot one key inormation which shows the 350th FG's normal task. The full sentence reads: "Operating from Corsica, the group mounts 75 sorties in ten missions. . ."

When this took place, the 350th FG still was mainly tasked to coastal patrols far from the front lines. The operations on 6 April 1944 was an exception from this. Following the Allied defeat in the third battle of Monte Cassino and in preparation for the next Allied attempt to achieve a breakthrough, the 350th FG was temporarily called to bolster the intense Allied air offensive against German lines of communication.

See this:

Extract from General Orders No. 86, War Department, Washington D.C., 8 November 1944:

". . . citation of the following unit. . . is confirmed. . . in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

The 350th Fighter Group is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations on 6 April 1944. . . . Although assigned exclusively to air defense and reconnaissance because its battle-worn and outmoded aircraft were considered dangerously inferior to enemy fighters, this group . . . while flying 10 missions, comprising 75 sorties, on this day the group, in the face of intense antiaircraft fire, destroyed 1 highway bridge and 2 railroad bridges, 2 air warning installation, 1 barracks building and 2 trucks, and inflicted many casualties on enemy personnel and heavy damage on numerous other military buildings and vehicles. Just as one flight of six P-39 dive bombers was completing an attack on enemy communications in the Grosseto-Pisa area, they were intercepted by 10 or more ME-109's and FW-190's. Gallantly ignoring the odds against them, and despite damage to their own aircraft, the P-39 pilots unhesitatingly turned into the larger hostile formation and attacked with such skill and determination that five enemy fighters were shot down, two were damaged and the remainder driven from the battle area."

I agree that we don't know the real result of the single engagement between Airacobras and Luftwaffe fighters on 6 April 1944. III./JG 77 recorded one loss due to unknown reasons in the front region in Italy, but this could be due to any cause. I don't know if any Fw 190s were lost in Italy that day.

Apart from the 350th FG, which retained its Airacobras for coastal patrols over Northwest Africa or Sardinia/Corsica until later in 1944, when it finally received P-47s, the other Airacobra-equipped unit, the 81st, was relieved of its Airacobras and instead received P-38 Lightnings and returned to first-line service. While the Airacobras of the 350th continued to fly coastal patrols.

I don't know whether the pilots of the 350th FG in general "believed that they could fight with the LW fighters with their P-39s". I'd like to see Juha's source to that. I have heard nothing but the opposite. Like John L. Bradley of US 33rd FG who said that many of the Airacobra pilots were afraid of them and figured they "didn’t have a chance if they were jumped by enemy aircraft without top cover.” ("Fighters over Tunisia", p. 404)

US fighter pilot Edwards Park wrote a book dedicated to the Airacobra, "Nanette", and in it he wrote:

“The Aircobra was lazy and slovenly and given to fits of vicious temper. . . We also called her a flying coffin.”


Due to an account on the "Tuskegee airmen", the Afro-American fighter pilots of 332nd FG "felt betrayed and frustrated" when they initially were equipped with the "obsolete aircraft the Bell P-39 Airacobra" in the MTO. Later they received P-47s instead.


Reading through Hammel's "Air War Europa" (and making use of the excellent index) gives the impression that the Airacobra-equipped 350th FG was the possibly least successful among all US fighter groups in Europe and the MTO regarding air fighting. Although it later received P-47 to replace the outdated Airacobras, its final tally for the war was not impressive: 50 claimed victories against 158 own losses (95 pilots were killed, 22 shot down and becoming POWs, 16 wounded in action, and another 25 pilots were downed on offensive missions but either evaded capture in enemy territory, or bailed out over or crashed in Allied territory).

Regarding the Finnish report which states that the P-39 is about as good as La-5, I would assume that this is regarding the La-5 and not the La-5FN. Soviet 159 IAP operated the La-5 (also called LaG-5) on the Carelian Isthmus in the summer of 1944. Indeed, the Airacobra probably was on par with the La-5 (LaG-5). In "Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Second World War", Gordon and Khazanov conclude:

"Service tests of the La-5 revealed many defects. In combat it was inferior to the Messerschmitt Bf 109." (p. 43)

The pilots of 27 IAP, which brought the La-5 into service at Stalingrad in August 1942, concluded that the La-5 was inferior to the Bf 109 F-4s and especially G-2s "in speed and vertical maneuvrability."

Gordon and Khazanov also write that "owing to [the La-5's] high weight and insufficient control surface balance, it made more demands upon flying technique than the LaGG-3" (which it was supposed to replace).

(The La-5FN, however, was a completely different story.)

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

That is quite right. Following the Allied defeat in the third battle of Monte Cassino and in preparation for the next Allied attempt to achieve a breakthrough, the 350th FG was temporarily called to bolster the intense Allied air offensive against German lines of communication. 27 March 1944 was one example, as Juha mentioned. The P-39s of 350th FG also were out attacking German lines of communication on 28 March 1944. On 2 April 1944, 350th FG Airacobras took off from Alghero/Sardinia, dive-bombed and strafed rail lines at Falloncia/Italy; refueled and rearmed at Ghisonaccia/Corsica; dive-bombed and strafed rail lines at S.Vincenzo/Italy; refueled and rearmed at Ghisonaccia; dive bombed and strafed rail lines at Grossetto/Italy; returned to Alghero/Sardinia. Then followed the 6 April operations which we have already discussed. Next on 11 April 1944 the Airacobras were even used to escort B-25s to bomb targets in Italy.

Where did you find the information that P-39s got only 14 kills in the MTO? If that is true, the P-39s had an even worse victory-to-loss rate in the MTO - even if only losses due to Axis fighters are included - than I thought. Can you imagine any other Allied fighter plane with such a bad victory-to-loss rate?

I agree that pilot opinions on the Airacobra differed, although the negative opinions appear to be in the majority. I have to say that I find it hard to understand why Major Douglas V N Parsons "hated" to exchange the Airacobra for a Thunderbolt - particularly since he in the same sentence admits that re-equipping on Thunderbolts meant an improvement of the air equipment. "We got better equipment, and we hated it. . ." :confused:

Okay. . . :)

Now if anyone believes that the Airacobra was a fighter plane which was equal to the Bf 109 G-6 or Fw 190 A - in spite of the US War Department's assessment that the Airacobra in April 1944 was an "outmoded aircraft" and "dangerously inferior to enemy fighters" - I can agree that we disagree, as Ruy puts it in his rules. I think we have come as far as possible in this discussion. I think we can all agree on that.

Thanks a lot for your contributions, which I learned new things from!

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

What models of the P-39 are being compared here?

I see the P-39Q being mentioned, was there an improvement in performance as the models evolved??

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

If you want the actual results, go to my website http://www.ghostbombers.com and click on the link for I./JG 2 in Italy: February-April 1944

There was also a P-39 action against I./JG 2 on 2 April, which is described there too.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Christer
I recommended that You (and why not everybody else) buy a copy of both Osprey A/c of the Aces Specials, the "Long Reach" (VIII FC aces answers in 1944 to a questioner on fighter tactics) and the "Twelve to One" (V FC fighter leaders notes on fighter tactics in 1945). They give an interesting insight on the thinking of several well known USAAF aces and of several less well known fighter leaders, even if they don't handle Your speciality the Eastern Front.
The 3rd Special "Down to Earth" is on straffing tactics.

On Parsons, he have had rather difficult time in P-39D but he had found out that N model was better and that they could handle Japanese with it if they kept the speed up. P-47 meant more range and so more combat opportunity and also better high altitude performance. He probably had liked P-39N but admits that with P-47 they could reach more Japanese.

the 14 kill is from Osprey's P-39 Aces, but I'm not absolutely sure was it for NA only or for the whole MTO, too tired to climb to attic to check that out, sorry. And thanks for the extra info on 350FG.


JeffK
Yes, later model P-39s got better versions of Allison and so hold up their performance better at altitude. They also had ability to use WEP (War emergency or combat power) which meant an opportunity to use 1420hp power for 5 minutes (the normal military power was still 1200hp for 15 minutes). Also their 37mm gun (M6?) was modified and so less prone to malfunction than the original M6? in P-39Ds.

Juha

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Thanks a lot, Nick! Very interesting! So apparently all those five or six claims made by the 350th FG on 6 April 1944 were unsubstantiated?

Juha, thanks again! I looked up George Mellinger's and John Stanaway's "P-39 Airacobra Aces" and found that "some 107 P-39s were lost in the MTO . . . sources quote up to 20 confirmed claims in the air."

Not even 0.2 victories per loss - that must be the worst victory-to-loss ratio for any Allied fighter in WW II, and ought to be quite revealing as far as the Airacobra's quality is concerned.

The same source says that "USAAF P-40s claimed about 500 enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground for about 550 losses." Even if we assume that only half the P-40 claims were in air combat, it still gives a ratio of 0.5 victories per loss, which is much better than the Airacobra's relation.

The P-47 Thunderbolt is said to have attained around 6,000 aerial victories in the ETO and MTO against 5,200 own losses - i.e. 1.2 victories per loss.

The P-51 Mustang attained 4,950 aerial victories in the ETO. I don't know how many Mustangs were lost in the ETO, but 4th FG (which flew P-47s March '43 - Feb 1944, and P-51s after that) was credited with 583.5 air victories against 241 own aircraft MIA, a ratio of 2.4 victories per loss.

I don't either have any total figures for the P-38 Lightning, but 20th FG scored 82 air victories against 86 own aircraft MIA while flying the Lightning - a ratio of 0.95 victories per loss.

(Yes, losses above are to more causes than just air combat; nevertheless, the comparison of the victory-to-loss ratios for various US fighter types in combat with the Luftwaffe still are quite telling.)

In "P-39 Airacobra Aces", John Stanaway writes what also is quite telling:

"With two kills to his credit, Hugh Dow was one of the highest scoring P-39 pilots in the MTO." (Dow claimed his second victory in that combat on 6 April 1944, against a Bf 109; his first victory was claimed against a Bf 109 on 15 Feb 1943, but according to the German report, the Bf 109 lost on that occasion was shot down by the Spitfires which escorted the Airacobras.)

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

Thanks a lot Nick! I interpreted the text so that one Bf 109 was lost over the place where the 350FG's claims were made.

Juha

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I certainly couldn't find anything to back up the scale of American claims.

(Information from Ultra KV 474) Luftlotte 2 total effort was 140 sorties. No ground attack a/c took off; scrambles from Northern and Central Italy; partial offshore reconnaissance, Ischia-Tiber Estuary; sea Recce west coast of Italy to east coast of Sardinia, no important sightings.

Ulta KV 470 attests to one more loss from an Italian-based unit (but over Croatia): "German fighter shot down near Brinje. Pilot unhurt. I./JG 77., 2. Staffel in Lavariano to be informed. (Information, evening)"

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

There is one aircraft that perhaps would rival Bell's P-39 in universal dislike stakes by it's pilots.

And that would be Brewsters F2A Buffalo.

It was detested by both the USMC pilots who were unfortunate enough to be equipped with it in the defence of Midway Island in 1942 and the RAF/RAAF/RNZAF pilots who sadly had to face the Japanese over Malaya.

Surprisingly the Finn's found it to be quite an adequate fighter - but then they had the earlier B-239 version.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

I agree. However, the poor Buffalo pilots still were lucky that the fighter they most commonly were up against was the rotten old Nakajima Ki-27 Nate. And that also was in late 1941 and early 1942. When the far more modern Hayabusa later appeared, almost all Buffalo fighters had been shot out of the sky.

I have always had the impression that the Finnish fighter pilots were some of the best fighter pilots in the whole war. What they managed to achieve with their outmoded equipment is highly impressive.

Re: Airacobras in Tunisia
 

The worst aspect of the Brewster Buffalo was the Brewster. By that I mean the Buffalo would have benefitted tremendously from a more experienced "parents". I have never understood the praise the F4F is given considering it didn´t have significantly better performance, armament (since the F2A had two of the guns in fuselage I think it in fact better) and had relatively heavy control forces. On the other hand, the Buffalo´s handling was praised by all FAF pilot accounts I have seen. The weakish undercarriage did cause some problems in FAF service as well, but surely it could have been improved, had there been the will to do so (here a more experienced "parents" would have been beneficial.