Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Many, and probably all, historians dismiss the Fairey Battle as having been obsolescent in 1939.
John Terraine explained his use of obsolescent by calling the Battle under-powered and lacking in both speed and defensive fire-power. Obsolescent usually means outdated and technically surpassed by Vorsprung durch Teknik..
But the Fairey Battle was not technically outdated. It first flew in 1936, which was the same year as the Whitley, Wellington, Blenheim, Hampden, Hurricane, Spitfire, and Bf110. This was a year after the Bf109, He111, Ju87, and two years after the first flight of the Do17. None of these contemporary and older aircraft has been called 'obsolescent' in 1939.
If the Battle's problem had been lack of power, then it could presumably have been re-fitted with an engine more powerful than the Merlin. If it had lacked defensive fire-power then it could have been fitted with a turret - as indeed it later was when used as a trainer for gunners - or with a gunner like later versions of the IL-2.
The Fairey Battle was designed as a strategic bomber. It was sent to France in the AASF in great numbers to attack the Ruhr and give Germany a knock-out punch. "The bomber will always get through".
By December 1939 this strategy had been revealed as delusional because by December 1939, Blenheims, Hampdens and Wellingtons had been shot out of the daylight skies by LW fighters and Flak and Bomber Command had switched to operating at night. In May and June 1940, the AASF was told to support the BEF. It sent Battles to attack the Meuse bridges in a disastrous charge of the Light Brigade.
The RAF therefore changed its story. It blamed the Fairey Battle for being 'obsolete', forgetting that the RAF had drawn up the specification; that the RAF had tested the aircraft; and that the RAF had ordered 2,500 of them to give themselves the power to deliver Germany a knock-out blow and end the war all on their own.
So what was obsolete was not the Fairey Battle but the strategic thinking of the RAF. After the Meuse Bridge disaster the RAF had only one idea, which was to area-bomb at night with 4-engined heavies and cause a breakdown in civilian morale.
The RAF covered its tracks, and like the bad workman switched the blame for its own shortcomings onto its tools.
That no one saw through this RAF spin until too late was the true disaster, because the RAF was able to continue with its delusion that the war could be won single-handedly by bombing German civilians.
Or is there some objective evidence that the Fairey Battle was indeed a lousy aircraft in 1939?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Battle was an outdated concept and lacked development potential, ie. it was not possible to turn it into something more useful. That was the case of Defiant as well, which while quite modern in technology, was so outdated (or misfit) in concept. Of the mentioned aircraft, Blenheim, Whitley, Hampden, Do17, He 111, Me 110 and partially Ju 87 were found not fitting intended purposes and were either removed from service or send to other duties.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

No bomber in the early phase of the war was able to "fit intended purposes" and "were either removed from service or send to other duties". However this is very much a blanket statement. Since RAF and Luftwaffe bombers couldn't fulfil the vision of unescorted bombing and winning wars in a few days.

But not even the B-17 was able to fulfil its intended* purpose and tactics had to be adjusted. And even if accepting that fact it may have had more to do with the output of new a/c and aircrew than tactics, thus winning a battle of attrition.

The Ju 87 was a specialist a/c, just like the A-10. In the Gulf the latter was a great success, but I always wonder about its intended mission, protecting the Fulda Gap against a Soviet onslaught, facing an umbrella of (then) modern SAM and AAA and aerial opposition. We'll never know...

*actually its official design made it a coastal bomber, but during the NEI campaign it was less successful than the obsolete B-10/12 fulfilling intended purpose.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Not exactly, because of the mentioned aircraft, Hurricane, Spitfire, Wellington and Me 109 turned to be effective enough to remain in the service. As a general rule, I would say that the first generation of metal warplanes from mid-1930s turned out generally misfit and ineffective. Forthcoming generation that appeared at the end of 1930s/beginning 1940s seems much more nature. That said, Battle must be considered a failure, or perhaps a magnificent failure.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Some aircraft were failures like the Whirlwind, Typhoon, Manchester, Bf210, and He177. But they were and never are called obsolescent. Just failures.
Some aircraft were a raging success like the Ju88, Mosquito and P51 whose wing-form was revolutionary.
I come back to the problem of placing the Battle.
Do we agree that technically it was par for its age, like the B17? It was not a failure.
In which case it was the RAF's requirement for the Battle and the aircraft specification met by the Battle that were obsolescent, and not the Battle itself. The RAF had no need for a day-bomber that lacked the speed of a fighter.
That was why the RAF never acquired the B17. And the USAAF's own need for the B17 was saved from obsolescence by the advent of the P51 which removed the LW's day-fighter threat.
Ironically the night-fighter threat remained to decimate Bomber Command, which then started flying by day in October 1944. The P51 would have made it safe then even for an updated Battle to return. Its obsolescence in RAF-speak would then have disappeared.
I rest my case.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

You really have a thing about the Typhoon, don't you? But I thought we'd had that argument. The Battle had a slight problem in taking a three-man crew and a bomb-load aloft on one Merlin. The crew-to-engines ratio was all wrong if later experience is anything to go by. I don't know what "more powerful engine" you had in mind for the Battle in 1939/40, though.

The whole "ill-conceived" vs. "obsolescent" argument just seems like semantics to me. The aircraft in question proved not be a lot of use in the war that actually happened. Some had development potential, some didn't; some found other roles, some didn't.

BTW: I've seen the Swordfish described as "obsolescent" often enough but it did pretty well, didn't it? I do sometimes wonder how Fairey came to turn out so many ungainly-looking aircraft: Swordfish, Battle, Barracuda, Albacore, Fulmar...

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

With all due respect, you do have a particular axe to grind and do make some sweeping statements.

"After the Meuse Bridge disaster the RAF had only one idea, which was to area-bomb at night with 4-engined heavies and cause a breakdown in civilian morale."

While this was true from 1942 onwards (not 'after the Meuse Bridge disaster', as you imply), you fail to appreciate the reasons behind the area bombing decision. You also fail to appreciate the percentage of effort put in by Bomber Command from 1944 onwards against non-city targets, and, frankly, your arguments sound like the type of simplified stuff repeated on the History Channel. While the BC effort specifically against German cities from late 1944 and during 1945 was mis-guided, I suggest that you do some study and gain an appreciation on how much effort by both the RAF and USAAF during the winter of 1944/45 effectly did result in 'area attacks' and the reasons why this was so. The OKL situation reports on attacks on Germany during Feb-Mar 1945 are also available.

Following, as an example, are the statistics, as detailed in USSBS Report 2a - "Statistical Appendix - Overall Report (European War)", relating to the tonnage of bombs specifically dropped on oil, chemical and rubber targets in Germany by the USAAF and RAF between Apr/44 and Apr/45:

MONTH/YEAR - USAAF TOTAL - RAF TOTAL

Apr/44 - 201 - 0
May/44 - 2,459 - 0
Jun/44 - 6,280 - 4,597
Jul/44 - 6.655 - 4,770
Aug/44 - 8,525 - 3,541
Sep/44 - 3,542 - 4,603
Oct/44 - 6,926 - 5.315
Nov/44 - 16,595 - 15,947
Dec/44 - 7,232 - 4,058
Jan/45 - 2,298 - 6,218
Feb/45 - 5,532 - 13,076
Mar/45 - 10,219 - 14,754
Apr/45 - 2,312 - 5,146


These statistics seem to defy your notion that: ...RAF had only one idea...

"Ironically the night-fighter threat remained to decimate Bomber Command, which then started flying by day in October 1944..."

You seem to be inferring that Bomber Command 'remained' being 'decimate(d)' at night, and a switch was made to day bombing (because of this?). Once again, back up your opinions with facts. From July 1944 onwards, the operational attrition rate of Bomber Command at night steadily decreased, and remained (on average) relatively low (compared to pre-July 1944) during the remainder of the war. Where was the decimation? In fact, from December 1944 onwards, at least, the Nachtjagd loss rate on Defence of the Reich ops was at least double that of Bomber Command (sources: RAF BC ORS Night & Day Raids Reports / RAF BC ORS Interception Tactics Reports / OKL FüSt Ic statistics and air situation reports)

Therefore, may I respectfully ask that you back up your options/statements with evidence/facts. There is no problem putting forward a hypothesis, provided that if it can be backed up with reliable evidence.

As to the Battle, the problem of it's survivability may have pre-dated May 1940 - look at some of the recon missions from the Phoney War...

Cheers

Rod

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Re Nick: we had an argument about the Typhoon and Vengeance. My impression was you were convinced by evidence emanating from the Antipodes where they still remember these things.

Re Rod: of course I have an axe to grind. But the only way of judging the validity of tentative conclusions is to post a hypothesis and see if any one can shoot it down. Thanks for having a go.

Survivability was of course the problem by day and by night. That is a statement of the obvious. The Battle could not survive. True. Are you saying that was the reason for calling it obsolescent? If so then then every other aircraft in BC in 1939 was also obsolescent.

Why do you say I fail to appreciate the reasons behind area bombing? The reason was clear. BC couldn't survive by day, and it couldn't do precision bombing at night. Some in BC couldn't even find the right country to bomb in daylight; Squadron Leader P.I. Harris in Wellington L4302 bombed Esbjerg in neutral Denmark on September 4, 1939 and killed Mrs Ethel Hansen. There were no consequences and he was subsequently promoted Group Captain. So BC came up with the 'policy' of area bombing. What other idea could BC have had except to fold its tent? That was not realistic given its effect on the career prospects of the decision-makers.

You ask for evidence about BC going back to day bombing once the USAAF had made safe the daylight skies? On December 18, 1939 BC attacked shipping in the Jade and Schillig Roads, and were worse than decimated - they lost 55% (12 Wellingtons out of 22). The trauma in BC over the folloeing Christmas period is described in Revie's 'The Lost Command'. It's worth reading. After that dismal Christmas BC went to Wlhelmshaven only by night until October 15, 1944. By then the USAAF had established aerial supremacy over Germany in the face of RAF predictions that it was impossible for technical reasons x, y and z. Would you buy a used car from such people?

Please keep shooting. We might then both benefit.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Just to back up to what Rod said. The RAF did not have "only one idea", it had a new situation where British forces were not engaged on land in Northern Europe and thus the missions required were different.

Home air defence was a pre-war "idea" I suppose but it seems to have worked OK. The all-out bomber effort against the invasion fleet was next. Another "idea" was the rapid development of anti-submarine warfare. Then there was the evolution of tactical support in North Africa and the anti-shipping strikes in the North Sea.

All of these were responses to necessity. You could even say the same of the area bombing offensive. The pre-war theories of strategic bombing fell apart fast (and as Max Hastings pointed out in "Bomber Command" nodody seems to have made the preparations for putting those theories into practice) and the RAF looked for means to "hit back" at Germany with the means that Britan had.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Some in BC couldn't even find the right country to bomb in daylight....

You ask for evidence about BC going back to day bombing.....

That was not realistic given its effect on the career prospects of the decision-makers

Hi,

With regards to the first quotation, there were aircraft of the USAAF (and possibly other RAF Commands) that had the same problem in daylight, even in 1945, so what is your point?

With regards to the second quotation, I was not asking for evidence that BC went back to daylight bombing, I was questioning the validity of your implied statement that BC switched to daylight attacks because they were being 'decimated' at night.

As to the third statement, I would wager that there was more at stake for Britain, both politically and militarily, than just the "career prospects of the decision-makers"...

It's not so much the hypothesis that you are trying to put forward, but the way your frame your arguments that I question - i,e, some emotive statements that, when broken down, don't stand up to scrutiny. If your statements exhibited more objectivity, backed by evidence, then I wouldn't be saying boo...

As a point, a while back, someone posted stats from some book comparing the USAAF against Bomber Command to prove an argument. What was not mentioned is that the stats stacked up the efforts of at least three different USAAF AFs against one RAF Command, and, while implicitly noting the tonnage of incendiaries dropped by BC, failed to give a corresponding figure for the USAAF, thus implying that they didn't drop any.


As to the obsolescence of the Fairy Battle, you have a point but only from a limited perspective. The fact that the aircraft could no longer be effectively used in it's primary role, even at night, and could not be easily converted to another operational role meant that it had become obsolescent (i.e. outmoded, no longer of use). This is irregardless of pre-war doctines or specifications.

Was the Swordfish also obsolescent during the first two years of the war? Maybe from a technical standpoint but not from an operational point-of-view...

Cheers

Rod

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Just think what these Battles could have achieved, if supported by enough fighters, bombing roads instead of the bridges during the early phase of the war in the west. These roads were absolutely filled with miles and miles of concentrated military units waiting for a breakthrough.

Even with the light weight ordenance the effect would have been noticable. The RAF misused its bomber force during the early phase and (and I may offend some) kept its fighter force at home or in rigid patrol areas. Think what a combined fighter and light bomber effort could have done against the soft elements of these mile long traffic jams?

The Anglo-French armies were too aggressive by deploying too far north, the air forces too passive by concentrating on defence.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Absolutely, Ruy.

But remember the AASF was an Advanced Air Striking Force with the strategic objective of knocking Germany out of the war by destroying the heavy industry in the Ruhr. It was answerable to BC and the Air Staff and was only stationed around Lille because of the Battle's short range.

The new policy of restricted bombing that came from FDR destroyed the AASF's raison d'etre since it could not be used against the Ruhr. The AASF was therefore used tactically in support of the BEF because it had nothing else to do and the RAF could not think of a reason for refusing it's use against the Meuse bridges.

BC wanted to avoid being in such a bind again, so rubbished the Battle as obsolescent, and concentrated on the heavies.

Tony

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony
BC used its medium bombers, Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys against road targets in May and June 1940 to support badly pressed BEF. I’m sure if it had had heavies then, it would have used them also against tactical targets. When nation’s army is in desperate situation other branches had to help, even if they don’t like the idea. In 1944 situation wasn’t even desperate but still BC and 8th AF heavy bombers were used even to give battlefield support, for ex. at the beginning of Goodwood and Cobra. So I cannot see rationale of your claim.

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Exactly. I don't think the Royal Navy had planned to use its destroyer force getting troops away from Dunkirk rather than fighting the Kriegsmarine but it's what the war situation demanded, so they did it.

On Ruy's point, how about using the Battle force in the Nachtschlacht role against the German supply routes into France?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Ruy
on the first day (May 10th) Battles attacked exclusively against German columns but lost 13 out of 32 attacking planes, all to ground fire. So that wasn't the answer. Battle was too big, slow, vulnerable and too lightly armed for daytime interdiction ops. Nick's proposition might be better but Battle crews were trained on daytime jobs and I don't know how good Battle was as night flying machine, Blenheim wasn't very good for night flying. With hindsight one can argue that RAF should have foreseen the effectiveness of German light Flak and troops ability to defence themselves with mgs and thought beforehand some antidoses to that.

Juha

Checked from Franks' Valiant Wings, the losses were 13 FTR plus a written off out of 32. And most of others were damaged, some to extent that they were declared written-offs later.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Equally one could argue that the British and French Armies should have been much better provided with mobile automatic AA weapons than they were.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

At least Polish 300 and 301 Sqn flew Battles on night missions against Channel targets, but I suppose those turned ineffective, as they quickly converted to Wellingtons. Battle was a descendant of an old concept of light bomber/scout aircraft which were eg. predominant in French air force - see Potez XV/XXV and Breguet XIX. This was an aircraft outdated from the beginning. Concerning Typhoon - yes it was outdated as well. Airfoil used is not the thing that should have taken place. They have realised that and build Tempest, but too late.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The specification that was fulfilled by the Battle was P27/32 calling for a Medium Bomber Hart/Hind replacement.
Others call it a light bomber specification, but P apparently meant medium bomber, and B meant heavy bomber. There was apparently no specific designation for a light bomber.

By the way, has anyone published these complete specifications either on-line and/or in a book? I think they are important to any understanding of RAF intentions.

I would also like to see the complete Specification P4/34 for a medium bomber and close support aircraft that was fulfilled by the Hawker Henley of lamented memory.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

In 1944 BC and 8 USAAF were placed under Ike after a monumental pissing contest when Butcher Harris swore they could not bomb accurately and thousands of Frenchmen would be killed.

The heavy Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys were not much help to the BEF.

But what about the Fleet Air Arm Skua divebombers? Peter C Smith makes the claim that as well as sinking the cruiser Koenigsberg (which I know about and was something BC failed to do), the Skuas dive-bombed and broke up a major German army assault on the Dunkirk perimeter and perhaps saved the BEF. If true - and does anyone have the facts - this was far more than the heavies or the medium Battles and Blenheims ever did.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Will not wishing interupt the discusion about Battles that it desending into an attack against BC tactics, I will pass comment over the sinking of the crusier Koenigsberg. This already damaged ship (it had been hit by a coastal battery the day before during the initial invasion) was attacked by 15 FAA Skuas whilst alongside a quay in Bergen 10/4/40. The cruiser I believe suffered three direct hits from 500lb bombs and two near misses, hardly an impressive strike rate against an immobile target. All this goes to show is that even a divebomber, supposedly designed for 'precision' bombing was pretty much a hit and miss affair in WWII. I'm not aware of any attack on Bergen by BC, so I fail to see any facts to support the claim that BC 'failed' to sink it.

Regards,

Steve

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Tony
Yes, Hampdens etc were then called heavy bombers but I used the term medium because they are better known to that later term. And they did same harm to Germans, I read in 80s a history of the Anti-Tank Battallion of the 2nd Panzer Division (was that 57th PzJgAbt?) and in it they told stories on damaging attacks by IIRC Whitleys near Channel coast. I haven't read anything on decisive Skua attack near Dunkerque even if I know that Skuas operated there, cannot remember if they were used as escort fighters to Swordfish or Albacores or doing some divebombing there. And carpet bombing by heavies would have been more effective than dive bombing against PzD in attack formation.
Nick, You are absolutely right, British and French (and Poland) Armies run out of time in their preparations to war.

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Just a couple of things to bear in mind:

• The AASF comprised of Fairey Battle and Bristol Blenheim bombers and an escorting component of Hawker Hurricanes. Given the short range strategic bombing missions similar to those carried at the end of World War One, escorted, medium altitude missions by Battles and Blenheims may not have been so ineffective to start with.
• Unescorted Battle missions were found to be ineffective and suffered high percentage losses, as was discovered by the AASF in 1939-40, prior to the May 1940 Blitzkrieg campaign. These had been pretty much discontinued by early 1940.
• The heavy losses incurred by the Battles and Blenheims occurred during the desperation attacks against fixed positions (i.e. the Meuse bridges) where German AA defences had sufficient time to set up, and where the Luftwaffe had local air superiority. Under those circumstances, I can think of few aircraft of the period, attacking at low altitude, that didn’t suffer very heavy casualties. These included the RAF Battles and Blenheims, the Belgian Battles and also the French Bre 693s, LeO 451 and Po 633 bomber/assault aircraft. (The last three certainly can’t be called old, slow or obsolete.)

It is interesting to consider whether any other aircraft of the time (e.g. Hawker Henley – as a dive bomber, Blackburn Skua, Vought 167, Lockheed Hudson, Tupolev SB, Ju87 Stuka, Douglas Dauntless) could have done any better either as dive or low-level bombers. If such fighter-bombers could have been made available at the time – Hawker Hurribombers, Bell Airacobras, IL-2 – I suspect they would have suffered similar losses due to close quarter ground fire, or had to jettision their loads in order to fight their way clear against defending Bf109s. Remember that in 1945, the Luftwaffe jet bombers (Ar 234 and Me 262) were similarly ineffective, though suffering much lower losses – against the bridges at Remagen.

Throwing 150 Wellingtons, Hampdens and Whitleys in as medium altitude bombers with 100 Hurricanes, Spitfires, Dewoitines and Bloches as escorts may have been the only effective resort, but what sort of losses would/could have occurres; and how many times could the mission have been repeated if we assume the Werhmacht could rebuild the pontoon bridge crossings?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Wisdom comes after the event, as the Japanese used to say.
I don't intend to re-enact the May-June 40 campaign, but the most efficient move would have been to bomb by night the Ardennes roads. The planes would have been secure from Flak and the Germans, favouring speed to security, were driving with their lights on (nice target markers indeed!). Falling trees would have slowed their rush in a considerable manner and given more time to rearrange the defences at Sedan.
The air raids should have been carried out upstream (Ardennes) instead of downstream (Meuse bridges).

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Apologies for responding to a number of sub-threads, but I’ve been away and missed the best moments.

Skuas. That number of hits on the Kongsberg is not poor but a fairly good achievement – dive-bombing was a difficult art requiring much training and continual practice. Precision only comes at a cost, and not only in losses against prepared targets.

I know of no specific concerted Skua attack at Dunkirk, although the FAA lost numbers of their aircraft, including new Albacores, in the vicinity. The RAF did carry out dive-bombing missions on the troops around Calais with Hectors; perhaps it is a distorted memory of these missions that is being referred to?

P4/34: This aircraft appears to be so little in advance of the Battle as not to be worth any disruption in production: clearly an attitude shared by the Ministry. Air Britain has published a book listing all Specifications; though I suspect it is now out of print, you may care to check their website. What I would very strongly recommend is Colin Sinnett’s book from Frank Cass on British Operational Requirements prewar. This goes into detail on many of the good and bad decisions made, and the reasoning behind them. If this book (also, sadly, out of print) was required reading, there would be rather fewer over-blown over-simplified judgements expressed.

Battles in France: Surviving squadrons were switched to night-time operations, and interdiction missions flown against supply lines. These were as ineffectual as might be expected from the weapons of the time. The blitzkrieg armies did not advance down a single road – look to the Arnhem operation to see the folly of that. The tactics were based on flowing around and behind any strongpoint and moving on. Every road or convenient track (or indeed field!) in the neighbourhood was used. The many streams of vehicles only came together at chokepoints – in this kind of country that means bridges. The French/British were completely correct as seeing these as the prime targets – as did the Germans, which is why they concentrated their flak at the bridges. Bombing a road meant damage to a sub-unit, a platoon or a company, a regiment at best. Dropping a bridge stopped a whole battalion, brigaded or division. The Allied tactics were correct, but their cooperation and their weapons inadequate to the job. It is difficult to see P4/34s, Henleys or anything else making much difference. As said before, statistics show that in Normandy 1944 fighter-bombers would require 250 tons of bombs on average per bridge: medium bomber 500 tons. Payloads in 1940 would be half that of 1944: the number of sorties required were just not available to the Allied Commanders in 1940.

With some qualifications on the terminology, I have to agree that most of the first generation of metal monocoque designs were obsolescent by 1940: but then most of the second generation were obsolescent by 1945. In those days, five years of advancing technology did that to you. It was not the fault of the Battle, Blenheim, Potez 63, SB-2, He 70 or A-17 that their war came too late, or that early setbacks required some of them to be retained in production well past their desired retirement dates.

The arrival of the long-range escort fighter did not save the B-17: perhaps it saved the use of it on deep-penetration missions in Western Europe. It would have continued to have been used on less-distant targets, and the 8th AF fighters would have moved onto continental airfields to expand the range of operations (as planned but not adopted). The B-17’s replacement was already flying.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

[quote=Franek Grabowski;47195 Concerning Typhoon - yes it was outdated as well. Airfoil used is not the thing that should have taken place. They have realised that and build Tempest, but too late.[/quote]

What a BS statement. When fitted with similar propeller (4-blade) and Sabre alowing the same boost, the Tempest was a huge 15 mph (less than 4%) faster than the Typhoon at 20,000 ft and its service ceiling was a massive 1500 feet better (according to Mason´s Typhoon/Tempest book). The Tempest´s critical Mach number was a whopping 0.02 Mach (according to Brown´s Testing for Combat) improvement over that of the Typhoon, a huge 2.5%.

Perhaps in Poland you can transform obsolescence into magnificence by a 4% improvement. After all, there is "Polish inverse logic" as used by HP calculators...

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Then there is a big mystery, and no one likes those.
Fact: the RAF rejected the Typhoon for air superiority in 1942.
Fact: the RAF bought the Tempest for air superiority in 1944.
Why? Were the RAF mad as well as bad (tongue-in-cheek)?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

On the night of 8th/9th April 1940 German forces invaded Norway. In the early morning of the 9th German naval force landed troops in Bergen harbour, support being given by the two cruisers Königsberg and Köln, the gunnery training ship Bremse together with torpedo-boats, E-boats and armed trawlers. The Norwegian harbour defences were hampered by fog, and confused by the fact that the German force approached flying British flags. However the Kvarvan battery guarding the entrance to the harbour did score hits on the Königsberg, Bremse and the E-boat tender Carl Peters. The Königsberg's engines were damaged and two of her 3.7 cm anti aircraft gun positions put out of action, her fire-fighting mains and auxiliary power were also damaged. This did not stop her guns helping to silence the Norwegian coastal batteries around Bergen. The following day a reconnaissance flight by the RAF revealed the two cruisers to still be in harbour and a strike by Bomber Command was launched the same day. Two squadrons (one of Hampdens the other of Wellingtons) attacked at about 1800 hrs and dropped thirty 500 lb bombs but not a single hit was achieved (although one was claimed and it seems a bomb somehow caused a small number of casualties to Köln's crew, but just how is unclear ).
http://freespace.virgin.net/john.del...konigsberg.htm

You're right. BC tactics are under assault. And the best way to sink them is with a dive-bomber!

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Brown is clearly wrong on the critical Mach number, which is dependent upon the wing thickness with a modifier for the position of maximum thickness. There is clearly a much greater difference between the Typhoon wing and the Tempest wing than a mere 0.02 would represent.

Why is the speed quoted at 20000ft? Surely this is above the full throttle height of the Sabre? Above this point the thicker wing of the Typhoon could be giving better lift and hence reducing the Tempest's advantage. What is the speed difference at sea-level or full throttle height? However, it is worth pointing out that the Typhoon always was a fast machine in level flight - that was never a reason for criticism. Compressibility due to the thick wing was only important in the dive.

Being passed over in the air-superiority role only means that it was not the best option for that role: the same ruling applied to the P-39 in RAF service which the VVS found a great success. However, the VVS managed to gain air superiority without ever having a fighter with better high-altitude performance than a Typhoon - late Spitfire Mk.IXs excepted, which they retained for PVO use.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Thanks Graham for your excellent answers! I'm in complete agreement with you on these questions.

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Graham, I believe there was a smaller drag induced by Tempest's airfoil. Typhoon was indeed fast but not that fast, hence the need of Spitfire XIIs. Overall, judging by the fact that Tornado/Typhoon had to be the main aircraft of Fighter Command (nobody considered Spitfires seriously) but saw the service some 2 years after the plan in a rather limited role and almost cancelled, reaching some usable form only after further 2 years as a Tempest, not to mention Sea Fury that entered the service after the war, it was a failure. I presume the main reason the whole toy was continued was because of both Hawker being a major player and no alternative for production there.
Concerning Soviets, the one must be extremelly careful claiming air superiority there. Air superiority as we understand it was on the Western front and not in any way comparable to the East, just under the very same universal rules of aerial warfare. Of course unless someone uses 'inversed knowledge' which is quite common unfortunatelly.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

The thinner Tempest wing produced less profile drag than the Typhoon, but having a larger area it had more skin-friction drag. Plus, of course, less wave drag, but this was not relevant in level flight. Induced drag was possibly worse, because thick wings are better at producing lift, although there would be a trade-off with wing area. Any value of the elliptical planform is dubious. The overall Tempest superiority varies with the flight condition, being greater at low altitude and speed, but less at high altitude.

The large Hawker factories at Brooklands and Langley spent most of the war producing Hurricanes, only changing over to the Tempest in 1944. Typhoons were entirely built at Gloster. The Tornado was intended to be built at Avro, but the Lancaster took over with the cancellation of the Vulture.

Discussion of the fighter equipment programme very much depends upon just when you consider. The delays and cost of the early Spitfire programme certainly led to considerations of cancellation in 1937/38, when the Tornado/Typhoon programme looked most promising. In the 1939/40 period programmes were in a constant state of flux, with many changes, but closure of the Spitfire line was not among the considerations. Despite Quill’s apparent later fears on the subject there seems to have been no real suggestions of closing the line before A&AEE’s harsh comments on the early 20-series, and it is unclear how far that went beyond the initial flight reports. Over six years of war, with fluctuating fortunes in service and on trials, continual reassessment and redesign of competing projects, and not least the rotation of strong-willed individuals through the various staff posts, it would be astonishing if there had been a single policy held steadfastly throughout. It wasn’t that way and could not have been. Quill worries about bias in favour of the Typhoon, but Beamont speaks of a Spitfire mafia that continually belittled the Typhoon and its potential. Behind the scenes, great hopes are placed on Folland’s project. Conspiracy theorists may suggest that this was a deliberate policy for spurring on each manufacturer.

It is one thing, undeniably true, to say that the Typhoon did not meet the RAF’s perceived need for high-altitude performance in 1942/43, though it did meet the specification as written before the war. Like the Defiant, should we blame the specification for failing to foresee the future? Perhaps. It is quite another thing to write the Typhoon off as a failure overall. High-altitude air-superiority over Western Europe was not the only role or theatre for a fighter, and it was not a failure in the low-level fighter and fighter-bomber roles. As were other fighters excluded from high-altitude roles. There is an attitude that only the fighter-fighter combats count, and that mud-moving isn’t a proper role for an aviation hero. I disagree.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Graham.

Noted. But you will have to provide evidence of the Typhoon's accuracy in mud-stirring to be persuasive. Raising morale amongst the brown jobs is an argument in favour of CAS in general and not Typhoon CAS in particular.

If you have the inclination I would appreciate yours and others' ruminations on the P39.
Had the British army been permitted its own air arm, the P39 would surely have had a role. The Russkies seemed to like it, but they were not hung up on high altitude performance. A British army air force would have left the upper atmosphere to the RAF.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Graham, would you mind letting us know the CORRECT CMN data? After all, mr. Brown was personally involved in those CMN tests so he supposedly knows what he is talking about.

As for the 20,000 ft: it is because Mason gives the data for this altitude.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Re P-39. I suggest you raise this as a separate thread. A very interesting subject. The effectiveness of the Typhoon is well recorded - see Nick's postings - and accounts of the battle of Mortain (?), amongst others.

Re Critical Mach Number: I refer you to Hoerner's Fluid Dynamic Drag, which presents the equation of the curve defining this parameter, and how the results from a wide range of aircraft fit closely on it. I forget the chapter/page number, or quite where I placed my copy of the relevant pages (I don't own a copy of the book, unfortunately). If I get the time, and remember, I'll look for it tonight, but I think I'm on family ferrying duty.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Jukka
AFDU seems to have thought that the Tempest V was a great improvement on the Typhoon IB.
See http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.o...mpestafdu.html

Juha

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Without knowing the Pressure Error Correction it is impossible to be certain, but it looks as though the Tempest had an critical mach of 0.9 or higher, which seems to be fairly equivalent to the Spitfire with a similarly slim wing. That's assuming no safety margin was applied - but if there was, then that's a remarkable figure.

There's no doubt the Typhoon would be unable to get anywhere near that with its thick wing: even Mustangs and Me 262s only get to 0.84 or thereabouts.

Incidentally, if you follow the links you'll find that the RAF considered the Typhoon and Tempest to have very similar turning circles, whereas the USAAF pilot considered the Typhoon significantly superior. An indication of the problems in using comments from a single pilot and/or a single flight.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

Graham, It wasn't my intention to suggest the Skua's should have done better, rather to point out even dive-bombers of the 1940's were not that accurate. Lets not forget the cruiser was alongside a quay at the time of the attack.

As for the BC attack I guess the reported 'two squadrons' relates to 12 Wellingtons (from 9 and 115 Sqn) and 12 Hampdens (from 50 Sqn) launched on a general anti-shipping strike in the Bergen area on the afternoon of the 9th (not the next day). Not clear how many of the aircraft actually attacked the cruiser, as some attacked nearby shipping, 50 Sqn claiming one vessel sunk (though none appear to have actually been lost). The lack of success was hardly surprising considering the aircraft used and the limited training in this type of mission.

There is no denying that dive-bombers in the face of limited air defence offered a better weapons platform for 'precision' attacks and the failure to provide dedicated ground attack aircraft hampered the Allied forces in the first half of the war. The fact that squadrons of Cannon/bomb armed Hurricanes/Spitfires were the only aircraft available to support the ground forces during Dieppe raid in 1942, is a case in point. They suffered heavy losses to flak whilst providing little effect support. It is a fact that unprepared as they were, most parts of non-Axis world suffered painful lessons as they tried to catch-up and even the vaunted Red Army only survived to learn its lessons through trading land and at a terrible cost.

Imperfect though the Typoon may have been, to suggest that a dedicated ground attack aircraft would have been any less vunerable to flak is questionable. And in the absense of a fighter arm, by 1944/45 flak was the only reliable weapon available to the Germans.

Regards,

Steve

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

There seems to be a pattern.

Information is provided to justify a statement that has been questioned.

The comment comes back that the information is "not surprising".

I find that surprising.

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

I have to ask, was the P-47 a failed fighter, for it to was transferred to ground pounding duties?

Re: Placing the Fairey Battle.
 

'tcolvin', to quote me out off context is fine, but did you bother to read the post. If you had you would have noticed that I was agreeing that for a 1940's 'precision' attack dive-bombers would probably have offered the most accurate platform. All I was questioning was the use of the sweeping statement that Bomber Command 'failed' to sink the cruiser as a means of supporting your dive-bomber crusade. Using the failure of two squadrons that were not even specifically attacking the KONINGSBERG as evidence hardly supports the claim in itself.

Regards,

Steve