Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

I said a while ago that when I'd found them I'd post some deciphered messages from the German side about the impact of Allied tactical aircraft and here they are (at last)

Two are from III. Flakkorps about Normandy in late August 1944, the third is from 9. SS Pz. Div. about Typhoons vs. Panthers, apparently in the Ardennes battles.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Hi Nick,

Interesting reading, especially the fact it had been noted by the Germans that even a single man in the open could attract a straffing pass. This sort of reading lends great weight to idea that the destruction of moral is just as, if not more important than the destruction of men and materials.
The Typhoon got a special mention, i really think that this plane alone shattered the German foot soldier in Normandy.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Nick's post seems to refer to earlier exchanges on this theme so I apologise if this has been mentioned before.

There is a very interesting book on this theme "Air Power at the Battlefront - Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943-45" by Ian Gooderson published in 1998 by Frank Cass ISBN 0-7146-4211-8. It is a quite technical/academic read but based on Allied Operational Research both in Northern Europe and Italy.

Steve

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

There is a wealth of information about the impact of Typhoons on both the Wehrmacht and 21 Army Group. OR investigated the effect on enemy morale. Normal infantry became very anxious in the presence of Typhoons because the rockets were an unknown quantity and the subject of rumour. The noise of the plane was frightening, but most alarming was the noise of the rockets leaving the rails at a distance of 300 to 500 yards. Infantry responded by taking cover and staying there for an average of ten minutes. Some tanks were abandoned by their crews. The exception were the GAF Flak gunners who stayed at their guns and exacted a toll.

There is also a wealth of information about the lack of damage caused by Typhoons and CAS in WWII, as we saw on the previous thread from the OR investigation of the Falaise Pocket.

But it was the Flak that destroyed the vulnerable unarmoured Typhoon. 2TAF ORB records 78 aircrew KIA and MIA in February 1945, of which 27 were Typhoon pilots. Aircraft losses numbered 80 of which 30 were Typhoons. For 84 Group supporting 1 Canadian Army the total numbers were 38 pilots and 47 aircraft.

The consequence of this unsustainable loss rate is ignored in the literature. '2nd TAF Volume Three' by Christopher Shores and Chris Thomas published in 2006 makes no mention of the following entry for March 1, 1945 in 84 Group Operations' Log recording a conference during the night with 1 Canadian Army. This conference led to a decision to impose a severe restriction on the "liberal use of aircraft in support roles owing to the shortage of both Typhoon and Spitfire aircraft and the weariness of the pilots. The automatic use of aircraft in the counter-battery role, for instance, would be discontinued during static or semi-static periods, and indeed only accepted in special cases in an advance when our artillery could not take on the role, or if the menace of enemy guns was having a really serious effect. Moreover the prolific use of Rocket Typhoons in cab rank under FCP (Forward Control Post) control would have to be reduced and the scope of the FCP limited to a definite sector of front; for example a Div(ision) or B(riga)de front rather than as at present on an entire Corps front. A further check was to be kept on the acceptance by GCC (Group Control Centre) of targets so that effort would not be wasted". (Brackets contain my explanation).

Shores & Thomas record the disbandment on March 3 of 610 Squadron and of 257 Squadron on March 5, 1945 without drawing any connection with the admission by 2 TAF of their defeat by Flak, which was becoming increasingly concentrated as German territory shrank and supply lines to the Ruhr factories diminished.

So you have the same paradox as with Bomber Command which pointed to the destruction of Germany where Germans were terrified by bombing but output from their underground factories continued. With CAS the fear expressed by the Wehrmacht that you record, and the delight of allied soldiers watching it in operation which I have recorded from several eyewitnesses, went along with recognition that CAS caused negligible damage to the German war effort. Meanwhile Allied cemeteries filled up with horrendous numbers of 21 Army Group soldiers in the Reichswald and Hochwald such that there was a replacement crisis and talk of disbanding more infantry divisions. And unsustainable numbers of Typhoon pilots were being killed whose final months were filled with their own debilitating terror of Flak, and whose deaths necessitated squadron disbandments and severe restiction on CAS availability.

Am I alone in seeing a connection between the vulnerability of the Typhoon to Flak and its use of the inaccurate RP and lobbed bomb to the great and blood-soaked difficulty experienced by 21 Army Group in getting into Germany let alone Berlin which was of course taken by the Russians.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

March 1945 is ten months of near-continuous action, and the end of the war is clearly near. It is hardly surprising that operations were being cut back (no-one wants to be the last man killed) or that units were being disbanded because of losses - have you not read any description about the state of the British Infantry Divisions at this stage, or even sooner?

The rate of losses on the Continent is indeed recognised in 2nd TAF, and other works on the Typhoon. Consider the reference to the rebuild programme, and the withdrawal of aircraft from training units. But this is war, Mr. Colvin. One Typhoon loss per day in a month? It hardly compares with the Battle of Britain, does it? Or the defence of Malta, with many fewer units? Or any other period in the war with equivalent operational pressure and continuous action. Please consider the context of your statements.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

First off, if you are to cite the percentage of 2 TAF losses which were Typhoons then you need also to say what percentage of 2 TAF assets the type represented. It would also help to break down the losses by cause (and ditto for the tac support Spitfires). Similarly, if you're going to use a term like "unsustainable" then this needs to be set against the projected supply of replacement aircraft and pilots and the expected duration of the war.

Britain's manpower shortages were becoming apparent in Normandy (D'Este discusses this at some length but could not find answers on some crucial points re reserves in the UK). I believe that British divisions were being amalgamated and disbanded from Summer 1944 onward and certainly RAF Squadrons ditto in early 1945 (but this didn't seem to preclude the rotation of 2 TAF units to Armament Practice Camps in the UK) but as you say, German-held territory was shrinking fast by then.

There is another issue of context: the acceptability of losses will vary according to a commander's perception of what those losses are buying. (This board has seen a heated debate in the past about how Luftwaffe losses in France in 1940 exceeded those in the Battle of Britain. But in the former case much France was conquered and the country put out of the war - Germany's objectives were achieved in other words. In the latter, the Germans lost a lot of men and aircraft and came away with what?)

I feel that you fixate on direct destruction and morale effects while overlooking the disruption and paralysis produced by air attack or, yes, the fear of it. The less freely an army and (crucially) its supplies can move, the greater its disadvantage against an enemy not likewise handicapped. That is surely something more than your "negligible damage to the German war effort." Strategically, the same holds true for goods and materials in an industrial economy. Germany's "underground factories" (most of which were probably some component sub-contractor in an old tunnel) may have produced the goods but there is ample evidence of the difficulty of distributing them or of bringing sub-assemblies together into a finished product, or getting one vital bit for (say) an aircraft when the transport links were smashed or under interdiction by those "defeated" Typhoons, Spitfires, P-47s and P-51s.

And the material you have cited does not, to my eyes, amount to any kind of "admission of defeat" by Flak. It does however look like a recognition that German Flak was exacting a cost which cold not be justified by the results being obtained from some specific types of employment of close support aircraft. And the literature has often mentioned the Allied Generals' concerns that their troops were becoming hooked on air support and wouldn't make a move without it.

You speak of "Flak, which was becoming increasingly concentrated as German territory shrank and supply lines to the Ruhr factories diminished." Were not German guns often abandoned owing to lack of vehicles to move them and fuel to move the vehicles? Did ammunition and spare parts not have to brought to where they were needed? Did the raw materials to make them not have to reach the factories? Any "advantage" secured by the events leading up to the encirclement of the Ruhr was in reality a last gasp, dangerous for those who had finally to stifle it but not "sustainable."

21 Army Group's performance has been extensively debated (D'Este again or Max Hastings) and the reasons advanced for its perceived shortcomings are numerous but the British national resolve to have no more Sommes or Passchendaeles seems to be high on the list, alongside Montgomery's methodical approach and painstaking preparation.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Well, this discussion is slightly turning into what if scheme. Frankly, we cannot make an alternative scheme, we can only make some estimates of effectiveness. This has been already done, and we can see the effects in the development process of post war weapon systems. It is obvious that Flak was extremelly effective, so it remained in use. Fighter bombers also proven their capabilities and they practically killed classic bombers. There were several attempts made to reduce the role of aviation just over the battlefield because of high losses inflicted by defences, the last idea being F-16 CAS I believe, but in the end ground attack aviation always returned in a glory. So, the one must assume Typhoons were both effective and suffered tremendous losses. The latter probably could have been reduced by a more sophisticated design, but there was neither time nor resources available.
Army is another matter, another set of people, another industry and politics. There were several problems with introducing both new designs and tactics with far more people not being able to understand what the modern warfare is.
That said, I would love to read comments of Zetterling on those documents!

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

I don't understand the reference to Zetterling.

But I do understand, and try to avoid, what if schemes.
Let me put my thinking in a series of statements devoid of what ifs.
1. The key to military effectiveness is all-arms. Its exponents succeeded, and those that didn't failed; Monash in WWI, Blitzkrieg in 1939/40, Zhukov in 1944/45 were successful. The allies in WWII were unsuccessful. The performance of British and American armies in WWII suffered because of shortcomings in all-arms. You in Poland, by the way, paid the price of that deficiency in blood from 1944 to 1980.
2. All-arms is the combination of infantry with artillery, armour and air.
3. Monash won by combining excellent Commonwealth infantry, the much improved MkV tank, first-rate artillery, but so-so air support. This was the one shortcoming, but the rest was enough to defeat the German army.
4. The shortcoming in WWI air support is the key to understanding the problems of 2TAF's junky Typhoons.
5. The RFC/RAF's losses of unarmoured Camels and DH5s in CAS (close air support) devastated morale and was never forgotten, especially by the top brass in the RAF in the 190s and 30s who had experienced it.
6. The German Schlachtstaffeln, however, had half-decent CAS aircraft: Halberstadt CLII and CLIV, Hannover CLIII and Junkers J-1, which was an armoured aircraft in the tradition of the HS129, IL-2 and the USAF A10.
7. The German problem in 1918 was their lack of a tank. That was fatal. It was rectified by 1939 and added to the rest of their successful all-arms tactics which they maintained.
8. The British were in the act of rectifying their CAS weakness when the war ended. The armoured Sopwith Salamander was on test and would, I suppose, have matched the J-1 and provided the RAF with some satisfactory experience to temper the unalloyed horror that stuck.
9. The British never officially examined the reasons why they won WWI. Everyone had his own idea. No lessons were learned. All-arms fragmented away, with the RAF and the Tank Corps promoted by arseholes like Liddell-Hart arguing that speed was everything and the army that was used to travelling at 3mph would never 'get it' and would never modernise its thinking which was stuck in the mud of the Somme and Passchendael.
10. The RN got its aviation back in the late 30s. The Army never did.
11. The RAF was not interested in CAS. The Tank Corps was not interested in infantry support. The result was the ineffably bad unarmoured but fast Typhoon and the bad poorly armoured but ast tanks like the Crusader and Sherman.
12. The war in the west was won at great expense of blood and material by the simple combination of the allied infantry and the artillery's FOO (forward observation officer). The guns levelled the German defences which the infantry occupied, again and again. It was slow and costly because there were no tanks (with the exception of very few Churchill VII) and no aircraft that could survive against Rheinmetall-Borsig and Krupp. The tanks were held back ready to 'exploit' the gap which the infantry were supposed to make without benefit of well-armoured tanks and CAS. These were the tactics of the lunatic asylum.
13. Tedder and Coningham waged war on the army. They said the army was 'drugged with air '. They said the army had its own weapons - rifles, artillery and tanks - and should learn to stand on their own feet like men and stop whining for air support. BC had better things to do incinerating German cities. The tanks by the way agreed with the RAF. They had the same vision. Typhoons hopped over the front line and careered about in the rear areas shooting up the German army in exactly the same way the tanks had been taught to think by Liddell Hart of exploiting.
14. I could go on and on and on, but you have enough to understand the hypothesis. The absence of an army air force equipped with armoured dive bombers and CAS - updated Sopwith Salamanders resembling the Hs129 and A10 with the pilot and vitals protected behind rolled or cast armour - and the absence of enough Churchill MkVII infantry tanks to provide the attacking infantry with a large calibre aimed weapon, condemned the allied armed forces to ineffectiveness. Compare and contrast them with the Soviet armed forces. The Soviets studied WWI, and learned and implemented its lessons. They built excellent machine pistols, tanks, artillery, and CAS aircraft. And they copied the all-arms tactics that Monash had invented at Arras on July 4, 1918.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

• Agreed – but totally uncontroversial, I think?
• As above
• Ah, no. I think the blockade and the arrival of the Americans made the German defeat inevitable. See 6. (As an aside, so Monash was the only general, amongst all those on the Western Front, who saw things properly? I think it was more due to the entire staff finally learning the lessons of the preceding years, and being given the tools to put them into practice. And it was the excellent ‘Commonwealth’ infantry….I think your prejudices are showing.)
• Not agreed, but certainly arguable.
• Devastated morale? Arguable again, I think. I haven’t come across it in my readings about RAF thinking postwar, though there may well be some truth in it. How does the concept of this being never forgotten fit with your first sentence in 9? However, the DH 5 was never more than a very minor player, so why mention it?
• Half-decent and few. You appear to have a built-in assumption that the British air support was not effective, which doesn’t seem to be backed by the comments of the time. I don’t know that it has been demonstrated that the German air support, even though it had theoretically more capable aircraft, was actually much more effective.
• see 3 above. The German “all-arms tactics” were not that successful in mid-war. The late German successes were due to changes in their tactics, particularly the Strumtruppen prefiguring the blitzkrieg approach. This inspired the thinking of post-war theorists such as Liddell-Hart: see later.
• The Salamander was not an equivalent to the J-1. It was basically an armoured Snipe. Just as the armoured Typhoon of 1944 was just an armoured version of the 1942 fighter. You seem to have missed this point throughout – the Typhoon was not unarmoured in 2 TAF. However, as demonstrated by the German use (and losses) of armoured Fw.190, the benefit of heavily-armoured aircraft over the battlefield is debatable. The losses due to ground fire are reduced but the resulting aircraft are cumbersome and losses due to enemy fighters go up. Fine if you can rely on total air superiority – as the A-10 can. Without that, you might like to reconsider the value of the Russian armoured CAS aircraft. Over 30000 Il 2s were built, but no more than 5000 were maintained in service throughout the war because of a level of losses that would make Western commanders blanch. Some simple maths suggest that 5000 a/c in front-line service needs a similar number in training and support units, giving an average loss rate of 5000 a/c per year. Half of these will be non-combat, suggesting an AVERAGE combat loss over the whole war (early months of low service numbers and stationary winters included) of over 200 a/c a month. Yes, this does need adjusting to allow for true sortie numbers and utilisation. But so does any simple measure used to denigrate 2 TAF’s Typhoons. Incidentally, this morning I noted a reference to 350 Typhoons lost in the Normandy battles only – not properly statistically referenced, I’m afraid – but see Nick Beale’s comments above.
• Does all the thinking that was carried out after WW1 not count in your book? Just because they came up with different answers to yours does not mean that thinking did not occur. Your derision of Liddell Hart doesn’t seem to be backed by the general adoption of mechanisation, nor by the successes gained using his ideas of indirect approach by generals such as Guderian or Connor. Or, for that matter, Zhukov and Schwartzkopp.
• Much of the disastrous use of the FAA in the early stages of WW2, and its lack of decent types later, was due to the inability of the Admiralty to produce a decent aircraft specification, or use properly the tools it had. Cunningham excepted. As long as the RAF controlled the FAA it was equipped with types that compared well to land-based aircraft – often basically the same types. Look what happened afterwards. Thanks goodness the Army didn’t get control of the RAF – there’d have been less priority given to radar and the design of the defensive networks that saved us in 1940. One very relevant reference may be Futtrell’s The US Force in Korea, where discussion is presented about the US Marine Corps’ very high proportion of CAS, with much lower AVERAGE support provided to equivalent Army units. The USArmy was pressing for dedicated support units: the fallacy of which is well analysed.
• The RAF provided the Army between the wars with the type of support aircraft it was asked for. A lack of joined-up thinking in the British High Command, surely, but a dual failure, not one to be laid at the feet of the RAF alone. The RAF did experiment with dive-bombing in the early 1930s, but came to different conclusions as to its general desirability.
• The Sherman was designed to US requirements, and on its entry to service was an excellent tank, well-balanced in all features. It was retained too long without significant improvements, but I think the US Ordnance Board must carry the responsibility for that, with its own misconceptions. As for the other tanks: I’ve no desire to excessively defend the poor products of the British tank industry, but the main British tank in Normandy was the Cromwell, and this was equivalent to the most common German tank there, the Pz. Mk.IV. Not every German tank was a Tiger, despite impressions given (and clearly received). At the end of the Normandy battles, the US breakthrough on the right, and its sweeping advances across France, could only have been made by fast mechanised divisions and operational practice that Liddell-Hart, Guderian and Rommel would have recognised. It would have been less possible with the slow overweight under-gunned Churchill, no less vulnerable to those deadly German anti-tank guns.
• This really is a series of gross and insulting misrepresentations. It was Coningham and Tedder who worked with the desert Armies to establish all-arms operation, of exactly the kind you glowingly describe, and developed the tactics and co-operation that worked so well then and afterwards. It was Montgomery, with his meat-grinder approach to infantry, who separated the closeness of the staffs for the Normandy operations, leading to some friction during 1944. However, you will find the Army’s own officers criticising the Allied foot-soldier for relying too much on air support before advancing: Tedder was echoing these comments. Neither officer was involved with Bomber Command at all: both were immersed in all-arms co-operation. As for the derisive dismissal of interdiction missions: I refer you back to the references presented in this series of discussions.
• I understand your hypothesis, which at the core has some merit that few would contradict nowadays, but beyond this you are misunderstanding and distorting history to fit prejudices rather than presenting a reasoned case.

Before going overboard on Western Allies BAD Russians GOOD (purely in military terms, of course), it might be worth adding that wherever a post-war Western-trained Army has met a Russian-trained Army on a conventional battlefield, it is the Russian-trained Army that has lost. But then perhaps the post-war Russian equipment and doctrines were not the equal of their wartime counterparts?

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

I haven't had time to absorb the rest of your interesting reply.
But one thing stands out. You're right. In my mind the Typhoon was completely unarmoured apart from the usual fighter's armour of a rear seat back, perhaps an armoured seat and a bullet-proof windscreen.
So please define the armour you say was fitted to the CAS Typhoon, and please explain how, if his plane was armoured, the following could happen to Sqn Ldr. Eric Roberts, CO of 609 Squadron on March 9, 1945; (extract from Frank Ziegler's book on 609 Squadron; my additions are in the brackets); "Because of the lowered cloud base I checked with Baldy (Gp Capt. Johnny Baldwin) as to whether to attack, and received the expected OK owing to the scarcity of Flak (big NB). Turning west, I spotted the barges and led the boys down. At the bottom of the dive I saw a machine-gun on the barge I was aiming at open up and almost immediately felt the engine hit. This is it! Panic! Or not so much panic as a feeling of futility at getting hacked down on such a stopgap show. The motor stopped when I had climbed to 1,500 ft, and I jettisoned the hood ......"
One 10cent 7.92mm bullet downed Robert's Typhoon, and sent him to the Stalag. And you say his Typhoon was armoured?
You must know Schwabedissen's book; 'The Russian Air Force in the eyes of German Commanders'. "General der Flakartillerie a.D Wolfgang Pickert adds that the IL-2 was impervious to light 20-mm armour-piercing or 37-mm shells. The same views are expressd by General der Infanterie von der Groben, who emphasisies the nose armour and remarks that direct hits with 20-mm shells frequently had no effect on the plane".
The IL-2 is what I call armoured.
Over.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

I refer you to Francis Mason's book on the Typhoon/Tempest, where at least one photograph is printed showing the armour fitted to late production Typhoons around the cockpit (not just pilot back armour) and, IIRC, the engine. Liquid cooled engines are vulnerable to "the golden BB" as our US friends put it, but the Sabre installation was less vulnerable than most because the close mounting of the radiator to the engine resulted in shorter piping.

The vulnerability to small arms is of course one reason for the use of the rocket, permitting operation at greater stand-off distances. You may like to study the recently published history of 351 (Yugoslav) Squadron, with its interesting comments on the much higher loss rates of its Spitfires than its sister squadron with rocket-firing Hurricanes.

The Il 2 was indeed in a different category of armour, but given the number of Il 2s shot down by Bf 109s and Fw 190s, it clearly was rather less invulnerable to 20mm cannon than General Pickert believed. Perhaps his flak was also less accurate? The similar IL.10 proved vulnerable to the 0.5in machine gun fire of US fighters in the Korean War, and was driven from the skies by mainly a mix of P-51s and F-82s. Not a great advertisement for the concept, and closer to the loss rates of the Battle in 1940.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

A bullet in the radiator or a coolant line can stop a liquid-cooled engine. You cannot fully armour a radiator because it must have a free flow of air over it to function and if it doesn't, you engine seizes anyway. This is as true of an Il-2 as it is of a Typhoon.

I wonder how Luftwaffe fighters, primarily armed with 2 cm cannon, managed to shoot so many Il-2s down?

In your retrospective advocacy of armoured (and thus relatively slow and non-agile) aircraft, I think you'd do well to apply an "all-resources" analyis: to factor in the cost of producing and crewing the escorts necessary to keep the skies clear enough for your armoured machines to reach their targets and operate at acceptable cost, either as close escort or sweeping ahead.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Tony
I am not sure what do you mean by Polish blood resources. Could you clarify?
Concerning Russian/Soviet experiences, they were actually born in Poland in 1920 when dare attacks of Polish Brisfits decimated and panicked Budenny's cavalry. Proper conclusion of this highly manouverable war were drawn and ground attack aircraft secured their place in Soviet aviation. The question is if the way chosen was always perfect, but that is another matter.
Here is the point of widespread Il-2 myth. An armoured capsule was created and fitted with the most powerful engine available to get airborne. The problem was that in field conditions Il-2 could take some 500-600 kgs of bombs. Not very impressive. Due to weight and engine performance, mission profile was always quite low and the aircraft was exposed for a prolonged time to enemy groundfire. That said it is interesting note, those comments of that German guy. According to Soviet data some 4,500 aircraft were lost to Flak, 2,500 to fighters and 3,500 missing to unknown reasons. In 1944 alone those numbers were respectively 900, 1,900 and 600. Tremendous numbers considering rather limited presence of Luftwaffe and their allies. It is also a fact, Soviets returned to the concept of fighter-bomber, increasing their numbers, but the problem was in insufficient range of their designs.
That said, the concept of an armoured aircraft must be considered a wrong way, and it is confirmed by the concept of following ground attack aircraft, slightly armoured in weak points but with a strong structure, able to withstand a punch of enemy fire. Such aircraft is lighter and thus has better performances, the penalty being a higher damage rate. This is not that problem, however, as long as the pilot survives.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Tony
a) British even had a separate category for the slow and heavily armoured tank, Infantry tank. Have you never heard on Infantry Tank Mk II Matilda? First use in combat in May 40. Max armour thickness was 78mm when the German tanks at that time had max armour thickness of 30mm. Now Cruisers main problem was poor reliability and a gun which had optimized for anti-armour work but Cruisers armour protection was usually in same order than the German tanks they met, that means before Tiger and Panther and Panther's side armour was weak. But those late German tanks were much heavier and much more complicated than British and so needed much more materials and working hours to produce. It's true that between 1940 and late 44, so between A13 and Comet British Cruiser thanks were not as good as the best German tanks but majority of German tanks were not Tigers and Panthers during that time and with Tigers and Panthers one could not have made the dash through France and Belgium in August and Sept. 44, they were too unreliable for that.

b) there was not a big difference between number of claims made by Finnish 20mm and 40mm AAA troops on Il-2s in the summer 44. Finnish experience was that 20mm AAA fire when gun used both HE and AP rounds was effective against Il-2s. Il-2 was a hard nut but not invulnerable. Each troop also had a twin 7,62mm AA-mg and they even figured out a useful use for that against Il-2s.

Juha

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Considering they were probably flying 2 to 3 missions a day Graham, would that not mean a loss every 2 or 3 days?

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Kutscha: I read the statistic as 27 losses for the whole of 2TAF, not for a single unit.

Nick: The radiator of the IL 2 was placed in an armoured duct between the engine and the cockpit, so it was much less vulnerable than the more conventional external installation of Typhoon or Spitfire. Possibly it took advantage of the ducting to reduce the drag of the installation, but it does not seem to have gained any advantages from the exit flow.

I would agree with those suggesting that the slow armoured route is indeed one justifiable answer to supplying CAS, given the rest of the system to support this. However, it is certainly not the only way, and history suggests not the optimum. Not least the Soviet abandoning of the approach post-war, despite having it as an intrinsic part of their war-winning approach.

However, the fighter-bomber claims of self-defence capability can be exaggerated. Fighter bombers are generally more heavily armoured, and thus less agile than a “pure” fighter. They are normally flown by pilots trained in ground-attack tactics not air-to-air, and will usually be encountered in an inferior combat position. These characteristics can be seen in the late combats over both Western and Eastern Fronts. In the lack of air supremacy, the use of escorts may be minimised, but not abandoned completely.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Reading many accounts from pilots attacking the IL2 they all agree that the best route was from behind and underneath, away from the gunner and directing fire into the tailplane from close range. The 20mm was perfectly capable of bringing down the IL2 provided pilots ingnored the usual areas to target such as the engine with its heavy armour.
Nick has hit the nail on the head, all liquid cooled aircraft can be brought down by a single rifle bullet, the Typhoon with its massive inviting radiator surrered considerably from ground fire as well as flying into derbs from its own kills / ground attacks. Placing armour infront of a radiator is not even an option as the engine will simply over heat in seconds.
I still think the Typhoon was the best ground attack aircraft of World War Two with its ability to hit targets hard with cannons bombs and rockets but have the ability to revert back to a fighter should it encounter enemy aircraft. The IL2 although superb at dishing it out apperas to have only been able to lumber along and defend itself by flying low, allowing mutual covering fire from its gunners

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

IIRC Finns tried first to eliminate the gunner and then
a) high side attack aiming where wing merged to fuselage because 20/MG151 ammo was capable to penetrate the side armour of Il-2 and one was able to punctuate the fuel cells and ignite the fuel or
b) shoot the plywood tail/rear fuselage to pieces.

Now Il-2 was a hard nut and not easy plane to shoot down and could absorb great amount of hits and survive but it wasn’t impossible target and sometimes it was possible to get multiple kills on one sortie.

To give some info of penetrative power of 20mm AAA
20mm AP round of Flak 30 and 38, the main light Flak guns used by Germans, was able to penetrate 20mm of homogenous armour when hitting at 30deg from vertical from 100m distance and 14 mm from 500 m.

Juha

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Surely the 400mph Typhoon was vulnerable to the 452mph Bf109K, to the 472mph FwTa152C, to the 474 mph Ar335, and to the 541mph Me262. It was another myth, and RAF rationalisation, that the fighter-bomber could revert to being a fighter and defend itself. For a start the RP rails could not be jettisoned.

Pierre Clostermann flew the 440mph Tempest, and said this about the Typhoons' vulnerability in February 1945 in his book 'The Big Show'; "Typhoon formations frequently lost six or seven machines out of twelve in encounters with Fw190s and Bf109s. The Spitfire was powerless. It was to remedy this state of affairs that 122 Wing was sent to Volkel equipped with Tempests. It was a crack unit and on it depended the entire offensive and tactical system of the British front".

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Tony
you need a reality check. How many Ta152Cs or Ar(surelyDo)335s there were around at any time of war in combat formations? And can you give even one date when even 2 Typhoons was lost to enemy fighters from 2nd of Jan 45 to end of Feb 45?

Juha

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Spot on. The Matilda must be high up in any analysis of what saved the BEF. The 37-mm Pak's shells bouncing off its 4-inch glacis panicked the Germans in the Arras counterattack and led to the halting of the Panzer divisions. It was also the key to destroying the Italian army in North Africa.

The problem was this. From D-Day onwards the Allies were attacking German defences equipped with the Dual Purpose 88-mm, as well as the 50-mm Pak. For the 50-mm Pak the army needed a tank with about 7-inches of frontal armour. The Churchill VII provided this, but almost all of them were removed from the Tank Brigades for turning into flamethrowing tanks, leaving them with Churchill IV with only six inches. For the 88-mm a tank was needed with 12-inches of vertical armour or less if sloped. This was never produced for two reasons. The armoured divisions were fixated on speed over armour (exactly the same discussion as the Typhoon versus the IL-2) and persuaded Montgomery to scrap the Churchill (which WSC refused to allow); and because the RAF took roughly half of all the resources in their abortive campaign to bomb German civilians to force Hitler to surrender there were never the resources to develop a decent infantry tank. Forget the armoured divisions - they were only interested in exploiting the mythical hole in the line to be punched by the infantry with their infantry tanks. (All numbers are from memory. Only the realationships are vouched for).

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

My whole life has been spent with a conscience about Poland, for whom we went to war and which we left in Stalin's grip. What the German enemy did to Poland was one thing, but what our Soviet Allies did was another thing entirely. My father never stopped talking about our failure towards Poland, and in Warwickshire where we lived in the 1970s there was a camp full of old Polish soldiers who walked three miles to the village church every Sunday. It was enough to make us cry.
If the British and Americans had not distorted their armed forces by following the grail of the strategic bomber, then perhaps - and this is of course a what if - a balanced and integrated all-arms force could have got to Warsaw before Uncle Joe.
The distortion caused by giving the RAF half of Britains resources was paid with in blood; the blood of Harris' aircrew, the blood of the British army, whose daily losses in Northwest Europe exceeded the daily losses in WWI, and the blood of the Poles occupied by pitiless Germans and equally pitiless Russians.
That's what I meant.

Tukhachevsky studied their invasion of Poland in 1920, but he also, remember, studied Arras 1918.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Sorry to say but Churchill VII had six inch frontal armour.
British army had armoured divisions but they also had army tank brigades for infantry support. No army had in service during the WWII tanks which were immune to 88mm L/71, so were all top military commnders idiots or were they able to see that some 78 - 100 tons monsters would have been impractical?

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Maximum speeds like that are ideal figures for lightly-loaded aircraft (no ammunition) at given heights, all of which will be different, and there is no precise correlation with "real" combat. How about applying the "what actually happened test?"

In the air, the Typhoon was completely invulnerable to the Ar 234 which was unarmed apart from its bombs; there were never more than about 16 Ta 152s in service at any time, so they weren't much of a threat. Me 262s in tactical roles in the West were bomber and recon aircraft, which very occasionally brought down an Allied fighter but it was not their job. Which leaves the Fw 190 A-8/9 (the former not radically dissimilar in performance to a Typhoon, I think, but I'd need to check) the Fw 190 D-9 and the Bf 109 G-10, G-14 and K-4.

BTW, not all Typhoons carried RPs, many carried bombs.

Clostermann's book is a brilliant read, conveying how it all felt but far from reliable when it comes to what happened (see many previous posts). If you want some firmer numbers, check out the losses and claims by 2 TAF Typhoon, Spitfire (Mks. IX, XIV and XVI) and Tempest units (Shores & Thomas provide the necessary data). I think you'll find that all were getting kills right to the last and rarely if ever suffering losses on the dramatic scale Clostermann describes.

Also check out daily losses and claims by Luftwaffenkommando West (translated sitreps for February & March 1945 are available in the National Archives in the AIR20 series) which also include Flak claims some of the time. Units primarily engaged against 2 TAF were JG 26 and JG 27 while JG 2 and JG 53 faced the Americans for the most part. What comes home is how frequently German fighter formations were getting slaughtered for little or no success in return.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

On Il-2. Out of curiosity checked the best sortie result of Finnish Hawk 75 (P-36) pilot against Il-2s and it was 1 1/3 by Ltn M. Joutsen in 15th June at 12.45-13.15 sortie. And Hawk 75s were armed at time with 1-2 12.7mm mgs (+ 2-5 rifle cal mgs). And there were suitable matches in Soviet losses, 2 Il-2s from 957 ShAP. Also Hillo and Ojapalo got 1/3 each. Now all Curtiss pilots whose oppinion I know admit that Il-2 was very, very difficult plane to shoot down with rather weak armament of Hawk 75 but it wasn't impossible. The few Hawk 75s seemed to have got 5 Il-2s altogether during summer 44.

Juha

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

I thought you'd say that - hence my disclaimer on the actual but not the relative values.
Churchill VII kept out the 50-mm Pak which killed cruiser tanks - Sherman, Cromwell, and Crusader.
The frontal armour needed to keep out the 88-mm could have been fitted on an upgraded Churchill. Take my word for it, or work it out for yourself; it was not impractical. I think I worked it out once that 10-inches or a foot was needed. A Churchill upgrade would have needed more hp (the Merlin would have done nicely) and it would have needed the beefed-up suspension system designed for the Black Prince. It was all possible, and if Montgomery had not been in command would probably have happened.
Tanks in the attack surrounded by infantry do not need heavy side and rear armour - just adequately thick frontal armour. An 88-mm in enfilade shooting through the thin side armour would then have been killed at leisure by the remaining oncoming Churchills.
The point you were making was the British had the Matilda. This point is worth making, surely, only because this slow Infantry tank was immune to the common Pak of the day - the 37-mm 'doorknocker'.
Using your own argument, the British army could have been expected to maintain its tank design so the infantry tank continued its invulnerability to the common Pak of the day, which in 1945 was the 88-mm. That was the gun all tankers feared. The Germans could not have fielded anything of larger calibre because they lacked the resources.
The 88-mm was a large target for a CAS aircraft. But in the battles I have studied, 2TAF's Typhoons did not go after it. The 88-mm was usually on a flank behind a building, invisible from the British front line. In 1918, one of the main tasks of CAS was to take out anti-tank guns. Not so in 1945. An RP Typhoon in any case had difficulty hitting a building let alone an 88-mm even if it could find it. An MG-42 could and did down a Typhoon, and there were always plenty of those (MG-42s).
Were all top commanders idiots? The British invented the tank and always had the best ones in WWI. Were they idiots then? Or were they rather fools in WWII for having the worst tanks?

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Ar335???? :(

Sure the 452mph Me109K-4s which only appeared in VERY small numbers (less than 100 total, maybe) from mid March 1945? Have you even looked at where the 4 Gruppen were based?

The Ta152C has already been mentioned in another post but you have confused it with the 152H of which only a staffel could be kept operational. :rolleyes:

Clostermann likes to embelish his writtings so best to not to read to much into them. Going through the Typhoon loss list in the Thomas/Shores book I find 6 Typhoons lost with an enemy fighter reference and not all confirmed as by fighters. You need better references. Oh yes, Typhoons made 5 enemy fighter claims out of 18 claims during Feb 45

The Typhoon made 54:8 and 94:16 (claims: probable) against the 109 and 190 respectively. Seems the Typhoon did not do to bad against German fighters, especially the 190. Oh, and they also made 3 claims of Me262s.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

There is an excellent pair of books that give a full and at times acid account of the development of British tanks for and in WW2. There are times when it does indeed seem that those writing the requirements were foolish, and at other times clearly let down by the standards of British automotive production. I only have one of them, the second: I shall try to find the reference for you. They were published by HMSO, I recall.

One point to be remembered is the effect of the defeat of the BEF and the need to equip the remaining Army with anything available, leading to the retention in production of inferior types and almost a year of lost development. British tank design doesn't look quite so bad with a year's shift...not that this philosophical point helped the tankers.

However, the main thrust of the argument was not in favour of the kind of slow super-WW1 armoured monster you propose, which can indeed be seen in the prototype A33 and Black Prince, but for a single battle tank with a balance of armour, mobility and firepower, eventually arising as the Centurion. Tanks do not just require protection from the front - evidence for this can be seen in the up-armouring of the early Sherman for Normandy, with their applique over the vulnerable fuel tanks in the side sponsons. Tanks do not dash (or crawl) towards AT head on - at least not since futile attempts in the desert pre-Montgomery.

Most British armour could be penetrated by the 50mm PaK - similarly most German armour (still mainly the Mk.IV) by the 6 pdr. Or the heaviest by the 88mm - similarly the 17 pdr.

It is interesting to see that the Germans, who in WW2 designed for armour and firepower at the expense of mobility and reliability, changed to a more balanced tank (Leopard) postwar. They had seen the drawbacks of the armoured monsters and the advantages of a lighter design. Whereas the British followed the superb Centurion with the overweight super-gunned Chieftain, because they had seen the advantages of the heavy tank and the disadvantages of the lighter design. Both Armies/design teams had learned the lessons of history - just directly opposite ones. The Russians also abandoned their pursuit of super-heavies, despite the apparent success of the JS-2 "animal killers".

It's those awful compromises again........advantages have penalties, design is a matter of trade-offs. Tanks, aircraft, ships, cars, whatever. Stone scissors paper.....make your choice and roll your dice.

But if you really believe that a rocket couldn't hit a building, you really are misinformed. And the counterattack at Arras only stopped 7th Panzer for a day, with no effect on any other unit. Brave, and an interesting indication of what might have been achieved under other circumstances, but not by itself a roadmap for the future.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Just back from hols so missed most of this debate - but had to comment on this!

The first paragraph was just intended to be provocative (surely?). As Nick has pointed out 'maximum' speeds are not a particularly useful tool in comparing aircraft combat capabilities. What about manouverability, dive/climb speeds, roll rate, weapons, gunsights, abililty to survive damage, etc? The Typhoon could out-turn a Fw190 at low level, particularly if the Typhoon pilot dropped 10 degrees of flap.

As Nick also says, let the results speak for themeselves. At a quick count I reckon some 38 Typhoons were lost or believed to have been lost to German fighters in the air between D-Day and VE-Day. In the same period Typhoons were credited with 43 'confirmed' claims, including 17 Bf109, 15 Fw190 and 3 Me262 (I don't recall any 262 claims for Typhoons ....). 14 of these 35 claims for fighters were made by RP Typhoons the rest by bombers which were not encumbered by RP rails. The ratio of RP to bomber Typhoon squadrons was approximately 2 to 1.

I do like the correspondent's sense of humour, quoting 'The Big Show' as a statistical source. The statement about Typhoon losses would be correct only if you substituted 'never' for 'frequently'. The worst Typhoon loss in air combat occurred on 17 August 1944 when 8 Typhoons of 183 sqn were bounced by '50 plus' German fighters and lost four. There were a couple of other occasions when 3 were lost. Air to air combat with the Luftwaffe was relatively rare (I know one pilot who flew nearly 200 sorties during the period in question and never saw a Luftwaffe aircraft in the air), but when it did occur the Typhoon pilots could look after themselves as the above results show. The USAAF shot down more Typhoons in the first 3 months of 1945 than did the Luftwaffe ....

Re earlier posts, yes, the Typhoon was armoured. Mod 346 (55 lbs of fixed armour) and 347 (496 lbs of removable armour) were introduced in spring 1944. I am not sure of the exact disposition of this armour but photos show trial installations of sheet armour applied to the cockpit sides and floor and around the radiator. Nor do I know to what extent this armour was employed on operations. However many photos of Typhoons from D-day onwards show stencilling on the radiator fairings - "This fairing is armoured" - as a warning to groundcrew who might be removing the fairing.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

When engaged in fighter v fighter combat the high speed of a particular type was of little use other than allowing the faster of the two a better chance of escape if he needed to. The Typhoon and P47 in a nose down attitude were able to use this to their advantage time after time. As for rocket rails and bomb racks causing the Typhoon trouble duing air to air combat well yes of course it caused trouble, my point is that a well flown Typhoon after taking out ground targets was still an aircraft very capable of defending its self. Again the Typhoon was by far the best Fighter Bomber of WW2, the Tempest should not even be mentioned in the same breath as it was a different aircraft with a totally different role. As for the Polish argument that is lurking in the back ground here, it happened, it was in the best interest for Britain and the US, that was why it happened and i must say that i feel it was the right thing to do at the time for Britain. Call me old fashioned but i still think your own country should come first above all others.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Chris, tcolvin needs to pick up your Typhoon/Tempest book in which you have listed all the Typhoon, and Tempest, losses by cause.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Tony
"The frontal armour needed to keep out the 88-mm could have been fitted on an upgraded Churchill. Take my word for it"

Sorry Tony, I read You message in haste and misunderstood it. I'm sorry of the unnecessary outburst!

But As I wrote, max armour of Churchill VII, the best armoured Churchill, was 6inch (152mm) and the penetrative power of 88mm L/71 with the usual APCBC round, not with the better but rare APCR, was against homogenous armour plate at 30 deg from vertical, 203 mm from 100m, 185mm from 500m, 165mm from 1000m. But the clearly more common 88, that of Flak 18, 36 and 37 was able to penetrate in same situation 127, 117 and 106mm respectively and the 88mm L/56 KwK 36 of Tiger I a bit less, 120, 110 and 100mm. So the front sector of Churchill VII and VIII was already armoured against almost all German AP rounds. And with applique armour, which seems to be common in NW Europe, the noseplate of earlier Churchills seems to be just adequate to keep out APCBC round of the most common German A/T gun Pak 40 and of course those of guns of PzKpfw IV, StuG III and IV and PzJg IV etc.

"An 88-mm in enfilade shooting through the thin side armour would then have been killed at leisure by the remaining oncoming Churchills."

You really don't understand landwarfare! there is a well known case when one Churchill Sqn lost 9 tanks in a couple minutes to flank firing Jagdpanthers, BTW armed with 88mm L/71s.

"to the common Pak of the day, which in 1945 was the 88-mm."

The common Pak in 1945 happen to be 75mm Pak 40.

"In 1918, one of the main tasks of CAS was to take out anti-tank guns."

Please, give me the type of A/T gun in service in 1918.

Tony check your facts, the bitter truth is that from wrong premises the chance to get right conclusion is very near nil.

Juha

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

posted 11th March 2006 here by Dénes Bernád

statistics of Il-2 losses, according to Hans Seidl:

Year - Total Losses - To Enemy Action - % of Strength at Hand
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1941* - 1100 - 600 - 73.3%
1942 - 2600 - 1800 - 34.2%
1943 - 7200 - 3900 - 45.0%
1944 - 8900 - 4100 - 46.6%
1945** - 3800 - 2000 - 27.3%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: 23600 12400 70.3%
* presumably from June 22 [D.B.]
** until May 10

Therefore, over 50% of losses [not counting the 'worn out' category] was due to enemy.

So what was the calibre of the weapons that shot down these Il-2s?

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

The books I mentioned are David Fletcher's The Great Tank Scandal and The Universal Tank. The latter was published in 1993 ISBN0-11-290534-X.

I would also recommend the superb new French-authored British Tanks in Normandy, desite its lack of mention of CAS. I would give details for that too, but it has been swallowed up by the black hole in my library. It was published only last year, however, so should still be readily available..

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

I believe Renault FT-17 was the best tank of WWI as it was the only design to remain in the service for over 20 years.
I cannot confirm those Il-2 losses data, but the conclusion is correct. It was not invincible.

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Juha

The Churchill VII was removed from the Tank Brigades and turned into Crocodile flamethrowers. So there were very few Churchill VIIs in the Tank Brigades.
My point was that given resources and a commander like Slim rather than Montgomery who wanted the Churchill abolished from his order of battle, the British infantry could have had support from a tank that was proof against the 88-mm in 1944/45.
You agree with that statement.

"You really don't understand landwarfare! there is a well known case when one Churchill Sqn lost 9 tanks in a couple minutes to flank firing Jagdpanthers, BTW armed with 88mm L/71s."
That was the Scots Guards in 6 Guard Tank Brigade on Point 226 near Caumont. Their Churchill IVs fresh off the LCT got ahead of the infantry of 15 Scottish Division. Only one infantry company had arrived without anti-tank guns when the Jagdpanthers attacked and surprised the Guards. The event was unique. You should draw no conclusion from it. Note they were Churchill IIs and IVs and not VIIs.
The landwarfare I am talking about is a battalion of infantry with the support of a troop of tanks and artillery attacking fixed German defences. It happened repeatedly in the Low Countries and the Reichswald. Dual Purpose 88-mms would destroy the tanks and the attack would stop. It would take days while the artillery pounded the defences. The 88-mms would have pulled out after destroying the tanks to repeat their trick somewhere else. That was why progress was slow.

"The common Pak in 1945 happen to be 75mm Pak 40."
In numbers I am sure you are right. But it was not the common Pak in the Reichswald and Hochwald. There they had 40-mm Paks entrenched to the front which could deal with any Stuarts and Shermans, and Dual Purpose 88-mms on a flank to kill Churchills and anything else that got through.

"Please, give me the type of A/T gun in service in 1918."
The standard infantry gun – not the howitzer. See the following about anti-tank guns in 1918 at http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol035hk.html
"Though one can already notice a change in armament from gun to howitzer, the infantry division still had a noteworthy amount of guns at the end of the war, and only the gun was fit for anti-tank defence because of its higher muzzle velocity and flatter trajectory when compared with the howitzer."

"Tony check your facts, the bitter truth is that from wrong premises the chance to get right conclusion is very near nil."
Very true.

Tony

Re: Impact of Allied fighter-bombers
 

Tony
"The Churchill VII was removed from the Tank Brigades and turned into Crocodile flamethrowers. So there were very few Churchill VIIs in the Tank Brigades."

I cannot understand why you complained on that. The only function the Crocodile had was to give support to infantry, ie do what you want tanks to do. And of course the converted the most heavily tank around because of flamethrowers were short distance weapon. And crocodile had the flametrower put in place of hull mg and it could easily discart its trailer so it had its 75mm gun and co-axial mg ready to use as normal gun tank.

On Point 226. Now it didn't make a slightest difference were they Mk IIIs, IVs or VIIs because all Churchills were vulnerable to 88mm L/71 flanking fire. And the JagdPanhthers did their damage when they opened fire from their flanking ambush position. All went well to Germans until they made the basic mistake and charged out of their ambush position to the open. So infantry A/T weapons would not have helped.

Now most effective German weapons on D-Day were those capable to flanking fire along the beaches and in fact the effectiveness of flanking fire was known already before Ancient Romans and the reason why towers projected out of walls in medival castles is that so they allowed defenders to shoot flanking fire in front of the walls. All those permanent fortification lines build during 1920s and 30s whose basic design principle I remember were based on interlocking flanking fire zones(, and also to mutual support). So your earlier claim that flanking fire doesn't matter is false.

"The landwarfare I am talking about is a battalion of infantry with the support of a troop of tanks and artillery attacking fixed German defences. It happened repeatedly in the Low Countries and the Reichswald."

Now I can be wrong but I recall that the relation was a troop of tank to an attacking infantry coy. And aditional problem to tanks at Reichswald was that the terrain was sea of mud and in a thick forest the main risk to tanks was a flanking shot from Panzerfaust or -Schreck. And with good infantry 88mm in the forest wasn't unsurmountable obstacle. Finns always attacked through forests without tank support and the examples I can remember for Russian use of tanks in thick forests was that infantry opened the way, engineers prepared a route for tanks and Germans were surprised when the tanks burst out from "impervious" forest. And forest fighting was often bloody because of its nature. But I admit that there wasn't too much room for manoeuvring inside Reichswald.

"The standard infantry gun – not the howitzer. See the following about anti-tank guns in 1918 at http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol035hk.html"

Didn't check the link but I think you mean fieldgun, normal 77mm fieldgun Model??. I knew that and I must admit that I quess that you meant them, but IIRC you talked on anti-tank guns and I could not resist the temtation, sorry.

Juha