Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I've often thought that the Me110 was ill-used over Britain as an escort, to which it was so ill-suited.

IMHO it would have been far better to employ it as a free ranging ground straffer, operating in concert with, but free of, the main bomber forces. Escort could (and should) have been left to the more nimble Bf109's. As a ground straffer the Me 110 would have been able to make use of it's very good speed and powerful armament, coming in very low and adding a very important distraction to Fighter Command's raid reaction.

To a degree this approach was trialled by Epro 210 with reasonable success. But the concept would have been far more effective with several Gruppe's of Zerstorer's free ranging over Britain rather than just two Staffel's.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Stephen Bungay writes about this in his book "The Most Dangerous Enemy".
He comes to the conclusion:
"It [the Luftwaffe] had all and precisely the weapons it needed at its disposal. What mattered in attacking the ground targets was bombing accuracy. Stukas could deliver the accuracy, but were too vulnerable and were needed later to attack the Royal Navy when the invason commenced. The key weapon was the Bf 110. Had all the Zerstörer crews been retrained to deliver fast, low-level pin-point attacks in the way that Erprobungsgruppe 210 were, Göring would have had a war-winning weapon in his hands.
The radar stations were difficult to destroy, but they were all on the coast, which made them vulnerable to two tactics: air attacks by squadrons of Bf 110s and commando raids."

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hi Jim,
The blatant failure of the Bf 110 in air to air fighting in the BoB is often repeated in literature. Christer Bergström in his book ”Luftstrid över kanalen”(1), 2006, has analyzed the victory and loss statistics in the BoB and presents a different picture to the usually repeated "Bf 110 fighter BoB disaster" scenario.

The confirmed aerial victories achieved by Bf 109 units amounted to 815 while the Bf 110 units gathered 407 confirmed victories.
A comparison between confirmed victories and operational losses due to air battles gives at hand that in the period 8 August to end of October 1940:
Bf 109 units scored 815 victories to 489 losses – a ratio of 1,7:1
Bf 110 units scored 407 victories to 185 losses – a ratio of 2,2:1

In October the Bf 110 units even had a ratio of 3:1 while the Bf 109 units dropped to 1,4:1.

Christer Bergström continues to discuss the matter as well as comparing Spifire and Hurricane relative performances and some of the RAF unit’s performance, RAF Bomber command losses, coastal command and the Fleet Air Arm..
When finally comparing the scores by Bf 109 and Bf 110 units as mentioned above with the estimated true losses by each side for the period July-October 1940 it turns out that in approximate figures the authentic victories versus actual air battle losses where:

Spitfire 550 victories to 329 losses – a ratio of 1,7:1
Hurricane 750 victories to 603 losses – a ratio of 1,2:1
Bf 109 780 victories to 534 losses – a ratio of 1,5:1
Bf 110 340 victories to 196 losses – a ratio of 1,7:1

Bergström continues by discussing the validity of the data including the difficulties in identifying if a Bf 109 or 110 shot down a RAF fighter, however, the outcome is that minimum 25-30% of all British aircraft losses inflicted by Luftwaffe fighters were scored by Bf 110s.
The “Total failure of the Bf 110 as a fighter aircraft in the BoB” is perhaps another BoB Myth worth reassessing?

The fact is that on several occasions the Bf 110 units performed better than the Bf 109 units on a particular day. When deployed tactically correct using the advantages the Bf 110 offered the Bf 110 was still a lethal weapon in air-to-air fighting which I believe Christer Bergström is able to show.
When used as a high altitude escort, not being tied to close escort to the bomber force, it made effective diving attacks on RAF fighters using surprise, high speed and it’s heavy nose armament to score victories.
Long range and an extra pair of eyes was also helpful in air battle, the range enabling to wait for the right moment to strike and the extra pair of eyes increasing the situational awareness of the pilot in an air battle.

Wrongly used as a close bomber escort the disadvantages with slow acceleration and climb in comparison with the Spitfire and Hurricane negated the Bf 110s strengths, which was also proven by high losses on several such instances.

To use the Bf 110 more intensively as a ground attack aircraft was in my opinion not possible within short, while not enough well trained crews were available short term. However, to use the Bf 110 fighter units tactically correct more consistently had been possible with existing a/c and pilots in the ZGs, under a better management.

The Bf 110 undoubtedly scored several successes as low level attack aircraft but was also vulnerable if caught in the act as the bomb load and low altitude put the Bf 110 at a disadvantage if intercepted by Hurricanes or Spitfires.

JaBo attacks are tactical strikes which can be very effective to gain temporary supremacy over a limited area of battleground for a limited time and best used in combination with other units, such as army or naval units in a Blitz Krieg style war, but not as a strategic weapon. In order to subdue the British defenses and defense industry some heavier bomb loads would be needed and even then the experience from the later Allied heavy bombing raids over Germany indicates that it would have been very difficult to achieve this even if Germany would have had the strategic bomber force it never had or got.

Best regards,
Goran


(1) Only available in Swedish language to my knowledge, even if earlier intended to be released in English under the title “Battle of Britain”. I hope it eventually will be released through another publisher.
See also the thread here:
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=11715

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

A very interesting post Goran. Food for thought.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Goran
In the recent years we may notice a trend to debunk old myths, that actually turn to be new myths, or rather myths, comparing to the old truth, actually. Some of those new myths are doubtless created by limited knowledge of authors, who often cannot understand the obvious.
You have provided us (in good faith I believe) with some numbers. The problem is that for everyone, who dug a little in the Battle, they are completely meaningless! Do you think it is possible to find out, which type was responsible for victory? No way, those were big messes, and several aircraft were downed by up to ten different fighters of various types, sometimes even friendly. Also, how many mentioned Me 110 victories were achieved by gunners, those claims being usually unreliable? This should be somehow reflected in those stats, but is not.
Now, a question to you. Do you think that Goering and his staff were such a bunch of incompetent idiots, that they have removed so perfect weapon from their inventory?

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I am always surprised at accounts of Bf 110 formations forming defensive circles at the first sign of the RAF. Understandable as that may be if you are Bf 110 crewman and want to live, what is the point of flying all the way to England just to do that? It sounds as if there was some issue of training, morale or doctrine there somewhere.

I would hate to do the maths on its vulnerability to machine-gun armed fighters but I would imagine that it was easier to damage but harder to destroy than a 109 (bigger, less agile target but with a "spare" engine to get you home).

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I’d be careful on Christer’s analyzes.
Now at first I have to admit that I’ve not read the book, only leafed through it in one bookshop and noticed, as I have guessed, that he claimed that according to British John Alcorn’s deep study 303 Sqn was the worst overclaimer during the BoB even if when Christer gleefully posted on this board, IIRC on the old version, that British John Alcorn had made a study on the BoB and have proved that 303 Sqn was the worst overclaimer during the BoB, I informed him, and I must do that at least twice before he accepted the fact, that Alcorn had acknowledged that he had used outdated material in his study and had made a new one using better base material and according to the newer study 303 wasn’t the worst overclaimer. To me publishing accusation which one knows is wrong shows a bad researcher moral.

Christer’s selectiveness on facts is also shown on Bf 110s

in a tread in The Forum of the 1.Jagdmoroner Abteilung
http://www.1jma.dk/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=3371
Actual losses in the Battle of Britain

which no seems to went to cyber cemetery but on which on this board there was a thread on Christer’s “original” interpretation on RAF’s Cat 2 damage classification.
On 04 July 2004 : 22:00:20 message

Christer had opinion when trying to proof accuracy of 109 pilots claim during the BoB, Quote: “The twin-engine Me 110 crews with their rear gunners were just as notorious for huge overclaims as any bomber crews of any air force.”

On the other hand when he tried to proof the effectiveness of Bf 110s he tended to forget Bf 109s, see: http://forum.skalman.nu/viewtopic.php?t=28706
Forumindex » Militär teknikhistoria » Bf 110 - ett misslyckande?

Christer Bergström Från: Sverige 11 Feb 2007 19:52

…John Foreman skriver i sin bok ”Fighter Command War Diaries”, vol. 2, sid 44, om det uppdrag som ZG 26 flög den 28 september 1940: ”Det sista anfallet genomfördes mot 10 Groups område när en stor formation närmade sig Southampton. Denna visade sig bestå av Bf 110:or och de invecklades i strid med tre Hurricane-Squadrons utanför Selsey Bill. Hurricaneplanen fick stora problem med dessa tvåmotoriga jaktplan. Trots brittiska anspråk på tre förstörda och en skadad, gick inte en enda Messerschmitt förlorad. De tyska flygarna lyckades skjuta ned inte mindre än sex Hurricanes, där fem av piloterna också gick förlorade.”…

The problem is that The BoB Then and Now Mk V allocated only one Hurricane plus one badly damaged, which force-landed back at base, a/c repairable, to Bf 110s and 5 to Bf 109s and one damaged because it run out of fuel. And well before publication of ”Luftstrid över kanalen”(1), 2006 when he was repeatedly informed, also on this board, that Mason’s Battle over Britain, on which he based his earlier analysis, was outdated and The BoB Then and Now was clearly more up do date I informed him that Mk V was the edition he should look after and he thanked me on info and wrote that he had ordered a copy of it. So he’d have been aware of the difference.

After that flood of words, IMHO LW needed 110s to escort bombers outside the range of 109. The effectiveness of 110 escorts varied but sometimes they were effective sometimes FC pilots noted that 110s concentrated too much to their own safety. So at least part of ZG Gruppen was needed to escort work, because it was the bombers which could delivery really hard blows on key industrial targets.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

The circle is not necessarily defensive, and was often used as an offensive formation. It was often seen in Poland in 1939, hence I presume the tactics was to keep aircraft over a particular area to be covered.
PS Still, the Alcorn's study is a nonsense.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Dear Franek,
When you are mentioning “limited knowledge of authors, who often cannot understand the obvious” and regarding the data “for everyone, who dug a little in the Battle, they are completely meaningless” you are aiming at Christer Bergström, author of two books on the subject of the Battle of Britain after more than 30 years of research. If you are interested in arguing about his data or research you’d better take contact with him via his website and get an understanding about what data and sources are behind his conclusions in his published work.
I am not a complete moron myself regarding the subject, but as I have only 40 years of studying the subject at a shallower level, I believe Mr Bergstöm is more competent to defend his own findings. Before you discard my posting as nonsense, let alone in “good faith” as you write, I believe you should first take a step back and find out how C.B. came up with this view on the matter.
Regarding the data you are regarding as nonsense you might notice when reading my post again that I have added the comment “Bergström continues by discussing the validity of the data including the difficulties in identifying if a Bf 109 or 110 shot down a RAF fighter, however, the outcome is that minimum 25-30% of all British aircraft losses inflicted by Luftwaffe fighters were scored by Bf 110s.”
I am not going to translate the book into English for you as my posting is only a short “Reader’s Digest version” of part of one chapter, but if you are to denounce specific data with general comments as you do, I would rather see you take a scholar discussion with Christer Bergström - perhaps both of you will enjoy it.

Regarding the “big messes” you refer to, obviously in your opinion making it impossible to identify what happened to whom, and also initially referring to the “Myths” you might find it interesting to read the article by Dr. Alfred Price, “Myth and Legend” about the BoB, published in Aeroplane Magazine in two parts, October / November 1997.
To quote another researcher who might now face the risk of being labeled by you as among them providing a view as a result of “limited knowledge of authors, who often cannot understand the obvious”, you might find it interesting what Dr. Price writes concerning what he names as:
Myth 4: During the Battle of Britain there were large-scale dogfights between the opposing fighters:

“….These images provide a misleading impression of air combat during the Battle of Britain, however. When engaging enemy fighters, the side with the advantage in altitude or surprise would usually deliver a single “bounce” attack. After that the attackers would speed clear of their victims before the latter could reply. There were very few one-versus-one maneuvering combats between fighters that lasted more than 20sec. Any pilot who concentrated his attention too long on one enemy fighter stood the risk of coming under surprise attack from another. During detailed research into the action that occurred on August 18 I found no such combat. I found mention of only one lengthy one-v-one turning fight during the action on September 15."

Considering the above from Dr. Price and combining it with the fact that the Bf 110s forte was the high level bounce attack on unsuspecting fighters, which also can be verified by studying available publications, I find it no big surprise to read a claim that 25-30% of the RAF fighter losses where inflicted by Bf 110s.


Regarding your question specifically to me:

• No, Göring was far from being a fool regarding aerial warfare.
• The Bf 110 weapon was obviously not “Removed from the inventory” as you put it. After the actions of October 7 Luftwaffe receded, in daylight, to nuisance raids by small numbers of bombers and JaBo attacks why the Bf 110 long range escort capacity was not longer as needed as earlier during the larger daylight bombing raids. The growing need to build up the night fighter force to protect Germany from RAF’s increasing night bombing attacks grew in priority and the Bf 110 units were given a new task when the Luftwaffe KGs switched over to night bombings.
• It is no doubt the Bf 110 units got a mauling, some worse than others, but several Bf 109 units also had to be taken out of the front line during the BoB due to receiving crippling losses which set back their fighting morale to a level where they were not fit to continue.

My intention when posting the findings of C.B. was to give food for thoughts on the subject as I personally believe that the Bf 110 was not such a "complete “dud” as a weapon which was proven by a disastrously bad performance in the BoB after which the Bf 110 was taken out of its day fighter role for good". The reality is more in gray shades than black and white.

It can also be interesting to read the article “The Bf 110 …Hermann’s destroyer” by Captain Eric Brown, CBE, DSC, AFC, RN, in Air Enthusiast October 1973, where he states:
"In the Battle of Britain the Bf 110 fell far short of anticipation and its limited success was to lead to a widespread belief that it was an unsuccessful design. This was in fact, far from the case, for the Messerschmitt strategic fighter was not the indifferent warplane that its showing during the Battle of Britain led many to believe. It was an effective warplane but inadequate understanding on the part of the Führungsstab of the limitations of the strategic fighter category led to its incorrect deployment with the result that the Zerstörergruppen suffered some 40 per cent attrition within less than three weeks of the launching of Adlerangriff.”

As I am hinting at in my posting, the Bf 110 was actually effective when given the role it should have according to its design and concept – High altitude fighter escort, enabling them to bounce and zoom back to altitude.

Best regards,
Göran Larsson

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Bf 110 as traditional dogfighter.


The Bf 110 was faster than the Hurricane at altitude, but less manouverable, Right?

The Bf 110 was slower and less manouverable than the Spitfire, but better armed, Right?

The Grumman F4F4 was slower and less manouverable than the Mitsubishi A6M2. Yet it got the upper hand over Guadalcanal, due to tactics. Teamwork. Thach-weave, a.k.a beam defence.

Why didn´t the same apply to the Bf 110 in BofB?
In addition, the Zerstörer had a rear-gunner, which must have had some tactical value.
In a traditional low-spead turning manouver, why didn´t the rear-gunner shoot down the trailing s-e-fighter before it got enough lead to hit the Bf 110?
Was it due to some aerodynamic factors? or was it due to inadequate training of the gunners?
(This is for John Vasco. What would you, judging from your personal contacts with former Zerstörer pilots, say to the hypothesis, that they, being ex-single engine jockeys, had no thought for the tactical value or potential use of the rear firing gun.)


Birgir Thorisson.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Goran
I know where I am aiming, and I would say that post of Juha puts it in the shortest possible way. Sometimes it happens that after spending long years on research, someone remains incompetent. I note that any discussion with the man is senseless and waste of time.
That said, validity of discussed data is dubious to say the least, and I doubt if any accurate figure may be produced, partially due to losses of documents, and due to nature of combat.
I have read the article by Mr Price, and I think that you misunderstood what he meant, especially as he was (I believe) one of the first to describe phenomena of overclaim during the Battle for popular audience. Anyway, he meant long turning dog-fights of fighter-vs-fighter and not involvement of large number of aircraft in a limited space. Otherwise, he apparently had not searched long enough.
Finally, Me 110 was 'transfered' to other duties, and that means it was no more useful in its intended role, so it was removed from the inventory of day fighter units (please no discussion about difference between Jagd and Zerstoerer). Of course Mr Brown may have a different opinion, but then, does anyone know full background of decisions undertaken by the Luftwaffe's command?

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Gentlemen: Being a avid Bf110 enthusiast, I am finding this thread very interesting and informative with good information on both perspective's, Pro and Con. I would love to see this discussion continue, but hope that everyone can remain civil towards each other, as I have an uneasy feeling this may degenerate into another 'pissing match", the like's of which have occurred in the past. Thank you. Dean

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I've read that the 110 has poor acceleration compared to s/e fighters. Its maximum speed may have been greater than a Hurricane but I can see the problem if it was attacked while at cruising speed — it may not have had time to reach its maximum (and how manoeuvrable would it be when it got there?).

Rear gunner? One MG vs. eight, handheld vs. fixed, ring/bead sight vs. reflector. The guy had a hard job and I guess that the general rule about defensive armament applied, that cross-fire from a formation would be the most effective use of it. Also, I wonder how the Bf 110 was for blindspots to the rear. Still, some rear defence is better than none.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Very intersting discussion.

I have only a couple data points to add. First the reference to the F4F over Guadalcanal left out the most important factors: namely that the slow climbing F4Fs had plenty of time to get an altitude advantage for a diving attack due to early warning (and were excellent gun platforms for such attacks), the Japanese were forced to use the same limited approach route and Zeros were at the limits of their endurance.

With regard to the Me 109 and Me 110 in the BoB one factor not mentioned is that the Me 109 did not have a self-sealing fuel tank but the Me 110 did. I don't want to make too much of this because the thick skin in the rear fuselage of the 109 plus its duralmin bulkhead behind the fuel tank provided pretty good protection from stern attacks. I asked the question about fuel tanks on this board more than a year ago but got no answer so I hope the foregoing research data is of interest.

RLD

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello Birgir
already in WWI there were tactics for fighter pilots how to minimized the effect of rear gunner and in addition there were those already mentioned, one vs 8 mgs etc. Also during G-manoeuvres gunner had difficulties to stay on his seat not talking on keeping his gun on target.

But I agree with Göran and Christer B that 110 was better than descripted in many English language books. When used in right way it could be dangerous opponent. Spitfire was better but Hurricane only by a small margin and at least the combats between 110s of III./ZG 26 and Hurricane I Trops in N Africa before 109s arrived indicated that. hey fought more or less a draw there, usually the side which saw the other first won. Now Mk I Trop was worse than Mk I so my conclusion is that Hurricane Mk I was slightly better than 110C/D. Only an oppinion of mine, I'm not trying to convince anybody.

On the Christer B's victories vs losses table, if one checks the Spitfire losses from his source, a table in Narrow Margin, at least the table in 1963 edition gives different losses IIRC.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

R.L. Dunn.

I see the Bf 110 in 1940 in similar situation as regards relative performance as the P-38 and P-47 in 1943-44. Big, fast at altitude, but sluggish compared to ligther s.e. fighters. (I wonder about the diving charachteristic. Can´t recall any reference to that anywhere). What the Zerstörer had on the P-38 was the rear-gunner.

One light machine gun doesn´t amount to much, BUT, it is a more flexible weapon than fixed guns, and what matters is not the number of bullets fired, but the number of bullets that hit the target. Remember a certain scotsman named Jock McLuckie? He fought off a whole flight from JAAF premier fighter regiment, killing one major ace (Kato), wounding another, (Yasuda), and damaging the plane of the third, (Otani). The rest fled.
From the accounts I have read on the air-warfare (primarily in the early part of WW2, when rear armament is light,) I am struck by the contrast between actions when rear-gunners are a non-factor, and when they are very effective. I can only conclude that it is the skill of individual gunner (vis-a-vis the skill of the attacking pilot) that is the differentiating factor. I cannot recall any instance of effective rear defence by Zerstörer gunners. Thus I suspect that they were little trained, and held in low regard by their respective pilots, but John Vasco should know something about that issue.

Juha. A rear gunner is trying to get a bead on a pursuing plane in horizontal turning contest. Do you know how much he is constrained by G-forces and slipstream? Is there a zone, outside of which he is unable to get his gun to bear on the pursuer. (e.g. 15 degrees, 30, 45, or some other figure.) Is there any known quantification of this window of opportunity?

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I was once told by a Spitfire pilot (who flies the Temora Aviation Museum's Spitfire on showdays) that a standard rate level turn at 45 degrees exerts 3g at 300mph. That's fairly easy to picture and just gives an idea of G forces.

So if a pilot can function fully between 3 to 5g then there is no reason why a gunner cannot. However the limiting factor for the gunner is fighting the slipstream force acting aginst him.

Mick Mannock (of WWI fame) instructed his pilots that the best way to attack a single two-seater is to dive in fast from above left quarter, steady as if to shoot, and then quickly swing across to the two-seaters opposite quarter. The Se.5 could swing across from one side to the other faster than the rear gunner could drag his gun across against the force of the slipstream, especially if the two-seater pilot was manoeuvering at the time. And thats at only speeds of around 100mph.

So at speeds in excess of 250mph the forces acting against the rear gunner in a Me110 would be quite severe. A gunners effectiveness would possibly be more a function of strength than anything else.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I fully agree with Dean in both his points. Thanks to all for the excellent input.

Birgir, since only the barrels of the MG 81Z (Bf 110G) protrude, limitations aside from those of the gun mount, with a max. elevation of 48 degrees and 50 degrees to each side, would depend on the amount of G the pilot was pulling.

On the Me 210/410 the max. vertical movement was +80 degrees to -41 degrees, and sideways field of fire was -3 degrees to + 40 degrees. Since the movement of the weapons (one MG 131 per side) was combined electrical/mechanical, the maneuvers the pilot was performed would be the main source of problems for the gunner; as well as the need to resist jerking the aiming handle and causing a jam in the mechanism.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello Jim
one must remember that gunner in 110 wasn’t strapped as pilot onto his seat, otherwise he couldn’t use his gun effectively. After all he needed to align his head with the gunbarrel to take a proper aim. There are cases that even gunners of 410s didn’t stay on their seats during hard defensive manoeuvring in 44.

Hello Birgir
now P-38 was surprisingly good turner, read 109 pilots comments on Tunis air combats in 42/43. It was also excellent climber. E. Brown might have some on 110 dive behaviour. IIRC 110 suffered as 109 the heaving of controls at high speeds but was surprisingly docile at lower speeds.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Dean,

Good call, and I agree that this thread deserves to continue without degrading into something less constructive. Word in advance, for a change I'm thinking of setting examples and not locking threads.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

What means close escort? Right into the end of bigger daylight bomber attacks 110s tended to form their Spanish Rings, IMHO not a close escort tactic but trying to control a certain air space and producing a threat to RAF fighters planning to attack bombers, maybe tied at least part of the defending fighters to watch the threat and also making it possible to make diving attacks on fighters which ignored 110s and tried to attack bombers. The question was how eagerly 110s left the ring for an attack and IMHO that varied, sometimes FC pilots thought that 110s were reluctant to leave the relative safety of the ring, sometimes 110s gave adequate protection to bombers.

On LW air gunners generally
In the Richard Hough’s and Denis Richards’ The Battle of Britain. Coronet edition 1990 ISBN 0 340 53470 2. Exact location p. 156 note**, the study was based on opinions given in 1988 by some 100 surviving BoB pilots. 40 rated the quality of German bomber gunnery good or excellent, 32 thought it average and 30 poor. In text on that page is a short note of a combat where gunners of a tight formation of Dorniers shot down two British fighters and in the note is mentioned a combat in which 9 He 111s shot down three out of the first six attacking Hurricanes.

In both cases bombers kept their formations and in the later case, if I identified the right combat years ago, the first Hurricane attack was poorly planned and attacking fighters were caught by effective cross fire.

IMHO I doubt that the 110 pilots held their WO/AGs in low regard, after all they were a team and a team needed respect between its members to work effectively. Both pilots and WO/AGs might have low opinion on the effectiveness of lone MG 15 against 8 gun fighters but that is a different thing.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Juha, are you comparing the gunnery of bombers flying straight and level to the gunnery of maneuvering Bf110s?

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello Kutscha
no, I gave only a piece of info how a group of FC veterans rated LW air gunners 48 years after BoB. Only as an indicator of the level of LW air gunner training. I also commented that defensive fire was most effective when fighters used careless tactics while attacking a formation. And I have wrote earlier on problems which hindered gunner using free mounted gun while his a/c manoeuvred hard.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I'm a bit late to the party on this thread, still 101 things to be done following a recent change of address.

I'd like to touch on the defence circle (or the 'attack' circle as some crews disparagingly called it). A couple of examples:
1. The Croydon raid of 15th August 1940 involving the Bf 110s of Stab, 1. & 2./Erprobungsgruppe 210. Going in to attack the airfield, RAF fighters were already seen. The simple tactic,therefore, upon releasing their bombs was to climb and form a defensive circle(s), which was done. None were shot down while in the circle. What had to happen next was on a command, those aircraft in each circle would break for home as an entity. Wolfgang Schenck (and I hate quoting this guy on a regular basis, but he had so much information and knowledge that it would have been foolish to ignore it) told me that when he rejoined his Staffel (1./Erpr. Gr 210, the old 1./ZG 1) on 4th September 1940, he had chatted with Martin Lutz about the loss of Rubensdörffer on this raid. Lutz told him that 'Rubs' had got the break from his 'Stab' circle all wrong, resulting in Rubs (CO), Fiedler (Adjutant) and Koch (TO) being shot down, and Willi Benedens (who was attached as supernumerary to the Stabsschwarm) getting back to Calais-Marck in a badly damaged Bf 110. For the other two circles, 1. Staffel lost one Bf 110 (Beudel) and 2. Staffel lost two Bf 110s (Ortner and Habisch), with recent evidence pointing to the likelihood that Habisch's Bordfunker, Elfner, inadvertently shot through the rear controls of his aircraft in trying to fend off RAF fighters, thereby shooting his own aircraft down. SO, for the two Staffeln who got the break from the circle correct, losing one aircraft each to 18 RAF fighters (9 each from 32 and 111 Sqdns.) seems to be pretty good damage limitation. And yes, I know you must factor in the Stab losses overall, I'm just pointing out what the situation was with a well executed circle and break for home.
2. The defensive circle set in place on 27th September by ZG 26 when Erprobungsgruppe 210 set out to attack the Parnall factory at Yate near Bristol. ZG 26 set up a holding circle near the coast to await the return of 210 from the target. Now I don't know how good Luftwaffe Intelligence was with regard to the placement and movement of RAF Squadrons, but 504 Sqdn moved to Filton OVERNIGHT and were in place wonderfully to head-off 210 as they approached their target. Perhaps Luftwaffe Intelligence believed there would be no RAF squadrons in the vicinity of the target, and so believed 210 could have a free run in on it, while ZG 26 waited near the coast where it was believed the real intervention would take place. Hence the ZG 26 position and holding circle, in place to protect and ferry the bombing 110s back across the Channel, and mix it with any RAF squadrons that rose to intercept. We know that 504 intercepted 210 in the Bristol area, which was probably not part of the Luftwaffe plan, and more RAF squadrons intercepted around the coastal area and further inland, with consequent losses to the 110 units.
The above are just two examples of how the circle was used in the 'so-called' Battle of Britain (mustn't offend some people who say it never took place...!!!)

Another point I would like to quickly touch upon which has been mentioned in this thread, is the deployment of the Bf 110 fighter force. From the many interviews Peter Cornwell and I (and I'm sure Chris Goss also from his own research) did with Bf 110 crews, all those in the pure fighter units said that their role was close escort to bombers (immer, immer Begleitschutz). When you then consider the speed of bombers, and a fighter being tied to close escort to them, you can then see the huge disadvantage they were at when attacked by RAF fighters who might only be flying at just above two-thirds of their maximum speed. In other words, a Spit or Hurricane flying at 250-280 mph going after a 110 at about 200 mph. That is one hell of a disparity in air speed, and ability to avoid a sudden attack. That then lends some credence to the view that they were deployed incorrectly, and is supported by the famous request from a famous 109 pilot who asked to be allowed to have his unit roam free to hunt down the enemy and not be tied as any kind of escort to bombers. The decision to tie the Bf 110s to close bomber escort was a death warrant for many young Bf 110 crews as a result. One 110 pilot told me also that too many pilots respected the advice they received, of not pushing their engines to the limit. His attitude was that once in combat or heading for home he would push both engines to the max, and didn't give a toss about the life of an engine - his primary concern was to get back to base and leave it to the mechanics to decide if he'd buggered an engine on his 110 and it needed replacement.

I hope the foregoing is of some use in the ongoing discussion in this thread.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello John
thanks for the comments
What I was thinking were the Filton raid by KG 55 and the failed Yeovil raid when Ju 88s bombed Sherborne in error, IIRC during Filton raid FC pilots thought that 110s were too passive but 110s gave reasonable protection to Ju 88s during the failed Yeovil raid.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Thank you John! Much appreciated :)
Goran

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Wonderful input John, many thanks. Given the number of 110 vets you have spoken too, did any offer their own thoughts on how best the 110 could have been utilised in the battle Of Britain?

P.S. I do wish you would consider gettng back into writing and do another on the Me110. :)

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

As usual, this board is a wealth great of info.:D

Anyone recognize my nick?

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Jim,
Hardly any offered their thoughts on the actual best use of the 110. At the time they were young men, flying modern aircraft, drawn into a war, and just got into it. the odd one did give some additional views. Marchfelder said he flatly refused to go to a fighter-bomber unit, ashe was quite happy to fight in air-to-air combat, but not randomly drop bombs that would kill civilians. Schenck, who I mention from time to time, was a different kind of person altogether. He had served time at Rechlin, and got an insight into what was going on there in terms of all the experimental trials. He was what one would term a 'thinker', and so in all of my discussions with him (and there were several long ones) it was obvious that there was more to him than the usual pilot (that's not to denigrate pilots in any way - Schenck did head up 'Kommando Schenck' in 1944 trialling the 262 as a bomber, and become Inspector of Jet Fighters, so he must have had something going for him in terms of knowledge and ability). He felt the 110 could have acquitted itself better in the BoB had the pilots been allowed to fly it to its full capabilities. In other words, once across the English coast flying at full tilt, 'through the gate', to get on and stuck into the RAF fighters on favourable terms rather than at a disadvantage, as was most times the case.

As to some losses, well Hübner & Franke of 5./ZG 6 were given a reserve machine of 6./ZG 26 to fy one day, and once in the air they knew why it was a reserve. Clapped out. Easy meat for shooting down. And Wilhelm Schaefer of the Geschwaderstab of ZG 2, who had not flown since being fished out of the Channel on 11th August, was given his Geschwaderkommodore's Bf 110 to fly on 4th September. Very generous gesture by Vollbracht, until he and his Bordfunker were airborne and Schaefer realised both engines were knackered. Duty meant he stayed with his unit in the air, but once the RAF was encountered and the fighting began, his 110 was a disaster waiting to happen, and the best thing that happened was after taking many hits he was able to put down safely for both to become PoWs. So a couple of examples of why some losses occurred. I'm sure that is representative across all of the flying services of the nations involved at the time.

And there will be no more 110 writings from me. I have exhausted all of my research material. Everything I had is now in the books. Get the books and you have as much as I have ever had. The only writing I have left to do is to complete the story of my lunatic time with the early 1970s rock band I was in in Liverpool, and then parcel up two copies for my grandchildren for when they are old enough to read it.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Recognise it, I met the guy!

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

I'm not certain I understand the above comment, Juha. Are you saying that the gunner in the 110 simply wore a lap strap, or are you saying that the gunner would not wear the lap strap. The latter would, in my view, be somewhat dangerous for the gunner if the pilot got into some extreme positions and he ended up being thrown out through the canopy top panel.

I'm sorry to hear that, John, as I have always found your books to be of excellent quality.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Thank you George. Fernando and I did the 'C', 'D' & 'E'. Are you going to complete the set by doing the 'F' & 'G' given your extensive knowledge of these variants?

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello George
the gunner seat had very low back only up to the lumbar region, or what ever in English, and he was able to stand up if he wanted to fire downwards and for this he had a free standing belt attached to the floorboard. He well might also had a lap strap, at least for use during take offs and landings, but I'm not sure of that but probably he had. John surely knows the answer. Anyway he was not strapped onto his seat as tightly as pilot.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Karl-Fritz Schröder (Bordfunker, Erpr. Gr. 210/SKG 210/ZG 1) told me they would normally sit facing forward at their radio equipment for take-off.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello John
yes, with seat without high back that was the only logical position if the bordfunker didn't have 100% surety that there will be no crash.

Juha

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Thanks for that, Juha. But, the rear gun does not seem capable of firing downwards to any great degree. The field-of-fire diagram is for the 110E in which a framed cuff reduced the field-of-fire compared to earlier 110s. This was described as being introduced to prevent the shooting of the 110's rudders. Notice that in the attached diagram the gun can't even fire horizontally. Perhaps earlier gun set-ups could shoot beneath the horizon, but I haven't yet found any diagrams for these earlier set-ups.

In going through the 110 handbooks I found the following sketch which indicates that the radop/gunner had two seats, the forward, folding, one, with lap strap obviously, as John noted, for take-off and landing. And, the rear one for gunnery duties, with, as you mentioned, a strap attached to the cockpit floor.

Aw, John, you and Fernando did such a fine job on the 'C', 'D' & 'E' book that finishing the job with one on the 'F' and 'G' would be a great conclusion to your work on the Bf 110. I would be happy to help in any way that I could, but from your superb knowledge of the 'F' and 'G' that I have noted already, I can see that you would hardly need any.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

George,
I think that is not an 'E' variant. Maybe I'm nitpicking, but that diagram shows the earliest style of Bordfunker's central rear canopy, which is the fully enclosed type. Even before the 'E' came into service in late-1940, the central rear canopy could be seen with a central cutout in it for the rear MG to be seated centrally on a permanent basis. Also, some units removed the central canopy altogether.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Although not really adding anything to the debate I just came across this image and thought I would post it here to supplement George's post as it a nice shot of the Bordfunker's position on the Me 110. The photo dates from Aug/Sep 1940.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

You're right, John, when you say that the sketch of the gunner's position was not for a 110E. In fact that was taken from the 110B/C handbook which was later expanded to include everything up the the "G". I included it only to show that during the time of the Battle of France and of Britain, the radop/gunner had two seats: one for use of the radio and for take-off and landing; and the other for gunnery.

My reference to the 110E was made only to the firing diagram that I enclosed.

Thanks for the great photo of the 110's gunner's position, Andy.

Re: Me110: Ill-used in BoB
 

Hello George
IMHO in Andy's photo WO/AG sits on his normal seat, ie on the rear one. It was rotaring or swinging seat, whatever is the right term in English. The same system was in many a/c with WO/AG so that he could use radio when facing forward and his mg when facing backwards. The forward WO/AG seat is a rarity, maybe because in early Bf 110s WO/AG must also reload MG FFs with new magazines he needed more space and could not reach radio controls from his gunner position he needed separate seat for WO work.

Juha