Tunisian losses
 

Hello, the old thread was locked, so I started a new one.

I took some time to read a bit Playfair et al The Mediterranean and Middle East Volume IV London 1966

as background p. xvii "...We have seldom been able to ably our methods to the operations of the Axis air forces because the records are not complete. As regards the enemy's losses in aircraft, Italian records have virtually dried up, while German records describe a portion of losses on operations in terms of which we have not found an accurate explanation. [1 e.g. "Not by enemy action", "Unknown". The puzzle is because these headings, when compared with other information available to us, appear to express more than their obvious meanings.] Broadly speaking these casualties amount to a 1/4 of the aircraft lost, and have been omitted from our reckoning."

Rather cryptic to me. One explanation is that IIRC the writers had access to ULTRA material but of course only to use as a background material. Maybe they had found some conflicts between ULTRA and the then open loss info and revealt that on this rather hazy way. But maybe their way to handle those "Unknowns" explains the difference theirs and Hooton's numbers in March 1943 LW losses. (136 vs. 160)

p. 179 "...During the period 22nd - 30th Nov., in direct and indirect support of the advance, Eastern Air Command flew an estimated total of 1,710 sorties and lost at least 45 a/c, ten of them on the ground. The US 12th AF flew about 180 sorties and lost at least 7 a/c. The LW in Tunisia flew some 1,084 sorties and lost 63 a/c (excluding those destroyed by Malta's a/c), incl. 21 on ground and 3 to AA guns. The recorded Italian losses amounted 4 a/c."

p. 186 "...Between 1st and 12th Dec., in direct and indirect support of the advance, Eastern Air Command flew 2,225 sorties and lost at least 37 a/c. The US 12th AF flew 523 sorties and lost 17 a/c. The LW in Tunisia flew just over 1,000 sorties and lost 37 a/c (excluding those destroyed by Malta's a/c), 9 of them on the ground. The recorded Italian losses amounted to 10a/c."

p.189 "...Between 13th and 26th Dec., in direct and indirect support of the advance, Eastern Air Command flew an estimated 1,940 sorties and lost at least 20 a/c. The US 12th AF flew about 720 sorties and lost 16 a/c. The LW in Tunisia flew some 1,030 sorties and lost 17 a/c exclusive of those destroyed by Malta's a/c. The Italians lost 3."

p.278 "...Altogether, from the 27th Dec 1942 to 17th Jan 1943, and excluding operations against shipping, the British flew 3,160 sorties of all kinds and lost 38 a/c. The Amricans flew an estimated 3,200 or so (incl. 694 by their invaluable air transport a/c). for the loss of 36, so far as is recorded. 47 German a/c were destroyed, but total Italian losses are unknown."

In all the losses according to writers of this book were not very onesided and only after 13th Dec were the Allied losses clearly bigger than those of Axis. 13.12.42 - 17.1.43 Allied lost at least 110 and Axis 67+, thats maybe 1:1,64 for Axis advance which is much less than that of almost 1:4 in fighter to fighter combat in Jan 43. Maybe part of this is explaned by the fact that Allied bombers (excl. those hopeless Bisleys[Blenheim Vs]) were harder to knock down than the Axis bombers? Should have read lmore but ran out of time.

Juha

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Hi, Juha.

I am not that familiar with this area of operations, bue a lot of data gathered on Luftwaffe losses in general.

Could You pls give me a list of which units we are talking about and timespan?

Regards,
Andreas

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Juha
I presume they have noted differencies between monthly returns, daily GQ6 returns and possibly other data available, eg. from Allied intelligence, the latter including Ultra, wireless intercepts, crash data, etc.
I have been just comparing GQ6 (thanks to Jim P.) and monthly losses for a unit based elsewhere at the different time and the monthly write offs generally fitted to aircraft damaged 40%+. Generally it seems only aircraft lost due to enemy action were listed as combat losses - there were no missings, so I do not know how they were registered. Allied listings included aircraft lost in combat sorties or non combat sorties not depending on cause, so it is apples and oranges.
More interestingly, the unit I looked for somehow missed to record in daily returns about 6+ aircraft lost due to accidents(?).

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Hello Andreas
I'm at work now, but timeframe is 8.11.42 - 13?.5.43.
As on units, better check from Michael Holm's pages http://www.ww2.dk/.
But at least JG 77, JG 53, II/JG 51, II/JG 2, III/ZG 1 aka III/SKG 10, II/Sch.G 2, II/St.G 3 and a couple tac recon staffels, cannot remember the bomber units. And at the beginning zero unit, then rapid built up, then some units moved out some arrived and near the end only a few JGruppen and some other units. One researcher arrived, so I must stop now.

Juha

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Friends, according to Playfair’s 40-year old book, explicitly and admittedly flawed by difficulties to obtain accurate Luftwaffe loss statistics, it is said that during the period 22nd - 30th Nov., the Luftwaffe lost 63 a/c (excluding those destroyed by Malta's a/c) in Tunisia, incl. 21 on ground and 3 to AA guns.



I wonder which units should have suffered all those losses in only nine days. Anyway, in “Fighters Over Tunisia” (which I now have) one can find only 30 Luftwaffe losses in the air - losses due to accidents included - during the same period. The only figure which matches with Payfair’s old stuff is that 20 Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed on the ground. But where we shall find the difference between the 30 Luftwaffe losses in “Fighters over Tunisia” and the 42 Luftwaffe aircraft which Playfair implies the Luftwaffe lost in the air is an interesting question.

Abyway, due to the daily returns to the Generalquartiermeister der Lw, the Luftwaffe fighter units in lost a total of nine aircraft due to hostile action in the air in Tunisia between 22 Nov and 30 Nov 1942.

Obviously, Playfair's source for Allied losses also are flawed, since he writes - according to Juha: "Eastern Air Command flew an estimated total of 1,710 sorties and lost at least 45 a/c". - At least 45 aircraft? And Playfair apparently continues like that whenever he talks about Allied losses: "they lost at least. . ." or "so far as is recorded. . ."



I didn’t take the time to count the Allied losses listed in “Fighters Over Tunisia” during the same period - which occupies pages 62 - 79 in that book - but even a cursory reading shows that the Allied losses clearly were considerably higher than those of the Luftwaffe in fighter combat. Also, the Allies made quite heavy overclaims, which seems not to be the case regarding the Luftwaffe fighter claims.



Interestingly, the authors of “Fighters Over Tunisia” found that when II./JG 51 on 27 Nov 1942 attacked a formation of Spitfires and claimed seven shot down for no own losses, the corresponding Allied records gave no clue as to actual Allied losses. This is what the authors (Shores, Ring and Hess) found instead: “324 Wing recorded that of five sweeps made, two were badly bounced from cloud cover, but no details of the actual losses were recorded.” (p. 70.)



When Shores, Ring and Hess sum up the Tunisian air war at the end of the book, they write:



“Tunisia to the ‘experten’ of the German fighter force had proved to be a great killing ground. As the numerical strength of the Allies increased however, and the area over which operations took place got smaller, life became increasingly difficult for them. [. . .] Undoubtedly the Luftwaffe fighters had done a better job in Tunisia in early 1943 than they had in Libya and Egypt during 1942.” (p. 389)



And:



“The Tunisian Campaign [. . .] can perhaps be said was the last great heyday of the German fighter pilots in the West.” (p. 384.)



Or as the Polish fighter pilot Ludwig Martek of 145 Squadron is quoted recalling from the Tunisian air war:



“We [i.e. the Allied pilots] were always superior in numbers.” (p. 412.)

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Hello Christer
You wrote:" according to Playfair’s 40-year old book, explicitly and admittedly flawed by difficulties to obtain accurate Luftwaffe loss statistics,..."

Don't underestimate the book, the writers, who all were rather high-ranking officers (group captain, captain, RN, brigadier and major general) had access to all official documents, also those that were then and rather long time afterwards officially secret and so unavailable to other researchers, especially to civilians and they also got help and co-operation from official historians and from archives in other countries, for example from Germany and US. So problemsstemmed probably more on the fact that so much LW documents had been destroyed than an ability to track the material. But of course the book is old.

Christer wrote:"Playfair's source for Allied losses also are flawed, since he writes - according to Juha: "Eastern Air Command flew an estimated total of 1,710 sorties and lost at least 45 a/c". - At least 45 aircraft? And Playfair apparently continues like that whenever he talks about Allied losses: "they lost at least. . ." or "so far as is recorded. . .""

I don't see that as a problem, see above, but rather as a good professional practice. They might have noticed that there might have been gaps in their source material or that maybe there might have been losses that had not been property documented in the official documents and they made that clear to their readers. That was double important in this case because, as I wrote above, they had access to materials that were inaccessable to other researches. The problems with some US losses during the early part of Tunisian campaign is well known, for example.

OK back to work
Juha

Re: Tunisian losses
 

When the British Official Histories were written, the decrypting of Enigma was still secret, so no reference to it appears in them (other than the Intelligence volumes published after the declassification of the work at Bletchley Park). But they did prepare properly annotated volumes, and I believe a set of this is at the PRO in Kew. My memory says they are (or were) in the reference room, not the library, and not as accessioned items which have to be requested by computer. So their sources could be checked.

Frank.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Thanks for that info, I'll try to remember that when I visit PRO next time.

Juha

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Hi, guys.

I do believe the only way we can get any further regarding this issue is to get down to the basis and the hard records that does exist today.

I am also unable to check my records against Your comments here, especially when they are written like 'for the unit I checked some losses seem not to be recorded' like Franek just did. No negative remark really Franek, I just do not want to write an answer regarding apples, when You were counting beans....

There is one source in particular on the German side that has not been mantioned here in detail, namely the 'Summarische Verlustemeldungen' for the units involved. They do not give the details, but they definitely give the number of losses recorded.

I am currently doing some work in regards to checking these against the 'Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen' as published oin Michael Holm's web site. There are discrepancies, but it seems (conclusion this far) that these can be based on the following: Report timespan (losses recorded with dates just before a shortly after the end/start of the month not showing in correct monthly return), and unit dispositions (these records are by Gruppe, and thus a Gruppen-TO or clerk could have had problems obtaining the correct figures for his return, especially when seen against the above dating 'problem').

I will look further into this, and report my findings later.

Also as a general comment - an aircraft damage with a loss percentage BELOW 10% is not reported as an aircraft loss. In my work with the GenQu 6 Abt loss records, I have come across numerous records that are recorded and later stricken with the comment saying: 'Streiche .... da Flzg unter 10% beschädigt'. This could even happen if the pilot or a crew member was killed!

To know how the system that generated our sources worked is especially important when discussing like we do here, I even feel that some of the participants have not fully understood and studied the loss return system of the WWII Luftwaffe based on original documents, but are referring to secondary sources that are at best an authors comprehension of a given event.

Also one VERY important message, You cannot read the GenQu6 Abt listings to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth without comparing esplly to the above mentioned 'Summarische Verlustemeldungen'. The reason being of course that none of us have access to the returns for the following dates (without doing backwards reconstruction from other sources):

January 2nd 1944 - January 28th 1945
February 21st 1945 - February 26th 1945 (current research hints towards these never being completed)
All records after April 1st, 1945

The reason I am saying this is that the records for 1944 most probably contain a multitude of corrections and amendments to the records for 1943.

Regards,
Andreas

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Andreas
The unit I mentioned is JG26 in April 1942, so no way related to Tunisia. I have enough intriguing reports concerning the former, so I do not trust GQ6 returns anymore. :p

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Just to add to the puzzle, do any of you guys have Arthy & Jessen's 'Fw 190 in North Africa'? In their loss list there are numerous incidents that the authors list that are not in the GQ6 reports. They also list a number of machines found abandoned on various airfields - some listed in GQ6, some not.

Prien, in the later volumes of his JG 77 volumes, had a similar abandoned 109 list. Again some could be tied to a specific GQ6 report, but many couldn't.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Sure, Jim. I've found quite a few losses which aren't in the Genqu listings. Anyway, I see no reason to completely dismiss the Luftwaffe loss reports (Genqu or Summarische Verlustmeldungen). By comparing Genqu with first-hand material such as unit war diaries and logbooks, I get the impression that an absolute majority of the Luftwaffe losses are listed in the Genqu material.


One question: Are there any loss reports by any armed forces which are absolutely complete, 100% reliable, and completely untouched by human error?

Hasn't this thread strayed a bit from the original topic? Wouldn't the header to this thread rather be "General talk about just one example of a classical problem confronting historians in general"? ;-)

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Do you suggest that you have seen a representative sample of KTBs and FBs?

Bouncing back the question - are there any German loss reports?

No, this thread is still about losses in Tunisia and their reliability.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Hi,

Just a quick post regarding the 'extra' losses in the FW 190 in North Africa book by Morten and myself. The sources for those are either ULTRA or German records (especially the BA-MA records of the Führer der Luftwaffe Tunis). In my opinion, the Gen.Qu. lists are only about 75% complete for the FW 190 units in Tunisia and the Mediterranean. In particular, the Gen.Qu. list misses a lot of aircraft damaged or destroyed in bombing raids. This will be more evident in the next book by Morten and I.

PS - Thanks to Jim for providing Morten and I with many of the Gen.Qu. losses for Tunisia.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

I've found quite a few losses which aren't in the Genqu listings. Anyway, I see no reason to completely dismiss the Luftwaffe loss reports (Genqu or Summarische Verlustmeldungen). By comparing Genqu with first-hand material such as unit war diaries and logbooks, I get the impression that an absolute majority of the Luftwaffe losses are listed in the Genqu material.

Quote:

Do you suggest that you have seen a representative sample of KTBs and FBs?

I don’t know what your criteria for “a representative sample of KTBs and FBs” is, and neither do I know why you ask that question. I have a number of Luftwaffe unit KTBs (some are copies from Bundesarchiv and some from various private archives) and FBs. By comparing those with Luftwaffe loss reports (Genqu or Summarische Verlustmeldungen) I have found some losses which are mentioned in the former sources but not in the latter sources, but the absolute majority of the losses mentioned in KTBs or FBs are also listed in Genqu or Summarische Verlustmeldungen. Altogether, the KTBs and FBs which I have, have a total a sum of a couple of thousand Luftwaffe aircraft losses, maybe 10 % of all Luftwaffe losses, or maybe less than 10 %. Is that a statistically reliable sample, according to the rules for sample polls etc? I don’t know, since I am no educated statistician. Maybe someone here knows such stuff better than the rest of us?

Quote:

are there any German loss reports?

I don’t know what your criteria for “German loss reports” is. The answer could be yes or it could be no, depending on which criteria you use.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

How many of those KTBs or FBs reffer to the ETO or MTO?

Never heard there is any criteria for loss report. Everyone knows what is loss report but you. Anyway, have a look at any MACR to know what I mean.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Some notes on the Tunisian air war, based on Shores’s, Ring’s & Hess’s “Fighters over Tunisia”.



I am re-reading “Fighters over Tunisia” with great interest. To get a full picture of the air war of course requires a large amount of knowledge, so that one knows how to assess the caleidoscopic combat reports and place them into a context where conclusions can be drawn. The main benefit of “Fighters over Tunisia” is that it refers to an ocean of various combat reports. However, one thing I miss in the book is an overall assessment of various combats. It is easy to “drown” in the jungle of various unit reports. I find the final chapter, “Conclusions” - encompassing almost 50 pages, including many testimonies by the men who experienced that air war - as the most interesting part of that book. There one finds, among many accounts, this statement by the Polish fighter pilot Ludwig Martel (145 Sqn):



“We were always superior in numbers.” (p. 412)



We have seen how Luftwaffe units were drawn into one combat after another with numerically superior Allied fighter formations during one and the same combat flight over Normandy in 1944. See the article ”The Effect of Allied Numerical Air Superiority Over Normandy in 1944” here: http://www.bergstrombooks.elknet.pl/



The situation was similar for the Luftwaffe fighters in Tunisia (although the Allies didn’t enjoy the same massive numerical superiority in Tunisia as at Normandy 18 months later).



The description in “Fighters over Tunisia” of the air battle in the Mareth Line - Gabes area in shortly after midday on 22 March 1943 is interesting, because it illustrates the Allied numerical superiority in the air over Tunisia:



At 1250 hrs, a total of 24 Spitfires of 145 and 601 squadrons took off in two formations. 12 of these Spitfires, from 145 Sqn, reportedly met seven Bf 109s in the Mareth area. Then the other formation of 12 Spitfires also reported an engagement with seven Bf 109s in the same area. At 1315 hrs, 36 Kittyhawks from 112 and 250 squadrons took off and were attacked by six Bf 109s (whereby one Kittyhawk of 250 Sqn was shot down by Major Müncheberg of Stab/JG 77). Six more Spitfires of 145 Sqn were scrambled soon after this combat, and north of Mareth these Spitfire pilots “saw Spitfires, Kittyhawks and Bf 109s in combat”. An interesting note! Obviously, 12 or all 24 Spitfires and possibly all 36 Kittyhawks were involved in combat with the same Bf 109 formation. Since none of the various Allied formations reported to have encountered more than six or seven Bf 109s, it seems logical to assume that all these Spitfires and Kittyhawks - maybe a total of 66 Spitfires and Kittyhawks - were engaging those same six or seven Bf 109s. (The six additional 145 Sqn Spitfires reported that they dived into the combat, whereby S/L Wade claimed one Bf 109 shot down.) Then, at 1325, 13 Hurricanes of No. 6 Sqn. took off and was engaged by Bf 109s which shot down one Hurricane.



This is a perfect illustration of Ludwig Martel’s statement: “We were always superior in numbers.”



The result of this series of engagements was one Kittyhawk shot down for no German losses.



The massacre on Ju 52s over Tunisia on 5 April 1943 is another result of the US tactic of operating in large, concentrated numbers:



The formation of Ju 52s was escorted by only two Bf 109s (II./JG 27) and three Bf 110s (III./ZG 26). These were attacked by 46 P-38s, divided into two formations (due to the US report). The Germans scrambled whatever they could to aid the hard pressed formation of transport planes, but the whole reinforcement amounted to nothing more than eight Bf 109s from II./JG 53. The German fighter pilots shot down six P-38s, but of course were so outnumbered that they were unable to cover the Ju 52s against the masses of Lightnings. No less than 14 Ju 52s were shot down.



Later that same day, shortly after 1100 hrs on 5 April 1943, 2./JG 53 reported a combat with 24 Spitfires, whereby one Bf 109 was shot down. This matches with the Allied report referred to in “Fighters over Tunisia”, according to which 46 Spitfires of Nos. 72, 93, 111 and 243 “flew an offensive sweep over Tunis led by Wg.Cdr. Gilroy”. As a result of the Spitfire sweep led by Gilroy, the British claimed one Bf 109 shot down while they sustained the following own air combat losses: “F/Sgt. Nickless being shot down in flames, bailing out at 1,000 feet. Sgt. Faulkner’s aircraft was also damaged, as was that of PO Connors, who force-landed south of Souk el Khemis on return. Sgt. Allen’s aircraft was badly shot-up, one wingtip being shot off and a hole blown in the other wing.”



Regarding the Italian air force’s contribution to the air war over Tunisia, Wg.Cdr. D. I. Benham, who flew with No. 242 Sqn., is quoted saying this about his Tunisian air war experience:



“I only saw Italian fighters on about six occasions.” (“Fighters over Tunisia”, p. 395.)



On pages 436 - 437, Shores, Ring & Hess list the claims and air combat losses for the Luftwaffe fighter units in Tunisia during the period November 1942 - May 1943. II./JG 2, II./JG 27, JG 53 and JG 77 recorded a total of 907 victories against 157 own aircraft shot down in air combat. I wonder if Playfair gives any total sum for Allied aircraft combat losses in Tunisia for the same period? Due to figures published by the British during the war, the Allies sustained a total of 626 aircraft shot down (372 fighters and 254 bombers) over Tunisia during the period 1 January 1943 - 8 May 1943, but this source has to be taken with a grain of salt.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Christer
I would appreciate if you can keep on topic and to reply the questions addressed to you. To remind you, the topic is about actual losses of Axis and especially Luftwaffe in Tunisia. If you want to discuss Skalski's Circus, you can do so but in a separate thread. I have the ORB handy, so can immediatelly comment this but only after my return back home.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

More from ”Fighters over Tunisia” - on pages 438 - 440 there are lists of the most successful fighter aces during the Tunisia air war and their scores during the air war over Tunisia Nov 1942 - May 1943.

Due to this source, these were the top aces on both sides during the Tunisian campaign, and their respective aerial victory scores during the air war over Tunisia Nov 1942 - May 1943:

Axis:

Ernst-Wilhelm Reinert (Luftwaffe), 51
Kurt Bühlingen (Luftwaffe), 40
Heinz Bär (Luftwaffe), 39 at least (plus 22 in Libya in November/December 1942)
Erich Rudorffer (Luftwaffe), 27
Franz Schiess (Luftwaffe), 23
Wolfgang Tonne (Luftwaffe), 21
Anton Hafner (Luftwaffe), 20

Allies:

Neville Duke (British), 14
John J. Lynch (US), 11
Levi R. Chase (US), 10
John S. Taylor (British), 10
John K. Buchanan (British), 9,67


Anyone who now wishes to buy the excellent book “Fighters over Tunisia” only has to pay $400 to get a used copy. :p That’s true, have a look here: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/offer-listing/0854352104/ref=dp_primary-product-display_1//104-3524001-4463101?condition=all

No, I am not the seller, although I wish I were ;)

Re: Tunisian losses
 

What's up with all that blank space Christer, doesn't really improve your posts now does it?

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Isn't this OT, Ruy? But okay - I don't know. That happens when I write the text in Word and then paste it into this post form. It didn't happen with the 12 O'Clock forum which you had last month. Let's return to Tunisia now. . .

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Christer, according to "FW190 in North Africa", I have no confidence to the accurancy of Herr Bühlingen and Rudorffer 's claims, they obviously overclaimed heavily,
And I do have a copy of "“Fighters over Tunisia” , but NO ! I will not sell it even for $4000 !

Re: Tunisian losses
 

That is correct. The "Palm Sunday Massacre" on 18 April 1943 was carried out by a total of 46 Warhawks from all three squadrons of US 57th FG, plus an attached squadron from 324th FG, provided with a top cover by 11 Spitfires from 92 Sqn. The 65 Ju 52s which these attacked were escorted by 16 Bf 109s and MC 202s and three Bf 110s. Again, there were 19 Axis fighters against almost 60 Allied fighters - no wonder the Axis fighter pilots failed to protect the Ju 52 transport planes. The 15 Bf 109s claimed 7 P-40s shot down against a single own loss (in reality, the Americans lost six P-40s), so it must be concluded that if the numbers of fighters had only been even, the "Palm Sunday Massacre" could have had the opposite meaning - namely a massacre on American fighters. This only as an illustration of the significant importance of numerical inequality.

Here is a row of examples of strengths of US P-38 Lightning formations in Tunisia, from "Fighters over Tunisia", each time with reference to the US reports in question:


10 March 1943: 36 P-38s from 1st FG escorted bombers and were involved in combat with 15 Bf 109s.

12 March 1943: 32 P-38s from 82nd FG escorted B-25s. A little later, 30 more P-38s escorted bombers to attack Sousse.

15 March 1943: 38 P-38s of 1st FG escorted B-26s.

20 March 1943: 29 P-38s of 82nd FG escorted B-25s.

22 March 1943: 23 P-38s of 82nd FG escorted B-26s, and they were engaged by two Bf 109s. Later during the mission, the same US formation of bombers and P-38s was attacked by six Bf 109s.

23 March 1943: 27 P-38s of 1st FG escorted B-17s to bomb Bizerta.

When I described the US success against Ju 52s on 5 April 1943, my point was to describe it as the result of an overwhelming US numerical superiority in fighters in that combat. There were 46 P-38s against 5 Bf 110s and Bf 109s, later reinforced by 8 Bf 109s, and although the German fighters shot down six P-38s, they could not prevent 14 Ju 52s from getting shot down. Of course the result would have been completely different if the figures would have been reversed - if there would have been 46 Bf 109s and Bf 110s and only 13 P-38s.

It is true that the Americans made several tactical errors, due to their inexperience, early in the Tunisian campaign. One of these mistakes was to not fully exploit their numerical.

In consequence, the inexperienced US fighter units also were badly mauled by the Luftwaffe veterans. Here are some examples:

On 26 December 1942, 1st FG escorted B-17s, but lost two P-38s to German fighters while the German units sustained no losses.

On 2 January 1943, 27th FS/1st FG despatched eight P-38s to escort B-17s, but these were bounced by 12 Bf 109s of ÍI./JG 51 and the C.O., Capt. Glenn, and Lt. H. K. Smith were both shot down - by Fw. Anton Hafner and Ofw. Otto Schulz - without German losses.

On 8 January 1943, eight P-38s of 49th FS/14th FG, along with some P-38s of 97th FS/82nd FG and P-40s of 58th FS/33rd FG clashed with II./JG 2. In their excellent "Fw 190 in North Africa" (pp. 71 - 72), Jessen & Arthy write: "In this slaughter, the 48th FS/14th FG suffered three aircraft destroyed and two damaged. 58th FS/33rd FG and 97th FS/82nd FG losses are unknown."

On 10 January 1943, 14th FG again despatched eight P-38s on a mission, but these were attacked by Ofw Otto Schulz (II./JG 51) and his wingman, and one P-38 was lost without German losses.

On 11 January 1943, ten P-38s of 1st FG escorting B-17s again came across II./JG 51 and lost two more P-38s (one of them to Ofw. Otto Schulz) without German losses.

On 15 January 1943, eight P-38s of 48th FS/14th FG escorted bombers, while eight more from the 49th FS escorted other bombers. Both formations were attacked by Luftwaffe fighters. Capt. Fulmer was seen to crash into the sea, while Lt. Auton and Lt. Lawrence failed to return. Shores et al describe a third Lightning mission that same day ("Fighters over Tunisia", p. 153) : "Other P-38s escorted 18 B-26s . . . 12 Bf 109s of II./JG 51 attacked . . . records confirm the loss of two P-38s during this mission, the unit involved is not specified."

On 21 January 1943, another two P-38s were shot down out of a formation of ten 82nd FG P-38s.

On 23 January 1943, 16 P-38s of 48th FS/14th FG clashed with Bf 109s of II./JG 51 of about the same strength as the Americans, and the P-38 pilots Lt. Schottlekorb, Lt. Mark Shipman, Lt. Stuteville, Lt. Harley, Lt. Yates, and Lt. Soliday - a total of six Lightnings - were shot down without any German losses. Again Ofw. Otto Schulz - the Eastern Front veteran who started to emerge as a first class "Lightning killer" - was among the successful German pilots.

Here we can clearly see that II./JG 51 was the main reason why the 14th Fighter Group was so badly mauled that it had to be temporarily withdrawn from battle, as Sixnifty points out: At least ten, maybe over a dozen, of this unit's P-38s were shot down in only three of those examples above, all by II./JG 51 - which apparently sustained no own loss to P-38s during those days.

On 4 February 1943, ten P-38s of 1st FG escorted B-17s, and four P-38s were lost in combat with Bf 109s.

But the Americans eventually learned to pull together their fighters into formations which outnumbered the enemy, and due to this quite rational tactic, their successes increased.

The mass formations of US fighters started to appear in the Tunisian skies from late February 1943 and onward. Thus, on 25 February 1943, 1st FG pulled together 34 P-38s from the 27th, 71st and 94th squadrons to escort B-17s (together with numerous Spitfires). From then onward, the ruling phenomenon was this - as expressed by many German fighter pilots whom I have met and interviewed:

"Die Amerikaner kamen immer in die Masse." - The Americans always came in masses.

The tactic of despatching concentrated masses of fighters to gain an overwhelming numerical superiority against the enemy had been used by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain from August 1940, not without success.


The conclusion that "German pilots in Tunisia tried to avoid battle no matter what the odds" seems to be far fetched. Reading through "Fighters over Tunisia" rather gives the opposite impression, of very aggressive German fighter pilots actively seeking combat. On page 53 in "Fw 190 in North Africa", which Sixnifty quotes to prove his thesis, it is the Fw 190-equipped ground-attack unit III./SKG 10 which is dealt with. The task of a ground-attack unit is to deliver as many and as effective strikes as possible against ground targets, and for this reason, the ground-attack pilots are often forbidden to engage in air combat if they are not drawn into it. The ground-attack pilot has to drop his bombs, use his ammunition against ground targets, and then bring his own aircraft undamaged to base.

Also, Sixnifty left out the continuation of Spitfire pilot Peart's quote on p. 53 in "Fw 190 in North Africa":

"I think that all of the Luftwaffe pilots were good. I can't really comment on the pilots of the 190s because we had more fights against the 109s. The 190s weren't used in a straight out combat role. They were more attack, bomb and get out fast. They were fighter-bombers, and they wouldn't stick around for a dogfight." (End of quotation in the book.)

Regarding overclaims by II./JG 2, it should be noted that II./JG 2 fought much against the US aviation in northern Tunisia, and the US records for aircraft losses in Tunisia obviously are flawed by an unusually high degree of white spots. However, the comparison with Allied loss records in "Fighters over Tunisia" shows that the other German fighter units - mainly the former Eastern Front units II./JG 51, JG 53 and JG 77 - had a relatively good accuracy in their claiming. Not least if one compares with Allied or Italian claiming, which often was vastly exaggerated.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Hello!

For what it is worth.

Of the April 5th, 1943 Ju 52 massacre.

Anton Wöffen (Woeffen if ö is not showing) was one of the escorting JG 27 pilots and was shot down during the battle as was his wingman Uffz Rolf Piltz.

In his book "Ich war kein Jagdflieger-As" Wöffen writes about the battle on p. 118-119*. According Wöffen there was 65 Ju 52s which didn't flew in a concentrated formation but instead "everyone flew as they pleased". Additionally the flight altitude was relatively high, so attacks from below and behind were easy. Also Wöffen mentions that the Lightnings would have been escorting Marauders (these were two scouting Bostons instead?). Wöffen writes that he could see several Lightning formations each consisting of eight planes. According him the first eight P-38 attacked the escorting Bf 109s. Wöffen and Piltz were both down soon.

It is interesting that Wöffen writes 53 out of 65 Ju 52s would have been shot down, when the real numbers seem to be 13 out of 31.

Translator Hannu Valtonen has also added in the book the two losses as:

Uffz Rolf Piltz, MIA air battle 30 km ESE Cap Bon, Bf 109 G-4 Trop; WNr 15062, black 5.

Fw. Anton Wöffen, air battle, parachuted, Bf 109 G-6 Trop, WNr 16423.



Cheers;
Kari

PS I for one fail to understand what the argument here is. Does numerical superiority exclude the possibility that the pilots/planes/organization/leadership is equal or better than the opponent with fewer numbers?


*I have the Finnish edition "Sittenkin ässä", published by Koala-kustannus 2003, ISBN 952-5186-45-8.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Wöffen probably is confusing this with the figures for another Ju 52 massacre, namely that which took place on 18 April 1943, when 65 Ju 52s were attacked, of which 24 were destroyed and 35 damaged.


Of course not. However, when 46 American fighter pilots attack 31 Ju 52s and 10 fighters and 17 of the American pilots claim to have shot down enemy aircraft, I think it is reasonable to conclude that if the figures would have been reversed - if there would have been 10 American and 46 German fighters - the result would have been different. Also, ten German fighter pilots managed to shoot down six Lightnings. I think it's reasonable to conclude that more US fighters would have been shot down if the Germans also would have had 46 fighter pilots in that combat. I feel that the objections we hear rather are of the opposite nature, namely implications that numerical superiority is a negligible factor, and that any success in air fighting shall be interpreted mainly as the result of superior skills on the "winning" side. (I am happy that the Swedish ice hockey team does not draw the conclusion that numbers don't matter. Can you imagine "Tre kronor" with only two men on the ice meeting the Finnish team - or even the Polish team!:D )

Re: Tunisian losses
 

No it is not OT, since I am a moderator.

If the directives from some continue I think it may be time for me to set some things straight. Now we can continue with the thread.

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Ruy
May I expect your reaction? Christer Bergstroem's posts are off topic and not related to the subject of this thread. That is one thing. Another is that I still expect answers from him. How we can discuss anything if one side does not answer questions but goes off topic instead?

Re: Tunisian losses
 

Could you please stop telling me how to run my forum?

Since this thread has ended in the usual gibberish, I'll close it down as the first one.

Lets see if you are able to learn from your mistakes.