Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum

Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/index.php)
-   Luftwaffe and Axis Air Forces (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/forumdisplay.php?f=8)
-   -   Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations (http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=52404)

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 00:55

Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations
 
"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.160/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
A G.A.F. PATHFINDER UNIT.
Further Report on Ju.88 S-1, Z6+IN, of 5/K.G.66, brought
down in the sea off Brighton on 25th March 1944.
(Previous A.D.I.(K) Report No.141/1944).
1. The present report may be taken as the third of a series -
the first two in which were A.D.I.(K) Reports Nos. 64 and
108/1944 - dealing with the most recent G.A.F. pathfinder
practice.
2. The principal subject of interest which has emerged from
the interrogation of the one survivor of the Z6+IN is the
employment by his Staffel of a method of target pinpointing
known as the Egon procedure.
3. Since the issue of the last pathfinder report, the pilot
of the Z6+HK, who was wounded when shot down on February 24th,
has become available for interrogation and he has also
contributed to the information which this report contains on
the activities of I/K.G.66.
EGON PROCEDURE
4. On the night of 24th/25th March, the Z6+IN of 5/K.G. 66
was engaged in pathfinding for the attack on London; the
petrol tanks were holed by A.A. fire and on the way home the
aircraft came down in the sea through lack of fuel after the
crew had baled out.
5. The Z6+IN, which was equipped with the FUG.25a, FUGe.10,
FUGe.16, PeilGe.6 and the FUGe.216 ("Neptun") tail warning
device - the latter out of order - had laid its flares by
means of course and pinpointing data supplied by its own
ground control.
6. This system of controlling aircraft from the ground is
known as the "Egon Verfahren" (Egon Procedure) and in
operation depends upon response radiated by the FUGe.25a in
the aircraft being picked up and D/F'd by two Freyas.
7. During flight, the position of the aircraft is
continuously plotted by means of data supplied by the Freya
and necessary course corrections are passed to the aircraft by
ground control in the form of coded W/T and R/T signals.
8. Orders for flare or bomb release are similarly
transmitted, allowances for drift being taking into account by
the plotting centre; an accuracy to within 0.3° - or according
to P/W about 200 metres - is claimed for the placing of the
flares. (It should be noted that 0.3° at a distance of as
little as 150 km. is nearer 900 m.)
9. The Egon Procedure at present being used, relying as it
does on course and bomb-release signals passed by W/T and
R/T, is as yet only in an extemporised form. A new attachment
to the FUGe.25a in the aircraft will shortly provide for
visual signals appearing on a Cathode Ray Tube and will
eliminate all W/T and R/T course and bombing signals without
basically altering the present procedure.
10. This attachment is now being tried out by 4/K.G.66 at
Strausberg and according to P/W it is about to be introduced
into operational use; the apparatus and its method of
operation are described in a later section of this report.
Operation of Egon Procedure.
11. At the briefing for a pathfinder operation, crews are
given a course to the target and a height at which the flares
or bombs are to be released.
12. After take-off, the FuGe.25a in the aircraft is switched
on and Freya No. 1 plots the aircraft; the FuGe.25a radiations
giving the single-letter recognition characteristic of the
aircraft are received by the Freya and range and bearing data
are passed from the Freya to the plotting room.
13. The Egon plotting table is similar to the night-fighter
Seeburg Tisch; a transparent map of the area of operations is
laid on a glass table and the aircraft is represented by a red
spot of light which is thrown on the underside of the glass by
an automatic projector connected directly to the Freyas. The
course of the pathfinder aircraft can thus be followed
visually and any corrections necessary are given by Control.
14. In the vicinity of the target Freya No.2 takes the
aircraft over from Freya No.1 and thereafter no further course
corrections, but only the flare or bomb release instructions,
are given.
15. The height of the aircraft cannot be checked by the ground
Control and it remains with the pilot to see that his height
at the time of release conforms with the instruction given at
the briefing.
16. When marking targets over London the aircraft were usually
briefed to fly over southern England at 9,500 metres, reducing
height to 8,500 metres to release the flares. The height of
flight given at the briefing for Egon-controlled aircraft was
never less than 6,000 meters over London.
Communication with Aircraft.
17. The whole of the Egon procedure depends in its operation
on a short series of code-words used in communication between
Control and aircraft; these code-words are already familiar,
having been borrowed from the G.A.F. controlled nightfighters.
18. It, was stated by P/W that recently the R/T channels of
communication had been seriously disturbed by British
countermeasures and to combat such interference it has
recently been the practice to transmit all traffic passing
from Control to the aircraft in R/T and W/T simultaneously,
the latter in two different channels.
19. The R/T traffic passes on the frequency band of the
FuGe.16 whilst both the W/T channels are within that of the
FuGe.10 and PeilGe.6. One of these two W/T channels is
received by the aircraft on the PeilGe.6; this is on a
frequency of 563 kc/s., the signals being superimposed on the
broadcasting programme of Calais I - the familiar vehicle for
the outpourings of one William Joyce. The other is received on
another frequency on the FuGe.10,
20. The series of signal code-words, their equivalents in the
morse channels and their significant in the procedure are as
follows:-
W/T R/T Meaning
(Preceded by a/c call-sign)
KKK Kommen You are being plotted.
AAA Autobahn Change bearing to.....
RRR Rolf Bearing 5° right.
2 RRR Zweimal Rolf Bearing 10°right.
LLL Lisa Bearing 5° left.
UUU Kirchturm Height
CCC Caruso Fly straight and level cours.
ZZZ Pauke Pauke Open bomb doors.
-(dash) -(W/T dash) Pre-release signal of 3-4 secs.
.(dot) .(W/T dot) Bomb or flare release signal.
? Kurfürst Acknowledge that signal is
understood,(reply on FuGe.25a)
AAA HHH Autobahn Mat Set course for base.
(Heimat).
21. In operations the first signal which passes from Control
to the aircraft is the information that Freya No.1 has engaged
the aircraft and plotting has commenced. This signal opens
with the aircraft call-sign, e.g. CA1, followed by KKK or
Kommen; in subsequent signals the two letters of the aircraft
call-sign are omitted and the number only given.
22. The aircraft has no communication with its control but
replies to this and other signal, by manipulation of the
FUGe.25a - switching off for 3-4 seconds signifying that the
signal has been received and understood and repeated switching
off and on signifying the contrary.
23. Course corrections are passed to the aircraft in units of
5°, represented by the code-words Rolf or Lisa or their morse
equivalents; thus Rolf or Lisa = 5° and three times Rolf or
Lisa = 15°, In passing such instructions, Control signals the
aircraft's call-sign followed by the following type of
message:-
R/T: Autobahn dreimal Rolf.
W/T: AAA - 3 - RRR.
24. Whilst the aircraft is being followed by Freya No.1, any
necessary corrections in course continue up to the point where
the order is given to fly on a straight and level course after
which no further course corrections are made and orders for
release of flares follow.
25. When the aircraft is in a position to commence the bombing
run the order "Pauke Pauke" (open bomb doors) is given, at
which point Freya No.2 takes over and a pre-release signal of
a single dash is given, followed by a release sign of a single
dot.
26. The aircraft then signals "Quitting" (operation completed)
by manipulation of the FUGe.25a switch, Control gives the
order to return, and the aircraft is vectored back to base.
27. It is noteworthy that for this purpose again the
subterfuge of Calais I has been resorted to; on the last
flight of the Z6+IN the crew was briefed to return to
Montdidier unless the march "Kommt zurück" ("come back") was
played by Calais; on hearing this tune a landing was to be
made at Soesterberg. "Kommt zurück" was duly played and the
Z6+IN was on its way to Soesterberg when it came to grief off
Brighton.
28. It was stated that with the Egon procedure it was possible
for the ground control to direct one aircraft every ten
minutes; it is the practice, however for the flare dropping
aircraft to orbit the target after release of one cluster of
flares and to be controlled in a second run over the target
after an interval of six minutes to renew the concentration
before the first flares have burned out.
EGON GERAT - FUG.25a ATTACHMENT.
29. The introduction of the attachment to the PuGe.25a,
consisting of a Cathode Ray Tube presentation unit, will
dispense with all W/T and R/T signals as navigational aids in
the Egon Procedure.
30. The attachment, which was invented and tried out at
Rechlin by one Stabsingenieur BENES, consists of a unit placed
in the fuselage of the aircraft and a presentation unit,
placed between the pilot and observer, embodying a Cathode Rey
Tube of about the same diameter as that of the Lichtenstein.
31. The attachment was thought by P/W to have a common aerial
array with the FUGe.25a, the latter aerial being a rod about
35 om. in length.
32. The scale of the Cathode Ray Tube consists of a circle
divided into equal segments, each of which represents, and is
marked with, one of the code-words used in the Egon Procedure.
The circle is surrounded by an outer circle which is marked
clockwise from 0 to 9, the 0 being at 12 o'clock in the
circle, so that the whole scale has much the appearance of a
dartboard.
33. In operation, the Egon Procedure will be followed in the
manner already described, but the visual signal on the tube
will replace the aural signals at present in use.
34. A short blip, radiating from the centre of the tube, first
appears in the segment representing the appropriate signal,
such as "Autobahn". Bearings are than given in the same way by
a long blip, also from the centre, appearing opposite a
succession of figures in the outer circle, for instance 3
followed by 5 and 5 repeated represents 355°.
35. Course corrections can similarly be given by a short blip
appearing for example, in the "Rolf" segment followed by a
long blip opposite 3 in the outer circle, which would mean '3
times Rolf' or a correction of 15° right.
36. Height can similarly be given by indicating "Kirchturm",
followed by the necessary figures.
TARGET MARKING PROCEDURE.
37. According to the pilot of the Z6 + HK, which was shot down
on 24th February 1944, the Verbandsführer - Master of
Ceremonies - is being employed in target marking procedure;
this was denied by the P/W from the Z6+ IN, who was in another
Staffel, but the pilot of the Z6 + HK claims to have acted as
Verbandsführer on his last operation.
38. It was stated that the first pathfinder aircraft and the
Verbandsführer arrive simultaneously over the target and when
the pathfinder aircraft lays the first flares their position
is checked by the Verbandsführer from a higher altitude.
39. If the flares have not been correctly laid, the
Verbandsführer drops a single red flare, which he places above
the false cluster as a sighn to the attacking force; by then
himself proceeds to place flare in what he considered to be
the correct position. If by now the attacking force to nearing
the target, he is said to inform the formation leaders by R/T
in clear of the change in marking and that the false cluster
is to be ignored.
40. It is noteworthy that both of the present P/W were
convinced that decoy flares have been dropped on several
occasions during attacks; P/W stated that this would be
countered by the Verbandsführer announcing this by R/T and/or
dropping a flare of a different colour.
41. The burning time of the normally used single candle flare,
the Mark.C.50, is given as seven minutes and these are renewed
by the pathfinder aircraft, with the help of navigational
aids, in their sixth minute of burning.
42. The normal load of flares carried by the pathfinder
aircraft is eighteen Mark.C.50's; these are dropped in three
runs with six on each run, or alternatively in two runs of
nine.
I/K.G.66.
Order of Battle.
43. According to the most recently captured P/W, I/K.G.66,
although it has for some time had a strength of five Staffeln,
is still nominally one Gruppe. Up to 25th March 1944 the
disposition and equipment of these Staffeln were as follows:-
Staffel Equipment Base
1&2/K.G.66 Ju.88 S-1 Avord, forward base
Ju.188 Montdidier.
3/K.G.66 Ju.88 S-1 Cormeille-en-Vexin.
Ju.188.
4/K.G.66 Ju.88. Strausberg
Ju.188.
5/K.G.66 JU.88 S-1 Avord and Montdidier.
44. Up to about the first week in March the 1st, 2nd and 5th
Staffeln were based at Montdidier but continued attention from
Allied aircraft, including a fighter-bomber attack in which
three aircraft were destroyed, forced a move further back to
Avord, K.G.40 being ousted from that airfield in the process.
45. Aircraft of all three Staffeln still used Montdidier
operationally, however, and fuelling facilities were available
there; it was usual to fly from Avord to this airfield
immediately before starting off on operations.
46. Major SCHMIDT is still Kommandeur of I/K.G.66, he just
escaped being written off recently, however, when his aircraft
was shot down by Mosquitoes between Avord and Montdidier. His
crew was killed.
47. Hauptmann SCHMIDT, the Staffelkapitän of the 2nd Staffel,
was lost in the attack on Hull on 19th March; his successor is
not known.
48. Oberleutnant de MILDE, a signal officer formally at Halle
is Staffelkapitän of the 3rd Staffel and Oberleutnant BÖHMANN
now commands the 5th Staffel.
49. The 5th Staffel has sixteen officers on its strength, most
of whom are signal officers. Two of these are Leutnant
SCHUBERT and Leutnant MEUHAUSER.
ACTIVITIES OF I/K.G.66
50. It must be emphasised that recent P/W of K.G.66 have had
small knowledge of the activities of other Staffeln of the
Gruppe beyond their own; the W/T operator of the Z6+IN,
although he claimed a knowledge above the average, must be
classed with the other P/W since his information was mainly
from hearsay. He, like the others, can only be relied upon
where his own Staffel is concerned.
51. The 5th Staffel was formed in about May 1943 from
personnel of the 3rd Staffel, with the addition of some crews
from K.G.6. Losses, which have been heavy, have since been
replaced with crews from the other Staffeln of K.G.66 as well
as from K.G.54 and K.G.2.
52. This Staffel commenced operations with target marking by
D/R but in about December 1943.
December 1943 the Egon Procedure was practised at Rechlin and
later on from Montdidier.
53. According to this P/W the activities of the Staffeln of
I/K.G.66 are at present divided as follows:-
1st Staffel....
thought to be engaged as backers-up.
Navigational aid used uncertain.
2nd Staffel.... Pathfinding, using "Gee" (see A.D.I.(K)
108/1944).
3rd Staffel....
Known as the Störstaffel (jamming Staffel).
Radar investigation and jamming flights.
4th Staffel.... Non-operational: perfecting new Egon
apparatus as well as trying out a "Queen
Bee" aircraft.
5th Staffel....
Known as the "E" Staffel: pathfinding using
the Egon Procedure.
INVESTIGATION AND JAMMING.
54. The Störstaffel - the 3rd - is said to have commenced
operating in August 1943 in the fields of the anticipation and
attempted diversion of Bomber Command night attacks.
55. A few Ju.88 S-1's of this Staffel are variously equipped
with the Hyperbel Gerät, the "Naxos" search receiver such as
is used in U-boots for the detection of Radar transmission,
and a set known as the "Viktor 1" for jamming R/T.
56. In operations, an extra member of the crew is carried - an
English speaking signals officer - sometimes the aircraft may
be fitted with drop tanks.
57. When making investigation flights with the object of
anticipating Bomber Command's targets, the aircraft are
allotted specific areas of operation - the area off the North
Sea coast between Boulogne and Denmark has the code-word
"Rodelbahn" - and the first duty of the special W/T operator
is to discover any British navigational aids which may be in
operation.
58. The frequencies and bearings of such transmissions are
passed to a plotting centre which, using data from several
investigating aircraft, instigates counter-measures to the
navigational aids and the laying of decoy flares short of the
conjectured target.
59. Should the British navigational aids in use be discovered
in the earlier stages of an attack, the practice is said to be
to withhold any countermeasures until the later stages, to
ensure that no intermediate evasion of these countermeasures
can take place.
60. It was stated that the Staffel was at present only making
these investigational flights as far as Western Germany but
that they had already claimed some successes in their efforts
to divert attacks.
FW.190's ON NIGHT OPERATIONS.
61. It was stated that the, F.W.190's of S.K.G. 10 which use
Rosières and an airfield in Holland as their bases are now
equipped with FuGe.25a and controlled by the Egon Procedure.
62. Several pilots of the F.W.190's are said to have reported
wonderful bombing results before the installation of the
FuGe.25a took place, whereas they in reality merely made a
pleasant flight over some innocuous area and jettisoned their
bomb. With the introduction of the FuGe.25a many of the pilots
who did not understand its functions are said to have found
themselves facing a court martial.
63. The signal to the F.W.190’s to remain over the target was
stated to be "Walzer" and the homing signals the words
"Radetzkymarsch".
A.D.I.(K) S.D.Felkin
5th Apl.44. Wing Commander
AMENDMENT TO A.D.I.(K) REPORT NO. 160/1944.
Paragraph 27: Delete and substitute:-
"27. It is noteworthy that for this purpose again the
subterfuge of Calais I has been resorted to. In the last
flight of the Z6 + IN the signal for the crew to return to
Montdidier was to be the tune "Komm' zurück, ich warte auf
dich" (well known in this country under the title of
"J'attendrai") played every three minutes by Calais; if this
tune was not played, the crew was to land at Soesterberg.
"Komm' zurück" was duly played and the Z6 + IN was on its way
to Montdidier when it came to grief off Brighton. The pilot of
the Z6+HK also referred to a procedure of this nature. He
stated that the playing of a waltz was the signal to remain
over the target and the Radetzky March the signal to return to
base. No doubt the tunes played and their significance would
be varied from sortie to sortie."
Paragraph 63: Delete."

then in a second file this ...


"Further Report on the Crew of the Ju.88 8-3 Z6 + FH of
1/K.G.66) shot down by A.A. 5 miles N.W. of Alost, on 23rd
January 1945.
(Previous A.D.I.(K) Report No.142/1945)
LAST FLIGHT.
1. It will be remembered that this aircraft was brought down
while acting as pathfinder to a minelaying operation in the
Scheldt Estuary. The flight was described in detail in the
previous report and there is only one point of interest to
add; that after marking the minelaying point at the mouth of
the Scheldt, the Z6 + FH was to go on to attack the night
fighter airfield at Knocke/Le Zoute, for which purpose 18 x 50
kg. S.D. bombs were carried. If the lighting at Knocke
airfield was not on when the crew reached it they were to use
their bombs on A.A. batteries as targets of opportunity.
I/K.G.66.
2. It is confirmed that 1/K.G.66 based at Dedolstorf has
reverted to its old duties as a specialised pathfinder unit.
It is organised in the same way as when it operated against
England in the spring of 1944, that is to say with the 1st
Staffel using the "Y" procedure, the 2nd the "Truhe". (the
German equivalent of Gee), and the 3rd the EGON procedure.
There is, however, one important innovation; the lst Staffel
has been receiving instruction in a new navigational method, a
combination of the "Y" and Egon procedures, which will be
described in a later section of the present report.
3. P/Ws' knowledge of the Gruppe's activities was confined to
their own Staffel; they knew that the 2nd Staffel used "Truhe"
and that there were a number of German Gee stations, but they
did not know the locations of the latter and could give no
further details.
4. Shortly before the crew of the Z6 + FH was shot down, the
1st Staffel had received three new crews, bringing their
strength up to 12. Aircraft for these new crews, however, had
not yet arrived.
ACTIVITIES.
5. The present crew had joined 1/K.G.66 at Dedolstorf in May
1944, having previously been with 4/K.G.54, with which unit
they had flown 7 operations in Italy and 10 against this
country.
6. At Dedolstorf they did little or nothing during the summer
of 1944 beyond some very scanty training and they did not make
their first operational sortie until December 4th; this was a
weather reconnaissance over an area of the North See East of
the Thames estuary in preparation for a mining sortie in the
Scheldt that same night.
7. In about October or November it had been known in K.G.66
that the Germans believed the Allies to be planning a largescale
landing in the Bay of Venice, suit that K.G.66 was to be
moved South to take part in a "Total Einsatz" (full-scale
operation) against it. The landing did not, however,
materialise.
8. At the beginning of VON RUNDSTEDT's offensive a number of
aircraft of K.G.66 were detailed to mark an area near Eupen
where paratroops were to be dropped. The operation was kept a
close secret and members of the unit were forbidden to write
home until the flight had been completed. Some of the
paratroops were dropped from Ju.52's of T.G.30; about 100
aircraft in all took part in the mission.
9. A few days later 4-5 aircraft of 1/K.G.66 took off from
Dedolstorf to act as pathfinders for a bomber force in an
attack on some woods to the North of Bastogne which were
stated to conceal a concentration of artillery. They were
accompanied by 3-4 Ju.88 A-4's of K.G.200, the crews of which
were receiving pathfinder instruction from K.G.66.
10. When the K.G.66 aircraft arrived over the target the
weather was very bad with low cloud and poor ground visibility
and as the crews could not identify the target they returned
home with their markers. The crews of K.G.200, however, being
new to this kind of operation, decided to drop their markers
rather than return with them, the result being that the wrong
target was marked.
11. The Kommandeur of I4.1.66 made a complaint to Generalmajor
PELZ and soon afterwards the aircraft of K.G.200 were
withdrawn from Dedolstorf.
12. At about Christmastime some 12 aircraft of 1/K.G.66, six
of them acting as pathfinders and illuminators and the
remainder as normal bombers, flew another sortie to the
Bastogne area. They flew on a course Dedolstorf - Hanover -
Paderborn - Bonn/Mangelar airfield (marked by a searchlight
dome) a light beacon at Trier - a point immediately behind the
German lines, where the starting point of the target marking
run was indicated by Flak star shells. From the latter point
the present crew flew by D/R for about two minutes on a given
course and at a given height before releasing their flares and
ground markers.
TARGET MARKING.
13. The flight to the Bastogne pocket described above gives a
typical instance of the method of navigation used by those
aircraft of K.G.66 which did not employ special navigational
aids. The target marking run was flown on D/R and just before
the target was reached the aircraft began dropping their
flares. Ten of these were dropped in a straight line at tensecond
intervals - i.e. about 1000 metres apart - and laid so
that the centre of the line was over the target. The aircraft
then made a 180° turn, identified the target by the light of
the flares and then dropped coloured ground markers, usually
green, on the target itself.
14. The normal load carried was ten flares and two A.B.250's
containing ground markers. The flares were released from a
height of 2000 metres; they illuminated at about 1200 metres
and burned down to 200 metres above ground.
LUX BUOYS.
15. The Lux buoys used by K.G.66 for minelaying operations
and, as stated in the previous report, used by certain
aircraft of the Gruppe whilst pathfinding for at least one V.1
launching operation, are carried in A.B.250 containers. The
containers can, of course, be released from any height but
they must be fused to open, releasing the Lux buoys, at a
minimum height of 200 metres.
16. P/W said that in very clear weather the Lux buoys could be
seen at a distance of about 20 km. from an aircraft flying at
a height of 2000 metres.
NAVIGATION.
17. As befits a pathfinder unit, K.G.66 treats the question of
navigation as of primary importance during briefing. Full
details of W/T and visual beacons, Sonne, and other
navigational aids are given to the crews at least two hours
before take-off to allow ample time for study, and the
observer of the present crew states that with these aids it is
very difficult to go wrong unless the radio apparatus refuses
to function.
18. If the flight has gone according to plan the operation is
not examined in detail at the subsequent interrogation, but if
anything has gone wrong the latter is investigated very
thoroughly and the observer had to make a full report.
SPECIAL NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.
Egon.
19. It was stated in the previous report that a detachment of
K.G.66, consisting of three crews of the 1st Staffel and four
crews of the 3rd Staffel, was sent about the middle of
November 1944 to Zwischenahn where they were told that they
would have to fly sorties under Egon control in conjunction
with He.111's carrying V.1's.
20. During the first fortnight in December the crews carried
out a certain number of Egon practice flights but the weather
was so bad that the present P/W, who were members of the
party, made only one flight. This was to Texel and the
aircraft experienced severe icing conditions both on the
outward and homeward routes. Possibly as a result of the
aerials icing up they received no instructions from the
ground; on returning to base they were told that the Freya had
plotted them the whole way to Texel and back and had sent them
instruction, but had received no response.
21. The observer states that the usual operational height for
the Egon procedure is up to 4000/5000 metres, at which height
the maximum control range is about 350 km.
"Y" Procedure.
22. The present crew returned from Zwischenahn to Dedolstorf
about the middle of December. Up to this time none of them had
received more than theoretical instruction in the "Y"
procedure, but about a week later on December 20th/21st, the
W/T operator made one flight as a member of another crew
undergoing "Y" training.
23. This flight was from Dedolstorf to Wittenberg, about 100
km. to the E.N.E. The aircraft was controlled from a "Y"
installation at Dedolstorf consisting of one single mast with
a small aerial array at its head of which P/W could give no
exact description. Instructions were passed to the aircraft
over the FuGe 17 and when the ground control wanted to fix the
aircraft the W/T operator of the crew depressed the "Y" key on
his FuGe 17 for five seconds on request.
24. The flight was a failure. The "Y" beam became bent owing,
P/W thinks, to variations in the electric main current, which
fluctuated between 220 and 180 volts, and when the bombing
signal was received the aircraft, although still on the beam,
was at Magdeburg, some 95 km to the South of Wittenberg.
25. The next day the Staffelkapitän of 1/K.G.66 undertook a
similar flight, which was more successful. When he received
his bombing signal he was over Seehausen, only a few km. S.W.
of Wittenberge.
The New "X" Procedure.
26. This new procedure is basically a combination of the "Y"
beam and the Egon procedure. A "Y" beam - referred to by P/W
as "Oskar"; the code name known to have been applied to the
original "Y" beam used in 1940 - is employed in conjunction
with the FuGe 28, the FuGe 25a and a clock which P/W called
the "Y" clock, but which appears from their description to be
similar in principle to, if not identical with, the "clock"
reported in April 1944 as having been devised for the Egon
procedure. (A.D.I.(K) 160/1944).
27. The knowledge of the present P/W on the new procedure was
only derived from theoretical instruction. They had heard
whilst at Zwischenahn in December 1944 that the system was to
be introduced in their Staffel, but there was some delay in
obtaining the necessary apparatus, notably the "Y" clock, and
at the time when P/W were captured on January 23rd, only two
or three aircraft of the Staffel were equipped.
28. P/W themselves had received a certain amount of
theoretical instruction during January but only one of them -
the W/T operator - had seen the "Y" clock. They were to have
received airborne instruction on January 25th and 26th flying
over the North Sea one northerly course from Leeuwarden; it
was thought that the necessary airborne instruction could last
about 8-10 days in all and that early in March aircraft of the
Staffel would be ready to use the new procedure operationally
over the front line areas.
29. The type of "Y" beam station used is described by P/W as a
number of main aerial masts about 10-12 metres high
interspaced with smaller vertical dipoles which radiate one
main beam and a series of about six secondary beams on each
side of it at diminishing intervals, the first being at 13°
from the main beam. The array is located on a large turntable
for directional purposes. P/W stated that two of these "Y"
stations were at Leeuwarden and on the mainland near Den
Helder respectively.
30. For the reception of the "Y" beam the aircraft carries a
FuGe 28, the visual indicator of which is referred to
according to circumstances as "Kommando" or "Anzeiger". When
the aircraft is flying along the main beam to the target the
pointer on the dial gives "Kommando", that is to say when the
pointer indicates left it "commands" that a correction to the
left must be made to return to the beams. When the aircraft is
flying on a secondary beam, however, the pointer is referred
to as "Anzeiger" and "indicates" the position of the aircraft
in relation to the beams. When the pointer indicates left for
instance, the aircraft is to the left of the secondary beam
and a correction to the right must be made to bring it back to
that beam.
31. The reverse holds good when flying back from the target to
base but for convenience the visual indicator can be switched
over for the return flight to indicate in the same way as on
the outward flight.
32. The continuous tone of the secondary beam is undulating
while that of the main beam is level and the difference can be
readily distinguished by the W/T operator. It is usual for the
aircraft to fly along o secondary beam until instructions are
received over the "Y" clock or the FuGe 17 to fly on the main
beam.
33. The "Y" clock indicates by means of radio impulses from
the ground station a previously-arranged series of code
instructions similar to those used in the Egon procedure. Its
great advantage is that it dispenses with almost all R/T or
W/T signals between ground central and aircraft.
34. P/W did not know the FuGe number of this instrument and
none of them, with the exception of the W/T operator, had
heard any other name for it than the "Y" clock; the latter had
once or twice heard it referred to as the SNK-Gerät, but he
had no idea what these initials denoted.
35. The description given by P/W is strikingly similar to that
contained in A.D.I.(K) 160/1944 paras. 29-36. Basically the
clock consists of a cathode ray tube screen about 20 cm. in
diameter with numbers from 0 to 9 spaced at intervals round
its circumference. Each of these numbers denotes a code
instruction, the significance of which is given on the W/T
briefing sheet for each operation and is varied from sortie to
sortie.
36. Numbers 1 to 3 or 4 are reserved for the individual
aircraft and in explanation of this P/W says that at the most
four aircraft would be used as pathfinders proper, whilst
other aircraft in the unit would be used to renew the markers
and flares laid by these four aircraft, flying probably on
Egon or even on D/R to bring them near enough to the original
marking to enable them to correct their course themselves.
37. The remaining numbers, i.e. 0 and 4 or 5 to 9, are
allocated to the respective code instructions, such as
"distance from ground station to aircraft", "distance from
aircraft to target", "height", "change course left", "change
course right", and bomb release warning.
38. The "hand" of the look appears as a wedge-shaped blip on
the screen of the Cathode ray tube about two-thirds out from
its centre. It rests at a neutral position at twelve o'clock
and is moved to the various figures by means of impulses from
the ground station lasting only 1/100th of a second, and
therefore calculated by the Germans to be unjammable by us.
39. There is an aerial in a shallow perspex-covered bola in
the centre of the underside of the fuselage, but P/W could not
describe this array or say whether it was for the "Y" beam
reception or for the SNK-Gerät.
40. During its flight the aircraft keeps its FuGe 25a switched
on and is plotted by ground Radar, which gives any necessary
instructions over the "clock". According to P/W the positions
1 and 2 on the FuGe 25A indicate "Grob-Messung" (coarse fix)
and "Fein-Messung" (fine fix) respectively.
41. The method of working with the new "Y" procedure is as
follows:
The aircraft flies by D/R from its base until it picks up the
secondary beam of the "Y" station, along which it then flies
until instructions are received to move over to the main beam.
The W/T operator has his FuGe 17 switched on ready to receive
any instructions, and the FuGe 25A is switched on in position
1.
42. From time to time signals are received from the ground,
the warning to the W/T operator being a continuous tone of
about 2 - 3 seconds on the FuGe 17 indicating to him that he
is to stand by to receive instructions over the clock. Shortly
afterwards a small white indicator an the top of the clock
lights up and the blip moves round from the neutral position
at 12 o'clock to one of the numbers between 1 and 4 indicating
the particular aircraft being called. After stopping at the
number for a second or two only, the blip returns to the
neutral position.
43. The message for the particular aircraft called then
begins. If the instruction, for instance, is "change course to
the right by 15°", the blip will first move to the number
allotted to "Change course right" and then in turn to the
numbers 0, 1, 5, indicating 015°, returning to the neutral
position after each individual number, Acknowledgment of the
message is made by switching the FuGe 25A off and on again. If
this is done instructions are continued if necessary, but if
no acknowledgment is received by the ground control, the
instruction is repeated until acknowledged with the FuGe 25A.
44. Should the aircraft wander owing, for example, to
disturbance of the beam, fresh instructions are sent from time
to time by means of the clock. Shortly before the target is
reached, instructions are received via the "clock" to switch
over to position 2 on the FuGe 25A for a fine fix on the last
run to the target.
45. One minute before the actual target is reached the W/T
operator receives his standby warning on the FuGe 17 followed
by the appropriate code number on the clock denoting that the
markers or flares must be released in 60 seconds time. The W/T
operator or the observer then "stops" this time on his watch,
but the flares or markers are not-released until a red lamp
lights up above the clock; this may be a little short of 60
seconds or a little longer.
46. The bomb release signal could also be given over the FuGe
17 instead of over the clock. The method in this case would be
that at the beginning of the 60 seconds a morse signal such as
-. would be given and then when the time of release was
reached a further -. , the flares being released on the final
dot.
47. The clock is usually placed in front of the observer so
that he can acknowledge signals with the FuGe 25A, which is
also situated within his reach.
48. Although two or three aircraft of 1/K.G.66 are at present
fitted with SNK, it is the intention to fit all aircraft of
the Staffel with this new apparatus. The aircraft retains,
however, its normal radio equipment, so that it can operate
with either Egon or the new "Y" procedure as required. The
aircraft were flown from Dedolstorf to Celle for the fitting
of the SNK.
FuGe 217. (Radar).
49. The Z6 + FH was fitted with a FuGe 217. The crew had
little practical experience with it - they had used it on only
one sortie, in the course of which nothing was picked up - and
they appear to have had rather inadequate instruction in its
function, but they were able to give the following description
of the apparatus.
50. The FuGe 217 differs from the FuGe 216 in both the display
and the aerials. In the FuGe 217 the display is horizontal
across the middle of the screen and through the centre of it
runs a vertical white line which represents zero. The return
from the aircraft itself shows on both sides of this middle
white line, whilst the blip from the enemy aircraft shows on
one side or the other.
51. The range runs to both left and right, with an extreme on
either side of 8 km. The exact object of ranging from the
middle is not known to P/W and they can only suggest that it
may be to indicate whether the aircraft approaching from the
rear is to the left or right.
52. The W/T operator states that the crew had had this
apparatus explained to them merely as equipment for searching
to the rear and had never heard of it in connection with
D/F'ing, although having a vertical line in the centre of the
screen with display on both sides of it would indicate that
perhaps it could be used for this purpose.
53. Although the screen is calibrated up to 8 km, the actual
maximum range at K.G.66's normal operational height - some
2000 metres - is only about 4 km, as this is the distance on
the display between the return from the parent aircraft and
the ground return; the observer assumes that the minimum range
at which an aircraft can be identified is about 500 metres,
but it may be a little less.
54. Below the screen are three control knobs for focus,
brilliance and range; the latter has two positions, one for a
coarse setting giving the 8 km, range, and the other a fine
setting for a range of 4 km.
55. There is an aerial array above each wing surface; that on
the starboard wing, P/W believes, is the transmitter, and that
on the port wing the receiver. The main support for each array
protrudes rearward from the wing surface at an angle of about
35° from the horizontal, at a point about a quarter of the way
inboard from the wingtip and just forward of the aileron.
56. Running upwards from the main support, at a slight angle
to the vertical, are three feeders, each with a horizontal
dipole at its tip, extending about 15 cm. to either side of
the feeder. The feeders are staggered in length, the forward
one being highest and the aft one lowest; the latter is almost
directly over the trailing edge of the wing.
57. During lectures on FuGe 217, the instructor had drawn the
lobe of search and P/W says that whereas in the FuGe 216 this
was to the rear and downwards, in the FuGe 217 it was to the
rear and above the aircraft, with the deepest point only some
400 metres below the aircraft itself.
58. The explanation of this may be that the operations carried
out by K.G.66 were mainly those entailing a low flying height
- anything from ground level up to 2000 metres - and therefore
any contact by night fighters would be free the rear above
rather than below. The angle of search is about 30° from the
centre on each side, and there is a small lobe of search,
probably about 1 km, to the front of the aircraft.
59. Crews are not enthusiastic about the FuGe 217 and the
present one, although it had been flying several months with
it, had only once used it on one sortie, mainly because when
they switched it on it disturbed the whole of the radio
equipment in the aircraft. Not only the intercom, but also
ground signals over the FuGe 17 or FuGe 10 are upset, and it
also makes D/F'ing extremely difficult. Apart from this, P/W
also believe that the radiations facilitate the work of our
airborne search equipment.
JU.88 S-3.
60. The Z6 + FH, a Ju.88 S-3, was fitted with Jumo 213
engines. The crew are very enthusiastic about this aircraft
and state that with the Jumo 213's it has the following speeds
at about 2000 metres:-
2300 r.p.m............ 380 k.p.h. A.S.I. without bombs.
370 k.p.h. " with bombs.
2400 r.p.m............ 390 k.p.h. " without bombs.
380 k.p.h. " with bombs.
2700 r.p.m.(highest... 440 k.p.h. " without bombs.
cruising speed) 430 k.p.h. " with bombs
61. They themselves had never exceeded 440 k.p.h. and in fast
they usually flew with 2300 r.p.m. The rate of climb was
stated to be 8 metres per second with bombs at 270-280 k.p.h.
A.S.I. and 15 metres per second without bombs at 240-250
k.p.h.
PERSONALITIES - 1/K.G.66.
62. Oberleutnant HANSEN is Technical Officer of the Gruppe.
63. 1st Staffel.
Staffelkapitän Oberleutnant PIOTA.
Ia.(Operations Officer) Oberleutnant HEBERSTREIT.
N.O.(Signals Officer) Leutnant KUBLER.
64. The following are crews in the 1st Staffel:-
Pilot: Oberleutnant PIOTA. Leutnant ALTROGGER.
Observer: Unteroffizier SEMPF. Feldwebel HERMANN.
W/T: Unteroffizier KONNER. Oberfähnrich GRAUENHORST.
Pilot: Leutnant KUBLER. Oberleutnant TRAUBER.
Observer: Feldwebel MALLY. Fähnrich SCHNEIDER.
W/T: Unteroffizier SCHMIDT. Feldwebel BEHRENS.
Pilot: Stabsfeldwebel FISCHER. Feldwebel HOFSTELLER.
Observer: Oberleutnant HEBERSTREIT. Unteroffizier VOGEL.
W/T: Stabsfeldwebel BACHMANN. Feldwebel NIED,
Pilot: Oberfeldwebel JACOBS. Unteroffizier KELLER.
Observer: Oberfeldwebel JAGLA. Unteroffizier SCHONFELD.
W/T: Unteroffizier BINGEL. Unteroffizier SILKE.
65. Stabsfeldwebel FISCHER, who pilots Oberleutnant
HEBERSTREIT the IA of the Gruppe, is in the Stabstaffel but is
attached to the 1st Staffel.
66. Oberfeldwebel LEHR, a pilot in the Staffel, has gone off
to the Luftkriegschule and will shortly be returning as a
Leutnant. His W/T operator Feldwebel TOMASCHEK is at present
without a crew.
67. Oberfeldwebel SIEMER has left the 1st Staffel and is now
in the Kriegsschule; it is not known if he will return to the
Staffel.
68. Apart from the above, three new crews with an
Oberleutnant, an Oberfeldwebel and an Unteroffizier as pilots,
names unknown, arrived a few days before the present crew was
shot down.
2nd Staffel.
69. The following are pilots in the 2nd Staffel:-
Oberleutnant GUSZ.
Oberleutnant MADETZKI.
Unteroffizier ROTGANGEL.
Feldwebel ROTH.
70. Oberleutnant GUSZ is the Staffelkapitän; his observer is
Unteroffizier ULLRICH.
3rd Staffel.
71. The following are members of the 3rd Staffel:-
Pilot: Leutnant BERCHTOLD.
Observer: Unteroffizier GRUNEL.
W/T: Oberfeldwebel KURZ.
Pilot: Oberleutnant MEHLS.
" Leutnant HINZ.
" Gefreiter KANDZORA.
Losses.
72. The following were lost during the operations over the
Bastogne pocket:—
1st Staffel - Oberfeldwebel SCHMALZBAUER.
3rd Staffel - Fähnrich TULLNER.
Oberfeldwebel MOTZ.
Leutnant SCHUBERT.
73. The W/T Operator of the last named was Feldwebel LABINSKI.
K. G. 54.
74. It has been stated earlier in this report that prior to
joining K.G.66 this crew, had been in II/K.G.54. In December
1944 one of them met a friend from his old unit who told him
that II/K.G.54 was in process of converting to the Ar.234.
Unfortunately, no further details were available.
A.D.I.(K)&
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. Felkin,
19th February 1945. Wing Commander."


Bruce

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 01:02

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.187/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W.
AS THE STATEMENTS MADE HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED,
NO MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMAND OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED AS FACT UNTIL COMMENTED ON IN AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL
COMMUNICATIONS.
SOME FURTHER NOTES ON G.A.F. PATHFINDER PROCEDURE.
1. Since the issue of A.D.I.(K) Report N°160/151,4, "A G.A.F.
Pathfinder Unit", the two P/W concerned have added some
further details of the Egon procedure. This information,
together with some notes on other navigational aids, is
summarised in the present report.
EGON PROCEDURE
Operation
2. It was stated to be usual for five or six aircraft from
5/K.G.66, using the Egon procedure, to take part in a
pathfinder operation. Whilst some of these would be engaged in
laying the turning point markers, others, all controlled on
one and the same frequency, would be flying at intervals to
the target to place and renew the target marking.
3. According to P/W, although one Freya would suffice for the
Egon procedure, two plotting Freyas are employed so that the
second can give undivided attention to the aircraft which is
near and over the target, whilst the first Freya plots the
aircraft up to that point.
4. When a pathfinder aircraft has released its first flares
it is usual for it to make a 180° left-hand turn and fly away
from the target, leaving its bomb-doors open and maintaining
the same height as at the time of flare release; a further
turn of 180° then brings the aircraft back to its original
course for the second run-in.
5. Freya control is maintained during this manoeuvre and
course corrections are given if necessary; should the aircraft
be in the correct position for the bombing run, the only
signals from control are those for pre-release (dash) and for
release (dot). It is stated that the latter signal may consist
of either one or three dots.
6. It frequently occurs that aircraft which have placed the
turning-point markers also proceed to the target area to help
in renewing the marker flares. In such cases the aircraft are
given new courses by control immediately after completion of
the turning-point marking; the initial new course is indicated
in this case in degrees, e.g.: "Autobahn 128".
7. Freya control of any aircraft ceases immediately after the
completion of the task of that particular aircraft.
Range and Accuracy
8. The present Egon procedure is operable up to a range of
approximately 270 km. P/W amplified his previous statement on
the accuracy of the present Egon procedure and stated that he
had been told it was accurate to 0.3 degrees in bearing and
200/250 metres in range.
Communication with Aircraft
9. The P/W from the Z6+IN was able to add further code words
and their meanings to the list given is paragraph 20 of
A.D.I.(K) 160/1944.-
W/T R/T Meaning
3 letter code group Zeppelin
Originally (Rübezahl)
Codes used for
"control"
...--... Frage Question (precedes a
codeword if a
question is asked
MAR Marie Your distance in min-
(followed by a number) utes from base is ...
NTE Ente Your distance from
(followed by a number) the target is ...
SNK Schnecke (=snail) decrease speed
EXP Express increase speed
KRS Karussel (=merry-goround)
Fly in circle
REI Reise Reise Fly on as at
present
NAL 1 Kanal 1
NAL 2 Kanal 2
(The keyed (morse
(recognition) and un-
(Keyed signals
(respectively of the
(FuGe 25A.
CCC Caruso No more evasive
action to be taken
from now (prior to
bomb release signal)
AAAMAT+/+ Autobahn+/+
Heimat
Set course for base
VVV Victor understood
SAL Trübsal Have you enough fuel
(followed by a number) for....minutes flying
KKK Ich besuche Sie
or
Ich besuche Sie nicht
mehr, bitte kommen
you are being plotted
or
control finished,
please confirm
+/+ = amendment to previous list.
10. The signals "Schnecke" and "Express" are given by control
when the aircraft in ahead of or behind schedule. When control
sees that the aircraft will arrive too early, "Schnecke",
followed by a number is signalled, meaning "at your present
speed you will arrive...... minutes too soon over the target".
"Express" is given for the opposite condition.
11. Before the pathfinder aircraft has been released by
control the only communication from the aircraft to control is
normally by manipulation of the FuGe 25A switch, although if
specially requested the aircraft will resort to R/T or W/T.
Control frames questions to the aircraft in such a way that
they only require an acknowledgement and can therefore be
answered by means of the FuGe 25A.
12. The FuGe 25A is switched to Kanal 1 to transmit the morse
recognition signal and to Kanal 2 for the unkeyed tone signal.
Kanal 1 is employed until the aircraft is within 50 km of the
target, Kanal 2 being used whilst the aircraft is near and
over the target and under control of Freya No.2. The latter
Kanal enables the bearing of the aircraft to be read more
accurately.
13. Each signal passed by control to the aircraft must be
acknowledged on the FuGe 25A, either on Kanal 1 or 2. In
practice, however, crews often forget to acknowledge signals
and control therefore requests "Kanal Quittung" and awaits the
appropriate reply.
14. When control of an aircraft is being withdrawn, control
signals "Ich besuche Sie nicht mehr, bitte kommen" (I have
finished with you, please confirm).
Communication Frequencies
15. As an example of R/T and W/T frequencies employed on a
pathfinder operation, P/W quoted those used on the night of
24/25th March 1944. These were 40.5 mc/s on FuGe 16 and 4848
kc/s on FuGe 10, besides the 583 kcs of the broadcasting
station Calais I.
New Egon Procedure
16. It was stated that certain crews of 5/K.G. 66 had been
sent to Königsberg/Neumark for practice with the new Egon
procedure.
17. whilst P/W had little to add to his original description
of the Egon attachment which will be introduced into
operations at some future date, he believed that the
presentation apparatus of the ground-control equipment is
divided up into sectors in a similar manner to the airborne
apparatus.
18. He did not know details of the frequency, other than that
it is V.H.F. and crystal controlled.
OTHER NAVIGATIONAL AIDS Bernhardiner Gerät
19. The present P/W were able to add a few small details on
this subject to those given in A.D I.(K) 108/1944 paragraphs
37 - 39.
20. In October 1943, 5/K.G. 66 had a Do. 217M equipped with
the Bernhardiner Gerät, manufactured by Telefunken.
Oberleutnant Grotz and a civilian technician named Menzel or
Wenzel conducted some experiments but came to the conclusion
that the apparatus was not sufficiently accurate for
pathfinder work. It was thought to be accurate enough for the
use of bomber units, however, and at that time it was proposed
to pass the equipment over to K.G. 6.
21. P/W later overheard the Gruppenkommandeur saying that the
project might have been abandoned as work on the ground
installations had ceased.
22. One Bernhard (ground station) was known to P/W near
Chartres; the apparatus was about 30 metres high and was
mounted on a turntable some 40 metres in diameter. Each ground
transmitter was to work on a different frequency so that dross
bearings could be taken.
23. The aircraft equipment included a Hellschreiber
(teleprinter) some 40 cm. square. A paper tape appeared in a
window of about 30 cm. in length in the front panel, and every
30 to 60 seconds the true bearing of the aircraft and the time
of the bearing appeared on the tape. This equipment, which was
thought by P/W to work through the E.B.L.3., is remarkably
reminiscent of the Drehelektra described by P/W of the old
Gruppe 106 in May 1942 (A.D.I.(K) 104/1942 paragraphs 8 - 15)
and later by other P/W of the same unit (A.D.I.(K) 244/1942
paragraphs 11 - 16).
24. The range of the Bernhard was said to have been about 400
km. under ideal conditions.
Erika Gerät
25. Experiments in this navigational aid were conducted in
K.G. 66 under the direction of a civilian technician by the
name of Voss. The system was abandoned as being too open to
enemy countermeasure, and the instruments were withdrawn from
the unit. P/W knew no details of how the Erika Gerät
functioned.
Y-Gerät
26. P/W stated that 1/K.G. 66 used the 'Y' system as a
navigational aid; he had seen the switch for the FuGe. 28A in
one of the aircraft of that Staffel.
"X" Clock
27. Early in 1943 P/W saw a number of "X" clocks, of both the
larger and the new smaller types, in the technical section of
the Staffel. He understood that these were to be employed in
conjunction with Hohentwiel for attacking ships. He had heard
nothing more of this, however, and recently the "X" clocks
were no not to be seen.
Jamming of Knickebein
28. One of the present P/W stated that it was possible for an
experienced operator to read through British jamming of
Knickebein; he said that the genuine dots and dashes were more
pronounced than those produced by the countermeasures.
29. Another type of interference which P/W had experienced
with Knickebein took the form of rising and falling wail.
German Jamming of R/T
30. P/W could not enlarge on his previous account of the
activities of 3/K.G.66, to which he was attached for six
months at Cormeilles-en-Vexin, since during that period the
Staffel was still only under training for investigation and
countermeasure flights. He stated, however, that the aircraft
were equipped with a fixed wire aerial about 1.20 metres in
length fitted under the fuselage, and he believed that this
aerial was used in conjunction with the Viktor R/T jamming
set.
A.D.I.(K) S. D. Felkin
25/Apr/44 Wing Commander"

Dan O'Connell 30th October 2018 02:44

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Amazing.

Nick Beale 30th October 2018 10:29

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Dan O'Connell (Post 259911)
Amazing.

Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?

Other thoughts: (1) Bruce has done me a great service, at least — my microfilm print-out of No. 160/1944 is almost impossible to read, now I finally know what it says!

(2) If you're interested in the last flight of Z6+FH, on what was a busy night over Holland and Belgium, there's this http://www.ghostbombers.com/kf4/West/zeisig1.html and this
http://www.ghostbombers.com/Olga/map23jan.html

Marcel van Heijkop 30th October 2018 10:30

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Dan O'Connell (Post 259911)
Amazing.

The story of I./KG66 is indeed amazing! ;)

Best regards,

Marcel
(I./KG66 Research)

RudiS 30th October 2018 10:51

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Very interesting reading. Thanks for that.

Paragraph #74 of post #178 is probably responsable for the rumor that initially KG 54 was to convert to the Ar 234 in stead of the Me 262.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Nick Beale (Post 259922)
would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?
[/url]

I know I would, Nick.

SES 30th October 2018 10:58

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
[quote=Nick Beale;259922]Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?
QUOTE]

Hi Nick,
Yes what a wonderful idea.
bregds
SES

Marcel van Heijkop 30th October 2018 11:00

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Nick Beale (Post 259922)
Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?

(2) If you're interested in the last flight of Z6+FH, on what was a busy night over Holland and Belgium, there's this http://www.ghostbombers.com/kf4/West/zeisig1.html and this
http://www.ghostbombers.com/Olga/map23jan.html

Absolutely! Count me in, Nick!

PS: Is your website down at the moment? I tried to read the info from the links you provided, but couldn't get on your site.

Best regards,

Marcel

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 11:46

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Nick Beale (Post 259922)
Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?


Nick, I look forward to following whatever course you decide on.

For the record, within these P/W reports are references to 'captured documents': I hope everyone recognizes that this meant ULTRA or another sensitive source that could not be named at the time, hence my choice of the 'Using ULTRA...' thread for posting.

Bruce

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 11:50

Kg40 in item 37
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 357/1945.
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W. AS THE
STATEMENTS MADE HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM.
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED AS FACTS UNTIL COMMENTED
ON IN AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL
COMMUNICATIONS.
RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE - II
Navigational Aids.
1. This report is the second of the series dealing with radio and radar equipment in the
Luftwaffe.
2. As in the case of the first of the series (A.D.I.(K) 343/1945) dealing with Blind Landing
and Airborne Communications Equipment, it is based on interrogation of General
Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and a few important
members of his staff, and has been supported by a file of current papers which were in the
possession of the General’s Chief of Staff.
3. An index of the numerical designations of the navigational equipment mentioned in this
report appears in Appendix I.
4. For convenient reference, a translation of the document entitled "Funkausrüstung der
Flugzeugmuster, Notprogramm" (signal Equipment in the G.A.F. - Emergency Program) - item
45/99 ff in A.D.I.(K) Documents List 45/9 - which has also appeared as an Appendix to
A.D.I.(K) 343/1945, is reproduced as Appendix II to the present report but the list of equipment
contained in that document has been omitted as Appendix I gives a fuller list.
TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT.
5. Throughout the course of the war, the general standard of German navigational training was
undoubtedly inferior to that of the Allies. A simple form of navigation was taught but
navigators track plotted only and relied on W/T aids and in particular positioning by means of
loop fixes as the main basis for their navigation.
6. During the early part of the war extensive use was made of Knickebein and other beam
systems, but later this form of navigational aid gave way to the "Y" control system (better
known by the Allied codeword Benito) and "Egon".
7. Sonne was universally accepted as an outstanding success and from the time of its inception
in 1942 research was continuously directed towards overcoming its imperfection, in particular
the range limitation. Komet was a typical example, of attempted improvement on these lines
8. The Germans were patently backward in the field of pulse systems and the majority - if not
all - of their navigational aids of this type were copied from Allied methods.
9. The fear of the Allied countermeasures was much to the fore during the last two years and
considerable research and efforts was devoted to offsetting such interference and to perfecting
systems which would reduce and if possible preclude the danger of jamming. Another factor
always present in the minds of those responsible for tactical navigational requirements was that
the apparatus must be as light and small as possible because of the limited space available in
German aircraft.
10. During the last stages of the war, and as a natural consequence of German air policy, being
forced to concentrate on the defensive, thereby involving almost exclusive use of fighter power,
a great deal of attention was devoted to the development of simple navigational aids suitable
for single-engine aircraft of which Rübezahl was a typical example.
D/F LOOP EQUIPMENT.
PeGe (Peil Gerät) 6.
11. PeGe 6 was the successor of PeGe 5, the standard loop D/F, set in use at the beginning of
the war, and. operated on 150 - 1200 kc/s (2000-250 meters). It provided automatic D/F
facilities, the W/T operator merely having to tune to the signal and the "answer" being produced
on a course indicator.
12. In the opinion of P/W, who was responsible for operational requirements in the
navigational field and who had had fairly extensive navigational experience with K.G.40,
PeGe 6 was less reliable than the manually-operated PeGe 5 as the automatic D/F facilities
could not distinguish between the true signal and jamming and were apt to record bearing midway
between the two if they were near together. The human ear was much more acute and
could distinguish the minimum of the real signal from that of the "phoney” one. It had the
further disadvantage that it was a heavier piece of equipment than the manually operated set.
FuGe 141
13. The FuGe 141 operating on a frequency band of 58.0 - 59.2 mc/s was a receiver with a D/F
loop fitted to Air Rescue aircraft used for homing on to the NS 4 emergency radio set carried on
the chest by pilots.
14. The NS 4 had a flexible steel tape aerial and batteries which gave it an endurance of 2 to
2,5 hours.
FuGe 142.
15. The FuGe 142 using the 2000 - 250 metre band was a small D/F battery set for use in
emergency in the event of failure of the aircraft' s electricity supply.
16. The FuGe 142 had a manually-operated loop and its accuracy was only 10° to 15°.
17. When the P/W who, in October 1944, took over the navigational tactical requirements first
made its acquaintance, he discovered that the designer of the emergency set, while having the
laudable object of assisting a crew in dire emergency when they where probably well and truly
lost, had omitted to include any sensing arrangement. The set was, therefore, quickly scrapped
as being as much of a danger as an aid.
FuGe 145
18. The FuGe 145 was a simple type of D/F set in development for use in single-seater aircraft.
It was for use with M/F beacons and was designed for use by coastal reconnaissance aircraft, as
for example the Do.335, so that they could obtain a bearing when flying at low level.
19. It was much lighter than the PeGe 6 and had no automatic facilities, but was very easy to
operate. P/W had thought that it might ultimately supersede the PeGe 6 for other types of
aircraft.
Suggested loop for fighter aircraft
20. The research centre at Rechlin had been asked to examine a rough type of loop for singleseater
fighter aircraft, which would consist of a loop built into the pilot' s helmet. It was thought
that this would enable the pilot to establish the general direction of a beacon by movements of
his head and without recourse to the use of a compass.
21. This idea was tried out and seemed promising, but was never fully developed.
HOMING BEACONS.
Schwanboje.
22. The Schwanboje was a waterborne V.H.F. beacon dropped by parachute and originally
used by K.G.40 for marking convoys or submarines. In the autumn of 1944 a 1ine of Schwan
buoys was used to aid the He.111's when launching V-1’s from the North Sea against this
country.
23. The beacon consisted of a frame aerial and transmitted on a wavelength which could be
homed on by the FuGe 17, the standard equipment of K.G.40 in 1942 when the Schwanboje
came into use.
24. The set was powered by accumulators and had a live of five hours; by the means of a
clockwork device it could be pre-set before release so that it ran for a testing period
immediately on release and later started up again after a prescribed interval governed by the
expected time of arrival of the homing aircraft. The buoy was fitted with a self-destroying
charge operated automatically.
25. A later type of Schwanboje operated on the 38 - 42 mc/s waveband so that aircraft
equipped with the FuGe 162 could also use the system.
Biene
26. Biene is the code word for a responder beacon. The idea of responder beacons for homing
purposes had only been hit on in 1944 and Bienen to respond to the different airborne radar sets
were still under development in 1945. The FuGe 243 - Hohentwiel Biene – had been used by
coastal units in Norway, in February or March 1945.
27. Responder beacons were also being developed for use in the Baldur method of navigation
(see paragraphs 79, 82 of this report).
BEAM SYSTEMS.
Zyklop.
28. This was the latest form of the well-known Knickebein working on 30 - 33,3 mc/s and
received by E.B.L.3 in the aircraft. It was a mobile station which could be fully erected into
operation within a week.
29. A still more mobile unit known as the Bock-Zyklop had been introduced. This could be set
up in three days and could be adapted for use on the FuGe 16 frequency although as yet,
according to documents, no visual indicator for the FuGe 16 had been developed.
30. The 120 W ground transmitter was called the ???? which gave a beam 0.5° wide and a
range of 300 km. at a height of 5,000 meters. The Zyklop systems had been made use of on the
Russian front up to the end of the hostilities.
Sonne.
31. The Sonne beacon system which worked on a frequency of 270 - 480 kc/s was received in
the aircraft on the FuGe 10. It was considered an extremely effective daylight system but the
range limitation was a disadvantage. Fixes could be obtained from ranges up to 1,000 - 1,200
km. Sonne 6 at Quimper which was the most efficient of the Sonne beacons, had been used on
an occasion at a distance of 1,400 km.
32. The sectors served by Sonne covered, an angle of 120 – 150°. The beacon was very reliable
over the centre sector of 100°, but the error increased progressively towards the edges of the
beam in conformity with the sine law.
33. At night errors up to 4° were liable to occur even in the centre of the sector of the beacon
and no real use could be made of it.
Mond.
34. To improve the Sonne beacons both in range, and accuracy, an experimental system
working on the same principle, but on 3000/6000 kc/s was tried out in 1942. The shorter wave
transmission did not prove very reliable and was given up about the end of 1943.
Stern.
35. Finally a beacon of the Sonne type under the name "Stern" was designed for use on a V.H.
frequency. It, not unnaturally, only gave optical range and was, therefore, of no practical value
and was not developed.
Dora.
36. One P/W had seen documentary mention of Dora which he believed was a navigational aid
system and a precursor of Komet. He did not know whether it worked on the same principle but
the Komet experimental site at Kolby was on the former Dora site.
Komet.
37. In 1942 the question of navigation over the Atlantic stood in the limelight . As the He 177
was supposed to be coming into service shortly to enable K.G.40 to reach further West, the
need for navigational equipment of longer range became acute.
38. A year or so earlier Professor von HANDEL had categorically stated in a lecture that a
long-range navigational system based on pulse would inevitably be extremely inaccurate.
In view of Professor von HANDEL's views on pulse systems, an improved form of Sonne
which would give much greater ranges and be less susceptible to night effect was given high
priority.
39. The system evolved was called "Komet" and experimental stations were erected at
Bordeaux and Kolby (see A.D.I.(K) 364/1944). The ground station called for an array of no less
than 127 masts and 19 control huts in order to cover a 90° sector. It worked admirably provided
a 10° sector only was covered, but as soon as the planned 90° sector was put into operation,
mutual interference between the masts arose and the various lobes radiated were no longer of
symmetrical pattern, with the result that large errors crept in.
40. Research on this delayed the project considerably. After the invasion when long distance
reconnaissance in the Atlantic was no longer practical politics, the Komet system was given up
without ever having been effectively used. The development people were the more pleased to
dispense with it since it left the German radio research and industry free to deal with other more
urgent matters.
41. The beacon was to operate on frequencies of 5000, 9000 or 12,000 kc/s received on the
FuGe 10K, and it was estimated that ranges up to 3000 km would be obtained. The system
employed was to be similar to that used in the Sonne but instead of obtaining one reading per
minute, oscillation of the beam was to be speeded up to give 100 readings par minute.
42. The true bearing of the aircraft was automatically recorded by the FuGe 124 which was
known as the Kometschreiber. The recording took the form of a series of vertical lines, one for
each reading, printed on a strip of paper. At the same time as the lines were printed the
Kometschreiber recorded the section of the swept area in which the aircraft was flying, thus
giving what amounted to a rough position.
43. The fine reading was obtained from the length of the recorded lines. Any inaccuracies due
to night effect could be easily eliminated by averaging the length of the lines, as recorded, on
the paper strip, by eye.
Erika.
44. Erika was a navigation system (see A.D.I.(K) 364 and 409/1944.) which had already
reached the development stage in 1942 but its operational employment was of brief duration
and it was soon discarded in favour of Bernhard.
45. Erika was based on the principle of a V.H.F. (30 - 33 mc/s) beam oscillating rapidly over a
segment of about 60 – 90°. The beam was phased, a different phase being picked up in different
sections of the segment and read off in relation to a standard phase producer in the aircraft. In
order to obtain a fix, two such Erika stations had to be received and to receive each station no
less than two E.B.L.3's were necessary making a total of four receivers.
46. The range presentation unit in the aircraft, FuGe 121, took the form of a clock-face with a
needle indicator and calibrated, P/W thought, from 0 -100. A specially prepared map was
required to establish bearing.
47. A disadvantage of Erika was the vulnerability to jamming, interference signals modifying
the phase and thereby giving inaccurate readings. The great weight, carried and the bulk of the
four receivers, which were particularly cumbersome in the relatively small aircraft in use in the
G.A.F. made its widespread use impracticable.
Bernhardine.
48. This system was first introduced in 1942 for use by bomber aircraft, but was later dropped
in favour of the Benito and Egon control systems. With the increasing British jamming during
night raids it was reintroduced for use in night fighter commentary (see A.D.I.(K) 125/1945,
paras.5 to 29), which it was thought could only be jammed with great difficulty.
49. The term “Bernhard” was used for the ground stations whilst the airborne recording
equipment was called Bernhardine or FuGe 120. The latter made use of the E.B.L.3. receiver as
the transmissions lay in the 30-33 mc/s band.
50. At the time of the German capitulation, the following three transmitting stations were in
operation, the first two, of which could transmit commentary.-
-Thisted, on N.W. coast of Denmark.
-Bretstedt, N. of Husum, Germany.
-Trebbin, S.E. of Berlin.
51. A further station near Breslau had been almost completed when it had to be dismantled on
account of the Russian advance. Additional stations were in the course of construction near
Kassel, Munich, Pilsen and Vienna.
52. The Bernhardine system was looked upon as a considerable improvement on Erika. It gave
360° coverage as compared to 60/90° with Erika and, whereas from the jamming aspect stray
signals could disturb the phase of Erika causing false indication, in the case of Bernhardine,
interference merely resulted in no reading being possible, and furthermore to attain this through
360° a very powerful jamming transmitter flying near the ground station would be needed.
53. The Bernhardine system was not regarded as unjammable but it was thought that use of
high power and aerial gain would render jamming by airborne means impracticable.
54. In addition to the E.B.L.3 receiver, the airborne Hellschreiber FuGe 120, also called the
Bernhardine, which gave both bearing and commentary was employed. According to P/W the
FuGe 120 was large and weighty and the first improvement aimed at was to reduce the weight
and provide a set which occupied less space in the aircraft. To this end an attempt was made to
eliminate the use of paper strip for the Hellschreiber and a rotating "Folienschreiber" a
cellophane paper moving over a sticky carbon surface which constituted a self-eraser - was
employed. This projected recording method proved a failure and the use of paper strip had to
be reverted to. According to documents the type using paper strip was known as FuGe 120a,
and the self-erasing recorder FuGe 120b.
55. A smaller model, the FuGe 120k, to operate on the paper strip principle which constituted
the latest improvement, was still in the development stage at the conclusion of hostilities.
Previously the ground transmitter broadcast simultaneously from the upper and lower aerial
arrays on two frequencies close enough to one another for them both to be received on one
channel of the E.B.L.3. One lobe was used for coarse D/F, the other for fine. The two
frequencies were then separated by a filter before being fed into the Hellschreiber. The FuGe
120k was designed for use with a ground transmitter operating only on the coarse D/F
frequency. The filter could therefore be dispensed with and considerable weight saved in the
airborne set at the expense of some accuracy in D/F.
56. With the loss of D/F accuracy the sharp “V” in the vertical printing indicating the reading
(see diagram A.D.I.(K) 125/1945 para.18) became a gap about 4° wide. To facilitate the
reading of the centre of the gap by eye, and to reduce the size and weight of the apparatus, the
vertical lines referred to above were superimposed on the scale which could then only be read
in the gap. This allowed the paper strip to be considerably narrower.
57. The FuGe 120k was designed primarily for use in single seat jet aircraft but was also to be
embodied in the Ju.88 where space was at a premium, as soon as sufficient numbers of this set
were available.
Hermine.
58. The Hermine system was originally developed, in response to a tactical requirement
formulated during the second part of 1942, as a navigational aid for the purpose of giving an
approximate bearing to single-engine night fighters engaged on “Wilde Sau” operations.
59. By the time the initial difficulties in development had been overcome Wilde Sau night
fighting had almost ceased; it was found however that Hermine could be used to advantage by
day fighters, and it came into operational use.
60. An accuracy of ±5° was assumed, but it was found in practice that this could be improved
upon to ±3° by experienced pilots.
61. Thirteen or fourteen ground stations were in operation by Easter 1945 which, P/W claimed,
gave complete coverage of the Reich. It was intended to fit two Schlechtwetter (bad weather)
Fighter Geschwader with the necessary airborne equipment, and this program had been onethird
completed by May 1945. One P/W had heard that ten to fifteen Me.262's of K.G.51 were
amongst the aircraft so equipped.
62. The following may be added in modification of the description of the Hermine system
given in A.D.I.(K) 125/1945, paras.59 to 62. The Hermine rotating beacon transmits a
continuous tone on which is superimposed a speaking clock which counts from 1 to 35, each
figure representing tens of degree. Over an angle of about 15° the continuous tone falls to a
minimum and rises again. During this period the voice appears to become more audible and the
pilot can estimate where the minimum of continuous tone occurs, and so obtain his bearing
from the beacon.
63. The beacon recognition is given by means of a self-evident code name for example,
"Berolina” for Berlin – which is spoken by the voice in place of 000°.
64. The airborne equipment is the FuGe 125 consisting of the E.B.L.3 with the Tzg
(Telephoniezusatzgerät) which enables the 30.0 - 33.3 mc/s transmission picked up on the
E.B.L.3 receiver to be heard in the pilot's headphones. Though the Hermine beacons were fully
operational there was a scarcity of FuGe 125 sets, as a result of which practical experience of
this system was too limited to judge of its efficiency or to lead to further improved tactical
requirements been formulated.
PULSE SYSTEM.
Ingolstadt
65. All the P/W had heard reference to Ingolstadt and agreed that it was a long-range
navigational system.
66. One P/W thought that Ingolstadt was the cover name for a pulse navigation system using
hyperbolic curves and similar to British Gee; it was originated by Telefunken in 1938 but was
then turned down by the R.L.M. In his recollection the original Telefunken idea derived from
theoretical discussions at an international conference before the war.
67. As mentioned earlier under the heading of Komet, Professor von HANDEL maintained that
owing to the incidence of mutual interference between direct and reflected waves the system
was impracticable at long range. In consequence of von HANDEL’s view the system was
dropped.
68. Much consternation and annoyance was occasioned in 1944, when it was found that the
Allies were successfully operating a similar system.
69. Truhe is the cover name used to describe navigational aid system, using ground stations,
similar to those of British Gee. In effect the British Gee stations were also used, the airborne
sets being almost identical with the British Gee boxes.
Truhe.
70. There is no very distinct difference between "Truhe" and "Hyperbel". The latter term was
originally coined to denote our Gee. It was also used when German aircraft equipped with
British Gee sets made use of British ground stations.
71. The British Gee chain was used successfully but it was realised that so soon as the
Germans lost an aircraft, over England, a change would be made. The German "Y" service
monitored the British ground stations to follow any change in Gee phasing and passed advice of
such change to their aircraft by W/T.
72. Truhe referred to the German system which was ultimately to cover the 20 to 100 mc/s
band and employed various types of ground transmitters including Feuerhilfe, Feuerstein,
Feuerzange and Feuerland. All these transmitters could also be used to jam our own Gee,
further details of which will appear in a subsequent report on German Radio Countermeasures.
The original 46 to 50 mc/s system was known as Truhe I and the new 30 to 60 mc/s system as
Truhe II.
73. A chain of Truhe stations was built around Berlin, primarily for training purposes and there
were in addition groups of ground stations in the Schwarzwald and in Pomerania. The last
named was intended for operations against Russia and it is not known if the stations were
destroyed before their capture.
74. The airborne sets which were known as FuGe 122 covering 46-50 mc/s and FuGe 123
covering 25-75 mc/s were replicas of the British Gee boxes and according to P/W were
equivalent to British R.1324 and R.1355. These German sets were slightly smaller and more
compact than the British sets.
75. Truhe was used by F.A.G.2 and K.G.66, but up to the time of capitulation only a few
FuGe 122 and FuGe 123 sets had been produced and only one R.F. box for the latter set.
Baldur.
76. The Baldur range-measuring system is comparable to the British G.H. and appears to have
been imitated from it. It was referred to by P/W as “Egon in reverse" and was the only
navigational system developed by the German by means of which an aircraft could measure
distance from a known source as opposed to fixing itself by a position line. As the G.A.F. staff
were still thinking in terms of a grandiose bomber policy as late as June 1944, it was intended
for use by bomber aircraft for pinpointing targets and for accurate blind bombing.
77. The wavelength employed was in the neighbourhood of 2-4 meters and fell in the SN 2
band.
78. Only two experimental transmitters, both located in Lower Silesia, were erected and one
P/W maintained that this system never progressed beyond experimental trials by the
manufacturers. It was eventually relegated to low priority owing to the virtual cessation of
German bomber operations and the pressure of more urgent demands on radio research and the
radio industry.
79. The airborne equipment was known as the FuGe 126 which was made up of a transmitter to
interrogate a ground responder beacon, a receiver and a presentation unit. The receiver and
transmitter were SN 2 units, though P/W thought they might have been slightly modified for
use with Baldur.
80. From documents, the presentation unit appears to have been a modification of the
Würzburg range measurement tube, and the accuracy is given as ± 100 meters at all ranges, but
this was thought to be purely theoretical and P/W doubted whether it would have been possible
to achieve this accuracy in actual practice.
81. A smaller airborne set, the FuGe 126k (k = klein = small) was built for use by single-seat
aircraft. In reducing the size and weight of the set, and making it pilot-operated, accuracy had
to be sacrificed. P/W, who was responsible for putting up the tactical requirements, considered
a clock-face presentation to be the ideal solution. It was expected that the accuracy of the
FuGe 126k would then be of the order of 500 meters independent of range.
Baldur - Truhe
82. It was planned to experiment on a combination of Baldur and Truhe (Gee) for use by
bombers. The intention was to use a hyperbolic grid line of Truhe for the target approach. This
could be pre-set, and the pilot could fly along it by keeping the blip centralised, and could
ascertain his exact position along the line by measuring his distance from a Baldur beacon. This
system was considered simpler particularly for a single-seater aircraft, than the method of using
two hyperbolic grid lines or two distances from Baldur beacons. The first experimental sets
were to be ready in the autumn of this year.
Baldur - Bernhardine
83. A further project was a combination of Baldur and Bernhardine to give simultaneous
bearing and range. The range indication was to be obtained by the pilot pressing a knob when
the range would appear in kilometres on a dial. This system was suggested for use by both day
fighters and bombers.
GROUND CONTROL SYSTEMS,
Benito.
84. The Benito system of control using FuGe 16, known to the Germans as "Y", is too well
known to warrant description. The following paragraphs deal with recent developments.
85. When operating the bomber Benito procedure with the narrow beam. (0.3°) essential for
azimuth accuracy, it was easy for the bomber pilot to get on to one of the side lobes in error
since these were only about 3° from the main beam.
86. In order to minimise the possibility of mistake and to relieve the pilot of the strain of flying
on a beam, an automatic device, the FuGe 28a, was in use which was the improved and final
form of the old Y-Gerät of 1941. Documents dated about June 1944 show that it was used in
conjunction with FuGe 17, but P/W thought that it had been modified for use with FuGe 16ZY
as well.
87. The procedure was that the bomber pilot flew on instructions conveyed over the FuGe 17
until it had been established by ground D/F stations that he was on the true beam, when the
code word "Bako" would be given whereupon the pilot would switch on the FuGe 28a which
took over control of the automatic pilot and kept him on the beam.
88. P/W gave the accuracy of range measurement with the Bomber Benito procedure as only
± 1 km. at maximum range.
Egon.
89. The original Egon procedure which involved the use of two Freyas, the one for rough
positioning and the other for fine positioning - later became known as "Egon Einstand" (One
location) to differentiate from an improved system termed “Egon Zweistand”
90. Egon Zweistand was evolved to offset the inaccuracies in azimuth D/F, and cash in on the
range accuracy of radar. With Zweistand a third Freya was introduced, placed some
considerable distance from the other two Freyas in order to give a distance cut. It was intended
for use by bomber aircraft operating over England or on long range sea missions.
91. The original Zweistand system, which was first tried out in Italy by a Schlacht unit, was
somewhat primitive in that the readings from the extra Freya were telephoned through to the
plotting centre and worked out before being plotted on the Seeburg table.
92. To eliminate the delay thereby involved a landline connection was introduced to feed the
Freya pulse to the C.R.T., which then had two blips showing ranges from the two Freya sites.
The vulnerability of landline to disturbance and destruction later led to the development of a
W/T transmitter and this method was employed successfully in operations.
93. Since the Freya pulse was not strong enough to trigger off the FuGe 25A at ranges
exceeding 250 kilometres, it was planned to supplant the Freya by extra powerful
Wassermanns, and thereby increase the effective range of Egon Zweistand to 350 kilometres.
94. A further line of development was the provision of a new type of control table giving the
exactitude of plotting necessary for pinpoint bombing. This control table, which was under
development at Rechlin, made use of complicated mechanical apparatus for accurate projection
of the position of the bomber. One of these tables was destroyed in the course of a daylight air
attack on Rechlin in February 1945; two other tables were in existence at the time of the
capitulation, and were located somewhere in Western Germany.
95. Egon when first introduced was received with some scepticism by the crews, as it was felt
that it was too vulnerable to jamming. After it had been used operationally without being
jammed in the attacks on London in March 1944, the procedure was adopted with greater
confidence, and it gained a good reputation. As recounted in A.D.I.(K) 343/1945, Egon was
always favoured by the R.L.M. technical development section in preference to Benito control.
96. A drawback of the system was its restricted range at low altitude, which according to P/W
was the reason why it was not used in conjunction with V.1 operations.
Nachtlicht
97. The Nachtlicht system was the first method of control not using R/T speech to be
improvised by the Germans, and had been tried out during the raids on London in the spring of
1944.
98. It had been observed that the red signal lamp of the FuGe 25A was illuminated when the
aircraft was being swept by a Freya, and it was suggested that use could be made of this as a
means of transmitting morse signals from the ground. A Freya operating on a special
wavelength, which P/W thought was 2.55 meters, was set up on the Channel coast and was used
to send simple instructions to the aircraft attacking London by means of visual morse
indications on the lamp of the FuGe 25A.
99. The primitive method of giving distant control indications was the forerunner of
"Nachtfee", "Barbara" and "Barbarossa".
100. Luftkurier was the first development of the Nachtlicht idea. It was primitive device
intended to give visual indication to the pilot by means of a pointer which was started and
stopped by the reception of pulses.
101. P/W thought that Luftkurier was first tried out by K.G.66 on the Freya band, but it was so
easy to jam by the addition of extra pulses that it was never developed.
Nachtfee
102. Nachtfee was the term used to describe a system for the transmission of control
instructions to a pilot in the beam of the controlling Freya through the medium of a C.R.T.
indicator similar to the Lichtenstein range tube. The airborne equipment used was known as
FuGe 136 and weighed 12 kg.
103. The original purpose of Nachtfee was, to provide a solution to the jamming of R/T control
systems, and it had been used operationally by the Pathfinders of K.G.66 for mines in the
Scheldt estuary. It was to be adapted for use by night fighters to overcome our jamming of the
night fighter commentary.
104. Nachtfee was a system using the FuGe 25A as receiver.
105. The presentation screen in the aircraft was inscribed with various commands both on the
inside and outside of a circular time trace. There was a stationary zero blip in the 12 o'clock
position, and when an instruction was radiated the pulses received caused a second blip to
emerge from the first and travel round the C.R. tube in a clock-wise direction, presumably by a
slight change in p.r.f. This blip came to a stop and the command corresponding to its position
could be read off on the inside of the time trace where a total of about eight different
instructions were inscribed. It took from one to two second, for the blip to travel round the
tube.
106. It was thought that the further eight commands inscribed on the outside of the time trace
were denoted by the blip making a complete circle starting round a second time before coming
to rest at any one of the eight sectors. In this way a total of sixteen different orders could be
given. For night fighters such instructions as "turn left/right", "climb", "dive”, etc. appeared on
the inner side and figures for transmitting bearing on the outer side of the trace.
107. This system was used operationally, but it was found that, apart from the susceptibility to
jamming, other pulse transmissions could interfere by unlocking the system and thereby cause
wrong positioning of the indicator blip.
108. Another pronounced objection to the Nachtfee lay in the fact that it was necessary for a
member of the crew to watch the C.R.T. indicator uninterruptedly for missing one blip
indication might give the message a false value. It was not therefore possible to use it in singleseater
aircraft.
Barbara
109. This apparatus, also called FuGe 138, consisted of an attachment to the FuGe 25A
receiver and only weighed 2 kg. This unit contained an audio filter which allowed the pilot to
hear morse signals superimposed on the Freya interrogator transmission if they were emitted on
a suitable audio frequency usually about 800 cycles. By keying other morse signals on different
audio frequencies and equipping aircraft with suitable filters, more than one aircraft could be
controlled by a single Freya.
110. Barbara was to be used for Egon control of ground-strafing aircraft and bombers but not
for night fighters.
111. In the Germans' opinion there were three disadvantages, namely that the Allies could
intercept and make use of signals so transmitted, that the aircraft had to be in the beam of the
Freya if it were to receive, and so an aircraft "lost" by the Freya owing to jamming could not be
communicated with and finally that, though intended for single-engined aircraft, fighter pilots
rarely had sufficient command of morse to be able to use this type of control.
Barbarossa
112. Barbarossa was a set designed to meet the same requirements as Barbara but to remedy
two of the drawback mentioned in the last paragraph.
113. The instructions to the aircraft were to be transmitted by code pulse modulations which
were passed through a "pulse filter" in the airborne set and a written indication obtained on a
Hellschreiber. The pulse filter and Hellschreiber unit were attachments to the FuGe 25A and
were known as the FuGe 139. This apparatus was in development at Rechlin under the
supervision of Stabs.Ing. von HAUTEVILLE.
114. With this arrangement pulse modulations could not be read by the Allies, and for spoof
purposes in order to produce a wrong indication we would have had to know the exact type of
modulation accepted by it. Visual indication was also quicker and did not depend on knowledge
of morse.
115. This scheme was only in a very early stage of development and P/W were unable to give
details. It was hoped that in due course it would be possible to develop matters a stage further
and find a means of transmitting scrambled speech instead of morse, but P/W understood that
the question of pulse modulation for speech transmission had not been solved.
Rübezahl
116. Consideration had been given in 1945 to the introduction of a crude system of navigation
which could be only used within the boundaries of the Reich. This was to go under the code
name of Rübezahl, and the fact that it was seriously considered and actively supported by the
P/W responsible for Navigational Aids on the G.A.F. signals staff is an interesting reflection of
the depths to which a combination of Allied jamming under-trained fighter had forced German
technique.
117. It was expected that in the course of the summer of 1945 thousands of 162 Volksjäger
would be available for the protection of the Fatherland. They were to be equipped with
FuGe 24, which was to become the standard G.A.F. R/T set as described in A.D.I.(K)
343/1945. This set did not for the present give Benito control facilities and indeed as they were
short-range, high speed, fair-weather aircraft it was not certain that Benito control would be
essentially needed.
118. It was essential that their relatively inexperienced pilots should have a simple means by
which they could locate their approximate position without any additional navigation
equipment having either to be manufactured or carried in the aircraft. It was therefore decided
to develop a system which could be used with FuGe 24.
119. In order to direct the Volksjäger pilots to their target, recourse was to be had to the night
fighter system of broadcasting a commentary, and this commentary was to be combined with
the primitive navigation system Rübezahl.
120. It was therefore planned to set up ground transmitters over Germany at 30 km intervals.
The transmitters were to be beamed upwards, so that at 6,000 meters the polar diagram was
about 40 km in diameter and lobes from neighbouring transmitters just overlapped, thus
covering the whole area. Each transmitter emitted a plain language recognition signal in the
form of the name of its district, e.g. Halle, Magdeburg, etc.
121. All transmitters were to be operated on the same frequency so that to locate himself the
pilot merely tuned his FuGe 24 to the frequency for the day. The ground transmitters were to be
adapted from the FuGe 15 transmitters which had been manufactured in quantity as described
in paras. 23-39 of A.D.I.(K) 343/1945 before it was found that the FuGe 15 was unsuitable as
an airborne R/T set. They were renamed Bs.15 (Bodensender).
122. Later it was believed that the night fighters which were also to carry FuGe 24 (see
appendix 1) would also use the Rübezahl commentary as yet another alternative source for
vectoring themselves to the bomber stream."





Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 11:57

Nightfighters radar
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 369/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – VI.
Target Homing for Night Fighters.
German early warning Ground Radar.
1. This report is the sixth of the series dealing with radio
and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. As in the case of the
previous five reports (A.D.I.(K) 343, 357, 362, 363 and
365/1945),it is based on interrogation of General
Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, Director General of Signals, and
some members of his staff, and has been supported by a number
of relevant documents of recent date which were in the
possession of the General's Chief of Staff.
POLICY AND REQUIREMENTS
2. Members of General MARTINI’s staff have often repeated
a catch phrase "Aller Funkverkehr ist Landesverrrat" - all
radio traffic is treasonable, and the G.A.F. were only too
well aware that a transmission of any type could be listened
in to by the Allies and then D/F'd. They were, therefore,
fully aware of the opportunities of homing on to
transmissions from Allied aircraft and so when airborne
countermeasures against the Freya ground installations were
first taken by the Allies, Köthen developed an apparatus
which would enable a German night fighter to home on to the
source of the jamming transmission.
3. This equipment was called Freya-Halbe (Halbe = half
signifying that it was a radar apparatus equipped with the
receiver half only and not the transmitter), and it was
tried out at Werneuchen in early 1943. The trials were
successfully completed by about June of that year and it was
then demonstrated to the authorities for use by the G.A.F.
night fighter units.
4. At that time, however, the German night fighter force was
commanded by General KAMMHUBER who was the creator of the
Kammhuber line and whose night fighter organisation relied
essentially on ground-controlled night fighter aircraft
operating in comparatively limited boxes. The suggestion of
homing on to jammers was turned down by KAMMHUBER out of hand
because he was a rabid opponent of any form of freelance
night fighting and insisted on strict adherence by his
aircraft to the limits of their box.
5. With the discovery of Monica and the development of the
Rosendahl and later the Flensburg homers on to Monica,
KAMMUBER still maintained his obstinate stand against any
departure from the box system of control. It was, therefore,
not until General SCHMIDT assumed the control of the night
fighting force in November 1943 and proceeded to introduce
freelance methods that D/F homers on to transmissions from
the bombers could be used operationally.
6. Although the technical experts were satisfied that the
homers on to transmissions of metric wavelengths were
successful, aircrews seemed to be unable to use them well and
results obtained were never wholly satisfactory. Exactly the
same applied to Naxos for homing on to H2S is its early days,
particularly when a number of minor troubles were still being
encountered with its electrical parts and, though it was
available in January 1944, for the first three or four months
comparatively little use was made of an excellent homing
device.
7. By about Easter 1941 the early troubles of Naxos were
overcome and crews began to gain confidence in its use; with
the success of Naxos reliance on all types of homing apparatus
increased. At this stage, however the R.A.F. had almost ceased
to use Monica and Naxos remained the only important set of its
type.
8. In view of the change of policy governing night fighter
operations experimental D/F receivers known as X-Halbe were
designed capable of adaptation to any metric wavelength which
might be used by the Allies. In addition one of the tactical
requirements laid down after 1943 for all future A.I. sets was
that provision should be made for the switching off of the
transmitter portion so that the receiver could act as a homer
on to any airborne jammers employed by the Allies. Naxos and
Korfu Z which covered the 1.5 cm. to 20 cm. band already
existed.
9. As R/T and W/T Jamming became more intense and even
ground control by commentary broke down, increasing use was
made of homing on to the bomber stream by means of receivers
of the Naxos type but there remained always the serious
disadvantage that these receivers did not supply range. It was
claimed that both Naxos and Korfu were so sensitive that the
bomber stream could be picked up at a range of 200 km. and
that in consequence useless chases often ensued. Estimates of
range had to be made by deduction and even in the case of
experienced crews the estimate of range by indirect means was
not always reliable.
10. Short mention is made below of another form of homing
device, the Kiel Z, which attempted to use the infra-red
radiations from the exhaust stubs of the bomber. A fuller
description of the Kiel Z was given in A.D.I.(K) 390/1945,
paras 41 to 48.
FREYA-HALBE.
11. The Freya-Halbe, officially known as the FuGe. 221, was
designed early in 1943 to home on to airborne Freya jammers
but owing to KAMMHUBER's opposition to freelance night
fighting was not adopted. Towards the end of 1943 when freelance
operations were introduced it was proposed to install
the twenty-five Freya-Halbe sets which had been manufactured
but, when they were indented for, it was found that the makers
had used various parts for manufacturing other apparatus and
that the sets had been virtually consumed as spares. Freya-
Halbe was, therefore, never used on operations.
ROSENDAHL-HALBE.
12. The first Monica set obtained by the Germans was
recovered from a British four-engined bomber which was shot
down over the town of Rosendahl in Holland and the name of
Rosendahl or FuGe. 221.A was then given to the D/F equipment
developed for homing on to Monica.
13. According to one of the P/W who had flown the trials with
Rosendahl, it was quite successful, and gave good D/F until
the night fighter came within 4 km. of its target, after which
the D/F became unreliable. For this reason the general
introduction of Rosendahl-Halbe was delayed.
14. It was ultimately discovered that the polarisation of
the receiver aerials was at 90° to that used by the bombers
and it was assumed that this was the cause of the poor D/F. For
some technical reason it was not found possible to twist the
aerial through 90° in order to obtain the right polarisation
and by the time that these difficulties had been overcome the
R.A.F. use of Monica had ceased.
15. An interesting experiment was carried out with Rosendahl-
Halbe when a set of Rosendahl aerials was mounted round a 150
cm. searchlight. The idea was to align the searchlight beam on
to an aircraft transmitting Monica. Considerable difficulty
was encountered in getting the searchlight beam and the axis
of the receiving lobe to coincide and by the time this had
being achieved R.A.F. bombers were no longer using Monica.
16. The Flensburg, officially known as FuGe.227, was another
attempt at solving the problem of producing a homer to D/F on
to Monica transmission. Difficulty was encountered with D/F
properties but the set was satisfactorily selective and could
discriminate between a large number of signals by tuning to
both the r.f. and p.r.f. It was used to a limited extent in
night fighter operations.
17. With the cessation of the use of Monica the original
Flensburg became known as Flensburg I and a series of other
F1ensburgs, numbered from II to VI, were manufactured to cover
the frequencies used by the mandrel screen and other Freya
jammers. The frequencies as given in documents were:-
Flensburg I 1.3 m. to 1.75 m. against Monica.
Flensburg II 1.7 m. to 2.6 m. against Freya A and B
band and Jagdschloss jammers.
Flensburg III
Flensburg IV
2.3 m. to 3.8 m.) against SN 2 and Freya
3.8 m. to 5.0 m.) C frequency jammers.
Flensburg V 25 cm, band against 25 cm. P.P.I. ground
radar jammers.
Flensburg VI 50 cm. band against Würzburg jammers.
18. It was not known to what extent these additional
Flensburgs had been used in operations. They were considered
to be a successful solution to the homing problem except for
the fact that the large aerials, particularly on the Freya
frequencies, reduced the speed of the aircraft considerably.
A.G.L.T.
19. The interrogation of British prisoners of war had
provided information with regard to Village Inn and some
details of it were known. It was thought to operate on a
centimetre wavelength and pieces of equipment had been found.
Nevertheless, P/W were convinced that though preparations for
using it had been made it had not yet been employed
operationally.
X-HALBE.
20. This was the designation of the airborne receiver which
could be adapted for D/F'ing any new metric radar that was
observed by the monitoring service.
NAXOS.
21. The Naxos, known as the FuGe.350, was a detector set
which received all transmissions on the 8 to 12 cm, band but
could not discriminate between different wavelengths in the
band.
22. The problem of producing a homer on to a beamed
transmission rotating at 60 r.p.m., as in the case of H2S, was
first tackled in March 1943, some two months after the
discovery of H2S. Little progress was made until an engineer
hit on the idea of getting continuous presentation of the
signals received by employing aerials rotating about twenty
times faster than those of the transmitter. The G.A.F. signals
staff were so impressed with the ease with which it was
possible to home on to a slowly rotating beam such as that of
the H2S that one of the requirements for the Berlin A was that
its rate of rotation in searching should be very high to
ensure that the Naxos solution to the homing problem could not
be employed against it.
23. The first trials with the Naxos were flown in December
1943 at Werneuchen and the first operational Gruppe to be
equipped with the set had it installed in all their aircraft
by the 25th January 1944.
24. A whole series of Naxos sub-types were produced and of
those the following were mentioned:-
Naxos Z. = (Zielanflug = Target Approach): was the original
homing device operating on the 8 to 12 cm. band; it could
not differentiate between frequencies in the band so that
if there was more than one H2S aircraft in the
neighbourhood, a confused picture was obtained.
Naxos ZR. (R Rückwärts = Backward): employed aerials placed
both above and below the after part of the fuselage of the
Ju.88 and served as a backward warning device for the
approach of British night fighters using Mark VIII or Mark
XI on the 9 cm. wavelength.
Naxos ZX. (X = X-band = 3 cm. band): was the 3 cm.
equivalent of the original Naxos Z. It operated on the 2.5
cm. - 4 cm. band.
Naxos RX. was the 3 cm. equivalent of the Naxos R and was
used as a backward warner against 3 cm. A.I.
Naxos ZD. was a combined homer for both the 9 cm. and the
3 cm. bands. The 3 cm. aerial rotated on the same axis but
above the 9 cm. aerials.
25. As stated, the value of Naxos was first appreciated by
crews in the early summer of 1944 when the increase in British
jamming had reached such a pitch that communications with the
ground were affected and it was difficult to find the bomber
stream. The picture obtained by Naxos, however, was nonselective
and it was not always possible to home on to a
single aircraft unless the aircraft in question was separated
from the others in the stream. On the other hand Naxos made it
easy to locate the bomber stream, which at that period was the
main preoccupation of the G.A.F.
26. Although estimate of range could be gained if the height
at which the bombers were flying was known, since, by climbing
and determining at what point the Rotterdam signals were no
longer picked up, the night fighter aircraft could judge the
distance of the transmitting aircraft. A full description of
the method of approach employed appeared in A.D.I.(K)
125/1945. paras. 93-98.
KORFU Z.
27. The original Korfu set, otherwise known as the FuGe.351,
was a development of a superhet receiver designed for
frequency modulated 9 cm. carrier communications purposes.
After the discovery of H2S it was adapted for use by the
German "Y" service and towards the end of the war was further
modified for use as an airborne set and then became known as
the Korfu Z or FuGe.351Z.
28. The aerials employed were of the Naxos type and gave the
relative bearing of the transmitter but the advantage of the
Korfu Z lay in the fact that it could be sharply tuned and
could, therefore, home on to individual aircraft.
29. It was also hoped that with the help of the Korfu Z night
fighters would be able to differentiate between H2S and 9 cm.
A.I. which the Germans presumed used different sections of the
9.0 to 9.3 cm. band. In this connection, as mentioned in
A.D.I.(K) 363/1945, it was hoped in due course to produce the
Berlin and other German "9 cm. " radar on the 8.6 to 8.9 cm.
band in order to aid German night fighters to differentiate
between British and German aircraft.
30. The Korfu Z was to have been ready by mid-summer of 1944
but its advent was delayed by the shortage of magnetrons, all
available specimens of which were required for the ground
Korfu used by the "Y" service. So far as was known the Korfu Z
was never used operationally.
Kiel Z.
31. The Kiel Z was manufactured by Zeiss and known officially
as the FuGe 280. Infra-red radiations from the exhaust stubs
of aircraft were picked up in a parabolic mirror and focused
on to an Elac lead sulphide cell. The field of view in a cone
of ± 10° was scanned. A wider field of view could be obtained
by moving the entire scanner by hand in the same manner as
employed with the Berlin M.1.A.
32. Shortly before the end of the war a number of Kiel Z sets
were tried out in operations but it was found that, although
they gave a range of about 4 km. on a four-engined bomber,
various difficulties arose. Infra-red radiations from the moon
and stars formed "permanent echoes" on the cathode ray tube
used as viewing screen, and were not always easily
distinguished from a moving aircraft. In addition, if the
target aircraft was between the fires caused by the raid and
the night fighter aircraft, the target was obviously quite
indistinguishable against the background of the fires.
33. Night fighters equipped with the Kiel Z were also to
carry the FuGe 218 Neptun R3 backward warning radar so that
they at least had warning of British night fighters
approaching from the rear.
FALTER
34. Falter was an infra-red telescope of the Bildwandler type
used by German night fighters for homing on to British infrared
recognition lamps. Reference to Falter appeared in
A.D.I.(K) 365/1945, paras. 72-76. It was not known if it had
been used operationally.
A.D.I.(K)and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain
2nd August 1945"

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 13:32

NJ interception procedures
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 599/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F NIGHT FIGHTERS.
R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND COUNTERMEASURES
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON GERMAN NIGHT FIGHTER TACTICS.
1. The information contained in this report was obtained from a pilot
and W/T operator of 7/N.J.G.4 and a W/T operator of 5/N.J.G.1 who were
captured after a night operation over Western Germany on October 6th.
2. These are the first prisoners from operational night fighter units
to have been interrogated since the German night fighter force retired
behind its own frontiers, and although none of them had more than seven
operations to call upon for their experience, they were able to provide
a fairly complete picture of tactics now being employed.
3. If these two units can be taken as representative, it is evident
that the German night fighter force, rather than calling the tune in the
interception of R.A.F. night attacks, is now being forced more and more
to improvisation. Its tactics are being governed to an increasing extent
by the effective countermeasures against its Radar and signals system,
and the Germans are quickly reaching a point where they must choose
either a radical change in their methods of interception or continued
improvisation on the present lines.
4. The present report outlines the tactics now being employed by
II/N.J.G.1 and III/N.J.G.4 and shows how, with their signals systems and
interception equipment seriously upset by R.A.F. countermeasures, those
units are groping for a solution to their ever increasing problems of
intercepting the bomber force.
TACTICS OF INTERCEPTION.
Methods Employed.
5. Whilst II/N.J.G.1 is flying free-lance patrol (Ungeführte Zahme
Sau) from the Cologne area III/N.J.G.4, unlike other night fighter units
recently examined favours Geführte Zahme Sau. This method depends on
D.R. navigation by the aircrews, and on simultaneous tracking by the
ground control at Gruppe headquarters, with the addition of a measure of
signals control from the same source.
6. Some of the aircraft of 7/N.J.G.4 are also flying by the old type
of Himmelbett (G.C.I.) control, the system of the night fighter box
controlled by a plotting table, using data from two Würzburgs. On each
night the number of aircraft which may fly by that method - usually two
or three - is announced, and any of the less experienced crews, within
the limits of the permitted number, may do so if they wish.
7. Other forms of control, such as Egon or "Y", are not practised in
the two units under review.
Early Warning and Readiness.
8. Since the night fighters have retired to Germany at least those
units based on the western borders have been robbed of the greater part
of their early warning system, with the result that the aircraft, at
least of the two Gruppen examined, cannot be put into the air at such an
early stage of an impending attack as was previously the case.
9. Recently, therefore, crews have been kept at immediate readiness
night after night from dusk until dawn, whatever the weather. Even when
the nightly met. briefing indicates that flying conditions make night
fighter activity impossible, that state of readiness must continue.
10. In cases where an attack was known to be underway but the probable
course of the bombers had not been established, the night fighters have
in the past been put up and ordered to orbit a given point near the base
airfield, the aircraft being stepped up to 3,000 metres at intervals of
100 metres whilst orbiting. When the point of interception had been
decided upon, the aircraft were given an initial bearing by the Gruppe
commentary.
11. Since the retreat to Germany, there has been little or no orbiting
of the airfield or of beacons by the aircraft of these two units. These
P/W were insistent that no standing patrols are now flown, and that the
night fighters do not take off until warning of an impending attack is
received; occasionally, however, crews are kept in their aircraft at
immediate readiness until the situation has been clarified.
12. Upon receiving the first warning from Divisional Headquarters, the
aircraft have recently been directed immediately on to a bearing to meet
the bomber force. In III/N.J.G.4 at Mainz/Finthen, the whole of the
Gruppe - an average effort of 25 aircraft - is usually airborne within
20 to 24 minutes, the first aircraft taking off within about 8 minutes
of the first corning.
Weather Conditions.
13. The daily briefing of aircraft consists mainly of a summary of
weather conditions for the ensuing night, and when the "Weather Frog"
reports the prevalence of clouds, the main topic is the possibility of
the degree of icing conditions, the worst enemy of the night fighter.
14. In the opinion of P/W, the Germans have never found a satisfactory
de-icing system for the night fighters; the Me.110 is without de-icing
equipment, whilst the Ju.88 is fitted with the "Kärcher Ofen" - a
petrol-burning heater unit - which, however, is not efficient at high
altitudes.
15. If a cloud layer is deep and dense, but without icing conditions,
the night fighters will operate even if the cloud base at their own
airfield is as low as 100 metres; after operations a landing can if
necessary be made at another airfield where conditions are more
favourable.
16. In considering the expedience of operating in icing conditions, the
depth of the ice layer will be taken into consideration; it is possible
that the night fighters may risk climbing steeply through an icing area,
if it is not too thick, to operate at higher and clearer altitudes. If
the bombers are penetrating below a cloud and ice layer, the night
fighters will most certainly be sent up to intercept.
17. In this connection P/W were told of a recent Bomber Command attack
on Essen, when cloud was at 10/10ths between 3,000 and 7,000 metres and
when no German night fighters were put up. Each of these P/W immediately
gave his opinion that the non-appearance of the night fighters was
certainly due solely to icing conditions.
Navigation.
18. During recent weeks when the period of early warning has been
considerably reduced, all crews of a Gruppe are given the same initial
course before taking off; thus, once all aircraft of the Gruppe are
airborne, they are strung out on one and the same track in a form of
line ahead.
19. The crews fly by D.R., and the loose formation is simultaneously
tracked on a map at Gruppe headquarters. If, in the light of the
movements of the bomber force a change of course is necessary, a new
bearing will be given to all aircraft simultaneously through the Gruppe
commentary.
20. All crews are given strict orders to navigate by D.R., and to
accept the Gruppe orders if these differ from their own calculations, so
that the tracker at Gruppe headquarters can be reasonably certain that
the night fighters are in fact where he believes them to be. The older
crews, in spite of this order, are given to "cutting off corners" in the
hope of making a quick interception; in such cases the Gruppe
commentaries is obviously useless, and such crews must thereafter depend
on the Divisional or Reich commentaries and fly free-lance patrol.
21. These crews who stick to their orders are finding D.R. navigation
extremely difficult, since this duty falls on the W/T operator, who has
his signals and Radar duties to attend at the same time. It is therefore
unlikely that the initial formation will be maintained much longer than
the completion of the first leg.
22. If this tactic works according to plan the string of night fighters
should be brought up to the bomber stream on a parallel or nearly
parallel track. At the correct moment, and in accordance with D.R.
tracking at headquarters, the night fighters will be given a new bearing
which turns the whole line on to the bomber stream in a broadside. By
this method at least some of the night fighters must contact the bomber
stream with the aid of their S.N.2 equipment.
23. According to P/W, navigation by the night fighters is at present of
a low standard, particularly in cloudy weather when ground visual aids
are not available. It is evident, however, that the Germans intend to
continue operations on these lines, for in III/N.J.G.4. which is
equipped with the Ju.88, the crew is to be augmented by a Navigator/W/T
Operator, whilst the present W/T Operator will be solely responsible for
the Radar equipment.
24. A few weeks ago several experienced observers from bomber units
arrived at Finthen, and these men are at present being instructed in
night fighting navigation. With the crew of four, the Radar operator
will be placed next to the pilot and the Navigator/W/T Operator will sit
to back to the pilot whist the B/M will sit - or squat - in the
remaining space.
Contacting the Bomber Stream.
25. It is perhaps worth noting that the pilot of III/N.J.G.4., who had
made seven operations, had never succeeded in contacting the bomber
stream, and the Gruppe itself had only claimed one victory since August
8th; that victory was when we attacked Darmstadt or Frankfurt in mid-
September.
26. All P/W agreed that the only way to contact the bomber stream is to
obey the Gruppe commentary until such indications as target markers,
German night fighter flares, Flak and searchlight concentrations or
aircraft going down in flames are seen. Unless the flares are spoof, the
bombers will sooner or later be contacted by these means.
27. According to P/W, crews are wary of flares, as they have learnt
that these may spoof target markers put down to draw unsuspecting night
fighters into a Mosquito trap.
28. Providing that the S.N.2 is not too badly jammed by Window, the
final contact by the night fighter is made by variations of height of
about 1,000 or even 2,000 metres whilst making use of the search gear;
this tactic usually commences at as much as 50 km. from the bomber
formation, in the hope that a straggler may be picked up. Another reason
for this change of height is that in recent raids the heights given by
the commentary have been extremely inaccurate, and the height has
frequently been corrected on suggestions from such night fighter crews
as have made contact with the bombers.
29. The aim in theory is to intercept the bomber stream at its head;
this is the only part of the stream of which the precise position is
given in the commentary and crews do not, therefore, attempt any finesse
regarding the point of entry into the stream. In the words of the
present pilot: "We are damned glad to get into the stream, no matter how
we do it".
30. Lectures are, of course, given to crews on how to avoid Window and
tail warning devices, but P/W pointed out that under present conditions
the theory of the lecture room is extremely difficult to put into
practise, and a hit or miss method of entry is all that can be hoped
for.
Attack.
31. The range at which the night fighter opens fire with its forward
armament is determined by the pilot himself; whilst some will close in
as near as 50/60 metres, the more cautious will open up at a range of
200/250 metres. P/W considered, however, that the normal range might be
taken as l00/150 metres.
32. Recognition of the target aircraft is usually by the silhouette in
light conditions or moonlight, and by the four exhaust flames in
darkness.
33. The present P/W repeated the statement made by previous P/W, namely
that the only effective evasive tactic for a bomber about to be attacked
is a steep diving turn to port or starboard - preferably the latter -
which is on the night fighter pilot's blind side.
34. These P/W could add nothing to previous cements on the Schräge
Musik upward firing armament, but they stated that once this armament
could be brought to bear it was extremely effective; one officer had
claimed a kill with two rounds from the 20 mm. cannon.
35. They stated that the Ju.88 G-1 carried one drum of 50/60 rounds for
each cannon; in that type of aircraft the drums cannot be charged in the
air, but this quantity of ammunition is ample for one sortie.
36. In this connection, P/W had heard that some night fighters are now
being armed with two 30 mm. upward firing cannon in place of the 20 mm.;
with this new armament the barrels protrude 12" to 16" above the
fuselage and at an angle of 85°.
Flak.
37. With two exceptions - orbiting areas and airfields where aircraft
are taking off and landing - there are no restrictions imposed upon the
Flak in any part of Germany. Night fighters which chase a contact
through a Flak area, therefore, do so at some risk to themselves.
38. Old and experienced crews who flew in the days when the use of the
FuGe 25a or Verey signals enabled them to quieten the Flak are unhappy
about present day conditions, but P/W claim that younger crews who have
never known any but these conditions are not particularly perturbed. P/W
added that of course a night fighter would only enter a Flak area if it
already had an S.N.2 contact; no night fighter would venture
unnecessarily in such areas.
39. In orbiting areas, the night fighters will be given a ceiling of,
say, 3,000 metres; any unidentified aircraft above that height will be
fired on in spite of the night fighters below. The Flak units are
usually informed of orbiting areas in advance by the Flak Liaison
Officer attached to the night fighter unit.
40. Flak areas in the neighbourhood of airfields occupied by night
fighters are forbidden to the aircraft when taking off or landing.
I.F.F.
41. For a considerable time there has been a popular belief amongst
night fighter crews that the R.A.F. is homing on to FuGe 25a
transmissions, and crews of II/N.J.G.1 and III/N.J.G.4, including the
present P/W, were no exception.
42. It is difficult to understand how the belief has arisen, since
crews were officially told that the R.A.F. has no equipment with which
to home on to the FuGe 25a, and orders are that the apparatus must be
kept on at all times during flight.
43. In spite of these orders many crews are still switching off their
FuGe 25a during sorties, and when on one occasion one of the present
crews was shot down by Flak, they had the instrument turned off at the
time. At the subsequent enquiry one of the first questions asked
concerned the FuGe 25a, but the crew, fearing punishment, maintained
that it had been switched on all the time.
44. In addition to the fear that R.A.F. aircraft can home on to
FuGe 25a, night fighter crews, including these P/W, have serious doubts
as to its efficiency as an I.F.F. instrument.
45. On one of their earlier operations one of these crews was shot at
by Flak in spite of the FuGe 25a being turned on, and almost immediately
after the W/T operator witched it off the Flak stopped firing. Other
crews in both units have repeatedly been fired on both with the FuGe 25a
on and off, with the result that the majority has come to the conclusion
that as far as the Flak is concerned it does not matter whether the
FuGe 25a is used or not and that it is therefore better to leave it off
and enjoy the added advantage of not being homed at by R.A.F. aircraft.

SIGNALS TRAFFIC.
Gruppe Commentary.
46. The Gruppe commentary of both units reviewed was put out on the
3000/6000 Kc/s. frequency band and was received by the aircraft on the
FuGe 10-P. In III/N.J.G.4 there were usually one main and two
alternative frequencies; until quite recently it was usually found that
the main frequency was not jammed.
47. The W/T operator of I/N.J.G.1 stated that on such occasions as the
Gruppe R/T commentary was jammed he could call his control with the
codeword "Schwingen sie Hammer", whereupon the commentary continued in
Morse on the same frequency; in this way W/T operators could often hear
the Morse Commentary through the jamming.
48. The Gruppe commentary was put out by II/N.J.G.1 from a mobile van
equipped with FuGe 10 and FuGe 16 with the addition, P/W thought, of an
amplifier. The FuGe 16 was however, more often than not u/s, and the
airfield transmitter was used when starting and homing.
49. In III/N.J.G.4 there was also a mobile van, but in P/W’s experience
this was never used and the airfield transmitter was the source of the
commentary put out by that Gruppe.
50. Up to the beginning of October 1944 the two units under review,
although suffering considerable inconvenience from British jamming of
their channels of R/T and W/T control, were able to circumvent the
jamming fairly successfully by the employment of large numbers of
alternative frequencies and differing sources of control.
51. On the night of October 2nd and 3rd, however, the R/T operator of
II/N.J.G.1 found that the whole of the medium frequency band of the
FuGe 10 was jammed, as was the whole of the V.H.F. frequency band. After
some ten minutes of trying to pick up the Gruppe, Divisional and other
commentaries, he switched over to the M/F band and picked up the
commentary on one of the Reichluftflotte beacons.
52. Upon returning from this sortie, this W/T operator found that the
eleven other crews of the Gruppe who had operated on that night had
experienced the same difficulty, and the Gruppe Signals officer
thereupon demanded a written report from each W/T operator.
53. The jamming noise on both the 5000/6000 Kc/s. and the 38.4/42.5
Mc/s. bands was described by P/W as sounding rather like a kettle
boiling, with the lid rattling in a high pitched tone.
54. Instructions in Morse on the 5000/6000 Kc/s. band can be heard
through the jamming when the aircraft is over or near its ground
control, and for this reason III/N.J.G.4, which has only operated
recently within an area of 150 km. of its base at Mainz/Finthen, has not
been troubled to such an extent as II/N.J.G.1, which has been operating
much further afield from its control at Köln/Ostheim.
55. W/T operators of that Gruppe have found the FuGe 16 useless,
because within two or three minutes of the first words being spoken in
an operation, the whole frequency band is jammed; in many aircraft,
therefore, the FuGe 16 as no longer carried as being useless extra
weight.
56. The whole M/F band was also jammed with a high pitched whistle, but
these P/W claimed that they could still hear the Reichluftflotte
beacons. They stated that the latter beacon commentaries were now the
only real source of control left to the night fighters, and that once
these had been effectively jammed, the whole signals system would
completely break down.
Beacon Commentaries.
57. The Reichluftflotte W/T beacons in Central and West Germany – those
with names - only operate, according to P/W, during British night
attacks. These beacons transmit the Reich commentary in Morse in the
following sequence:-
(1) Dash - for D/F’ing
(2) Beacon characteristic.
(3) Letter C - called the Trennung,
separating signal.
(4) Commentary:
(a) A single figure denoting height of head
58. Early in October, W/T operators were told that one of these beacons
in each Jagd Division was to transmit instructions to the aircraft under
its control in a special code, in addition to the normal Reich
commentary. Thus, for example, if a bomber stream were flying towards
Hannover and part of the force detached itself on a southerly course,
Jagd Division 3 would call in the night fighters under its control
through the medium of this beacon to deal with the new situation.
59. In case of all R/T and W/T channels being jammed or otherwise
disturbed, homing instructions to the aircraft were also transmitted
through this medium.
60. The code for these beacons was changed at the same time as the Funk
Befehl (Tactical W/T Code), which on an average was about once a week.
This beacon code consisted of single letters some of which with their
meanings one of the present P/W was able to remember:-
C = Zurückkehren (Return).
B = Fliegen Sie nach 649 (Fly to 649)
649 The code number is that of an airfield.
MOS = Mosquito attack; when aircraft of
631 Ju.88 and ME.110 units hear this,
they return to base, or they may
be ordered to land at the nearest
airfield.
AGZ = Angriffsziel 631 (Target 631). The
number in this case is that of
Darmstadt airfield, meaning that
Darmstadt is the target of the
bombers.
61. Another single letter, which P/W could not remember, signified
"Tune in to frequency of Jagd Division 1". Upon receiving this
instruction, the W/T operators would first try the short wave frequency
of J.D.1 and, if unable to receive the latter, would go over to the
frequency of the high powered beacon of that Division.
62. This contingency would occur when there was no bomber penetration
in the territory of Jagd Division 3, and when an attack was taking place
over the territory of J.D.1. The W/T operators of units of the 3rd
Division would remain tuned in to the last Division beacon until ordered
to revert to their own divisional beacon.
63. In Mosquito attacks when these are recognised as such, no
commentary is broadcast by the beacons.
64. The beacon used for the 3rd Division's code instructions was
Kurfürst, and up to October 6th this beacon had not been disturbed,
neither had its position been moved; P/W had been told, however, that it
was shortly to be moved further East.
65. The beacon Ida has, according to P/W, been moved from its former
position to a point S.S.E. of the visual beacon Ida, and now stands
approximately at pinpoint 50° 30’ N., 7° 45’ E.; the beacon Kuli since
being overrun by Allied advance, has not been replaced.
66. Spoof R/T instructions have a limited success amongst the less
experienced W/T operators, but those operators soon learn by experience
to recognise a strange voice almost immediately; since the complete
jamming of R/T from early October, however, this question hardly arises,
at least in Western Germany.

COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST S.N.2.
Window.
67. The present P/W confirmed the effectiveness of Window countermeasures
against the S.N.2 search equipment. Operators are now being
told that Window is completely effective if the night fighter is at a
range of more than 2,000 metres from a target aircraft; at ranges of
less than 2,000 metres a skilled operator can distinguish between the
Window blips and that of the bomber.
68. The theory is that the night fighter closes in on the Window at a
higher speed than on the bomber, and that the Window blips would
therefore travel quickly down the S.N.2 display, whilst the aircraft
blip would remain more or less stationery. These P/W, however, were of
the opinion that an operator would have to be gifted with a high degree
of skill to be able to follow these suggestions, unless, of course, the
Window cloud was not too dense.
69. They stated that if Window were only thrown by the bombers, it
would be comparatively easy to home on to the Window cloud and thus find
the bomber stream, but since the high-flying Mosquitoes had also taken
to throwing Window the night fighters could no longer depend on finding
the bombers by that method.
70. Thus, in the present circumstances in which Window clouds are
widely spread and do not necessarily indicate the presence of the bomber
stream, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to home on to the
bomber stream with S.N.2. alone when Window is present; night fighter
crews are, therefore, depending more and more upon the visual
indications described earlier in this report.
71. One P/W stated that with the S.N.2 jammed by Window, it frequently
happened that a crew would only know that they were in the bomber stream
from the air disturbance caused by the slipstreams of the bombers.
72. The question has been asked whether it is likely that as a result
of jamming of the S.N.2, the Lichtenstein will be re-introduced to the
night fighter units. This has not so far occurred in II/N.J.G.1 and
III/N.J.G.4 and these P/W thought it highly unlikely, since the
Lichtenstein had in the past been just as thoroughly jammed as is the
S.N.2 now.
Electrical Jamming.
73. The Germans are firmly convinced that the R.A.F. is jamming the
S.N.2 electrically. One of the present P/W had himself experienced what
he thought to be such jamming, and had reported this on his return; he
was told that it was caused by a "Rauschsender" (Noise Jammer).
74. The other W/T operator had also been told the same story early this
year, but he then understood that the effect of the jamming on the
display was inconsiderable. In August, this P/W was told officially that
it was possible to home, albeit inaccurately, on to the jammer aircraft
by switching off the S.N.2 transmitter circuit and using the receiver
only.
75. The jamming produced "grass" on both sides of the trace of both the
range and bearing tubes, and he was told that the "grass" extended above
or below and to left or right of the trace, according to the range and
bearing of the jamming aircraft.
76. On the night of October 7th, this P/W experienced a similar display
on the S.N.2, and made an attempt to home on to what he thought to be
the jamming aircraft, but without any result.

MUTUAL INTERFERENCE OF S.N.2's.
77. The S.N.2 of one night fighter will interfere with reception in
another if the two aircrafts are within S.N.2 range of one another. The
disturbance takes the form in the S.N.2 display of continuous wiggling
lines on both height and range tubes; for this reason an eliminator
circuit has been installed, controlled by a knob in the bottom left-hand
corner of the S.N.2. panel, and W/T operators have instructions to make
use of this knob if interference occurs.
78. According to these P/W, it is generally accepted that the
eliminator makes not the slightest difference; neither of these two W/T
operators had themselves used it.
79. It was stated that, providing there are not more than two other
aircraft using the S.N.2 within S.N.2 range of a given night fighter,
the aircraft blip can be read through the disturbance an the display,
but within a range of 2,000 metres, even the interference produced on
the display by one other S.N.2 night fighter is such that the aircraft
blip is extremely difficult to see.
80. As on example of mutual interference, the W/T operator of
II/N.J.G.1 had heard that about two months ago 40 to 50 night fighters
equipped with S.N.2 were sent to intercept some bombers over the Ruhr.
The S.N.2's of the night fighters interfered with one another to such an
extent that not a single contact was made. P/W himself had not taken
part in this operation, but was told about it on the following day.

NAXOS.
A Lecture on Naxos.
81. Early in 1944, one the present P/W attended a lecture given to
I/N.J.G.4 at Florennes by an officer from Werneuchen. The lecture was
accompanied by a film, which showed the development of the Naxos display
as the aircraft closed in on its H2S target.
82. The lecturer claimed to have made the film himself under
operational conditions, and furthermore claimed to have shot down two
H2S aircraft with the sole aid of Naxos; it was emphasised that,
although the aircraft carried S.N.2 in addition to Naxos, the former was
switched off throughout the flight.
83. The film showed the Naxos display initially with two spots of light
when the first contact was made at a range of 70 km. As the Naxos
aircraft closed in, the spots multiplied and spread round the circular
traces of the tube; the circle was completed when the aircraft was
directly below the H2S aircraft and at a range of 50 metres.
84. The lecturer was most enthusiastic as to the possibilities of the
Naxos and foretold that it would displace all other night fighter aids
in attacking H2S aircraft.
85. The type of Naxos shown in the film was the "Z", and the lecturer
mentioned two newer and improved types known as the "Naxos-Post" and
another which P/W had forgotten.
Equipment in I/N.J.G.4.
86. In April 1944, two of the present P/W were at Werneuchen, where for
about a month they carried out flight tests on Ju.88's equipped
variously with Naxos, S.N.2 and Flensburg. Of 20/24 aircraft which P/W
tested in that time, about 16 or 18, equipped with both Naxos and S.N.2,
were delivered to I/N.J.G.4; the aircraft which had no Naxos had both
S.N.2 and Flensburg.
Equipment in II/N.J.G.1 and III/N.J.G.4.
87. It has already been reported that II/N.J.G.1 is equipped throughout
with the Me.110, with the exception of one Ju.88 G-1 in the Gruppenstab;
this latter aircraft was equipped with the Naxos, but had been u/s since
early September.
38. Crews were told that the Me.110 was slow enough without having its
speed further reduced by the Naxos, but they were nevertheless led to
believe that their Gruppe was soon to be equipped with the Ju.88 in
order that Naxos might be employed. Up to the 6th October there was no
sign of the Ju.88's.
89. In III/N.J.G.4 some of the Ju.88's had begun to be sent some weeks
ago to, P/W thought, Werneuchen to have Naxos installed. On October 4th
or 5th, at least one of these aircraft had been returned to Finthen
equipped with Naxos.
Leader Aircraft.
90. When, up to mid-August, II/N.J.G.1 was based at Deelen, the Naxosequipped
aircraft flown by the Gruppenkommandeur was employed as a
shadowing aircraft to home on to H2S transmissions of incoming bombers
and to report their position and composition to the Gruppe.
91. This shadowing aircraft was known as the Führer (Leader), or
sometimes the Aufklärer, (Reconnaissance), and at the first indications
of an R.A.F. attack it took of early - before the remainder of the
Gruppe - and made contact with and flew with the bomber stream.
93. The Division in turn passed such information as was necessary to
the night fighter Gruppen under its control, and this information was
received by the latter on the Tannoy system.
94. When the night fighters took off to intercept the bombers, the
information from the leader aircraft was put out in the form of a Gruppe
commentary; the night fighters could not communicate with the leader
aircraft. P/W did not know if the ordinary commentary was ignored and
all dispositions were made solely on the basis of the shadowing
aircraft's reports, or if other sources of information were used
simultaneously as a basis for the Gruppe commentary; he rather inclined
to the former.
95. Reports by the leader aircraft continued during a raid and included
details such as flares laid, Flak being encountered, and any aircraft
shot down in flames.
96. Once the interception force had been led to the bomber stream with
The help of the leader aircraft, the latter dropped flares of varying
combinations of colours to mark any turning points of the bomber stream,
at the same time informing the Divisional headquarters. The night
fighters were simultaneously ordered by their ground control to fly on
to the flares, or to fly on a specific bearing from these flares.
97. The pilot from III/N.J.G.4 believed that in some units the jammer
aircraft communicate direct with the night fighters under their control,
and issue vectoring orders to them. In all cases however, once the night
fighters have been brought up to the bomber stream, the leader aircraft
is informed by the Division, and thereafter it assumes the function of
an ordinary night fighter.
Night Fighter Flares.
98. These P/W had heard that the Führer aircraft procedure was falling
into disrepute, because on occasions considerable time had been lost
between take-off of the leader aircraft and that of the reminder of the
night fighters, so that in consequence the night fighters had frequently
failed to contact the bombers.
99. This story is perhaps strengthened by thy fact that more recently,
at least in III/N.J.G.4, al1 Ju.88’s have been carrying three or four
flares on each sortie. When a night fighter makes contact with the
bombers, three flares are dropped in or near the bomber stream as a
signal for other night fighters that the bombers have been contacted;
the flares indicate the position of the stream.
100. Until early in October these flares were always composite whitered-
white, each colour burning for one minute in a varying sequence
which was changed from night to night. Just recently, however, crews
have been told that new colour combinations of red, white, yellow and
green would shortly be coming into use.
Single-engined Fighters with Naxos.
101. Whilst at Werneuchen one of these P/W saw Me 109’s and F.W. 190’s –
which they heard were destined for a "Wilde Sau" unit - equipped with
Naxos. In the F.W. 190 the Naxos dome was fixed to the after part of the
sliding part of the cockpit cover. P/W could give no further information
and had not noticed how the aerial array was mounted, but he was certain
that the dome moved back with the cockpit cover.

FLENSBURG.
102. Neither II/N.J.G.1 nor III/N.J.G.4 have any aircraft equipped with
Flensburg, but during the first week of October two new Ju.88 with both
Flensburg and S.N.2 were delivered to the 7th Staffel. P/W did not know
the reason for this delivery, and he had understood that the Flensburg
had fallen out of use.

REACTIONS TO MOSQUITO INCURSIONS.
103. The R.A.F. Mosquito incursions are giving the Germans cause for
some serious thought and, according to P/W, much inconvenience and
disturbance is being caused both by the intruders and the small
attacking forces.
104. Intruders over airfields are, of course, a considerable cause of
disturbance, and it is very seldom that a night fighter crew can land on
its base in peace. Added to this, there is always a sense of uneasiness
amongst crews during sorties, with the result that their efficiency is
much impaired.
105. One of the present P/W - the pilot - went so far as to say that he
would shoot at any twin-engine aircraft without waiting for a
recognition of type, which is strictly against the present rules.
106. The same P/W was of the opinion that at present it is often
impossible for the ground warning system to establish whether a
penetrating force is composed of Mosquitoes or heavy bombers, and that
as a result the night fighters must be put up, if only as a precaution,
until such a time as the true composition and intentions of the force
are established.
107. When a penetration force has been identified as a Mosquito
formation, the Me.110 and Ju.88 night fighters are not put in the air,
and the Reichluftflotte W/T beacons do not transmit a commentary. It was
suggested by P/W, however, that He.219's were being-put up to intercept
Mosquitoes.
108. It has often happened recently that night fighter units have been
put in the air to intercept large four-engined bomber formations which
have only later been identified as smaller Mosquito formations. This has
resulted in much waste of effort, to say nothing of petrol, since the
night fighters were recalled as soon as the attacking force was
identified.
109. In a recent lecture to III/N.J.G.4, crews were told that a small
formation of Mosquitoes could with the help of a special apparatus and a
low speed, lead the Germans to believe that a large formation of fourengined
bombers was underway; crews were given no details of this
special apparatus.
110. It is interesting that of the seven operations which the W/T
operator of II/N.J.G.1 had made, no fewer than three were false calls
caused by Mosquitoes. In these sorties the crews had been sent up to
intercept four-engined aircraft, and after having been airborne for 1 to
11/2 hours they had been called back to base and told that the supposed
heavy bomber force was only a Mosquito formation. The W/T operator of
I/N.J.G.4 had made six operations, and of those two were similarly false
calls for Mosquitoes, on which the night fighters had been recalled
after having been airborne for 3/4 - 1 hour.
111. On one occasion early in October, on the other hand, the aircraft
of II/N.J.G.1, at that time based at Düsseldorf, had been stood down
after an early warning of a "Mosquito penetration". Soon afterwards,
however, cascades of flares were seen falling near the airfield and it
was thought that the airfield itself was about to be attacked.
112. The attack was, in fact, on München/Gladbach, and Oberleutnant LAU
thereupon took off alone at about 2300 hours. That officer shot down two
four-engined bombers and landed again after having been airborne for 22
minutes.
113. The two W/T operators amongst these P/W were sufficiently cooperative
to compile diaries of the sorties which they had made;
although naturally they could not remember dates with any degree of
reliability, their notes include an indication of the inconvenience and
waste of ill-spared fuel of which the Mosquito incursions are the cause.

5/N.J.G.1.
114. (1) On 27th august, 1944. Took off from Deelen at about 2230
hours. This crew was ordered to fly direct to the W/T beacon
Quelle, because, it was said, a bomber force approaching the
Weser estuary from the North Sea was likely to fly to the
Hanover/Brunswick area.
This aircraft, about the fifth to take off from Deelen,
flew for a time on D.R. whilst the W/T operator listened to
the Gruppe commentary. He then switched over to the W/T beacon
and used that commentary.
The pilot made a left-hand turn and at the same time
heard on the beacon commentary that the bombers were heading
for Hannover. By this time, however, petrol was running low
and the crew decided to break off; they landed in Oldenburg.
The S.N.2 was u/s from time of take—off.
This crew only learned afterwards that they had been
directed by the Gruppe commentary to fly to Mannheim, where an
attack was taking place, but since by the time the Mannheim
attack had been identified they had switched over to the
beacon commentary, they had not heard this order to the
Gruppe.
During the afternoon of the day following these raids, an
operations officer of Jagd Division 3, Hauptmann KNICKMEIER,
came to Deelen and gave all the crews a talk on the raid of
the previous night. He told them that the night fighter sortie
had been a failure because as soon as he knew that Bomber
Command were making two penetrations he had ordered all
aircraft of II/N.J.G.1 to break off from the more northerly
penetration and to make for the other bomber stream going for
Mannheim.
This, he stated, had 1ed to some confusion and,
therefore, in the future the night fighters would be allowed
to continue to fly according to their first orders, and no
attempt would be made to divert them to intercept any
subsequent attack.
(2) Early September. Took off from Düsseldorf at 2225 hours.
Objective Stettin - Kiel. Commentary gave false direction of
penetration as Weimar. No interception. Landed at Jüterbog.
(3) Mid-September. Took off from Deelen at 2350 hours.
Mosquito attack. Landed at Deelen after 1/2 hours.
(4) Mid-September. Took off from Deelen about 2300 hours.
Mosquito attack. Landed at Deelen.
(5) End September. Took off from Düsseldorf about 2230 hours.
Mosquito attack. Ordered to W/T beacon Christa. Landed at
Mainz/Finthen. S.N.2 mutual disturbance.
(6) October 2nd or 3rd. Took off from Düsseldorf at about
2230 hours. Heavy bomber penetration with München-Gladbach as
objective. S.N.2 contacts near Münster. Enemy aircraft bombed
through gaps in cloud from 4,200 metres. Commentary gave false
height. Saw four 4-engined aircraft, but could not close in
because they disappeared into cloud. White, red and green
cascade flares. Heavy Flak; several aircraft seen going down.
Landed at Gütersloh after 21/2 hours.
(7) See A.D.I.(K) 365/1944.

7/N.J.G.4.
115. (1) August 7th or 8th. Airborne landings in Seine Estuary.
Took off at about 2300 hours. No contacts; ordered to return
after 11/2 hours.
(2) August 9th. Ordered to W/T beacon Mücke, shot down by own
Flak and bailed out over Nassolt.
(3) End August; Took off from Twente. Mosquito attack.
(4) Mid-September. Took off from Mainz/Finthen at 2300 hours.
Flares at Frankfurt or Darmstadt - apparently Mosquitoes.
Ordered to land after 11/2 hours. No contacts.
(5) About September 20th. Took off at about 2200 hours.
Bombing in Frankfurt area. Saw 4-engined aircraft on opposite
track held by searchlights, but did not go after it as it was
at a greater height. Window upset S.N.2.
(6) October 6th. Took off from Finthen at about 2000 hours
in direction of Kaiserslautern. S.N.2 electrically jammed;
tried to home on jammer without success. Got lost and shot
down by U.S. Flak.

Ground Attack.
116. At the closing stages of the French campaign some of the night
fighter units, including II/N.J.G.1 and III/N.J.G.4, were given the
extra duties of attacking ground targets with their forward armament -
duties which proved both expensive in aircraft and unpopular with the
crews.
117. Since their return to Germany, neither of these two units had
attacked ground targets, but on the night of October 6th an order was
re-introduced into II/N.J.G.1 to attack ground targets if any suitable
objectives were seen.

A.D.I.(K) S.D.Felkin,
2nd November, 1944. Wing Commander."

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 13:48

Aufklärer and Verbandsführer aircraft
 
Item 34 onward:


"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 700/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
GERMAN NIGHT FIGHTERS.

A REVIEW OF CURRENT GERMAN TACTICS.
1. Three recent A.D.I.(K) Reports, Nos.508, 599 and 620, have
described current German night fighter tactics in some detail and have
shown how the night fighter force, robbed of much of its early warning
and at the same time the victim of extensive radio countermeasures was,
up to the beginning of October 1944, forced into improvisation in its
tactics.
2. This report has been compiled with the object or examining the
extent to which the Germans have varied their tactics during October and
November to meet the continued and successful countermeasures employed
by R.A.F. Bomber Command.
3. The present information has been obtained from a pilot, a radar
operator and a W/T operator of 3/N.J.G.2 shot down in Holland on the
night of November 29th, and from a pilot of the same Staffel shot down
in Belgium on the following night.
4. These prisoners confirm the fact that the situation at the end of
November remained much the same as in early October; the following
paragraphs therefore, whilst adding little to present knowledge of
German tactics, have their value in showing the situation as it was on
the more recent date.
Present Use of SN 2.
5. A re-examination of the conditions under which the night fighters
are operating their search equipment shows that, at least in the
neighbourhood of a bomber stream, interference by jamming is such as to
render the SN2 completely useless. Resort to the alternative frequencies
- of which there are two - had in P/W's experience made not the
slightest difference; he described the disturbance as taking the form of
grass on both sides of the traces on the range and bearing tubes.
6. These P/W expressed the opinion that of late Bomber Command has
been making less use of window in favour of airborne jammers known as
Rausch-Sender (see A.D.I.(K) 599/1944 paras.73 - 76); little
interference from Window has in fact been experienced recently by crews
of I/N.J.G.2.
7. Like their predecessors, the present P/W were not seriously
disturbed by the prospect of Window jamming; recent recommendations had
laid down that under certain conditions the aircraft blip could be
distinguished through the Window disturbances by the difference in their
relative rates of movement down the SN 2 display.
8. In some of the aircraft of I/N.J.G.2 an attempt has been made to
reduce the effects of electrical jamming by mounting the SN 2 aerial
diagonally instead of vertically; these P/W had, however, no first-hand
knowledge as to whether this expedient did or did not improve the
situation.
9. An indication of its lack of success may be that during October the
Gruppe Signals Officer had told the new aircrews that a new version of
SN 2 was in course of development but that meanwhile they would have to
make the best of present conditions and take advantage of periods when
jamming was not present.
10. The Signals Officer did not divulge the name of the new apparatus,
neither did he tell the crews when they could expect it to be introduced
into operations; gossip in the Staffel had it that the new apparatus
would be the SN 3.
11. The Gruppenkommandeur of I/N.J.G.2, Hauptmann RATH, now publicly
claims to have been a life-long adherent of "cat's eye" night fighting
and avers that all his victories have been achieved without the use of
search equipment.
12. It is perhaps worth repeating that, as far as these prisoners knew,
there is no question of re-introducing the Lichtenstein; one P/W, stated
that that apparatus has completely fallen out of use and is not even
employed in training.

SN 2 as Tail Warning.
13. Since the introduction of SN 2 into operations, all prisoners
interrogated have stated that that apparatus in its present form is
capable of giving a tail warning, although at a comparatively shorter
range than its forward capabilities.
14. In I/N.J.G.2 there has recently been a further development in the
improving of the tai1 warning; at the beginning of November new
deliveries of Ju.88 G-6’s began to arrive with an aerial array for tail
warning installed at the extreme end of the aircraft tai1 unit.
15. This array consisted of one dipole carrier similar to those used
for the normal SN 2 forward array, but with the dipoles placed in a
horizontal position.
16. By the end of November, the Gruppe possessed some ten aircraft
equipped in this manner; these P/W had themselves had no experience with
this innovation but had understood that a picture only appeared in one
tube of the SN 2 display - they thought the azimuth tube.
Naxos and H2S.
17. Some time in early October, crews in I/N.J.G.2 began to complain
amongst themselves that something had gone wrong with Naxos; whereas
until that time it had been considered entirely efficient, and they had
always been able to count upon obtaining large numbers of H2S contacts
from a raiding force, they had now begun to obtain so few contacts as to
arouse the suspicion that the R.A.F. had come to known about Naxos and
was playing tricks with it.
18. Up to the end of November, nothing had been said officially by any
of the senior officers, but the opinions of radar and W/T operators may
be summarised as
(a) that H2S is not being used to the same extent as formerly,
(b) that the R.A.F. has an H2S of a new type or with a new frequency,
and
(c) that in some way Naxos is being jammed.
19. Of the 25-30 aircraft it the Gruppe, about half are equipped with
Naxos.

Flensburg.
20. About ten of the aircraft of I/N.J.G.2 are equipped with Flensburg
and according to these prisoners it frequently occurs that Ju.88-G is
delivered with this apparatus installed.
21. Crews are at a loss to understand why the Flensburg is still being
delivered since the apparatus has fallen out of use. At one time
attempts were made to remove the internal part of the equipment to save
weight in the aircraft, but a sharp reprimand came from higher quarters
and it was duly put back. At all events, official instructions on
present intentions with the Flensburg are entirely lacking.
22. It is perhaps worth repeating that the present radar operator P/W
had been told by one of the experienced W/T operators of a possible use
of the Flensburg as a warning of enemy aircraft.
23. It was said that a Monica signal always appeared within two limits
on the Flensburg display; any signal appearing on either side outside
those limits was an indication of either a ground radar pulsation, that
from an SN 2 or from Allied A.I.
24. There was said to be no method of distinguishing between the three
types of signal, but it would be possible to obtain an indication of
whether a transmission originated from below, above or at the same
level. In this way, it was claimed, Flensburg at least gave an
indication that another aircraft, possibly a Mosquito using A.I., was in
the vicinity.
25. One of the present crews had Flensburg installed in their aircraft
but they had never taken an opportunity to try out the recipe described
above.

SIGNALS TRAFFIC.
German Reaction to Continued Countermeasures.
26. The fact that at the beginning of October the German night fighter
force was reduced to only one reliable signals channel - the high
powered W/T beacon commentaries - was reported in A.D.I.(K) 599/1944
para.46 et seq. The present interrogations, whilst producing little that
is new, have once again confirmed that the situation with night fighter
signals was as previously reported and, in fact, remained little changed
at the end of November.
27. In I/N.J.G.2 the W/T operators had been experiencing exactly the
same difficulties as in the other units recently examined; the present
P/W stated that they too had found the Divisional and Gruppe
commentaries on the M/F and H/F bands seriously jammed from about the
middle of September, and they too had been forced to resort to the
Divisional commentary put out by the high-powered W/T beacons.
28. On rare occasions, it has been possible to hear the Gruppe morse
commentary (Gruppen Tastführung) through the jamming but results are in
the majority of cases so uncertain that operators waste no time and go
straight over to the beacon commentaries; the latter present no
difficulties.
29. These P/W described the jamming note on the Fu.Ge.10P frequencies
as being a rising and falling whistle. The VHF frequency band of 38.4 -
42.5 Mc/s has fallen completely out of use for the purposes of
commentaries, but in the FuGe.16 was still used at take-off and for
landing at the base of the unit at Kassel.
30. Thus, the present situation is that the night fighter Gruppen can
no longer operate as units, but each individual crew must judge the
situation for themselves from the information given by the beacon
commentary and must themselves decide whether they shall attempt to
intercept the bombers or give up the chase; if the search equipment is
jammed, and the homing equipment produces no reactions, then the night
fighter operation is reduced to the level of a Wilde Sau sortie.
31. One further complication which arises when the Gruppe commentary is
inaudible is that crews listening to the Divisional commentary from the
high-powered beacons often miss orders given to aircraft of the Gruppe,
with the result that recall orders are frequently not heard and much
effort is wasted in aircraft flying about aimlessly.
32. Eventually, when the attack is over and jamming has been withdrawn,
crews will return to the Gruppe frequency and then belatedly hear the
orders to return to base.
33. It is perhaps worth adding that the aircraft of I/N.J.G.2 have not
been flying by the Himmelbett (Würzburg-Freya controlled) method.

RECONNAISSANCE AND LEADER AIRCRAFT.
Definition.
34. The prisoners were able to clarify the question of the so-called
formation leader (Verbandsführer) described somewhat inadequately by
previous P/W and reported in A.D.I.(K) 599/1944 paras.90-97.
35. It transpires that two separate categories of aircraft with totally
differing functions are employed; one, known as the Aufklärer
(Reconnaissance) has the duty of taking off before the main formation
and of contacting and reporting on the composition and movements of the
bomber stream.
36. The other aircraft, the Verbandsführer, is the leader of a night
fighter formation and, in an attempt to keep the unit together, that
aircraft transmits periodical D/F signals, on to which the others are
supposed to home, and which in theory have the effect of keeping the
formation together.
37. Neither system has recently been working satisfactorily, largely
owing to the jamming of signals channels. Nevertheless, in I/N.J.G.2
nightly preparations were made for putting reconnaissance and leader
aircraft up, should Divisional Headquarters decide that it was
necessary.
38. The functions of these two aircraft described in turn below.
Verbandsführer (Formation Leader).
39. The Verbandsführer aircraft it normally flown by an experienced
senior officer such as the Kommandeur or a Staffelkapitän, and his
aircraft always takes off with the main force of the Gruppe.
40. When ordered to take off, the aircraft of the Gruppe fly an initial
course in the normal manner. Thereafter the duty of the Verbandsführer
is to transmit a periodical D/F signal of two minutes duration at 10, 15
or 20 minute intervals, together with a pre-arranged single code-letter;
the aircraft of the formation are expected to home on these signals and
thus maintain a compact formation.
41. The code letter and the exact times at which the D/F signals shall
be transmitted are arranged at nightly briefings.
42. In I/N.J.G.2 the D/F signals were given on the long wave band of
the FuGe.10, with the addition of short-wave R/T or W/T instructions by
the Verbandsführer to the formation on changes of course and height;
only the leader aircraft was permitted to transmit.
43. The leader aircraft supplemented the R/T orders by the firing of
prearranged verey signals as a guide to the bomber stream.
44. The Verbandsführer system had one serious disadvantage in that the
D/F signals when given at the longer intervals, had the effect rather
of scattering the formation after the first leg of a course from base,
since the aircraft of the formation were apt to zig-zag across the
leader's track at each succeeding D/F signal.
45. Up to the middle of September the Verbandsführer procedure could be
said to be operating fairly satisfactorily, but when jamming of the
frequency bands of the FuGe.10 commenced, its operation became
impossible and in I/N.J.G.2 the procedure was dropped.
46. Divisional orders to operate a Verbandsführer still stand, and a
routine daily briefing on procedure and callsigns was still held with
I/N.J.G.2; Hauptman RATH, the Kommandeur, openly admits, however, that,
under present conditions he has no intention of operating a
Verbandsführer and by holding the briefing he is merely obeying
Divisional orders in the spirit.

Reconnaissance (Aufklärer aircraft).
47. The duty of the Aufklärer aircraft is to make contact with the
bomber stream with the help of ground control, Naxos and SN 2, and then
to report directly and solely to Divisional headquarters on its
composition and movements. The Aufklärer is usually one of a number
detailed daily from the ordinary night fighter Units.
48. In I/N.J.G.2 the crews of from one to three aircraft equipped with
Naxos were briefed nightly to stand by for Aufklärer duties; orders to
take off came from the Division, and once airborne the aircraft operated
entirely under Divisional control on a special frequency known as the
Aufklärer Welle.
49. Once the Aufklärer had served its purpose of contacting and
reporting on the raiding force, that aircraft, on orders from the
Division, assumed the duties of a normal night fighter.
50. It usually happened that orders to the Aufklärer to take off
preceded those to the main force by anything from ten minutes to one
hour; the Aufklärer detailed in I/N.J.G.2 were sometimes ordered up
singly, whilst at other times two or three took off together. If no
orders came from Division, then the Aufklärer took off with the main
force and operated as normal night fighter.
51. Since the beginning of October, the Aufklärer aircraft, although
briefed and standing by nightly, had not been ordered up by Division.
These P/W were of the opinion that of late the channels of “Y” control
had been so seriously disturbed as to make the procedure impossible in
Western Germany. Additionally the air situation had recently been so
confused that nothing more could be done than to order the main force of
night fighters to take off at the last moment - and very often too late
to be of any use.

TACTICS OF INTERCEPTION.
52. The following paragraphs of necessity take the form of notes and
additions to the account given in A.D.I.(K) 599/1944. The methods used
in I/N.J.G.2 have been found to follow the same principle as those used
by other units; the present P/W were, however, able to clarify several
points and to enlarge upon others.
Readiness.
53. Standing patrols were not flown by I//N.J.G.2; as with other units
examined recently, a met and signals briefing was held each evening and
crews remained at readiness in the crew-room during the whole of the
night or until such a time as they were called on the Tannoy laid on in
the room.
54. The aircraft were lined up at a dispersal and the engines were only
started up after a crew or crews had been called to take off. In this
case the first aircraft could be away within 8 minutes of the crew being
called; it had occasionally happened that crews were detailed to sit in
the aircraft, but with the engines still.
55. Should an order to take off prove to be a false alarm and the
aircraft be ordered to return, crews resumed their original state of
readiness and the fuel tanks of the aircraft which had returned were
immediately topped up ready for another start.
56. In the case of double sorties being flown, crews who returned to
their base airfield after the first sortie resumed their original state
of readiness. Such aircraft as landed on other night fighter bases,
however, were temporarily attached to the unit which they visited, and
received signals briefing as though they belonged to that unit.
Take-off.
57. There is no predetermined point at which the night fighters are put
up to meet a raiding force, and sources of early warning of bomber
penetration are, of course, unknown to the majority of operational
crews.
58. In the experience of these prisoners, the order to take off was
occasionally accompanied by a note as to the position and direction of
the bomber force, but often, as on the last sortie of the 4R + RL on the
night of November 29th, the night fighters were simply ordered to make
for a given high powered W/T beacon and to await further orders.
59. In the days before the Gruppe commentary was jammed, the aircraft
were went to assemble over or near their base airfield, after which
orders were given as to course and height to meet the bombers. Under
present conditions, each crew or batch of crews ordered into the air is
given an initial course which takes them to a beacon, or which is
calculated to bring them directly to the bomber stream. If, after the
first leg, no contact is made, the crews must do the best they can from
the beacon commentary.

Navigation.
60. Navigation in I/N.J.G.2 follows the general practice amongst German
night fighters in that an attempt is made to navigate primarily by D.R.
with the additional help of ground navigational aids; it was stated that
at present the only reliable aids were the visual and radio beacons.
61. One of the present P/W had the idea that some aircraft of the
Gruppe, including those of the Kommandeur and Staffelkapitäne, were
using Bernhardine as an additional aid, but he could give no further
details. He had understood that the method of determining a position was
by means of a succession of sine curves along a horizontal base, with a
series of figures at the points where the curves struck the base line.
Contacting the Bombers.
62. These prisoners repeated that no attempt is or can be made to
operate in any specific part of the bomber stream, and under present
conditions crews are content to have found the bombers at all, no matter
how or where.
63. Once in the stream the night fighter crew will attempt to remain
there, and it is only if chased off by a Mosquito or through lack of
fuel or other defects to the aircraft, that the pilot wi11 deliberately
leave the stream again.
64. The commentaries are broken off as soon as an R.A.F attack has
finished - at least as far as the recent shallow penetrations have been
concerned – and the question as to whether the returning bomber shall be
followed on their homeward track lies entirely with the night fighter
crews, and depends largely upon the amount of fuel remaining in the
aircraft.
65. There are no restrictions as to how far beyond the German border
the night fighters shall fly, but these P/W pointed out that after the
bomber attack is over, the night fighter has no commentary to help him.

I.F.F.
66. At the beginning of November the Signals Officer at I/N.J.G.2
announced that the R.A.F. had equipment for homing on to FuGe.25a
transmissions; he nevertheless told crews that the order to keep the
I.F.F. switched on must stand, but he added the order that the apparatus
should be turned off when leaving German territory.

Armament - German and R.A.F.
67. The rear armament of one M.G.131 in the Ju.88 G-6 is intended
solely for defensive purposes. The majority of crews felt that this
armament was an unnecessary extra weight, and these P/W themselves had never heard of a case where it had been used in combat.
68. As far as R.A.F. armament is concerned, crews in I/N.J.G.2 at least
have no knowledge of the use of radar aids by R.A.F. gunners. These P/W
stated, however, that tracer fire from a bomber has distinct deterrent
effect upon all but the most hardened night fighter crews.

Petrol.
69. There has been no noticeable shortage of petrol in I/N.J.G.2 and
according to these P/W there have been no orders to economise. The sole
indication of any shortage was a recent restriction in SN 2 practice
flights by day.

Night Rocket Phenomena.
70. The question has been asked as to whether the Germans are using jet
propelled aircraft at night. These prisoners had not heard of the use of
this type of aircraft and were inclined to ridicule the suggestion.
71. They themselves had seen rocket traces at night and had attributed
these to rocket Flak; they had had to draw their own conclusions,
however, since officially they were told nothing.
72. One of the present pilots had twice encountered enormous flaming
masses over Berlin some time ago; he had at first thought these to be
aircraft going down in flames, but on the second occasion he was close
enough to make a careful observation and could see that the rate of fall
was too slow for a crashing aircraft. Again, he had been told nothing
officially.

THE NIGHT FIGHTER'S DIET.
73. The fact that night fighter crews must now depend more and more
upon good night vision has prompted an enquiry into the measures being
taken by means of diet and drugs to maintain a standard of night vision
in I/N.J.G.2.
74. The familiar black pills formerly distributed to night fighter and
bomber crews in the G.A.F. were absent in this unit. The normal diet of
the night fighter was given by one of the present P/W as follows:-
Breakfast: 30 grammes of butter,
White bread,
One egg,
50 grammes of sausage,
½ litre of fresh milk,
Ersatz coffee.
Lunch: Soup; varying from meat and vegetable to
noodle.
Meat and 2 veg.,
Pudding (occasionally}.
Supper: 45 grammes of butter,
80 grammes of sausage,
Black bread,
Jam or artificial honey,
8 cigarettes
75. When returning from a sortie, the night fighter is given the
following special issue:-
25 grammes of chocolate,
25 grammes of coffee beans (real),
2 packets of boiled sweets,
1 cake of dried fruit,
Biscuits.
A.D.I.(K). and U.S. S.D. FELKIN
Air Interrogation. WING commander
30th December 1944"

Nick Beale 30th October 2018 19:06

Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Marcel van Heijkop (Post 259927)
Absolutely! Count me in, Nick!

PS: Is your website down at the moment? I tried to read the info from the links you provided, but couldn't get on your site.

Best regards,

Marcel

Hi Marcel,
My website is still alive (I just checked) and both those links work for me.

Another site with a selection of transcribed ADI(K) reports is: http://www.cdvandt.org/felkin_reports.htm. The emphasis there is on radar and communications systems.

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 20:56

NJ developments
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 125/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F.NIGHT FIGHTERS.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN NIGHT FIGHTING.
1. Between the opening of the Rundstedt offensive on 17
December 1944 and the night of 1st January 1945, fifty-nine
German night fighter aircrew captured on the Western Front
were brought to England for interrogation by A.D.I.(K). Of
these prisoners, ten were selected as being suitable for
special interrogation with the object of investigating current
German tactics, and the extent of their deviation from methods
employed up to the end of November and reported in A.D.I.(K)
508, 599, 620 and 700/1944.
2. The present report is based on the interrogation of these
ten prisoners, who came from III/N.J.G.1, II and III/N.J.G.2
and II, III and IV/N.J.G.3, and of whom one had recently spent
some time at the G.A.F. radar experimental station at
Werneuchen. In addition, there was one prisoner who had spent
one year as a ground radar mechanic with I/N.J.G.4 and had
then transferred to the Schulstaffel of the same unit to train
as a radar operator. The Schulstaffel had been dissolved at
the end of October 1944 and its personnel posted to the
infantry; this P/W fell into Allied hands as an unwilling
member of the Waffen SS.
3. From interrogation of previous night fighter prisoners -
captured between September and the end of November 1944 - it
has been amply proved that the German night fighter force has
been at a loss to overcome the successful Bomber Command
spoofery and radio countermeasures and as yet has made no
progress in its efforts to overcome this disadvantage.
4. From the present interrogations there are signs that the
Germans, not content to let the matter rest as it is, are
striving to gain the upper hand over Bomber Command by the
introduction of at least two new measures. One of these,
discussed in the following paragraphs, is the employment of
Bernhardine beacons for the dual purpose commentary and
navigation, and the other - as yet in its early stages - the
probable introduction of a new type of search equipment, the
SN 3. Details of the latter are at present lacking, but
evidence suggests that it may be of the nature of centimetre
A.I.

BERNHARDINE – FuGe.120.
Earlier Vicissitudes.
5. As far as G.A.F. prisoners are concerned, Bernhardine is
no innovation, as early as May 1942 hazy allusions to this
form of navigational aid were made by prisoners, but the first
mention of Bernhardine by name was made by an officer of
1(F)/121 captured in October 1943 (A.D.I.(K) 498/1943;
thereafter nothing further was heard until K.G.66 opened its
pathfinder operations over England early in 1944.
6. A prisoner from 5/K.G.66 captured in England on 25th March
1944 gave an account of Bernhardine which, in the light of the
present interrogation proves to have been remarkably accurate
(A.D.I.(K) 187/1944, paras.19 – 24)
7. In October 1943, 5/K.G.66 had had 1 Do.217-M equipped with
Bernhardine, but after some experiments the experts had come
to the conclusion that the apparatus was not sufficiently
accurate for pathfinder operations; the P/W concerned had
heard later that work on the ground installations had ceased.
8. In spite of continued interrogation of subsequent
prisoners, nothing more was heard of Bernhardine until late in
December 1944. The capture of a prisoner from III/N.J.G.1 on
17th December 1944 and other prisoners from II and III/N.J.G.3
later in the same month has now revealed that Bernhardine is
being seriously considered - if not already used - not only as
an aid to night fighter navigation but as a source of the
commentaries.
Introduction of Bernhardine to Night Fighting.
9. Some time in October 1944, crews of 8/N.J.G.1 were given a
preliminary lecture on Bernhardine in which its principles
were explained, they were told that it was no new discovery
but would shortly be introduced to night fighting. In
III/N.J.G.3 crews had also been given frequent lectures and by
November some of the aircraft of that Gruppe already had the
necessary apparatus installed.
10. According to prisoners who attended these lectures, the
transmissions from the ground station take the form of a
conventional twin lobe polar diagram with an equisignal area
and with a very small amount of rearward radiation. A signal
transmitted from the ground station once every minute is
translated by the airborne apparatus into a teleprint message
on a paper tape giving the QTE (true bearing) of the aircraft
from the ground transmitter followed by a further image in
figures and letters which is a Divisional commentary of the
type at present broadcast by the high powered W/T beacons.
11. It was explained that the Bernhardine transmitters would
operate on 32 frequencies between 30.0 and 33.1 mc/s, and that
the signal would be received through the normal E.Bl.3 in the
aircraft. Thus the first 32 of the 34 spot frequencies of the
E.Bl.3 would be used for Bernhardine whilst the remaining two,
33.2 and 33.3 mc/s, would be retained for blind landing
purposes.
12. It is claimed by P/W that Bernhardine signals are
unjammable and that transmissions have a range of 400 - 500
kilometres.
13. A captured night fighter map, recovered from a recent
crash in Belgium and issued by the signals officer of N.J.G.3,
was marked with Bernhardine transmitters at approximately the
following pinpoints;-
N° 0(?) Berlin 52°13'N;13°6'E
N° 8 Alkmaar, Holland. 52°42'N;4°38'E
N° 9(?) Leck 54°41'N;9° 2'E
N° 10 Thisted, Denmark. 56°42'N;8°33’E
N° 11 Breslau 51°25'N;17°5’E
N° 12 Pilsen 49°45'N;13°15’E
14. A further indication that Bernhardine may already be in
operational use was found in a file of signals orders from an
aircraft of II/N.J.G.1 shot down on December 31st. On the same
page as the usual numbering of the Y-line frequencies was
another column headed "Kanäle" (= channels); the channels were
numbered from 1 to 32 and to each number was appended a
frequency, commencing with 30.0 at No.1 and rising by .1 mc.
to 33.1 mc/s at No.32.
15. Both of the above documents have been forwarded to
A.I.4(b).

Airborne Apparatus.
16. The Bernhardine apparatus in the aircraft is contained in
a box measuring some 60 cm in width, 30 cm in height and 20 cm
in depth, placed in the JU.88 in some cases to the right of
the W/T operator on the lower port wall of the fuselage and in
others to the left of the W/T operator or in the forward
instrument panel.
17. The front of the box has a wide glass-covered slot about
40 cm. in length and 12 cm. in depth along which the paper
tape travels from right to left after the necessary data have
been printed upon it by a teleprinter contained in the box.
The on-off switch for the apparatus, marked FuGe.120, is
placed on the R/T operator's switch panel, and is used in
conjunction with the click-stop frequency selector for the
E.Bl.3.
18. From evidence supplied by the present P/W it is possible
to give a description of the Bernhardine display and of the
exact data which it supplies. An impression of the Bernhardine
display is given below; it will be seen that the printed tape
is divided into three horizontal sections, on the uppermost of
which appears a series of close vertical lines shortening at
intervals to a "V", on the central section a reading in
degrees, and on the lower a coded image which is the
commentary. One simultaneous printing of these sections takes
place during ten seconds of every minute, the tape remaining
stationary for the remaining fifty seconds, after which the
process is repeated.
19. In the lectures on Bernhardine it was stated that the
ground transmitter makes one full revolution of 360° in sixty
seconds; a section of the pattern of the ground transmission
is repeated on the tape in the form of the series of vertical
lines, the equisignal zone being represented by the apex of
the "V".
20. In each printing lasting ten seconds a sector of 60°
appears on the tape and in every case it contains a repetition
of the equisignal zone. The reading in degrees appears in the
central section of the tape in numbers representing 10's of
degrees, and the point opposite to which the apex of the "V"
is printed represents the bearing in degrees of the aircraft
from the transmitter. Accuracy of bearings was stated to be
within 0.5°.
21. A recognition letter is allotted to each transmitter and
is repeated on the tape at every 20° on the scale; in the
sketch the letter X - the recognition for the Leck transmitter
is shown.
22. The commentary in the lowest section appears in each 10-
second printing as a group of a maximum of ten letters and
numerals, inclusive of two crosses denoting the beginning and
end of a message. Should a message be of more than ten
characters it wi11 be continued in the succeeding printing, a
cross appearing at the end of the message.
23. Thus, the commentary message shown in the sketch, + 40 KA
27 100, just falls within the ten-character limit if the final
+ denoting the end of the message is omitted. The latter is
therefore carried forward and appears at the commencement of
the next printing; it denotes simultaneously the end of the
one message and the beginning of the next. It was stated that
a single message could be continued over three or four
printings.
24. The commentary always appears in a standard order;
analysis of the typical message shown in the sketch is as
follows:-
25. It will be noted that the form of this commentary is
exactly the same as that at present put out by the Divisions
on the high powered W/T beacons (see A.D.I.(K) 599/1944 para.
57).
26. The present P/W had been told that, in addition to the
Divisional commentary, instructions to individual formations
of night fighters would be transmitted by the Bernhardine and
printed on the lowest section of the tape. How, in such a
case, the aircraft would be tracked or how the orders by the
subordinate units would be coded, they did not know.

Operational Use.
27. The aircraft set is switched on soon after take-off, so
that the bearing transmitter can be constantly watched. If the
+ = beginning of message
40 = height of head of bomber stream in 100’s of metres
KA = fighter-grid position of head of stream
27 = course of formation in tens of degrees
100 = estimated number of aircraft
W/T operator wants the fix, he switches over to the
transmission of a second Bernhardine station for a gross
bearing; it was stated, however, that quicker and more
favoured method was to obtain a simultaneous cross bearing
from a high powered beacon through the PeilGe 6.
28. As far as these prisoners knew, only the Bernhardine
stations at Berlin and Leck are so far capable of transmitting
a commentary and flying instructions; the latter station was
only modified in this way at the beginning of November 1944
and aircraft of 9/N.J.G.3 made several test flights, usually
taking off from Uetersen at about 0230 hours and remaining
airborne for some four hours.
29. The present P/W of 9/N.J.G.3 had not taken part in these
flights, but after the tests he had seen the tape, which he
described as being printed on white paper in red letter,
4 - 6 mm. high as clearly as with a typewriter. He was told
that there was sufficient tape to allow of continuous
operation for 4 hours 20 minutes.

SIGNALS TRAFFIC.
German Spoof Signals.
30. An aircraft of 7/N.J.G.3 shot down in Belgium on January
1st carried a signal order on which appeared the word
"Orgelpfeife" (= organ pipe). Interrogation of all the present
P/W elicited the fact that Orgelpfeife is the codeword for
spoof R/T and W/T traffic passed between small numbers of
aircraft and the ground with the object of simulating large
numbers of night fighters in operation.
31. According to a P/W of 9/N.J.G.2 Orgelpfeife was
introduced in that unit, in mid-November; one crew in the
Staffel had received special briefing and usually operated the
spoof traffic. In operating R/T spoof, this crew’s duty was to
imitate a large number of night fighters operating by the
simple expedient of all four members of the crew taking turns
to speak, each using different callsigns.
32. It was said that the pilot of the crew in question,
Oberfeldwebel GELLNER was something of an actor and was able
to imitate various German dialects and different voices; P/W
claimed that the single Aircraft could simulate as many as
twelve night fighters.
33. The Orgelpfeife aircraft operated under Y control, since
such importance was attached to its position in relation to
the raiding force; the spoof aircraft patrolled an area near
the estimated target and as the raiding force was approaching
the target, the simulation of night fighters operating
commenced.
34. According to P/W the spoof aircraft carried large
quantities of Düppel (Window).
35. It seems that only one aircraft in a Staffel operates
Orgelpfeife; this was certainly the case in III/N.J.G.2, and
another P/W of III/N.J.G.3 stated that similar conditions
prevailed in that Gruppe.
36. None of the present P/W could give any useful information
on the method of coding the Orgelpfeife traffic, but it was
stated that the briefing usually gave two codewords or groups,
according to whether the spoof was R/T or W/T, and the crew
was to ignore all orders from the ground except those preceded
by the operative Orgelpfeife codewords or group.
37. In the captured briefing sheet mentioned above, the
codewords for 7/N.J.G.3 on the night of December 31st were
"Elfenbein" for the aircraft and "Hallore" for the ground.
38. A P/W of 9/N.J.G.3 stated that early in December R/T
silence had been enforced amongst the normally operating night
fighters of that Staffel.

Defence of the Ruhr by N.J.G.1.
39. The four Gruppen of N.J.G.1 have been allotted the
special task of defending the Ruhr in night attacks by R.A.F.
Bomber Command, and to achieve this aim all the Gruppen are
based strategically at airfields in that area.
40. In operations over the Ruhr the Gruppen are not
controlled separately as would normally be the case, but
operate under the central control of a special Geschwader
commentary put out on a M/F and an alternative V.H.F.
frequency; the latter, however, is almost invariably jammed.
41. This commentary consists of tactical instructions to the
aircraft as well as reports on the general situation;
according to P/W, the latter are not based on a Divisional
picture of events, but on data supplied by the Ruhr Flak
defences.
42. When a Mosquito force is reported over the Ruhr area, and
providing that flying conditions are suitable, all aircraft of
N.J.G.1 are put up and ordered to orbit any of the beacons
Börse, Bruno, Achmed, Gemse, Heide, Schnake, Paule, Ratte and
Drossel to await further events.
43. In case of jamming of both channels of Geschwader
control, two of these beacons, Achmed and Paule, are set aside
for transmission of the Geschwader commentary. P/W also heard
that a further alternative H.F commentary is to be put out on
a 20 kW transmitter whose signals will be superimposed on a
Cologne broadcast programme.
44. The aircraft of N.J.G.1 usually orbit the beacons for
about an hour, and if by then no attack by four-engined
bombers has materialised they are recalled; upon returning to
base, the aircraft are immediately refuelled so that should a
further attack be made a fresh sortie can be initiated
immediately.
45. In the middle of December some 50% of the aircraft in
N.J.G.1 were equipped with two white LC.50 flares carried
externally under the outer rings, and in the event of a major
bombing attack on a Ruhr objective these aircraft were to make
for the target and lay the flares at the operative height of
the bombers, so that the remainder of the night fighters could
quickly close in the area for visual attack.
46. The flare-carrying aircraft were to be given an X-time
for arrival over the target to coincide with the arrival of
the bomber stream; at this time the Flak would have orders to
cease fire, the flares would be laid and the night fighters
would go in to attack.
47. Importance was attached to the flare-carrying aircraft
arriving exactly at X-time, since a previous arrival would put
them and the remainder of the night fighters in danger of
being shot down by the Flak, and a late arrival would
jeopardise the operation.
48. In such a case where the aircraft of N.J.G.1 had been put
up against a spoof attack of Mosquitos and a four-engined
attack developed against targets outside the Ruhr, the
Geschwader commentary would transmit the codeword "Diogenes",
at which the aircraft would revert to their respective Gruppe
commentaries and would operate against the new attack in the
normal manner.
49. Crews of the flare-carrying aircraft were instructed that
in defending targets outside the Ruhr they could use their
flares, but only if they were certain of the true target.
Jamming of Commentaries.
50. Prisoners of II and III/N.J.G.3 stated that the Gruppe
commentaries were not seriously jammed in the Hamburg area;
although R/T could occasionally be heard, however, crews
relied mostly on the morse commentaries.
51. They stated that intensity of jamming varied considerably
from night to night. They could not understand the reason for
this since they had been officially told that the jamming had
been D/F’d and traced to the London area.
Verbandsführer (Formation Leader).
52. From the present P/W there are again conflicting reports
on the success or failure of the system of flying in formation
with a leader aircraft (A.D.I.(K) 700/1944, paras.34 – 49).
53. Whilst one P/W of N.J.G.3 stated that the system had been
working well in that Gruppe up to mid-December and that leader
aircraft operated under Y control, another prisoner, of
8/N.J.G.1, stated that in his unit the system had proved
unworkable and had been dropped in October. He gave as one
reason the dislike by the more experienced crews who flew as
formation leaders of acting as flying beacons, with the
attendant danger of being homed on by Mosquitoes.

I.F.F.
54. Much has already been said about the FuGe.25a in recent
A.D.I.(K) reports but nevertheless interrogation has continued
as to the conditions under which the apparatus is or is not
switched on during operations. One P/W of 8/N.J.G.1, based at
Düsseldorf, stated that if no intruders were reported at the
time the night fighters were ordered up for an operation, he
would switch on the FuGe.25a at take-off and keep it operating
until well clear of the airfield.
55. During operations he would have the instrument turned
off, but on returning to base would again switch it on shortly
before reaching the airfield - provided no warning of
intruders was in force.
56. A P/W of 9/N.J.G.3 knew of the British air-to-air I.F.F.
and knew that R.A.F. A.I. included a button which, upon being
pressed, identified the friendly aircraft on the A.I. picture.
57. Crews in this Staffel were told that a German air-to-air
I.F.F. was shortly coming into operation, but no further
details were given.
58. A prisoner of 11/N.J.G.3 remembered having seen a note in
a G.A.F. intelligence summary stating that the R.A.F. was
using infra red air-to-air recognition.

Hermine Beacons.
59. One of the present P/W had first heard of Hermine V.H.F.
beacons in March 1944, and at the time had learned that these
were radio beacons of new type from which pilots of singleengined
aircraft could obtain bearings.
60. He stated that the beacon, which has an effective range
of 200 – 300 kilometres, rotates through 360° in about three
minutes. The beacon transmits a continuous tone over about
359° with a silence zone of 1° which sweeps through 360° as
the beacon rotates; additionally a "speaking clock" counts
continuously from 1 to 360 and the continuous tone is
superimposed over this speech.
61. The pilot in the aircraft hears the continuous tone and
the counting on the FuGe.16Z, but hears the bearing spoken
clearly when in a line with the silence zone; he thus hears
his bearing to the beacon.
62. It will be remembered that prisoners of the Wilde Sau
single-engined night fighter unit I/J.G.301, captured in July
1944, had made mention of these radio beacons, albeit not by
name. The Kommodore of a single-engined day fighter Geschwader
had suggested that "Hermine" is derived from Oberst HERMANN,
founder of Wilde Sau night fighting.

INTERCEPTION EQUIPMENT.
Spot frequencies of SN.2.
63. The word "Streuwelle" in conjunction with SN 2 has been
mentioned for the first time by the present batch of
prisoners. Although none was able to define the word
Streuwelle or its origins, one suggested an alternative word
"Frequenz"; A.D.I.(Sc.) has supplied an agreed translation of
"Streuwelle" in the term "Spot frequency".
64. It has already been reported that in I/N.J.G.2 an attempt
had been made to reduce the effects of electrical jamming by
mounting the SN 2 aerial arrays diagonally instead of
vertically. These prisoners confirmed that this had also been
the case in other units, but the present interrogations have
established that this arrangement of aerials has no connection
with the spot frequency of the SN 2. In many cases prisoners
have known the differing aerial arrangements to exist in
several aircraft all equipped with SN 2's of the same spot
frequency.
65. These prisoners knew of three Streuwellen at present in
operational use, namely 4, 5 and 6; in two units, 8/N.J.G.1
and IV/N.J.G.3 some of the aircraft carried No.6, and other
prisoners stated that aircraft of their units were equipped
with 4 or 5 or a mixture of both. In 5/N.J.G.3, for example,
Streuwelle 5 had superseded 4, whilst 8/N.J.G.1 was equipped
with a mixture of 4 and 6, the latter having been delivered in
October.
66. It is worth noting that aircraft equipped with
Streuwellen 5 or 6 are forbidden to fly over enemy territory
unless the boxes have previously been removed; no such
security measures, however, exist with Streuwelle 4.
67. One prisoner had heard that a JU.88 equipped with SN 2
and Flensburg had landed at an airfield in East Anglia last
summer and that the British were therefore in possession of an
SN 2. He naturally assumed that the latter apparatus was of
Streuwelle 4. Upon being asked how it was known that a German
night fighter had landed in England he replied that the
information had been given by British prisoners in Germany.
68. Not one of the present P/W could supply the respective
frequencies of Streuwellen 4, 5 and 6, but the radar servicing
mechanic P/W, who had been with N.J.G.4 up to the end of
October, was able to give a few details of 4 and 5; up the
time when he left the unit he had not encountered No.6.
69. He was certain that the frequency of 5 was slightly
higher than that of 4; No.5 has one more induction coil and
has a range exceeding No.4 by 5 kilometres, being provided
with an extra switch giving two range pictures, one at 5 km.
and one at 10 km.
70. He and other prisoners stated that no matter which
Streuwelle, 4, 5 or 6, is installed in an aircraft, the aerial
array remains unchanged and in all cases the same CRT's and
the same electrical length of connecting cables are employed.
71. The ground radar mechanic stated that outwardly there is
little difference between the three Streuwellen, and to avoid
confusion by the ground staff all boxes have the appropriate
number painted on the back; the boxes of different Streuwellen
are not interchangeable.
72. An example of the effects of jamming on the differing
Streuwellen was given by one of the present prisoners. In May
1944 all aircraft of his unit were equipped with Streuwelle 4
with provision for the alternative frequency. In July 1944,
however, Window jamming made the set useless.
73. In October 1944 Streuwelle 5 and then 6 were delivered,
both with the alternative frequency; these, however, were
seriously jammed by the so-called Rauschsender (electrical
jammer). It was found, however, that the remaining SN 2's of
Streuwelle 4 were not so seriously upset by electrical
jamming, and the result was that many crews asked for No.4
back again and their wish was granted.
74. According to the radar mechanic, the C.R.T's used in the
SN 2 are manufactured by both Lorenz and Siemens Nürnberg; the
latter are the more satisfactory in service.
75. One P/W had spent six months up to May 1944 installing
SN 2's in Me.110’s at Werl; he stated that installation work
for Ju.88’s was carried out at Gütersloh.
Serviceability of SN 2.
76. Considerable trouble in the servicing of the SN 2 was
experienced in misty or wet weather; the chief source of
trouble was rain water percolating into the pulse distributor
at the base of the antennae and was the cause of squints and
the blowing of valves.
77. In units recently examined, night flying tests are no
longer made; in the experience of one P/W of II/N.J.G.1 some
30% of the SN 2's were found to be u/s if the unit had been
stood down for more than three or four days.
78. Should radar equipment be found to be u/s after an
aircraft has taken off on an operation, the order is that the
sortie must be completed. This is a state of affairs which
rattles the crews, particularly if the SN 2 is not working and
they are robbed of backward cover.

SN 3.
79. As compared with prisoners captured up to the end of
November 1944, the present P/W gave the impression that
developments in the SN 3 have reached a further stage.
80. No prisoner has yet been encountered who has seen an
SN 3, but several had heard some scraps of information. It was
stated that the aerial array for this set is carried inside
the aircraft, and that Major SCHMAUFER, Kommodore of N.J.G.4,
is already flying an aircraft with this new search equipment.
81. There is no doubt that the Germans are in possession of
details of British centimetre A.I. and it has recently been
freely discussed by G.A.F. aircrew under the name "Grille"
(= grid).

TAIL WARNING.
SN 2 Tail Warning.
82. The present P/W were able to add considerably to
information obtained on night fighter tail warning equipment
and set out in A.D.I.(K) 700, paras.13-16. The present
interrogations, leave no doubt that the tail warners now
extensively fitted to German night fighter aircraft are a part
of the SN 2 equipment and that the picture appears on the SN 2
azimuth tube.
83. No height or bearing, but only a range reading can be
obtained from the backward aerial; forward and backward
displays do not appear simultaneously on the SN 2 tube, but
the set is provided with a switch which can select one or the
other. The method employed by the radar operator is therefore
to search for contacts with the forward aerials whilst
occasionally switching over to rearward aerial to see if an
enemy night fighter is following.
84. A tail warning tactic recommended to crews of III/N.J.G.1
is one of not taking immediate action when a rearward contact
is picked up, but of waiting until the range begins to close
in. When this occurs, the pilot increases speed and if the
blip closes in to 600 metres the pilot then takes evasive
action.
85. In the above-mentioned unit evasive action has been
ordered to take the form of a 180° hard turn to port or
starboard. If the pursuing aircraft has been seen by the crew,
the turn will be made according to its position; when the
pursuer is to port, the pilot of the night fighter will turn
in to port, or vice versa.
86. Previously, the tactics of the night fighter in those
circumstances was to peel off towards the pursuing aircraft,
but this resulted in losing 1500 to 2000 metres in height
which took about ten minutes to regain.
87. The newer tactic described above was ordered in
III/N.J.G.1 late in November to obviate this loss of height
and time and in that unit at least, the tactic of peeling off
is now forbidden except in extreme urgency.
88. A number of P/W knew the SN 2 tail warning as the D (or
Dora) Zusatzgerät (= the Dora attachment).
Fu.Bl.2 as Warning Device.
89. Yet another piece of German Airborne radio equipment, the
Fu.Bl.2 has been added to the list of sets that are capable of
giving a warning of approach of an aircraft.
90. Three P/W had heard that if the Fu.Bl.2 is switched on,
the red marker beacon warning lamp lights up when a radarequipped
aircraft is in the immediate vicinity.

Naxos as Tail Warning.
91. Crews of 8/N.J.G.2 had recently been told officially that
Naxos is capable of acting as a warning of the presence of
enemy A.I.–equipped aircraft. No such information had been
given to any of the other units examined during the present
interrogations, and none of the other prisoners knew that
Naxos had such capabilities.
92. It was pointed out by the one P/W concerned that Naxos
can do no more than give warning of A.I. radiation on a given
bearing, and range of the source of the radiation cannot be
measured; a bearing reading would, however, at least indicate
the probability of an enemy night fighter in pursuit.
HOMING EQUIPMENT.
The Naxos as an A.I. Instrument.
93. Since the first mention of Naxos by a prisoner in July
1944 (A.D.I.(K) 407/1944) and in the subsequent fuller account
of other aspects of Naxos and its tactical use (A.D.I.(K) 508
and 620/1944) it has frequently been reported how some night
fighter pilots have claimed to have used Naxos as an A.I.
instrument. There have been frequent claims usually by
lecturers at Werneuchen, that night fighter crews have shot
down four-engined bombers with their upward armament without
having used SN 2 at any time during the pursuit, but no
prisoner has been encountered with first-hand knowledge of
this fact.
94. Amongst the present P/W was a crew of 4/N.J.G.2 who had
six victories, each with the help of Naxos to a greater or
lesser extent. On five occasions they had located the bomber
stream with Naxos and had made the final approach with SN 2.
On the sixth occasion, however, they had shot down a fourengined
bomber with upward armament after an approach with the
sole use of Naxos.
95. In an attack on Berlin in March or April 1944, this crew
took off from Twente and flew towards the Baltic coast. At
about 54° 30' N; 11° 30' E some eight H2S contacts were
obtained from a height of 4,500 metres; one of these was
selected by manipulation of the Naxos brilliancy knob and
followed to about 13° E and then southward over Berlin.
96. The contact was held and followed from Berlin towards
Leipzig whilst the night fighter gradually approached its
target by making contact with the edge of the H2S cone,
throttling back to avoid penetrating too far and being
detected, then climbing and again making contact with the cone
in horizontal flight; a visual of the R.A.F. bomber was
obtained near Frankfurt-am-Main when the night fighter was at
a height of 7,800 metres.
97. The pilot closed in to make the attack but missed the
bomber; after a second unsuccessful attempt, the rear gunner
of the bomber fired a burst but missed. On the third attempt
by the night fighter the bomber was hit and was claimed as a
victory by this crew.
98. Early in October H2S contacts in the Naxos began to be
fewer, and such contacts as were made invariably disappeared
abruptly. The pilot who, incidentally, had a very high opinion
of his own capabilities, put this down to his radar operator
and blamed him for inefficiency; the result was that the crew
was continually quarrelling and was engaged in heated argument
when shot down.

The Naxos Aerial.
99. The radar mechanic had been with I/N.J.G.4 had attended a
Naxos course at Werneuchen in May 1944 and subsequently had
had some experience in servicing the apparatus. The
interrogation of this P/W on the subject of Naxos was carried
out with the co-operation A.I.2(g), with the result that he
was able to add some useful details to the substance of
A.I.2(g) Report No.1734.
100. In August 1944, Naxos began to be delivered to
1/N.J.G.4. The Naxos-equipped Ju.88’s first delivered to the
unit had the aerials installed on the after part of the
fuselage, but in later deliveries, the plexiglass dome
containing the aerials was fitted to the jettisonable hood of
the cabin – a position known as "Ausführung A". It was feared,
however, that the hood would be difficult to jettison and in
some aircraft the original position of the aerials was again
adopted.
101. When this P/W left I/N.J.G.4 in October 1944 the display
unit in use was the Naxos-Post, but he did not know which type
of aerial array was associated with this display, and he knew
of no further designation of any part of the equipment.
102. When Naxos was first introduced to the unit, the aerials
consisted of two plastic rods, of a material known as
Trollitul, of square cross-section with rounded ends and
measuring some 40 cm. in length and 5/6 cm in thickness. This
type of rod was, however later superseded by one of circular
cross-section with a diameter of 3-4 cm. and of the same
length.
103. These aerials were fixed parallel to one another and
about 3 - 4 cm, apart, being held in position at their central
points by a bakelite clamp made in two halves. Rotation of the
aerials was in a clockwise direction about an axis which was
vertical when the aircraft was in flying position, the aerials
cleared the aircraft skin by about 5 cm. Speed of rotation was
estimated by P/W at about 3000 r.p.m.
104. The aerials were mounted on a vertical axle running in a
ball Bearing flush with the aircraft skin and driven directly
from an electric motor which P/W recognised as being similar
to that illustrated in A.I.2(g)1734.
105. A copper lead came away from each plastic aerial rod and
joined the axle on which the aerial rotated; between the ball
bearing and the electric motor, a right-angle plug led the
signals received by aerial out of the axle and through a length
of single 1 mm. copper high tension wire to the Abgleichkasten
(cable matching box). P/W had also heard the term "Hochpass
Einrichtung" in connection with this box.
106. The cable matching box was shaped in cross-section like
a half ellipse and measured about 25 x 8 x 8 cm. The screws
securing the lids were sealed, and if any fault developed, the
box had to be sent away to the Gruppe repair and servicing
depot; the Staffel servicing staff were forbidden to break the
seals.
107. This P/W had seen a box open at the Gruppe at the
servicing depot and remembered that it contained a special
type of coil and detector of a type similar to that shown in
the A.I.2(g) Report. He was under the impression that there
were six such detectors.

Daily Inspection of Naxos.
108. The daily inspection of Naxos consisted of running up
the aerial array on ground batteries and using an ordinary
buzzer working from a torch battery as the transmitter. The
oblong box containing the buzzer had to be held so that one of
its ends, called the Strahlenseite (radiating end) pointed
towards the aerial and was in their plane of rotation. A
lightening of the appropriate part of the Naxos trace showed
that Naxos was in order.

AIRBORNE PLOTTING TABLE.
109. In the autumn of 1942 one at the present P/W had taken
part in some flying trials of a television device which was
being tried out at Werneuchen. For the purpose of the trials a
television receiver which was to repeat an 18 cm. square
picture of the Seeburg Tisch of a night fighter box, was
installed in a He.111.
110. In the trials reception was remarkably good and a clear
definition was obtained, the two spots of light representing
the friendly and enemy aircraft could be seen, but the only
means of distinguishing between the two was by the insertion
of a cardboard arrow on the Seeburg Tisch. In a similar way
cards bearing written vector instructions were placed on the
plotting table in view of the camera.
111. At that time the Germans were experiencing no
difficulties with box-control of night fighters and since
continual troubles were experienced with the television
transmitter the trials were discontinued toward the end of
1942.

GERMAN H2S - THE BERLIN GERÄT.
112. The same prisoner had heard of a German version of the
H2S called "Berlin" which he understood, was an improvement on
the British apparatus.

GERMAN KNOWLEDGE OF 100 GROUP R.A.F.
Activities.
113. In lectures on night fighting given to 8/N.J.G.1,
7/N.J.G.2 and 9/N.J.G.3 in October and November 1944, crews
had been given some details of the activities by 100 Group
R.A.F. which gave them the impression that the German Higher
Command has the greatest respect for the efficiency of those
responsible for planning that unit's activities. Some details
of these lecturers which prisoners from the above units could
remember show that the Germans are now accumulating
considerable knowledge of the equipment and tactics of 100
Group.
114. At recent briefings to 8/N.J.G.1 great importance had
been attached to the part played by 100 Group, and the many
occasions when warning of an impending attack had been given
and the aircraft had been airborne only to find the advertised
raid melt away, were now ascribed to the wizardry of that same
unit.
115. It was stated that the Group is equipped with Mosquitoes
and Lancasters - amongst whose crews were some expert bombers
- and that both these aircraft types carry the jamming
equipment which together with ground jammers upset the
commentaries and the SN 2. Long range intruders were also
ascribed to the same unit.
116. In a lecture on 100 Group given to 7/N.J.G.2 early in
November 1944, crews were told of so-called 'D' aircraft which
has the duty of putting out spoof R/T and W/T instructions to
German night fighters; one instance was related in which a
whole night fighter Gruppe had returned to base as a result of
spoof orders by one of these D aircraft. The W/T operators at
the 1ecture were advised that if they paid sharp attention to
their R/T and W/T signals they would be able to distinguish
between the false and genuine instructions.
117. It is now widely known by G.A.F. night fighter aircrew
that Mosquitos are equipped with a search equipment, the
Grille (= grid), that has a range of 15 kilometres (about 10
miles) and is said to work on a frequency of 3 cm. An
interesting extra piece of information given in these lectures
was that Grille was capable of homing on SN 2 transmissions, a
point that was noted by crews with some consternation.
A.D.I.(K) and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Wing Commander
27th January 1945"

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 21:39

Underground factories for Junkers aero-engines.
 
"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.151/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

UNDERGROUND FACTORIES - NIEDERSACHSWERFEN AREA
(July 1944)
1. The following information on underground factories in the
Niedersachswerfen area was obtained from the Dutchman, who was
the subject of A.P/W.I.U. (2nd T.A.F.) 3/1945. Representatives
of A.I.2(a) and A.C.I.U. were present at the interrogation and
due thanks are rendered for their co-operation.
2. According to informant's story he began to work for the
Germans in January 1942, when he was employed as a labourer by
the 0.T. in connection with the electrical installations on
Lorient airfield. Thanks to diligent work, spare-time study,
judicious bribery and his self-assertive nature, he claims to
have risen rapidly in the world and to have acquired something
of a reputation both as an electrical engineer and as a reliable
satellite of the Germans.
3. After working as a foreman electrician on the Dutch coastal
defence works between Flushing and Den Helder, he was given the
task of supervising the installation of electrical equipment at
the Vught concentration camp. Finally, he asserts that at the
beginning of 1944 he obtained employment on the staff of S.S.
Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen S.S. Dr. Ing
Kammler (see A.D.I.(K) 522/1944), who was entrusted with the
task of constructing important secret underground aircraft and
armament factories.
4. According to informant's account, Kammler placed him in
charge of the Abteilung Energieversorgung of Amt C.III of his
staff, which was charged with supervising the provision of
electric power to underground factories in course of
construction under the aegis of the S.S.
5. In this capacity, informant stated that in June 1944 he was
sent to Niedersachswerfen to arrange for the provision of
electric current to a number of underground sites which the S.S.
proposed to construct in the area, but at the end of six weeks
he was called away to undertake similar work at other projects
at Litomerice (Leitmeritz), Czechoslovakia, which will be dealt
with in a separate report.
6. It was apparently intended that he should return to Niedersachswerfen
on 1st December 1944 but before that date he had
decided, for motives best known to himself, to desert the S.S.,
and in due course he arrived inside the Allied lines.
7. As the well-known underground factory at Niedersachswerfen
itself was already working at the time of informant's visit, it
did not fall within his province and he only entered it on one
occasion. His information on this factory was therefore
disappointingly meagre, but he was able to make some general
remarks on the Niedersachswerfen complex as a whole which,
although based on impressions gathered during a short stay,
sound reasonably plausible.
8. As regards the function of the already native
Niedersachswerfen plant informant could not enlarge upon
existing knowledge. He was aware that Junkers were installed and
thought they were making "the turbine for the V.1 and V.2".
General.
9. According to informant, no less than seven underground
factories were projected by the S.S. in the Niedersachswerfen
area, and the project as a whole was known as Bauvorhaben X.
10. These sites comprised the already active factory at
Niedersachswerfen, the Woffleben site which was numbered B.3.
and on which construction work had already started by Ju1y 1944,
another site some 800 yards to the North West of the Woffleben
one to which the code name "Nie" had been allotted, and four
other projected sites numbered B.8, 3.9, B.11 and B.12 of which
informant pinpointed two.
11. It was pointed out that the letter 'B' stood for
Bauvorhaben and that in theory the number indicated the original
order of priority in which it was intended that construction
work should be undertaken.
12. Informant stated that all seven sites in the area were
destined to be occupied by Junkers and that all the plans were
drawn up by Ing. Spott, the chief construction engineer of the
parent Junkers works at Dessau. The factories, however, formed
independent units in that there were no underground connections
between the various sites.
13. The scheme was carried out under the supervision of S.S.
Sonderinspektion II, who were responsible for the provision of
labour and materials and, of course, security precautions, but
the actual construction work was in charge of the "Wifo"
organisation, a fact which may explain rumours which have
connected the Niedersachswerfen project with P.O.L. storage and
or production.
14. The S.S., however, provided technicians to assist in the
construction cork and they also installed their own agents, such
as informant, in order to exercise a general supervision and to
keep an eye on developments. There was said to be continual
friction between Junkers, who desired the best possible
standards of accommodation, and the S.S., who insisted that the
utmost economy must be exercised in every respect.
15. According to the planned schedule, the six new factories
were to be ready for occupation by February 1945 but in
informant's opinion they would not be able commence work before
July at the earliest, chiefly owing to the difficulty of
obtaining transformers.
16. In July 1944 the original Niedersachswerfen factory was of
course in operation, and construction work had started at
Woffleben, where informant thought that work had begun on two
tunnels, and possibly also at the site 800 yards to the North
West of Woffleben.
17. In August 1944 the underground sites at Litomerice were
given priority over the projects of the Niedersachswerfen area,
but informant did not know whether this was on account of the
urgency of the activity to be accommodated at Litomerice or
because of the greater rapidity with which these latter
projects, which largely occupied existing workings, could be
pushed forward.
Niedersachswerfen.
18. As P/W had only been inside the Niedersachswerfen complex
on one occasion he could only give a very general and not
particularly reliable impression of its internal layout. He
confirmed a previous informant's statement that the workings
consisted of two main tunnels serving a number of workshops, but
thought that the workings, though quite level, were not
straight, and that the standard gauge railway line did not run
into the tunnels.
19. He had noted that the entrances were strengthened with
concrete reinforced by railway metals, and that inside the
galleries weak places were also reinforced with concrete for
distances of up to 100 metres in some cases. He could make no
statement on overburden.
20. Informant believed that in the floor of the galleries there
were a drainage channel one metre wide and another channel 75
cm. wide for the piping of the air conditioning system. Some of
the power cables were installed in third channel in the floor
and others, together with the wires for the lighting and the
telephone cables, were carried on iron supports along the walls
of the galleries.
21. Informant believed that a power supply of 600 kW was
required to run the air conditioning plant and that the capacity
of the Niedersachswerfen stand-by plant was insufficient for
this. He therefore believed that, if normal supplies could be
cut off, the air conditioning system would necessarily cease to
function and that the galleries would start to drip, with
disastrous results to the virtually irreplaceable machine tools.
Woffleben. (B.3).
22. In July 1944 the Woffleben site enjoyed the highest
priority of the six new projects envisaged in the Niedersachswerfen
area. At this date two entrances giving access to two
parallel main tunnels running roughly N.W. - S.E. through the
hill were said to have been started, and several subsidiary
galleries running off the main tunnels had also been commenced.
It was believed that considerable difficulty was being met with
on this project owing to underground springs and streams
encountered in the course of the excavations.
23. It was believed that when construction work was completed
the site would be taken over by Junkers for the manufacture of
aero-engines.

Woffleben West ("Nie").
24 The project 800 yards North West of the Woffleben workings
and designated by the code name "Nie" was the last of the
Niedersachswerfen sites on the official priority list but,
strangely enough in July 1944 it was the only site besides
Woffleben on which construction activity appeared likely to
begin in the immediate future.
25. One entrance only was planned, and this was to be located
at the south-western corner of the hill. This entrance was to
give access to the main tunnels running the length of the hill,
and these tunnels were to be connected by a network of some 40
or 50 cross-galleries. A servicing gallery was to run round the
whole site in order to facilitate transport; the workshops were
to be arranged to give a production flow running northwards from
the entrance, the finished articles being collected at the
northern end of the site and brought round to the entrance by
the servicing gallery.
26. This factory also was earmarked for Junkers, but informant
had no reliable information as to the purpose for which it would
be utilised. In July 1944 instructions were given to extend the
existing power cables as far as this site, so that construction
work could be commenced.

Ilfeld.
27. Besides the above-mentioned sites, another underground
Junkers factory was planned in the hills a short distance to the
West of the village of Ilfeld some two miles North of
Niedersachswerfen. The entrance was to be in the vicinity of
110360 GSGS 4416 Sheet Q5, and this was to serve a complex of
galleries arranged on the conventional grid pattern. In July
1944 construction work had not begun but a small group of
contractors' huts had been put up near the proposed entrance.

Appenrode.
28. Although informant knew that a total of seven underground
factories was envisaged, the only other projected site which he
was able to identify was in a hill between the villages of
Appenrode and Ilfeld and to the North of the road connecting the
two. It was understood that the entrance would be located in the
neighbourhood of 087361.
29. In July 1944 two contractors' huts had been put up on the
site but at that date construction work had not been started and
power cables had not been brought up to the area.

Power Supplies.
30. Informant alleged that in July 1944 all power supplies both
for the already active Niedersachswerfen factory and for
construction work at the other sites was supplied exclusively by
the 110 kV line from the Bleicherode power station. At the new
sites the 110 kV line was to be led directly into the tunnels
and the transformers intended to serve the factory machinery
were to be installed inside the workings, and informant
understood that this system was already obtained at the

Niedersachswerfen factory.
31. It was intended that when other sites came into operation,
power would also be supplied by a new 110 kV line running from a
power station at Frose in the Magdeburg area to Woffleben, where
it would join the grid serving the underground factories in the
Niedersachswerfen district. As in the case of the existing line
from Bleicherode, the power was to be stepped down in the
Niedersachswerfen complexes to 20 kV and 6 kV in the first
instance.
32. According to informant's story, the power stations at
Bleicherode and Frose would therefore be the sole sources of
electricity supplies for the underground plants around
Niedersachswerfen. He explained that it was not intended to draw
on other sources partly on account of the load already carried
by other power stations and partly because of the acute shortage
of materials needed for the construction of transmission lines
which made it necessary to rely on generating stations located
reasonably near the factories.
33. The new line from Frose was said to be intended to run
South-West across country from Frose for about one third of its
length and thence almost due West to Woffleben. The most direct
route was chosen in order to effect the greatest possible
economies in cables and pylon.
34. In July 1944 the holes for the pylons had been excavated
and sufficient pylons were on hand at the Frose and for
completing about one quarter of the proposed line. In the
following month, however, some of those pylons were
requisitioned for the Litomerice projects, which in the meantime
had been given a higher priority, and some of the new pylons on
order were also later diverted to Litomerice.
35. The contract for supplying the pylons was held by the firm
of Seidl of Falkenstein (Vogland) who were said to be able to
deliver three daily.

Emergency Power Supplies.
36. Unfortunately informant did not claim to be conversant with
the emergency power supply system in the Niedersachswerfen
complex. He stated, however, that he understood that it
conformed to the general instructions on the subject issued by
Generalleutnant Kammler on 1st August 1944, and he had the
foresight to bring with him a photostat copy of the document in
question.
37. In his instructions Kammler draws the attention of his
Sonderinspektionen and S.S. Führungsstäbe to the fact that the
emergency power plants proposed by these bodies are of
excessively high capacity. He adds that as a measure of fuel
economy emergency plants are only to serve such appliances as
necessary for the safety of the personnel, i.e. lighting, water
supplies end air conditioning.
38. The two last-named systems are to be confined to the
absolutely necessary minimum and Kammler formally forbids the
connection of any normal equipment to emergency generators.
39. Future demands for emergency sets are to show the capacity
of the act divided into the requirements for lightening, water
supplies and air conditioning. The projected requirements for
lightning are to be cut down to the necessary minimum since, if
the normal supplies of power fail, normal activity will cease
ipso facto. For the same reason, good grounds are to be shown
for the maintenance of air conditioning and water supplies
during the period when normal power is cut off.

Railway Services.
40. The plans for the Niedersachswerfen complex of underground
factories provided for a now ring railway connecting E11rich,
Ilfeld and Nordhausen and serving the whole of the sites. For
the convenience of workers proceeding between their quarters and
their place of work as well as between the various factories, a
train was to be run every three minutes on this line.
41. In addition, a large marshalling yard was envisaged on both
sides of the village of Woffleben and on both sides of the
existing Nordhausen - Ellrich line.

Personnel.
42. Appendix I contains a list of some of the principal personalities
connected with the Niedersachswerfen complex of sites.
Construction work at Woffleben was being carried out by inmates
of the Buchenwald concentration camp under the supervision of
"Wifo" personnel.
43. When all the factories were in operation it was expected
that they would employ a total staff of some 45,000 workers. In
July 1944 some personnel was already billeted in Ellrich and
Nordhausen and it was rumoured that when the various sites came
into production these towns and the area surrounding them would
be evacuated to provide accommodation, especially for married
employees and their families.
A.D.I(K) and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Wing Commander
5th February, 1945.

APPENDIX. SECRET.
PERSONALITIES CONNECTED WITH UNDERGROUND ACTIVITY IN THE
NIEDERSACHSWERFEN AREA
S.S. Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Waffen S.S. Dr. Ing.
H. Kammler.
Entrusted by Himmler, in his capacity as the head of the
S.S. Wirtschaftsverwaltungs Hauptamt, with the execution of
the Deutsches Geheimbauprogramm, which comprised important
secret underground factories.
Head of the so-called Stab Kammler which was created for
this purpose (see A.D.I.(K) 522/1944).
S.S. Hauptsturmführer Dipl. Ing. Geissen.
Head of S.S. Sonderinspektion II, which was charged with
the supervision of construction work on the sites in the
Niedersachswerfen area.
S.S. Sturmbannführer Fleto.
Head of Amt C.III (Technische Fachgebiete) of the Stab
Kammler and in this capacity in charge of the technical
side of construction work.
Sturmbannführer Skowronneck.
Head of the Abteilung Maschinen of Amt C.III of the Stab
Kammler. A subordinate of Flote and responsible for the
provision of the necessary machinery.
Major Regierungsbaurat Dr. Dr. Ing. Trautvetter.
In charge of the section of the S.S. Wirtschaftsverwaltungs
Hauptamt responsible for the provision of materials.
Dr. Neu.
"Wifo" representative in charge of construction work in the
Niedersachswerfen district.
Ing. Schwatz.
Chief "Wifo" engineer at Niedersachswerfen.
Ing. Reinzhagen.
"Wifo" engineer in charge of the electric,
gas, heating and air conditioning equipment.
at Niedersachswerfen.
Ing. Spott.
Chief Junkers constructional engineer. Responsible for the
plans for all the Niedersachswerfen sites.
Dipl. Ing. Pönitsch.
Junkers constructional engineer responsible for
electricity, gas and similar supplies."

Bruce Dennis 30th October 2018 21:44

Luftwaffe morale
 
"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.157/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.


LUFTWAFFE MORALE.
(August to December 1944)
1. This report is an endeavour to assess and analyse
Luftwaffe aircrew morale in the period of five months from
17th August 1944, on which date a similar assessment was made
in A.D.I.(K) 473/1944. The number of aircrew prisoners
interrogated for the present review, amounting to 246,
comprises the largest sample since 1940.
2. The majority of these prisoners have been tough and well
drilled in security; at no point did the proportion with high
morale fall lower than 51% and, as may be expected, the period
when it reached this lowest ebb was during the German
withdrawal in August. Since then, the proportion of high
morale amongst all aircrew has risen steadily until, in
December, it was found to stand at 64%, with day fighters even
higher at 74%.
3. It should be noted that the present report deals
throughout solely with aircrew morale and that ground
personnel are not taken into account. The morale of the ground
personnel, judging from recent samples, is just the same as it
has been for a long time – bad.


THE BASIS OF MORALE.
4. The basis of G.A.F. morale remains very much the same as
before, and can be said to consist of a mixture of the
following factors: the natural discipline of nearly all
Germans, youth, love of flying, patriotism and a general
ignorance of the real facts of the war. It is true that
aircrew have very few amusements and almost no time off, but
they continue to live fairly well; in fact, better than any
other section of the population. They experience no hardship
comparable to that of the front-line soldier, and they receive
on the whole less bombing than either the army or the
civilians.
5. Expectations and promises for the future play a large part
in maintaining morale and still continue to be believed. As
one fighter-pilot said: "In the autumn we were guaranteed
2,000 new fighters. They have turned up, and this makes me
prepared to believe that the other new weapons and aircraft
promised will also turn up". However small the "come back" of
the Luftwaffe might seem to the Allies, it has helped the
ordinary German pilot to believe that the inventors and
technicians still have the situation in hand. The promise of
large numbers of jet aircraft for the spring has had the same
effect.
6. Many, though a decreasing number, of the younger P/W still
profess belief in ultimate German victory, a belief which is
quite unconnected with any logical process of thought
whatever, but depends on what can only be termed as mystic
belief in German invincibility. This faith is no doubt
fostered by the good fight they are putting up in spite of the
enormous difficulties caused by bombing and the shortage of so
many necessities inside Germany.
7. It cannot be said there is much desperation in their
courage. Rather is it a quiet resignation to the fact that
they have no alternative to fighting on. Certainly the impetus
derived from fighting on German soil against unconditional
surrender helps to counteract strain and war weariness; but
although attempts have been wade by German propaganda to
instil a kind of "Battle of Britain" spirit, it is doubtful
whether it has succeeded.
8. One of the smaller props to morale has gradually been
upset. When the Luftwaffe was in its prime, outstanding aces
were carefully built up as heroic types, an example to others.
This hero-worship, to which the Germans are so addicted, was
encouraged to what we would consider an inordinate degree. But
by now most of the aces have been killed and others, like G
GALLAND and PELZ, no longer fly on operations and are even
accused of becoming out of touch with the operational
personnel. At the same time the camaraderie between officers
and men has become less.
9. The new appeal is based more on staple patriotism and fear
of the consequences of defeat. A frequent propaganda theme is:
"Life will not be worth living after the war". The horrific
picture of a conquered Germany, easily concocted by GOEBBELS
from unofficial Allied pronouncements, is well calculated to
make men fight to the bitter end.
10. Much greater than fear of defeat at the hands of Britain
and America is dread of Russia. "Sieg oder Sibirien" - Victory
or slavery in Siberia, is a slogan which has a considerable
effect, an effect not unconnected with a sense of guilt for
what Germany has done above all to the populations in the
East. Manly realise that such wrongs avenge themselves, but
nevertheless justify their conduct by persuading themselves
that they are upholding a higher civilisation.
11. Among aircrew less resentment of our bombing policy is
felt than might be expected. The destruction of so much of
both private and public property and fine cities, however, not
to mention the casualties involved, helps to foster a certain
feeling of futility about the future, and even a wish to
escape it. Thus in some ways continued resistance is a
putting-off of an evil day - with the small, but to them
worthwhile chance that the Allies might quarrel, the German
technicians produce a trump, and defeat might be avoided in a
triumph of defensive warfare.


A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MORALE.
12. The three tables presented below show morale at time of
capture; the assessments are those made by the original
interrogators on the Continent, and differ slightly - almost
always for the better - from the assessments given at the end
of A.D.I.(K) reports in which allowance is not always made for
the weaknesses which develop under prolonged interrogation and
in the isolation of theme from the sustaining effect of his
group.
(a) Period August – November 1944.
August Morale.
Type of Unit. No. of P/W High. Fair. Low.
Bomber 22 12=55% 6=27% 4=18%
Day Fighter 14 6=42% 6=42% 2=16%
Others 7 4 -
Total 43 22=51% 15=35% 6=14%
Average age - 23.3 years.
September - November Morale.
Type of Unit. No. of P/W High. Fair. Low.
Bomber and
transport 18
+
11=61% 2=11% 5=28%
Day Fighter 10 7=70% 2=20% 1=10%
Night Fighter
and N.S.G. 15 8=54% 2=13% 5=33%
Others 2 2 - -
Total 45 28=62% 6=13.5% 11=24.5%
Average age - 23.3 years.
+ This figure includes the only bomber crew captured
between 16th August and 18th December; this crew comprised
the three survivors of a V-1 launching He.111 which
ditched in the North Sea on 6th October.
Notes on the above Tables.
(1) Even in the catastrophic days of August, 51% of the
Luftwaffe aircrew captured showed good morale, and of the
rest 35% could be said to have fair morale.
2) Although the sample is too small to be satisfactory,
it is perhaps significant that the morale of the crews of
heavy aircraft retrained steadier than that of the fighter
pilots which, however, recovered more quickly.
(3) The absence of any marked defeatism in the Luftwaffe
directly after the attempted Putsch of 20th July and the
catastrophe in France indicates the extent to which its
personnel are imbued not only with a sound fighting spirit
but with esprit de corps. Though of an age which has only
known a Nazi upbringing, flying personnel of the G.A.F. are
not very politically minded. Loyalty to the regime which has
done them personally no apparent harm, and which has often
benefited them, is strong, as there is no substantial
alternative.
(4) The fact that there was a virtual debacle in the air
at the same time certainly had a depressing effect, but
there was always the excuse of overwhelming superiority on
the Allied side. Furthermore, promises were made that a
great new fighter force would be formed and a new training,
programme was put in motion. It was believed by many that
the new jet-propelled aircraft would enable the Luftwaffe to
make a startling come-back with qualitative superiority. In
fact the 0.K.L. reacted to the new situation with vigour
which gave a new hope to a depressed but eager-body of young
airmen; whose mental horizon is as limited by flying as it
is by propaganda and education.
(b) Period December 1st 1944 - January 1st 1945.
14. By the end of November 1944 it seems that the German Air
Staff considered that the Luftwaffe had been sufficiently
nursed back to health to be employed on a large scale in
tactical support of the Army. At the same time, in the absence
of an adequate bombing force, night-fighters were sent in
considerable numbers in an attempt to cause dislocation over
the Allied lines at night. The result has been the largest
batch of aircrew prisoners, since the Battle of Britain.
15. The morale of the 158 P/W, assessed as before at time of
capture, is analysed as follows:-
State of morale
Type of unit N° of
P/W
High Fair Low Average
Age
Day Fighter 80 59=74,5% 14=17% 7=9% 22.9yrs
Night Fighter 54 28=52% 19=35% 7=13%
Others, incl.
Bombers,transport
and recce crews
24 14=58% 8=33.5% 2=8.5% 23.2yrs
Total 158 101=64.6% 41=26.5% 16=10% 23.0yrs
Notes on the above Table
(1) The over-all improvement in morale seems very slight
against the previous three months. This steadiness is in
contrast to the fluctuation noticed in 1943 during the same
period, i.e. between the low point reached with the
landings in Italy and the defection of BADOGLIO, and the
recovery connected with the bogging-down in Italy and the
beginning of reprisal raids on England. Unfortunately the
method of assessment was not identical with the present one
and the samples much smaller but it is interesting to note
that in the period September to mid-November 1943 the
percentages of high, fair and low morale were found to be
61% 31% and 5%, while in the period mid-November to January
1944 they were 83%, 17% and nil.
(2) The only marked improvement is among day fighter
pilots, whose morale has jumped from 42% high in August to
74% high in December. This has been due (a) to careful
husbanding of strength for a big effort. (b) the
maintenance of the fighter aircraft industry in spite of
Allied bombing and (c) the successful defence of the
frontiers of the Reich.
(3) While these three factors also apply to the whole of
the Reich defence force, the morale of one branch, the
night-fighters, has noticeably declined although they are
better trained and more strictly selected, and not long ago
were the most steadily successful part of the Luftwaffe,
they show an inferior spirit to the day-fighters. One
reason for this is that they have an increasing sense of
frustration, caused by jarring of signals channels and
interception equipment and frequent failure owing to
"spoofery" to contact bombers at all. They also show a high
level of intelligence, which does not help morale. They may
fly blind, but they think less blindly about the war.
(4) The majority of these P/W were captured during the
RUNDSTEDT offensive and before they were plainly aware of
its failure. That it could be launched at all gave, a
certain fillip to morale.
(5) The fighter unit showing the most consistently good
morale is J.G.4, with J.G.2 coming second.
(6) It would be wrong to consider all those with morale
assessed as fair to be only fair fighting material. In a
unit with a high spirit - which applies to most - they
would be carried along with the majority, and would hardly
be aware themselves of the chinks in their armour.
(7) Fewer P/W are found to have listened to Allied
broadcast propaganda than at any time during the last 18
months. This is partly due to the fact that most are
fighter pilots, as opposed to bomber crews as in the past,
and live in less permanent quarters, and partly because
morale itself is higher.


THE EVENTUAL UNDERMINING OF MORALE.
16. Interrogators on the Continent who see P/W in the first
days after their capture have found them extremely tough
almost without exception. In so far as the time taken to break
down a man's security is an indication of his fighting spirit
and not of improved security instruction, morale is higher
than it has been for some time. It is, however, not so deeply
ingrained. P/W to-day are not only slightly younger than in
the past, but each time they come from a later age-group. This
means they are more unformed. Fewer are intelligent and more
are bone-headed, and the eventual undermining of security, and
later of morale, is made easier by this fact. With them
security is often merely an induced state with automatic
reactions rather than intelligent attempt to continue fighting
although a prisoner or war. Once it breaks they tend to talk
freely. This applies chiefly to N.C.O.'s and other ranks.
17. With most younger officers the basis of the high morale is
somewhat different. They attempt to explain their professed
faith in victory, which for them amounts to avoiding defeat,
on the score of superior fighting ability, V-weapons etc. But
they also tend to be less fact-proof and easier to reach with
argument, though only with much time and trouble. Older or
senior officers, who know more facts, are nearly always
prepared to admit that Germany has lost the war, but their
discipline and sense of responsibility clearly keeps them from
showing any defeatist spirit to the men under their command.
18. It is nevertheless startling to find how different is the
attitude of most P/W after a week or so of being moved from
place to place and being interrogated. During this time they
learn with their own eyes or from the people they meet a great
many unlightening facts and some truths; they have time to
reflect on the tremendous material superiority of the Allies
which they see behind our lines; if they happen to pass
through London, this especially brings home to them the
swindle of their own propaganda.
19. The young generation in Germany has so long been denied
the possibility of finding out the other man’s point of view
that when he gets the chance of doing so he frequently
discovers he cannot answer it. This is a weakness of which
interrogators have learnt to take advantage. If a patient and
serious attempt is made to open a P/W's eyes to the facts he
has been denied, for him the GOEBBELS machine begins to
operate in reverse.
20. This very susceptibility of Germans to propaganda might
suggest that their re-education after the war may not be so
difficult, but it should be remembered that the interrogators
achieve little more than a rather static "deconditioning and
with the assistance of depressing circumstances. Any eventual
"reconditioning" must depend on a new dynamic of ideals, and
social and political loyalties, which are at present all too
painfully absent.


CONCLUSION.
21. It would seem that since morale is not built on reason,
but on blind faith, loyalty and patriotism, it will only break
down when facts or a conflict of ideas, successfully undermine
the original basis. In so far as these destructive influences
operate at all in the field, the whole of German propaganda is
working, not unsuccessfully, to exclude them. As a result
aircrew on capture continue to show good fighting spirit.
22. Morale did not slump seriously during the disastrous days
of the summer, and does not become unduly depressed by failure
or heavy losses, or even as a result of land reverses. This
suggests the conclusion that taking flying personnel in the
Luftwaffe as a whole, morale will not break as long as they
have aircraft and petrol, the army continues to resist, and
they themselves are told to go on fighting.
A.D.I.(K)&
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. Felkin,
8th February 1945 Wing Commander"

Dan O'Connell 31st October 2018 01:19

Re: Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations
 
Fascinating, especially by U.S. Air Interrogation.

ju55dk 31st October 2018 07:13

Re: Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations
 
ADI K 065 5/NJG 101 Ju 88.
Junker

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 20:16

Interrogation of Baron Von Schalcky CIOS File 24-15
 
"(49) A.L. No. 19 (Sheet 2) 29/9/45
Interrogation of Baron Von Schalcky CIOS File 24-15

JAGDSCHLOSS
The original plan for Jagdschloss provided three models
covering the following frequency ranges; 75 to 120 Mcs; 120 to
160 Mcs. Jagdschloss A was actually operated between 130 and 160
Mcs, with a frequency change requiring only five seconds. This
frequency change was among a choice of four pre-set frequencies
in which the proper dial settings for transmitter, receiver, and
TR-antenna coupling systems were indicated with special markers.
The antenna was designed to work over a two to one frequency
range with the limit set by tactical requirements rather than by
standing wave ratio.
Jagdschloss was first used in April 1944 and by February
1945 it was felt that the Jagdschloss coverage of Germany was
complete and with considerable overlap. The normal usage of
Jagdschloss was described as "Luftlage"; that is, it was used
for early warning and to maintain a watch of all aerial
activities. It was used in this capacity to assign targets to
either ack-ack control or GGI installations and, as noted below,
was used directly for fire control under some conditions.
The maximum range ever obtained on a Jagdschloss was said
to be 250 kilometers on an 8th Air Force formation. Ranges of
180 to 120 kilometers could be obtained normally. However, these
ranges were obtained with the A scope which was normally used
for tuning and testing purposes. In normal operation for
Luftlage, the range of Jagdschloss was limited by the 120
kilometer sweep length on the Sternschreiber (P.P.I.)
In the Berlin area on several occasions during August and
September 1944, Jagdschloss data was used directly for fire
control. This was done by assuming the altitude shown by our
bomber formations to be a constant which was found statistically
to be quite an acceptable assumption. Then the range and azimuth
of the formation was obtained by Jagdschloss and appropriate
data was transmitted to the flak batteries. The battery then
fired a controlled barrage, setting the fuzes in such a way as
to cover about 2,000 foot altitude spread. The Baron said this
procedure was considered very effective against our 8th Air
Force bomber formations. Incidentally, the Baron was well
acquainted with our division of bomber activities and was
familiar with 8th Air Force organisation and procedure.
Jagdschloss was fitted with a remote transmission system
which transmitted the Sternschreiber picture up to 150
kilometers OVER WIRE TRANSMISSION LINES. No specific mention of
direct use of this facility was made.
Several Jagdschloss radars were in various stages of
development: One of these sets was the 50 cm set on which the PW
had been running tests. This was another Jagdschloss by Siemens
Company. In addition a 25 cm set of similar characteristics had
been developed by Telefunken and was known as Forsthaus F. This
set used a conventional type tube in the transmitter known as
Scheibenröhren. The details of its construction were not known
to von Schalcky. A 9 cm. Jagdschloss set, known from other
sources as Forsthaus Z, was also in development by Telefunken.
The PW indicated that Forsthaus was the Telefunken name for
"Luftlage" radar whereas Jagdschloss was the name used by
Siemens. The effort on these radar developments was to obtain
higher discrimination so as to provide less susceptibility to
Düppel. Von Schalcky was of the opinion, however, that going to
narrower beams, although it provided a smaller pulse packet and
thus higher discrimination, caused sufficient loss of target
return due to the shorter length of time that a target was
illuminated as the radar antenna rotated, to set a limit to this
technique. His reasoning is probably correct if one considers
the low peak powers used in precision German radar. The PW also
had the opinion that the higher frequency sets (above 1000 Mcs)
were less satisfactory for early warning due to what he called
"Troposphere" reflections.
Several anti-"Düppel" (anti window) measures had been
developed and were being tested on the 50 cm. Jagdschloss. It
was interesting to note that the procedure was to utilize 8th
Air Force Window for test purposes rather than bothering to drop
their own.
1. Phosphor clearing device.
This was a simple expedient which was made necessary by a
characteristic of the Sternschreiber phosphor. Apparently the
decay time was so long that Window echoes would tend to build up
large, fully, illuminated areas giving a sort of compound
jamming effect over a period of time. The expedient was to turn
off the beam for one or two rotations of the antenna system and
to radiate the screen from an infra-red source during this off
period. The existing echoes were thus erased. Equipment for
doing this automatically was just being completed.
2. Film frame comparison method.
Exposure of two successive frames of the Sternschreiber
presentation were made on the same piece of colour film. The
exposure for frame A was made with a red filter and exposure
frame B was made with a green filter. Each rotation required six
seconds, thus the total exposure required 12 seconds. The
equipment for doing this job had been developed and built by
Zeiss. The existing development model had been destroyed by von
Schalcky at Heidhof. The equipment was arranged so that one
minute after the exposure, the colour film could be projected on
a screen. Due to the additive effects of green and red, fixed
echoes appeared as black marks or "streams". However a moving
target in which the succeeding exposures were displaced in
accordance with the motion appeared as a "beetle" having a green
head, black center, and red tail. The green, of course, points
in the direction of motion.
Von Schalcky distinguished between heavy 8th Air Force
daylight window and thinner RAF Window. Heavy Window gave
definite black areas or "streams". However, Window occurring in
small separated clumps sometimes gave the effect of motion due
to the random shifting of dipole orientation with consequent
random displacement of the effective center of the Window cloud.
This effect was considered a disadvantage of this
particular A/J system, the principal aim being to enable
distinction of fixed and moving targets.
3. A frame storage moving target indicator method was being
developed and had undergone preliminary tests. An iconoscope
mosaic storage was employed. The Baron did not think that this
method used coherent pulse. The same disadvantage of the
difficulty of distinguishing between aircraft and small clumps
of Window was encountered as in the case of the photographic
method.
4. Siemens was developing an adaption of the Laus or coherent
Doppler to Jagdschloss, the intention being to alter the display
of moving targets on the Sternschreiber, allowing fixed echoes
to be presented normally. A third detector circuit derived a
pulse signal from the beating Laus of a moving target. This
pulse was applied to the radio deflecting system in such a way
that moving targets tended to trail in towards the center of the
tube as shown in the sketch below.
The Sternschreiber tube had a double phosphor similar to
our P-7, in fact, adapted from the P-7. The flash trace is blue
but in the Sternschreiber the afterglow is green and apparently
of longer duration than our yellow. Von Schalcky did not know
the chemical details of this phosphor. He thought a persistence
of ten minutes was obtained.
Comment was made that our daytime 8th Air Force jamming was
picked up often on the 50 cm. experimental Jagdschloss and that
it was never possible to see aircraft in the jammed sector on
the Sternschreiber.

B. Freya.
The Dreh Freya was considered very inferior to Jagdschloss for
general search and coverage because of the serious nulls in the
vertical antenna pattern.
The modification of the Freya Laus, known as "Windlaus",
was designed to enable cancellation of any particular Doppler
beat caused by wind drift of the Window. Two oscillators were
used, one to lock the transmitter frequency and a second for
comparison in the receiver. The frequency of the receiver
oscillator could be adjusted independently so that a particular
Doppler frequency produced no output, thus wind-blown Window
echoes would not appear as a Laus presentation, whereas fast
moving aircraft would still be detected as moving targets. This
was said to be in use on a considerable number at Freya
installations.
The use of centimeter listening receivers, either, on Freya
mounts (as at Kothen airfield) or in separate installations, was
quite common as an early warning system for detecting the
approach of H2S or H3X.

C. Fire Control Radar.
The PW stated that the Würzburg Frequency spread was 63 to
50 cms (476 to 600 Mcs). He stated this twice, and was rather
positive on the point.
Gustav is a code name for Würzburg Riese G and consists of
Freya radar added to the normal Riese. Freya equipment is
located in the far end of the can necessitating very slight
alteration in the normal layout. Two antenna arrangements are in
use, in one a single vertically polarized radiator one wave
length long being mounted in front of the normal Würzburg
antenna and using the normal Würzburg reflector to obtain a
measure of directivity. The second arrangement utilizes two
dipoles one on each side of the normal antenna, again vertically
polarized. Von Schalcky did not believe that reflector elements
were used with this antenna arrangements and that the Würzburg
dish was the only other element involved. In addition to Riese
G, there was a variation with a broadband Freya installation
known as the Riese G-la. The use of these combinations as
understood by this PW was simply to aid in putting the Würzburg
on target. He did not believe they were used for range, only
A/J.
The Mannheim was preferred over either Würzburg for
tracking in normal conditions but it was considered less
effective in the presence of jamming than the Würzburg. This was
attributed to the ability of a good operator to interpret a
jammed scope on the Würzburg, a procedure impossible in the
Mannheim meter presentation. It appeared the Mannheim scopes
were not usable where jammed. The use of aided tracking on the
Würzburg D, on the Riese, and on the Mannheim, was common as a
measure against jamming which was not effective all the time. A
fixed tracking rate could be set in by the operator.
Von Schalcky did not know of any centimeter fire control
sets.

D. Fire Control Procedure
With regard to predictors used for fire control
computation, von Schalcky knew only of the KG-40. He understood
that the preferred SOP was to use optical direction and radar
range in all possible circumstances including night operations.
In this connection, the small Würzburgs were used for
searchlight control, the optical system built in the KG-40 being
then applied for final direction finding. Using the Riese, he
thought it was nearly always possible to obtain slant range in
the presence of our jamming. He felt that the KG-46 was still
the most widely used predictor in the GAF defense system.
Use of Wurzburg Riese and Riese G's for fire control was
said to be quite common and extensive.
A procedure for utilising data from several different
radars as in the Gross-battery was mentioned. In this, a
specially trained operator surveyed Selsyn relayed data from the
several radars associated with the battery and mentally selected
and averaged the best appearing data. That is, if two radars
were producing roughly the same information but a third was
giving different indication, he would utilise the data from the
two more consistent sets, delivering this information by phone
to the KG-40. With this installation, which was said to be
fairly common, it was thus possible to change instantly from one
radar to another for control purposes.
In a defense area such as a city or other specific target,
all defenses were controlled from a central Kommand post. A
Jagdschloss was associated with this Kommand and was used in
assigning targets to ack-ack or fighter defenses. In addition,
Wassermann or other height finding radar would usually be
associated with the Jagdschloss. In the case of fire control, if
the battery was unable to track an assigned target because of
jamming, it was usually instructed to fire a barrage on the
basis of Jagdschloss data. In a few cases, arrangements were
made for relaying information between adjacent batteries by
phone but the P.W. did not believe this to be as common as the
practice of using Jagdschloss data. Provisions for automatic
transmission of data between batteries had been worked out but
were not in common use.

E. GGI Procedure.
Naxos had been in use since April 1944 for homing on
British H2S radar.
The practice of triggering our IFF from both ground and air
installations was common and, it was felt, quite successful.
Also few night fighters had recently been fitted out for
triggering what must have been Oboe Mark II in the RAF planes.
Automatic Seeburg was not liked as well as the manual
because of the roughness of the data plotted when a radar would
"spring" or deviate from the true tracking course. A manual
table allowed smoothing in the process of manual plotting.

F. Allied RCM.
As-noted previously our jamming was not considered
effective in jamming range on the Riese. However, against
Würzburg D and Mannheim, the combination of Düppel and
Störsender was quite effective, especially after October 1944.
Screening of Freya was more effective in night than in the day
time but was never considered a serious effort. This PW had the
understanding that screening was also directed against
Jagdschloss and knew of cases where Allied planes had circled a
Jagdschloss site continuously during operations in that
vicinity. The overlapping coverage of Jagdschloss made it
possible nearly always to obtain the necessary information,
though a particular set was out. The maximum range of
Jagdschloss as used operationally was 120 kilometers.

G. Centimeter antennas.
The PW knew of the poly-rod antennas used in Naxos and the
use of a parabolic reflector copies from H2S. The parabolic
reflector antennas were chiefly by Siemens.
One other type of centimeter antenna of interest was a
slotted wave guide as shown in the sketch.
The slot is tapered to provide uniform radiation from all
sections of its length. This was Telefunken development, known
as Holstraehlen.

(47) A.L.No.14 (sheet 20) 24.9.45
Magnetrons & Klystrons
Interrogation of Drs. Kleen, & Lerbs by Mr. Griffing,
Major Ravenel,
F/Lt. F. R. Holt.
(Evaluation Report 139)
Dr. Kleen was head of the Telefunken Tube Research
Laboratories, recently at Berlin. Dr. Lerbs was in charge of the
Magnetron group under Dr. Kleen.

Most of the German centimeter tube development has been
made in these laboratories, which were for some time in
Liegnitz.
The first 10 cm. equipment. "Rotterdam" was operational
between 6 and 12 months ago; since then further marks of this
(known as X1 and X2) also "Berlin" and "München" have been
developed. The magnetron used, LMS 10, was a copy of the allied
one. The 3 cm. ones produced were claimed to be their own
development. The LMS 10 was 30% efficient. The LMS 100 up to 100
kW, also on 10 cm. was 10% efficient and had a field of 1500-
2000 Gauss, 30% greater than critical. It was air cooled and was
suitable for space/mark of 1000. The LMS 12 on 3 cm. had 18
splits, the L.M.S was 3 cm. tuneable, and water-cooled, with 2
kW loss. Small receiver magnetrons are the RD2MG (3 cm. 6 or 8
splits, 50 kW output, short life), the RD2MH, and the RD4MG,
This series contains about 10 other types. They have only used
Copper Magnetron anodes recently, have had trouble with glass
sealing (usually Nickel-iron soldered to the copper with Silversolder
was preferred), and have only recently found a
satisfactory method of pumping the LMS 100. For power
measurements up to 10 watts, they used the heating effect on a
resistance wire forming part of the Wheatstone bridge; above
that, water-flow methods.
Most of the tunable Magnetron work was done on 3 cm. They
used a metal ring supported on a flexible membrane and moved
towards the circle of gaps. Some magnetron development was done
by Sanitas GmbH, and possibly the Reichspost at Heidelberg. They
were produced by Telefunken at Berlin and Reichenberg in
Eulengebirge, and also by Sanitas and Getewent.
Most of the work on Klystrons was done in Prague by Dr.
Labos of the B.H.F., Telefunken have made 3 cm. all metal (that
is, main body) Klystrons and have been experimenting on 1 1/2
cms. These are reflected beam tubes. The following ceramic and
metal grounded-grid triodes have been made:-
LD7, LD9, LD11, LD13, LD70, LD90, LD110, a development of
LD10, LD120, LS1000, and a diode of similar construction
LG11. (They prefer however use a crystal detector up to
20 cm. LD12 was used in "Berlin", and LD11 in "Euclid" a
27 cm Navy equipment.
With the triodes they have obtained 10 kW peak power with a
space/mark from 5 to 10. This was of course in jammers. Names of
jammers mentioned were "Anti-Boomerang" i.e. Oboe "Anti
Rotterdam" i.e. H2S and any equipment with name beginning with
"Feuer" e.g. "Feuermolch" and "Feuer-Zauber". These jammers are
said to have been used operationally in small numbers (10 to 20
equipments.)"

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 20:22

UNDERGROUND FACTORIES IN GERMANY
 
"ITEM N° 21,22,31
FILE N° XXXIII-36 SECRET UNDERGROUND FACTORIES IN GERMANY Reported by C.I.O.S. Party 536

(L) HAMMERWERKE FACTORY, near Hausberg Porta Westfalica, Minden
This factory, of the multi-storey type, was constructed in underground quarries on the East side of the Weiser gap south of Minden. The quarries were situated in the Porta Sandstone above the Dachs I Refinery, and had been enlarged by the Gewerkeschaft Porta to house the Phillips Radio Valve factory from Eindhoven, in Holland.
Constructional work is said to have started in March, 1944 and to have been completed in September, 1944. Production started in February, 1945.
Contracts
The following were interrogated-
Herr Goosens, engineer, Dutch, speak English.
Herr Pott, mining engineer, manager of the Gewerkeschaft
Porta.
Herr Haupt, formerly engineer on plant installation now custodian of the factory for the military Government

Geology
The geology of the area has already been described in the
sections dealing with Dachs I and Denkmal Stollen. The Hammerwerke factory nine storeys high was constructed in the Porta sandstone (photograph No. 21) and being south of Dachs I was at a higher level as a result of the dip of this stratum as can be seen in the geological motion attached to this report (Fig. 8A.) The two factories were to have been connected by an internal shaft.
There was no evidence of rock falls in the factory area.

Lining & Support
The workings were for the most part unsupported and the rock surface only whitewashed. At a few points steel joists and timber laggings had been used.

Excavation
The little excavation done on this site was carried out simultaneously with Dachs I and no separate data was available on labour, costs or progress.

Entrance
The main entrance, on the seventh floor, was protected by a blast wall of concrete 1.1 metres thick, and was connected with the main road at Hausberg by funicular railway.

Water Supply
Process water was pumped from the River Weser. Water was available from the town supply.

Sewage Disposal
Sewage was disposed by gravity into the Weser after treatment.

Air Attack
There was no evidence of air attack on this site.
Engineering Services
(a) Heating
The Boiler House was located on the surface at road
adjacent to the entrance of the Porta (Dachs I) factory.
The boiler was of the horizontal type in three sections:-
1. Cornish boiler design with corrugated flue.
2. Section comprising smoke tubes.
3. Smoke box section.
Steam was taken off the middle section, which was also provided with dead weight safety valve, and thence proceeds to
the super heater section located round the crown of the smoke box.
Steam and condense mains were taken through the entrance of the Dachs I factory and thence by means of a sloping tunnel up to the ground floor of the Hammerwerke Factory and to the various steam heater batteries associated with the ventilation plants.
(b) Ventilation
Six separate plenum extract systems were installed all of similar character and dealing with the floors in groups. Each system draws fresh air from, and discharges vitiated air to, the cliff face.
Each inlet system comprised a main inlet fitted with a wire grill leading into a concrete spray chamber thence to an eliminator and finally to the fan chamber. The water sprays were not connected, but it was clear that they were to be supplied with water from the main supply and that this water would be rejected to waste.
Two types of delivery fan were used:–
1. Double inlet type in an enclosed fan chamber following spray and eliminator chamber.
2. Single inlet fan with duct connection to the spray and eliminator chamber.
Each inlet fan discharged into a main delivery duct constructed in building board, at the respective ceiling level, and vertical metal ducts were taken down to floors as required with adjustable discharge openings near each floor level.
Vertical extraction ducts with inlets at high level, as required, were connected to a main extraction duct, also constructed in building board, running adjacent to the corresponding main fresh air delivery duct. The main
extraction duct was connected to the extraction fan chamber and thence to atmosphere. At the time of the inspection all fans were running but heater batteries and water sprays were out of commission. Condensation was evident on the lower floors but the general state of the factory suggests that production heat energy in conjunction with the use of steam heater batteries had resulted in a reasonable air condition.
(c) Electric Power and Lighting
The electric supply was taken from the sub-station at Porta (Dachs I) at 6,000 volts and the high tension cables were brought up through the service tunnel and taken to four transformer stations. The voltage was than transformed from 6,000 volts to 400 volts 3 phase 4 wire, each of these transformers was rated at 800 KVA.
Low tension feeder cable were taken as risers to metal closed cabinets containing main switches, fuses, circuit breakers and relays.
Circuit wiring was taken at high level and in general was supported by a series of galvanised multi-strand steel cables which also served as earthing wire collectors. Each steel cable was thoroughly bonded to the rising watermain.
Drops to machines and table inspection lights were taken from special metal junction boxes with porcelain interiors.
All metal parts and components were earthed on to the galvanised straining cables by means of single strand cables, approximately No. 18 gauge.
An attempt was made by interrogation to gain information regarding the type of earth leakage system installed but the only information offered was that every power unit had a leakage trip and that transformer were earthed at the star point.
The general illumination and local bench lighting were of a high standard for example 4 kilowatts of lighting load has been installed in an inspection bay approximately 25' x 25'.
(d) Fire Protection
Fire hydrants complete with hose reels were provided in metal cabinets fixed to walls and connected to the rising waterman. Portable fire extinguishers were also provided.
(e) Gas Installation
Gas for process work was obtained from the town supply and the installation followed conventional standards for the class of work under consideration.

Production and Layout
This factory consisted of nine floors with layout as shown on the attached print and situated in the same hill as the Oil Refinery, Dachs I, which is the subject of a separate report. This factory was first put into operation in February, 1945 when
it was intended to reinstate the production hitherto obtained from Philips Eindhoven factory, Holland. All plant and equipment even down to the inspection benches and stools were transferred from Eindhoven. This factory was very impressive in so far that there was ample spacing, and lighting was particularly good.
The ultimate production was to have been 12,000 radio valves per day, but it was ascertained that up to the date of ceasing production, some 7,000 serviceable valves only had been issued. This in no way represents the total number of valves actually manufactured since it was made clear by the Production Engineer (Dutch) that the number of defective was considerable and this in the main was due to inclusion of dust at the final assembly stages. It should be appreciated that this dust trouble would not be discernible by casual observation. Nevertheless, the question of dust did not apparently interfere with the manufacture of component parts nor did it affect work carried out in the tool room and maintenance shop. Walls had been whitewashed but not otherwise treated or lined.
The total labour force spread over three shift would have been 1,200/1,400, the vast majority being female, mainly young Jewish girls from concentration camps. Three shifts were arranged via:- two of 6 hours, and one of 8 hours, the break coming between 3.0 am and 7.0 am.
Production arrangements were as follows :-
lst floor - Toolroom and general maintenance shop. This plant was in first class condition, amply spaced and machines were of first class make, including several American tools such as Gorton and Milwaukee Milling machines. This floor also housed the gas production
mixing plant required in production and was distributed to the required stations on the other floors by normal pipe distributing system.
2nd floor - This was essentially devoted to grid rolling and all the requisite plant for this operation had been installed and its condition was good.
3rd floor - Allocated to component assembly. This floor was also used as a main stores for component parts.
4th floor - Mainly for assembly and testing.
5th floor - This was laid out for the drawing of filament wire. and testing, but it was obviously not yet in full production. A side gallery on this floor was occupied by a separate firm, Carsten of Hamburg, who
were apparently responsible for stamping out the mica parts which were subsequently used by Philips in the assembly.
6th floor - Had no defined use at the time of visit, except for a few offices and it was understood to have been used as sleeping quarters.
7th floor - This was the main entrance and exit for the whole factory, and contained a certain amount of plant for preparation of cathodes and filaments.
8th floor - Preparation of cathodes and filaments.
9th floor - This was used for offices and ablution, and had a small exit probably used by staff only.
Access for employees to the respective floors was by stairway, and for goods, a lift 4 x 3 metres and having a capacity of 5,000 kilograms was installed to serve floors 1 to 7.
The only external access provided to this factory from the main road was by means of a funicular railway which terminated at the level of floor 7 and about 200 ft. from the tunnel entrance."


Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 20:55

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 394/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR – II.
Sources and Dissemination of Intelligence.
1. This, the second report of the series dealing with G.A.F.
Intelligence during the War, is based mainly on the interrogation of
Hauptmann ZETZSCHE who, during the Period of Major WODARG's office, was
in control of Gruppe A of the department "Foreign Air Forces West" under
Chef Ic.
2. The infuriation set out in this report falls into two main headings
of "Sources" and "Publications". The paragraphs dealing with the German
"Y" Service as a source of intelligence have been purposely reduced to a
minimum, since a series of eight reports covering that subject alone is
to be issued shortly by A.D.I.(K).

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE.
FOREIGN AIR FORCES WEST.
3. The department of Foreign Air Forces West, under Major OWE (see
A.D.I.(K) 393/1945, Appendix IV) and with a staff of about 100, was
responsible for covering Great Britain, the Empire, the U.S.A., France,
Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and the Middle East.
4. The two Gruppen of the department "A" and "B", dealt respectively
with military aspects and political and economic questions. In spite of
the far greater commitments of Gruppe A, departmental strength was
equally distributed between the two Gruppen.
5. The following are the sources upon which Foreign Air Forces West
depended for collation of intelligence.
German "Y" Service.
6. The German Y-Service - Abteilung 3 of General MARTINI's staff –
supplied collated data to Chef Ic. In spite of Generalleutnant SCHMID's
complaints of that department's methods of working (see Part I para.
31), Hauptmann ZETZSCHE stated that this source provided extensive data
for Allied Order of Battle, subordinations and chains of command,
operations, radar developments and ferryings of aircraft from the U.S.A.
7. Four sub-sections of Abteilung 3 covered all aspects of Allied
activities, and issued daily intelligence summaries which were
telephoned or teleprinted to Chef Ic. Ten-day and monthly appreciations
of Allied activity were also issued, the latter containing valuable
Statistics of Allied incursions.
8. One section, Chi-Stelle (codes and cyphers) Referat B covered all
radio and radar intelligence on the western front such as details of
current air operations, including Gee-H and Oboe attacks. The southern
front was similarly covered by Chi-Stelle Referat C, and a sub-section,
Referat C-1, dealt with Allied transport and ferrying traffic, this
latter was of special value to Ic in assessing Allied production and
losses.
9. Radar intelligence from both Western and Southern fronts was
collated by a section known as Funkleitstand. A monthly report was
issued which was of great help to Ic in assessing Allied radar and the
effects of German jamming. A liaison officer was maintained by
Funkleitstand with the P/W Interrogation Centre at Oberursel for the
purpose of clearing up obscure points by interrogation of Allied
aircrew.
10. Another section, the Zentrale Funkaufklärung (ZAF) was set up at
Treuenbrietzen for tactical evaluation of radio and radar data received
in the area of Jagdkorps I. As this section was solely concerned with
tactical considerations, its relations with Chef Ic were not close.
Prisoner of War Interrogation.
11. Excellent results were obtained from the close co-operation with
Auswertestelle West - formerly Dulag Luft; collated reports resulting
from detailed interrogation of Allied aircrew provided valuable matter
for Ic publications as well as for filling in gaps in Order of Battle,
etc., left by the "Y" service, and supplying the Y-Service itself with
working data.
12. The actual methods employed by the Germans in the interrogation of
their prisoners has been set out in detail in A.D.I.(K) 388/1945. It is
perhaps worth recording that Oberst WODARG was frequently caused no
little embarrassment as a result of Generalleutnant SCHMID of Jagdkorps
I being on the distribution list for P/W interrogation reports; SCHMID
usually had his copy first, and WODARG found it disconcerting to have to
tell GOERING things he already knew.

Air Reconnaissance.
13. The G.A.F. strategic reconnaissance effort was limited by lack of
fast aircraft types. During the period leading up to the invasion,
reconnaissance of England by day had been practically nil; at the end of
May 1944 two Me.109's succeeded in carrying out a probing reconnaissance
of the Isle of Wight under cover of cloud and an American four-engined
sortie. The invasion fleet in Southampton was covered only once -
whereupon a night attack by Fliegerkorps IX followed. Beyond a few
isolated daylight efforts, reconnaissance results consisted entirely of
night flash bomb cover - mainly valueless - and visual reconnaissance by
Me.410's.
14. With the introduction of the Ar.234 subsequent to the invasion, the
situation improved steadily. Airfields, harbours, London etc. could then
be effectively covered. Nevertheless there were still too few aircraft
(three names of pilots only were to be read on aerial photographs), and
the enemy picture obtained continued to be only a partial one. This
state of affairs was partly due to the emphasis placed on tactical
reconnaissance, the results of which were of interest only to the Army
and G.A.F. operation commands.
15. Scientific evaluation and appreciation of aerial photographs by Ic
was made difficult through bad organisation, the G.A.F.
Hauptbildabteilung being subordinated to the General der
Aufklärungsflieger.

Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) and 3 S.K.L.
16. Ic placed great value on the information on Order of Battle,
subordinations and directions of thrust of Allied ground forces supplied
by Fremde Heere West, which for its own part found the Ic enemy air
situation report extremely useful, in that the Order of Battle of air
ground support units showed a clearer cut and timelier picture of enemy
intentions than the movement of military ground forces.
17. Fr.H.W. issued extremely good appreciations. Alone with Ic/West it
pointed continually to the probability of one sole landing on the
Normandy coast, in opposition to the firm Wehrmachtsführungsstab belief
in the likelihood of a second landing in the Straits of Dover.
18. Intelligence received from 3.S.K.L. the Naval liaison unit, was for
the most part scrappy, owing to the dearth of information regarding the
occupation of Allied harbours and the distribution of the Allied navies,
landing craft and merchant fleets.

Reports from Operational Commands.
19. Ic officers at the front complied only partially with Chef Ic's
requirements, owing to a variety of reasons, such as Chef Ic's lack of
personal influence, the sometimes poor quality of the Ic officers
themselves, and the emphasis placed at the front on the reporting of the
enemy’s actions rather than on knowledge about him, such knowledge being merely designated as enemy propaganda.
20. The main teak of Operational Command Ic's was to teleprint to Ops.
Staff In a current enemy situation report, comprising Order of Battle,
operations, tactics and any special considerations such as possibilities
of air landings, invasion eta. These reports were, however, only
forthcoming at irregular intervals and even then seemingly with an ill
grace. Thus, with the exception of the Luftflotte 3 Ic appreciation
prior to the invasion, Front Ic reports could not be considered as a
regular source of intelligence comparable with Auswertestelle West or
the W/T Listening Service.
21. A further duty was also neglected by Ic's at the front, that of
passing up Staffel reports to Chef Ic and passing down Chef Ic reports
to the Staffeln. Instead, every month each Operational Command
painstakingly produced its own comprehensive report of the air situation
carefully printed and edited and covering enemy incursions, operation.,
Order of Battle strength, subordination., etc., the figures naturally
differing between one Command and another, and from those of Chef Ic who had other sources at his disposal.
22. As for the sources available to Operational Commands, on which the
reports were based, Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, one-time Chief Intelligence
Officer of Luftflotte 6, gave the following as sources available between
January 1941 and March 1943:-
i) The Luftflotte tactical and strategical reconnaissance units.
These were at the disposal of the Ic as and when required.
ii) A signals intercept unit for the Luftflotte 6 area.
iii) The interrogation centre for Russian flying and Flak personnel.
iv) A photographic unit.
v) Evaluation of battle experience of Luftflotte 6 units.
vi) A captured equipment evaluation centre.
vii) Current data from adjacent Luftflotten.
viii) Reports from Ic-Heer, supplied by the Army Group Centre.
ix) Reports from the Military Intelligence Service affecting
Luftflotte 6 area.
23. OHLEZ states that results of a tactical nature were distributed by
him to Luftflotte 6 units. Full details were sent to O.K.L. Ic and Army
Group Centre, and brought to the daily conferences of the Flottenchef
with his Chief of General Staff and officers in charge of operations.
24. It is therefore not difficult to understand why Operational Command
Ic's with such resources at their disposal and in view of their special
operational commitments, should feel themselves independent and to some extent intolerant of control by Chef Ic, and why Chef Ic on his side,
with responsibility for the accurate assessment of the full enemy
situation, and viewing the situation solely from this standpoint, should
maintain that Ic's at the front were overstaffed and negligent of their
true functions.

Evaluation of the Press.
25. Each Intelligence organisation in Germany made its own arrangements
for the procuring and evaluating of foreign newspapers and periodicals.
Chef Ic obtained its papers either through the R.S.H.A. or the G.A.F.
Air Attachés in Bern, Stockholm and, up to 1944, Madrid, Lisbon and
Ankara; Papers were at least four weeks out of date when received owing
to poor R.S.H.A. organisation. American newspapers and periodicals were
received only occasionally and in small numbers. Luftwesen was
responsible for supply within Ic, and thus provided a further cause of
delay.
26. Intelligence was extracted from press reports concerning
personalities (e.g. from "Aeroplane, "Tatler" and "Sphere"), production
figures, photographic material, tactics and economics matters.
Technical Intelligence.
27. Enemy aircraft armament was covered mainly by Chef Technische
Luftrüstung section A/Rü, and Ic could neither guide nor co-ordinate its
work. Generally speaking, A/Rü took upon itself to keep industry and
Operation Commands informed, Ic serving to pass its reports down to unit
level.
28. These reports mare very good and complete, but came much too late
to be really valuable, since TLR-Rü invariably waited until the last
details were known on any subject before issuing a report upon it. For
the same reason Ic only received at long and irregular intervals reports
on Allied aircraft shot down.

Broadcast Monitoring.
29. Of special interest and value were the broadcast links between the
news agencies and their correspondents in the various capitals of the
world. Of broadcasting stations, the B.B.C. and Swiss stations were
considered the most reliable, Daventry in particular being appreciated
for its figures concerning Allied sorties and losses. Indeed, during the
period between the invasion and collapse, BBC reports were often the
only source of reliable information on the war situation.
30. Radio monitoring was done by O.K.W.-Chi, its Naval counterpart the
Seehausdienst, and the Forschungsamt, the results being sorted out and
distributed by Ic/Luftwesen.

Agents.
31. The complete failure of the German Agent Organisation as a source
of reliable information was attributed by ZETZSCHE to the following
causes:-
i) The unsuitability of personnel both at home and abroad.
ii) Lack of agents in high positions.
iii) Many agents inspired by British Intelligence, e.g. Hector,
Josephine probably, and Ostra for certain.
iv) No agents in America.
v) Agents' reports evaluated and issued without reference to Ic,
final judgment on them being passed by Abwehr I/Luft (later
R.S.H.A. Mil.Amt).
vi) The splitting of the Agent organisation between Haupt Amt IV
and Haupt Amt VI of the Mil.Amt, thus giving rise to two
separate organisations abroad.
vii) The final assumption of control by the S.D. causing the whole
organisation to fall to pieces, and the flow of useful reports
to cease altogether.
32. Liaison was maintained with the Militärisches Amt through Oberstleutnant von DEWITZ. From the middle of 1944, however, agents' reports were not passed out to Commands owing to their proved unreliability.

Attaché Reports.
33. Attaché reports came from Amtsgruppe Ausland (Admiral BÖRKNER) of O.K.W. which passed to Ic important reports from military, Naval and
G.A.F. attachés, as well as direct from Air Attachés in neutral
countries, organised by the Ic Attaché Gruppe.
34. For the most part attaché reports consisted of descriptions of
economic conditions and morale abroad, sometimes amounting to no more
than translations of newspaper reports. Little of any value was ever
received concerning England, France or U.S.A. On the other hand attachés
often swallowed whole rumours issued by the Allies for German
consumption, e.g. rumours concerning the imminent invasion of Norway,
the Balkans, etc.
35. Air attaches were not held in very high esteem partly owing to
their being considered poorly chosen for the task and partly owing to
lack of firm direction by Ic (Luftwesen).

Diplomatic Reports.
36. Reports from the Foreign Office and agencies abroad came to Ic both
through Amtsgruppe Ausland of O.K.H. and through the Ic Liaison Officer
with the Foreign Office, Hauptmann EHRENHAUS (Ic/Luftwesen/Pol). They
were of little military value.
37. Intelligence concerning foreign diplomatic exchanges was received
from the Forschungsamt (subordinated directly to GOERING) through
Ic/Luftwesen/Abwehr, and was given a restricted distribution. It
consisted of intercepted Allied radio-telegrams (e.g. London-Stockholm),
ordinary radio reports (e.g. Atlantic Radio) and intercepted traffic
between diplomats and ministers on certain links, Ankara-Moscow (Turks),
Bern-Washington (Americans), London Washington (Poles).
36. The last-mentioned source was of great value before and during the
invasion and after the breaking-off of Turkish-German relations. In
general the Forschungsamt reports contained a great deal of significant
information concerning economic and political matters.

Reports from Repatriated Germans.
39. The Army, Navy, G.A.F. and Gestapo interrogated at will both
military and civilian repatriates. A general lack of direction and coordination resulted. Auswertestelle West, Oberursel, was responsible for
the G.A.F. interrogations and obtained many interesting details on enemy
morale and supply.

FREMDE LUFTWAFFE OST (FOREIGN AIR FORCES EAST).
40. This section, the eastern front counterpart of Fremde Luftwaffe
West, covered the Soviet Union, China, Sweden, Finland and the Balkans.
It was organised into the following subsections:-
i) Aufmarsch.
In this section the Russian Order of Battle was worked out in
the greatest detail. Since the bulk of the Soviet Air
Forces was employed tactically in support of the Armies at the
front, this work was of the utmost scope and importance.
Appreciations of the air situation were issued whenever
necessary, on average every three to five days. Maps showing
the locations of Soviet flying units were issued on the 1st
and 15th of each month.
ii) Training and Organisation.
This section covered Soviet subordinations and chains of
command, the organisation of Soviet flying schools and the
training of pilots.
iii) Archives.
This section was responsible for provision of target data. It
covered Soviet Industry, power plants, oil installations, ball
bearing factories, etc. It issued industrial reports, based
mainly on P/W statements and W/T intercept material supplied
by the Forschungsamt.
iv) Auswertestelle Ost (Evaluation Centre East).
This organisation differed from Auswertestelle West in that it
dealt only with the most important and knowledgeable
prisoners, as for instance the Russian Inspector of Fighters
who landed with his staff by mistake on a German airfield in
1943. Thirty to forty P/W at the most were at Auswertestelle
Ost at any one time. The remainder were dealt with by the
interrogation centres of the individual Luftflotten, which
reported anything of interest daily. Since the Listening
Service provided the complete Soviet Order of Battle, and
knowledge of Soviet tactics was deemed unimportant, P/W were
only kept for what information they might provide concerning
Soviet organisation.
Auswertestelle Ost was located near Karlsbad and was under the
command of Oberstleutnant MOLTERS.

MELDEWESEN.
41. As the receiving and distributing centre for all data concerning
German and Allied operations, Meldewesen constituted an information
bureau highly appreciated by its users, i.e. O.K.W., O.K.L., GOERING,
Operational sub-areas, etc. The limited communications and staff of Ic
were however, insufficient to cope with the stream of enquiries from
HITLER, GOERING, Chief of General Staff and the rest, so that the flying
units were perforce neglected and the very success of this section
tended to have a detrimental effect on the work of Ic as a whole.

LUFTWESEN.
42. This department was an unhappy attempt to co-ordinate a number of
widely differing functions. It comprised the following sub-sections,
some of which have been already referred to:-
L/Abwehr, which was responsible for the maintenance of security
within the G.A.F. and for the security training of the flying units. For
the first task it did not dispose of sufficient personnel, and as
already indicated, Fremde Luftwaffen West and Ost were the only
departments competent to carry out the second. However, from the middle of 1944 an Oberleutnant ROLFES was appointed liaison officer with German P/W camps with the object of exploiting the intelligence possibilities of this source.
L/Pol. Maintained Ic liaison with the Foreign Office. His main
effort was to produce his "Aussenpolitischen Wochenbericht", a weekly
report on the political situation, reflecting Foreign Office views and
mainly emphasising the reasons for an Anglo-American-Soviet Russian
conflict of views.
L/Informationsdienst sorted and distributed radio reports sent in
by O.K.W./Chi.
L/Presse received reports from the Army, Field Propaganda companies
etc. as well as foreign publications.
Liaison with the S.D. was provided by Major MERKWITZ and Hauptmann
BULA.

Attaché Gruppe. Owing to the total lack of accommodation in Berlin,
the close direction of Attachés by Luftwesen was made impossible and
their control virtually ineffective.

INDEPENDENT SPECIALISTS.
43. Ic Wirtschaft. In this section Oberstleutnant SEIDL, with the
assistance of one officer, issued a monthly report on Anglo-American
bombing attacks, comprising details of damage, falling-off of production
etc. and predicting probable future Allied tactics.
Ic/See. This department covered purely Naval matters.
Ic/Bild. Theoretically for the purpose of Ic-liaison with the Main
Photographic Section, this department was rendered superfluous owing to
the practice of subordinate units by-passing Ic and dealing direct with
the Hauptbildabteilung.

PUBLICLTIONS ISSUED BY Ic.
44. The succeeding paragraphs in this report are in the form of a
catalogue of publications issued by Chef Ic. Hauptmann ZETZSCHE's
assessment of the scale of contribution to the subject matter of these
reports by the various sources of intelligence already mentioned will be
found in Appendix I to this report. A diagram prepared by Hauptmann
ZETZSCHE summarising the sources which went to make up Ic's publications
appears in Appendix II.
(a) Maps showing Order of Battle.
Maps of the Western Front (Great Britain and France), Southern
Front (Italy), Mediterranean area and the world as a whole were issued
monthly down to Divisional level and to O.K.W., O.K.L., O.K.H. and
O.K.M. Printing difficulties were responsible for this limiting of
distribution.
(b) Rechenzettel (Allied Strength Estimate).
Issued monthly down to Divisional level and to the Flugmeldedienst.
(c) Truppenfeststellungen.
Covered unit transfers, rearmament and changes of subordination and
command, quoting the source of each item, e.g. Presse, Grönbild
(covername for Listening Service). (Issued every two to three days to
Luftflotte Ic's and the Flugmeldedienst).
(d) Appreciations of the Air Situation.
Teleprinted at three to five-daily intervals to specialist
departments of O.K.W, O.K.H., O.K.M., Luftflotte Ic's and Air
Observation Units, these appreciations covered tactics employed against
special targets, new operational procedures, estimates of Allied
production and losses, ferrying figures, invasion potentialities.
(e) Red Books.
Issued by Gruppe B of Fremde Luftwaffen West, the so-called Red
Books contained data concerning Allied targets and airfields and those
of neutral countries.
(f) Target Data and Photographs.
Also issued by Gruppe B.
(g) Notes on Allied Air Armament.
Figures of Allied production and losses, derived mainly from press
and radio reports were prepared for O.K.L. headquarters units. German
and agent reports of aircraft shot down were disregarded owing to
unreliability. These figures, as well as Ic predictions, proved more
accurate than those issued by TLR/Rü.
(h) Reports on Allied Morale.
Contained notes on morale, supplies, political questions, economy,
etc. derived from P/W statements and extracts from captured letters.
(i) Foreign Comment on the Air War.
Press and radio opinion concerning the German and Allied air
forces, presented in tendencious form to illustrate various themes, such
as, for instance, that the G.A.F. was handmaiden of the German Army.
(j) Ic Kurzmeldungen.
Immediate reports on new aircraft types, new operational
procedures, new commanders and their characteristics, new weapons and
apparatus, etc. Distribution was extremely varied to include all
possible interest parties. Up to the middle of 1944 advance warnings of
Allied attacks, derived from P/W interrogations, captured maps and
target data, were also promulgated in this form. After that date, to
avoid unnecessary delay, they were issued independently at source by

Auswertestelle West.
(k) Stichworte zum Feindeinsatz (Notes on Enemy Operations).
Contained extracts from P/W interrogation reports of special
interest, evaluations of captured documents, press and radio reports
etc. Cartoons from the foreign press added immensely to its popularity.
It was issued every three to five days and distributed to some 60
departments (O.K.L., Commands, Flugmeldedienst Units, Research,
Industry, etc.).
(l) P/W Interrogation Reports.
Demand for these was great largely owing to the political
observations they contained, and until about August 1944 they were
allowed a wide distribution. After this data the original reports were
limited to Commands sod Air Observation Units, the remainder receiving
"Stichworte sum Feindeinsatz" instead.
(m) Blue Books.
Instituted by KIENITZ at the end of 1943, the Blue Books dealt with
subjects of a confidential nature, e.g. American day operations, A1lied
ground support, British navigation, etc. However, in spite of a wealth
of illustration and good printing they proved a failure, being too bulky
to be easily read, apart from the contention in certain high quarters
that they only amounted to Allied propaganda.
(n) Einzelnachrichten des Ic Dienstes (Special Ic Studies).
The first of this series was brought out in the middle of 1943,
nothing of the kind having been attempted before. At first they appeared
weekly on such subjects as "American day and British night operations",
"Experiences of Fliegerkorps IX in the bombing of London", etc. With the
dropping of the Blue Book series round about June 1944, E-N began to
include such restricted subjects as "Allied twin-engined operations',
"American fighter navigation", etc. Difficulties were encountered in its
distribution, which were countered by the printing of 3,000 copies. It
was highly valued by such as managed to get hold of it, and was in
constant demand by the Wehrmacht, industry and research.
(o) Schnellbildsendungen (Rapid Photo Delivery).
This was a system, inaugurated by Ic/See, of delivering negatives to
Commands in order that the latter might run off as many prints as were
required by subordinate units. The system was originally utilised by
Ic/See for distributing Ship types, but Ic applied the idea generally to
the swift distribution of new aircraft types, captured H2X negatives,
and apparatus, aerial photographs of airfields, etc.
The system did not work effectively; for instance, it took longer to
procure both positives and negatives from the Main Photographic Section
than to obtain the required number of prints. Moreover, the shortage of
photographic material at Commands made it difficult for them to do the
necessary printing from the negatives which they received. Finally, the
previous system of delivering normal prints had to be reverted to.

A.D.I.(K) and Walter A. Frank
U.S. Air Interrogation. for:- S.D. Felkin
2nd October 1945 Group Captain.
SECRET. APPENDIX I.
AN ASSESSEMENT BY HAUPTMANN ZETSCHE
OF THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF IC SOURCES
TOWARDS FINAL APPRECIATIONS BY CHEF IC.
A. ORDER OF BATTLE.
W/T Listening Service……………………………………… 70%
P/W Statements )
Captured Material )…………………………………………… 20%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 1%
Air Photos ………………………………………………………………… 9%
B. SUBORDINATIONS AND CHAINS OF COMMAND.
W/T Listening Service……………………………………… 50%
P/W Statements )
Captured Material )………………………………………… 5%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 45%
C. PERSONALITIES.
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 90%
P/W Statements )
Captured Material )…………………………………………… 10%
D. OPS. APPRECIATIONS.
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 55%
Captured Material ……………………………………………… 20%
W/T Listening Service …………………………………… 20%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 5%
E. TECHNICAL APPRECIATIONS.
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 30%
Captured Equipment …………………………………………… 50%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 20%
F. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY PRODUCTION.
Ferrying and O.B. Data (Mainly W/T
Listening Service) …………………………………………… 35%
Enemy Losses …………………………………………………………… 30%
Radio and Press …………………………………………………… 30%
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 4%
Agents' Reports …………………………………………………… 1%
G. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY LOSSES.
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 20%
Press and Radio …………………………………………………… 40%
W/T Listening Service ………………………………… 30%
Neutral Reports …………………………………………………… 9%
Agents' Reports …………………………………………………… 1%"


Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:08

Radio and radar equipment in the luftwaffe
 
"A. D. I. (K) Report No. 365/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – V.

I.F.F.
1. This report is the fifth of the series dealing with radio
and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. As in the case of the
previous four reports (A.D.I.(K) 343, 357, 362 and 363/1945), it
is based on interrogation of General Nachrichtenführer MARTINI,
Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and some members of his
staff, and has been supported by a number of relevant documents
of recent date which were in the possession of the General's
Chief of Staff.
2. For convenience in reading, the report is divided into
three main sections covering the following applications of
I.F.F.
A - Flak.
B - Early Warning Radar.
C - Air-to-Air Recognition.

GERMAN VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF I.F.F.
3. Before the outbreak of war the practical application of
radar was mainly concentrated upon its use as an aid to Flak,
and the Germans did not realise the importance of an early
warning service until after hostilities had begun. In
consequence the need for the identification of friendly aircraft
picked up by radar sets arose initially mainly in conjunction
with Flak requirements.
4. Owing possibly to the fact that the first solution to the
Flak problem was not as successful as that achieved in
connection with early-warning radar, while at the time great
importance was attached to Flak as a defensive weapon, much
effort was devoted in the first few years to producing a
suitable identification system for that arm.
5. By 1944, the American bomber force was able to bomb Berlin
by daylight in clear weather with insignificant losses by Flak,
despite the application of various radar and optical aids. As a
result, Flak had fallen into disrepute as to defensive weapon.
6. This opinion of the ineffectiveness of Flak was very
pronounced among the members of the Signals Staff of the G.A.F.
and it is hoped to give their reasons for this view in a later
report in this series on Ground Radar. Flak was regarded by them
as an out of date weapon and for this reason as well as on
account of the inherent difficulties of the problem, practically
no effort was made to provide a means of identification of
friendly aircraft for Flak purposes during the later stages of
the war.
7. On the other hand the position of early warning radar was
exactly the reverse and as early warning became vital so the
G.A.F. attached ever greater importance to I.F.F. for early
Warning radars, particularly in connection with bad weather and
night raids involving feints and spoof sorties. It was
considered essential to obtain a clear picture of the tracks of
Allied raiding aircraft and to avoid any confusion with German
fighter aircraft which also flew in group. The latest endeavour
in this field went so far as to provide separate identification
for different G.A.F. night fighter units in order to assist
ground control still further.
8. Increasing attention was also being paid to air-to-air
recognition between German aircraft but this, though considered
desirable, was not thought to be nearly so important as the
essential requirement that friendly aircraft should be
recognisable to the early warning service In order that a true
picture of the progress of Allied bomber attacks could be
obtained and fighter aircraft vectored to the attack by ground
control.

A – I.F.F. FOR FLAK
9. At the beginning of 1939 it was intended to equip all
Flak sites with a radar fire control apparatus then being
developed by the firm of Lorenz. The Lorenz apparatus proved
unsatisfactory and in the course of 1939 the Würzburg, produced
by Telefunken, was adopted for Flak fire control.
10. The need for the recognition of friendly aircraft for Flak
purposes had been apparent to the Germans and an I.F.F. set for
use with the Würzburg was produced, and was available at the
outbreak of war. It was known as the Zwilling and was given the
designation FuGe 25.
11. The 50 cm. Würzburg transmission received by the FuGe 25
caused the FuGe 25 transmitter to broadcast an audible morse
signal on the same frequency, which could then be heard by the
Würzburg operator in his headphones. As this was not a retransmission
of the Würzburg radar pulses, it gave no indication
of range and might equally well have originated from an aircraft
in the vicinity beamed by some other Würzburg. General MARTINI
was fully aware at this stage that the FuGe 25 was no real
solution to the identification problem.
12. Meanwhile, the firm of Gema had produced the Freya for
the Navy, and in October 1939 eight of these had been taken over
by the G.A.F. and were stationed on the East end North Frisian
Islands, where they proved their value la combatting early
British bombing attacks directed against the North Sea ports.
13. In November 1939 Gema demonstrated an I.F.F. set for use
with Freya which proved to be forerunner of the FuGe 25A
Erstling. General MARTINI recognised immediately that this Freya
I.F.F. which operated on the principle of returning the Freya
pulses and which provided range measurement, was a far superior
solution and he endeavoured to use his authority to have the new
principle universally adopted for Flak.
14. At that time many different departments were involved and
partly on this account and partly because FuGe 25 Zwilling was
sponsored by the Technisches Amt, MARTINI failed to gain his
point. (see also A.D.I.(K) 334/1945),paras. 95-96). It was only
with great difficulty that he was able to persuade the R.L.M. in
early 1940 that an order for 3,000 FuGe 25A for Freyas should
be placed and even then considerable delay occurred before they
were supplied.
15. During 1940 and 1941 the shortcomings of the Zwilling
gradually became apparent, particularly in connection with night
fighter operations, but by the time the advantages of the
FuGe 25A Erstling had been recognised and the set had been
finally adopted, over 10,000 Zwilling sets had already been
manufactured.
16. The original Freya used a wavelength of 2.40 metres to
which the FuGe 25A Erstling responded on 1.90 metres. To permit
of the universal application of the FuGe 25A a small transmitter
called the Kuh had to be built into other types of early warning
radar in order to interrogate the airborne set. The response was
picked up by the Gemse receiver unit. In this manner a simple
pair of wavelengths were, in effect, set aside for aircraft
I.F.F. purposes.
17. In spite of these achievements the Flak problem had not
been completely solved, as it was not possible to produce a
sufficiently beamed transmission on 2.40 metres to be certain
that a response seen on the recognition tube was that of the
aircraft in the Würzburg beam. Various expedients were tried out
but as mentioned above, the problem still remained unsolved up
to the end of the war and was finally abandoned.

FUGE 25 - ZWILLING.
18. The FuGe 25 Zwilling (= twin) received the Würzburg pulses
on a 50 cm. carrier wave and re-transmitted a morse recognition
signal on the same frequency, but as it did not re-transmit the
pulses received, no range could be obtained by the ground set.
The shortcomings of this system were recognised in 1941 end a
series of attempts was made to overcome them by using responder
technique as detailed below.

HÄUPTLING.
19. In order that the Flak Würzburgs should get a range with
their recognition signal, the FuGe 25 Zwilling was converted so
that the pulses received on 50 cm. were re-transmitted on the
FuGe 25a wavelength of 1.90 m. This conversion was complete by
the autumn of 1942. The new set was called Häuptling. About this
time, however, Allied jamming of Würzburgs commenced and the
Germans were forced to produce Würzburgs on various wavelengths
known as Insel A 53.0-54.2 cm. and Insel B 56.7-58.0 cm. As a
result, the FuGe 25 no longer responded to all Würzburgs and so
the Häuptling did not fulfil its task.

KUCKUCK.
20. When Würzburgs on various frequencies were introduced, the
basic FuGe 25 set was finally given up and the FuGe 25A Erstling
became the standard airborne set.
21. All Würzburg radars were provided with a Kuh type
transmitter on 2.40 m. called the Kuckuck, the aerials for which
were placed in the Würzburg paraboloid. The resultant polar
diagram was extremely wide-angled as compared with the Würzburg
beam and a response at the same range as that of the aircraft
held in the beam was not positive proof of identity if many
aircraft were about.
22. In addition the 2.40 metre transmission spilled over and
could be picked up at distances of as much as 10/15 km. behind
the Würzburg set, so that even aircraft behind the Würzburg were
triggered off. As Flak was only interested in aircraft within
firing range of the Würzburg, this procedure was at its weakest
with the very type of recognition for which it had been
expressly designed, and in consequence Kuckuck was finally
condemned as a failure in 1943.

WOBBELBIENE.
23. With the failure of Kuckuck the Germans decided that the
only solution to the Flak problem was to apply British I.F.F.
technic. The FuGe 225, known as Wobbelbiene, which was designed
to sweep through (Wobbeln) the 50 cm. to 60 cm. band and act as
responder (Biene), was developed for this purpose and was to
have been introduced in the winter of 1943/1944. This, however,
still did not cover the new Würzburg Insel C of 62.3 - 63.8 cm.,
which was being introduced in 1944.
24. Further modifications to Wobbelbiene were considered in
order to cover this waveband but many difficulties, both
mechanical and electrical, had been encountered with the design
despite the fact that the set was said to be a direct copy of
British R.F.3090.
25. The project was ultimately given up before being used
operationally and up to the end of the war no satisfactory
solution to the Flak problem had been found.

B - I.F.F. FOR EARLY-WARNING RADAR.
26. The Kuh and Gemse arrangement in conjunction with the
FuGe 25A whereby two wavelengths, 2.40 m. for interrogation and
1.90 for response, had been set aside for I.F.F., worked
satisfactorily for early-warning radars. MARTINI's staff
considered that this system was superior to the then current
British principle of an I.F.F. set sweeping through the various
early-warning wave bands and responding only intermittently to a
particular frequency.
27. When Allied jamming became serious, it was fully realised
that the use of one special wavelength for recognition purposes,
rendered recognition very vulnerable to Allied countermeasures
although it was considered difficult from a technical point of
view to carry out effective jamming.
28. To anticipate this eventuality, a tactical requirement was
formulated in 1943/1944 calling for a FuGe 25A working on a new
frequency and the Erstling-Grün was designed and manufactured,
but never put into use as the Allies did not employ the expected
counter-measures.
29. With the advent, during the course of 1944, of automatic
sweeping ground radar with a P.P.I. presentation like
Jagdschloss, a new problem for I.F.F. arose. So long as the
recognition signal emitted by the aircraft in responding was a
morse letter there was no guarantee that it would come up
effectively as the beam swept over the target aircraft.
30. The Germans' first solution of this problem, was the
Erstling-Rot, a form of FuGe 25A, which responded with the morse
identifications separated by a six-second dash, thereby ensuring
that response was sufficiently continuous for the ground set to
sweep the aircraft at least once whilst the airborne set was
transmitting the long dash.
31. In 1944 Allied radio countermeasures became more intense
and it was realised by the Germans that the general principle
applied in all their anti-jamming countermeasures must also hold
for I.F.F. This principle was to have a number of alternative
frequencies available for every type of set and a new tactical
requirement embodying this facility was, therefore, formulated.
32. It was decided that the new I.F.F. set must also give
continuous presentation of the recognition response so that
ground controllers could immediately identify friendly aircraft.
At the same time this would solve the identification problem for
panoramic ground equipment of the Jagdschloss type.
33. This requirement led to the development of the Neuling
which, however, had not been used operationally up to the end of
the war. It appears to have been a set with a number of novel
features which are discussed below at some length.
34. In complete contradiction of the principles used in all
earlier sets, the problem of I.F.F. for centimetre radar was to
be solved by using the searching beam to trigger off the I.F.F.
set. A small unit called the Frischling was to convert the
centimetre wavelength to a frequency which would be accepted by
the standard Erstling receiver.

FuGe 25A – ERSTLING.
35. The FuGe 25A is the well known set which has been installed
in every German aircraft since about the beginning of 1942 and
which had also been used for Egon control(see A.D.I.(K)
357/1945). It was often referred to as the Erstling.
36. It was a responding transmitter receiving on 2.40 m.(the
original Freya frequency) and re-transmitting the pulses
received on 1.90 metre. A morse signal repeated roughly every
two seconds was superimposed on the re-transmission, six
alternative codes being available. It was claimed that an
advantage of using a morse letter as recognition was that it
could easily be read by ear through the operator's headphones
and that this was easier than following the recognition C.R.
tube by eye.

ERSTLING-ROT.
37. In the early part of 1945 the G.A.F. began to introduce a
form of FuGe 25A known as the Erstling-Rot. It was designed to
deal with recognition difficulties occurring with ground radar
of the automatic sweeping type such as Jagdschloss.
38. The Erstling-Rot separated the morse signals by a dash of
six seconds duration - a period sufficient to ensure that the
ground radar swept the target. It embodied an improvement in
that it permitted of 18 different morse recognition signals
being superimposed on the re-transmission instead of only six as
in the case of the original Erstling.
39. Originally it was to have a more powerful transmitter but
this requirement was allowed to lapse when it was realised that
the factors limiting range were the sensitivity of the FuGe 25A
receiver or the power of the ground interrogator. A project for
a more powerful ground interrogator called the Gross Kuh was
considered, but as the ranges obtained with the normal Kuh were
thought to be adequate this idea was abandoned.

ERSTLING GRÜN
40. The G.A.F. signals staff realised that the use of a single
frequency for recognition purposes exposed them to the danger of
Allied R.C.M. In view of this a version of the FuGe 25A
operating on a new frequency was produced which was known as the
Erstling-Grün. The wavelengths used were to be 2.52 metres for
interrogation and about 2.00 metres for the response.
41. The small shift in wavelength was dictated by the need to
avoid new ground equipment. With the relatively small frequency
change the Kuh and Gemse were capable of being adjusted to the
new frequencies by the field "S. und I" (maintenance and repair)
teams, and so an economy was effected.
42. Erstling-Grün was never used operationally as Allied
jamming of the original Erstling frequency was never
experienced.

NEULING.
43. The FuGe 226, usually referred to as the Neuling, was to
have been available for installation in operational aircraft by
December 1944, but owing to difficulties encountered during the
trials carried out at Rechlin it was not yet ready at the time
of the capitulation. Lorenz were responsible for its production
and Dr. KRAMAR of that firm was considered the expert on its
technical aspects.
44. The Neuling, which was considered to be a good solution to
the identification problem, was designed to overcome previous
difficulties and to provide new facilities. The tactical
requirement originally called for were:-
(a) Continuous presentation of I.F.F. signals on all types
of early-warning radar including panoramic radars
such as Jagdschloss.
(b) Twelve alternative pairs of frequencies for I.F.F.
(later reduced to six pairs) - each pair to consist
of an interrogating and response frequency.
(c) Air to air recognition between German aircraft.
45. This ambitious programme was not fulfilled when the
FuGe 226 was tried out in the later part of 1944 at Rechlin, but
the experts who carried out the trials believed that the main
requirements could be met by sacrificing half the pairs of
frequencies, thereby limiting the set to six frequency pairs.
46. To meet requirement (a) and provide continuous presentation
of the recognition signal on the ground radar, and at the same
time permit the simultaneous use of a number of different
frequencies, the responder and transmitter were to sweep very
rapidly through the selected band which was believed to be 125 -
167 mc/s.
47. The receiver and transmitter sweeps were synchronised a few
megacycles apart, so that the response was always on a slightly
different frequency to that of the interrogation. This sweep was
to be carried out sufficiently rapidly for the blip on the
recognition tube of a ground set interrogating on one of the
frequencies to appear continuous to the eye of the operator.
48. Presumably, even allowing for after-glow effects, the
frequency of sweep must have been extremely high. It was not
known exactly what repetition rate was used, nor what technical
method was employed to obtain such a high rate of sweep through
the band.
49. Great importance was attached to requirement (a) as it
allowed ground controllers to obtain continuous recognition on
Jagdschloss type P.P.I. tubes and so distinguish between
friendlies and hostiles. It also greatly assisted the control of
friendly fighters by Freya stations.
50. The requirement (a) for continuous presentation of the
recognition signal appeared to have precedence over the
requirement (b) for twelve alternative pairs of frequencies
since in order to meet (a) Rechlin decided that the number of
channels available would have to be cut from twelve to six
pairs. It was found by Rechlin that squeezing twelve separate
frequencies for response (which could not overlap with
interrogation frequencies) into the swept band caused the band
width of the individual responder frequencies to be so narrow
that the recognition blip became too thin and indistinct on the
ground radar recognition tube.
51. It was hoped that requirement (b) - the provision of
alternative frequencies - would prove a safeguard against
possible Allied R.C.M. It was also believed that it would aid in
mitigating clutter on the recognition tubes of Freya etc., since
interrogation would be spread over a number of frequencies.
Wandering blips resulting from neighbouring ground radars which
triggered off other aircraft obscured the tube and caused this
clutter.
52. Efforts had also been made to overcome this trouble by
building an arrangement into ground radars which prevented
interrogation being carried out continuously as was often the
undesirable habit of operators. By means of this arrangement
power was cut off from the Kuh aerials about a minute after the
interrogation switch had been depressed and this device also
prevented interrogation until a further short period had
elapsed.
53. Requirement (c) was only third in importance. The air to
air I.P.F. facility, however, entailed a disadvantage which was
regarded as a serious one, namely that when being used for that
purpose the Neuling was no longer capable of responding to
interrogating by other radar apparatus on the ground.
54. The tactical application of the Neuling must be considered
in relation to the defence problems which the Allied bomber
forces set Germany in 1944. The Germans regarded it as essential
for the defence and more particularly for night defence that
they should be able to obtain an absolutely clear picture of the
air situation and identify Allied bomber streams unequivocally
and at a glance. The P.P.I. presentation of ground radar like
Jagdschloss and Forsthaus was beginning to be appreciated and
attempts were being made to control directly from these
panoramic displays.
55. It will be remembered too that German night fighter Gruppen
operating under the Verbandsflug system flew together in loose
groups or patrolled in the area of a selected beacon. It was,
therefor, considered essential that these aircraft should be
immediately identified as friendly on the P.P.I. tube and not
confused with a bomber stream. It was also held to be of great
value to ground controllers to have a means available for
identifying one Gruppe from another with equal immediacy.
56. To attain these requirement one of the six interrogating
frequencies available was allotted to early-warning radar and
the remaining five were to be given to different night fighter
Gruppen or Geschwader. The Neuling in each aircraft was then so
switched that it could receive and respond to two of the six
Neuling frequency pairs, viz. the early-warning frequency and
the frequency allotted to the Gruppe to which the aircraft
belonged.
57. For Jagdschloss panoramic ground equipment a complete
continuous identification picture divided into friendlies and
hostiles could be obtained by interrogating on the earlywarning
frequency.
58. By simply training a knob the transmitter and receiver
could be switched to the frequency pair of a particular
operational Gruppe and this presented no technical difficulty
with Breitband aerials. Aircraft of that Gruppe could then be
identified immediately in the over-all picture on the P.P.I.
tube. This facility was considered a great advance both from
the point of view of I.F.F. and of ease of ground control of
night fighters.
59. P/W who claimed to have seen a ground P.P.I. display
during the Neuling trials stated that the recognition blip came
up on the tube as an extension of the reflected blip at
slightly greater range and that it subtended a greater angle in
the display. He described it as a "sausage rather longer than
the aircraft blip and sitting on it".
60. Reference has been found in a document to a Neuling
covering the band 1,000-1,500 mc/s. The P/W who was responsible
for the formulation of radar requirements stated that he had
never heard of a Neuling on this frequency, but suggested that
it might be for use in responding directly to the beam of 25
cm. ground radars such as Forsthaus F. This suggestion appears
unlikely, however, as it seems to involve a departure from the
Neuling principle.

FRISCHLING.
61. In view of the introduction of highly beamed 9 cm. ground
radar such as Forsthaus Z and Jagdschloss Z, it had been decided
to depart from the principle of using a separate interrogation
frequency and to employ the search beam to trigger off I.F.F.
For this purpose a special attachment to the airborne Erstling
called Frischling had been planned. This was a receiver on 9 cm.
which converted the frequency to that of the Erstling so that it
responded on 1.90 metres.
62. With the planned introduction of the Neuling, consideration
was given to a modification of the Neuling whereby a Frischling
attachment would be built in for the purpose of converting the
frequency and so trigger off the Neuling in the same manner. P/W
was not clear whether this would only apply to one frequency of
the Neuling, nor did he know what technical method would be used
to accomplish it.
63. Frischling was to be produced by Telefunken but was still
in course of development when the ear came to an end.

AIR-TO-AIR I.F.F.
64. For some reason as yet unexplained, the German interest in
air-to-air recognition only became great enough for suitable
equipment to be designed during the last stages of the war.
During the year preceding the termination of hostilities,
captured night fighter crews consistently maintained that
some improved form of I.F.F. which would allow recognition
of friendly aircraft was expected but no attempt appears to
have been made to adapt the FuGe 25A for this purpose.
65. The present P/W assert that so long as I.F.F. and airto-
air search operated on metric wavelengths and could not
be sharply beamed, the problem of air-to-air recognition
could only be half solved, as a range identification only
was obtained. It was realised that with a dense bomber
stream there would be so many aircraft comparatively near
to the fighter that recognition by range only was not very
valuable. Nevertheless the Neuling FuGe 226, which was
shortly to be introduced, was to have provided air-to-air
I.F.F. facilities.
66. In the beginning of 1945 the Germans tackled this
problem for centimetric search gear and proposed to depart
from their original principle of separating search and I.F.F.
interrogation. The search beam of centimetre equipment was to
be received by the Frischling attachment to the airborne
I.F.F. set and the centimetre frequency so converted that the
I.F.F. net was triggered off.

NEULING.
67. In the Neuling, which has been described above in
detail, it was planned to provide air-to-air I.F.F.
facilities by the use of a special switch which, when
depressed, reversed the roles of the receiver and responding
transmitter. The interrogating aircraft could then trigger
off the I.F.F. set of neighbouring aircraft and receive its
response on the receiver portion of the Neuling.
68. The response was to be fed through to the SN 2 or other
set in use and the presentation of this recognition signal
was to take the same form as in the Freya, i.e. a second
time base carrying the I.F.F. signal was to appear to one
side of the main time base.
69. During this operation no I.F.F. response could be made
to interrogating ground stations, and this caused some
apprehension. To discourage excessive use of air-to-air
interrogation, the switch in the aircraft was to be awkwardly
placed and inconvenient to operate – a typically German solution
to a problem of aircrew training.

FRISCHLING.
70. The night fighter search apparatus – the Berlin N.1.A.
and the Bremen 0 on 9 cm, and later probably the München on
3 cm were to go into service some time in 1945 as will be
discussed in a future report in this series.
71. To provide air-to-air I.F.F. facilities the
Frischling, mentioned in paras. 61-63 above, was to be
attached to the FuGe 25A and later built into the Neuling
as a modification. It was to convert the centimetric beam
transmission of air-to-air search apparatus to the
frequency of the Erstling FuGe 25A so that the latter was
triggered off directly by the searching beam.

FALTER WITH GÄNSEBRUST.
72. As early as 1940, experiments had been made with infrared
homing on to aircraft exhausts using an infra-red
telescope of the Bildwandler type called Spanner. This met
with only limited success on account of restricted range and
the dependency of infrared on clear weather conditions but the
idea was never completely dropped.
73. With the introduction of night fighter commentary and the
Verbandsflug tactics in 1944, it was required that night fighter
units should fly in groups and keep as close together as
possible.
74. It was, therefore, proposed to introduce an aid in the
shape of some form of infra-red navigation lights to be viewed
through an infra-red telescope. The latter, which was a form of
Spanner, was named Falter. As, however, the field of view of
this telescope was confined to about 15° it soon transpired
during trials at Werneuchen that it was not a practical
proposition.
75. In 1944 the idea of using infra-red for recognition
which had long lain dormant was once more evoked by the
discovery that British bombers were carrying en infra-red
recognition light. It was, therefore, proposed that German
night fighters should home on to the infra-red lights by means
of the Falter.
76. For mutual recognition between night fighters an infrared
lamp termed "Gänsebrust" was also planned. It was hoped that
Gänsebrust might not only allow recognition between German
aircraft but possibly afford some protection from British night
fighters which might become uncertain in their recognition of a
German night fighter if the Gänsebrust was flashed intermittently
even though the British code in use for the night were
not known.
A.D.I.(K)and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain
2nd August 1945"

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:16

THE BERLIN GERÄT
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 188/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

THE BERLIN GERÄT.
1. A recent German Army prisoner, a doctor of Physics of
Vienna University, had worked for fifteen months up to 23rd
October 1944 in the High frequency research laboratory of the
G.E.M.A. G.m.b.H. at Berlin and latterly at Wahlstatt, near
Liegnitz. During that period one of his tasks had been to
determine the characteristics of the transmission lobe from
the aerials of the Berlin Gerät.
2. The Berlin Gerät is a German development of the British
H2S, on a wavelength of 9.1 cm., but employs a totally
different aerial system developed by Siemens. Whilst P/W's
description of the apparatus given in the following
paragraphs, is considered to be reliable, he had no knowledge
of its eventual operational use.
3. Acknowledgements are due to A.D.I.(Science) for their
collaboration in the interrogation.

AERIAL SYSTEM
4. The sketch in the Appendix to this report gives an
impression of the Berlin aerial unit.
5. The four rods forming the aerial array are composed of a
plastic called Trollitul and are of circular cross-section
about 4 to 5 cm. in diameter at their base, tapering somewhat
to a rounded end. The rods lie parallel to the plane of a
circular metal plate of about 1 metre diameter, and about 15
cm, clear of it.
6. The energy to be radiated is led to the aerial rods by a
concentric feeder which forks into too branches where it
enters the metal plate and again fork; making 4 branches to
feed the four aerials. At each of the forks the concentric
feeder widens into a funnel shape called a transformer piece,
the sloping side of which is a half wavelength long, that is,
4,5 cm.
7. A Trollitul dome some 40 cm in depth covers the aerial
array and fits, flush to the edge of the circular metal plate.
8. The whole unit including the aerials can be made to
rotate. This prisoner had never seen the apparatus fitted
either to an aircraft or a ship and he did not know the speed
of rotation; he has an idea however, that the axis of rotation
was at an angle to the geometrical axis of the cylindrical
disc, so that in an aircraft the transmission beam would be
thrown slightly downwards or in a ship, upwards.

TRANSMISSION LOBE
9. The Berlin Gerät has a half-value lobe 10° in width in the
plane of the four aerial rods and 35° to 37° in width at
right-angles to the plane. The lobe was measured by the normal
method; the aerial unit, however, was not resting on a metal
surface as it would have done if built into an aircraft. Under
these conditions the lobe was symmetrical about the axis of
the Aerial array. P/W presumed that if the aerial system were
built under the fuselage of an aircraft shadow effects would
cause the lobe to be asymmetrical or to be deflected.
10. The experiments which P/W had conducted were in the open
air; he had found that when rain covered the Trollitul dome
with a layer of moisture, no transmissions could be detected,
even at a range of 20 metres, along the line of the axis of
the aerial rods. He thought that in these circumstances the
whole lobe was strongly deflected.

PRESENTATION.
11. This P/W had read the regular reports of the "Rotterdam
Sitzungen" - a special committee on centimetre radar - and one
of these reports contained a description of the Berlin
presentation, including photographs taken in an aircraft
flying over Kiel Bay.
12. From this report he could remember that the presentation
was on a circular screen; coast-lines of the mainland and of
islands showed as white ribbon-like stripes and towns appeared
as white areas, whilst individual ships in Kiel bay could be
seen as small elongated white blobs.
13. He had the impression that distant towns, although
slightly distorted in the picture, still retained their
approximate shape. He thought that in the photographs of the
presentation an area of about 60 km. in diameter was
represented; he did not know, however, at what height the
aircraft had flown.

RECEIVER MAGNETRON.
14. It was stated by P/W that a weak point of the Berlin
apparatus was the receiver valve, which frequently broke down.
This valve was a magnetron contained in a glass envelope, with
a solid metal anode in which four or six holes had been
drilled. An impression of the valve, which P/W believed was
called the MD2, appears in the sketch in Appendix I.

USES OF BERLIN GERÄT.
15. Apart from its use in giving a panorama of the ground
over which an aircraft was flying, P/W knew of no other air
uses of the apparatus. He understood, however, that the device
was to be installed in U-boats as an aircraft warning device.

A.D.I.(K) and
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. FELKIN
24 February 1945. Wing Commander"


Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:19

LUFTWAFFE ELECTRIC ALTIMETERS
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 362/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – III.

ELECTRIC ALTIMETERS
1. This report in the third of the series dealing with radio
and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. As in the case of the
previous two reports (A.D.I.(K) 343 and 357/1945), it is based
on interrogation of General Nachrichtenführer MARTINI,
Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and a few important
members of his staff, and has been supported by a number of
relevant documents of recent date which were in the possession
of the General’s Chief of Staff.
2. The development of electric altimeters was probably the
only field of G.A.F. airborne radar technique in which the
Germans approached Allied standards. The FuGe 101 had long
been standard equipment and was an entirely satisfactory
instrument apart from the fact that height readings were
limited to a maximum of 750 meters.
3. Efforts were being made to produce improved and, in
particular, more compact electric altimeters which would give
readings up to great heights, and it was hoped that the FuGe
104, described below, would meet all current requirements.

FuGe 101A.
4. This standard sensitive altimeter which had a range scale
of 0 – 150 meters or 0 – 750 meter, is already familiar. By
the end of the war it was only built into aircraft flying by
night and seems to have been used for checking heights in the
approach.

FuGe 102.
5. The FuGe 102 was an improved electric altimeter giving
height readings ranging from 100 to 15,000 meters. It was
developed at Oberpfaffenhofen in 1942. Presentation was in the
form of a circular trace on a C.R. tube with the zero mark in
the 12 o'clock position.
6. As the aircraft climbed, a break in the continuous trace
occurred extending in a clockwise direction from the zero
position, and this gave the height measurement. The end of the
gap was not clear cut and in consequence accuracy was poor.
The presentation unit was considered too bulky as it occupied
too much space in the Ju.88 and similar twin-engined aircraft.
Only a few were produced and used operationally, chiefly in
the F.W.200’s and He.177’s.

FuGe 103.
7. One P/W, who had made test flights at Werneuchen in the
spring of 1943 with the purpose of testing the FuGe 103, which
was known under the code name "Jena", considered it a most
successful and reliable instrument. It was designed and
developed by Zeiss for use in the He.177 and was tested under
the supervision of Stabs.Ing. Dr. KNOSKE. P/W understood that
it was part of the standard equipment of the series-produced
Ju.188’s.
8. The indicator dial of the instrument was calibrated from
0 – 4,000 meters in a clockwise direction. Height was
indicated by a fine blip about 1 cm long which appeared on the
circumference of the tube, the forward blip being taken for
the reading. The sharpness of the tip was such that height
could be read to within 25 metres, although the tube was only
calibrated to 50 metre intervals.
9. Heights over 4,000 and 8,000 metres were read on the
second and third evolution of the blip, but no "hour-hand" was
incorporated, so that the pilot could only distinguish between
say 5,000, 9,000 or 13,000 metres by using his common sens.
10. The FuGe 103 indicator unit, although only 10 - 12 cm in
diameter and about 35 cm long, was still too bulky and was
never used operationally on a large scale.
FuGe 104.
11. The FuGe 104 was a scaled-down model of the FuGe 103 and
went by the same code name "Jena" and had an identical type of
display. It was to supersede the FuGe 102 in all aircraft
equipped with the latter, as its accuracy and presentation
were as good as the FuGe 103 and better than the FuGe 102, and
it had the advantage of being smaller than either of them. It
was hoped that it could be the final type of altimeter.
12. In the Signals Equipment Emergency Program reproduced as
Appendix II to A.D.I. (K) 343 and 357/1945 it will be seen
that under the heading of "234, bombers" both the FuGe 102 and
the FuGe 104 are shown. P/W thought that in the table there
should either have been an arrow connecting these two sets to
indicate that the FuGe 104 was to replace the FuGe 102, or
alternatively that 102 was a misprint for FuGe 101A.

A.D.I.(K)and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain
27 July 1945
Distribution:- same as for report 357/1945"

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:27

EQUIPMENT OF A Y-SITE
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 527B/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

EQUIPMENT OF A Y-SITE.
1. The operational procedure in the control of fighters by
the "Y" procedure was described in A.D.I.(K) 525/1944. The
interrogation of the two G.A.F. signals officers, who supplied
the information for that report, has produced a large amount
of information on Y-site and airborne equipment which is of
rather more limited interest. The present report, which
contains that information, is therefore being given a limited
circulation.
2. Captured documents on the "Y" procedure have helped to add
further information, and have provided a further basis for
interrogation; these documents have been forwarded to
A.I.4.(b).

TRANSMITTER HUT.
3. Four types of "Y" ground transmitter are believed to be in
use. Y-Stations in Germany are said to be equipped with a
four-stage transmitter known as Berta I or Berta II, with an
output of 80/100 watts and a range of 400/500 kilometres, when
controlling aircraft at heights of 5,000/7,000 metres.
4. Another transmitter used in Germany is the S16B (Sender 16
Boden), which is a modification of the FuGe 16, and which has
a maximum range of 250 km. when used in conjunction with a
Rechlin range-measuring unit, or a range of 250/350 km. when
used with the more accurate Siemens range-measuring unit.
5. Y-Stations installed in France employed a Sadir 80/100
watt transmitter, usually also in conjunction with a Siemens
range-measuring unit; the ranges achieved by this combination
were of the order of 400/500 kilometres for aircraft operating
at heights of 5,000/7,000 metres.
6. The transmitter S16B (Sketch I) is operated in the
following sequence of steps:-
(i) Main switch (1) first to stop Hzg (Heizung = heating)
then after two minutes to stop "Ein" (on). Lamps
(2) and (3) light up.
(ii) Select frequency to be used. Switch (4). Frequency
indicated in Window (5).
(iii) Switch (6) to stop Test.
(iv) Knob (7) (blip intensity) turned until vertical line
appears on Cathode Ray tube (8).
(v) Definition of line re-adjusted by means of Knob (9).
(vi) In the meantime operator of range-measuring unit has
switched on "Geber" for production of "Messton"
(Modulation tone).
(vii) Knob (10) turned to right until the luminous area
produced in (3) corresponds to 80% modulation.
(viii) Transmitter now ready tuned for transmission to
commence. Switch (6) to right (Load).
(ix) Transmission is automatic when the switch for the
modulation note is depressed by the operator of
the range-measuring unit; or for R/T instruction
when key for R/T circuit is depressed by the
plotter.
7. When taking over a "Y" controlled aircraft from one
station to the next, the following procedure for tuning the
receiver and transmitter is carried out by the station taking
over when using a S16B transmitter.
8. As a first step the receiver of the range-measuring unit
is set to the transmitter frequency given for the aircraft.
The range measurer then tunes his receiver to maximum audible
strength of the modulation tone received ("Hörmaximum").
9. The 80% modulation image on Cathode ray tube (8) then
shows an additional bright vertical line within the area of
the image. By turning frequency stop (4) this vertical line is
displaced to the right.
10. The operator of the transmitter turns the frequency stop
(4) until the line reaches a limiting position, and on further
movement of stop (4) tends to re-trace its path to move again
to the left. This turning point ("Umkehrpunkt") corresponds to
the accurate setting of frequency stop (4), and provides a
visual method of tuning the transmitter accurately to the
receiver frequency of the "Y" aircraft.

D/F'ING CABIN.
11. The D/F'ing cabin consists of an octagonal wooden hut
erected on the platform of the receiver pylon; the latter are
of wooden construction and according to P/W, are either 15 m.
or 25 m. heigh, depending on the location of the site.
12. The present P/W were acquainted with two types of D/F
equipment, known respectively as "Heinrich I" and "Heinrich
III". The latter equipment is of recent origin, and was only
introduced to Y-Stations in France early in 1944.
"Heinrich I" D/F Equipment.
13. The aerial array of this equipment, illustrated in Sketch
II, consists of four quarter-wave vertical dipoles arranged in
pairs at the corners of one side of a horizontal frame about
four metres long. In each pair one dipole is mounted above and
one below the frame. Two half-wave reflectors are mounted on
the opposite corners of the frame. A single quarter-wave
dipole is mounted centrally, and is connected to the rangemeasuring
unit situated at the base of the receiver pylon.
14. The vertical axis of the aerial system can be rotated
about the control axis of the pylon by means of a hand-wheeled
drive operated from the interior of the cabin. The vertical
axis of the aerial is geared to a graduated disc, marked from
0° to 360° in a box placed centrally on the table of the D/F
cabin. Readings are made through a small window carrying a
hair line at the back.
15. To the left of the central box is a receiver E16P; this is
the normal receiver unit of the FuGe.16, from which the A.V.C.
(Regler) has been removed. To the right of the box is a
voltmeter.
16. The D/F operator, who is equipped with headphones, sits in
front of the box. The modulated note or "Messton" reaching the
receiver is audible in these headphones, and having
established the minimum position, the operator checks the
direction as follows.
17. The aerial is turned out of the minimum position by about
30°, and the reading of the output meter is noted. If, on
pressing a switch attached to the output meter, the voltage
falls, the direction in which the bearing has been taken is
correct. If, on pressing the button the voltage increases,
this indicates that the aerial has to be swung by 180° to get
the correct direction.
18. The readings should on the average be correct to within
0.5°, and for distances of under 100 km. to within 0.3°. This
reading is spoken aloud by the D/F operator, and is recorded
by a logbook-keeper (Betriebsbuchführer), who also repeats the
reading on a telephone connected to the range-measuring unit
and from there to the plotting room.
"Heinrich III" D/F Equipment.
19. The Heinrich III, also known as the "Umtastpeiler", is
referred to in documents issued by "Hochfrequenzforschung
Einsatzstab Holland" as having been developed at the "Flug
Funk Forschungsinstitut Oberpfaffenhofen".
20. The Heinrich III differs from the "Heinrich I" in several
respects. The aerial system consists of six quarter-wave
vertical dipoles, four of which are arranged in pairs at the
end of a single horizontal support about 4 metres in length.
The fifth dipole is mounted centrally above the D/F cabin, but
also forms part of the D/F aerial system.
21. The sixth quarter-wave dipole is placed vertically within
the structure of the receiver pylon midway between the D/F’ing
cabin at the top and the range-measuring room at the base, and
is connected to the range-measuring unit.
22. The aerial system rotates horizontally about the central
axis of the pylon, and the vertical axis of the aerial is
geared to the central box in the D/F’ing cabin as with the
Heinrich I.
23. The D/F receiver used is the El6EP, and this operates in
conjunction with an automatic device known to P/W as PUG
(Peilumtastgerät), also referred to in documents an ZVG 16 P
(Zielflugvorsatzgerät 16 P), and finally with a visual
indicator termed AFN 2 (Probably = Anzeiger Frequenzniedrig
2).
24. The PUG is connected to E16EP as well as to a plug
connection on the central box. The AFN 2 device has the
appearance of a mall box, measuring approximately
20 x 10 x 10 cms., connects to the same plug.
25. The dial on the side of the AFN 2 has a pointer which is
directed vertically downwards when the aerial is in the
minimum position. The correct direction is now established by
turning the aerial a few degrees out of the minimum position.
If the pointer deflects in the same direction in which the
degree graduations in the small window have moved, the bearing
has been taken in the correct direction. If the pointer moves
in the opposite direction to the movement of the degree
graduations, then the aerial must be swung by 180°.
26. According to P/W, this device allows the D/F operator to
fix the minimum position by visual means only, eliminating
errors duo to the human factor when aural methods are used.
Secondly, the device is automatic and does not require to be
switched on each time by the D/F operator.
"Heinrich II M" and "Heinrich II U" D/F Equipment.
27. Captured documents make mention of the Heinrich II M.
and II U; these versions were unknown to the present P/W, but
the II M is shown in a document, issued at Arnheim in May 1943
by Staaatsrat Dr. PLENDL, to utilise an aerial array with
three sets of quarter-wave dipoles and reflectors.
28. The II U, mentioned in another document from the same
source, and dated July 1943, is shown to be the forerunner of
the Heinrich III described above, and to embody the same
aerial array as the letter.

RANGE MEASURING CABIN.
29. The range-measuring cabin is situated at the base of the
receiver pylon, and houses a range-measuring unit. Two types
of units are in use, known as Rechlin and Siemens rangemeasuring
units respectively.

"Rechlin" Range-Measuring Unit.
30. The "Rechlin" unit (Sketch III) was designed by Dr. BECKER
of Rechlin, and constructed by a firm named Graetz. It is thus
sometimes referred to as the "Becker Gestell" or the "Graetz
Gestell".
31. The Rechlin, which is used principally on day fighter
"Y" control stations, gives reading accurate to 1 km.; it
measures the time required by the transmitted impulse to reach
the aircraft and return again to the receiver of the rangemeasuring
unit. This time is determined by means of an
invisible point which travels along the graduations of the
Cathode ray tube, and becomes visible at the moment when the
returning impulse reaches the range measuring unit.
32. The tuning and operation of the Rechlin range-measuring
unit are carried out ne follows:-
(i) Main switch (1) to ON. Dial lamp (2): lights up.
(ii) Knob (3) turned to left (Bright), an illuminated area
appears on the face of Cathode tube (4). This area
is usually off-centre and of irregular shape.
(iii) By adjustment of trimmer screws (5) the illuminated
area is moved to the centre of the tube and made
uniformly circular in outline.
(iv) By turning controls (6) the circular area is enlarged
until its circumference coincides with the scale
graduations on the edge of the Cathode ray tube
face.
(v) Knob (3) is turned to the right (Dim). The
illumination of the Cathode ray tube is now
extinguished.
(vi) By means of knob (7) the receiver in now set to the
transmitter frequency of the aircraft which is to be
controlled (that is at 1.9 Mc/s. less than ground
transmitter frequency). The frequency is given by
the plotter.
(vii) Switch (8) is now moved to down position for
transmission of the Modulation Note ("Messton").
(viii) Switch (9) controlling test transmitter is then moved
to the "On" position. This initiates transmissions
from the station transmitter on a frequency
automatically reduced by 1.9 Mc/s. The modulation
note ("Messton") is audible in the operators'
headphones. At the same time a point of light
appears on the graduations of the Cathode ray tube
(4) near the 13.7 km. graduation.
(ix) Fine tubing knob (10) is now turned until the sound
heard in the headphones is at maximum.
Simultaneously with this adjustment the light point
is seen to travel in a clockwise direction, reaching
a turning point from which it retraces its path.
This turning point coincides with the point of
maximum sound reception and provides a visual method
of tuning.
(x) Phase switch (11) is now moved until the light point
accurately coincides with graduation 13.7 km.
(xi) Finally knob (12) (Amplitude width) is used to adjust
the definition and intensity of the light point.
(xii) The range measuring operator can now either switch on
to the transmitter for continuous transmission by
means of switch (13) or select either an automatic
five or ten second transmission by means of switch
(14). The latter system has recently been
discontinued and on some Rechlin measuring units,
switch (14) and the clock above it are not fitted.
(xiii) To test R/T circuit the range-measuring operator
depresses knob (15). Dial lamp (16) lights up. The
operator must now hear his own conversation in his
headphones. Turn knob (17) to adjust for correct
audible strength. The R.M. unit is now tuned ready
for use.
(xiv) To go over to aircraft control, switch (9) (Test
transmitter) moved to OFF position.
(xv) If "Y" aircraft is being controlled then a light
point will appear on the graduation of the Cathode
ray tube. This gives the correct reading for the
last digit. If, for example, the light point
appeared on the 12 km. graduation, the digit "2"
only is noted. When coarse-control knob (18) is
pressed, the light point will spring forward by 10%
of the real distance of the "Y" aircraft. That is,
if the point advanced by 6.2 km., the correct
distance of the "Y" aircraft could be 62 km.
(xvi) The tuning transmitter referred to in (viii) forms
part of the range-measuring apparatus, and
superimposes its own transmission of 1.9 Mc/s. on to
that of the station transmitter. This results
automatically in a reduction of 1.9 Mc/s in the
frequency of the station transmitter.

"Siemens" Range-Measuring Unit.
33. The "Siemens" unit (Sketch IV) is found on "Y" control
stations controlling night fighters. It is said to permit
readings to an accuracy of 200/250 metres, allowing night
fighter aircraft lacking search gear to be directed close
enough to their target to obtain visuals.
34. The tuning and operation of this unit is effected as
follows:-
(i) Main switch (1) to "On" position. Dial lamp (2)
lights up.
(ii) Select frequency by means of knob (3). Instruct
operator of station transmitter to transmit (a
tuning transmitter is not incorporated in the
Siemens unit).
(iii) Switch (4) moved to "On" position.
(iv) Switch (5) to "On" position, modulation note now
being transmitted. Green dial lamp (6) lights up.
(v) Tune for maximum audible signal strength by means of
fine control knob (7).
(vi) Turn knobs (8) and (9) until an image appears in the
Cathode ray tube (10). Knob (8) controls light
intensity and knob (9) controls definition of
image.
(vii) Control (11) now turned until the shape of the
illuminated area in the Cathode ray tube is
approximately circular.
(viii) Using switch (12) (Wechselspannungs Diode) and
switch (13) (Wechselspannung Empfänger) the
approximately circular area now made fully
circular and adjusted to a diameter of 3/4 cm.
(ix) Control (11) now turned until the accurate reading
pointer (14) records 13.7 km. The circle on
Cathode ray tube (10) should now have become a
line approximately at an angle of 45° from left
bottom to right top of the face of the tube. If
the circle shrinks only to an ellipse, trimmer
knob (15) is used to reduce the ellipse to a line.
(x) Switch (17) now moved down to coarse reading
position. Turn knobs (18) (Intensity) and (19)
(Definition) until a sharp image appears in
Cathode ray tube (20).
(xi) The coarse reading pointer (22) is then moved to the
413 km. position by turning control (11). The
image in tube (20) should now be a line. If not,
adjust by means of trimmer screw (21).
(xii) This completes the tuning of the Siemens unit. "Y"
control can commence as soon as the receiver
frequency is lowered by 1.9 Mc/s. to bring the
receiver frequency in line with aircraft
transmission.
(xiii) To take over control of an aircraft the following
procedure is carried out:-
Switch (17) moved to bottom coarse setting
position. Control (11) turned until blip appearing
in left tube (20) forms a diagonal line. If switch
(17) now moved up into up (fine setting) position
the line disappears in left tube and reappears as
a flat ellipse in the right tube (10). On slightly
turning control (11) the ellipse is converted into
a line.
(xiv) Distances can now be read off. The coarse reading
scale is calibrated to read from 0 to 500 km. in 5
km. intervals. The fine reading scale has
calibration readings from 0 to 100 km., which are
divided, according to P/W, in 250 metre
graduations. A very skilled operator is said to be
able to estimate fairly accurately to 100/200
metres.
(xv) As the distance of the aircraft varies, control (11)
has to be used to maintain the blip in the form of
a thin line. After the first setting, the coarse
reading is only taken again at intervals.
(xvi) Adjustment of the fine control knob (7) of the
receiver unit as described under (v) also controls
the "steepness" of the line image in the Cathode
ray tube. The position of maximum steepness
coincides with maximum audible signal strength and
represents the turning point of the line image.
This provides a visual check for tuning correctly.
(xvii) The controls shown at the bottom of a Siemens unit
are not touched by the operator. They are set by
the makers of the instrument initially, using
Deutschlandsender transmissions. (According to one
captured document, a special transmission at 1040
hours daily by Deutschlandsender can be used for
this purpose). The controls are subsequently reset
by special test personnel.

AIRBORNE R/T EQUIPMENT.
35. The R/T set used in Y-controlled aircraft is a
modification of the FuGe 16-Z, in which the receiver unit of
the set is linked to the transmitter unit in such a way that
all signals received on the carrier frequency ("Gemeinschaftswelle")
are automatically re-transmitted on another lower
frequency ("Messwelle"), which is usually 1.9 Mc/s. below the
first.
36. The automatic re-transmission of all signals received
enables the aircraft to be plotted by bearing and range
measurement without any reference to the personnel of the
aircraft.
37. Two modifications of airborne FuGe 16-Z R/T sets are used
in the "Y" procedure.
FuGe 16-ZE.
38. The original modification of the FuGe 16-Z used for
Y-control was the FuGe 16-ZE, which incorporated the
"Zielfluggerät" (Z).
39. This set had the disadvantage that it caused a phase
displacement ("Eigenphasenverschiebung") equal to a reading of
13.7 km., which had to be allowed for in the calibration of
Siemen or Rechlin range-measuring units working in conjunction
with it.
FuGe 16-ZY.
40. In this modification of the FuGe 16-Z, the phase
displacement of the apparatus is eliminated. Hence, when using
Rechlin range-measuring unit, an attachment to this equipment
is used which has the effect of cancelling the calibration
allowance of 13.7 km., and causes the light point on the
Cathode ray tube to start all readings from the zero
graduation on the tube.
41. When the Siemens range-measuring unit is used in
conjunction with FuGe 16-ZY, a second pointer marked "Y" is
fitted in the former apparatus on the fine and coarse reading
dials, in addition to the existing pointer marked "E" on both
dials. The pointer marked "Y" added to the accurate reading
scale is set back (to the left) of the pointer marked "E" by a
number of scale graduations corresponding to the reading of
13.7 km. Therefore, when pointer "E" of the Siemens unit is on
the 13.7 km. mark, the pointer "Y" is opposite the zero
graduation. The additional coarse-reading pointer is similarly
set back to approximately the 413 km. graduation, so far as
P/W can remember.

A.D.I.(K) S. D. Felkin.
25 Sept. 1944. Wing Commander."




Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:35

G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 402/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR – I.

Organisation.
1. This report is the first of a series of ten comprising a study
of the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence Service from the time of its
inception onwards. Beginning with the broad principles and organisation,
this series will cover the early history, the monitoring of signals and
radar, countermeasures, cryptography, advance warning and route
tracking, and intelligence of callsign and frequency systems. In some
cases the various fronts in the war will be taken separately and dealt
with in greater detail.
2. The information has been obtained mainly from the
interrogation in England of senior staff officers of Abteilung 3,
General Nafü and of Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L.; further evidence from captured
O.K.L. documents has, however, been helpful in supporting these
interrogations.

FOREWORD.
3. One outstanding characteristic of the G.A.F. Signals
Intelligence Service as reflected in P/W statements and captured
documents is its constant improvisation and reorganisation to enable it
to cope firstly with continually expending and later with contracting
but more highly complex theatres of operations. This improvisation was
clearly the natural result of the progress of the war as a whole, and
had its origins in the Germans original calculations that their
Blitzkrieg methods would finish the war quickly; this basic concept of a
lightning war gave birth to a correspondingly short-term Signals
Intelligence organisation.
4. Up to 1940 emphasis was necessarily laid on the tactical
rather than the strategic side of the war, its external manifestation
being the preference given to R/T rather than W/T traffic. The
monitoring of W/T traffic hypothesises the existence of a large and
efficient cryptographic organisation, and despite creditable achieve -
ments by certain sections of the Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L. and the W-Stelle it
is clear that a completely satisfactory central crypto Organisation did
not exist.
5. As the war fronts expanded, the Signals Intelligence Service
tended to become decentralised, so that as much work as possible should
be done near the intercept stations. This of course demonstrated a
considerable degree of elasticity in organisation, but it is obvious
that it was forced on the Germans by sheer geographical necessity and by
the diversity of problems presented by such different enemies as the
Russians and the Western Allies.
6. The activity of the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence on the eastern
front most nearly approximated to the original German concept in so far
as Russian air activity was chiefly in support of the army, and the
Signals Intelligence was able to concentrate on R/T and D/F. Russian
radar was very elementary compared with the centimetre radar of the
Anglo—American allies, hence the chief problems on the eastern front
were those of distance rather than technical complexity.
7. By way of compensation for the inferior cryptographic results,
the degrees of efficiency achieved by the G.A.F. D/F service was
extraordinarily high, many of their best results being obtained by this
means. It is certain that a large proportion of their most valuable
long—term intelligence was obtained from D/F rather than cryptographic
results (cf. Part V). The one is admittedly an inferior substitute for
the other, but it is impossible to over-emphasise the contribution of
the G.A.F. D/F service to strategic intelligence.
8. It will be seen in Part II of this series of reports how the
origin of the German Signals Intelligence Service was due to an accident
occurring, shortly before the battle of Tannenberg in the last war, and
how it was developed in a desultory manner until the collapse in 1918.
But in 1924 a small party of civil servants did their best to salvage
what they could of the former Imperial Army's "Y" Service by studying
current cryptographic problems and evaluation methods.
9. When the G.A.F. was expanded in 1936, it was able to utilise
the signals intelligence and intercept experience gained by its Army
counterpart; the Army's tendency was, however, centrifugal, each theatre
of operations and major unit, such as Army Group, Army, Army Corps staff
and even Divisional staff having its own almost self-contained Signals
Intelligence unit. This army organisation was copied fairly faithfully
by the G.A.F., so that all major units of the G.A.F. had their own
Signals Intelligence organisation, the best-known of these in the first
phase of the war being the Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor Nr. 3 working with
Luftflotte 3.
10. It is almost a truism that Signals Intelligence has its
greatest value when a war is going badly and is of least importance when
all is going well. Thus Germany’s lightning successes were a great
handicap to the future development of its Signals Intelligence, for they
rendered almost superfluous the help which it could have given if duly
appreciated and developed. All that seemed necessary was to listen to
enemy R/T traffic while the German Army and the G.A.F. were hammering
their way forward, so that as late in 1942 Referat B found it very
difficult to induce certain intercept stations, to cover valuable but
not so productive W/T frequencies rather than very productive R/T
frequencies (cf. Part V).
11. Relations between intelligence sections and cryptographic
sections working together appear, according to several of the present
P/W, to have been none too cordial, as the former accused the latter of
not getting the results which they could have done with greater effort
and which they stated were not nearly as good as those achieved by the
army. The real reason was not the incompetence of the individual
cryptographers so much as the fact that they were not supplied with a
sufficient depth of W/T traffic and that the crypto service should have
been centralised; the output of a large centralised crypto service
exceeds the sum total of the contributions of its individuals members
and is higher in quality.
12. It is possible that this centralisation may have been achieved
had the war taken a different course, but when the protraction of the
war carried operations to widely separated fronts, the Signals
Intelligence Service, always closely connected with the operational
commands, began to be diffused. The first unit to move into remote parts
was III/Ln. Rgt. 5, with W-Leit 5 as a nucleus (later Ln. Abteilung 355)
started to operate with Luftflotte 5 at Oslo about the middle of May
1940, and continued to monitor both Anglo-American, and Russian traffic
and radar transmissions in that area until the end of the war. (cf. Part
I.)
13. The opening of the campaign on the eastern front in 1941 made
an expansion of the Signals Intelligence service in that theatre
absolutely necessary to cover the enormous front involved.
14. The front resolved itself into three major sectors - the
Leningrad, Moscow and Southern Sectors. These sectors coincided to a
certain extent with the static intercept stations of Insterburg
(later Kobbelbude), Glindow and Pulsnitz of 1936-1937 and the later I,
II and III Abteilungen respectively of Ln. Rgt. 353. On the southern
sector a considerable volume of information will be found in Part No.
VIII of this series. Very little information is available from P/W’s. on
the central and western Sectors.
15. The war in Italy developed into a war very much on its own
from the Signals Intelligences point of view, excepting from a technical
and equipment aspect, where information obtained in one theatre of
operations was of necessity of value to all theatres. Certain
cryptographic results, as for example the grid system mentioned in
Report V, obtained in this theatre was of value later on the Western
Front.
16. It must be clearly realised that the G.A.F. Signals
Intelligence Service did not resolve itself into a large number of small
self-contained units but that, just as the German armies were spread out
ever more thinly, the expansion of the war compelled the service to
become centrifugal and prevented it from achieving that degree of
centralisation and concentration which would undoubtedly have increased
its efficiency.
17. The technical ingenuity of the Western Allies and development
of radar on the western front continually presented new problems for the
G.A.F. Signals Intelligence, making the setting up of new specialised
units very necessary. As Germany's war situation deteriorated so it
naturally expanded its organisation to cover all forms of Allied radio
and, especially, radar activity. Thus arose the
Funkmessbeobachtungsdienst, which, although carrying out some of its
initial experiments in the East, concentrated on obtaining as much
intelligence as possible from radar transmissions in the West.
18. This side of G.A.F. Signals Intelligence continued to increase
in importance to the end of the war and, because of the tightening of
Allied R/T security especially, became equal in importance to radio
interception. In this respect it is interesting to notice how units of
the Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor No. 3 were gradually adapted to cope with
these new developments as Funkhorch Regiment West, and how eventually towards the end of the war a comprehensive organisation which included all fronts was set up, but much too late to be of real value (cf. Part VIII).
19. When in 1944 deep R.A.F. bomber penetrations into Germany
became possible, they were accompanied by a very complex system of
countermeasures and "spoof" attacks, very largely carried out by
100 Group. Thus the Signals Intelligence Service was further expanded by
the inclusion of specialist radar technicians. Specialisation became the
order of the day and each unit was allocated a specific function. Thus
Ln. Rgt. 351 became responsible for monitoring Allied air activity in
the West - except for heavy bombers, which became the primary task of
two specialist Abteilungen 356 and 357.
20. No aspect of Allied countermeasures was more important than
radar jamming, both passive and active (Window and noise modulation).
This became so important as a potential means of obtaining early warning
and route-tracking that a special Abteilung (359) was set up to deal
with it.
21. The channels of communication varied according to the type of
traffic involved. In the case of low-grade R/T or W/T tactical traffic,
as for example A.S.P. traffic, the work was often done entirely on the
fighter unit as in the case of the Horch Verbindungskommandos (= warning squads) described in Part V. As far as strategic bombing was concerned, a much more complicated system was necessary to coordinate the results of all forms of radio interception, radar observation and
countermeasures. Where the work was being done within the framework of the Signals regiments, results were passed from the intercept units to
the Meldekopf and thence to the competent fighter authorities, usually
the Zentrale Gefechtsauswertung of Jagdkorps I, and ultimately to the
Operations Staff via IC who co-related the results of signals
intelligence with other forms of intelligence (see A.D.I.(K) 394/1945).
22. Always bearing in mind the fact that the picture of the G.A.F.
Signals Intelligence Service was constantly changing in conformity with
the changing war situation, the Appendices to this report set out the
functions, locations and chains of command of the Regiments and
Abteilungen of the Service.
23. Appendix I shows the connection between the component parts of
the regiments and the referats of Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L., and the relations
on a higher level with the Army and Navy Signals Intelligence Services,
the Funkleitstand, the Leitstelle der Funkaufklärung and the G.A.F.
Operations Staff IC.
24. Appendix II illustrates the expansion of Signals Intelligence
in the West from its beginnings in Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor No. 3 in 1941
to the Funkhorch Regiment West in 1942, and then to its final form of
Ln. Rgt. 351 and Ln. Funkaufklärungs Abteilungen 356 and 357 in 1945.
25. The final form of the chain of command in 1945 is shown in
Appendix III. The radar observation service had by this time become so
important under Abteilung 3, General Nafü, that it had to be coordinated
in service matters along with the ordinary radio intelligence by a still
higher authority.

FUNCTION, LOCATION AND COMPOSITION OF UNITS.
Ln. Rgt. 351 (Formerly Funk Horch Rgt. West).
26. The germ or this Regiment lay in the Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor
No. 3 at Paris-St. Cloud in 1940/1941. Its function was to observe the
Allied Air Forces in the West, excepting for the heavy bombers, which
was done by Ln. Funkaufklärungs Abteilung 357 in co-operation with 356.
27. Its chief interest thus lay with the R.A.F. 2nd T.A.F. and
U.S. IX Air Force, whereas R.A.F. Bomber Command and the U.S. 8th Air
Force were dealt with by the specialist Abteilungen (356 and 357). To
all intents and purposes Ln. Rgt. 351 was responsible for monitoring the
combat areas, but it was not always possible in practice to avoid
overlapping on someone else’s territory, especially as work was often
duplicated by the Ln. Rgt. organisation and the evaluation sections of
the Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L.; Referat 5, for example, was housed at Limburg in
the same building as Ln. Rgt. 351. and was also employed in supplying
intelligence directly to the IC of the Operations Staff.
28. Ln. Rgt. 351 consisted of 3 Abteilungen - I/351 at
Limburg II/351 at Heidelberg and III/351 at Burg Schwalbach. I/351 was
composed of an evaluation Company (25/351) a W/T Company (26/351) a
Technical Company and a short-rang intercept company for picking up
A.S.P. traffic, etc. The second and third Abteilungen had 2 - 3 shortwave
reception companies.
29. The tactical R/T, W/T and Fu.M.B. messages were sent at once
either by landline, teleprinter or, where not available, by R/T to the
appropriate H.Q.s of the G.A.F., the Army and the Navy, as well as to
the Zentrale Gefechtsauswertung at Jagdkorps I. This was done by
Meldekopf at 25/351 (The origin of the Meldekopf is discussed in Part V
of the present series).
30. The organisation of Ln. Rgt. 352 (Italy and Yugoslavia),
353 (Eastern Front) and Ln. Rgt. 355 (Norway) will be dealt with
in special reports as they became special problems on their own with
less direct influence on the course of events in the West.
Ln. Abt. 356 (Formerly Funkaufklärungs Abteilung Reich).
31. Abteilung 356, with its H.Q. at Berlin-Wannsee, consisting of
five Kompanien - 1/356 at Wannsee, 2/356 at Hamburg for monitoring
approaches to the North-West and North, 3/356 and 5/351 at Stuttgart-
Böblingen for incursions to the South and 4/356 for watching the U.S.
Fifteenth Air Force. This Abteilung was a pure radar observation unit,
operating within the Reich. Its task was to monitor and evaluate Allied
airborne radar transmissions for the use of the Reich defence
authorities in route-tracking of raids. The individual outstations
transmitted the results of their observations to their Meldekopf for use
in the air situation picture.

Ln. Abteilung 357 (Formerly I/Ln. Fu. H. Rgt. West).
32. Abteilung 357, consisting of six Kompanien with H.Q. at
Heiligenstadt/Harz, was responsible for monitoring the Allied heavy
bomber formations and had to provide early-warning and route-tracking
data for use in the defence of the Reich. The results of observation by
this Abteilung were evaluated by Meldekopf I, who passed them on to the
central report centre at Jagdkorps I.

FINAL ORGANISATION.
33. In the final stages of the war the following radio
intelligence units were in operation:-
West.
(a) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 351 with three Abteilungen.
Task: Observation of Allied Air Forces in the West.
(b) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 357.
Task: Observation of the heavy bombers and route-tracking
in collaboration with Ln. Abt. 356.
Germany.
(a) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 356.
Task: Following routes of enemy formations over Germany
(cf. Ln. Abt. 357).
(b) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 359.
Task: Radar jamming in the West and in Germany.
(c) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 350. (with Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L. and
Funkleitstand Ob.d.L.
Task: Concentration and final evaluation of all radio
intelligence.
(d) Ln. Abt. 358.
Task: Training of replacement personnel for the radio
intelligence units.
South (Balkans and Italy).
Ln. Funkaufkl. Rgt. 352 with 3 Abteilungen (Major FEICHTIER).
Task: Observation of Allied Air Force in the
Mediterranean.

EAST.
Ln. Funkaufkl. Rgt. 353 with 3 Abteilungen (Oberst DICK).
Task: Observation of the Russian Air Force.
North (Norway)
Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 355.
Task: (a) Observation of the Allied air forces over
Norway.
(b) Observation of the Russian air force in Northern
Norway.
- - - - -
A.D.I.(K) and S. D. FELKIN.
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain.
25th October 1945"

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:48

General der Nachrichtenführer MARTINI
 
"A. D. I. (K) Report No. 334/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF
THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL
COMMUNICATIONS.

THE GAF SIGNALS ORGANISATION IN THE WAR.
1. This report results from the interrogation in England of
General der Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, the Director General of
G.A.F. signals from the time of the formation of the Luftwaffe
until the end of the war. A feature of this interrogation was
General MARTINI's rather surprising lack of detailed knowledge
of signals and radar equipment in use in the Luftwaffe, but
his knowledge on matters of broader policy of the signals
organisation was naturally considerable.
2. The gap in his detailed knowledge has to some extent been
filled by the chiefs of his subordinate formations, and it is
intended in due course to issue a further report dealing with
employment of radio and radar equipment. The present report
confines itself to the main events during the war as they
concerned the signals organisation, and shows that General
MARTINI himself was not free from the intrigues which beset
the whole of the General Staff.
3. The information has been divided into five parts, each of
which is, as far as possible, dealt with in historical
sequence; the parts are:-
1. Expansion of the G.A.F. Signals Organisation.
2. Navigational aids for G.A.F. bombers.
3. Defensive radar.
4. The success of Window.
5. Wireless intelligence and Signals developments.

I - EXPANSION OF G.A.F. SIGNALS ORGANISATION.
4. To meet the growing needs of the G.A.F., General MARTINI
developed the Signals Organisation from a small force with
about 300 active officers at the outset of the war, to an army
of about 350,000 of which 10,000 were officers and 100,000
women.
5. In the early autumn of 1940, GOERING, appreciating the
part played by G.A.F. signals, ordered the force to be
doubled. As Germany conquered fresh territories the Signals
Organisation had to be constantly expanded.
Early Campaigns.
6. General MARTINI was of the opinion that all the early
German campaigns were prepared with great speed. When the
German marched into Austria, he and General Feldmarschall von
REICHEMACH were at a radio conference in Cairo. Neither of
them had the slightest idea that Austria was to be invaded.
They were both informed at Cairo that German troops had
marched into Austria. Similarly, General MARTINI heard only at
the last minute that German troops were to invade
Czechoslovakia.
7. Some days before the Polish Campaign was opened, German
land-air exercises were being carried out on a large scale,
and the G.A.F., signals organisation was assuring interservice
communications, in particular between RICHTHOFEN's
Stukas and the Army. On the outbreak of war considerable
strain was put on G.A.F. Experimental Regiment KOETHEN at the
last minute, so as to ensure satisfactory communications for
the Stukas in Poland. The British declaration of war came as a
general surprise and created great uneasiness.
8. General MARTINI was emphatic in maintaining that he was
informed of the intention to invade Norway only six to eight
days in advance. He doubted whether HITLER had told more than
a very few people of his intentions beforehand and he asserted
that everybody appeared to be taken by surprise as
arrangements were kept "terribly secret".
9. As soon as General MARTINI was informed of the intended
campaign, he flew to his headquarters in Hamburg and selected
his best officers for organising communications. They worked
at high speed day and night for six days. The organisation
proved exceptionally difficult because all the details of the
plan had to be kept secret. It was decided that the Army Navy
and Luftwaffe would all work on the same frequency at the half
dozen points where landings were to be effected.
10. Every Ju.52 which the G.A.F. signals organisation could
lay its hands on was transformed into a signals aircraft, and
communications Trupps were also sent out on all the transport
ships. The success of the G.A.F. communications, the General
considered was largely due to the Ju.52 signals aircraft.
Invasion of Britain.
11. General MARTINI would not commit himself about the time
at which preparations were first made to invade England. Once
the Germans held the Channel ports a plan was evolved under
the cover-word "Seelöwe" by which barges were assembled in the
Channel Ports. The whole plan was so decentralised, however,
that the various departments knew only what directly concerned
them. For a long time General MARTINI had the impression that
the whole plan was a feint. He estimates that the General
Staff worked seriously on the invasion plan for two to three
months.
12. The plan comprised landings in two different places, but
he maintains that he was never told what these places were,
and he is not aware that any date was fixed for the invasion.
He is certain that if the date for the invasion was fixed and
the plan called off, then the High Command deliberately kept
up the fiction that it intended to invade England for months
after the whole thing had been shelved.
Russian Campaign.
13. Support was given to the above contention by the General
when he stated that he was informed at least six months ahead
of the High Command's plan to invade Russia. Since the Germans
wished to avoid fighting on two fronts, the plan to invade
England must have been postponed indefinitely at any rate
before 1941. When he was informed of the Russian invasion
plan, General MARTINI discussed his requirements at a
conference with HITLER.
14. This was one of the two or three occasions on which he
had personally to report to HITLER. He worked out a plan to
build six lines of communication advancing into Russia, each
manned by one signals regiment. This required a considerable
amount of material and transport. Generaloberst JESCHONNEK
appreciated that General MARTINI’s requirements were
justified, but the Army put up objections.
15. At the inter-service conference with HITLER which ensued,
General MARTINI stated his case. "How quickly will you be able
to construct your lines of communication?" HITLER asked him.
MARTINI replied "30 kilometres a day". HITLER interposed;
"That is far too little. Forty kilometres of railway will be
built per day!".
16. MARTINI said that by putting down one telegraph line
instead of two, he could assure the construction of more than
40 kilometres a day. HITLER then sanctioned all his
requirements, telling the other services not to under-estimate
the value of signals communications.
17. A unified method was adopted for signals construction in
the Russian advance; field cables were first laid, then
ordinary telegraph wires. Inter-service and fast communication
such as Met. reports were sent by wireless. The system of
G.A.F. Army Liaison officers used in Russia was modelled on
that worked out by the Germans in the Spanish war.
18. Telegraphic communications were as a rule reserved for
communications between O.K.L. and the Luftflotten, between the
Luftflotten and the Fliegerkorps, and between the Fliegerkorps
and Army Staff.
19. The German land lines were tapped by the Russians.
General MARTINI regretted that the Germans had never succeeded
in making a secure telephone scrambler. Ha said that towards
the end of the war a satisfactory apparatus was found in a
British or American aircraft. He had it tested and found it
good.
20. Land lines in Russia also suffered considerably from
partisan action. They were guarded every 30 to 50 kilometres
by posts of 8 to 12 men, but guard duties were particularly
difficult in forested country. When one line was cut,
communications were switched onto one of the other lines or
put over wireless links. Despite these difficulties, regular
communications were maintained throughout the campaign.

II – NAVIGATIONAL AIDS FOR BOMBERS.
Development of Bombing Beams.
21. At the beginning of the war the G.A.F. tended to neglect
its defensive organisation and concentrated on the offensive,
General MARTINI was not responsible for navigation as such,
but for high frequency radio as an aid to navigation. In 1933
he had calculated that with the navigational aids at his
disposal, mainly D/F and compass, he could obtain an accuracy
of only about 50 kilometres at is distance of 500 kilometres.
22. At the end of 1933, Dr. PLENDL, who had been introduced
to him by the Technisches Amt, told him that if the funds were
placed at his disposal he could in some years' time produce, a
navigational aid with an accuracy of 500 metres at a distance
of 500 kilometres, Feldmarschall MILCH placed the means at his
disposal. After several years PLENDL completed his apparatus,
and experiments were conducted on the X-System by Versuchs
Regiment KOETHEN with the bomber Gruppe which later became
K.G. 100.
23. The first operations of the war with mobile X-Stations
were on two bombing missions against a munitions factory in
Poland. The factory vas foolishly bombed at the same time by
ordinary bombers, so that the experts were unable to determine
whether or not the X-System was a success.
24. The campaign was over so quickly that no other
operational trials with X-beams on Poland could be made.
Knickebein Beams.
25. After the Polish campaign, Knickebein and X Stations were
constructed opposite the German-French frontier in preparation
for the Western offensive. Kampfgruppe 100 was by that time
thoroughly trained in the beam procedure, and many highly
specialised Signals officers had been incorporated in the
Gruppe as navigators.
26. The Norwegian campaign then took place, and Kampfgruppe
100 was thrown into it as an ordinary bomber unit. Most of the
crews were killed, and the Gruppe was wasted. The specialists
were scarcely required for the French campaign, but the Gruppe
had to be re-formed completely with lesser trained crews for
the attack on England.
27. The Knickebein system was used at the outset of the
attack on England. The apparatus on the Channel coast had been
hurriedly set up, however, and there were neither sufficient
technicians nor material to make conclusive tests. Dr. MODEL,
a former Reichspost official who died during the war, was
taken over by the wireless department of the signals
organisation and was chiefly responsible for developing
Knickebein in collaboration with the Technisches Amt and
Telefunken.
28. The crews using Knickebein soon reported that the beam
was being diverted, and that British fighters were being
vectored on to it. Several weeks were required to prove that
the beam was really being diverted. After some weeks,
experienced signals officers were sent out with the bombers
and reported that countermeasures had in effect been taken by
the British.

"X" and Benito Bomber Beams.
29. Dr. PLENDL invented both the "X" and "Y" (Benito)
systems. The "X" beams were developed under the signals
organisation at Köthen by Dr. KÜNHOLD with K.G.100 and General
- then Oberst - ASCHENBRENNER, an old and experienced pilot.
The Benito system, on the other hand, was perfected by Dr.
PLENDL at the Technisches Amt under Feldmarschall MILCH, and
General MARTINI had nothing to do with it.
30. It was intended to train a whole Geschwader to navigate
on the "X" system. After Kampfgruppe 100, acting as
pathfinders for large bomber forces, had been attacking towns
in Great Britain on the "X" system for a short time, however,
Dr. PLENDL wanted to try out Benito in practice, which he
regarded as the better system.
31. At that time Oberst ASCHENBRENNER's younger brother, who
was the Kommandeur of Kampfgruppe 100, was ordered to take
over III/K.G.26 which had been intended to fly also on "X".
Dr. KÜNHOLD always considered the "X" system better than the
Benito, and was annoyed with Dr. PLENDL for introducing and
pushing the Benito system.
32. P/W from III/K.G.26 stated in 1940 that the Benito system
was introduced prematurely because of the countermeasures
which the British had been taking against the "X" beam.
General MARTINI, however, maintains that the causes for the
early introduction of Benito were more complex. He said that
he had been responsible for putting into practice the use of
beams as navigational aids for bombers, and that he had
considerable difficulty in overcoming the objections of the
pilots and their commanders.
33. The pilots maintained that they could obtain better
results by finding the targets themselves, and those who were
obliged to follow the pathfinders felt that they were being
relegated to subsidiary tasks. They reported that K.G.100 had
bombed in the wrong place, and that they had found the right
target by themselves. Despite the good results obtained with
"X", anger against the system remained unabated.
34. The aim of operating two whole Geschwader on beams
against England was not achieved because of initial distrust
and British countermeasures and later because the bombers were
earmarked for the Russian campaign. The Benito system suffered
chiefly from British interference of the R/T.
35. General MARTINI himself realised from the outset that the
beams could be interfered with from Britain, and favoured the
introduction of several systems to make countermeasures more
difficult.
36. Thus, in the light of later experience, the Benito system
was introduced prematurely. The General points out that this
was only the beginning of the high frequency war, and they
lacked experience about the best measures for forestalling
countermeasures.
37. When KG.100 was achieving its successes, GOERING enquired
as to who was responsible for the "X" system. On hearing from
MARTINI during a long talk on navigational aids that PLENDL
had invented it, he said: "Then I shall promote him to
Staatsrat!" (State Councillor). GOERING could not understand
how the system had been jammed. MARTINI spent two hours trying
to explain the procedure of jamming and countermeasures.
GOERING asked a number of questions, but was afterwards
clearly none the wiser. He grew very angry, and accused
MARTINI of fiddling about with patchwork measures.
38. In reading the above statement it must be emphasised that
General MARTINI was sometimes confused in his memory between
the "X" and "Y" systems.

Mobile "X" Stations in Russia.
39. Kampfgruppe 100 later flew in Russia with mobile "X"
stations, which were set up with great speed.

Cyklop System.
40. Towards the end of 1943, the Knickebein system was
developed on a new basis with mobile stations under the cover
name CYKLOP. This system was used extensively by Fliegerkorps
IV, in Russia and was to have been set up on the Channel coast
for attacks on England, but the General was not sure whether
it was actually used.
41. Cyklop had a range of 300 to 350 kilometres as against
the 450 kilometres of Knickebein. It was developed by Dr.
KÜNHOLD at Köthen.

Hitler Demands a Demonstration of the "X" Beam.
42. About the summer of 1942, when General MARTINI was at his
headquarters in South Russia, he was suddenly ordered to fly
over to Hitler’s general headquarters near Kalinovka some 12
miles away. HITLER had heard that the Krupps works had been
hit in an attack at night throw ten-tenths cloud by R.A.F.
bombers flying with navigational aids. He could not believe
it, and said that there must have been a gap in the clouds;
GOERING was troubled, and General JESCHONNEK - his Chief of
Staff, who also had no faith in high frequency aids, was also
sceptical. So HITLER ordered them to call in MARTINI.
43. Asked by HITLER whether such accurate bombing was
possible on beams, MARTINI said it was. GOERING, who saw
trouble ahead for himself, interposed saying: "Yes, my Führer,
but we also have such systems."
44. HITLER asked MARTINI how the "X" system worked. In an
attempt to simplify the explanation, MARTINI spoke about
impulses and echoes. HITLER asked for more and more details,
calculating for himself everything that MARTINI explained. The
General thus found himself thoroughly involved and confused.
45. "Now I want to know", HITLER said with some impatience,
"if you were to attack Munich main railway station from
Leipzig on your system, whether you could hit it?" MARTINI,
taking good care not to commit himself too deeply, said; "I
should estimate that Munich is about 400 kilometres from
Leipzig. If that is correct, and if the station is 1,000
metres long by 300 wide, then I believe that some of the bombs
would hit the target."
46. HITLER replied: "I hope this is correct. I don't trust
high frequency. I went on a flight in South Germany, and ended
up in North Germany by mistake with your high frequency." He
reflected for a moment and said: "I order a demonstration to
be carried out with the "X" System in Germany, just as if it
were an operation, to show me whether these things really can
be done.
47. This was the last that MARTINI heard on the subject from
HITLER himself, but a long time afterwards he was rebuked by
GOERING for taking so long to prepare the demonstration;
preparations actually took about nine months.
48. At the time the "X" apparatus was undergoing trials for
improvements, and the aircrew who had used airborne apparatus
had to be replaced in the aircraft, the "X" stations set up in
the neighbourhood of Vienna, and new pilots trained. General
MARTINI did not know all details of the trials, since they
were put into the hands of Dr. PLENDL and the Air Officer for
Bombers who was also Inspector for Navigation.
49. The actual bombing demonstration flight was from Austria
to an unpopulated spot near Grafenwöhr in the neighbourhood of
Bayreuth, and was a success, but it cost enormous effort.

Disappointment over Erika.
50. Explaining why "Erika" stations had been built on the
Channel coast but had not been used, General MARTINI said that
the system proved far more difficult to perfect than had been
supposed.
51. Moreover it necessitated a large airborne apparatus, and
a very large ground installation, and this took years and
years. In the final stages an inaccuracy was observed which
had been previously overlooked.
52. There was besides the continual danger that it could be
easily jammed. "I worried a great deal over it", the General
said.
53. Professor von HANDEL, whose great passion it was, had
claimed that it would be more accurate than the "X" system. He
worked at it as feverishly as PLENDL worked on his "X" system.
54. The two men fell out and MARTINI went to great pains to
get them to work together, and finally succeeded. He hoped
that they would combine the "X" and "Erika systems, but this
never happened.

Sonne Beacons in Spain.
55. Talking of other air navigation systems, General MARTINI
said that besides using Sonne beacons themselves in Spain, the
Germans made over some Sonne apparatus to the Spaniards.

III - DEFENSIVE RADAR.
First Information on British Radar.
56. Discussing British and German ground radar, General
MARTINI said he was aware before the beginning of the war that
great radar stations had been put up on the coast of England,
and that they had very long range. It was known that the
impulses were 25, 50 and 1000, and that height measurements
could be obtained. It was not known whether the radar could
really determine the number of aircraft approaching.
57. Just before the war the Graf Zeppelin flew along the
coast of England during an experimental flight. The main
object of that flight was to test ultra-short wave receivers.
Incidentally it was thought that British radar stations might
be D/F'd. General MARTINI said he did not know exactly what
experiments were made during the flight, but he had heard that
the high frequency receivers were not satisfactory, and
results were uncertain.

First German Radar.
58. In General MARTINI’s opinion, the two men chiefly
responsible for the invention of radar in Germany were Dr.
RUNGE, of Telefunken, who worked on a 50 to 60 centimetre
wavelength, and Dr. SCHULTES, of GEMA, who worked chiefly with
80 centimetre and 2.4 metre waves.
59. Radar apparatus was first developed in Germany by the
Naval Experimental Institut and GEMA in 1936 or earlier.
General MARTINI was shown a Freya by the Navy, and saw that it
could achieve results over the sea. He hoped that the G.A.F.
would be successful with it over land and foresaw that it
could have a great feature in aircraft reporting, blind
landing and other spheres.
60. Just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia he had a Freya
placed in the Sudeten mountains. "I hoped", he said "that with
our Freya in the mountains we would be able to pick up
aircraft taking off in Czechoslovakia, but we failed to obtain
any results".
61. At about the same time the firm of Telefunken began
trials with Würzburg apparatus. They claimed that it could
pick up aircraft, but their demonstration failed.
62. The General said that he had ordered about 200 Freyas and
800 Würzburgs for the G.A.F. before the war, but he had
obtained only a small number by the time hostilities had
begun. A very few Freyas were set up on the North Sea coast
and these worked satisfactorily, being instrumental in causing
heavy R.A.F. losses over Heligoland in the bombing attacks in
1939.
63. Freyas were not used during the Norwegian campaign, but
were set up after the Luftwaffe had established itself on the
Norwegian coast. The signals organisation was obliged to hand
over all the Würzburgs intended for the aircraft reporting
system to the Flak arm, because the radar apparatus brought
out by Lorenz which was used for Flak aiming had proved a
failure.

Fighter Control.
64. From the reports of his Signals Intelligence Service, the
General concluded that the R.A.F. aircraft reporting system
and radar were used principally to aid the ground control of
fighters. For a long time the Luftwaffe was unable to organise
ground control of day fighters, because of the opposition of
most of the pilots, who insisted on free-lance fighting.
65. The change was introduced very slowly and was influenced
by the discovery by the German Signals Intelligence Service
that the R.A.F. was using Pip-Squeak. The Pip-Squeak aircraft
apparatus was later captured. The procedure seemed a good idea
to the German pilots, who wanted a Pip-Squeak of their own,
and began to realise the advantages of fighter control.
66. Actually, German industry had for a long time been
working on a similar apparatus, but failed to bring out a
satisfactory one. Later the Pip-Squeak apparatus was copied by
the Germans, but it was never used operationally.
67. The organisation of radar for fighter defence suffered
both before and during the war from inter-departmental
difficulties and intrigue.
68. The main reason why radar was not developed earlier for
ground control of fighters, General MARTINI said, was that
until the summer of 1941 the Luftwaffe concentrated on
offensive tactics to the neglect of fighter defence. The
decision to subordinate aircraft reporting and radar to
fighter ground control was reached at a stormy conference in
Russia in the early stages of the campaign. MOELDERS and
GALLAND insisted that the only way to improve fighter
interception and cut down losses was to introduce satisfactory
ground control.

Research, Industry and Intrigue.
69. General MARTINI had a constant struggle to obtain the
technical improvements necessary for carrying on the high
frequency war. Except for a period of less than a year, during
which he was given special responsibilities by GOERING,
General MARTINI had no authority to make demands either from
the scientists or from the industrialists.
70. Until 1937 he and his subordinates had been allowed to
keep in close contact with the wireless industry, and to state
their requirements, but merely for information. After that
time Feldmarschall MILCH strictly forbade these contacts, and
ordered that requests and enquiries should be made by the
signals organisation through the Technisches Amt, of which he
was head. Feldmarschall MILCH knew just as little about high
frequency matters as GOERING.
71. MILCH issued his veto during a scandal in 1937 over the
sale of the FUGe.7 to Switzerland, in connection with which a
number of prominent scientists at Telefunken were arrested.
P/W had the feeling that the scandal was worked up to prevent
free collaboration between industry and the services, and to
place the big firms under the supervision of the Technisches
Amt.
72. Relations between MARTINI and MILCH were strained for
years, even if the two men were outwardly polite to each
other. MILCH was a great opponent of the General Staff, and
particularly of the Tactical Führungsstab. He attempted to
have the whole signals organisation placed under his command,
but MARTINI resisted this strongly.
73. Thwarted in his empire-building, MILCH carried on an
underground war against the signals organisation. On one
occasion, in the presence of MARTINI, he said to GOERING: "It
is a great crime that this signals organisation has been set
up!" MILCH tried to prevent Luftwaffe officers from working
in the Technisches Amt, and made liaison with MARTINI
extremely difficult. For a time MARTINI had a representative
at the Technisches Amt but he requested to be posted back to
the signals organisation, saying that it had room only for
engineers and not for officers.
74. MARTINI had engineers in his Experimental Regiment, the
L.N. Versuchsregiment at Koethen, working together with the
officers, but the engineers in the Technisches Amt refused to
co-operate with them. When the Versuchsregiment brought out
something new and stated its requirements, the Technisches Amt
engineers said that their work was all wrong.
75. Even during the time that UDET was head of the
Technisches Amt, MILCH in P/W’s opinion, really held the reins
because of his position as GOERING's representative.
76. Feldmarschall MILCH made a point of co-operating with the
signals organisation from the summer of 1941 for about nine
months, during which MARTINI had GOERING's backing. Because of
MILCH's opposition, MARTINI was still given no authority over
the scientists or the industrialists, but he was given special
powers to hold conferences with them, and with representatives
of the Technisches Amt.
77. He had GOERING's authority to discuss his requirements in
the utmost detail. When agreement had been reached on which
developments could be carried out by the industry, the General
had to make written requests to the Technisches Amt to put
through the required orders. Thanks to GOERING's backing,
MARTINI was able to force the Technisches Amt to place these
orders.

Role of the Versuchsregiment.
78. The Versuchsregiment had the task of conducting
experiments with signals apparatus, and stating the technical
or tactical requirements of the Luftwaffe with regard to it.
Their reports went to the Technisches Amt. When the apparatus
was delivered to the signals organisations the
Versuchsregiment carried out operational tests with it and
often made improvements.
79. The Versuchsregiment Koethen acted as a fillip to the
wireless industry, sometimes producing new apparatus which the
industrialists were unable to manufacture.
80. For example, the height measuring attachments on the Freya
were built and produced by Koethen. Whenever work of this
nature was handed over to Koethen, MARTINI had to obtain the
sanction of the Technisches Amt. Despite the rivalry with the
Versuchsregiment, this sanction would be given. Feldmarschall
MILCH once or twice indicated that Koethen should be directly
subordinated to him, but never pursued the matter.
81. General MARTINI described Dr. KÜNHOLD, the Technical
Chief of the Versuchsregiment, as exceptionally able and at
the same time very modest scientist. He was responsible for
all the technical work done at Koethen. Oberst LÖWE,
Kommandeur of the Regiment, was responsible for administration
and discipline. He was also a good technician. He had formerly
been a Captain in the Signals section of the Landes Polizei
and had been taken into the Luftwaffe signals organisation in
1934.
82. The work of the Versuchsregiment at Koethen embraced all
branches of the signals organisation; its work on radar was in
practice restricted to ground apparatus.
83. The experimental station at Werneuchen restricted its
research to radar and concentrated on airborne apparatus.
Whereas Koethen, under the signals organisation, trained the
experimental detachments which were incorporated in the
signals regiments, Werneuchen was restricted to engineers and
was subordinated to the Technisches Amt.
84. Oberstleutnant HENTZ, at the end of the war head of
General MARTINI's Radar Section, the VI Abteilung, was
formerly Kommandeur of Werneuchen responsible for its growth.
85. Co-operation between Werneuchen and the signals
organisation was always better than that of the Technisches
Ant itself with the signals organisation.
Industry's need of Technicians.
86. At the end of 1941, it became obvious that the wireless
industry did not have a sufficient number of technicians to
carry out the requirements of the signals organisation.
87. Realising the danger of defeat in the high frequency war,
MARTINI offered the industry up to 15,000 technicians from his
Signals Regiment. He started by having 7000 to 8000 men
transferred to industry, and then persuaded GOERING to
transfer back to the industry and research organisations about
15,000 technicians from both the Army and Luftwaffe.
88. While the transfers were being carried out, the manpower
crisis occurred on the Russian front and the process was
reversed. Thus the best experienced technicians were being
sent from industry to the Russian front, while less capable
men were coming home and required at least a year to be
trained.

Countering of Allied Countermeasures.
89. The very nature of the high frequency war with
countermeasures, measures to overcome countermeasures and
constant changes in the apparatus, led to demands from the
wireless industry which it could not meet. Thus the
Versuchsregiment was frequently called upon by MARTINI to make
the alterations itself.
90. For instance, when Freyas were manufactured with only one
wavelength, MARTINI told the industrialists that it would be
useless without a wave band. The industrialists replied that
such a change would be colossal work which would require a
very long time. "At any rate", MARTINI interposed, "bring out
the next series of Freyas with two wavelengths, the one after
with three, and gradually get a reasonable frequency band".
The industrialists made objections, saying that the work was
too fiddling.
91. MARTINI then ordered the Versuchsregiment to make the
required modifications in the Freyas. Thus, despite British
jamming from high-powered transmitters, the Versuchsregiment
modified a sufficient number of Freyas for some to operate
without being jammed.
92. Gradually all the Freyas were modified at Koethen under
the covername "Voll-Wismar" and the wireless industry finally
produced Freyas with an adequate frequency band.
93. Similar difficulties were experienced with FuG.16. The
signals organisation asked the Technisches Amt for the
apparatus to be constructed with 100 two-way channels, but
through a misunderstanding it was produced with 100 one-way
channels.
94. In the ensuing discussions, the industrialists considered
that they would not be able to produce the apparatus with the
required frequency band for about two years.

FuG.25 and 25A.
95. The failure to organise the mass production of the German
I.F.F., the FuG.25A, at an early date was attributed by the
General to the weakness of his position in relation to the
Technisches Amt. He was first shown the apparatus, which had
been constructed by Dr. SCHULTHES, in September or October
1939. He was delighted with it and requested the production of
two or three thousand.
96. These unfortunately were not produced, the General said,
because too many people had a say in the matter. "Shortly
afterwards a high official at the Technisches Amt told me
quite by chance that 30,000 FuG.25 were already in production.
That was terrible; it was my greatest worry. But
Reichsmarschall GOERING said to me "It is the easiest problem
of all and you haven't even solved that for me!"
Switching on of I.F.F.
97. The General had heard the explanation from British bomber
pilots that they kept their I.F.F. switched on to dowse
searchlights, but he did not believe it.
98. He thought that there must have been some important
reason this procedure which allowed the Germans to pick up the
approach of R.A.F. bombers. He asked whether it was maintained
with the object of eventually being of use to night fighter
escort aircraft. He pointed out that it was of exceedingly
great value to the Germans.

The Panorama Apparatus.
99. About September 1942, somebody, whose name MARTINI never
discovered, told GOERING that the signals organisation had
neglected to develop the Panorama search apparatus. GOERING in
a fit of temper told MARTINI that he had sabotaged the
Panorama apparatus and MARTINI retorted sharply. That same day
GOERING appointed Oberst KNEEMEYER as his Wireless and
Navigation Officer, and put an end to MARTINI’s special
functions in high frequency developments.
100. MARTINI continued to hold conferences with the
scientists and industrialists on behalf of the Chief of the
General Staff, but without GOERING’s authority he laboured
under great difficulties.
101. The production of a German Panorama apparatus was
delayed largely because at the beginning of the war tests were
unsuccessful, and afterwards the wireless industry neglected
it to try and satisfy other demands regarded as more urgent.
The first Panorama, which was put up to the West of Berlin,
could not be made to work and its development was shelved.
102. At the beginning of 1943, General MARTINI insisted that
he should be shown what the apparatus was worth. He was told
that the apparatus, which worked on one of the Freya
frequencies, had not yet been perfected. He sent two members
of his staff to try and overcome the technical difficulties
and three months later he was asked to inspect the apparatus
as it was at last working. He spent two hours looking at it,
but the demonstration failed.
103. A second prototype, which worked on decimetre waves, was
burnt out just after being completed.
Centimetre Wave Research.
104. The failure to develop radar on centimetre waves was
due, General MARTINI said, partly to Feldmarschall MILCH’s
lack of understanding of the problem, and partly because the
wireless industry could not cope. He himself had demanded in
1937 that research should be carried out on centimetre waves.
105. Staatsrat ESAU made experiments with ultra-short waves
at first with a milliwatt, which he later increased to a watt.
The scientist said that it was not his business, but that of
the industrialists to continue the work with higher power. The
industry, however, had too many other orders on hand, and
Feldmarschall MILCH, who could have put the research in the
hands of the Technische Amt, did not realise the implications
of the high frequency war.
106. In the summer of 1942, GOERING suddenly decided to
replace Dr. ESAU by Dr. PLENDL, whom he promoted to the rank
of Oberst Ingenieur, saying: "I appoint you chief of all high
frequency research in Germany". Dr. ESAU complained to General
MARTINI of being cold shouldered, but the General had not even
been informed of GOERING's decision beforehand.
107. General MARTINI made about 60 closely inter-connected
requests for research on high frequency matters to Dr. PLENDL.
He said that PLENDL's work as Chief of high frequency
investigations was somewhat disappointing, and criticised him
for spending too much time on organising, to the neglect of
research. He did not put the same energy into this work as he
had done in the development of the "X" and "Y" systems.
However, the General did not agree with those critics who
accused Dr. PLENDL of combatting the protagonists of the Egon
system.
108. In 1944 GOERING became dissatisfied with PLENDL, and
reinstated ESAU in his place. The old collaboration between
ESAU and MARTINI was then resumed.

The Egon System.
109. Dr. SCHULTHES, who first worked with GEMA for the Navy
and later with Siemens, had reported early on that the Egon
system promised great possibilities. At one of the General's
conferences in 1941, he said that exact location up to 350
kilometres could be attained with Egon, but could not give a
date for the perfection of the system. Nevertheless those
scientists who were opposed to Dr. PLENDL advocated the
immediate scrapping of the Benito fighter control system and
the introduction of Egon.
110. MARTINI intervened, stating: "The problem is not so
simple. We have built up the whole organisation for the Benito
system which has definite advantages; it can be used not only
for bombers but for fighters with very good results. We must
develop Egon with all possible speed, but before it is ready
to be used operationally it would be madness to do away with
Benito. We must have both systems operating at the same time".
111. In General MARTINI's view, time has justified his point
of view. The Benito system had proved itself thoroughly
efficient for fighter control, and in the later stages of the
war those controllers who used both systems were glad to check
up one on the other. With the small fighter force to which the
Luftwaffe was reduced, a small error in ground control was
fatal.

Capture of the British "Gee" Apparatus.
112. GOERING, who was in the habit of cursing the signals
organisation, was particularly vehement when he heard that a
British bomber had been captured with a fine apparatus on
board which was an improvement on anything brought out in
Germany. This was the "Gee" apparatus which the Germans named
Hyperbel.
113. General MARTINI said that he learned a long time
afterwards that the firm of Telefunken had actually worked out
a similar system to "Gee" on long waves in 1939. Telefunken
which had given the apparatus the cover name "Ingolstadt", had
proposed developing it, but the Technisches Amt had turned it
down because of an order previously issued forbidding work on
any developments which could not be completed by the end of
1940.
114. The "Gee" apparatus was handed over to Koethen for
examination and copies. The reason why Gee" was not jammed
earlier, the General thought, was because of the German lack
of ultra-short wave transmitters. It required a good nine
months to construct apparatus, once the prototype had been
completed. For a time, he said, the Germans considered that
they were successful in jamming both "Gee" and "Oboe", but
when these systems were used by the Allies with many
wavelengths, the only answer was to build up a great system of
jamming throughout Germany. This system was never completed.
Jamming – The Feldberg Project.
115. The General recalled an attempt in 1945 to jam Allied
airborne radar which ended in disaster. The first new highpowered
German ground jamming plant, which was manufactured
with great difficulty because of Allied bombing attacks, was
finally all assembled inside a tower on the Feldberg with the
object of jamming all wavelengths from the one place.
116. The work was carried out by the Reichspost "just as it
were peacetime" without a thought to passible consequences of
bombing. No sooner had all the apparatus been completed than
the tower was destroyed by a fighter bomber attack. The case
was brought before a court-martial.

H2S Countermeasures.
117. The Germans were not successful in their ground
countermeasures against H2S, because they were unable to get
such apparatus as they had captured intact to work properly.
The apparatus was technically in order, but despite repeated
trials the navigators were unable to achieve results with it.
Results were finally with a F.W.200 which was fitted with both
the H2S and the "Berlin". When flying over the Mark
Brandenburg in the spring of 1944, the aircraft crashed for
some unknown reason.

"Berlin" for Night Fighting.
118. It would have taken a long time, the General said,
before "Berlin" could have been put into operational use for
bombing on the same lines as H2S for which it was originally
constructed. As the Germans were not carrying out bombing
raids it was no longer important. It was therefor proposed to
adapt the "Berlin" for night fighting, and as such it would
have been used operationally within a comparatively short
while.
119. The Germans had great difficulty towards the end of the
war in constructing airborne apparatus such as "Berlin" small
enough to fit into their aircraft. They had scarcely any fourengined
aircraft, and the Ju.88 was not roomy enough. In the
final stages the wireless industry had to concentrate on
apparatus sufficiently small to fit into the Me.262.

Me.262 Radar.
120. No Me.262 had flown operationally with radar, but a few
successful trial flights had been carried out, using Neptun
apparatus which was small to go into the aircraft without
being unwieldy.
121. The type used was the forward-looking Neptun. The test
aircraft crashed and the observer was killed, but the pilot
reported that good blips had been obtained.

Me.163.
122. No attempt had been made to operate the Me.163 with
ground control.

Kammhuber’s Night Fighter Belt.
123. Speaking of the development of German night fighter
defences, General MARTINI said that General KAMMHUBER did not
at first appreciate the value of radar. Before the latter had
taken over the night fighter defences, he had distinguished
himself as a good blind flying pilot, but he had no technical
knowledge of radar. For that reason he organised the wellknown
searchlight belt defending the western approaches to the
Reich.
124. About two and a half months after KAMMHUBER had begun to
work on the night fighter belt, MARTINI sent him six reporting
companies which were then equipped with Würzburgs, because
MARTINI considered that this would be the best way of
organising night fighter defences.
125. The reason why the night fighter defence sectors were
worked out in a perfect pattern was that KAMMHUBER, being a
keen organiser, considered that he would benefit by their
being all exactly alike.
126. Asked why KAMMHUBER did not organise his night fighter
belt to rely on Würzburgs from the outset, General MARTINI
said that he himself had not been consulted when the work
began. GOERING had ordered KAMMHUBER to organise night
fighting, without referring him to MARTINI. KAMMHUBER did not
even know what to do with the aircraft reporting companies
which MARTINI sent him; however, he studied the whole question
of high frequency with much vigour, and soon reorganised the
night fighter defences to depend on ground radar.
127. The reason why so many radars were put up on the
Kammhuber belt was that the Germans at that time were using
the old Würzburgs which could obtain satisfactory results only
up to a radius of 35 kilometres. When the Würzburg Riesen were
introduced, General KAMMHUBER kept the other Würzburgs for a
time so as to maintain the pattern of his organisation
throughout the night fighter belt.
128. KAMMHUBER preferred the Seeburg Tisch method of plotting
to the Freya-AN system, because he said that the former method
of control could be understood by all but the latter could be
managed successfully only by special gifted officers. MARTINI
was disappointed because he considered that there were enough
capable young officers in his organisation to have worked with
the Freya-AN.

The Removal of Kammhuber.
129. The General said that he did not know exactly why
KAMMHUBER was removed to Luftflotte 5. In his own words, taken
from shorthand notes during interrogation: "It was a sudden
decision of the Reichsmarschall and I imagine that he must
have reached it after one of the officers had told him
something or other. It happened during a big conference at
Deelen during which the Reichsmarschall attacked me sharply
because he was determined not to understand why I wanted to
maintain the visual and oral aircraft reporting system as well
as the radar organisation. I explained that it was important
to know what types of aircraft were approaching when there
were low-flying attacks. He would have nothing of it and was
in a very bad temper.
130. "The next day he took General KAMMHUBER aside, and then
came back saying that he was to be A.O.C.-in-C. of the
Luftflotte in Norway. Possibly the reason for this was that
the night fighters were not gaining so many victories.
Outwardly the new post meant a great promotion, for he was a
young officer, and as A.O.C.-in-C. he attained the rank of a
General-Feldmarschall.
131. "I did not ask him what he personally thought about it.
Perhaps he had expected to control all the fighter forces in
Germany, and to have become an A.O.C.-in-C. like that.
132. "The change took place at the time of the appointment of
a new General Staff. I was to have been thrown out also. They
wanted to divide up my work, and I had made it a hard and fast
rule that my organisation must not be split up, whatever
happened. I had to insist on this several times, and each time
said that if the organisation were split up, I should ask for
another post. Finally on that occasion too, it was decided
that I should.....
133. The Reichsmarschall did not understand the principles of
night fighting, but discussed them a great deal with General
KAMMHUBER just as he did with me. When I held a different
opinion, I told him so quite openly. For a long time he
listened to me, and then one day he refused to listen to me at
all. It was roughly the same with General KAMMHUBER. He too
used to state his opinion openly".

IV - SUCCESS OF WINDOW.
Not a Surprise.
134. The dropping of Window by Bomber Command over Hamburg in
the summer of 1943 did not come as a complete surprise to the
German signals organisation. For about a year engineers at the
Technisches Amt had studied the question. The scientists had a
suspicion of the danger to German defensive radar but said
nothing because they did not wish to bring them-selves into
disrepute.
135. Six months before the Hamburg raid their experiments had
proved conclusively what a menace the metal strips
represented. The information was passed to MARTINI, who handed
GOERING a two-page report on the subject, pointing out what a
terrible danger they might be. GOERING was so upset that he
ordered MARTINI to destroy the document at once, and take the
utmost precautions to prevent the enemy from learning of the
discovery.
136. "It was thus extremely difficult", the General said, "to
work out countermeasures because we dared not experiment with
the little beasts for fear of their being discovered. Had the
wind blown when we dropped the metal strips, people would have
picked then up, talked about them, and the secret would have
been betrayed".
137. When the Hamburg raid came there was great excitement
because the signals organisation had not discovered any
countermeasures. GOERING blamed MARTINI again, saying: "The
British have now gone and used the metal strips, so they have
surely got countermeasures against them and you haven't!"

Window Countermeasures.
138. A few days after the Hamburg raid, two scientists
independently worked out countermeasures to Window and the
result was the Würzlaus attachment to the Würzburg and the
Freyalaus attachment to the Freya. When considerable
quantities of Window were dropped, the Würzlaus was swamped,
however, but the Freyalaus still gave results. Finally a
combination of the two, the "K-Laus", was tried out but was
found difficult to handle.
139. The General admitted that no really satisfactory answer
to Window had been found, and doubted whether there could be
one if the strips were dropped in sufficient quantities and
places. The Flak batteries never succeeded in using their own
radar instruments when the Allied air force used sufficient
Window or Chaff, but the aircraft reporting system was at
least able to provide them with rough data on height end
direction.
140. With Koethen Grau apparatus they managed for some months
to get a rough picture despite Window. German night fighters
were on the whole not too much affected by Window and at first
it frequently even gave them a rough idea of where to find the
bomber stream. Their task was then complicated by the
countermeasures of 100 Group, R.A.F. Bomber Command, which
General MARTINI described as outstandingly good.
141. Explaining the lines on which the Germans developed
their radar defences, General MARTINI said that in order to
obtain as early a warning as possible. They built bigger and
bigger apparatus, as the range of the Allied bombers
increased. The Germans thus gradually increased their warning
range from 100 kilometres with the Freya to 300 kilometres
with the Wassermann, the Mammut and the Elefant. The danger of
jamming and bombing was fully realised but the Germans were
glad to have the latter types of apparatus when the British
introduced Window and airborne jamming,
142. Elefant proved particularly useful as it was not jammed
for a long time. Results with Klein-Heidelberg were also good
General MARTINI believed that the apparatus had been invented
by Oberpostrat SCHOLZ, who had the chief merit for jamming
British radar when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau passed
through the Channel. The General attributed the success of
this operation to the fact that it was started with very
slight jamming which was gradually and almost imperceptibly
increased until it became effective.

Wilde Sau Night-Fighting.
143. The fact that the Germans began to develop Wilde Sau
free-lance night fighting at the very time that the R.A.F.
introduced Window was largely fortuitous. Oberst HERRMANN was
mainly responsible. He said that the night fighter had to take
risks in German Flak areas and shoot down bombers caught by
the searchlights or in the glow of the blazing target. He said
he was quite prepared to do free-lance night fighting of this
nature himself, and did so.
144. GOERING, seeing that far fewer bombers were being shot
down because of Window, encouraged the younger night fighters
to go up over the targets and fight.

V - SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND SIGNALS DEVELOPMENTS.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.
Work of the Intercept Service.
145. The German Signals Intelligence Service (Luft
Aufklärungs Dienst) was under the operational command of
Oberstleutnant FRIEDRICH, who was subordinate to MARTINI
through Oberst MORGENSTERN; the officer responsible for
discipline and administration of the service was Generalmajor
KLEMME. Coverage of Allied signals was determined by the
Intelligence of the Luftflotten in which the signals units
operated.
146. GOERING himself was interested in the service and
occasionally gave personal orders for some particular activity
to be covered.
l47. Results from the German Signals Intelligence had,
according to General MARTINI, given high satisfaction to
everyone until the last phase of the war, when the service, no
longer able to cope with the enormous number of Allied raids
or to keep track of the continually changing basings of Allied
aircraft, also came in for its share of GOERING's displeasure.
148. Up to this point it had never failed to provide, from
the Battle of Britain onwards, a current and exact Order of
Battle of the British and later of U.S.A.A.F. formations,
including subordinations, the number of squadrons operating in
each sector, and their dispositions and strength.
149. Valuable information on Allied fighters was given by the
interpreters, who were sent up with reconnaissance crews
operating from Norwegian and Mediterranean bases. They were
briefed beforehand in the locations of Allied fighter units in
the operational area, and the frequencies on which the latter
were likely to work. The low number of suitable men available,
however, had confined their employment to reconnaissance
aircraft. The General thought they would have continued to be
valuable as long as air to air and ground communication
remained insecure.
150. The Germans were able to recognise Allied preparations
for taking off, not so much through the pilots' talk as by
observation of small details in point to point traffic. The
slightest carelessness in procedure between two ground
stations, for instance, might suffice to reveal which networks
were active. Then, even though the traffic itself remained
unbroken, time and time again it became possible to draw
definite conclusions concerning the operations involved by the
comparison of traffics occurring in similar form.
151. The General admitted that sometimes the German intercept
service was tricked by British spoof traffic.
152. The very high standard of R/T discipline shown by
British pilots was held up by General MARTINI as a model for
German pilots, who, as a result of the example began to show
marked improvement in the later stages. He considered American
pilots to be about the equal of the German pilots in this
respect.

Employment of Signal Aircraft.
153. General MARTINI thought that experiments with Signals
Ju.52’s had begun in the Spanish war, but in any case
exercises with them shortly afterwards had proved their worth,
and they were used with success in considerable numbers in the
Polish Campaign.
154. Later on, with fighter units being constantly switched
from one area to another out of range of their home stations,
the signals Ju.52's were used to pass information from
Aircraft Reporting Station and ground radar to airborne
fighter formations.
155. As the scale of Allied attacks increased, it became
impossible to protect these signals aircraft on the airfields.
Their signals equipment was therefor made portable, taken out
on arrival at the airfield at which it was desired to operate,
and set up some distance away.
156. Allied bombing was thus responsible for the abolishing
of the signals aircraft, which was used in the later stages of
the war as a transport aircraft.

Liaison with German Navy.
158. All intercepted signals that concerned shipping were
passed immediately to the German Navy, who controlled the
costal observation posts. In general, liaison with the German
Navy in signals matters was very close indeed, key personnel
of both services and the Army often working together on the
same problems.

High Grade Cyphers.
159. The General did not think that Allied high grad Cyphers
had ever been broken, although since he was only concerned
with what came cut he could not speak with certainty. Allied
Cyphers in general were very secure.
160. Prior to the North African Campaign the Germans
themselves introduced the "Sägefisch" for communication over
great distances in the event of cable being rendered
unserviceable.
161. "Sägefisch" comprised a short-wave transmitter operating
in conjunction with an automatic cyphering Machine; it was
efficient only over distances of 250 miles or more. Messages
were typed into the machine in clear, automatically encyphered
and then transmitted. At the other end they were automatically
received, decyphered and typed out by the machine also in
clear, the entire operation taking only a few minutes.
162. Continual watch had been kept by the Germans on their
Sägefisch traffic, and whenever possibilities of the Allies
breaking down the cypher were observed, countermeasures were
immediately taken to render it more secure.

Defensive Measures.
163. Towards the end of the war, with the overwhelming
superiority of the Allied air forces, special efforts were
made to obtain the maximum efficiency from the German
Intercept Service, which was accordingly brought into much
closer co-operation with the Aircraft Reporting Service,
employing visual and radar means for aircraft detection.
164. Radar stations and intercept stations finally worked
together, both at Divisional and Sector Battle H.Q.'s. By
comparison of the intelligence produced by both services, it
was possible to obtain a more accurate picture of the air
situation. In this connection, the General said that Allied
bomber formations could be D/F's to within 1° of accuracy.
165. To ensure that German signals traffic could not help an
eventual enemy to D/F German airfields, General MARTINI laid
it down from the outset that transmitters must not be situated
in their vicinity. Throughout Germany, therefore, the wireless
transmitters were built at least 10 kilometres away from the
airfields. One transmitter station was usually built to serve
several airfields. To maintain land communications during
bombing attacks the decimetre wave point-to-point system,
Richtverbindung, for telephonic and/or telegraphic
communications was extensively developed.
166. In Italy, Allied bombing frequently made it impossible
for the Germans to move along the roads, and telegraphic
communications were wrecked. The Luftwaffe, however, was able
to help the Army out with its Richtverbindungen.

Point-to-Point Communication.
167. The General said that a number of conversations on
Richtverbindungen were held which should not have taken place,
since this method of communications was not secure.
168. Another difficulty with the Richtverbindung system was
that it could be seriously jammed. He believed that the
jamming which actually took place was by chance, and that it
came from airborne transmitters intended to jam the German
ground radars. He even considered organising a raid warning
system on the basis of this jamming.

Spoof before D-Day.
169. Before D-Day the Germans were tricked by a spoof
operation which gave them the impression that a big force was
making for Fécamp.
170. Although many aircraft reporting radars along the coast
had been put out of action by Allied bombing, the General
claimed that there were still sufficient left to maintain the
service. (He said that he was not responsible for the Naval
Radar Service). •
171. During the last few days before the invasion, the radar
operators were often misled to report that something was
coming when nothing was there at all. This was partly due to
the atmosphere, and the radar operators were accordingly
warned to caution when reporting.
172. As a considerable number of jamming transmitters on the
French coast had been destroyed by Allied attacks, the Germans
had to achieve results with mobile ones which were to jam
ground-to-air R/T. They were never used, having possibly been
destroyed on the way to the coast or on their arrival.

SIGNALS DEVELOPMENT.
Allied Bombing.
173. The signals organisation suffered most through the
Allied bombing of wireless valve factories; on the other hand
the General did not think that decisive results could have
been achieved, had the Allies made a concerted campaign
exclusively against the valve industry.
174. The Germans started dispersing stocks after Telefunken
and Lorenz had been severely damaged. A marked shortage of
valves resulted, but according to the General the situation
was never critical. The General admitted, however, that during
the Mediterranean campaign, for a time fighter aircraft were
delivered to Sicily without wireless apparatus.
Low Quality of Radar Operators.
175. It was mentioned to General MARTINI that earlier in the
war, when the Würzburg was captured on the French coast at
Bruneval, the prisoners who were taken with the apparatus were
found to have remarkably little technical knowledge.
176. The General ascribed this to the crisis in manpower
among wireless technicians, which forced him to use unskilled
men and later women as radar assistants.
177. Wireless technicians had to be trained within the
signals organisation, because before the war there were no
radio amateurs as in Britain and the United States. The
activities of all amateurs had been suppressed in Germany "at
the time of the Communist danger".

Failure of HS.293.
176. Lack of success with the Hs.293 radio-controlled glider
bomb was attributed by the General largely to two factors.
Firstly, the Technisches Amt, which was responsible for its
development and production, kept the weapon entirely for
itself. Only when it was realised that there were not enough
frequencies on the radio control of the bomb to make it immune
from jamming, did the Technisches Amt feel obliged to bring
the signals organisation into the picture. General MARTINI
insisted on a number of alterations, but the Hs.293 was
brought out before the radio control had been perfected to
make it free from jamming.
179. Secondly, the Germans had not sufficient numbers of
suitable aircraft from which the bomb could be operated. The
Do.217 with which it was mainly employed was, moreover,
extremely limited in range.
180. The high vulnerability of the Hs.293 to jamming was
accepted by the Germans, who decided that it had best be used
in a heavy surprise attack in an area where immediate
observation by the Allies would be difficult. Norway was
considered to offer best chances of success, and it was
therefore a very unpleasant surprise to the General to learn
that the bomb had been used in the Mediterranean theatre
shortly afterwards.
181. Nevertheless, to render Allied countermeasures as
difficult as possible and in order to camouflage tuning, radio
stations were set up whenever the bombs were being used, and
aircraft were employed with the bombers to transmit on other
wavelengths while the bombs were being armed.
182. In spite of these precautions the General thought that
the Allies might have succeeded in jamming the bomb, owing to
the extreme simplicity of the wireless control.
183. Radio-controlled bombs had been conceived solely as an
anti-shipping weapon, the HS.293 against large transport, the
FX against battleships and armoured vessels of all sorts. They
were afterwards relegated to uses for which they were never
intended - against bridges and other land targets.

Collaboration with Japan.
184. The extent to which the Germans gave their secrets to
the Japanese was not known by the General. He said that early
in 1945 HITLER ordered that all German technical secrets of
short and medium term value should be given to the Japanese.
185. He said that no members of the signals organisation had
left for Japan apart from those who were presumably in the Uboat
which was intercepted by the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic.
186. From a visit to Germany paid by a delegation of Japanese
officers. General MARTINI gained the impression that they were
behind-hand in radar. A Japanese told him that they had
apparatus with centimetre waves, but he could not remember the
details. He regarded the Jagi aerial as very good, but did not
know whether or not the Technisches Amt had received it from
Japan. He was sure that the Japanese had received at least
documents and photographs of German ground radar.

A.D.I.(K)&
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. Felkin
21st June 1945. Group Captain"

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 21:58

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 393/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR.

Abteilung Ic (Chief of Intelligence).
1. The present report is the first of a series of three dealing with
some aspects of G.A.F. Intelligence during the War and in the series of
European incidents which preceded it. Whilst this report covers the
vicissitudes of the two Chiefs of Intelligence during the major part of
the War, Generalleutnant Josef ("Beppo") SCHMID and Oberst WODARG, the second and third reports will deal respectively with details of sources
of intelligence and their value to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, and
with the working of Intelligence during the main incidents preceding the
War and in the main campaigns of the War Itself.
2. The information has been supplied by Generalleutnant SCHMID, the
Chef Ic from 1938 to 1942, Oberst WODARG, the Chef Ic from 1942 until
February 1945 and Oberstleutnant KIEMITZ, who worked under both SCHMID and WODARG and finally took over the latter's post. Some additional information was supplied by Hauptmann ZETZSCHE, chief of one of the Groups in the Ic department of Foreign Air Forces West and from
Oberstleutnant OHLETZ who, from January 1941 until March 1943, was
Ic of Luftflotte 6 on the Russian front.
3. The main impression gained from these interrogations is one of two
distinct phases in the fortunes of G.A.F. Intelligence, each the direct
result of the War situation at the time. These two phases fall roughly
into the periods of office of "Beppo" SCHMID and Oberst WODARG.
4. The handling of Ic by SCHMID for the furtherance of personal ends
and as an obliging and gratulatory adjunct to the G.A.F. General Staff
could find no impediment in the rising tide of German success. With the
reversal of fortunes and the ever-widening gap between the wishful
thinking or the General Staff and insistent reality at the fronts,
however, the broad and easy path of SCHMID became a tightrope from which he inevitably fell.
5. It is noteworthy that SCHMID, the close friend of GOERING, departed
to the command of Jagdkorps I with undiminished prestige, whilst WODARG, eclipsed by the glow of a former spurious glory, was left to struggle in evil times to obtain recognition of an unpleasant war situation. At times he was forced to the employment of amazing expedients in order to achieve this end. Since the acceptance of defeat could find no place in
Nazi philosophy it was never possible for the German Intelligence, which
had foreseen defeat as early as 1943, to achieve the prestige,
facilities and effectiveness enjoyed by its Allied counterpart.

THE FIRST CHEF IC - 1938 to 1942.
6. The 5th Abteilung was established as part of the G.A.F. General
Staff on first January 1938 and was to collect information on foreign
air forces and to build up target data for appreciation in air warfare.
The new department was to combine and systematise functions previously
the responsibility of a target data unit and of R.L.M. departments of
foreign air forces.
7. Those two organisations were already known respectively as Gruppe
II of the first Abteilung and the 5th Abteilung, and were manned by
civilians and reserve officers who had large quantities of information
from the foreign press and literature at their disposal, but worked with
no clearly defined aims; their main policy seemed to be deliberate
exaggeration of the strength of foreign countries it order to justify
German armament.
8. An appreciation by Generalleutnant SCHMID of the achievements of
these two organisations up to January 1938 will be found in Appendix I
to this report.
9. The new 5th Abteilung was to be under the command of
Generalleutnant, - then Major, - SCHMID, who since 1935 had been
employed in a ministerial capacity and had no knowledge of foreign
languages. He had, however, been recommended to GOERING by
Oberstleutnant JESCHONNEK, at that time Chief of the 1st Abteilung of
the General Staff.
10. The first task which SCHMID set himself was to replace his staff by
younger and more suitably qualified officers, although these were
difficult to obtain. The organisation of the 5th Abteilung, or
department Ic of the Ops. Staff as it now became, is shown in Appendix
II to this report. After the dismissal of SCHMID in 1944 the department
was reorganised by Oberst WODARG to the form in which it remained until
the closing stages of the war. This aspect is discussed later in this
report and the new organisation appears in Appendix IV.
11. The main departments of SCHMID’s new organisation were set up as a
first echelon at the Wildpark headquarters, and other departments as a
second echelon at the R.L.M. in Berlin. For 21/2 years SCHMID and his
staff lived and worked in the command train which was the "Robinson"
headquarters.
12. By the outbreak of war intelligence departments had also been set
up in the subordinate commands of the G.A.F., but choice and training of
staffs were far from satisfactory, and it was not until 1942 that Ic
(Intelligence) officers were appointed down to Geschwader and Gruppe
levels. Even then the type of officers chosen reflected a lack of
appreciation of the needs of Intelligence.
13. According to Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the entire Ic service suffered
from lack of experience when the war broke out, since the apparatus to
meet the demands of war was not brought into being, until that time;
from the technical point of view, however, Intelligence had played its
part well up to that time, as, for instance, in that the target indices
available at the outset were good, as were the political and
geographical studies produced.
14. In spite of SCHMID's efforts to introduce younger men into
Intelligence at the time when he took office, his specialist staff was
still mainly composed of older reserve officers, the majority of whom
were lacking in both physical and mental agility. His officers were
blindly devoted to him and appeared uncritical of the course he gave
them to pursue.
15. Actually there was much disagreement in the G.A.F. concerning the
personality of SCHMID. His self-confidence was enormous and his enmity
was feared. By virtue of his double office as Chef Ic and GOERING’s
personal General Staff Officer, he exerted an influence over GOERING
outweighing even that of JESCHONNEK when the latter was Chief of Staff.
The strong tension later existing between SCHMID and JESCHONNEK was
openly discussed. It was also accepted that SCHMID would not tolerate
any officer about him who could become potentially dangerous to his
position.
16. The composition of his staff certainly appeared to bear out this
conviction. By dint bribery, a persuasive tongue and his proverbial
conviviality - was a heavy drinker – he had created about himself a
circle of officers who were completely under his thumb.
17. It is only in the light of this state of affairs that the
discrepancies between the information from intelligence formations at
the front and its dissemination by the Chef Ic to be discussed later in
this series of reports can, to some extent, be understood.

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCES.
18. It was impossible for the 5th Abteilung to achieve the ideal
solution for the collection of intelligence, namely, the subordination
to it of all agencies concerned with the procuring of information.
SCHMID’s suggestion to set up an inter-service department of O.K.W,
which would build up a complete picture of the military, naval, and
industrial potentialities of the enemy met with no more success. The
result was that each service produced a partial appreciation from
available sources, whilst the S.S. maintained a separate agent and
foreign service.
19. The 5th Abteilung sought to administer its own press and attaché
service, the technical study of foreign aircraft and the interrogation
of prisoners. It also claimed that it should be the channel for liaison
with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda, should have the
right to control sales of German aircraft abroad, and finally that it
should have the sole responsibility for a day-to-day appreciation of the
situation in war. From SCHMID's point of view, however, few of these
matters were arranged satisfactorily.
20. In the spring of 1939 he was able to obtain control of the R.L.M.
press department following upon certain blunders in the censorship, and
in the few months remaining before the War introduced a tighter
discipline.
21. The aims of the press department were to glean information from the
foreign press as well as to conduct propaganda for the G.A.F. in press
articles, pictures and films whilst maintaining a control of the
security aspect and, after outbreak of War, to organise the G.A.F. press
publicity units. The wartime organisation was never clearly defined,
however, being complicated by the rival intervention of the Propaganda
Ministry.
22. Liaison with the Propaganda Ministry produced good results only in
the form of films and other comforts for the troops, but in the
favourable periods of the War the difficulties of propaganda and
censorship were not important. Later, however, WODARG found himself
blamed by GOERING or the Chief of Staff for errors in publication over
which it was impossible to keep a control – a situation which led to
much personal friction.
23. The provision of foreign newspapers was in the hands of the
Sicherheitsdienst and the supply of daily papers for intelligence
purposes was therefore irregular, although periodicals could be obtained
without much difficulty. Liaison with foreign scientific institutes was
forbidden and could only be conducted through the Abwehr.
24. The G.A.F. Attaché Service abroad was subordinate to the Chef Ic,
and was also responsible for securing the confidence of German-allied
and neutral air attachés in Germany. Although the Attaché Service was
regarded as a valuable potential source of information, its
subordination to the 5th Abteilung was not brought about until the
spring of 1939.
25. Its contribution to the information on foreign air forces was very
small both in peace and war. Before 1939, when the Attaché Service had
been subordinated to the central office at the R.L.M., its chief, Major
CRAMON, had refused to regard the obtaining of information as part of
his task, added to which GOERING's attitude had always been to send illqualified officers abroad as air attachés.
26. The importance attached by the head of Ic to the Attaché Service
did not meet with official approval and the Attaché conferences held at
Berlin at which was expressed the dissatisfaction of Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary and Turkey with the lack of German support, were finally
forbidden on account of their political character.
27. The Foreign Office declined to pass on military or air information
via its officials, and only after outbreak of war was closer liaison
effected by setting up a representative (Ic/Pol) who, however, only
covered the rather restricted questions of violations of the frontier,
exchange of prisoners, free passage of ships and listening to enemy
radio.
28. Intelligence officers of all departments had at first been allowed
to listen to the enemy radio, but this was restricted in summer 1942 to
Ob.d.L. and the heads of the Luftflotten and a list had to be sent to
the Propaganda Ministry of all persons to whom this authority was
delegated.
29. SCHMID considered the Abwehr department to be the worst
functioning institution of O.K.W. and stated that whatever material was
supplied by it could not be appreciated at its true value because there
was no way of judging the reliability of the agents. The Abwehr was a
huge and expensive organization but, according to SCHMID, it was manned by the worst and most unsuitable officers in the services. It achieved very little in peace and only occasional chance results in war. At the beginning of the war it had undeserved larols thrust upon it by the
attention paid in enemy countries to the fifth column. SCHMID did not
find it surprising that the S.S. took over the whole organisation with
apparent ease.
30. At the outbreak of war the special photo-reconnaissance Staffel
formerly subordinated to the office of O.K.W. was put under the control
of the 5th Abteilung and became the Ob.d.L. Gruppe. SCHMID praised the
outstanding reconnaissance work of this unit in all theatres of war, as
well as pioneer technical achievements in high altitude flying. The main
sources of intelligence were, however, the wireless interception service
and the interrogation of prisoners of war although the latter did not
produce any outstanding results until towards the closing stages of
SCHMID's period of office.
31. The wireless interception service was developed in peace-time by
General MARTINI and was still controlled by him during the whole of the
war. SCHMID recognised the valuable nature of the work done by this
department, but depreciated the tendency of the Signals Staff to issue
independent appreciations which were necessarily incomplete and
unbalanced. In his opinion much more could have been achieved by its
subordination to an organisation with a wider horizon and more
penetrating aims. This deficiency became even more apparent to SCHMID
when later in the war he became the Chief of Jagdkorps I and was
concerned with defence of the Reich.
32. An appreciation by Generalleutnant SCHMID from memory, and unaided by documents, of Intelligence covered by the organisations mentioned above appears in Appendices III A to C of the present report.

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE
33. In the early stages of the war the 5th Abteilung was responsible
for drawing up situation reports under the headings of air attacks, air
defence and the sea and land situation. These reports were based upon
those received twice daily from the fronts by the Ic Report Centre and
often had to correct hasty and exaggerated reports which had reached
GOERING through In (Operational channels). When Germany began to suffer reverses in the War the distribution of these Intelligence reports was
restricted and in the spring of 1942 GOERING forbad their publication
altogether.
34. Chef Ic had other tasks which were not purely concerned with the
G.A.F. direction in that he passed Intelligence to interested specialist
ministers and general staffs of German-allied countries whenever it
seemed necessary or opportune, being thereby drawn into conferences
outside the G.A.F.
35. At certain intervals reports were issued by Chef Ic containing a
survey of the position on individual fronts. There were, however, other
bodies which trespassed upon the functions of the 5th Abteilung or
overlapped in the issue of intelligence appreciations. UDET's technical
office under Oberst Ing. TSCHERSICH (GL/Rü) appeared to consider that
its task was to prove that all foreign equipment was inferior to German.
His reports on the excellence of German Intelligence, bombs, and weapons
were preferred by GOERING, and enjoyed great popularity in the period
after the French campaign. This organisation was finally linked up with
the Chef Ic in 1940 and was reorganised with good effect under Oberst
Ing. SCHWEPKE.
36. The head of the O.K.W. Wirtschaftsstab had announced at a
conference in the summer of 1939 that his task in War would include the
conduct of strategic air war-fare. This body did in fact issue reports
on the sensitivity of foreign countries to air attack. A Ic
Wirtschaftsstab was later formed under WODARG, but according to the
staff of Oberstleutnant KILLINGER of Dulag Luft the opportunity of
interrogation of Allied prisoners on industrial subjects was almost
completely neglected; the interrogators could never obtain the necessary
briefing or outside interest for such work.
37. An example of the worth of the Ic Wirtschaftsstab in January 1943
in the form of appreciation of British synthetic oil production and
Russian oil production has recently come to light in a captured document
now in the hands of A.D.I.(K) Document Section (List No.93).
38. In the opinions of KIENITZ, OHLETZ and ZETZSCHE the Ic Service
itself suffered from the fact that its Chief did not present with
sufficient obduracy a plain unvarnished picture of the situation which
was to be concluded from practical experience at the front, and from
indubitable facts photographic reconnaissance and captured material,
underlined by P/Ws’ statements, outside intelligence and above all by
evidence from the wireless interception service.
39. One result of this was that the total numbers of British bombers
engaged in night attacks on Germany was not believed, and when the Chief of Ic confirmed the accuracy of CHURCHIL's figure for the 1000-bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942, he laid himself open to charges of
defeatism and theorising. His reports acquired the reputation of
"Lügenmeldungen" (lies) among members of the Operations Staff, and the
Chief of Air Staff finally ordered that the Ic staff should be cut down
to lessen the output of unpleasant nonsense.
40. In another instance of this kind, which is described more fully in
the final report of this series, disagreement of Luftflotte 6's figures
of Russian strength became so acute that JESCHONNEK ordered an enquiry into the methods of appreciation by Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Luftflotte.
41. The strength postulated by Chief Ic for the Russian Air Force was
but a fraction of the enemy strength actually encountered at the front
and so increasingly worthless did the appreciations become that at the
instance of von GREIM, OHLETZ refrained from handing them down to the
operational units in order that their faith in the Higher Command should
not be further shaken. There were days on which over 100 aircraft were
shot down in the area of Luftflotte 6 alone, whilst Chef Ic was
estimating the total Russian effort as 150 to 200 aircraft on the entire
Eastern front.
42. In order to cover his intelligence officers, von GREIM himself flew
immediately to headquarters to put the case personally. On his return he
informed OHLEZ that JESCHONNEK had recognised the accuracy of the
Luftflotte reports and wished the fact to be conveyed to him; he added
that Oberst SCHMID would not remain in office much longer.

DISMISSAL OF SCHMID
43. Matters were brought to a hold as far as SCHMID was concerned when
in August 1942 an Ic officer of the Attaché Gruppe, Oberstleutnant
SCHULZT-BOYSEF, was arrested by the Gestapo, in agreement with GOERING, on a charge of espionage for Russia. A number of other members of Ic were questioned and altogether at least 100 persons were arrested in Berlin in what became known as the "Rote Kapelle affair".
44. It was established that SCHULZT-BOYSEF, had had sources of
information in the G.A.F. Technical Office, in the Foreign Office and
the O.K.W. although he had not received secret information of any kind
from Ic. Nevertheless, SCHMID was reproached by GOERING and the Chief of Staff for having protected SCHULZE-BOYSEF in 1938 and at the beginning of the war against the suspicions of the Gestapo.
45. In October 1942 SCHMID was relieved of his post, officially because
of the Rote Kapelle affair; in the G.A.F., however, it was considered
that his departure was due to events at the front not having conformed
with his predictions.
46. After SCHMID, the task of taking up the reins of Ic was allotted to
Oberstleutnant KOEGL who, however, was not suited to his duties and
handed them over shortly afterwards to Major WODARG. KOEGL’s short
tenure had one good effect in that it brought Oberstleutnant KIENITZ
more into the picture. According to OHLUTZ that officer was a very
accurate worker, but unfortunately, although undeniably the most
valuable of the officers in responsible positions, did not possess the
particular gifts necessary to make a successful Chef Ic.

WODARG's TENURE OF OFFICE - 1942 to 1945
47. Major WODARG had been deputy head of Ic under Oberst SCHMID and he was also involved in the Rote Kapelle affair and was dismissed at the
same time on a charge of failing to maintain adequate supervision. He
was saved from further punishment only because it was maintained that
meticulous secrecy had been carried so far in the Gruppe Ost and the
Operations Staff that supervision by WODARG had been impossible.
However, 5 months after the dismissal of SCHMID, WODARG succeeded KOEGL as Head of Ic.
48. He took up his duties with remarkable energy and he soon rid
himself completely of the superannuated personal staff of Ic, apart from
a small number of experts, and introduced young and highly ambitious
General Staff officers. By this means he diffused considerably more
energy into the department. Oberstleutnant KIENITZ was available to
facilitate the smooth change-over from the SCHMID regime, and with his
complete mastery of the methods of the past provided a good liaison with
the new generation.
49. A table showing the Ic staff after its reorganisation by WODARG
appears in Appendix IV and may be compared with the organisation under
SCHMID given in Appendix II.
50. According to KIENITZ, WODARG undoubtedly brought the required ideas and breadth of vision to Intelligence. His methods of evaluating the
War situation were completely revolutionary and his appreciations were
built up on the basis of front Intelligence, being given out unvarnished
and untainted by the methods which had played such a big part with his
predecessor. For protection against attempts to oust him from the saddle
he relied on a very close relationship with the ministry of Dr. GOEBBELS
and the Reichssicherheits Hauptamt (security police headquarter).
51. His work was much hampered by his one outstanding peculiarity,
which stamped his department with a certain character. His mind was
imbued with a morbid distrust of the whole world and he suffered from a
form of spy mania which could almost be described as pathological. This
made life very unpleasant both for himself and for those about him. He
had his officers watched continually and he checked every possible
method and procedure with Amt IV of the Sicherheitsdienst in order to be
in a position to cope immediately with any possible threat to himself or
his department.
52. In his relations with GOERING Oberst WODARG was made to feel that
he was an imperfect substitute for Oberst SCHMID the founder and
architect of the Ic Service. WODARG never attended a Führer’s
conference, nor was he allowed in HITLER’s presence because of his
Jewish appearance - he had Jewish connections in both his own and his
wife's family. In the O.K.L. he was the least important personality of
the staff and he himself did not consider that he was the right man,
especially in view of his ill health, to have played an active part in
the shaping of policy and the raising of Ic from its subordinate role in
the councils of O.K.L.
53. In spite of the drive which WODARG brought to Ic and in spite of
his many ideas the work of Ic was doomed to failure in that it had to be
performed at a time when the G.A.F. was at its lowest ebb, when through
lack of air reconnaissance and liaison with Mi1itary Intelligence
services, the enemy dispositions were becoming increasingly difficult to
arrive at. Ides might burst from WODARG in an unfailing flow, but no
sooner did some new factor crop up than the situation grew out of hand
again. That the department functioned with any regularity at all WOGARD
felt was due to Oberstleutnant KIENITZ, who as WODARG’s permanent deputy provided the one stable focal point in the entire organisation.

INTERNAL INTRIGUE.
54. From the time of his own implication in the Russian spy affair,
WOGARD maintained more or less friendly relations with officials of the
S.D. in the Reichssicherheitsdienst Hauptamt, relations which were
fostered by the judicious distribution of delicacies from G.A.F. stores.
Apart from the confession that these occasional visits provided him with
an excuse vis-à-vis the O.K.L. Staff for leisure hours in Berlin or
otherwise unauthorised journeys, WODARG gave three examples of his
exploitation of these contacts.
55. He passed on as a precaution any reports on officers who seemed to
him to arouse suspicion, but often without any further action to be
taken as the investigating authorities were too overburdened. In return
the S.D. sometimes passed to Ic reports of corruption inside the G.A.F.
which were dealt with internally by the O.K.L. without BORMANN being
drawn into the matter.
56. After the bomb explosion in HITLER’s headquarter WODARG shortcircuited the S.D.'s investigations into the General Staffs by himself
undertaking to watch over O.K.L. by means of GOERING’s Forschungsamt.
This telephone eavesdropping was reduced to a farce since there was only
one possibility of listening-in on six exchanges with a daily average of
12-18,000 telephone conversations. Discreet personal warnings were
passed by WODARG to the Air Staff, and a few weeks later the control was
dropped after WODARG had reported to GOERING and so to HIMMLER that the task had been carried out with negative result.
57. In autumn 1944 the Sicherheitsdienst office at Frankfurt charged
Oberstleutnant KILLINGER and his interrogation officers with anglophile
tendencies, defeatism and transgression of service rules. The S.S.
demanded punishment of the offenders and subordination to the S.S. of
the prisoner of war interrogation centre, which WODARG interpreted as a
move by Amt IV of the R.S.H.A. to steal a march on Amt VI. WODARG claims the credit for having taken successful steps to get the matter settled by G.A.F. court martial instead of in the People’s Court.
58. Through his former activity as G.A.F. censor, he was on good
relations with Dr. GOEBBELS, about whom he records the admittedly quite
new point of view that he was personally in favour of coming to terms
with the Allies long before the catastrophic effects of Allied air
supremacy. He had a wholesome respect for Allied statesmen, and warned
against the error of underestimating the enemy. WODARG used his contacts in the Propaganda Ministry, the personnel of which was mainly G.A.F. officers, to play off one government clique against another and to
secure private information which he claims to have used to protect
O.K.L. against the S.S. - until the latter took over all the key
positions in the Propaganda Ministry.

OBERSTLEUTNANT KIENITZ
59. In February 1945 Oberstleutnant KIENITZ was put in charge of Ic,
although he was never appointed Chef Ic. After service as a
Gruppenkommandeur with J.G.3 in the early part of the war he held office
successively under SCHMID, KOEGL and WODARG, being responsible for Order of Battle first on the eastern front and later in the West. From
November 1944 onwards he was WODARG's deputy and right hand man.
60. After taking over from WODARG, KIENITZ very soon came to the
conclusion that the G.A.F. had become a purely ground support air force,
and he therefore directed all his efforts towards the determination of
Allied intentions first in the East, later in the West — as indicated by
the position of new airfields, ammunition and fuel dumps, unit
movements, etc. For this information he relied mainly on the W/T
listening service; the results of his findings he embodied in as air
situation report.

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE – CONCLUSIONS.
61. The mentality of the German rulers, who had risen to power in
internal political strife and were fanatical to the point of despising
the intelligence of the so-called "Intellektuellen", was such that they
were incapable of appreciating an intelligence service of their own
fashioning or of respecting the intelligence service of the enemy.
Otherwise according to WODARG, they would have avoided the War in the
first place, or having recognised the absolute superiority of the enemy,
would have concluded peace earlier - about the beginning of 1942.
62. The General Staff of the G.A.F., in common with the other branches
of the armed forces, was in WODARG's opinion too small and untrained to
assume effective leadership even if the Chief of Staff had recognised
the value of the intelligence service in general or appreciated its work
in detail. Since this recognition was lacking, Ic was inadequately
staffed in comparison with Ia, the operations department. Moreover, the
lack of co-ordination between the sources of information and Ic limited
considerably the latter's ability to draw up a complete intelligence
picture.
63. The activity of the General Staff and particularly the Ic
department was further crippled by HIMMLER's assumption of power over
the State and armed forces, and from spring 1944 onwards the General
Staff had to struggle for existence against the encroachments of the
S.S.
64. Hauptmann ZETZSCHE has summed up the main weaknesses of German
Intelligence during the War in the following main points:-
A) Within the State.
i) There was no hard and fast Ic organisation within the
Wehrmacht with boundaries clearly demarcated from those
of similar civil bodies.
ii) Wehrmachtführungsstab Ic did not co-ordinate the work of
the Heeres-, Marine- and Luftwaffenführungsstäbe Ic, but
was merely a distributing agency for the Ic reports of
the individual Wehrmacht components, exercising
practically no authority over them.
iii) The large number of intelligence organisations in Germany
without clearly defined tasks, including O.K.W./
Amtsgr.Ausland, R.S.H.A. (Mil.Amt), R.S.H.A. (Hauptamt
IV) and Reichsministerium Speer (1. Abtlg). (The
Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Office also partly
covered the same territory).
iv) The lack of a Ministry of Economic Warfare. Military
Commands were obliged to cope with the problems without
expert knowledge or guidance, (e.g. in the Battle of
Britain). With so many independent intelligence
organisations and no centrally co-ordinated hand the
Germans consequently never saw the enemy picture as a
whole.
B) Within the G.A.F.
i) Again innumerable bodies working over the same ground as
G.A.F. Ops. Staff Ic, TLR Rü, Gen. Nafü, Waffengeneräle,
Forschungsamt, etc. These departments were not
responsible to Ic and on grounds of personal ambition
worked by and far for themselves. All this was due to the
lack of a “man of stature” as chef Ic (GOERING’s phrase).
ii) The not altogether happy organisation of G.A.F. Ops.
Staff Ic (Luftwesen, Ic/See, Ic/Bild).
iii) The subordination of Ic to Chief of G.A.F., whose
decisions were too often swayed by In considerations.
iv) Ic was kept as ill-informed on the subject of German
weapons, apparatus, etc. that it was incapable of
offering suggestions which would otherwise undoubtedly
have arisen from Ic knowledge of Allied material.
v) Ic's tactical suggestions were mainly ignored owing to
the jealousy of the Training Abteilung which again was in
no position to evaluate enemy information since in the
sphere of training too, there were many figures in the
pie (principally those of the Waffengeneräle and Forward
Commands).
vi) Ic was unable to have its wishes carried out by Forward
Commands. It could not order but only request.
vii) The poor quality of Ic personnel. Many officers who were
not wanted by other branches of the service found their
way into the various departments of Ic.
viii) Ic was considerably understaffed. Moreover, such staff
as it had was unevenly distributed in relation to the
tasks.
ix) There were no Ic officers with the flying units, so that
valuable lessons which might have been drawn from battle
experience were lost.
x) The lack of intelligence courses for officers
xi) The insufficient support of Ic in every sphere, e.g. no
aircraft, no cars, no money or additional comforts and
drinks (the latter for P/W interrogation centre,
Oberursel), insufficient communications with Oberursel.
65. Ironically, the sole organisation to recognise the worth of Ic was
the S.S. (since most personnel had connections with foreign countries
and were therefor already under suspicion). Hence the efforts of the
S.S. (by means of agents) to keep a watch on the entire Ic organisation
in Germany and finally even to take it over.

A.D.I.(K) and Walter A. Frank
U.S. Air Interrogation. for:- S.D. Felkin
Group Captain."

Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 22:05

Fighter defence of germany: Control of fighters
 
"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.525/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

FIGHTER DEFENCE OF GERMANY

CONTROL OF FIGHTERS BY THE "Y" PROCEDURE.
1. The Interrogation of G.A.F. fighter pilots in the past has
made it possible to form a picture of German tactics against
U.S.A.A.F. bomber formations from the point of view of fighter
interception force. Knowledge by P/W of the raid tracking
organisation on the ground, however, has up to the present
been lacking, and many gaps have remained in the picture,
particularly where the Fühlungshalter (shadowing aircraft) and
the "Y" controlled fighters are concerned.
2. Two G.A.F. Signals Officers, who had been directly
concerned with "Y" control sites - one man was a plotting
officer - have now described in some detail the method of
ground control at present being used in the operation of
fighter interception forces and of the shadowing aircraft;
their knowledge was chiefly confined to methods practised in
France, but they state that the same principles also apply to
operations in Germany.
3. Some of the information is of a semi-technical nature, and
the present report is therefore divided into two parts; the
first part concerns the operational aspect of fighter control,
and the second part deals with the equipment and method of
operation of the unit of control - the "Y" site.

I. CONTROL OF FIGHTER INTERCEPTION.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
4. In Allied attacks on Germany, the Jagd Division receives
and plots all Radar information on the movements of the bomber
formations, together with direct reports from the
Fühlungshalter aircraft shadowing those formations and the
plotting reports from the fighter "Y" control sites. It is
primarily on this information that the Divisional commentary
and the control of a whole interception action are based.
5. The sole medium for transmission of the Divisional
commentary is the "Y" site; the latter is connected by
landline to the Divisional plotting centre so that the
plotting of an operation is carried out at both those centres
simultaneously.
6. An interception can therefore be directed either from
Divisional Headquarters or from the "Y" site, but it is
normally the plotting officer at the "Y" site who puts out the
R/T commentary.
7. The area of control ("Führungsraum") of a "Y" site is
limited by the range of the transmitters used, and according
to P/W the average range may be taken as 250 to 300
kilometres; the Division therefore controls an operation over
its territory by making use of a chain of "Y" sites.
8. The area of R/T control of a "Y" site may be increased by
additional ground relay transmitters, known as "Brummer", so
that R/T communications with fighters can be continued outside
normal range. These stations and their operation are discussed
in Part II of this report.
9. The present P/W stated that the Central Operational
Headquarters ("Zentral Gefechtsstand"), situated in the Berlin
area, receives simultaneous information from each Divisional
plotting centre and makes its own plots on that basis; the
fighter commentary on the "Reichsjägerwelle" or such orders as
are put out on the broadcaster "Annemarie" emanate from that
centre, but according to the present P/W are only utilised by
fighter interception forces in case of failure of the
Divisional commentary, or the breaking up of an interception
formation.

"Y" CONTROL OF FIGHTERS.
General Principls.
10. The principles of "Y" fighter control, whereby the range
and bearing of friendly fighter are determined by a "Y" ground
station, are already well known.
11. In operations in Germany, the "Y" site, known as a
"Stellung", usually consists of five separate stations
("Stationen"), each of which comprises a transmitter hut and
mast, and a receiver pylon incorporating a D/F, and rangemeasuring
unit. All five stations are connected to a plotting
room situated on the site.
12. Each station of the site is allotted a separate W/T
channel, known as "Linie", consisting of a transmitter and a
receiver carrier frequency; thus a number of individual
aircraft can be controlled simultaneously within a given area.
13. In order to extend the control of a single aircraft, such
as a night-fighter, to that of a number of aircraft, such as a
day fighter interception force, it is only necessary to
include a "Y" controlled aircraft amongst the fighters of the
formation.
14. In this case the receivers of all aircraft in the
formation wi11 be tuned to the ground transmitter frequency to
receive R/T instructions from the plotting centre as well as
from the fighter formation leader.
15. In this manner up to five separate interception formations
can be controlled, each on a different frequency form a single
"Y" site. If necessary, all five formations can be brought
together to intercept a single bomber formation, or
alternatively, each of the five formations can be despatched
separately to meet the bombers or their fighter cover at
various points.
16. The ground transmitter carrier frequencies, known as the
"Gemeinschaftswelle", are distributed over the 40.4 to 42.3
mc/s. band at intervals of .05 mc/s. and the ground receiver
carrier frequencies, known as the "Messwelle", are distributed
over the 38.5 to 40.4 mc/s. band at the same intervals. A list
of such frequencies numbered 1 to 40, appeared in a recently
captured Signals Order (A.D.I.(K) 4.68/1944, paras.41-42).
17. In operation, the ground transmitter carrier frequency is
modulated by a continuous note of 300 or 3,000 cycles; the
receiver/transmitter in the "Y" aircraft (known in J.G.3 as
the "Lotse" aircraft) receives its modulation and
automatically re-transmits it on another frequency in the 38.4
to 40.4 mc/s. band; the aircraft transmitter frequency is
normally 1.9 mc/s. lower than the ground transmitter
frequency.
18. The re-transmission from the aircraft is picked up at the
"Y" station by the D/F receiver, by which the bearing of the
aircraft is than determined. The same transmission is also
received by the range-measuring unit, and the distance of the
aircraft from the station is determined by measuring the phase
difference of the modulation received.
19. The height of the aircraft under control is not measured
by the "Y" station, but is obtained over the R/T channel from
readings taken in the aircraft, thus all the data required for
the plotting of a controlled aircraft, viz. bearing, distance
and height, are obtained.
20. There are two methods of controlling aircraft formations
by means of the "Y" procedure, and these are illustrated
diagrammatically in Sketch I.
21. The first method, known as the "Begleiter", has now
dropped out of use, but is repeated here as a matter of
interest. By this method, the leading aircraft of a formation,
known as the "Führer" aircraft, also acted as the "Y"
aircraft, whilst the accompanying aircraft of the formation
were known as "Begleiter".
22. In the Führer aircraft the receiver was linked with the
transmitter and the receiver frequency was tuned to the ground
transmitter frequency, whilst the aircraft transmitter was set
to the frequency of the ground receiver.
23. In all other aircraft of the formation the receiver was
tuned to the transmitter frequency of the leader, and in none
of them was the receiver linked to the transmitter. The
formation was thus plotted solely by the position of the
Führer aircraft.
24. The Begleiter method has, according to P/W, now been
replaced by a newer method known as the "Gemeinschaftswelle",
in which the receivers of all aircraft of a fighter formation,
including that of the leader, are set to the ground
transmitter frequency ("Gemeinschaftswelle"). In this method
the aircraft is not the leader of the formation but he flies
as N°2 to the leader, with one or more similar aircraft as
reserves.
25. Upon referring to the Sketch, it will be seen that the
formation leader's instructions are not heard directly by the
"Y" station; they are picked up by the receiver of the "Y"
aircraft (in this case on 41 mc/s.) and automatically retransmitted
(on 39.1 mc/s.) to the ground station.
26. On the other hand, should the pilot of the "Y" aircraft
wish to speak to his own formation leader, he must pass his
message to the ground station on 39.1, mc/s., and the plotting
officer will repeat the message on the Gemeinschaftswelle.
Transmission of Commentary.
27. A plotting officer on the "Y" site, or his counterpart on
the extended line to the Divisions, is provided with
headphones connected to the receiver of the range-measuring
unit, and with a microphone which is connected to the
transmitter.
28. By depressing a key he can link the microphone with the
ground transmitter and can impose R/T speech on the already
modulated carrier frequency which it sends out. It is not
necessary to discontinue the modulating note, so that D/F’ing
and range measuring can therefore proceed at the same time as
the commentary.
29. In practice, the fighter interception force is led by the
"Y" control officer as far as within sight of the bomber
formation, at which point R/T control ceases to allow the
formation leader to direct the combat, and is only taken up
after combat when the fighters have re-formed for a second
interception, and the "Y" aircraft has made fresh contact with
ground control. During this time, however, the ground station
continues to plot the formation through the "Y" aircraft.

Fühlungshalter Aircraft.
30. It will be remembered that when a U.S. bomber force is
reported to be entering German territory a special shadowing
aircraft, the Fühlungshalter, wi11 be sent to meet and follow
that force and report its movements and position.
31. The Fühlungshalter aircraft operates under the control of
the "Y" plotting officer in the manner described above. In the
opening stages of an operation, the Fühlungshalter is directed
to the penetrating formation on the basis of Radar plots, and
upon making contacts it takes up a position usually above and
to the rear of the enemy formation.
32. The Fühlungshalter then reports strength, type of
formation, direction, height and fighter cover of the
penetrating force. After the initial report, further
information is only sent in the event of major changes in the
composition or movements of the U.S. formations.
33. As soon as the Fühlungshalter has made contact with the
bomber formation, all R/T control by the "Y" site ceases; the
Fühlungshalter aircraft communicates directly with Divisional
Headquarters through the receiver of the "Y" station and the
"Y" control officer stands by and listens to the R/T traffic
whilst maintaining a plotting control by the "Y" procedure.
31. According to P/W, the Divisional Plotting Centre at this
stage relies on Radar data for following the formations, and
only depends upon the Fühlungshalter aircraft to supply
immediate details of such circumstances as withdrawal of
fighter cover.

II. "Y" CONTROL SITE, AND IT’S OPERATION.
"Y" CONTROL SITE.
Manning.
35. A "Y" control station requires nine men per shift, or
27/30 men per 24 hour, for its operation and a site consisting
of nine stations is normally occupied by a company of 150/160
operators and 50/60 maintenance personnel. The personnel of
the "Y" control station is distributed as follows:
Transmitter hut: One operator.
D/F Cabin: D/F Operator and log-book
keeper.
Range-Measuring
Cabin:
A Supervisor, range-measurer
and log-book keeper.
Plotting Room: Plotter (friendly plots),
plotter (enemy-plots)
and plotting officer.
Communications.
36. Internal: The standard layout of the internal system of
commutations in a "Y" site is shown diagramatically in Sketch
II. In this Sketch "Station A" shows the general layout
applicable to all five stations, while "Station B" shows a
diagram of the internal communications which are in reality
repeated in all five stations.
37. The internal lines which are shown in the Sketch have the
following names and functions:
(a) Plotting line (Werteleitung): A telephone connecting
the log-book keeper in the D/F cabin to the range-measuring
cabin and "Y" plotting room for transmission of bearing
readings. (R in Sketch).
(b) Telephone (Ringleitung): Connects the D/F cabin, the
range measuring room and the transmitter hut for the passing
of internal instructions. (I in Sketch).
(c) Modulation line (Modulationsleitung): Connects the
range-measuring unit to the transmitter for carrying the
modulation note. (M in Sketch).
(d) Diode line (Diodenleitung): Connects the rangmeasuring
room to the transmitter hut; required only when a
Siemens range-measuring unit is used. (D in Sketch).
(e) Receiving line (Hörleitung): Open line which connects
the receiver and the range-measuring unit to the control desk
in the plotting room; a parallel line also runs to the
Division. (H in Sketch).
(f) Transmitter Circuit (Besprechungsleitung): Open line
which connects the Division and the plotting room to the
range-measuring unit. This can be used as a closed line for
internal speech or as an open line for transmission of R/T
instructions to the aircraft from the Division or the "Y"
plotting officer. (B in Sketch).
(g) Keying circuit (Tastleitung): Open line which
connects the Division and the "Y" plotting officer to the
range-measuring unit and transmitter. Depression of a key at
Divisional Headquarters or on the "Y" plotting officer's
control desk operates relays to the transmitter and modulation
line of the range-measuring unit, allowing R/T instructions
from the Division to be transmitted on the carrier wave to the
aircraft under control. (K in Sketch).
38. According to P/W, the twenty Channels connecting the five
stations of the site to the Division may be carried on two
single lines utilising a multi-channel carrier frequency
equipment.
39. External W/T Channels: The number of external W/T channels
varies, depending on the location of the control site, but
usually consists of the following:-
(a) Command network star (Befehlsstern d. Ln. Regt.) for
reception of tactical orders and general administrative
business from and to the headquarters of the Ln. Regt. to
which the company operating the "Y" site belongs - a Saram or
FuGe.3 set is used for this traffic.
(b) Divisional signals star (Divisionsbefehlsstern), used
for operational orders and transmissions of range values in
the event of failure of the ground lines to the Division. This
traffic is also usually conducted on Saram or FuGe.3 sets.
(c) Aircraft reporting frequency (Frontflugmeldewelle, or
more recently Gerätemeldewelle). On this channel W/T
transmissions are received from all Radar search sites giving
briefly the important data relating to aircraft activity
taking place within the area of the site. This transmission
takes place by day and night and supplements and confirms
information on enemy activity received from the Divisional
Headquarters; messages are written out and handed to the "Y"
plotting officer. A pack type W/T set is used for reception of
this traffic.

Brummer Relay Stations.
40. According to P/W, Brummer relay stations are placed
throughout German territory and are employed for relaying R/T
speech in cases where aircraft have flown beyond the normal
R/T range of the "Y" site.
41. The Brummer stations are connected to the Division H.Q. by
landline and are controlled by the Division; should a "Y"
plotting officer find that an aircraft under his control is
nearing the limit of R/T range, he will request the Division
H.Q., to connect with a Brummer station in the relevant area.
42. Whilst making this request, the "Y" plotting officer
states the frequency on which the "Y" station is operating,
and the Brummer will transmit at that frequency. According to
P/W, the R/T traffic on Brummer stations is usually confined
to directional and homing instructions, although "Y" control
can sometimes continue after the limit of R/T range of the "Y"
site has been reached.

Plotting Hut and Operational Procedure.
43. The plotting rooms of the five stations belonging to "Y"
sites are grouped, in a single hut known as the "Auswertung"
(plotting centre). According to P/W there are two types of hut
at present in use and a plan view of both these types is shown
in Sketch III.
44. The older type of hut contains a separate plotting room
and table for each of the five stations, but this type of
control contra is said to have offered no satisfactory method
of centralised supervision of plots and each plotter had to
act on his own responsibility.
45. The improved type of plotting hut has been developed by
the Flugmeldedienst (aircraft reporting service) and is
believed by P/W now to be widely in use in Germany. In this
type of hut a series of six tables is arranged on one side of
a rectangular room and each table is fitted with the normal
control point and is occupied by an M.C.O. plotter. The chief
plotting officer's table and control point are placed behind
the row of tables in such a position that he has a view of all
proceedings.
46. The reason, for the six plotting tables is that on some
"Y" sites the "Egon" method of fighter control is practised in
addition to the normal "Y" control and an extra plotting table
is set aside for this purpose.
47. According to P/W the Seeburg table has been withdrawn from
the majority of "Y" sites in favour of the present simple
method of plotting. In front of each group of three tables is
a vertical glass screen marked with the German fighter grid
and the main outlines of a 1:300,000 map of the area of
control.
48. Behind each screen are four plotters, three of whom
receive and plot friendly bearing and range values on the
reverse side of the glass screen. Plots are compiled from
range and bearing data in the range-measuring room of each
station and are passed through to these plotters in terms of
the fighter grid; the fourth plotter is responsible for
receiving and marking enemy plots.
49. All plots are numbered and in addition the courses drawn
on the glass screens during each operation are copied on to a
sheet of paper for record and reference purposes.
50. The extremely close and continuous contact with the "Y"
controlled aircraft enables the plotting control officer
immediately to detect any deviation of the aircraft from the
correct course and to rectify the error by ordering a slight
correction of course when necessary.
51. The plotting officer bases his instructions to the
controlled aircraft on the estimated position of the friendly
and enemy aircraft; in doing this an allowance is made for a
delay varying from five to ten seconds between the times of
the observations of enemy aircraft when originally made and
when finally received and plotted. By experience, specific
allowances are made for the extent of the delay from the
various stations supplying enemy plots.
52. When the fighters are nearing the limit of the range of
the "Y" site, the "Y" plotting officer is responsible for
handing the aircraft over to the next station; he must advise
that station, through Divisional Headquarters of the receiver
and transmitter frequencies in use, since the new station may
have been operating on other frequency channels. This step is
taken sufficiently early to allow the new station taking over
control to tune in on the R/T traffic of the controlling
station.
53. The "Y" plotting officer's task ceases for the time being
when the control aircraft or accompanying formation is brought
in sight of the enemy or, in the case of night-fighters, when
the aircraft is sufficiently close to its target to be able to
make an attack with the aid of search equipment.
54. Plotting by the "Y" station continues throughout the
sortie and combat of a fighter interception force, and does
not cease until the aircraft return to base after combat.

A.D.I.(K) S.D. Felkin
23 Sept.’44. Wing Commander"


Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 22:15

German early warning Ground Radar
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 390/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – X.
German early warning Ground Radar.
1. This report is the tenth of the series dealing with radio
and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. As in the case of the
previous nine reports (A.D.I.(K) 343, 357, 362, 365, 369, 370
and 330/1945), it is based on interrogation of General
Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, Director General of Signals, and
some members of his staff, and has been supported by a number
of relevant documents of recent date which were in the
possession of the General's Chief of Staff.

DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY-WARNING RADAR.
Early History.
2. As recounted in A.D.I.(K) 343/1945 and again mentioned in
A.D.I.(K) 365/1945, the Freya, which became the first standard
early-warning radar set for the G.A.F., was developed by the
firm of Gema, Berlin, with the encouragement of the Navy. The
first Freyas were in operation as naval coast watchers in 1938
at a time when the G.A.F. was only thinking of radar in terms
of searchlights and Flak.
3. The Technisches Amt wished to push 50 cm. wavelength
like that of Würzburg, but the Navy backed the longer
wavelength of Freya, and General MARTINI, who immediately
appreciated the advantage of a wide-angle apparatus of Freya
type to early warning, asked that a number of Freyas should be
allocated to the G.A.F.
4. In early 1939 one of the present P/W, Oberst Ing. HENTZ
was selected from among the Köthen staff to take charge of the
first experimental Freya used by the G.A.F. in that year.
It was thought at first that the Freya would only give
indications over the sea, but during the march on Prague in
the first part of 1939 an experimental Freya was set up in the
Riesen Gebirge in order to watch Czech aircraft which might
react to the German advance. This experiment was not a
success, as the signals operators had not been expecting to
find their tube cluttered up with permanent echoes.
5. At the outbreak of war the G.A.F. possessed eight Freya
stations distributed round the East and North Frisian islands
guarding the Heligoland Bight and the approaches to the North
Sea ports. These Freyas proved their value during the early
Bomber Command raids on Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven etc., when
some outstanding successes were registered by German fighters,
which were vectored on to the bomber formation as a result of
the early-warning obtained by the Freyas. It was this success
which convinced the G.A.F. of the practicability of radar as
an early-warning device.

Early Developments.
6. The range of the early Freya was of the order of 80 km and
their accuracy of the order of a few degrees. No height
finding facilities were available. The height finding problem
at close range was solved by directing a Würzburg on to the
target when it came within the range of the latter, which in
these days was about 30 km. This system of height measurement
continued to be the only practical one for a long period,
although the field operators had put in requirements for
height finding Freya apparatus as early as 1940.
7. Experiments by the G.A.F. produced the Wassermann, but
the German Navy experimented with the object of introducing
height finding facilities in the Freyas, and the N.V.K. at
Pelzerhaken produced the "Chinese" and "Tiefland". The former
gave maximum location by means of a compensator in an serial
system inclined at 45° and was used for angles greater than
15°, whilst the latter was intended for angles less than 15°.
The combination of the two mounted on the Freya was known as
the “Malaya”.
8. Measurement of height with the Tiefland was possible
between 2° and about 15° over level terrain; measurement of
angles of less than 5° was, however, very inaccurate and range
was actually less than that of the Würzburg-Riese. Over uneven
terrain, measurement of the vertical angle was impossible.
9. The Tiefland had the disadvantage of being complicated in
operation - a large field of reflector nets was also necessary
- in addition to which it gave no better performance than the
Würzburg-Riese. Its use would only have been justified had it
been a device which could be moved easily and quickly and had
there not been restrictions on the selection of suitable sites
for its mounting.
10. Freya Fahrstuhl was designed by Köthen as early as 1943
but was never put into large-scale production, and was not
satisfactory. This apparatus depended on the difference of
phase observed between direct ray and ground reflection to
give height.
11. Finally, in 1944 methods or swinging the beam
electrically were used in the Wassermann for height
measurement, but the Würzburg remained the basic means of
measuring the elevation up to the end of the war. The D/F
accuracy of the Freya was greatly improved when the split beam
or A.N. technique was introduced in 1942, end this made Freya
valuable for fighter control on the Egon system.
12. The range of Freya, naturally dependent on height of an
objective, was about 150 km. but this was not considered
sufficient for the early-warning service and efforts were made
in 1942 to produce early-warning apparatus with greater range.
The first of these was the Wassermann which improved the
early-warning range to about 200-250 km, while the Mammut,
used by the Navy for coast watcher purposes, was also used by
the G.A.F. and gave ranges up to about 300 km. Finally
Elefant, which gave ranges up to 350 km., was built and came
into operation in about 1944.
13. By the middle of 1943 an elaborate early-warning service
covering the whole of Germany and composed of sites with both
Freyas, Würzburgs and Giant Würzburgs had been built up, and a
number of Wassermann chimneys were in operation along the
coast of Europe.
14. The great improvement in D/F accuracy resulting from the
split beam technique was utilised by KAMMHUBER to develop his
box system of night fighting, and in fact at this time it was
strictly forbidden for a night fighter to fly any form of
night defence other than the close control of the KAMMHUBER
box system.
15. Other methods of fighter control namely the Egon and
Bonito, were under development, and of these the former also
used the Freya wavelength for range and D/F.
Effect of first use of Window.
16. When Window was first used in July 1943 the whole of the
early-warning system as well as the night fighter control
system broke down completely.
17. The first German reaction to the use of Window was to
attempt to filter it out or obtain some method of
distinguishing between blips due to window and those due to
the aircraft itself. Virtually no work had been done on this
problem before July 1943 because GOERING had been so
frightened by the prospect of Window being used by the enemy
that the theoretical possibilities had been hushed up and
scientists has not being allowed to work on the problem (cf.
A.D.I.(K) 334/1945).
13. Nevertheless, when Window was first used by the Allies, it
was only a matter of some ten days before the first solution
to the Window problem for the Würzburg was forthcoming in the
shape of the Würzlaus, which relied on the Doppler effect.
High priority was given to the problem and even money prizes
were offered for solutions.
19. Three main types of equipment were evolved as a result of
the various solutions proposed; one was Taunus, which gave
greater blip resolution, another was the propeller modulation
type such as Nürnberg and the third was based on the Doppler
effect, the latter being termed Laus A—J devices. Of these the
Freyalaus for Freya and Wasserfloh for the Wassermann were not
used operationally till 1944.

Effect of Further Countermeasures.
20. As Allied countermeasures became more intense and
electronic jamming was also used, the signals staff decided
that it should be the genera1 policy to provide all types of
radar with the facility for a change of frequency. The first
efforts to do this were brought about by mechanical trombone
tuning of the aerials so that two or three neighbouring
wavelengths could be used. This was termed the WISMAR
principle.
21. Sometime in 1943 Dr. SCHULTER of the firm Siemens
developed the Breitband (wide band) aerial which enabled a
much greater frequency spread to be used. This principle was
termed Voll Wismar and with increasing experience was to be
applied to all types of ground radar. At the same time Freya
and Würzburg were allotted different "Inseln" or frequency
bands in the hope that some of these bands would not be jammed
locally. This policy was carried to great lengths, but Allied
countermeasures still remained extremely effective.
22. Either owing to the weakness of German centimetre
technique, or to a lack of appreciation of the value of
centimetre wavelengths, the main trend in avoiding British
countermeasures was towards longer wavelengths, and special
Köthen Freyas using wavelengths of 5 and 8 metres were
prepared. When jamming on the more normal wavelengths
became severe these reserve sets were operated for a minimum
period often only a few seconds, in order not to compromise
the wavelength, and an effort was made to obtain a clear
picture of the air situation with their aid.
23. Eventually wavelengths up to 13 metres came into use for
early-warning with giant sets such as Elefant.
British Transmissions as an Aid to Early Warning.
24. Despite all these precautions, and despite the fact that
P/W claimed that many of these wavelengths were not
effectively jammed, it frequently happened that the earlywarning
service was unable to obtain a clear picture of the
situation and recourse had to be made to indirect means. The
monitoring service was of particular value in this respect,
and they successfully maintained their point of view that it
was not worthwhile jamming the fighter R/T because D/F’ing of
this provided excellent early warning.
25. The fact that British night bomber crews were in the
habit of using Monica and H2S from the very beginning of their
flights was also of great assistance in supplementing the
early-warning picture. In the same way Allied I.F.F. was of
great value, and special Freyas known as Freya Flamme which
covered the I.F.F. frequency band were erected on some
important early-warning sites.
26. Finally, an ingenious system which was invented by Oberst
Postrat SCHOLZ called Klein Heidelberg utilised the reflection
of the transmissions from British C.H. stations and was
regarded as virtually unjammable.
Development of Panoramic Presentation.
27. As early as 1940 a requirement was put up for a panoramic
presentation for early-warning radar, but no great progress
seems to have been made until the discovery that H2S was using
a P.P.I. successfully. Difficulties were encountered with the
early types such as Propeller developed by Lorenz and it was
not until early 1944 that the Jagdschloss sets came into
existence. These were originally used entirely for early
warning and not with the idea that night-fighter aircraft
could be controlled with their aid. It was not until 1945,
when the value of Jagdschloss was fully appreciated and it was
numerous enough to cover 1st class radar sites throughout
Germany that some efforts were made in its employment for
control of night fighters.
28. With the intended introduction of Neuling I.F.F., which
could distinguish not only between friend and foe but between
individual crews as described in A.D.I.(K) 365/1945, fighter
control from panoramic presentation was to be greatly
extended.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND APPLICATIONS ON GROUND RADAR.
Day Fighter Control.
29. The necessity for day-fighter control from ground radar
stations was early appreciated by the Signals staff, and the
Battle of Britain proved to them how successfully it could be
used by air force inferior in numbers. Spasmodic attempts were
made to introduce it into the G.A.F. but the German fighter
tradition was too strong, and the pilots would not accept
ground control.
30. It was not until 1943 that close ground control on the
Egon system using the FuGe 25A in the aircraft was introduced.
Control of Night Fighters.
31. With KAMMHUBER’s box system two Würzburg sets were used -
one to follow the target and one to follow the fighter, the
positions of each being projected on to the map by means of
the so-called Seeburg Tisch. So long as there was no jamming
of ground radar, this method was successful and could place a
fighter within 200-400 metres of the target. Later the
Würzburg Riese was used and the majority of these sets were
allocated for this purpose.
32. A suggestion had been made that the Würzburg 50 cm.
transmission should be used simultaneously for giving the
fighter his vectors and a system named Sprechstange was
experimented with. It was rapidly found that, if the operator
failed to hold the fighter in the beam, the pilot received no
instructions from the ground, and so vital instructions might
not be heard. For this reason it was soon abandoned as not
practicable.

I.F.F. Problems.
33. The FuGe 25A was originally designed by the firm of Gema
for use with the first Freyas operating on 2.4 metres. As
recounted in A.D.I.(K). 365/1945 it became the standard German
airborne I.F.F. set in 1942 and was used with the Kuh
transmitter and Gemse receiver on all ground radar
installations, whatever the wavelength, with the exception of
the Würzburg series. A full description of the problems of
ground radar has been given in the above-mentioned report.
Plotting of High Flying Aircraft.
34. In 1944 it was found that the very high level Mosquito
bomber attacks on the Reich sometimes crossed the coast
unplotted, and at best were only detected intermittently after
passing the coastal screen of Wassermanns which could swing
their beams upward electrically. The reason for this was that
the main lobs of Freya only went up to about 8,000 metres.
There were two subsidiary lobes, the higher of which reached
to 12,000 metres, but the latter only gave limited coverage at
this height over an estimated range of 70 km.
35. The Würzburg beam was too narrow and did not give general
coverage, while Freya Fahrstuhl, which could also be utilised
for aircraft flying at great height, had hardly been
introduced into operations. For this reason considerable use
was made of the Würzburg Riese-G which was a Giant Würzburg
with a very narrow 50 cm. beam, with additional Freya aerials
on 2 metres, set in the paraboloid, giving a wide beam
coverage as well. As the circle paraboloid could be tilted
upwards, excellent high coverage was obtained and high fliers
were plotted with its aid.

Plotting of Low-Flying Aircraft.
36. The Germans were fully aware of lack of low cover, which
enabled aircraft flying low over the sea to cross the coast
unnoticed. A number of experiments were conducted to overcome
this disadvantage by placing special aerial arrays at
considerable height above the ground as for instance in the
case of the Würzmann using the Würzburg frequency and the
Tiefentwiel using the Hohentwiel A.S.V. frequency.
37. Some experiments were also conducted with wavelengths of
about 20 metres with the idea, it was believed, of making use
of the curved path which those waves followed. The experiments
were never completed, as this band was interfered with by
communications signals transmitted on the same wavelength.
38. Experiments had also been made at Köthen with Taunus
equipment coupled to the Freya to obtain extremely high
resolution. A Fieseler Storch aircraft was used, flying at 150
metres over flat country, and under these conditions the
aircraft could just be seen at ranges of 4 or 5 km. through
the ground returns due to woods and houses. It was concluded,
however, that this range was so small that no advantage was to
be gained.

GROUND RADAR INSTALLATIONS.
Freya.
39. Freya was manufactured by the firm of Gema, Berlin,
which, at the outbreak of war, was only a small establishment
largely financed by the Navy. Members of the Technisches Amt,
as well as of MARTINI’s staff, criticised the firm, severely,
saying that they lacked experience of manufacturing and were
unwilling to make themselves adaptable. They described the
Freya Stand for instance as a “cast iron monstrosity”, which
they felt could easily have been made very much lighter in
weight and manufactured more simply.
40. Despite this complaint against Gema, it was a principle
that all ground radar apparatus should be of fairly simple
construction so that it could be made mobile. A few days after
the invasion of Norway the Germans were experiencing
considerable trouble from bomber raids in the Stavanger area
and an urgent request was sent out from there for a Freya to
be supplied. This job was given to one of the present P/W, and
within three days of receiving it a Freya LZ Stand had been
dismantled and packed into three Ju.52's and transported to
Stavanger. Eight days after the reception of the order the
Freya was operating.
41. At the beginning of the war the G.A.F. possessed eight
Freyas. At the end of the war over 1,200 had been manufactured
and a document dated 1st January 1945 states that 671 were in
operation at that time.
42. Owing to the incidence of all forms of Allied jamming,
the original wavelength of 2.40 metres had been modified very
considerably. The following impressive list of wavelengths
current at the beginning of November 1944 was found among
documents brought by General MERTINI’s staff:-
M. M.
Insel A
Insel B
Insel C
Insel D Band Z
- 2,32-2,45
- 2,08-2,24
- 3,00-3,30
- 1,50-1,55
Köthenband gelb/braun
Köthenband gelb/rot
Köthenband Ludwig
Köthenband gelb
1,70
1,80
1,95
2,00
Y
X
W
V
U
T
Vollwismar
Bereich I
II
III
- 1,55-1,60
- 1,60-1,65
- 1,65-1,70
- 1,70-1,75
- 1,75-1,80
- 1,80-1,85
- 1,90-2,50
- 1,20-1,90
- 2,50-4,00
Köthenband gelb/grün
Köthenband grün
Köthenband rot
Köthenband braun
Köthenband weiss
Köthenband schwarz
Köthenband blau
Köthenband violett
Köthenband grau
Köthenband blau neu
2,56
3,15
3,40
3,65
4,05
4,60
4,80
5,20
5,75
8,80
43. In addition to this formidable list P/W states that in
early 1945 experiments were being made with a Köthen Freya on
about 12 metres. The Köthen Freya with wavelengths of over 4
metres presented a problem to the aerial experts which was
being solved by using Yagi aerials mounted above the normal
aerial mattress. Although it was considered desirable to mount
the aerials at a height above the ground of at least ten times
the wavelength, this was not always possible; for instance the
Yagi aerial of Köthen Blau (4.80 metres) was, according to a
document, to be mounted 30 metres above the ground.
44. Two further new wavelengths known as the Rotschwarz and
Grünschwarz were planned and were to operate on two of the
frequencies used by British Gee in the hope that they would
not be jammed. It was realized that these wavelengths could
only be used when the jamming of Gee by Heinrich transmitters
was not being carried out. The Freyas so equipped were to be
located as far as possible from the positions of the Heinrich
jamming transmitters.
45. In order that these longer wavelengths should not be
compromised, a so-called Kurz Zeit apparatus was built into
the Freyas which allowed transmission of only ten impulses and
prevented more impulses being emitted for a period which could
be set between 2 and 22 seconds. It was considered unlikely
that listening aircraft would be able to tune to these short
interrupted pulses.
46. A document, dated June 1944, in the possession of a
member of General MARTINI's staff, contains a short history of
the jamming experienced by Freya. Extracts from this document
are given below in free translation:
"Jamming by Jamming Transmitters.
"In April 1942 the jamming of Freya on the original 2.40 metre
wavelength was reported.
"On 5th March 1942 the Chef N.V.W. put up a requirement to the
Technisches Amt asking that alternative frequencies for Freya
should be made available, basing his request on the fact that
parts of a Würzburg, from which the exact wavelength could be
determined, had fallen into enemy hands during the Cap
d'Antifer (Bruneval) raid on 27th February 1942. By the end of
1942 the original Freya wavelength was being jammed generally.
"As no steps to provide alternative frequencies in operations
had at that time been taken by the Technisches Amt or by
industry, Ln. Versuchs Regiment Köthen was asked to use its
resources to provide them.
"After about one month, on 15th June 1945, the first Freya
which operated in an unjammed band, the Köthen Grün, was
handed over to a unit for operational use.
"In 1942, Freya on Insel B and Insel C had been demanded from
the industry but they were not delivered until 1943. The Insel
B sets were first available on 23rd February 1943, but shortly
after being used operationally were jammed by the Allies. The
Insel C apparatus was made available on 10th July 1943 and has
been in regular production until the last few months.
"It must be recorded at this point that the first new Insel
was produced by the industry about a year after Köthen had
produced an improvised apparatus. Moreover, the Technisches
Amt and industry were unable to give the Signals branch a
Freya which was not jammed. Assistance had to be sought from
Köthen, who produced Köthen bands which alone enabled the
further operation of Freyas to take place.
"In view of the jamming situation the Chef N.V.W. demanded on
19/12/42:-
(a) Freya frequencies below 1.90 metres.
(b) A Voll Wismar band which allowed constant frequency
change
(c) Long waves over 4 metres, with the suggestion that the
Yagi aerial arrays should be used.
"The following comments must be made on the foregoing
demands:-
(d) The first Freya below 1.90 metres (Flum 41) became
available on 2/7/43.
(e) The first Voll Wismar was delivered in May 1943, but in
spite of this the first mass-produced apparatus was not
available until July 1944, and then only in small
numbers.
(f) The problem of long-wave Freyas was never taken up by
either the Technisches Amt or by industry. This problem
was solved by the development by Köthen of Yagi
aerials, and these were first built into operational
sets in September 1944.
"Jamming by Window.
"The possibilities of jamming by Window were made quite clear
on 17/3/1943 and a requirement for an anti-jamming device for
all radar apparatus was formulated. Not until 19th June 1944,
that is, one year and three months later, was the Freyalaus,
which had been developed by ZVH, made available by the Chef
TLR.
"Since it was clear that a change-over to longer waves to
avoid Window was the only possibility available at that time,
the only solution was the use of long-wave apparatus (Yagi
Köthen Grau). With this type of equipment it has been possible
for some months to obtain an early picture free from jamming.
Further Yagi wavelengths were developed and units are being
equipped with them.
"To make recognition of new radar wavelengths impossible for
the enemy, a short transmission system (Kurz Zeit Messung)
described above was formulated as a requirement on 23/9/42. At
the data of writing this has not yet been introduced."
48. The decision to avoid Window by using longer wavelengths
appears to have been taken on the results of some experimental
work. When Window 1.80 metres long was produced against SN2,
Insel C was severely affected, and research work was done on
the susceptibility of different wavelengths to Window of this
length. The diagram produced in Appendix I shows the effect
produced by a standard quantity of 1.80 metre Window at a
range of about 70 km. on various types of Freya.
49. As a result of this experimental work, the Signals staff
realised that it was an advantage to increase the wavelengths
as the intensity of the signal received fell off sharply above
3.80 metres. It was considered impracticable to put a longer
Window into use and as a result the so-called-Köthen bands
were produced.
50. The Germans were unaware that we were dropping very long
Window {rope) at a later date. A certain number of specimens
of this had been picked up and it had been assumed that it had
something to do with meteorological observations.
51. In an interesting publication Funkmessnachrichten No. 19
dated 25th February 1945, it is stated that the C-Insel of
Freya suffered worst from jamming by ground transmitters but
gelb-rot, grün, braun, weiss and grau Köthen bands and the A,
B and D Insel were also jammed at times.
52. Airborne transmitters were beginning to jam the Köthen
grau band, while Köthen braun and D Insel experienced
occasional interference by airborne-electronic jammers. Only
on one occasion had jamming of the Köthen weiss been observed
from the air.
53. The G.A.F. was vitally interested in the Köthen grau band
which was the main stand-by for the early-warning service, and
it was this band and the Köthen blau on 8.80 metres about
which instructions had been given that they were to be
switched on only for very short time in emergency. About 40
Köthen grau equipments were in operation.
54. The range claimed for Freya was 80-120 km., with a range
accuracy of ±300 metres and D/F accuracy with split beam
(A.N.) 1/3°.
55. It is stated in the same document that by February 1945
all Freya equipments, with the exception of some motorised
units, had been fitted with the Freyalaus. A new type of A-J
device, which is however, not described, named the Prüflaus
was at this time being tested on a few sites.

Freya Flamme.
56. A certain number of Freyas in the Insel D band were set
aside for the purpose of triggering off British I.F.F. when
this had been left on in aircraft inadvertently. It was
claimed that, provided the aircraft was flying at a
considerable height, ranges of up to 450 km. had been obtained
with the Freya Flamme. D/F was difficult due to the wide
spacing of the short pulses and no continuous echo beingobtained.
The Germans were aware that six codes were
transmitted by British I.F.F. and believed that they know the
significance of the various identifications.
57. Initially this proved a most useful very long-range early
warning, but the number of aircraft flying with I.F.F. had
been greatly reduced during the last year of the war.

Freya Fahrstuhl.
58. The Freya Fahrstuhl, designed by Köthen, is a Freya with
height—finding facilities obtained by making use of the
reflected ground wave. It was first introduced in early 1943,
but owing to unknown causes, a certain amount of trouble was
experienced and only about eight equipments were in operation
on 1st January 1945. The original requirements were formulated
in 1940 for a Freya type apparatus to give elevation.
59. This set had a range of 220 km. and was used for height
finding by the early—warning service and also as an aid to
Flak if the Würzburg were jammed. The wavelength used was 2.00
metres (Köthen gelb). The Freya Fahrstuhl was originally
intended as an early-warning radar giving height, but the few
produced were largely used to give height to Flak when the
latter's Würzburg was jammed.

Würzburg.
60. The history of the development of this apparatus will be
told more fully in the next and final report of this series
which will deal with German Flak radar, for which purpose it
was originally designed.
61. The original Würzburg Insel A had no split beam D/F but
was nevertheless used for early attempts to control night
fighters.
62. The frequency used by Würzburg A was a single spot
frequency, between 53.0 and 54.2 cm. It was first introduced
in any quantity for raid reporting purposes in the autumn of
1940, when it was used to obtain the height of aircraft
observed on the Freya. Its maximum range was about 25 km.
63. The next type introduced was the Würzburg C with A.N. D/F
facilities and range of 25 km. The first Würzburg C’s came
into service in the summer of 1941. A few were used for
controlling night fighters, but the great majority was used by
Flak. The Würzburg C’s were on fixed frequencies in the band
53.0 to 54.2 cm.
64. The final form of Würzburg, the D, had still only a 25
km. range operationally, but was a general improvement over
the C with split D/F facilities giving an accuracy of ± ½° and
range accuracy of ±50 metres. It was introduced in the autumn
of 1941 believed to have been used for Flak purposes only.
65. The original sets were in the frequency band known as
Insel A 53.0 - 54.2 cm but later a B band from 56.7 to 58.0
and a C band from 62.3 to 63.8 were introduced.
66. Finally a Würzburg was manufactured with wide band
aerials using the Urechse equipment which allowed any
wavelength between 53.0 and 63.8 cm. to be used. The Urechse
transmitter was being generally introduced in the spring of
1945.

Würzburg Riese.
67. The Würzburg Riese was introduced in 1941, and from the
beginning was mainly used for the close control of night
fighters on the Himmelbett system. In all, 452 sets were in
operation on 1st January 1945. A few sets were used for
providing the Gross Batterien, situated at Berlin and other
places, with information for their anti-aircraft operations,
but these were of the Riese G (Gustav) type with Freya aerials
incorporated in the paraboloid, so that a 50° wide search beam
was provided as well as the 13° main beam on 50 cm.
68. The wavelength used for the Freya section of the Riese G
was originally 2.20 Metres, but wavelengths of 1.80 metres and
1.70 metres were also introduced, and it was intended to use
1.60 metres in the future. The Würzburg section of the Riese
used the A and B Insel of the Würzburg bands, namely 53.0 -
54.2 cm. and 56.7 - 58.0 cm. The range of the Würzburg Riese
was about 70 km. and its range accuracy was of the order of
±50 metres.
69. Some ten of the sets used for Flak were provided with
Voll Wismar using the Schwarz Echse transmitter on a new
wavelength of 1.50 metres.
70. The additional Freya wavelength was found to be
particularly valuable against U.S. day bombers, which usually
only jammed the Würzburg 50-60 cm. band and left the Freya
band unjammed.

Wassermann.
71. The original purpose for which Wassermann was introduced
was to obtain a more powerful early warning radar with a
greater range than Freya, and it was therefore the G.A.F.
equivalent of the novel Mammut. Three main types of Wassermann
were produced, the L, S and M.
72. The Wassermann L (Leicht = light) was produced by Gema
and was said to have a range of 200 km., an accuracy in D/F of
± ½° and in range of ±5 km. The first set came into use about
the summer of 1942; two types were manufactured, namely L.I,
on 2.40 metres and L.II on 2.01-2.27 metres, in which spot
frequencies (Streuwellen) at 15 mc/s intervals were available.
About 25 of these were built. They were constructed as lightly
as possible so that they would be transportable, which was
considered specially important for the Balkans and in Norway.
It was estimated that they took about 3-4 weeks to erect. They
had, however, a disadvantage that in strong winds the whole
tower was apt to be blown over.
73. The Wassermann S (Schwer = heavy) was also constructed by
Gema and its accuracy was comparable with the L, except that
ranges of 300 km. were obtained. The first equipment was
erected towards the end of 1942 and in all some ten became
operational. The first seven sets erected (S.1 to S.7) used
wavelengths of 2.40 or 2.46 metres. These numbered S.8 to 10
used 2.36 metres, 2.34 metres and 2.29 metres. These sets took
something over 4 months to build, but they were at least more
robust than the Wassermann L.
74. The final form of Wassermann, the M. (Mittel =
intermediate) was designed by Siemens. Its accuracy in D/F and
range was about the same as the other two types but a maximum
range of about 220 km. was obtained.
75. The first types introduced were the M.I and M.II in the
autumn of 1943. Both used frequencies in the 2.01-2.20 metre
band but the M.II allowed different frequencies within this
band to be used on the Wismar principle.
76. The M.III used the 1.20-1.90 metre band, and was of the
wide band Voll Wismar type but only two sets were built, as it
was succeeded in the spring of 1944 by the M.IV which gave
wide-band facilities from 1.90-2.50 metres. Some twelve M.IV.
were in operational use by January 1945, and more were being
produced.
77. The latest form of Wassermann was to be the M.V. which
was a wide band equipment working on 2.50-4 metres, of which
one experimental set had been set up on the Baltic coast.
78. Since about the beginning of 1944 an electrical
compensating arrangement had been built into the Wassermann
which allowed the beam to be swung in elevation, and an
elevation of about 15° could be obtained. The A-J device
Wasserfloh with Doppler effect was fitted first towards the
end of 1944.
79. Generally speaking the Wassermann was a disappointment.
Production of Elefant was postponed as the original estimate
of Wassermann's range, as late as autumn 1943, was that it
would give 400 km. coverage. Wassermann never succeeded in
giving coverage much over 200 km.

Mammut.
80. This coastal radar equipment which was known to the
Allies as the "Hoarding" was really a Naval coast-watching
radar of which some 8-10 specimens were operated by the
Luftwaffe. It had the advantage that the polar lobe was well
beamed - more beamed than the Wassermann - and, therefore, it
was not very susceptible to jamming but it took about 8 months
to erect and was costly and unvieldy. The comparatively narrow
lobe scanned electrically by means of a phase shifter, termed
a compensator. The wavelength used was the original Freya band
2.40 metres and the range achieved some 300 km. No height
finding was available.

Elefant.
81. The Elefant, sometimes referred to as See-Elefant was
produced by the Reichspost and was designed in part by Ober
Postrat Dr. SCHOLZ. At the end of the war three equipments of
this type had been built and a further three were in course of
erection. The wavelength used was comparatively long, in
conformity with policy of escaping the effect of Window by
increasing the wavelength. Of the three sets built, two were
in the 7.90-8.80 metres band, and the remaining one in the
band from 10.70-12 metres.
82. A D/F accuracy of 1° was obtained and range accuracy of
±4 km. The first set was created in the summer of 1942. But it
underwent constant improvement and its form was not finalised
until 1944. In November 1943 the Technisches Amt refused
definitely to sanction the large-scale introduction of Elefant
as although a range of 400 km. was obtained similar results
were expected (but never obtained) from the Wassermann. A few
were, however, built by Köthen in the field.
83. In order to prevent the long wavelength from being
compromised, the Elefant was only used for short periods and
when the air situation was not clear to the ear1y-warning
service. This was the more important as it was realised that
Elefant could easily be jammed. The normal array consisted of
two 100 metres high towers.

Heidelberg.
84. One of the present P/W believed that experiments were
being carried out with an early warning set on a wavelength of
between 18 and 20 metres which was to be called Heidelberg. He
understands that jamming interference was encountered, as the
set operated on the frequency band used by W/T traffic, and
for this reason the project was dropped. P/W stated that it
was hoped to obtain very great ranges, as the waves would
conform to the earth's curvature. There may, however, be some
confusion in his mind with the Klein Heidelberg system
described below.

Klein Heidelberg.
85. The name Klein Heidelberg was given to a system utilising
reflections from aircraft of the pulses emitted by British
radar stations or by distant German stations. Strictly
speaking, therefore, it was not a radar set at all.
86. The results obtained were satisfactory at the three
stations used, but at the time of its invention by Ober
Postrat SCHOLZ, in 1941, it was not regarded as of particular
importance, as their radar was not being jammed.
87. In 1944, when jamming became serious, the Klein
Heidelberg system proved of great value. Its D/F was poor but
range was adequate for early warning information.
88. It was noticed in October 1944 that our 25 cycle CH
stations had started to change their p.r.f. but a radio
locking system was improvised within six weeks and thereafter
no trouble was experienced. Tests were made to utilise the
Gee pulse sources, but the system worked adequately with CH
and the experiments were not pursued.
89. When he was interrogated on this matter Dr. SCHOLZ stated
that he understood that the results obtained at the Römö
station were surprisingly good, despite the great distance
from Great Britain.

Würzmann.
90. The Würzmann was the name given to an experimental
coastal set which was to be used for the location of low
flying aircraft. According to P/W, it was a Jagdschloss
Michael B aerial array set up on end. The aerial array of the
Jagdschloss Michael B consisted of a double row of 18 Würzburg
mirrors and measures not less than 56 metres x 7 metres.
91. This gigantic erection was mounted so that the electric
centre of gravity was 50 metres above sea level and produced,
in fact, a Würzburg beam which was very narrow in azimuth.
With its aid it was claimed that aircraft flying at 0 feet
could be seen at a range of 20 km.

Tiefentwiel.
92. Tiefentwiel was the code name applied to an aerial array
placed high above ground using the Hohentwiel A.S.V. set with
the intention of detecting low-flying aircraft coming in over
the sea. No details of the aerial array or method of operation
were known but it was stated that the Tiefentwiel achieved as
good results as the Würzmann, namely a range of about 30 km.

Hohentwiel Boden.
93. Funkmessnachrichten publication No. 19 announced the
introduction of a short-range highly-mobile early-warning
radar called Hohentwiel Boden which could be erected in 15
minutes. The set consisted essentially of the Hohentwiel
A.S.V. set with an aerial array mounted on the top of a 10'
high mast. This improvisation was carried out by the Ln.
Versuchs Regiment Köthen, who stated that individual targets
could be seen at a range of 30-35 km. and formations at 60-70
km. It was to be used in the front line to give advance
warning of raids.

PANORAMIC RADARS.
Propeller.
94. Some time in 1943 the firm of Lorenz produced an idea for
a P.P.I. presentation for early warning to which they gave the
code name "Propeller". This set relied on extremely rapid
rotation of the aerials and used a wavelength of about 50 cm.
95. Just before the set was officially demonstrated to the
G.A.F. it exploded. All the apparatus was lost and the project
was abandoned.
Jagdschloss F.
96. The first type of early-warning radar set giving
panoramic display which come into operation in usually
referred to as the Jagdschloss, although it’s official
designation is Jagdschloss F, to distinguish it from later
types, such as the Michael B and Z. It was produced by the
firm of Siemens and was first used in operations in early
1944. About 65 Jagdschloss F equipments had been manufactured
by the end of the war.
97. Equipments No. 1 to 62 were of the Voll Wismar type using
wide band aerials and covering the band 1.90-2.20 metres. From
63 onwards the frequency band to be covered was 1.20-1.90
metres. A document mentions Jagdschloss lang (=long) with a
wavelength of 8.0-10 metres. No information about this has
been obtained.
98. These sets were used exclusively by the early-warning
service and gave a range of about 100 km. with a D/F accuracy
of 1° and a range accuracy of 4.5 km.
99. The range accuracy depended largely on the presentation
on the 40 cm. P.P.I. tube. At 100 km. the area of error was
stated to be 5 x 5 km. but Köthen was attempting to improve
the presentation so that blips could be read to a greater
accuracy by introducing electrical range rings.
100. Another trouble that was being experienced in February
1945 was that the 50 cycle frequency at the national electric
grid affected the presentation so that the blips which should
have appeared as small arcs actually appeared as an arc with a
wavy out-line.
101. The P.P.I. tubes produced by Siemens were being modified
to avoid this imperfection while the Fernseh A.G., who also
produced tubes for Jagdschloss, were working on the problem.
It was believed that a new type of "Tonfrequenz" cable would
be necessary. Particular attention was being paid to this
point because of the difficulties in reading the tube caused
by window.
102. According to a document a new type of valve called the
Nullode was being introduced at this period to replace the
8D.6 diode in the Simultan unit.
103. It was proposed to introduce a selecting switch, by
means of which three alternative pictures could be produced on
the P.P.I. tube. The first picture showed all blips present on
the tube, the second position allowed the I.F.F. to be
switched in, while the third was a purely I.F.F. picture in
which only friendly aircraft with I.F.F. operating came up.
104. The I.F.F. problem had not been fully solved and it is
stated in a document that a separate FuGe control set is
necessary to assist in obtaining unequivocal identifications.
105. In this same document mention is made of the Münchhausen
system which was to use coloured photographic films to
distinguish between Windows and moving targets; stationery
targets would appear on the film as dark spots while moving
aircraft would appear as spots with red and blue edges in the
direction of movement. This system had been worked out at
Werneuchen and in February 1945 the first apparatus was in use
with a Jagdschloss equipment in the field. The film, however,
took between one and two minutes to develop.
106. Further difficulties in the form of dead zones were
being encountered with Jagdschloss and it is suggested in
Funkmessnachrichten publication No. 19 that a wire netting
surface with a radius of 50-60 metres should be built round
the Jagdschloss in order to get rid of the lower dead zone and
to aid in increasing the range against high flying aircraft.
It is stated that one ton of iron wire netting necessary for
each site.
107. According to P/W the electrical jamming of Jagdschloss
was never very severe, particularly as it had Voll Wismar. The
fact that it was causing trouble was, however, proved by the
fact that in Funkmessnachrichten publication No. 19 it is
stated that a number of special cameras had been provided and
were in use at various Jagdschloss sites to take pictures of
the type of jamming encountered in order to ascertain what
measures could be undertaken against jamming.
108. A so-called electric lens was to be used as a means of
seeing through Window. This was an arrangement whereby a
magnification of between 2 and 3 times natural size could be
obtained of a circular area of the picture. The area which
could be magnified could be chosen but was limited to circles
whose circumference passed through the centre of the tube, but
did not reach the edge of the 40 cm. P.P.I. tube.
Jagdschloss Michael B.
109. A ponderous aerial array of two rows of eighteen
Würzburg mirrors measuring 56 metres long x 7 metres high was
used in the Würzmann experimental early-warning radar, and
formed the serial array for Jagdschloss Michael B with the
array in a horizontal position. The wavelength employed, was
that of a Voll Wismar 53.0-63.8 cm.
110. By means of this aerial a beam of ½° horizontal width
was obtained and a range of about as much as 250 km on single
aircraft was expected. It was also expected that the narrowbeaming
of Michael B would be of great assistance in avoiding
Window. The dead zones were to be overcome by switching the
frequency to another wavelength in the Voll Wismar band II,
which was believed to run from 50-60 cm. The first set was to
be ready in April 1945.

Forsthaus F.
111. This apparatus was designed by Telefunken to fulfil the
same purpose as the Jagdschloss Michael B using the so-called
Euklid 25-29 cm. waveband employed by the Navy. Once more a
very long aerial array 48 metres long and about 8 metres high
was used, employing a cylindrical paraboloid. A wave guide
antenna (Hohlraumstrahler) was placed along the focal line
with a second and a third wave guide parallel to it above and
below respectively. The object of these two supplementary wave
guide aerials was to provide displaced beams and so avoid the
dead zones. A range of 220 km. was expected against single
aircraft but no details were available as to whether it had
come into operational use.

Forsthaus KF.
112. In order to introduce as rapidly as possible a panoramic
early-warning radar in the West on a hitherto unused
wavelength, a smaller form of the Forsthaus F called the KF
was to be introduced while the F was being completed. It was
planned so that it could be used on a railway wagon; the
revolving aerial array was only 24 metres long and it was
expected to give a range of 120 km. The wavelength and
electrical circuits used were exactly the same as in the

Forsthaus F.
Dreh Freya.
113. This set, which was also known as Freya Panorama, was
first introduced in June 1944. It consisted of a Freya aerial
of the Breitband type working in Bereich I (1.90-2.50), the
frequency of which could be adjusted at will. The aerial was
so built that it rotated through 360° and gave a remote
panoramic presentation. About 20 equipments were in use in
January 1945. The range claimed for it was only about 100 km.

Jagdhütte.
114. This apparatus, which was produced by Siemens, gave a
panoramic P.P.I. display of the German I.F.F. responses, using
24 metre or 36 metre rotating aerials. The wavelength employed
was 2.40 metres and it was planned, with its aid, to trigger
off the FuGe 25A. In this way friendly fighters were to be
controlled from the ground at ranges up to about 300 km. It
was fully realised that if the FuGe 25A frequency was ever
jammed the Jagdhütte would be useless, but it was not
considered likely that the Allies would attempt to jam it.
115. On the 1st January 1945 the first Jagdhütte equipment
was being erected, and it was expected that production would
amount to two per month thereafter. At the end of the war
about 8-10 were being built, but there is no information as to
how successfully they were employed.

Jagdwagen.
116. Jagdwagen was designed as a mobile Panoramic radar to
control fighterAs at close ranges immediately behind the front.
It was a project of the firm of Lorenz. The aerials were
considerably smaller than the Jagdhütte, the array being only
8 metres long. The aerial array was to be mounted on the
Kumbach stand as used in the Egerland Flak set. The frequency
bend used was that of the A.S.V. set Hohentwiel namely 53-59
cm.
117. The horizontal beaming was of the same order as that in
the full Jagdschloss F, namely about 6°, and ranges claimed
for it were of the order of 40-60 km. for medium heights. A
small P.P.I. tube of about 15 cm. diameter was used.
118. In February 1945 the first sets were being tried out at
Werneuchen but it was hoped to produce the Jagdwagen, in
series, as a fully mobile panoramic set operated by a
motorised company to install them on aerodromes so that a
picture of the local air position could easily be obtained.

Jagdschloss Z.
114. The Jagdschloss Z was the centimetric form of
Jagdschloss, which was in development by Siemens; the rotating
aerials were to be about 24 metres long. These sets were to
give an extremely narrow beam and so offer protection against
jamming. The range expected was of the order of 100 km., and
although the first experimental equipment had been built it
was not expected that sets would came into operational use
until the autumn of 1945.

Forsthaus Z.
120. The Forsthaus Z was another form of 9 cm. panoramic for
early warning, which was produced by the firm of Telefunken.
It differed from Jagdschloss Z mainly in the design of aerials
and was about in the same stage of production. No information
could be given as to the advantages or disadvantage possessed
by Jagdschloss Z.
NOTE: One of the documents brought to England by General
MARTINI’s staff contained a list of the frequency
coverages mentioned in this report, and is reproduced
in Appendix II."



Bruce Dennis 31st October 2018 22:56

German Radio Countermeasures
 
"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 380/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – IX.

German Radio Countermeasures.
1. This report is the ninth of the series dealing with
radio and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. The present
information was mainly obtained from Dr. Ingenieur SCHOLZ, a
civilian employee of the Reichspost Zentrale who was in
charge of a sub-section of Abteilung 6 of the
Generalnachrichtenführer dealing with the problem of RCM
(radio countermeasures).
2. Interrogation of this man has been supported by
information gained from other members of General MARTINI's
staff and by a number of relevant documents of recent date in
possession of the General's Chief of Staff. Some useful
additional help was given by two engineers who had recently
been engaged in testing ground and airborne jamming equipment
at the G.A.F. research establishment at Werneuchen.
3. The radio countermeasures used by the Germans have been
treated in this report under four headings, the first being a
brief historical account of their employment, and the other
three dealing in turn with RCM against communications, metric
radar and centimetre radar. The types of jamming transmitters
referred to by name, or of which a mention has been found in
documents, are listed in alphabetical order and their
functions briefly described in Appendix I to this report.

THE GERMAN MONITORING SERVICE AND EVOLUTION OF COUNTERMEASURES.
BASIS FOR COUNTERMEASURES.
4. At the beginning of the war the G.A.F. High Command was
not radio minded; GOERING in particular has been frequently
accused by his underlings of paying no attention to technical
matters. In the opinion of General MARTINI's staff, the vital
importance of radio warfare and radio countermeasures was
only truly appreciated by the General Staff towards the end
of 1944. Those responsible for German jamming, therefore, had
great difficulty in obtaining permission to use the
countermeasures to the extent that they could have wished.
5. The countermeasure organisation relied in the first
place on the German "Y" service, which formed Abteilung 3 of
General MARTINI's staff, to give advance information of new
radio activities, and for this purpose it employed a staff of
expert radio engineers whose task was to identify and explain
any new frequencies or types of transmissions received. If,
however, novel features in a monitored transmission were
observed and could not be explained, a commission for the
investigation of the particular subject was set up. This
commission was composed of representatives of the "Y" service
and of the Development (E) departments of the R.L.M.,
representatives of the research (F) department of the R.L.M.,
and such experts from the leading firms as had special
experience in the field of radio which was thought to be in
question.
6. Evidence collected by listening, though it could be very
valuable as intelligence, did not necessarily tell the whole
story or indicate the most suitable form of countermeasures.
As far as airborne equipment was concerned, statements made
by prisoners of war often helped to fill out the details and
the capture of equipment and its identification with the new
transmission was of great value, even if the equipment was
severely damaged.
7. Intelligence information from the above three sources
could usually be pieced together to tell the whole story, so
that decisions could be taken as to whether radio
countermeasures were required.
8. The Germans relied very largely on the laboratories and
experience of the Reichspost Zentrale (RPZ) to solve the
technical problem of how and with what equipment to jam, and
they obtained for the duration of the war the loan of an
engineer of that organisation (the present P/W) who was put in
charge of RCM and carried out liaison with RPZ to this end.

EVOLUTION OF COUNTERMEASURES.
9. The decision to jam a particular type of transmission
rested very largely with General MARTINI and was often taken
despite the protests of the "Y" service section of his staff,
who were interested professionally in monitoring all
transmissions. Particularly in the case of R/T, the "Y"
service insisted that more strategic and tactical information
could be obtained by D/F’ing enemy transmissions than any
tactical advantage which might be gained by jamming them.
10. As an instance of the extent to which the decision lay
with General MARTINI the following case was quoted: In 1942
Allied night fighters were becoming a nuisance in the
Mediterranean area but General KESSELRING had to ask General
MARTINI’s permission to jam their ground-to-air R/T control in
his theatre of operations and only then could the
countermeasures be undertaken.
11. The first German radio countermeasures were instituted in
September 1940 during the day bombing raids of the Battle of
Britain and were directed against British radar operations in
the Channel. The first and most important site used was that
at Mont Couple behind Calais were, by the end of the war, a
battery of some 35 jammers had been set up.
12. Radio countermeasures against Gee were put in hand in the
summer of 1942 and at about this same time the first attempts
were made to jam A.S.V. in the Channel. From this time on, the
countermeasure warfare increased and consideration was given
to jamming all types of new radar devices.
13. In about 1943 it was realised that countermeasures might
well be called for on every wavelength, and Dr. SCHOLZ put up
a requirement to the Reichspost Zentrale (RPZ) laboratories
for a series of jammers to be designed for covering all
wavelengths from 50 cm. upwards. These jamming transmitters
were designed in the Potsdam RPZ laboratories, and
improvements were constantly being incorporated in them so
that if there was a sudden call for countermeasures on an as
yet unused frequency, a practical design was available and
apparatus could be built at short notice.
14. As a result of this policy new countermeasures could be
put in hands quickly, but in practice they usually took
considerably longer to organise than might theoretically be
expected because the ground crews had to be trained in their
use. Dr. SCHOLZ stated that with a few exceptions these ground
crews were of second-rate material and it was frequently a
matter of weeks before they were sufficiently well-trained for
the countermeasures to become effective.

COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST COMMUNICATIONS.
GROUND-TO-GROUND COMMUNICATIONS.
15. With the possible exception of communications between land
and convoys, P/W believed that no attempt was made to jam
Allied W/T communications on the ground. Listening to them was
considered to be of the greatest strategic intelligence value
and little or no tactical object was served by jamming.
16. Radio countermeasures against the B.B.C. news service were
in the hands of civilian authorities, and the G.A.F. had
nothing whatsoever to do with them. Dr. MEINEL of the
Reichspost was believed to have been responsible for the
production of the type of jamming modulation which was
generally used.

GROUND-TO-AIR R/T.
17. The question of jamming Allied ground-to-air and air-toair
R/T was one of the points most strongly disputed between
the "Y"-service and the operational side of the G.A.F. The
"Y"-service maintained that by listening to and D/F’ing
traffic, both strategic and tactical intelligence was obtained
and that it was frequently their best source of early warning
of attack by aircraft; as a result relatively few attempts
were made to jam Allied R/T.
18. In the case of German raids on England the signals staff
agreed that there was an advantage in jamming British R/T
communications; this point arose when the possibilities of
Mark IV A.I. were first realised early in 1941. The question
of how to undertake countermeasures against British A.I. was
discussed and the weak point of the system was held to be the
R/T link from ground to air, because it appeared to be
essential for the night fighter to be brought within
2 km. of the bomber before contact could be made.
19. The Reichspost Zentrale built an airborne R/T jammer set
which was given the name of Karuso and was intended to prevent
R/T being heard by the night fighter when the latter was
within 3 km of its target. Within eight weeks the first Karuso
equipment was ready and a total of 100 were built. With the
cessation of the bombing of England in about May 1941, the
majority arrived too late and Karuso was only used once in a
limited number of aircraft in a bombing operation when, P/W
believed, Plymouth was the target.
20. When in 1943 trouble with British night fighters was again
being experienced in the Mediterranean, the Karuso sets were
sent down to that theatre. There, however, the range of
British A.I. was found to be about 4 km. instead of 2 km., so
that the power output of Karuso had to be boosted to give it a
range of 5 km.
21. The method employed was barrage jamming using two bands
(100 - 110 mc/s and 110 - 120 mc/s) with mechanical condensertuned
sweep through the band. There was not room for two
transmitters in one aircraft so only half the band could be
covered in any one German bomber. Karuso III, a later
improvement, was to be capable of being tuned through 100 -
150 mc/s band but so far as is known, it was not put into use.
22. Subsequent tests of Karuso indicated that it had
insufficient range, and by December 1944 the Starnberg, which
was developed in 1940 by D.V.L. as a jammer against radar, had
also been tried out but was likewise considered inefficient. A
new set named Nervtöter was under development but never came
into operational use.
23. It was decided that the jamming of R/T would be of value
against air activity when the invasion took place and prior to
D-Day some 50 or 60 modified Karl II jammers had been formed
into a Stördorf (= jamming village) and assembled at a site on
the Channel coast near Dieppe. With this assembly of jammers,
all possible frequencies in the 100 - 150 mc/s R/T band could
be covered.
24. A few days before the invasion the site was carpet bombed
by the Americans and although the jammers had been somewhat
dispersed, 90 of them had their aerials damaged or were put
out of action. There was some delay in bringing up reserve
motorised units and the invasion took place before they
reached the Channel coast. As a result, no countermeasures
against fighter R/T took place during the invasion.
25. In November 1944 a limited amount of jamming of fighter
R/T in the 70 - 100 mc/s band was carried out on the western
front by motorised units and from a few fixed sites. These
countermeasures were on a restricted scale, owing to lack of
apparatus, but it was hoped to interfere with Allied ground
control of fighters and fighter R/T.

AIR-TO-AIR R/T.
26. During defensive operations over the Reich against Allied
aircraft, countermeasures were very rarely used owing to the
insistence of the "Y"-service on the value of D/F’ing
transmissions, particularly as the German early warning radar
was heavily jammed. Early in 1945, however, it was planned to
create four jamming villages (Stördorf) each with ten Karl
transmitters in order to jam R/T during raids over German
territory. The use of airborne jammers to carry out the same
task had been considered but it was felt that airborne jamming
was less rational than jamming from ground stations because
the frequencies had to be constantly monitored.
27. By the end of the war a new jamming transmitter called the
Feuerland had been developed by Blaupunkt. This allowed noise
modulation to be used in addition to the more generally used
Reichspost modulation. A few sets were sent up to the Holstein
area just before the capitulation, but it was believed that
they had never been used in operations.
28. The standard type of modulation which had been developed
by Reichspost consisted of a number of "Kipp" frequencies -
sharp triangular pulses produced by blocking oscillators -
superimposed on the carrier wave. Tests of its effectiveness
at audio frequencies were carried out early in the war and a
statistical analysis of them seemed to show that it was the
most effective modulation against R/T.

RUSSIAN R/T
29. The airborne FuGe.10 was being developed for use as a
jamming transmitter against the 3 - 6 mc/s band R/T used by
the Russian Air Force. This apparatus never came into
operational use.

R.C.M. AGAINST METRIC RADAR
EARLY WARNING RADAR
30. It was in August or September 1940 during the Battle of
Britain that the first German countermeasures were directed
against British ground radar. The site at Mont Couple behind
Calais was used at first, but was gradually extended to a
chain of ground jammers along the whole Channel coast, and
ultimately there were sufficient to have every identified
British ground radar station covered by at least one suitable
jammer.
31. In 1940 the stations jammed were those in the 20 - 30 mc/s
and 50 – 90 mc/s bands. Both ground stations and airborne
apparatus carried in Ju.52's were used. By 1941 a chain of
Karl jammers which also covered the 200 mc/s band had been set
up along the whole coast.
32. During the initial period, various efforts were made to
spoof our early warning radar. The first of these was the
brain-child of Dr. SCHOLZ and was tried out in 1940.
33. Pulses radiated by one of our C.H. stations were picked up
on the ground and re-transmitted on a different frequency to
an aircraft flying some way behind the Channel coast. The
aircraft re-transmitted the original radar pulse on the C.H.
frequency, but a slightly different phasing, so that a phoney
blip located over the Channel was received. Owing to the ease
with which this phoney blip could be D/F'd and the spoof
immediately revealed by a second station, this method was soon
discarded.
34. About the beginning of 1941 a special experimental
equipment called the Garmisch Partenkirchen, which produced no
less than five different phasings and five phony blips, was
tried out. For the same reason this was not much used in
practice.

How the "S & G" Got Through.
35. The first big operation on which the jamming chain against
British radar ground stations was used was on the occasion of
the passage through the Channel of the Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau in February 1942. A few days prior to the operation
Dr. SCHOLZ was specially brought from Berlin to supervise it.
36. The radar cover of our C.H. and C.H.L. had been carefully
plotted and it was ascertained that the ships would come
within its range as they passed off Fecamp, where they were
due at 10 a.m. At that hour every available jammer was
switched on. The fact that the ships passed through unscathed
was, in P/W's opinion, the best proof of the effectiveness of
the German countermeasures. P/W was not aware that we had
either decimetre or centimetre radar in operation at this
time.

Siege of Malta.
37. In July 1942 P/W was sent to Sicily to take charge of an
intensive jamming programme which he suspected was to be the
precursor of the invasion of Malta, although he was never told
so officially. The first four Karl jammers on 193 mc/s were
brought into service in the neighbourhood of Noto en 3rd July
1942 and the number was later increased to eight, to cover
both A.I. and ground stations. They were beamed on to the
sites at Malta. These transmitters were half kilowatt, C.W.
amplitude-modulated at 100 c.p.s. using an unsmoothed HT
supply, plus a modulation of 150 - 200 kc/s. The reason for
the amplitude modulation being unsmoothed was that there was a
shortage of high-voltage smoothing condensers.
38. After a time it was observed that we had adopted frequency
changes. The German jammers were however, controlled by
monitoring receivers on sites so arranged that the jamming
signals and the original radar signals could be seen side by
side on a C.R. tube; this enabled the frequency change to be
followed within a few seconds. A great aid to them in
following and preparing for these changes was that new
frequencies were invariably tried out during the day from
Malta and the monitoring service could warn the jamming
operators of frequencies likely to be employed.
39. It was noticed that signals on the 50 - 80 mc/s frequency
were switched on during a raid and it was suspected that they
were due to the height-finding equipment of the radar station
controlling our night fighter which seemed to operate in a
similar fashion to the German Würzburg. This opinion was
confirmed when "Y" service heard a ground station say that
they could give the range of the bandits but that height
measurements were not yet available.
40. To jam the "height-finding" frequencies a Ju.52 fitted
with eight jammers covering the 50 - 80 mc/s band was brought
down to Catania. An hour before a raiding force became
airborne this aircraft left Catania to patrol half way between
Sicily and Malta and jam this band.
41. After P/W left, jamming was also carried out on the 42
mc/s band with the same type of Karl ground transmitter as was
used for other frequencies.
Modulation of Jammers.
42. When jamming out ground radar, H.F. modulation was always
preferred to noise modulation since the equipment necessary to
produce a given effect with noise modulation was much more
extensive than for H.F. modulation, and in particular a large
number of high-power valves was needed. The greater efficiency
of noise modulation was not considered sufficient to warrant
the extra power and extra equipment needed. It was also
thought unlikely that H.F. modulation could be filtered out of
the radar receiver without severe deterioration of the
picture.

Düppel (Window).
43. The idea of using window to spoof ground radar had
occurred to the Germans in 1941 and a series of experiments
was carried out in great secrecy over the Baltic in February
1943 (See A.D.I.(K) 334/1945 Part, IV). Very careful
arrangements were made to ensure that the wind was in the
right direction so that the window strips would fall into the
sea and not in Sweden, or even on German occupied territory.
44. The effect of window was observed on all types of German
ground radar deployed along the Baltic coast, and its efficacy
as a countermeasure was realised. The German codename for
Window was "Düppel" - a word with a very similar pronunciation
to the German word "Dipol" (= dipole), indicating the function
of the metal strips.
45. The Signals Staff realised that Düppel was a two edge
weapon and although its development was completed sometime in
1942, and a certain quantity was manufactured, no use was made
of it for fear of Allied retaliation.
46. The whole project was, in fact, kept so secret, that only
a very few high officers and technical experts in the G.A.F.
were aware of the scheme. So closely was the secret of Düppel
guarded that the scientists were not even allowed to carry out
research work to discover what anti-window measures could be
applied to the various types of German radar.
47. Although the Germans were free to employ window as a
countermeasure over this country after its first use by the
R.A.F.in July 1943, it was realised by the Signals Staff that
they had never used it to such good effect as the Allies.
48. The reason was that the small German bomber aircraft like
the Ju.88 could only carry a very limited quantity and
therefore could not produce a real window cloud. They
therefore decided to drop small quantities scattered over a
wide area in the hope of deceiving the night fighters and of
producing the impression that a larger number of aircraft was
engaged on a certain raid as well as in the hope that ground
controllers might vector night fighters on to a window cloud
instead of on to an aircraft.

Final Policy against Early Warning Radar.
49. The general policy followed by the G.A.F. at the end of
the war with regard to the countermeasures against early
warning metric radar appear to be summarised in a document
dated December 1944, which states that the use of ground
jammers against all ground radar is, in principle,
particularly desirable during German bomber raids on enemy
territory, but that there is no advantage in using airborne
jammers because the frequency of the ground radar has to be
constantly monitored and followed.
50. This principle was not strictly adhered to because an
airborne jammer for the 170 - 220 mc/s band named Kettenhund
was used to a small extent in raids on the South-West of
England in May 1944 (sec A.D.I.(K) 321/1944) but it was not
considered to be very effective.
51. Some attempt was being made to develop a noise-modulated
airborne transmitter named Wolke but it was never used
operationally.

METRIC A.S.V.
52. The first attempts to jam A.S.V. were made in the Channel
in the summer of 1942. During the preparations for the
proposed invasion of Malta it was found that reception of
British A.S.V. transmissions was obtained at extraordinary
ranges in the Mediterranean area. This was ascribed largely to
the fact that the receivers were placed as high as possible -
in some cases 3,000 foot above sea level - and attempts were
made to jam A.S.V. by using Karl transmitters placed near them
on high points of the coast of Sicily, Greece and Crete.
53. At about this time a Sonderkommando KOCH was formed and
based at Athens-Kalamaki. Its duties were to monitor and jam
A.S.V. and it was thought they used the Kobold airborne
transmitter with a frequency range of 160 - 200 mc/s. It had
the disadvantage that it could only be built into large
aircraft and some doubts arose as to whether it was very
effective.
54. Up to the of the war, the Bari ground jammers continued to
be employed against A.S.V., particularly along the length of
the Adriatic and along the Norwegian coast at points where
German coastal convoys obtained no cover from islands lying
off the coast.
55. In mid-1943 U-boats leaving Brest were suffering a serious
increase in losses owing, it was thought, to the use of our
A.S.V. a Sonderkommando Rastädter was formed with a few He.111
and Ju.88 aircraft for the purpose of listening to British
A.S.V. on metric and centimetric wavelengths and determining
what type of radar was being used with such effect (see
A.D.I.(K) 38/1944). These aircraft carried, amongst other
receivers, both Naxos and Korfu. The net conclusion reached as
a result of these investigations was that Coastal Command was
using a centimetric frequency (presumably H2S) for which the
Germans had no jamming transmitter.
56. The Allied attacks on U-boats took place so far from the
coast that ground jamming of A.S.V. on metric wavelength was
impossible and too many aircraft were needed to carry out
efficient airborne jamming. It was feared, too, that if
airborne jamming were carried cut, it would only attract
A.S.V.-equipped aircraft or surface vessels to the vicinity,
and be a proof that U-boats were about.
57. Warning receivers were therefore installed in U-boats. The
first of these - Metox - was used against metric A.S.V. It
suffered from the disadvantage that its local oscillator
radiated strongly, and it was suspected that we could home on
to this radiation from 100 km.; the Samos receiver later
replaced Metox. A form of Naxos was introduced to provide
warning against 9 cm. A.S.V. and was used up to the end of the
war.

METRIC A.I.
58. The weak link in the British night fighter organisation
was, as already mentioned, considered to be the R/T
communication; the airborne jamming of British A.I. itself by
German bombers or special R.C.M. aircraft was not considered a
practical measure because it was believed that British night
fighters would be able to home on to the jamming aircraft and
severe losses were therefore to be expected.
59. No intentional jamming of Mark IV A.I. was ever carried
out from the air or from the ground, although it was
considered possible that Karl jammers against G.C.I. and
harmonics of the Heinrich transmitter against Gee, and
possibly of all transmitters jamming Oboe and C.H., may have
had some effect.
60. In this connection P/W stated that it was extremely
convenient for the Germans that we had so many equipment
working on such a restricted frequency band in the 200 mc/s
region. This fact has eased their jamming problem very
considerably.

GEE.
61. The value of Gee system of navigation referred to by the
Germans as Hyperbel, is that it allows an aircraft to navigate
by a radar method without transmitting any signals which could
be used to D/F the raider from the ground. This threat was
realised by the Germans in March 1942 when the existence and
method of operation of the system was first discovered, but
the decision to jam Gee was not taken until August 1942.
62. A jamming transmitter was hurriedly improvised out of the
standard A.S. ground transmitter used for R/T traffic with the
FuGe.16. This was modulated with the standard "Mont Couple"
modulation at 150 - 200 kc/s. Prior to this makeshift coming
into use, a certain Dr. MÖGEL had experimented locally with
jamming transmitters but these only operated for a short time
and no details are known of them.
63. An order for a large number of suitable jamming
transmitters for countering Gee was placed in August 1942 and
the first of these - 1/2kw. Heinrich - went into service in
November 1942. As the Heinrich transmitters became available
in quantity they were deployed all over Germany and by the end
of the war some 270 were in operation against Gee.
64. Estimates of the effectiveness of jamming by the deployed
Heinrich transmitters were obtained by flying captured Gee
equipment and by questioning British P/W. The conclusion
reached was that before the invasion the Gee chains were of no
use further East than 4°.
65. After the invasion the situation changed, and in August
1944 a so-called Stördorf (= jamming village) was set up on
the Feldberg in the Taunus area and controlled and run by the
Reichspost Zentrale. Installation began in August and in
September the first equipment came into use.
66. The Gee countermeasures from the Feldberg site were of a
different type. In addition to a number of normal Heinrich
transmitters, three new types of much greater power were used.
These were Feuerzange, a very powerful pulse transmitter with
a peak power of 1 megawatt, Feuerstein with a peak power of
120 kw. at 5,000 pulses and a smaller transmitter, Feuerhilfe
with a power of 30 kw. which had been improvised by Köthen.
These three powerful transmitters were used to pick up the Gee
transmissions and retransmit them but with a very slightly
different p.r.f. A keying arrangement was incorporated so that
the pulses of the master and slave stations could be imitated.
67. In the immediate neighbourhood of the site it was expected
that the pulse powers used would be so high that the Gee
presentation screen would be completely jammed. At greater
distances aircraft would receive on each frequency used three
or four false pictures broadcast by the Feuerzange and
Feuerstein. As they transmittal their spoof pictures on
p.r.f's which differed only slightly from that used by the
British stations, the effect produced was that the false
pictures wandered very slowly over the true pictures so that
it was difficult for an operator to tell which was the correct
set of blips.
68. At the beginning an insufficient number of sets was
available to carry out this spoofing on all the chains, but by
January 1945 the site was fully equipped. The Germans were
convinced that this system was successful because on 2nd March
1945 at 1230 p.m. a number of fighter bombers paid them a very
unwelcome, visit and completely destroyed the site.
69. Consideration given to the idea of jamming the link
between the Gee ground stations, was never carried out as it
was thought that we would certainly anticipated such measures
by providing a number of reserve links, possibly on centimetre
wavelengths, or oven co-axial cable links.
70. When Gee jamming was first properly undertaken towards the
end of 1942, a large number of monitoring stations placed
about 100 km. apart were erected around the occupied coast
form Brest to Norway. Each site had two Heinrich transmitting
units, one operational and one spare, and monitored all
possible wavelengths. Changes of phase were also reported so
that German aircraft flying with Gee equipment could be
notified by W/T.
71. The whole problem of Gee jamming was considerably
simplified on the few occasions that we made unexpected
frequency changes, because our transmitters lined up on the
new frequency before they were used operationally. Had this
not been done the effectiveness of the German jamming program,
might have been considerably reduced.

LORAN.
72. As has been mentioned in a previous report of this series,
the discovery of Loran came as a great shock to the Germans
because Professor von HANDEL had convinced himself that a
long-range, comparatively long-wave pulse system would be too
inaccurate for employment as a means of navigation. The
Germans' first knowledge of the system was obtained about the
middle of 1944 when maps were captured, and ultimately a
complete apparatus was obtained from an American aircraft.
73. Attempts were made to jam it, and by March 1945, 10 to 20
one kW noise jammers, which jammed the ground wave
satisfactorily within a radius of 50 to 100 km., were in
operation. At this time transmitters to meacon the pulses were
being built and consideration had been given to jamming the
synchronisation of the transmitters from the ground, using a
100 kW. C.W. transmitter which was to be erected as near the
front line as possible in order to be near the ground link.
74. The transmitter was ready and hat been taken to Thüringen
but the disruption of transport and communications prevented
it ever being used operationally.

G.II.
75. The same equipment was used for jamming G.H., known to the
Germans as Diskus, as was used for jamming Gee.
76. A number of jamming villages (Stördörfer) with from two to
eight Heinrich transmitters were deployed throughout Germany.
It was calculated in December 1944 that at 20,000 feet G.H.
could only be received and used up to a line joining Emden and
Kassel and from there swinging South in an arc to Stuttgart,
while at 33,000 feet reception was thought to be possible up
to an arc joining the mouth of the Elbe, Weimar and Augsburg.
77. In addition, it was planned to use the powerful Feuerzange
and Feuerstein transmitters in an attempt to trigger-off the
ground stations from the Feldberg/Taunus Stördorf used to jam
the Gee chains.

OBOE - METRIC WAVELENG.
78. In the autumn of 1942 a new type of radar signal in the
200 mc/s band was picked up by the German monitoring service
at Calais. Statistics were kept and it was observed that these
transmissions occurred mainly at night, and seemed to be
associated with British M.T.B. activity in the Channel.
79. In about June 1943 the same type of radar signals was
heard in Essen during a very heavy bomber raid on Cologne and
Dr. SCHOLZ was able to correlate them with the dropping of
T.I's visually observed. It was realised at once that these
signals were the same as those heard at Calais and an
immediate investigation was carried out. For this purpose a
"noise investigation commission" was formed and a special
experimental Freya with a number of D/F receivers was set up.
The Freya was used to plot the course of the T.I.-carrying
aircraft while the receivers D/F'd and monitored the signals.
80. Some 6 to 8 weeks after the signals had first been
attributed to path-finders, a satisfactory story had been
worked out by the Germans as to how Oboe, called by them
Bumerang, worked. When this had been accomplished, subsequent
Oboe raids were systematically monitored by the normal
monitoring service.
81. At this time (August 1943) plenty of jammers were
available because of the reserve apparatus available for use
against 200 mc/s radar stations on the Channel coast. Ten
sites were chosen to give jamming coverage over the Ruhr and
eight ½ KW MCW Karl jammers employed at each site. The
standard Mont Couple modulation also used against C.H.L.
stations was applied giving 150 mc/s sine wave modulation at
100 c.p.s from an unsmoothed H.T. line.
82. The radio frequency was determined by picking up the
aircraft return signal and tuning the jamming transmitter
until the normal signal failed. Four frequencies in the 200
mc/s band were ultimately detected, but though the ground
station frequencies were found to be steady, those of the
airborne transmitter were not very stable.
83. Aerials recovered from crashes appeared to be mounted
sometimes en the starboard wing and sometimes on the port wing
of the aircraft. This fact, combined with some information
obtained from a British P/W, caused the Germans to believe
that the aerials were directional, and in order to jam more
successfully, all transmitters were moved to the West of the
Ruhr.
84. Jamming was almost entirely confined to the Ruhr area
because this territory was far away, the most important target
within the limited range of Oboe. The Germans were greatly
relieved when Oboe was used against the rocket sites in
Northern France, as the pressure on the industrial Ruhr was
thereby reduced. From about December 1943, intermittent
attempts were made to jam Oboe ground stations from the site
at Mont Couple behind Calais. These were not very successful -
a fact which was attributed to the beam width of British
aerials.
85. In June 1944 a new form of jamming which was known as the
Ballverfahren was suggested. This was essentially meaconing,
using an A.B.G. responding transmitter in the hope of
confusing the aircraft's return signals to the ground station.
It was believed to work well, and P/W quoted as an example a
raid on Nürnberg when aircraft deviated from their course as
soon as the jamming was switched on and returned to their
course when it lifted.
86. An instance of the success of Oboe jamming on the Ball
system was quoted. In June 1944 an oil installation - possibly
Wanne-Eickel - was the target, and all Oboe aircraft were
successfully jammed. The T.I's were dropped late and some 8 km
away from the target. As a result of this the main bomber
force spread out and many aircraft were shot down.
87. Only one metric Oboe receiver fell into German hands and
that was 90% destroyed; although the Germans knew the
principle, therefore, the details of the airborne set were
lacking, and the effectiveness of jamming could only be judged
by the accuracy of bombing.
88. By observing on a Freya the point at which bombs left the
aircraft, the Germans estimated the accuracy of Oboe as 300 x
300 metres for bombing from 9,000 metres, but a further 200
metres of ballistic inaccuracy occurred, giving an effective
error of 500 x 500 metres in the Ruhr area.
89. The success of jamming Oboe was considered to depend
partly on the training of personnel, so it was less effective
on a new target than on an old target which had been jammed
before. It was finally believed that the jamming was 90%
effective.
90. The Germans claim to have been so familiar with Oboe that
they were able to plot aircraft and withhold their jamming
until the aircraft turned onto the bombing run. They were then
able to identify the real target and localise the air-raid
warnings so as to disturb industrial production in the
neighbourhood as little as possible.
91. It is of some interest that on several occasions there was
a consistently good concentration of bombs in an open field
near Leverkusen, which P/W presumed to be due to an error in
computing the exact location of the target.

COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST RADAR.
OBOE - CENTIMETRE WAVELENGTHS.
92. Signals which were recognised as Oboe by the type of
coding were detected on a wavelength of 9 cm on the Channel
coast about the spring of 1944. The normal monitoring service
had previously intercepted unexplained 9 cm. signals in
October 1943 but had not finally connected them with Oboe.
93. When 9 cm. Oboe was recognised, it presented the Germans
with a great problem, as no jamming valves were available for
that frequency and German intelligence had not given any hint
that a centimetre version of Oboe might be produced.
94. By July 1944 a valve called LD.7o (= 7 ohne = without) had
been produced, which was an LD.7 valve without cooling fins. A
transmitter unit called Feuermolch, tuneable from 8.6 - 9.6
cm., pulse modulated and giving 3 kW peak pulse power, was
than built. The whole apparatus, a Feuermolch transmitter
together with a mirror reflector to achieve 200 km. range by
beaming, was called Feuerball or A.B.G. (Anti Bumerang Gerät).
95. Jamming on 9 cm. Oboe was first used in operations in
October 1944 at Weser and Leuna. The Feuerball jammer was used
as a pulse repeater, after the frequency had been established
by interrogating the aircraft. The jammer then set up ringing
between the aircraft and jammer on the Ball system used
against metric Oboe.
96. The latest type of centimetric meacon responder called
Feuerburg had receiver and transmitter aerial mechanically
linked to follow individual aircraft, the jammer aerial system
giving a beam of 13° width. The aircraft was followed by hand
by means of a spinning dipole in a receiving dish.
97. According to Dr. SCHOLZ the wavelength originally used by
British centimetric Oboe was 9.26 cm. Sites were set up with
both 200 mc/s and 9 cm. jammers so that either could be
selected by a change-over switch on the receivers.
98. The jamming of Oboe by spoof massages was never tried
although the meaconing jammers were fitted with a keying
arrangement which would have allowed them to attempt this.
99. Oberleutnant Dr. BÄHRE of Ln. Versuchs Regt. Köthen had
doubts as to the effectiveness of the Ball system and had
proposed building a jammer with a very high p.r.f. to saturate
the aircraft receiver with pulses so that the strength of each
individual pulse re-radiated by the aircraft transmitter would
be greatly reduced and the range of the system would therefore
be considerably decreased. The Roland J transmitter which had
been designed for H2S countermeasures was to be adapted by
Lorenz for this purpose, but the idea was never put into
operation as the end of hostilities occurred shortly after it
was made.
100. An example of the success of jamming centimetric Oboe was
quoted and concerned a series of five raids on Gotha. Three
attacks, each with between three and five aircraft, were
unjammed and all scored hits on the railway station. The
fourth attack was jammed and no hits were scored on the same
target. The fifth attack was again let pass without jamming
and the station was once more successfully hit.
101. A further proof of the efficiency of the Ball system was
that in plotting aircraft a diversion from track could be
induced when the jammer was switched on and the aircraft would
return to track if the jammer were switched off again.
102. On the only occasion on which a 9 cm. Oboe aircraft was
known to have been shot down, it crashed in the Zuider Zee in
shallow water where it could neither be reached from shore nor
by sizable ship, and it was not possible to salvage the
equipment. As a result, the Germans never obtained any Mark II
Oboe equipment and detailed information as to how the system
worked was always lacking. There was no explanation, for
instance, of why certain aircraft transmitted pulses which did
not appear to have normal Oboe coding, although the aircraft
flow at heights and along tracks which obviously identified
them with Oboe procedure.
103. No advance information of the target could be obtained
from these aircraft but this was easily obtained from the W/T
transmissions between ground stations. The W/T channel used
was also monitored in order to see if jamming had been
successful. It was also noticed that some aircraft would not
respond to the interrogator but the reasons for this were not
fully understood. These aircraft seemed to be operating on a
wavelength above 9.6 cm.
104. A new valve to cover the 9.6 - 10.6 cm. band was being
produced by Dr. GROOS. It was a 100-watt Klystron and it was
proposed to jam with its aid as soon as it was finally
produced.
105. Towards the end of the war there was a great increase in
the daylight use of Oboe but P/W did not believe that the
Americans had ever used it. With so many aircraft over Germany
towards the end of the war correlated evidence was not
available.

H2S.
106. Shortly after the discovery of H2S in January 1943 panic
orders were given for the production of a jammer. Later in the
year Roderich, which was manufactured by Siemens and which
used a Magnetron of theoretically 5-watt power, was made
available. The transmitters were unbeamed and the power was so
low that they were useless. By 1944 the use of Roderich had
been discontinued.
107. The difficulties of jamming highly-beamed centimetric
radar were so great that it was decided that all that could be
done was to attempt to defend a few vital targets. The first
target to be chosen was the Leuna works which was considered a
good target.
108. The Reichspost Zentrale was called on for assistance and
Dr. GROOS of that institution successfully developed a
Klystron valve, which was a water cooled 100-watt valve
tuneable by hand from 8.5 - 9.5 cm. This was built into the
jamming transmitter which was known as the Postklystron.
109. In order to concentrate as much of the energy as possible
to the aircraft, horns or paraboloid aerial reflectors were
employed with the transmitters. About eight sites around Leuna
were chosen, bearing in mind that the attacks always seemed to
use a route coming in from the North, presumably because the
best H2S pinpoints lay in this direction.
110. Four Postklystron transmitters were placed on suitable
sites and spaced in frequency across the observed 30 mc/s band
of H2S by putting them about 5 mc/s apart and making use of
the side bands from 2 - 10 mc/s single frequency amplitude
modulation. This barrage was used with low directivity.
111. A second type of jammer employed made use of the Roland
transmitter built by Siemens, which had a 30° beam, but its
development was abandoned about March 1945, as it was not
considered very successful.
112. In yet a third system Postklystrons were used with a
beamed aerial system giving a lobe 6° wide. The transmitter
was coupled mechanically to the D/F, receiving aerial of a
Korfu receiver, its aerial being provided with rotational
eccentric split. The receiving aerial was trained on a single
H2S bomber, which was followed manually.
113. The detection range for setting up was about 300 km. With
the less beamed type, Roland, effective jamming ranges up to
about 30 km had been obtained but with the narrow 6° beaming
the H2S tube was completely obliterated at 40 km if the beam
was focussed on the H2S aircraft.
114. One P/W had flown with H2S equipment installed in German
aircraft in order to carry out experiments in ground
camouflage against H2S with the aid of corner reflectors. The
conclusion was that corner reflectors were ineffective. It had
originally been planned to cover arms of the sea and lakes
with corner reflectors, but in the first place too many were
needed, and in the second place arrangements had to be made
for these to remain fixed in a certain orientation in order to
produce an effect.
115. Another suggestion had been made that metallic powder
could be used to increase the reflectivity of an area. This
was obviously no use as camouflage for a target, which was the
end originally in view. Consideration was given to producing a
dummy target with its aid but it was concluded that the
quantity of powder necessary was so enormous that it was not a
practical proposition.

H2X.
116. The Germans had such leeway to make up with the production
of 3 cm valves that no active countermeasures against H2X had
been put in operation up to the end of the war. Development of
a transmitter called Roland 2 was started in December 1944
with Telefunken Ceramic 3 cm valves believed to be known by
the designation LD.72 and LD.77.
117. The set was to be modulated by 100 kc/s pulses and to
sweep through a small radio frequency band. The power achieved
was 50 watts average. With horn aerials a 20° beam was to be
achieved. The range against an H2X set which had been captured
undamaged at Wiesbaden was 20 km. in the initial experiments.

A.I.
118. Owing to the strong beaming and method of sweep of
centimetre A.I. the G.A.F. was doubtful if any jamming would
be possible. No airborne transmitters against centimetric radar
were developed.

-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.
Acknowledgements are due to the various technical bodies,
both British and American, who collaborated in producing the
technical information contained in this report.
A.D.I.(K) and S.D.Felkin,
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain.
29th August, 1945.

A.B.G. (DALL)
The A.B.G.(Anti Bumerang Gerät) meaconing jammer was first
used in June 1944 and was an idea fathered by P/W. It was a
responder beacon which was employed against Oboe to set up
"ringing" between the aircraft return signal and the A.B.G. so
that the aircraft return to the ground station was confused.
The jamming transmitter had a 20 - 30 kW power in the case of
the model used against 200 mc/s Oboe. In the A.B.G. used
against 9 cm. Oboe (Feuerball) the power was 3 kW.

BRESLAU.
This was the pulse modulated transmitter with a range from
20 - 250 mc/s developed and built in the G.A.F. laboratories
in PARIS. It was believed to have consisted of six or eight
½ kW transmitters. Some 50 sets only were put in hand and
about half of them were completed. It was thought that they
had been used against ground radar stations along the Channel
but with what success it was not known.

FEUERBALL.
This was the name for the A.B.G. centimetric responder used to
jam centimetre Oboe. The jammer was used as a pulse repeater
and set up ringing between the aircraft and the jammer. It
consisted of a transmitter using a klystron valve developed by
the R.P.Z. which covered the frequencies 9.0 - 9.6 cm., backed
by a beaming reflector. The peak power was about 3 kW.

FEUERBURG.
In order that the Feuerball transmitter should be beamed on to
the transmitting aircraft, a beamed receiver was mechanically
linked to the Feuerball set. The receiver was operated so that
the receiving mirror was aligned on the aircraft and the
Feuerball paraboloid mirror followed any changes of elevation
or direction made by the receiving operator. This complete
set-up of beamed Korfu receiver with a Feuerball beamed
transmitter was known as Feuerburg.

FEUERHILFE.
This was a smaller form of Feuerstein improvised by Köthen
with a peak pulse power of 30 kW.

FEUERLAND.
This was a two-stage inductive transmitter (final stage
LS.1000) manufactured by Blaupunkt and served the same purpose
as the Karl II. The first production sets were ready in March
1945 and were believed to have been sent to the Holstein area,
but they were never used operationally.
The frequency of the Feuerland could be adjusted from
30 mc/s to 300 mc/s by means of interchangeable H.F. coils.
Different types of modulation could be introduced according to
whether it was to be used against R/T or radar. Against R/T it
was known to have had the four-tone chime modulation described
under Nervtöter below. It could also be used with noise
modulation with an adjustable bandwidth up to 2 mc/s. The
power output was about 350 - 500 watts.

FEUERMOLCH.
This was the name given to the centimetric transmitting
equipment of the Feuerball.

FEUERSTEIN.
The Feuerstein designed by Telefunken was used for producing
a false picture on Gee sets, the keying of the pulses being
carried out by equipment supplied by Telefunken and Siemens. A
number of these sets were installed on the Feldberg. It was a
high-power pulse transmitter at frequency range of either 20 -
52 mc/s (known as the Feuerstein 1) or 48 - 90 mc/s (known as
the Feuerstein la). At a p.r.f. of 5,000 cycles it had a peak
power of 120 kW.

FEUERZANGE.
This was the highest-powered pulse transmitter possessed by
the Germans and was used in 1945 on the Feldberg to provide
spoof Gee transmissions. The transmitter, developed by Dr.
FREUDENHAMMER and built by Siemens, was water-cooled and could
be modulated in exactly the same way as Feuerstein. The
frequency range of the transmitter was 20 - 87.5 mc/s and at a
p.r.f. of 5,000 cycles a power of 1 megawatt was claimed. It
was considered a very effective set but only came into
operation towards the end of 1944.

GARMISCH PARTENKIRCHEN.
Garmisch Partenkirchen was believed to be an improvised
airborne apparatus, probably manufactured by Neufeld and
Kuhnke of Kiel. It was used to a very limited extent in 1941.
It consisted of a receiver which picked up a ground radar
transmission and re-transmitted on the same wavelength but
returned no less than five different pulses with slightly
different phases with the object of creating false echoes. As
these false echoes could be immediately identified if a second
ground radar D/F’d the jamming aircraft, the idea was carried
no further.

GEWITTERZIEGE.
An experimental spark, ground jamming transmitter for
employment against flight radar and using a 1/2 wavelength
dipole aerial in front of a reflector, was given the code name
Gewitterziege. The band width was very large but it was
claimed that it was an effective jammer at close range.

HEINRICH.
This transmitter was developed by the Reichspost Zentrale in
1942 with the specific intention of providing the G.A.F. with
a jammer against the Gee navigation system. A large number of
these sets was built and deployed all over Germany to jam Gee.
A set of the same type, from which Heinrich had been
developed, was used in Sicily in July 1942 for jamming the
radar stations in the 50 - 80 mc/s band in Malta.
In its ultimate form, Heinrich II, the transmitter had a
power of 500 watts and covered the band from 20 - 90 mc/s in
four separate sections. For this output it used four LS.180
valves arranged in parallel push-pull.
It was 100% modulated by 150 kc/s sine wave with the
addition of 100 cycle ripple obtained from an unsmoothed H.T.
power supply. The set needed only two controls, one for the
main tuning and one for the aerial coupling.
The aerial consisted of a wide band dipole of squirrel cage
circular section, with normal tapping at the feeding point.
This one aerial was used in the entire frequency band from 20
– 90 mc/s. It was stated to have a standing wave ratio of 20%
in voltage.

KARL I.
This was the standard jamming transmitter for use against
British radar and was designed to cover the frequencies 90 -
250 mc/s in two bands. Development work on it was started at
the end of 1940. The transmitter employed four LS.180 valves
and had a power output of between 300 and 500 Watts. It was
modulated by the standard Mont Couple 150 kc modulation on
which a 100-cycle tone coming from an unsmoothed 50-cyle
source of supply was imposed. The type of modulation employed
could not be changed in the field.

KARL II.
This was on improvement of Karl I with few changes in the
electrical specifications but it was really composed of two
more powerful Karl I units with a common feed. It was also
modified so that any desired standard type of modulation could
be substituted at the site where it was employed, thus
obviating the necessity for returning the transmitter to the
factory, as was the case with Karl I.
The Karl II employed an LS.1500 valve with an output of
2 kW, and besides being used against ground radar, it had been
modified for use against R/T with the Post type of modulation.
It was not known what degree of success had been achieved with
this set.

KARUSO.
The original Karuso I was improvised by the R.P.Z. with the
specific object of providing aircraft with an airborne
transmitter to jam the R/T link between the British ground
control stations and British night fighters. It was origina11y
intended to sweep through the whole 100 - 120 mc/s band. 0wing
to the relatively large frequency sweep, however, jamming was
not vary effective, so it was manufactured in two forms, to
sweep from 100 - 110 or from 110 - 120 mc/s.
It had ultimately an effective range of about 5 km. and a
power of about 30 Watts. Altogether, only 100 sets were
manufactured.
The designation Karuso II was given to a development which
never got farther than the laboratory stage, but Karuso III
was produced and covered the 100 - 150 mc band. The width of
the jamming band was only 3 mc/s and the frequencies used was
set up on the ground according to intelligence information
given by the German "Y"-service. It was not known whether this
set was used operationally.

KETTENHUND.
Kettenhund was a 30 watt air-born jammer developed in 1943
by a certain KETTEL of Telefunken covering the 170 - 200 mc
band. It was used against British ground radar stations in
raids over South-West England in 1944. Tests with the set led
the Germans to the conclusion that it was not very effective.
Modulation employed was a triangular wave with a frequency of
several hundred kc/s.

KLYSTR0N.
This was the name commonly applied to a centimetre jamming
transmitter witch was also referred to as the "Postklystron".
It acquired this name because it made use of a centimetre
klystron valve developed by Dr. GROOS of the Reichspost. A
power of 100 watts was claimed for it. It was a CW jammer
which could be tuned by hand between 8.5 cm. and 9.5 cm. It
was fitted with a horn aerial to be aligned on the approaching
H2S force. It was claimed that at a range of about 40 km. the
H2S tube was completely obliterated when the Postklystron was
focussed on an individual aircraft. This set came into
operation about March 1945.

KOBOLD.
The Kobold was an airborne set designed by the Post
specifically to jam A.S.V. and was originally used in the
Mediterranean in conjunction with a Karl transmitter working
from the ground. It was, in effect, half a Karl transmitter
and used two LS.180 valves. A modulation of about 400 cycles
originating from the aircraft transformer was superimposed on
it. It had the handicap that it could only be built into very
large aircraft.

NERVTÖTER.
Nervtöter I was designed as an airborne transmitter to jam
Allied R/T but considerable difficulties were encountered in
tuning it in the air to the frequency observed and it was
never used in operations.
As a result of the criticism made by T.L.R., the Nervtöter
II, which was also believed to be known as FuGe. 40, was to be
developed. This set employed an LS.50 valve in the final stage
and the frequency of the R/T was to appear as a blip along is
time base on a cathode ray tube, while the frequency, to which
the transmitting jammer was adjusted, appeared on a similar
blip on a second time base on the tube. By setting these two
opposite each other the operator could easily see that he was
jamming the required frequency.
A so-called chime modulation of four changing tones was
used. The power output was 25-30 watts and the frequencies
ranged from 90-160 mc/s. Wide band aerials were to be used.
This set had not got beyond the experimental stage by the end
of the war.

OLGA.
Olga was a self-excited, grid-keyed, one valve transmitter
(LS.180) developed by the Navy and had a frequency range of
150 - 200 mc/s and an output of about 300 watts. It was
believed that a p.r.f. of 500, 700 or 900 cycles was used.
This jammer was an early type used against British coastal
watch radar without much success.

RODERICH.
This was the name applied to the first set developed by
Siemens for jamming H2S when panic counter-measures were
called for early in 1943. It used a magnetron valve with a
maximum power output of 5 watts and was virtually of no use
whatsoever. It took some months to develop; in the meantime,
German knowledge of how to Jam H2S had increased to such an
extent that it was never used.

ROLAND.
The Roland jammer was developed for use against H2S by Dr.
WEHRMANN of Siemens and was said to employ a triode
transmitter valve designated L.D.72 or possibly L.D.75. The
wavelength was 8.5 - 9.5 cm. and with the aid of a horn aerial
it produced a 30° beamed transmission, modulated, it was
believed, by 100 kc sine wave and pulses of an unknown p.r.f.
It had less than 50 watts average power. The range at which
obliteration of the H2S tube was claimed, was about 30 km.
The Roland II was the name applied to an attempt to produce
a similar set on 3 cm using, it was thought, a LD.77 triode
valve and a horn aerial a 20° beam. It is doubtful if it was
used operationally as the valves had a very short life.

STARNBERG.
This was believed to be the precursor of Kettenhund and was
designed by D.V.L. Adlershof in about 1940 but never used. In
a document there is an indication that attempts were later
made to use it as an R/T airborne jammer; A.D.I.(K) 231/1944
also gives an account of preparations to use the Starnberg
operationally.

WOLKE
Wolke was believed to be the code name applied to the first
German attempt to imitate a noise jammer like that used by the
Allies. It was believed to use two L.D.5 valves in the final
stage and to have a carrier frequency of 90 mc/s. The average
power output was 15 - 20 watts, the width of the noise band
being about 2 mc/s.
As a result of the examination of Wolke the conclusion was
reached that noise modulation required too many valves and too
much power and that with the some number of valves a better
effect could be obtained with other types of modulation. The
set was therefore used for training night fighter crews to see
through electronic jamming of SN.2."

Bruce Dennis 5th November 2018 00:36

RADAR AT DOUVRES
 
SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.320/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

A GERMAN RADAR STATION AT DOUVRES.
1. The information contained in this report was obtained from
selected P/W of the 8th Kompanie of Ln. Regiment 53, who were
captured on 17th June 1944 at a Radar station which they were
manning 2 km. to the East of Douvres. The site consisted of
two Würzburg Riese and two Freyas without the A.N. attachment;
one of these Freyas was of the mobile type, and was not
operational pending its being changed for one of the fixed
type.
2. The operators as a whole were not particularly
knowledgeable, but were able to give some interesting
information on the way in which Allied air attacks affected
operational efficiency of the station. One member of the
station, an officer, was more knowledgeable than the others
and added some odd scraps of information on other Radar
equipment, which are summarised in this report.

DAMAGE BY ALLIED AIR ATTACK.
3. The beginning of May saw the opening of almost daily air
attacks on the Radar station at Douvres; from this time until
D-Day the site was subjected to bombing, machine-gun and
rocket projectile attack from Thunderbolts, Typhoons and
Spitfires.
4. Surprisingly little resulted from those attacks; eight men
had been killed and one barrack building had been burnt out,
but the Radar installations themselves, protected as they were
by heavy brick work, were practically undamaged. Apart from
short intervals of a few hours for repairing cables and
aerials severed by M.G. fire, the installations were,
according to P/W, continuously in operation.
5. It was stated R.P. attack was particularly ineffective,
but that machine gun fire into the cabins of Radar
installations was both feared and effective. During air
attacks, therefore most of the personnel of the station,
including crews from the Würzburg and Freya cabins, went to
the "Bunker" shelters.
6. On the night of 6th/7th June, the Kompanie had been busily
employed in plotting Allied shipping and at 0100 hours on that
night the Würzburg had plotted same 100 ships, which
information was passed through to Jafü 5. At 0300 hours a
large number of bombs fell in the neighbourhood and all the
personnel left their posts to take to the shelters, leaving
the apparatus unattended.
7. From D-Day onwards the Würzburgs and Freyas were kept
operating even with the added weight of artillery and tank
attack and the equipment was, in fact, operational until a few
hours before the site fell to the Invasion Forces. It is,
therefore, clear that in an operational sense the site
survived nearly five weeks of constant attack.
8. When capture became imminent, however, all technical
apparatus on the site was destroyed by explosive charges. The
personnel put up a good defence, and it was not until the
Allied tanks broke through the protective minefield that the
station finally surrendered.

PLOTTING ROOM.
9. The plotting room on this site, which correlated data
received from the Freya and Würzburg, was housed on the top
floor of a two-storey "Bunker" - a box like building partly
sunk in the ground and constructed of concrete two metres
thick. It had originally been intended that, in addition to
handling normal Würzburg and Freya searches, the plotting room
should also be employed for control of night fighters, but
since there were no night fighters operating in this area, this
latter function had never emerged; in any case the Seeburg
Tisch had not been installed, although provision for it had
already been made.
10. At the time of the Invasion, the plotting equipment
consisted of a ground-glass screen, measuring some 8 x 12 ft.
let into a wall, the glass bearing a map on which the plots
were drawn. In addition to this a small-scale map of Northern
France, overlaid with tracing paper, was laid flat on a table
but this latter had never been put into use, having been
forestalled by the Invasion.
11. In operation, plots from the Würzburgs and Freya were made
in pencil, no distinction being made on the ground-glass
screen between friendly and enemy plots.
12. The plotters, who wore earphones, received their
information direct from the operators of the Freya or
Würzburg, and transferred their plots to the ground-glass
screen. A man called an "Ableser" then read off the plot from
the ground-glass screen and telephoned it to Jafü 5 at Bernay,
and latterly in the Western suburbs of Paris.
13. At one end of the room there was a platform on which sat a
supervisor, who was responsible for the accuracy of the
plotted information. He kept his eye on all plotting whilst
listening to information as it came from the Radar equipment.
He had a small telephone at his side through which he could
plug in to any line from Würzburg or Freya.

SOME NOTES ON RADAR EQUIPMENT.
General Remarks.
14. The only knowledgeable P/W, an officer, gave as his
opinion that British and American Radar technique are slightly
ahead of their German counterpart. In German Signals circles,
he said, it is openly admitted that any piece of Allied radar
equipment is seized upon and studiously copied.
15. One major difference, he believed, was that Allied Radar
equipment was always smaller and more compact in construction
than similar German apparatus.
Hand written comment: but the German Rotterdam weighs about
half H2S - its British original!
16. Some few details on current German Radar Geräte were given
by the above source. These are summarised below.
Würzburg.
17. The Würzburg Riese on the station at Douvres were of the
usual type, and had a search range of 30/40 kilometres.
The frequency of both Würzburg Riese was stated by P/W to be
600 mc/s.
"Window".
18. Some operators of the Würzburg and Freyas, although
agreeing that they experienced interference from "window",
interference which showed itself in a series of specks and
lines on the presentation screen, maintain that because
"window" travels more slowly than an aircraft, an experienced
operator can distinguish the flight of the aircraft against
the tracks of the "window".
19. The officer P/W, however, is sceptical about all anti—
window devices, and believes that the German Radar authorities
are seriously perturbed by it.
20. Some few weeks ago Goering, it is alleged, offered a cash
prize of 300,000 Reichmarks to any Signals personnel who could
invent an apparatus to outwit "window".
Nürnberg Gerät.
21. According to P/W, the Nürnberg Gerät is fitted to Würzburg
in order to eliminate the effects of "window". This apparatus
has not been entirely successful, although it makes the
operator's job slightly easier.
"Würzburg Laus".
22. The "Würzburg Laus" is said to be an apparatus replacing
the Nürnberg Gerät as a counter measure for "window". The
apparatus in contained in a box 18 x 9 x 9 inches, which is
attached to the Würzburg.
23. The "Laus" is a much more recent development, and is said
to be somewhat more successful than the Nürnberg Gerät.
Flanderzaun.
24. This is the colloquial name given to highly characteristic
interference pattern on the screen of the Würzburg and Freya.
The word is apparently associated with the barbed wire
entanglements of Flanders in the last war, and this gives some
indication of the picture which the interference makes.
25. P/W believed that this interference is a transmission
apparently on the frequency on which Würzburg and Freya are
operating, and same P/W have the idea that it emanates from
the Isle of Wight vicinity.
Köthen Gerät.
26. The "Köthen Gerät" is, according to P/W, not an apparatus
but a frequency of the Freya. For example, particular
frequencies on Freya are designated A, B, C and D, and Köthen
is merely another frequency deriving its name from an
experimental station at Köthen.
27. The A, B, C and D frequencies, P/W thinks, were produced
by civil firms, and the Köthen name implies that this
frequency is a development of the Luftwaffe's own experimental
station at Köthen.

"Limbach".
28. Amongst documents found at the Radar station at Douvres
was a paper headed "Limbach"; this piece of apparatus was
stated to be attached to the V.H.F. transmitter/receiver in
the aircraft and to operate in conjunction with the Freya on
the ground.
29. The paper stated that the procedure employed with this
apparatus was similar to that of the Gemse - Erstlings
procedure, but strangely enough was used in conjunction with
the FuGe 7.
30. According to this P/W, the Limbach was superseded by the
Gemse - Erstling (FuGe.25).
31. The document in question has been forwarded to A.D.I.(Sc).

Rammstoss Gerät.
32. This is stated to be an instrument carried in German
bombers, its purpose being to show the position of other
aircraft and prevent collisions in tight formation.
Rotterdam Gerät and Panorama Gerät.
33. It is stated that both these instruments, Allied in
origin, are now being used by G.A.F. aircraft, but all P/W had
heard was that the Panorama Gerät had a wide focus, whilst the
Rotterdam Gerät was designed to show a small area.

Diana.
34. At long last, after a lapse of 21/2 years, confirmation of
"Diana" has come to light through documents. The first
mention was from a notebook of a P/W of I/K.G.30 in August
1941 (A.D.I.(K) 420/1941), which stated that Diana was to be
similar in principle to Elektra, but working on a short-wave
band and within a frequency range of 3,000/6,000 kc/s.
35. The present document notes that "Diana" is similar to
Elektra but operates on short waves. This P/W stated that
"Diana" had not been operational.

ORDER OF BATTLE - LN. REGIMENT 53.
36. The 53rd Ln. Regiment, to which the 8th Kompanie at
Douvres belonged, consists of a number of Kompanien ranging
from 1 to 26; The Kompanien are not necessarily numbered
consecutively, so that the total in the 53rd Ln. Regiment may
therefore be less than 26. All the Kompanien had code names.
37. The 53rd Ln. Regiment was responsible for an area bounded
on one side by the coast, and on the other sides by a line
running from the tip of the Cherbourg peninsula to the South
of Paris and northwards to Dieppe. Its Kompanien lie all along
the coast and towards the interior at a distance of 30/40 km.
apart; each Kompanie's area overlaps so that the entire
territory is completely covered.
38. The H.Q. of the 53rd Regiment is in Paris and is under the
command of Oberstleutnant FLECH, with Major HOFFMANN as
Deputy.

25th Kompanie.
39. The 25th Kompanie is the H.Q. Kompanie and has a strength
of 20/25 men, who were engaged in visiting Freya and Würzburg
sites of the Regiment and doing minor repairs. It was stated
that these men were by no means skilled engineers, and knew
nothing of the internal workings of the Freyas and Würzburgs.
8th Kompanie.
40. The 8th Kompanie at Douvres had a total strength of 160
men, who were divided as follows:-
Kompanie Stab............ Administrative Staff.
Zug 1 )
Zug 2 ) ................. Personnel manning the Freya
and Würzburg on six-hour
shifts day and night.
Flak Zug................. Personnel manning and
guarding Flak position
round the Kompanie’s site.
41. Another Kompanie of this Regiment, the number of which was
unknown to these present P/W, was said to be manning a site at
St. Valery-en-Caux.

MORALE.
42. Generally speaking, the morale of the 8th Kompanie during
the pre-Invasion raids was high, and their resistance during
the final attack on the station was certainly not suggestive
of low morale. It is noteworthy, however, that since capture
and the absence of the excitement of action, these P/W are
heartily glad to be out of the war. The majority are convinced
that Germany has already lost the war.
SEE APPENDIX OVERLEAF.

A.D.I.(K). S.D. Felkin,
30 June 1944 Wing Commander

1. The Deputy Commander of the 8th Kompanie at Douvres
an Oberleutnant - was good enough to bring his paybook with
him, and his career is therefore set out below as a matter of
interest.
Oct. 1937 – March 1938... Was with Ln. Abteilung R.L.M.,
2nd. Komp. at Potsdam (This was,
supposed to be one of the very
elite schools for Signals in
Germany before the war).
March 1938 – April 1938.. Was with Ln. Abt. R.L.M. 2nd. Komp.
in Vienna, and took part in the
Anschluss.
April 1938 - Aug. 1938... Back to the R.L.M. 2nd. Komp. at
Potsdam.
Aug. 1938 - Sept. 1939... Acted as Funker to Ln. Regt. 4,
7th Komp. in Vienna.
Sept. 1939 - Feb. 1940... Became a Horchfunker with Ln. Regt.
4, 7th Komp. At Cracow.
Feb. 1940 - March 1940... Was posted to the Ln. Officers'
Training School at Halle.
April 1940 - Aug. 1940... Joined Ln. Regt. 4, Abt. III as
Staff Officer. Here he was
in command of a Hörstelle.
Aug. 1940 - April 1941... Became O.C. of Horchstelle (W.24)
at Breslau. (P/W explained that all
these Hörstellen are described in
passon and paybook as Wetter
Funkempfangstelle which is in fact
only a cover name for Horchdienst).
April 1941 – March 1942.. Was at the depot of Horchstelle (W.3) which is at Athens. Here his job was to listen in to English ground telegraphic messages which were coded and decoded.
March 1942 - April 1942.. Posted to Nikolaiew in Russia as Staff Officer to III Abteilung Ln. Regt. 4.
April 1942 - May 1943.... Served in Ln. Regt. 130, who were
there in the South Russian sector in support of a Flak division.
May 1943 - May 1944...... Became O.C. of the 11th Komp. Of
Ln. Regt. 57 and later O.C. of the 7th Komp. Of the same Regiment then
near Orleans.
2. In May 1944 he was posted to his present unit (Ln.53, 8th
Komp.) as Second-in-Command to Hauptman EGLE. He says that it
was intended that he should take over this Company in a very
few weeks' time.
Decorations:
Erinnerungsmedaille for Austria.
Erinnerungsmedaille for Sudetenland.
K.V.K. Second Class with Swords.
Rumanian Cross given to those who fought against
Communism.
Krimm Shield, which commemorates the battles of
the Crimea, including Sebastopol and Kersch and
last:-
E.K.II.

Bruce Dennis 5th November 2018 00:56

GERMAN KNOWNLEDGE OF 'OBOE'
 
SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 318/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

GERMAN KNOWNLEDGE OF 'OBOE'.
1. Attached is a translation of a paper issued by the General
der Flakwaffe on 24th May 1944 concerning the British 'Oboe'
procedure - called by the Germans the Boomerang.
2. Apart from showing that the enemy understands the working
of 'Oboe' the report is of interest as it indicates the lines
on which German defence was concentrating. Night-fighters are
dismissed summarily and the main hope is that, by knowing the
approach course, the height and the speed of the attacking
aircraft, the Flak defences must be concentrated near the bomb
release point so as to produce a "Vernichtungsfeuer" by which
success was certain. The report also hints that, since the
German knew the 'Oboe' frequencies, radio counter-measures
were in hand.
3. One other point of interest is the high standard of the
plots of aircraft attacking on the night of 2nd February 1944.
This Sketch of is reproduced as Appendix II.
4. The original document has been passed to A.D.I.(Science).
A.D.I.(K) S.D. FELKIN
29 June 44. Wing Commander

TRANSLATION SECRET
("TOP SECRET")
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe Bernau b/Berlin d.24.5.1944
Tel.: Berlin 56 40 76 App.:122
General der Flakwaffe Bernau 814 u.815 od.üb.
(General der Flakausbildung) L.V. 12.
Az. 79 m Nr.0236/44 g.Kdos.(A/C)
Number of Copies: 250.
Copy N°: 79.
Subject: Combating "Boomerang" Aircraft.
Attached are instructions for dealing with aircraft attacks using the Boomerang procedure.
In view of the importance of defence against this new method of attack adopted by the enemy it is imperative that all units be instructed in the Boomerang procedure and that counter—measures are adopted on the lines laid down in the attached instruction.
Subsequent observations and experiences are to be reported to the General in charge of A.A. defences.
Distribution:
All independent Flak Groups as well as interested sections of
O.K.L., O.K.H., O.K.M., SS-Führungs-Hpt.-Amt, Höhere Kdre.,
Flakersatzdivision General der Jagdflieger,
Generalnachrichtenführer, General d. Kampfflieger u.
GL/Flaktechnisches Amt.
(Sgd) v. Axthelm.
Generalleutnant.

TRANSLATION SECRET
("TOP SECRET")
Encl. To: OKL – Gen.d.Flakwaffe
(Gen.d.Flak-ausb.)
Nr.0236/44 g.Kos. (A/C)
Dated 24/May/44.
A. General.
Recently, nuisance raids have been developing more and
more into high altitude precision attacks against pin-pointed
targets (particularly important industrial complexes) by means
of a special navigational procedure known as the "Boomerang"
procedure. So far, "Boomerang" attacks have only taken place
at night on the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area, Aachen and
Osnabrück, airfields and railway stations, in the area of
Luftgau Belgium/N. France, Paris and targets in Brittany.
The "Boomerang" aircraft employed were Mosquitoes belong
to 105 and 109 (B) squadrons, stationed at Marham. Immediately
after take-off the aircraft climb to the prescribed attacking
height of 8,000 to 11,000 metres, with a view to checking wind
drift.
The enemy is carrying out on an increasing scale his precision attacks and pathfinder technique using the "Boomerang" procedure. It is clear from the increase of activity that the enemy is constantly expanding his
"Boomerang" organisation and improving the technique. An expansion of these attacks on further targets with ever increasing effect is the result.
It is therefore essential to bring to bear everything in our power with a view to combating "Boomerang" aircraft. The basic principle is that aircraft must be shot down.
B. The "Boomerang" procedure.
The "Boomerang" procedure is the most accurate method of remote control at present known. It consists of controlling aircraft by means of Radar stations located in S., S.E. and E. England. These stations work together in pairs of which one is the main station, and passes navigational signals to the aircraft. One signal from this station indicates the course to
the pilot whilst the other is for the bomb-aimer to release the bombs. (see App. 1).
The aircraft to be controlled flies under its own control to an agreed point, where the remote control takes over. The aircraft is then directed by W/T to the turning point, which is on an arc centred on the Radar station in England and passing through the bomb dropping point. Constant corrections from the ground station in England keep the aircraft on its
course (see App. 1) but in spite of the great accuracy of measurement deviations up to 300 metres are possible.
The total time required for the target approach is 8 to 15 minutes. As soon as an aircraft passes over the target, the next one is taken over by control. The time interval between attacking aircraft is frequently reduced by attaching several uncontrolled aircraft to one controlled aircraft, or by using further pairs of Radar stations. The uncontrolled aircraft aim their bombes on ground or air markers. The approach to targets East of England is made from a N. - S., S. - N. or S. – W. direction. Targets South of England are approached W. - E. or E. - W. The course depends upon the relationship of the two Radar stations to one another. Unless there in a disturbance by a jamming station the final phase of the line of approach becomes an arc centred on the ground control station in England and passing through the objective to be attacked.
It has been observed that simultaneous flights to
different objectives on a N.- S., S.- N. as well as S.- W. and N.- E. courses, have been carried out, which proves that the enemy has already set up several ground stations.
The range of this system is limited by the curvature of the earth and for a flight at a height of 9,000 metres, the range is between 400 – 450 km. The bombing accuracy depends on the reading and measuring accuracy of the ground station in England. The accuracy is within a square of approximately .5 km. by .5 km.
So far, the followings types of "Boomerang" attacks have
been made:-
a) Single "Boomerang" aircraft.
b) One "Boomerang" aircraft followed by 2-5
uncontrolled aircraft.
c) "Boomerang" aircraft as Pathfinders for a
following bomber force.
d) "Boomerang" Pathfinders as decoy marker flaredroppers
and "window" aircraft. (Translator's note:
the German text is ambiguous. The word is
"Scheinmarkierer" which may mean decoy or
illuminating markers. The subsequent context
suggests the former).
The "Boomerang" Pathfinders at first saturate the approach and target area with "Window", then place light markers over the target. The bomber stream then follows up immediately on the "Boomerang" course.
C. Counter-measures.
The following take part in "anti-Boomerang" attacks:
a) Night fighters.
b) Radio jamming service
c) Flak.
I. Our own Mosquito night-fighters (sic) have not had any worth-while successes in shooting aircraft down prior to the bomb release or to the commencement of the Pathfinder activity.
Over a period of time, however, night-fighters should be more successful, provided high flying aircraft are employed. Uncontrolled night-fighting with the aid of search lights is possible if our own fighters are high enough and in sufficient numbers in the waiting area over the Flak zone.
Because of vapour trails, it is possible to pick out highflying aircraft by searchlights.
II. The radio jamming service has appreciated the principles
of the "Boomerang" system and has set up jamming stations. It
is possible to force part of the approaching aircraft off the
approach line by jamming. However, the enemy soon recognises
the disturbance and can change over to a pre-arranged
alternative frequency. The radio jamming service has already
met with success, but is still limited in its effectiveness.
III. The main burden of defence, now as before, rests with the
Flack. For the successful execution of the "Boomerang" system
conditions must be fulfilled:-
1. The attack must take place at a constant height of
about 8,000 - 11,000 metres.
2. The target approach must follow a fixed course for
several minutes. (Course for every objective known).
3. The ground speed must remain constant throughout the
approach. (140 - 180 metres/s.)
These known and partly constant target factors constitute
a great weakness to the enemy. In addition the Mosquito,
because of its wooden construction, is highly vulnerable to
well-directed Flak.
If, in spite of these favourable conditions, the Flak has only so far obtained little success, the fault lies in the increased factor of error when engaging targets at great heights, and also to the high speed of the Mosquito.
On the other hand, the courses flown at the moment are well-known. This factor, together with the known target heights and target speed, enable the point of bomb release for each individual objective to be calculated accurately and in advance. These known facts, combined with the total fire-poor of all batteries within reach of the bomb-releasing area, should produce a successful "Vernichtungsfeuer" (annihilation fire) and prevent accurate bombing and lead to aircraft being shot down.
D. Methods of Shooting.
1.) The shooting method employed on principal is annihilation fire.
2.) Provided that:
a) The course is known,
b) The target approach is fixed and confirmed by the
Malsi Flak Calculating instrument.
c) It is known with certainty that our own radio jamming does not result in the deviation of the enemy aircraft from its course and that the speed
and height remain constant. This contradicts L.Dv.400/4b und VER-Flak 18 Ziff.11)
3.) If the precise plotting is difficult, the following measures are to be taken:
a) The track is to be set in accordance with the known value.
b) The ground speed is to be obtained and passed on by the Flak transmitter. In the absence of this data, action is to be taken on the basis of previous experience. (Translator's note: in other words, use your own brains).
c) Height is to be obtained from accurately adjusted Radar and is to be passed over the Flak transmitter.
4.) With reference to the manner, in which "Boomerang" coursers are to be obtained for individual objectives, Commands will contact Luftgaukommando VI with a view to ascertaining the courses for their own
particular area.
E. Tactical Employment.
Suitable steps must be taken in the event of a change in the direction of approach of "Boomerang" aircraft, and if possible one to two batteries (special Eis. batteries) will be brought into the probable direction of approach for immediate action.
F. Counter-measures.
The following is to be noted when combating "Boomerang" aircraft:
1.) Most accurate alignment of the respective batteries (adjustment of instruments and guns, calibration of direction-finding apparatus, re-checking of ballistic correction of the moment in order to eliminate the
meteorological factor).
2.) Blocking together of the movement of target values:
a) Set course for known value.
b) Determine ground speed and height from previously emplaced batteries over Flak transmitter.
3.) As far as possible the Trupp should be provided with uniform ammunition (as few different batches as possible); calibration shoots should be carried out with this ammunition and muzzle velocity
determinations with (?special) calibration ammunition should be avoided.
4.) Accurate meteorological reports must be obtained every two hours for heights up to 11,000 metres. These must be actual and not extrapolated. Contact must be made with the nearest airfield.
5.) Charge temperature should is periodically determined by means the two specially equipped cartridges (Messcartuschen) placed in the ammunition dump.
6.) The ammunition used for checking drill time should be carefully controlled and the error should be eliminated.
7.) Preliminary practices should be made along the known lines of approach by means of special fire control tables prepared for this purpose. Test shoots should be carried out using intervals of one second. (FAS I
will supply fire control tables for "Boomerang").
8.) All actual "Boomerang" courses should be charted on the Malsi plotting table as a check against the actual plots. (See Appendix II).
A systematic research of shooting at great heights, having due regard to the available ammunition has been inaugurated. Results are to be expected shortly and until then all existing orders and instructions
hold good. In order to keep counter measures apace with the enemy's intentions, it is essential to inform higher quarters of any new observations made during "Boomerang" attacks. The Luftgaukommando and Divisions are instructed to report regularly their experiences of "Boomerang" counter-measures to the General der Flakwaffe.




Bruce Dennis 5th November 2018 01:25

Northern Convoy Routes
 
SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 410/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS
THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION
OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF
COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED
UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR
SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F.SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR — IX
Norway and the Northern Convoy Routes.

1. In this series dealing with various aspects of the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence service in the war, it had been intended to conclude with the eighth report. Since the issue of the first report, however, another P/W has become available who had a comprehensive knowledge of signals activities in the Norwegian area throughout the war. It has therefore been found possible to add the present report, the ninth and final in the series.
2. The gradual expansion of signals intelligence based in Norway, and the Allied activities which it covered, are followed in this account from year to year from the time of the invasion of Norway onwards. In order that ready comparisons of the extent of that expansion may be made each year is dealt with separately, and maps showing the situation at various intervals during the war are appended.

1940.
NUCLEUS OF THE ORGANISATION.
3. Soon after the invasion of Norway in May 1940, signals intelligence personnel from W-22 at Husum were formed into a new unit and sent to operate at Oslo. This new unit was named W—Leit 5 and, subordinated to the Höherer Nafü of Luftflotte 5, formed the nucleus of the projected signals intelligence service in Norway; its initial strength was that of a Trupp, but by the autumn was to be increased to a Zug (platoon).
4. The function of W—Leit 5 was to act as the central organisation in Norway for the comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of all enemy R/T and W/T traffic in the North Sea area, and the watching of R.A.F. Coastal Command operations against the West coast of Norway. Information was to be passed to the higher signals intelligence authorities in Germany, who in return fed WLeit 5 with such data on Bomber Command radio traffic as was of value to the Norwegian area. The unit did not itself undertake
interception work, but confined its activity to organising the various intercept units and evaluating their results.
5. The first intercept unit, W-25, was set up at Trondheim, Skatval at the end of May with the strength of a Trupp, and also operated a H/F Adcock D/F set on Örlandet. This unit covered W/T traffic of 18 Group Coastal Command and W/T and R/T traffic from aircraft carriers, its intercept results being passed to W-Leit 5 at Oslo.
6. At the same time, W-25 was to make a local evaluation of its intercepted signals and pass the results to a specially appointed signals intelligence officer attached to Fliegerkorps X, so that the latter could amplify its air situation picture. Actually the greater part of the material passed by W-25 to the Fliegerkorps consisted of intercepts from reconnaissance aircraft of 18 Group.
7. At the end of August, W-25 was moved from Skatval to Stavanger, partly owing to the concentration of 18 Group's attention to that part of Norway and partly in order to be near Fliegerkorps X headquarters, which had meanwhile moved to Stavanger.
8. At the beginning of July another intercept Kompanie, 9/Ln. Regt. 2, had moved into Norway and had been put into operation at Naerland, near Stavanger. This unit employed an Adcock D/F station, whilst rhomboid intercept installations were planned and partly constructed during the latter part of the summer.
9. 9/Ln. Regt. 2 was to intercept the W/T traffic of 15 and 18 Groups and the H.F. R/T traffic of the fighters operating in the North of the U.K.; parallel with W-25 at Stavanger, this unit was to pass its intercept results to W-Leit 5 at Oslo and at the same time to make a local evaluation for the benefit of Fliegerkorps X.
10. In October the Signals Intelligence service in Norway began to take shape with the formation of an Abteilung, III/Ln. Regt. 5, subordinated to the Höhere Nafü of Luftflotte 5 both operationally and in its organisation. In December, 9/Ln. Regt. 2 at Naerland was renamed 9/Ln. Regt. 5.
11. The listening chain was completed by the subordination of W-22 at Husum (Schleswig Holstein) to III/Ln. Regt. 5. The duties of W-22 were essentially the same as those of W-25 and 9/Ln. Regt. 5, namely to feed W-Leit 5 with the results of its observations.
12. Owing to the lack of adequate D/F equipment in Norway at this time, and in order to ensure a full cover of Coastal Command operations, Husum also had to monitor 15 and 18 Group traffic. In addition, it shared with 9/Ln. Regt. 5 the task of covering the schools and ground networks of Coastal Command.
13. Once the full interception equipment of 9/Ln. Regt. 5 had come into operation at Naerland, W-Leit 5 was able to fulfil its primary tasks of controlling the coverage of the intercept station, evaluating the intercept results collected from the outstations by teleprinter tie-lines and distributing the resulting intelligence to all interested commands and units.
14. A situation report compiled from current messages and documents was produced each day, and every fourteen days a consolidated report was issued containing the more long term intelligence on strength and locations of enemy units, types of aircraft and tactics, and the identities of units being employed on specific operations.
15. Thus, from the late summer of 1940 onwards, intercepts of great value to G.A.F. reconnaissance units were regularly passed to the Operations Staff of Luftflotte 5. All important intelligence was immediately sent to Abteilung I of O.K.L.

INTERCEPT ACTIVITIES.
16. Observation of 15 Group radio traffic was essential for providing the G.A.F. reconnaissance and coastal units with a picture of the air situation in that Group's sphere of operations. The watch on 18 Group by W-25 and 9/Ln. Regt 5 aimed at keeping a check on its strength and dispositions.
17. The H.F. R/T traffic of R.A.F. fighters based in the northern U.K. produced intelligence on defence tactics, organisation, strength and dispositions. This particular listening activity was supplemented by the D-Funker (interpreter radio operators), carried in aircraft of the long-range reconnaissance units for the purpose of evading attack by Allied fighters. When in April 1941, R.A.F. fighters converted to V.H.F. this practice was discontinued. In the late autumn of 1940 the 0.T.U.'s in Scotland and the Midlands were also covered.
18. Beacons in Scotland and the Midlands were covered by 9/Ln. Regt. 5 at Naerland from 1940 until the end of 1943. This work was controlled partly by W-10 (later the Leitstelle der Funkaufklärung) in Germany and partly by the Höherer Nafü of Luftflotte 5 for the benefit of G.A.F. units operating from Norway. The Kompanie supplied such information as it had collected on location, recognition signals, signals strength and method of
operation of the beacons, and was frequently called upon by Luftflotte 5 to suggest uses to which such beacons could be put for the benefit of the G.A.F.
19. Meteorological traffic was also covered by 9/Ln. Regt. 5, and intercepted messages were passed to the interested G.A.F. Met. stations in the Norwegian theatre and to W-22 at Husum for further distribution amongst stations in Germany.
20. Responsibility for breaking the Syko messages of Coastal Command reconnaissance aircraft lay with W-22 at Husum, and for this purpose traffic of 16 and 19 Groups and other networks were also intercepted in order to increase cryptographic depth. This traffic could not be broken with sufficient speed to be of tactical value, but it provided long-term intelligence on types, squadrons, dispositions, operational methods, distress signals and accidents. Results were forwarded in collated form to interested units on day plus one.
21. In the succeeding years W-22 was called upon to an increasing extent to cover various R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. formations. The breaking of other types of codes and cyphers was undertaken centrally by W-10.

1941.
EXPANSION OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENT.
22. In April 1941 R.A.F. fighter units in the North of England discontinued the use of H.F. R/T and converted to V.H.F., thus robbing German signals intelligence of a fruitful source of intelligence. From early summer, therefore, arrangements were made to experiment on the West coast of Norway with V.H.F. receivers and various types of aerial arrays; in the autumn V.H.F. experimental flights were carried out in the direction of the East Coast of Scotland with an aircraft specially provided by O.K.L.,
but results were disappointing.
23. By the summer, intercept equipment in use in Norway comprised 1 L.F. and 3 H.F. Adcocks as well as 5 interceptrhomboid installations. The function of the latter was to D/F ground transmissions with low signal strength, as well as the traffic of 15 or 18 Group aircraft operating at extreme ranges from the intercept stations.
24. The three H.F. Adcock stations were employed respectively for 15 Group, 18 Group and other radio traffic from unknown ground stations; the L.F. Adcock covered Coastal Command reconnaissance traffic, beacons and all other traffic from unknown ground stations.
25. In the autumn another radio interception Trupp, Wo-Hammerfest, commenced operations. This unit was to test reception conditions in northern latitudes for the purpose of covering bases in Iceland and the traffic of Allied long-range reconnaissance aircraft. The unit met with many difficulties, amongst which were the extreme remoteness of the unit and
consequently poor communications and 1ack of D/F equipment.
Reception conditions proved unreliable on account of atmospherics.
By the end of 1941 no solid results had been achieved.
26. In the meantime the organisation of signal intelligence in Norway was being developed. A signals intelligence officer was attached to the operations staff of Luftflotte 5; by the end of the year all signals intelligence units in Norway were subordinated to the Höherer Nafü Luftflotte 5, and all came under the administrative command of Ln. Regt. 5.
27. During this year the channels of communication of W-Leit 5 at Oslo were improved and at the close of the year comprised teleprinter lines to Berlin, Husum, Naerland, the G.A.F. exchange at Oslo and between Naerland and Husum. Direct telephone lines were also installed to Luftgau Norway and the Naval Command at Oslo.

1942.
D/F BASE ATLANTIC.
28. The most notable development in signals intelligence in Norway during 1942 was the establishment in the summer and the preliminary organisation of a chain of intercept stations, known as D/F Base Atlantic, for the covering of Atlantic signals traffic. This chain was to comprise stations at Bodö, Örlandet, Naerland, Husum (Germany) and Brest, with Naerland as the central point.
29. The D/F Base Atlantic did not begin operations as an entity until the early summer of 1943, but its main functions were to supply an increased number of plots on 15 Group aircraft on convoy escort, end to watch the anti U-boat flying boats.

V.H.F. TRAFFIC.
30. The experiments in V.H.F. interception begun during 1941 were continued but with little success. Various types of antennae were tried at different locations, and the special aircraft continued spasmodic flights towards the East Coast of Scotland, mainly to test antennae and to check up on new kinds of transmissions.

CONVOY TRAFFIC.
31. During the autumn it was decided that the interception Trupp, Wo-Hammerfest, was serving no useful purpose.

32. The interception Trupp established at Hammerfest during 1941 had supplied useful data on reception conditions in Northern Norway, but as far as operational results were concerned, no useful purpose was being served and the unit was withdrawn. Shortly afterwards, however, another similar unit began to operate at Svanvik.

33. Conditions for operation at Svanvik were found to be more favourable than at Hammerfest, besides which, the former station was provided with a D/F Adcock, and during the autumn the Trupp was busy with traffic from the two Allied convoys, P.Q.18 and 19.
34. From this traffic two main facts were elicited. The first was that some of the flying boats had transferred from Sollum Voe to Murmansk, whence they were flying anti U-Boat patrols. The second new fact was that the R/T traffic from land-based or escort carrier fighters could be intercepted and D/F'd.; in this way additional data to those from normal reconnaissance sources could be supplied to supplement the air situation picture.
35. Signals intelligence was particularly valuable in providing security to German naval forces passing along the Norwegian coasts.

CHANGES IN ORGANISATION.
36. In the autumn another intercept Kompanie, the 8th, was added to III/Ln. Regt. 5.
37. Training of its new personnel began towards the end of the year, and its eventual duties were to man the D/F Base Atlantic in Norway, to monitor Allied North Sea convoys and to watch for new British and Russian traffic on the northern front.
38. At the end of the year W-Leit 5 at Oslo was renamed 14/Ln. Regt. 5, whilst W-22 at Husum became 15/Ln. Regt. 2.
39. Communications facilities of 14/Ln. Regt. 5 were further increased during 1942, and at the end of the year consisted of the following:-
1 Teleprinter line to Gefechtsstab of Luftflotten Kdo. 5.
1 Teleprinter line to G.A.F. exchange, Oslo.
1 Teleprinter line to Naerland.
1 Teleprinter line to Husum.
1 Teleprinter line to Berlin.
1 Teleprinter line from Naerland to Husum.
1 Telephone line to G.A.F. exchange, Oslo.
1 Telephone line to Ln. Regt. 5.
40. The teleprinter line between Naerland and Husum which had been
established in 1941 was used on occasions for D/F squad traffic, but as
the same line had to be used for all other purposes this was not entirely satisfactory.

1943.
8/LN. REGT. 5.
41. The training and expansion of 8/Ln. Regt. 5 continued until the spring, when the 3rd Zug was ready for operations and was sent to Svanvik. Two D/F Adcocks were constructed so that both East and West D/F'ing could he carried on simultaneously.
42. An advance Trupp of the 8th Kompanie was sent to investigate the terrain in the Alta-Bardufoss area with a view of determining a final position for intercept operations. Bardufoss was found suitable so far as convenience and communications were concerned, and two Züge of the Kompanie soon followed.
43. Intercept Trupps of 8/Ln. Regt. 5, with D/F sets at Svanvik, Bodö and Örlandet, were put to covering all Allied W/T and R/T traffic in the North Sea and from Iceland Base and North Sea convoys. The Kompanie was also commissioned by W-10 to intercept all U.S. traffic, the results of which were to be transmitted to W-10 direct and without preliminary evaluation.
44. At times the Kompanie produced excellent results, especially in the interception of unknown U.S. traffic, but operations in general suffered from frequent atmospheric disturbances and a lack of any results which had value for immediate operations.
45. The Zug at Svanvik enjoyed far more favourable conditions than
the unit at Bardufoss; besides the valuable work which it performed in
following North Sea convoys it investigated radio conditions in the
northern area. Its assistance and advice were sought for important
tactical operations in the area.

D/F BASE ATLANTIC.
46. As already stated, the main function of the D/F Base Atlantic was to D/F or plot aircraft of 15 and 18 Groups, with a secondary function of D/F'ing unknown radio stations.
47. Inadequate communications between Oslo and Brest, however, made the immediate use of the information from Brest impossible, its only advantage being in its value for subsequent confirmation.
48. On the whole, the Base proved its worth as it supplied Fliegerführer Atlantik and B.d.U. with regular intelligence on strength, tactics and area of operation of convey escorts and of the aircraft of 15 Group, besides, providing B.d.U. with data which often led to successful U-boat attacks.
49. During the year the communication facilities of the Örlandet, Bodö and Svanvik D/F sites remained unsatisfactory, but nevertheless they contrived to make valuable contributions to the intelligence picture.

ANGLO-SWEDISH COURRIER SERVICE.
50. In the course of the year an intercept cover was put on the Anglo-Swedish courier service, and the monitoring was developed to such
an extent that daily reports on numbers of aircraft operating, bases
and, towards the end of the following year, the squadron strength.

TRANSATLANTIC FERRY SERVICE.
51. In the spring, W-10 ordered Husum to undertake the interception of all Allied transatlantic ferry traffic in the North and East Atlantic; the results were to be evaluated by 14/Ln. Regt. 5 at Oslo. The object was to establish the approximate daily figures of aircraft ferried, their density on the various stretches of the outward and return flights, and the types of aircraft employed for varying purposes.
52. Results were teleprinted daily and also distributed in monthly reports.

SYKO AND A.R.C. MESSAGES.
53. The breaking of Syko messages was carried out by 15/Ln. Regt. 2 at Husum until Syko was dropped in the middle of 1943. When A.R.C. was
introduced considerable initial difficulties were encountered, but by the end of the year some measure of success was achieved and was further
increased during 1944. These results were used strategically but never
tactically.

IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS.
54. In the course of the year the Kompanien at Oslo, Naerland and
Bardufoss were equipped with transmitters in case of breakdown in
landline communication. 15/Ln. Regt. 2 became the relay station for the
re-transmission of messages to superior and related signals intelligence
units in the Reich.

1944.

RE-ORGANISATION.
55. The year saw considerable changes in the G.A.F. SignalsIntelligence service as a whole in its attempt to create a homogeneousorganisation. The units in Norway brought into the scheme were renamedas follows:-

14/Ln. Regt. 5 became 1/Ln. Abt. 355.
8/Ln. Regt. 5 became 2/Ln. Abt. 355.
9/Ln. Regt. 5 became 3/Ln. Abt. 355.
15/Ln. Regt. 2 became 5/Ln. Abt. 357.
56. At the same time W-10, the controlling station in the Reich, was renamed Leitstelle der Funkaufklärung.
57. As an anti-invasion measure a mobile listening Zug was created, consisting of a contingent of W/T and R/T operators and evaluators. The unit was responsible to the Fliegerführer and was to be ready to operate at the focal point of an invasion attempt.

MOVEMENTS OF UNITS.
58. The intercept station set up during 1943 at Bardufoss and manned by 8/Ln. Regt. 5 (2/Ln. Abt. 355) had shown only partially satisfactory results due to bad reception conditions. The changing war situation made the station redundant as the unit at Svanvik was sufficient for the Northern area so that in the spring the Bardufoss station was moved to Halden.
59. At the same time 15/Ln. Regt. 2 (5/Ln. Abt. 357) was becoming
monopolised by the Leitstelle der Funkaufklärung for duties in defence
of the Reich, and consequently became of less value to signals intelligence in Norway.
60. After the Allied invasion in France the D/F Base Atlantic suffered the loss of its left wing at Brest and then the loss of the Svanvik base through the evacuation of Northern Norway. In the course of 1944 the entire strategic evaluation of Coastal Command traffic was taken over by the evaluation Kompanie of the Leitstelle der Funkaufklärung which was supplied with intercept data by 5/357 at Husum.

V.H.F. AND H.F. INTERCEPTION.
61. The experiments which had been made during 1941 and 1942 with
the object of intercepting Allied V.H.F. traffic were finally abandoned
in 1944, although the increasing weight of 16 and 18 Group attacks made
the use of V.H.F. receivers on the West coast more necessary than ever.
62. Changes which took place in the W/T traffic of 18 Group during 1944 caused some difficulties to the Germans, but on the other hand the combined use of R/T and W/T by Allied forces approaching the Norwegian
coasts restored the possibility of obtaining vital intelligence.
63. In such cases as the latter, the W/T intercepts could not be used for direct fighter control but a running commentary on events could be passed to the fighter control officer, detailing direction, probable intentions, tactics and strength.
64. During the year, 2/Ln. Abt. 355 at Halden was engaged in such tasks as covering U.S. W/T traffic and R.A.F. Bomber Command tactics for the benefit of O.K.L. W/T traffic of T.A.F. aircraft was also covered for practice, and 16 Group was intercepted when it operated against the South Coast of Norway. The Kompanie later covered training and part of the coastal network, as well as D/F’ing minelaying and supply dropping activity in the Norwegian area.
65. After the re-organisation of the G.A.F. signals service early in 1944, the radio command stations (Funkbefehlsstellen) established at the divisional and sector reporting centres for the use of the radio observation and jamming services were also used by the Signals Intelligence units for the relaying of messages to higher authorities. At the same time efforts were made to develop the tactical evaluation organisation to the utmost; to that end a close co-operation with radio observation (Fu.m.B.), aircraft reporting and jamming services was achieved.
66. The monitoring of fighter O.T.U.'s in the U.K., which had continued since 1940, came to an end in the spring of 1944 when those units converted to V.H.F. At the same time a fuller cover was put on long range reconnaissance training traffic which was closely connected with the increasingly important North Sea convoy traffic.
67. The latter traffic provided intelligence on tactics, state of development, strength in carrier aircraft and the nature of carrier manoeuvres. To deal with the increase in this convoy traffic a liaison officer was attached to Fliegerführer 5 at Bardufoss and an R/T intercept Trupp was established at Tromsö; R/T operators had already been posted to the D/F squads established at Bodö and Örlandet for the purpose of intercepting R/T traffic of carrier aircraft.

1945.
D/F SQUAD TRAFFIC.
68. The radio D/F squad traffic (Funk-Peilkommandoverkehr) instituted at the beginning of the year proved more and more important for assisting the evaluation of 18 Group and Northern convoy traffic and produced invaluable results. An H/F Adcock was set up at Jessheim to supplement the Halden Kompanie's efforts in monitoring Allied Air operations in the Skagerrak, Kattegat and Oslo Fjord and act as alternative D/F base to that at Naerland.
A.D.I.(K) and S. D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain.
14th November 1945.

Bruce Dennis 5th November 2018 01:32

German countermeasures against allied radar jamming
 
SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 356/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR
LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED
ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL
COMMUNICATIONS.

GERMAN COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ALLIED RADAR JAMMING.
1. The following information, which is believed to be fully reliable,
has been obtained in the main from a P/W who had been in charge of Flak
Würzburg positions on the Cherbourg Peninsula.
2. Interrogation has been carried out in co-operation with A.D.I.(Sc),
but this report deals only with the general principals involved,
technical details of circuits and instruments having been passed to
A.D.I.(Sc).
3. Ever since the summer of 1942, the Germans have been alive to the
possibility of electrical jamming of ground radar, and have had
countermeasures under consideration. In the autumn of 1942, amongst
other measures, instructions were issued to units using the Würzburg-D
to remove the revolving dipole if electrical jamming were encountered,
and to replace it with the fixed type dipole aerial from the
Würzburg-A.
4. In January or February 1943, instructions were issued which stated
categorically that electrical jamming was expected shortly to begin, and
detailing countermeasures called by the code names "Stendal A" and
"Stendal B", the latter employing a modification to the set known as
"Goldammer"; these proved reasonably satisfactory.
5. The use of "Window" took the Germans completely by surprise and was
at first almost 100% effective. No countermeasures were available and
entire Flak batteries were put out of action. At first the Radar
operators were told that they must somehow learn to distinguish the
bomber formations from the "Window" reflections, but in practice it was
found that only the most experienced operators were able to do this, and
then only occasionally.
6. Countermeasures were evolved and introduced fairly quickly, and
these are detailed below. All Würzburg instruments in the Cherbourg
Peninsula are stated to have been equipped with the necessary
modifications at the time of the invasion.
7. The German authorities maintain that these countermeasures are 80%
effective, but the present P/W considers that 50% would be a more
accurate figure, since one or other of the special modifications to the
Würzburg is frequently used. Another point mentioned was that even these special modifications were apt to fail, or at least to prove
unsatisfactory, if "Window" was used in very large quantities.
8. Since the introduction of these new countermeasures, the Stendal
procedures have become obsolete and are no longer used.

NÜRNBERG PROCEDURE.
9. The Nürnberg procedure is a countermeasure against "Window” invented by Stabsingr. HOFFMANN of Flak Artillerie Schule III at Heiligensee.
10. With this procedure, the Würzburg is modified so that variations of
signal strength due to rotation of the enemy aircraft's propellers make
a note which is audible in the headphone, thus enabling the operators to
distinguish between the aircraft and “Window".
11. An improved version of Nürnberg, known as Nürnberg 7, which is less
fatiguing to the operators, has also been developed.

WÜRZLAUS PROCEDURE
12. This enabled operators to distinguish between fast and slow moving
echoes, and so permits differentiation between aircraft and "Window" or
permanent echoes.
13. The blip on the Cathode ray tube appears as a blob of light
resembling a louse, extending over both sides of the time-base.
NOTE:- Captured wax stencils of the original German instructions for
the use of the Nürnberg and Würzlaus procedures were received from
Normandy after the above interrogation had been completed, and fully
confirm P/W’s statements.
The stencils have been rolled off, and copies are being sent as an
Appendix to this report to A.D.I.(Sc), and to the other departments
marked with a star on the distribution.

TAUNUS PROCEDURE.
14. This countermeasure to "Window", is achieved by a modification
which operates by virtue of the sharper wave front obtained from a true
target blip compared with the more gentle sloping of a "Window" blip.
P/W stated that this procedure was used in conjunction with Nürnberg and
Würzlaus, but was unable to give full details. He claims that Taunus is
also effective against jamming by means of noise modulators.

FAKIR.
15. Fakir is the term applied when the split presentation both on the
bearing and elevation tubes is made to appear on two separate traces
placed opposite to each other and nearly a centimetre apart, as shown in
the sketch below.
16. This double trace presentation was usual with Würzlaus before the
introduction of Taunus; with the introduction of the latter, the use of
Fakir has become essential if clear readings are to be obtained on the
cathode ray tube.
Normal bearing "Fakir" bearing
Presentation with presentation with
Würzlaus Würzlaus

WISMAR PROCEDURE.
17. The Wismar procedure is a counter to electrical jamming, achieved
by means of a change of wavelength.
18. For purposes of this procedure the original Würzburg frequency,
which this P/W believed to be 600 Mc/s., was separated into two or three
bands, each comprising three separate frequencies as follows:-
Frequency Al - 3 Mc/s. above A4.
Frequency A4 - Original frequency,
Frequency A7 - 3 Mc/s. below A4.
A second frequency band, Bl, B4 and B7, was also employed, in which B4
was 30 Mc/s. below A4, and B1 and B7 were respectively 3 Mc/s. higher
and lower than B4.
19. It was intended that there should be third band "C" below the "B"
band, but this has not yet been introduced, as existing transmitters
cannot operate so far below the original frequency.
20. A new local oscillator, known as the "Michael Local Oscillator",
which is easily tuneable, has been introduced for the Wismar procedure,
and nearly all Würzburg-D in the Cherbourg area were equipped with this.

WESTERWALD.
21. A captured document, which has been handed to A.D.I.(Sc), gives
details of an anti-jamming device known as "Westerwald", which is
applicable to Freya and coast-watcher equipment.
22. In effect, this adapts the Taunus technique as used on the Würzburg
to Freya and coast-watcher. Westerwald is the name of the mountainous
country in Germany just north of the Taunus region.

FuGe 25.
23. P/W states, that the Würzburg attachments intended for the FuGe 25
(I.F.F.) procedure have not been fitted for a long time, and that more
recently the frames for these have also been removed in the Cherbourg
area. He states that the FuGe 25 was formerly called by the code name

"ZWILLING".
MAINZ AND MANNHEIM.
24. These apparatus, which are developments of the Würzburg, have been
reported in A.D.I.(K) 12/1944, paras.18-26, and A.D.I.(K) 141A/1944,
paras.24-25. The present P/W refers to them under the numbers 40 and 41
respectively. He states, however, that they are complicated and very
expensive, and have hardly been brought into use.
A.D.I.(K) S.D. Felkin
16th July, 1944 Wing Commander
Anlage 4.
Gegenmaßnahmen bei Störung
der Funkmessgeräte (Flak)
Im Fall von Feindstörung der Funkmessgeräte (Flak) sind sofort je nach Art der Störung die
Gegenmaßnahmen:
"Wismar" Gemäss L.Dv. 400/30
"Standal" Teil I ‐ IV
"Goldammer"
"Nürnberg"
und "Würzlaus"
einzuleiten.
Bis zum Erscheinen der Vorschriften "Nürnberg" und "Würzlaus" sind diese beiden Verfahren wie folgt
anzuwenden:
I. Nürnberg
A. Begriffsbestimmung
Der Sonderbetrieb "Nürnberg" ermöglicht das Suchen und Auffassen von Flugzielen durch
Funkmessgerät (Flak) 39 T bei Störung durch Folienabwurf.
Das Verfahren beruht darauf, dass die von einem Flugziel reflektierte Energie periodischen
Schwankungen unterworfen ist. Diese erzeugen in den Kopfhörern eines Hörzusatzes einen
Brummton von 50 ‐ 150 Hz.
Die von Folien reflektierte Energie ist unregelmäßigen Schwankungen unterworfen. Diese erzeugen
in dem Hörzusatz ein zischendes und fauchendes Geräusch, das sich von dem Brummton der
periodischen Schwankungen deutlich unterscheidet.
Der Brummton eines Flugzeuges ist nur dann hörbar, wenn das Flugzeug entfernungs‐und
winkelmässig ungefähr angemessen ist.
Bei genauer Ortung ist der Ton am lautesten (Maximum).
Des Verfahren "Nürnberg" ermöglicht also eine akustische Ortung, wenn die gestörten
Entfernungsbereiche auf dem Übersichts‐ und Entfernungsfeinmessrohr ein Zielzeichen nicht oder
nur undeutlich erkennen lassen.
B. Geräte teile und Arbeitsweise des Sonderbetriebes "Nürnberg"
Der Hörzusatz "Nürnberg" ist in die D‐Stufe des Richtgerätes eingebaut. Die auf "Nürnberg"
umgerüsteten Bausteine tragen auf der Vorderseite ein "N".
Auf der Vorderseite des Richtgerätes sind 3 Anschlussbuchsenpaare für die Kopfhörer des B 1, B 2
und B 3 angebracht. Der Sonderzusatz "Nürnberg" ist bei Schalterstellung E + S immer
betriebsbereit. Eine Überprüfung der Betriebsbereitschaft ist möglich durch den Tastknopf in der
B‐Stufe des Richtgerätes. Das Suchen des Flugziels hat bei stehendem Dipol zu erfolgen, weil der
umlaufende Dipol im Hörzusatz ein Geräusch erzeugt, das die Feststellung des Tonmaximums
erschwert. Sind nach der akustischen Ortung Zielzeichen auf dem Übersichts‐und
Entfernungsmessrohr festzustellen, dann kann der UmlaufdipoI wieder eingeschaltet werden.
Blatt 2 zu Anlage 4
In diesem Fall kann die Winkelmessung durch "Sonderbetrieb Winkelmessung" und die
Entfernungsmessung durch "Sonderbetrieb Entfernungsmessung" erfolgen. Das Peilverfahren
dient lediglich als Hilfsmittel zum Suchen und Auffassen von Flugzielen, ist jedoch zur Ermittlung
von Schiessunterlagen nicht geeignet. Eine Erschwerung tritt ferner dadurch ein, das benachbarte
Funkmessgeräte (Flak), (vornehmlich Funkmessgeräte (Flak) 41 T) ein starkes Knarren im Hörzusatz
erzeugen, wodurch die Hörkennung von Flugzielen erschwert bzw. unmöglich gemacht werden
kann.
C. Bedienungsanleitung für Senderbetrieb "Nürnberg“.
1.) Überprüfung des Hörzusatzes „Nürnberg“
B 2 legt den Kopfhörer um,
schaltet den Umlaufdipol aus und
stellt den Drehknopf "Pot" auf "Null".
B 1 stellt den Dunkelpunkt auf eine festzeichenfreie Stelle des Entfernungsbereiches.
B 2 dreht an der oberen Schlitzschraube in der D‐Stufe solange nach rechts, bis er ein knatterndes
Geräusch hört, dreht dann die Schraube, so weit nach links, bis dieser Ton gerade verschwindet.
Drückt auf den Tastknopf auf der rechten Seite des Richtgerätes und ruft, wenn er im Kopfhörer,
einen tiefen Brummton hört:
"Hörzusatz betriebsbereit! "
2.) Exerzierordnung für die gefechtsmäßige Anwendung des Sonderbetriebes "Nürnberg"
Flugziele im Störzeichenbereich nicht feststellbar.
Sind Zielzeichen auf den Braunschen Röhren nicht feststellbar, so sind die Winkel ‐und
e‐Messung allein nach dem Gehör durchzuführen. Es werden dabei alle drei Werte nach dem
akustischen Maximum ermittelt.
B 2 ruft bei Auftreten eines Störzeichenbereiches aus:
"Feindstörung durch Folien!"
Kann er kein Zeichen im Störbereich des Übersichtsrohres erkenne, ruft er nun:
"Auffassen nicht möglich!"
M.F. befiehlt.
"Hörzusatz! "
B1
B2 legen Kopfhörer um.
B3
B1 dreht am e‐Grobtrieb die Entfernung des Störzeichenbereiches langsam durch, beobachtet die
Störzeichen und achtet auf den Ton im Kopfhörer.
Hört er neben zischenden und fauchenden Geräusch einen tiefen Brummton, so bringt er diesen am
e‐Feintrieb auf in Maximum.
Blatt 3 zu Anlage 4
B 2 betätigt gleichzeitig das Höhenrichthandrad und bringt durch Peilen den im Kopfhörer hörbaren
Brummton auf größte Lautstärke. Dadurch ist das Ziel grob geortet (Messfehler bei feststehendem
Dipol; zur Verwendung als Schiessunterlage nicht geeignet).‐
Das Flugzielzeichen ist noch in dem Störzeichenbereich erkennbar.
Der Hörzusatz dient in diesem Fall lediglich als akustisches Hilfsmittel zum eindeutigen Erkennen
des Flugziels. Ist dies möglich, kann mit Hilfe des "Sonderbetriebes Winkelmessung“
weitergearbeitet werden. Ist auf Grund der akustischen Ortung auf dem Übersichts‐und
e‐Feinmessrohr als Zielzeichen erkannt, rufen B 1 und B2 aus:
"Ziel erkannt"
M.F. befielt:
"Sonderbetrieb Winkelmessung! "
B2 schaltet den Umlaufdipol wieder ein.
B1 hält das erkannte Zielzeichen auf dem Dunkelpunkt.
B2 und
B3 messen gemäß "Sonderbetrieb Winkelmessung".
Verschwindet das Zielzeichen auf den Röhren kurzzeitig, so führen B1 und B2 bei umlaufendem
Dipol das Ziel akustisch weiter bis das Zielzeichen wieder sichtbar ist.
II. "Würzlaus".
A. Begriffsbestimmung und Erscheinungsform.
Das Verfahren "Würzlaus" dient zum Auffassen und Anmessen eines Flugzieles bei Feindstörungen
durch Abwurf von Folien.
Das Verfahren "Würzlaus" ermöglicht die bildliche Unterscheidung der reflektierten Energie eines sich
bewegenden Zieles (Flugzeug) und eines festen Zieles (Düppelwolke). Durch Verwendung eines
eingebauten zusätzlichen Hilfssenders wird erreicht, dass sich das Zielzeichen durch eine besondere
Formgebung von den Störzeichen unterscheidet.
Festzeichen und Metallfolien geben bei Sonderbetrieb "Würzlaus" auf dem Übersichtsrohr sich
schlängelnde Zeichen. Die Zielzeichen von einem sich schnell bewegenden Flugziel erscheinen als
eiförmige ausgefüllte Zeichen (sogenannte Würzlaus).
Auf den Richtrohren erscheinen nach Umschalten auf "Würzlaus" zwei Lichtstriche, auf denen die
Ablenk‐und Störzeichen kehrbildlich einander gegenüber stehen. Ein Zielzeichen ist dann genau
angerichtet, wenn die beiden, einander gegenüberstehenden Flugzielzeichen (Würzlaus) gleich groß
sind. Auf dem e‐Feinmessrohr erscheinen ebenfalls 2 Lichtstriche, aber die Stör‐und Zielzeichen
kommen nur auf dem oberen Lichtstrich zur Anzeige. Das Ziel ist dann genau angemessen, wenn der
Dunkelpunkt die "Würzlaus" halbiert.
Blatt 4 zu Anlage 4
B. Geräteteile zur Bedienung des Sonderbetriebes "Würzlaus".
Zum Sonderbetrieb "Würzlaus" sind folgende Geräte und Geräteteile am Funkmessgerät erforderlich:
1.) ein Hilfssender H.S. 62/65 "Michael" (am Ausleger links neben dem Richtsitz)
mit Bedienungsknopf "Ankopplung" und Bedienungsknopf "Abstimmung",
2.) ein H.F.‐Kabel vom Hilfssender zum Senderüberlagerer
(führt durch den Ausleger in den Sendeempfangsgeräteschrank und ist
mit dem H.F.‐Stecker in den Senderüberlagerer eingeführt),
3.)Drehknopf zum Ein‐und Ausschalten der Kehrbildanzeige
auf der rechten Seite des Richtgerätes (Mittelteil),
4.) Schlitzschraube (K) zum Nachjustieren des Kreisdurchmessers
auf dem Übersichtsrohr auf der rechten Seite
des Richtgerätes (Mittelteil),
5.)Senderüberlagerer, die für den Sendebetrieb "Würzlaus"
ausgerüstet sind, tragen ein "W" auf der Frontplatte.
C. Bedienungsanleitung für Sonderbetrieb "Würzlaus"
a. Herstellen der Messbereitschaft.
Allgemeines: Das Funkmessgerät 39 T(D) wird nach
der L.Dv. 400/8a eingeschaltet und abgestimmt.
Mit dem Einschalten des Funkmessgerätes (Flak) ist auch der Hilfssender eingeschaltet. Die
Justierung des Dunkelpunktes auf dem Übersichtsrohr entfällt.
Die Schraube "Dunkelpunkt" bewirkt lediglich nur eine Verschiebung der
Ablenkzeichen auf den Bildröhren.
"Abstimmen des Hilfssenders".
B1
B2 messen Standziel genau an
B3
B2 schaltet Kernbildanzeige ein
durch Umlegen des Schaltknopfes
im Mittelteil auf der rechten Seite des
Richtgerätes von "N" auf "S";
überzeugt sich, daß Bedienungsknopf "Ankopplung" auf Linksanschlag steht
regelt Sprühen auf dem Übersichtsrohr auf 2 mm
durch Drehknopf "Pot" (Stellung 2 ‐ 3).
dreht Bedienungsknopf "Ankopplung" auf Rechtsanschlag
stellt Lichtstriche auf dem Seitenrichtrohr (gleichzeitig Höhenrichtrohr)
auf größten Abstand
durch Drehen am Bedienungsknopf
"Abstimmung" am Hilfssender.
Blatt 5 zu Anlage 4
Noch B2
bringt Lichtstriche auf 1,5 cm Abstand
durch Linksdrehen des Bedienungsknopfes "Ankopplung"
justiert Durchmesser des Lichtkreises auf dem Übersichtsrohr nach
durch Drehen der Schlitzschraube
im Mittelteil auf der rechten
Seite des Richtgerätes.
Hilfssender ist abgestimmt, wenn Festzeichen als
sauberer Schlängel auf den Richtröhren erscheint.
B 2 meldet: "Hilfssender abgestimmt".
schaltet wieder auf "Normalbetrieb"
durch Umlegen des Schaltknopfes im Mittelteil auf der rechten
Seite des Richtgerätes von "S" auf "N".
schaltet Sonderbetrieb "Würzlaus" aus
durch Drehen des Bedienungsknopfes "Ankopplung" auf
Linksanschlag.
b. Gefechtsmäßige Bedienung.
Beachte, dass der Abstand der Lichtstriche im Seitenrichtrohr stets 1,5 cm betragen muss.
Durch Änderung der Empfindlichkeit durch den Drehknopf "Pot" ändert sich auch dieser
Abstand. Durch Drehen an dem Drehknopf "Ankopplung" am Hilfssender müssen daher
Lichtstriche laufend auf 1,5 cm Abstand gehalten werden.
B 2 beobachtet das Übersichtsrohr. Bei Feindstörung durch Folien ruft er aus:
"Feindstörung Folien"
M.F. befielt " Sonderbetrieb "Würzlaus".
B 2 schaltet Sonderbetrieb "Würzlaus" ein
durch Drehen des Bedienungsknopfes "Ankopplung" auf
Rechtsanschlag
schaltet Kehrbildanzeige ein
durch Umlegen des Schaltknopfes im Mittelteil auf der rechten
Seite des Richtgerätes von "S" auf "N".
sucht in der vermutlichen Richtung
regelt die Empfindlichkeit laufend nach
durch Drehen am Drehknopf ''Pot" .
bringt Lichtstrich auf normalen Abstand von 1,5 cm
durch Bedienungsknopf ''Ankopplung'' am Hilfssender
Blatt 6 zu Anlage 4
Noch B 2
beobachtet das Übersichtsrohr.
Beim Erkennen einer ''Würzlaus'' ruft er aus:
''Aufgefasst in 130!"
B 1 stellt die von B 2 ausgerufene Entfernung
durch den e‐Grobtrieb ein
hält laufend die ''Würzlaus" auf den Dunkelpunkt
durch Drehen am e‐Feintrieb.
B 2 u.
B 3 messen den Seiten‐ bzw. Höhenwinkel,
in dem die beiden kehrbildlichen
Würzläuse auf gleicher Größe gehalten werden.
Bei genauer Einstellung rufen sie aus:
''Seitenwinkel (Höhenwinkel) ‐ Null 1''.

Bruce Dennis 5th November 2018 02:26

RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT: Wilde Sau item 58
 
SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 357/1945.
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W. AS THE
STATEMENTS MADE HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM.
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED AS FACTS UNTIL COMMENTED ON IN AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE - II
Navigational Aids.
1. This report is the second of the series dealing with radio and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe.
2. As in the case of the first of the series (A.D.I.(K) 343/1945) dealing with Blind Landing and Airborne Communications Equipment, it is based on interrogation of General Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and a few important members of his staff, and has been supported by a file of current papers which were in the possession of the General’s Chief of Staff.
3. An index of the numerical designations of the navigational equipment mentioned in this report appears in Appendix I.
4. For convenient reference, a translation of the document entitled "Funkausrüstung der Flugzeugmuster, Notprogramm" (signal Equipment in the G.A.F. - Emergency Program) - item 45/99 ff in A.D.I.(K) Documents List 45/9 - which has also appeared as an Appendix to A.D.I.(K) 343/1945, is reproduced as Appendix II to the present report but the list of equipment contained in that document has been omitted as Appendix I gives a fuller list.

TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT.
5. Throughout the course of the war, the general standard of German navigational training was undoubtedly inferior to that of the Allies. A simple form of navigation was taught but navigators track plotted only and relied on W/T aids and in particular positioning by means of loop fixes as the main basis for their navigation.
6. During the early part of the war extensive use was made of Knickebein and other beam systems, but later this form of navigational aid gave way to the "Y" control system (better known by the Allied codeword Benito) and "Egon".
7. Sonne was universally accepted as an outstanding success and from the time of its inception in 1942 research was continuously directed towards overcoming its imperfection, in particular the range limitation. Komet was a typical example, of attempted improvement on these lines
8. The Germans were patently backward in the field of pulse systems and the majority - if not all - of their navigational aids of this type were copied from Allied methods.
9. The fear of the Allied countermeasures was much to the fore during the last two years and considerable research and efforts was devoted to offsetting such interference and to perfecting systems which would reduce and if possible preclude the danger of jamming. Another factor always present in the minds of those responsible for tactical navigational requirements was that the apparatus must be as light and small as possible because of the limited space available in German aircraft.
10. During the last stages of the war, and as a natural consequence of German air policy, being forced to concentrate on the defensive, thereby involving almost exclusive use of fighter power, a great deal of attention was devoted to the development of simple navigational aids suitable
for single-engine aircraft of which Rübezahl was a typical example.

D/F LOOP EQUIPMENT.
PeGe (Peil Gerät) 6.
11. PeGe 6 was the successor of PeGe 5, the standard loop D/F, set in use at the beginning of the war, and. operated on 150 - 1200 kc/s (2000-250 meters). It provided automatic D/F facilities, the W/T operator merely having to tune to the signal and the "answer" being produced on a course indicator.
12. In the opinion of P/W, who was responsible for operational requirements in the navigational field and who had had fairly extensive navigational experience with K.G.40, PeGe 6 was less reliable than the manually-operated PeGe 5 as the automatic D/F facilities could not distinguish between the true signal and jamming and were apt to record bearing midway between the two if they were near together. The human ear was much more acute and could distinguish the minimum of the real signal from that of the "phoney” one. It had the further disadvantage that it was a heavier piece of equipment than the manually operated set.

FuGe 141
13. The FuGe 141 operating on a frequency band of 58.0 - 59.2 mc/s was a receiver with a D/F loop fitted to Air Rescue aircraft used for homing on to the NS 4 emergency radio set carried on the chest by pilots.
14. The NS 4 had a flexible steel tape aerial and batteries which gave it an endurance of 2 to 2,5 hours.

FuGe 142.
15. The FuGe 142 using the 2000 - 250 metre band was a small D/F battery set for use in emergency in the event of failure of the aircraft' s electricity supply.
16. The FuGe 142 had a manually-operated loop and its accuracy was only 10° to 15°.
17. When the P/W who, in October 1944, took over the navigational tactical requirements first made its acquaintance, he discovered that the designer of the emergency set, while having the laudable object of assisting a crew in dire emergency when they where probably well and truly lost, had omitted to include any sensing arrangement. The set was, therefore, quickly scrapped as being as much of a danger as an aid.

FuGe 145
18. The FuGe 145 was a simple type of D/F set in development for use in single-seater aircraft. It was for use with M/F beacons and was designed for use by coastal reconnaissance aircraft, as for example the Do.335, so that they could obtain a bearing when flying at low level.
19. It was much lighter than the PeGe 6 and had no automatic facilities, but was very easy to operate. P/W had thought that it might ultimately supersede the PeGe 6 for other types of aircraft.

Suggested loop for fighter aircraft
20. The research centre at Rechlin had been asked to examine a rough type of loop for singleseater fighter aircraft, which would consist of a loop built into the pilot' s helmet. It was thought that this would enable the pilot to establish the general direction of a beacon by movements of
his head and without recourse to the use of a compass.
21. This idea was tried out and seemed promising, but was never fully developed.

HOMING BEACONS.
Schwanboje.
22. The Schwanboje was a waterborne V.H.F. beacon dropped by parachute and originally used by K.G.40 for marking convoys or submarines. In the autumn of 1944 a 1ine of Schwan buoys was used to aid the He.111's when launching V-1’s from the North Sea against this
country.
23. The beacon consisted of a frame aerial and transmitted on a wavelength which could be homed on by the FuGe 17, the standard equipment of K.G.40 in 1942 when the Schwanboje came into use.
24. The set was powered by accumulators and had a live of five hours; by the means of a clockwork device it could be pre-set before release so that it ran for a testing period immediately on release and later started up again after a prescribed interval governed by the expected time of arrival of the homing aircraft. The buoy was fitted with a self-destroying
charge operated automatically.
25. A later type of Schwanboje operated on the 38 - 42 mc/s waveband so that aircraft equipped with the FuGe 162 could also use the system.
Biene
26. Biene is the code word for a responder beacon. The idea of responder beacons for homing purposes had only been hit on in 1944 and Bienen to respond to the different airborne radar sets were still under development in 1945. The FuGe 243 - Hohentwiel Biene – had been used by coastal units in Norway, in February or March 1945.
27. Responder beacons were also being developed for use in the Baldur method of navigation (see paragraphs 79, 82 of this report).

BEAM SYSTEMS.
Zyklop.
28. This was the latest form of the well-known Knickebein working on 30 - 33,3 mc/s and received by E.B.L.3 in the aircraft. It was a mobile station which could be fully erected into operation within a week.
29. A still more mobile unit known as the Bock-Zyklop had been introduced. This could be set up in three days and could be adapted for use on the FuGe 16 frequency although as yet, according to documents, no visual indicator for the FuGe 16 had been developed.
30. The 120 W ground transmitter was called the ???? which gave a beam 0.5° wide and a range of 300 km. at a height of 5,000 meters. The Zyklop systems had been made use of on the Russian front up to the end of the hostilities.

Sonne.
31. The Sonne beacon system which worked on a frequency of 270 - 480 kc/s was received in the aircraft on the FuGe 10. It was considered an extremely effective daylight system but the range limitation was a disadvantage. Fixes could be obtained from ranges up to 1,000 - 1,200
km. Sonne 6 at Quimper which was the most efficient of the Sonne beacons, had been used on an occasion at a distance of 1,400 km.
32. The sectors served by Sonne covered, an angle of 120 – 150°. The beacon was very reliable over the centre sector of 100°, but the error increased progressively towards the edges of the beam in conformity with the sine law.
33. At night errors up to 4° were liable to occur even in the centre of the sector of the beacon and no real use could be made of it.

Mond.
34. To improve the Sonne beacons both in range, and accuracy, an experimental system working on the same principle, but on 3000/6000 kc/s was tried out in 1942. The shorter wave transmission did not prove very reliable and was given up about the end of 1943.

Stern.
35. Finally a beacon of the Sonne type under the name "Stern" was designed for use on a V.H. frequency. It, not unnaturally, only gave optical range and was, therefore, of no practical value and was not developed.

Dora.
36. One P/W had seen documentary mention of Dora which he believed was a navigational aid system and a precursor of Komet. He did not know whether it worked on the same principle but the Komet experimental site at Kolby was on the former Dora site.

Komet.
37. In 1942 the question of navigation over the Atlantic stood in the limelight . As the He 177 was supposed to be coming into service shortly to enable K.G.40 to reach further West, the need for navigational equipment of longer range became acute.
38. A year or so earlier Professor von HANDEL had categorically stated in a lecture that a long-range navigational system based on pulse would inevitably be extremely inaccurate. In view of Professor von HANDEL's views on pulse systems, an improved form of Sonne which would give much greater ranges and be less susceptible to night effect was given high
priority.
39. The system evolved was called "Komet" and experimental stations were erected at Bordeaux and Kolby (see A.D.I.(K) 364/1944). The ground station called for an array of no less than 127 masts and 19 control huts in order to cover a 90° sector. It worked admirably provided a 10° sector only was covered, but as soon as the planned 90° sector was put into operation, mutual interference between the masts arose and the various lobes radiated were no longer of symmetrical pattern, with the result that large errors crept in.
40. Research on this delayed the project considerably. After the invasion when long distance reconnaissance in the Atlantic was no longer practical politics, the Komet system was given up without ever having been effectively used. The development people were the more pleased to dispense with it since it left the German radio research and industry free to deal with other more urgent matters.
41. The beacon was to operate on frequencies of 5000, 9000 or 12,000 kc/s received on the FuGe 10K, and it was estimated that ranges up to 3000 km would be obtained. The system employed was to be similar to that used in the Sonne but instead of obtaining one reading per minute, oscillation of the beam was to be speeded up to give 100 readings par minute.
42. The true bearing of the aircraft was automatically recorded by the FuGe 124 which was known as the Kometschreiber. The recording took the form of a series of vertical lines, one for each reading, printed on a strip of paper. At the same time as the lines were printed the Kometschreiber recorded the section of the swept area in which the aircraft was flying, thus giving what amounted to a rough position.
43. The fine reading was obtained from the length of the recorded lines. Any inaccuracies due to night effect could be easily eliminated by averaging the length of the lines, as recorded, on the paper strip, by eye.
Erika.
44. Erika was a navigation system (see A.D.I.(K) 364 and 409/1944.) which had already reached the development stage in 1942 but its operational employment was of brief duration and it was soon discarded in favour of Bernhard.
45. Erika was based on the principle of a V.H.F. (30 - 33 mc/s) beam oscillating rapidly over a segment of about 60 – 90°. The beam was phased, a different phase being picked up in different sections of the segment and read off in relation to a standard phase producer in the aircraft. In order to obtain a fix, two such Erika stations had to be received and to receive each station no less than two E.B.L.3's were necessary making a total of four receivers.
46. The range presentation unit in the aircraft, FuGe 121, took the form of a clock-face with a needle indicator and calibrated, P/W thought, from 0 -100. A specially prepared map was required to establish bearing.
47. A disadvantage of Erika was the vulnerability to jamming, interference signals modifying the phase and thereby giving inaccurate readings. The great weight, carried and the bulk of the four receivers, which were particularly cumbersome in the relatively small aircraft in use in the G.A.F. made its widespread use impracticable.


Bernhardine.
48. This system was first introduced in 1942 for use by bomber aircraft, but was later dropped in favour of the Benito and Egon control systems. With the increasing British jamming during night raids it was reintroduced for use in night fighter commentary (see A.D.I.(K) 125/1945, paras.5 to 29), which it was thought could only be jammed with great difficulty.
49. The term “Bernhard” was used for the ground stations whilst the airborne recording equipment was called Bernhardine or FuGe 120. The latter made use of the E.B.L.3. receiver as the transmissions lay in the 30-33 mc/s band.
50. At the time of the German capitulation, the following three transmitting stations were in operation, the first two, of which could transmit commentary.-
-Thisted, on N.W. coast of Denmark.
-Bretstedt, N. of Husum, Germany.
-Trebbin, S.E. of Berlin.
51. A further station near Breslau had been almost completed when it had to be dismantled on account of the Russian advance. Additional stations were in the course of construction near Kassel, Munich, Pilsen and Vienna.
52. The Bernhardine system was looked upon as a considerable improvement on Erika. It gave 360° coverage as compared to 60/90° with Erika and, whereas from the jamming aspect stray signals could disturb the phase of Erika causing false indication, in the case of Bernhardine,
interference merely resulted in no reading being possible, and furthermore to attain this through 360° a very powerful jamming transmitter flying near the ground station would be needed.
53. The Bernhardine system was not regarded as unjammable but it was thought that use of high power and aerial gain would render jamming by airborne means impracticable.
54. In addition to the E.B.L.3 receiver, the airborne Hellschreiber FuGe 120, also called the Bernhardine, which gave both bearing and commentary was employed. According to P/W the FuGe 120 was large and weighty and the first improvement aimed at was to reduce the weight and provide a set which occupied less space in the aircraft. To this end an attempt was made to eliminate the use of paper strip for the Hellschreiber and a rotating "Folienschreiber" a cellophane paper moving over a sticky carbon surface which constituted a self-eraser - was employed. This projected recording method proved a failure and the use of paper strip had to be reverted to. According to documents the type using paper strip was known as FuGe 120a, and the self-erasing recorder FuGe 120b.
55. A smaller model, the FuGe 120k, to operate on the paper strip principle which constituted the latest improvement, was still in the development stage at the conclusion of hostilities. Previously the ground transmitter broadcast simultaneously from the upper and lower aerial
arrays on two frequencies close enough to one another for them both to be received on one channel of the E.B.L.3. One lobe was used for coarse D/F, the other for fine. The two frequencies were then separated by a filter before being fed into the Hellschreiber. The FuGe 120k was designed for use with a ground transmitter operating only on the coarse D/F frequency. The filter could therefore be dispensed with and considerable weight saved in the airborne set at the expense of some accuracy in D/F.
56. With the loss of D/F accuracy the sharp “V” in the vertical printing indicating the reading (see diagram A.D.I.(K) 125/1945 para.18) became a gap about 4° wide. To facilitate the reading of the centre of the gap by eye, and to reduce the size and weight of the apparatus, the vertical lines referred to above were superimposed on the scale which could then only be read in the gap. This allowed the paper strip to be considerably narrower.
57. The FuGe 120k was designed primarily for use in single seat jet aircraft but was also to be embodied in the Ju.88 where space was at a premium, as soon as sufficient numbers of this set were available.

Hermine.
58. The Hermine system was originally developed, in response to a tactical requirement formulated during the second part of 1942, as a navigational aid for the purpose of giving an approximate bearing to single-engine night fighters engaged on “Wilde Sau” operations.
59. By the time the initial difficulties in development had been overcome Wilde Sau night fighting had almost ceased; it was found however that Hermine could be used to advantage by day fighters, and it came into operational use.
60. An accuracy of ±5° was assumed, but it was found in practice that this could be improved upon to ±3° by experienced pilots.
61. Thirteen or fourteen ground stations were in operation by Easter 1945 which, P/W claimed, gave complete coverage of the Reich. It was intended to fit two Schlechtwetter (bad weather) Fighter Geschwader with the necessary airborne equipment, and this program had been onethird
completed by May 1945. One P/W had heard that ten to fifteen Me.262's of K.G.51 were amongst the aircraft so equipped.
62. The following may be added in modification of the description of the Hermine system given in A.D.I.(K) 125/1945, paras.59 to 62. The Hermine rotating beacon transmits a continuous tone on which is superimposed a speaking clock which counts from 1 to 35, each
figure representing tens of degree. Over an angle of about 15° the continuous tone falls to a minimum and rises again. During this period the voice appears to become more audible and the pilot can estimate where the minimum of continuous tone occurs, and so obtain his bearing from the beacon.
63. The beacon recognition is given by means of a self-evident code name for example, "Berolina” for Berlin – which is spoken by the voice in place of 000°.
64. The airborne equipment is the FuGe 125 consisting of the E.B.L.3 with the Tzg (Telephoniezusatzgerät) which enables the 30.0 - 33.3 mc/s transmission picked up on the E.B.L.3 receiver to be heard in the pilot's headphones. Though the Hermine beacons were fully operational there was a scarcity of FuGe 125 sets, as a result of which practical experience of this system was too limited to judge of its efficiency or to lead to further improved tactical requirements been formulated.

PULSE SYSTEM.
Ingolstadt
65. All the P/W had heard reference to Ingolstadt and agreed that it was a long-range navigational system.
66. One P/W thought that Ingolstadt was the cover name for a pulse navigation system using hyperbolic curves and similar to British Gee; it was originated by Telefunken in 1938 but was then turned down by the R.L.M. In his recollection the original Telefunken idea derived from
theoretical discussions at an international conference before the war.
67. As mentioned earlier under the heading of Komet, Professor von HANDEL maintained that owing to the incidence of mutual interference between direct and reflected waves the system was impracticable at long range. In consequence of von HANDEL’s view the system was dropped.
68. Much consternation and annoyance was occasioned in 1944, when it was found that the Allies were successfully operating a similar system.
69. Truhe is the cover name used to describe navigational aid system, using ground stations, similar to those of British Gee. In effect the British Gee stations were also used, the airborne sets being almost identical with the British Gee boxes.

Truhe.
70. There is no very distinct difference between "Truhe" and "Hyperbel". The latter term was originally coined to denote our Gee. It was also used when German aircraft equipped with British Gee sets made use of British ground stations.
71. The British Gee chain was used successfully but it was realised that so soon as the Germans lost an aircraft, over England, a change would be made. The German "Y" service monitored the British ground stations to follow any change in Gee phasing and passed advice of such change to their aircraft by W/T.
72. Truhe referred to the German system which was ultimately to cover the 20 to 100 mc/s band and employed various types of ground transmitters including Feuerhilfe, Feuerstein, Feuerzange and Feuerland. All these transmitters could also be used to jam our own Gee, further details of which will appear in a subsequent report on German Radio Countermeasures.
The original 46 to 50 mc/s system was known as Truhe I and the new 30 to 60 mc/s system as Truhe II.
73. A chain of Truhe stations was built around Berlin, primarily for training purposes and there were in addition groups of ground stations in the Schwarzwald and in Pomerania. The last named was intended for operations against Russia and it is not known if the stations were
destroyed before their capture.
74. The airborne sets which were known as FuGe 122 covering 46-50 mc/s and FuGe 123 covering 25-75 mc/s were replicas of the British Gee boxes and according to P/W were equivalent to British R.1324 and R.1355. These German sets were slightly smaller and more compact than the British sets.
75. Truhe was used by F.A.G.2 and K.G.66, but up to the time of capitulation only a few FuGe 122 and FuGe 123 sets had been produced and only one R.F. box for the latter set.

Baldur.
76. The Baldur range-measuring system is comparable to the British G.H. and appears to have been imitated from it. It was referred to by P/W as “Egon in reverse" and was the only navigational system developed by the German by means of which an aircraft could measure distance from a known source as opposed to fixing itself by a position line. As the G.A.F. staff were still thinking in terms of a grandiose bomber policy as late as June 1944, it was intended for use by bomber aircraft for pinpointing targets and for accurate blind bombing.
77. The wavelength employed was in the neighbourhood of 2-4 meters and fell in the SN 2 band.
78. Only two experimental transmitters, both located in Lower Silesia, were erected and one P/W maintained that this system never progressed beyond experimental trials by the manufacturers. It was eventually relegated to low priority owing to the virtual cessation of German bomber operations and the pressure of more urgent demands on radio research and the radio industry.
79. The airborne equipment was known as the FuGe 126 which was made up of a transmitter to interrogate a ground responder beacon, a receiver and a presentation unit. The receiver and transmitter were SN 2 units, though P/W thought they might have been slightly modified for use with Baldur.
80. From documents, the presentation unit appears to have been a modification of the Würzburg range measurement tube, and the accuracy is given as ± 100 meters at all ranges, but this was thought to be purely theoretical and P/W doubted whether it would have been possible to achieve this accuracy in actual practice.
81. A smaller airborne set, the FuGe 126k (k = klein = small) was built for use by single-seat aircraft. In reducing the size and weight of the set, and making it pilot-operated, accuracy had to be sacrificed. P/W, who was responsible for putting up the tactical requirements, considered a clock-face presentation to be the ideal solution. It was expected that the accuracy of the FuGe 126k would then be of the order of 500 meters independent of range.

Baldur - Truhe
82. It was planned to experiment on a combination of Baldur and Truhe (Gee) for use by bombers. The intention was to use a hyperbolic grid line of Truhe for the target approach. This could be pre-set, and the pilot could fly along it by keeping the blip centralised, and could ascertain his exact position along the line by measuring his distance from a Baldur beacon. This system was considered simpler particularly for a single-seater aircraft, than the method of using two hyperbolic grid lines or two distances from Baldur beacons. The first experimental sets were to be ready in the autumn of this year.

Baldur - Bernhardine
83. A further project was a combination of Baldur and Bernhardine to give simultaneous bearing and range. The range indication was to be obtained by the pilot pressing a knob when the range would appear in kilometres on a dial. This system was suggested for use by both day fighters and bombers.

GROUND CONTROL SYSTEMS,
Benito.
84. The Benito system of control using FuGe 16, known to the Germans as "Y", is too well known to warrant description. The following paragraphs deal with recent developments.
85. When operating the bomber Benito procedure with the narrow beam. (0.3°) essential for azimuth accuracy, it was easy for the bomber pilot to get on to one of the side lobes in error since these were only about 3° from the main beam.
86. In order to minimise the possibility of mistake and to relieve the pilot of the strain of flying on a beam, an automatic device, the FuGe 28a, was in use which was the improved and final form of the old Y-Gerät of 1941. Documents dated about June 1944 show that it was used in conjunction with FuGe 17, but P/W thought that it had been modified for use with FuGe 16ZY as well.
87. The procedure was that the bomber pilot flew on instructions conveyed over the FuGe 17 until it had been established by ground D/F stations that he was on the true beam, when the code word "Bako" would be given whereupon the pilot would switch on the FuGe 28a which took over control of the automatic pilot and kept him on the beam.
88. P/W gave the accuracy of range measurement with the Bomber Benito procedure as only ± 1 km. at maximum range.

Egon.
89. The original Egon procedure which involved the use of two Freyas, the one for rough positioning and the other for fine positioning - later became known as "Egon Einstand" (One location) to differentiate from an improved system termed “Egon Zweistand” 90. Egon Zweistand was evolved to offset the inaccuracies in azimuth D/F, and cash in on the range accuracy of radar. With Zweistand a third Freya was introduced, placed some
considerable distance from the other two Freyas in order to give a distance cut. It was intended for use by bomber aircraft operating over England or on long range sea missions.
91. The original Zweistand system, which was first tried out in Italy by a Schlacht unit, was somewhat primitive in that the readings from the extra Freya were telephoned through to the plotting centre and worked out before being plotted on the Seeburg table.
92. To eliminate the delay thereby involved a landline connection was introduced to feed the Freya pulse to the C.R.T., which then had two blips showing ranges from the two Freya sites.
The vulnerability of landline to disturbance and destruction later led to the development of a W/T transmitter and this method was employed successfully in operations.
93. Since the Freya pulse was not strong enough to trigger off the FuGe 25A at ranges exceeding 250 kilometres, it was planned to supplant the Freya by extra powerful Wassermanns, and thereby increase the effective range of Egon Zweistand to 350 kilometres.
94. A further line of development was the provision of a new type of control table giving the exactitude of plotting necessary for pinpoint bombing. This control table, which was under development at Rechlin, made use of complicated mechanical apparatus for accurate projection
of the position of the bomber. One of these tables was destroyed in the course of a daylight air attack on Rechlin in February 1945; two other tables were in existence at the time of the capitulation, and were located somewhere in Western Germany.
95. Egon when first introduced was received with some scepticism by the crews, as it was felt that it was too vulnerable to jamming. After it had been used operationally without being jammed in the attacks on London in March 1944, the procedure was adopted with greater confidence, and it gained a good reputation. As recounted in A.D.I.(K) 343/1945, Egon was
always favoured by the R.L.M. technical development section in preference to Benito control.
96. A drawback of the system was its restricted range at low altitude, which according to P/W was the reason why it was not used in conjunction with V.1 operations.

Nachtlicht
97. The Nachtlicht system was the first method of control not using R/T speech to be improvised by the Germans, and had been tried out during the raids on London in the spring of 1944.
98. It had been observed that the red signal lamp of the FuGe 25A was illuminated when the aircraft was being swept by a Freya, and it was suggested that use could be made of this as a means of transmitting morse signals from the ground. A Freya operating on a special wavelength, which P/W thought was 2.55 meters, was set up on the Channel coast and was used to send simple instructions to the aircraft attacking London by means of visual morse indications on the lamp of the


FuGe 25A.
99. The primitive method of giving distant control indications was the forerunner of "Nachtfee", "Barbara" and "Barbarossa".
100. Luftkurier was the first development of the Nachtlicht idea. It was primitive device intended to give visual indication to the pilot by means of a pointer which was started and stopped by the reception of pulses.
101. P/W thought that Luftkurier was first tried out by K.G.66 on the Freya band, but it was so easy to jam by the addition of extra pulses that it was never developed.

Nachtfee
102. Nachtfee was the term used to describe a system for the transmission of control instructions to a pilot in the beam of the controlling Freya through the medium of a C.R.T. indicator similar to the Lichtenstein range tube. The airborne equipment used was known as FuGe 136 and weighed 12 kg.
103. The original purpose of Nachtfee was, to provide a solution to the jamming of R/T control systems, and it had been used operationally by the Pathfinders of K.G.66 for mines in the Scheldt estuary. It was to be adapted for use by night fighters to overcome our jamming of the
night fighter commentary.
104. Nachtfee was a system using the FuGe 25A as receiver.
105. The presentation screen in the aircraft was inscribed with various commands both on the inside and outside of a circular time trace. There was a stationary zero blip in the 12 o'clock position, and when an instruction was radiated the pulses received caused a second blip to emerge from the first and travel round the C.R. tube in a clock-wise direction, presumably by a slight change in p.r.f. This blip came to a stop and the command corresponding to its position could be read off on the inside of the time trace where a total of about eight different instructions were inscribed. It took from one to two second, for the blip to travel round the tube.
106. It was thought that the further eight commands inscribed on the outside of the time trace were denoted by the blip making a complete circle starting round a second time before coming to rest at any one of the eight sectors. In this way a total of sixteen different orders could be given. For night fighters such instructions as "turn left/right", "climb", "dive”, etc. appeared on the inner side and figures for transmitting bearing on the outer side of the trace.
107. This system was used operationally, but it was found that, apart from the susceptibility to jamming, other pulse transmissions could interfere by unlocking the system and thereby cause wrong positioning of the indicator blip.
108. Another pronounced objection to the Nachtfee lay in the fact that it was necessary for a member of the crew to watch the C.R.T. indicator uninterruptedly for missing one blip indication might give the message a false value. It was not therefore possible to use it in singleseater aircraft.

Barbara
109. This apparatus, also called FuGe 138, consisted of an attachment to the FuGe 25A receiver and only weighed 2 kg. This unit contained an audio filter which allowed the pilot to hear morse signals superimposed on the Freya interrogator transmission if they were emitted on a suitable audio frequency usually about 800 cycles. By keying other morse signals on different audio frequencies and equipping aircraft with suitable filters, more than one aircraft could be controlled by a single Freya.
110. Barbara was to be used for Egon control of ground-strafing aircraft and bombers but not for night fighters.
111. In the Germans' opinion there were three disadvantages, namely that the Allies could intercept and make use of signals so transmitted, that the aircraft had to be in the beam of the Freya if it were to receive, and so an aircraft "lost" by the Freya owing to jamming could not be communicated with and finally that, though intended for single-engined aircraft, fighter pilots rarely had sufficient command of morse to be able to use this type of control.

Barbarossa
112. Barbarossa was a set designed to meet the same requirements as Barbara but to remedy two of the drawback mentioned in the last paragraph.
113. The instructions to the aircraft were to be transmitted by code pulse modulations which were passed through a "pulse filter" in the airborne set and a written indication obtained on a Hellschreiber. The pulse filter and Hellschreiber unit were attachments to the FuGe 25A and were known as the FuGe 139. This apparatus was in development at Rechlin under the
supervision of Stabs.Ing. von HAUTEVILLE.
114. With this arrangement pulse modulations could not be read by the Allies, and for spoof purposes in order to produce a wrong indication we would have had to know the exact type of modulation accepted by it. Visual indication was also quicker and did not depend on knowledge
of morse.
115. This scheme was only in a very early stage of development and P/W were unable to give details. It was hoped that in due course it would be possible to develop matters a stage further and find a means of transmitting scrambled speech instead of morse, but P/W understood that
the question of pulse modulation for speech transmission had not been solved.

Rübezahl
116. Consideration had been given in 1945 to the introduction of a crude system of navigation which could be only used within the boundaries of the Reich. This was to go under the code name of Rübezahl, and the fact that it was seriously considered and actively supported by the P/W responsible for Navigational Aids on the G.A.F. signals staff is an interesting reflection of the depths to which a combination of Allied jamming under-trained fighter had forced German technique.
117. It was expected that in the course of the summer of 1945 thousands of 162 Volksjäger would be available for the protection of the Fatherland. They were to be equipped with FuGe 24, which was to become the standard G.A.F. R/T set as described in A.D.I.(K) 343/1945. This set did not for the present give Benito control facilities and indeed as they were
short-range, high speed, fair-weather aircraft it was not certain that Benito control would be essentially needed.
118. It was essential that their relatively inexperienced pilots should have a simple means by which they could locate their approximate position without any additional navigation equipment having either to be manufactured or carried in the aircraft. It was therefore decided
to develop a system which could be used with FuGe 24.
119. In order to direct the Volksjäger pilots to their target, recourse was to be had to the night fighter system of broadcasting a commentary, and this commentary was to be combined with the primitive navigation system Rübezahl.
120. It was therefore planned to set up ground transmitters over Germany at 30 km intervals. The transmitters were to be beamed upwards, so that at 6,000 meters the polar diagram was about 40 km in diameter and lobes from neighbouring transmitters just overlapped, thus covering the whole area. Each transmitter emitted a plain language recognition signal in the
form of the name of its district, e.g. Halle, Magdeburg, etc.
121. All transmitters were to be operated on the same frequency so that to locate himself the pilot merely tuned his FuGe 24 to the frequency for the day. The ground transmitters were to be adapted from the FuGe 15 transmitters which had been manufactured in quantity as described
in paras. 23-39 of A.D.I.(K) 343/1945 before it was found that the FuGe 15 was unsuitable as an airborne R/T set. They were renamed Bs.15 (Bodensender).
122. Later it was believed that the night fighters which were also to carry FuGe 24 (see appendix 1) would also use the Rübezahl commentary as yet another alternative source for vectoring themselves to the bomber stream.



Bruce Dennis 6th November 2018 14:26

German traffic analysis of russian communications
 

EXTRACTS FROM TICOM REPORT I-112 :
VOLUME 9--GERMAN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNICATIONS


Lt. Werner RASCH, of the 353rd German Air Force Signal
Intelligence Regiment in the East, gives the folloving account
ot the development and achievements of the Russian Long Range
Bomber Forces (ADD--Avitsiya Dalneye Dyestviya).

"Soon after the outbreak of the Russian-German .
war, practically allot the Russian Long Range Bomber
Porce was destroyed, either by German attacks on
Russian airfields, or in combat with Geman fighters.
What was lett of it was withdrawn from action. Marshall
GOLOVANOV, chief of ADD, reorganized his forces
with the intention of using them in night opera~ions
only, owing to the threat presented by the strong
German flak defense. The first successful operations
following the reorganization took place in the battle
of Stalingrad (September 1942 - February 1943).
From then on, ADD operations played an important part
in all Russian ottens1ves. The training for night
operations was of long duration; at the end of'the
war each bomber reg1ment had crews which were still in
a training status. .
"The achievements of' the ADD units were not -
very impressive. Crews were not trained tor carrying
out night attacks in close formation. In the
latter days of the war 60 aircraft of a division
need approximately one hour to assemble and take
off, and even this was accomplished only- under the
most favourable navigational and meteorological
conditions. In planning an attack, each division
was allotted 20 minutes over the target; in that
time it was intended that all aircraft or one division
should have completed their mission and moved out to
make room for the next division. Unless targets on
the front itself were being raided, the front line
was usually crossed before dark. This permitted the take-off
to be made during daylight, and the first aircraft
to take of were held in an assembly area in order
that a close-flying formation be formed. Formations
equipped with radio-telephone communications were
again brought into close order by the leading
aircraft of the regiments before going into the
bomb run. Each regiment had several Pathfinder aircraft,
which were flown by the most experienced crews.
Since the success of the mission depended upon the1r
efforts. In addition to theflares, they usually
carried a 1,,000 pound bomb.
Point-to-Point Nets. --These po1nt-to-point nets of the
Long Range Bomber Forces (ADD) alone were a sufficient basis
on Which the Germans could build up an accurate picture ot
the ADD organization. When the 18th Russian Air Army was
reorganized the Germans immediately recognized such steps
from traffic on these nets. The most profitable traffic in these nets from an intelligence standpoint, came from units which were widely separated in the field as this necessitated the use of radio facilities for communication. In instances where the units were close together very little s1gnal
intelligence could be gained since there was slight need tor
radio transmissions.
From the intercept and analysis of traffic on these
point-to-point nets movements ot the Russian Air Army units,
locations and occupations of airfields numbers of operational
and unoperational aircraft and locations of supply dumps
could be determined. Traffic intercepted-on these nets
also gave the Germans considerable information regarding
intended operations and offensives. One outstanding success
along this line occurred when a Russian order to bomber units
was intercepted by the Germans. The message ordered an
attack on Shavli, Lithuania, where an entire German Panzer
Army was immobilized due to a lack of sufficient fuel.
The German Signal Intelligence Service reported the information to
the Lufttlotte which provided fighters to meet the Russian Long Range Bombers while German JU 52' s dropped gasoline supplies to the encircled Panzer Army and enabled it to escape.

Call Signs and Frequencies. --Three-character call signs were used in the radio nets between the Air Army and Air Corps. They were changed once during the day and once at night, at which time the frequencies also were changed.
I. Call signs were based on an arbitrary combination of letters and digits and were selected from a call sign list that changed monthly. The Germans were unable to determine whether any definite system was employed for the choosing of the call signs. They did notice however that during the course of a month a call sign used by a given radio station might be repeated without the succession of call signs which had followed at the time of the previous occurrence. Traffic between corps and divisions took place with a periodic change of call signs, but on fixed trequenc1es. This fact aided the intercept tasks of the German Signal Intelligence."

"a. Supply Traffic. --Valuable intelligence was obtained
by the German Signal Intelligence from the interception of [RUSSIAN] radlo traffic which gave details on supplies of fuel, ammunition and other materials. Details of railway movements of
supplies were transmitted by the District Air Base Depots to
thier subordinate airfield battalions. These messages contained information on the destination, number or railway cars being used, amount and type of supplies, and the scheduled time of arrival. When the trains arrived at their destination a message announcing their arrival was sent to the airfield battalions. As a result ot the exploitation of this type of traffic the Germans were able to bomb successfully the stations soon after trainloads or fuel and ammunition had arrived. In the Southern sector a service Command point-to-point radio net reported arrivals of replacement
aircraft tor the 17th, 5th, and 8th Air Armies. These replacement
planes were ferried from the factories to the airfields. Tactical'. units down to regimental level receipted for these planes and supplies, and from interception of these strength reports the Germans were able to estimate the production and distribution rate of Russian planes.
Current fuel and ammunition supplies at airfields were reported on pre-arranged message forms transmitted by the air-field battalions. These messages, since fuel and ammunition supplies were always increased prior to an offensive, afforded the Germans a sund basis for predicting impending Russian offensives.
b. Miscellaneous Air Service Command Traffic. --The
Russian Air Service Command reported by radio on the achievements in salvaging German aircraft which had been shot down or which had been forced to land. These reports afforded
the Germans with a source of informat1on concerning their missing crews, and in many, cases it was possible for the Germans to inform families that the crew members were alive and were Russian prisoners of war. Reports of interrogation of captured German military personnel were also often transmitted and intercepted by the Germans. In some cases as a result of the information contained in these reports, the German Command carried out court martial proceedings in absentia where the intercepted information carried sufficient proof that the German prisoners of war had revealed information of a secret nature. An Air service Command of
the 8th Russian Air Army on the southern front reported routes
to be flown by aircraft in large-scale ground attacks, giving
the time at which the attack would take place. For such attacks the Russian Air Army usually ordered the placing of smoke markers in the frontal area on the day before the attack would take place. These smokemarkers were used by the Russian planes as an orientation point, and not only indicated the proposed direction to be flown, but also corresponded to the direction the ground force would advance. After a study of these smoke signals the German Air Force Slgnial Intelligence learned that the signals were lit
thirty minutes to an hour before the actual time of attack.
Thus, when it was learned that smoke signals had been set
out the German Signal Intelligence could usually inform the Air and Ground forces some twenty-four hours in advance of plans tor a Russian offensive."

Allan125 6th November 2018 21:41

Re: Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations
 
Thanks Bruce, these continue to be fascinating reading, nice to see the other side of the hill, so to speak. Getting Court Martial proceedings against you in absentia, not good, hope nothing happened to the relevant families.

cheers

Allan

Bruce Dennis 7th November 2018 13:03

PREDICTING ALLIED BOMBING ATTACKS
 
4 Attachment(s)
TICOM I-109


Extracts of translation from report of Lt. LUDWIG of Chi. Stelle O.B.d.L

(note: TICOM report is dated post-war but no date is given for original report from LUDWIG.)


All times are GMT +2. The time now is 19:38.

Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.7.2
Copyright ©2000 - 2024, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Copyright ©2004 - 2018, 12oclockhigh.net