Killer Incentives: Relative Position, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots
 

https://home.uchicago.edu/bursztyn/K...s_July2019.pdf

Killer Incentives: Relative Position, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots, 1939-45 Philipp Ager Leonardo Bursztyn* Lukas Leucht Hans-Joachim Voth University of Southern Denmark & CEPR University of Chicago & NBER UC Berkeley Haas School of Business University of Zurich & CEPR

Abstract. What motivates soldiers to fight energetically for their country? We shed new light on the intensive margin of conflict participation by focusing on a novel explanatory channel – concern over relative standing. Using newly-collected data on death rates and aerial victories of more than 5,000 German fighter pilots during World War II, we examine the effects of public recognition on performance and risk-taking. When a particular pilot received public recognition, both the victory rate and the death rate of his former peers increased. The strength of this spillover depends on the intensity of prior interactions and social distance. Our results suggest that an intrinsic concern about relative standing, beyond tangible benefits associated with public recognition,

Re: Killer Incentives: Relative Position, Performance and Risk-Taking among German Fighter Pilots
 

Hi David,

Very interesting research -- thanks much for posting it!

Regards,
Leon Venter