Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

The biggest difficulty of a German invasion of Britain in 1940 would be to bring enough troops to defeat the British Army, even weakened by Dunkirk.

The Kriegsmarine lacked both ships, training and tactics to carry out large landing operations. It gathered in French and Belgian ports hundred of barges, but how these will behave in the Channel in autumn weather loaded with troops, tanks and so on was not assured. Also British bombers (the often overlooked part of the BoB) bombed regularly those ports and disabled a good part of the fleet.

As for an airborne invasion, paratroops won't be able to do much alone. The German paradrop on Crete was a very bloody affair, while the Anglo-Greek defenders were certainly weaker and with a worst equipement that what the British might have thrown against an invasion in 1940. And Crete had only some tens of aircraft to defend itself while Britain had hundreds

Any invasion would probably have been met with the full power of the Royal Navy. It is a fact that British destroyers had retreated from the Channel at the end of July 1940, but they could have been based in ports outside Bf 109 range and still raid the Channel at night or in bad weather days. And the biggers guns could have come too. At the time torpedo bombers were not operational on the German side, and I doubt the Luftwaffe would have been able to stop the Home Fleet going to the Channel. Probably it will have suffered, especially from Stukas, but far less than the German flotilla once it had reached it.

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

I suspect that re-supply of the troops they did get ashore might have proved an impossible problem for them too.

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

Thanks for the corrections.

Ruy's point is that even if Hitler had “won” the BofB, he would still have baulked at the risks of invasion. And that is surely correct. It's why Dizzy Allen in "Who Won the Battle of Britain?” said it was the RN that won it.


Hitler showed little interest in the BofB. He was certain that reality would force Britain to see sense and do a deal with him. Britain was bankrupt and lacked the resources to continue the war into 1941. For example, Britain deliberately ordered more aircraft than it could pay cash for on the calculation that US manufacturers would pressure FDR to cough up the money.


Hitler was correct in his analysis that Britain could not continue the war, but wrong in his conclusion. He failed to understand Churchill would give up everything, including British independence, in preference to dealing with him. And it was more than that. Churchill, the 'Yankee Marlborough', actually welcomed Britain's becoming a US dependent satellite, calling himself FDR's lieutenant, because Churchill dreamed it would lead to his pet project of the union of the English-speaking peoples. This is part of the myth of 1940 that remains unquestioned to this day, that Britain survived 1940 through US assistance (David Cameron actually said that).



When Kutscha thinks, “there is a sickness in British society these days”, then surely dependence on the USA could be its biggest cause. (The recent BBC2 programme, “The Special Relationship?” showed just where it gets Britain).


Nick says, “I know you love doing this "why everyone was wrong" thing”. That's not my motivation. The story of the Few brings tears to most eyes on September 20 because our fathers stood alone and beat off the aggressor, but it's worth remembering the consequence of meeting the cost of standing alone. It was the last thing Britain did as an independent nation. 20/20 hindsight shows there were other options that could have given Britain victory while maintaining its independence, just as today Britain has other options but never seems to consider them.


Tony

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

Tony,

I believe that David Cameron later apologised for his mistake as he was referring to 1941 when America actually joined the War. Also Lend Lease in 1940 only helped air force wise with non-fighter aircraft.

I can vouch for many who did believe that invasion was imminent in 1940, from both sides.

Regards,
David

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

iirc

Didn't high octane fuel and new props (from the USA) have a direct impact for fighter command in the summer of 1940?

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

Hello Ruy
100oct came from USA and British sources, props (and CSUs)were produced in GB by DH and Rotol, but both the 100oct and the prop were US innovations, prop by Hamilton Standard.

Juha

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

Lend/lease only began in March 1941. This is months after the BoB had ended.

Much is made of American shipments of 100 octane fuel, but.....

Consumption of Aviation Spirit
The following figures are for the Air Minstry and are the Average Monthly Consumption

September – November 1939 16,000 tons
Dec 1939 – February 1940 14,000 tons
March 1940 – May 1940 23,000 tons
June 1940 – August 1940 10,000 tons (100 Oct) 26,000 tons (87 Oct)
Sept 1940 – November 1940 15,000 tons (100 Oct) 18,000 tons (87 Oct)

Stocks of 100 Octane
30th September 1939 153,000 tons(b)
27th February 1940 220,000 tons(b)
31st May 1940 294,000 tons(a)
11th July 1940 343,000 tons(b)
31st August 1940 404,000 tons(a)
10th October 1940 424,000 tons(c)
30th November 1940 440,000 tons(a)

source: http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/avi...2-a-20108.html

This is well researched with documentation.

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

unfortunately I don't remember the source, but I read somewhere that a lot of the props were more than just invented by Hamilton standard, but also produced by said firm.

But I can't go further than a weak statement, since I don't have the source.

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

Interesting thread, indeed.

While the planning, HQ conferences and plans for "Barabarossa" are well known, AFAIK, no such things ever popped up regarding the would-be invasion of Great Britain. Am I wrong?

Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
 

Hello Ruy
if you have the Morgan’s & Shacklady’s bible, look pages 53-54. Those Spitfires with DH 2-pitch propellers had their props converted to CS propellers with DH built conversion sets at sqns by DH teams and additionally 20 conversion sets per week were sent to Supermarine from 25 June 40 for the production line. As much of M’s & S ‘s book, this part is straight from old Flight article and tells the story on DH’s POV and forgets Rotol part of the story. But because of the massive installation of CS props to fighters was initiatived in late June 40, I doubt that US propellers had much impact during the BoB.

My impression is, based on fairly limited information, that some Spits, from Dec 39 onwards and some Hurricanes at least from Apr 40 onwards were equipped with Rotol CS props but when it was found out how dangerous opponent 109E was it was decided that all Spits, Hurris and Defiants were to have CS props and because of Rotol’s production capacity wasn’t big enough to satisfy this sudden rise of demand in the very short time allowed it was decided to satisfy most of the demand by DH conversion sets. Its entirely possible that Brits placed an order of CS props also to HS, but when would the props ordered in mid June at earliest arrive to Supermarine factory? I have not read on early Spits with HS props, but that means nothing. CS props are one of those important details on which there are not so much reliable info in aviation literature.

Juha

ADDITION: By summer 40 all new Spits, Hurris and Defiants were delivered from the factory with CS prop, either Rotol or DH, as standard equipment and the crash conversion program at sqns was estimated to be complated by 20 Jul 40 for Spitfires, after which fighters at MUs were to be converted.